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The Library

First we work out what kind
of question you asked.

Most consequential questions are a known kind of problem wearing industry clothing. We identify the kind, say what evidence would actually settle it, and then go and get that evidence: structured interviews with the people who have run it, the published record, and where they are possible, surveys and experiments. This page shows the thinking. The Desk applies it to your decision.

Jump to the 232 entries

Thirty-year-old mathematics, finally computable.

The founder studied formal social science in Northwestern's Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences program from 1989 to 1993, where his game theory professor was Roger Myerson, later a Nobel laureate. Across that program, the economics department, and later the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, he studied under six Nobel laureates. Not one of them gave him an A. The models they taught, and the decision sciences tradition of Kellogg's Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences department that ran alongside, were always the right way to think about a consequential decision. They were rarely usable, because the variables they needed could not be observed at the price of a research engagement. That is what changed. The Library restates those models as research moves, and Vista does the part general AI cannot: it goes and gets the missing evidence.

The shapes a question arrives in

Will people choose it, or pay for it?
Asking them is close to worthless. We make them choose between real alternatives and read what they give up.
Did X cause Y, or would it?
Before-and-after settles nothing on its own. This needs a comparison group, a threshold, or a change in timing.
Will it happen, and when?
Timing is a different question from probability and it is usually the one that decides. It is answered from comparable cases, not opinion.
How will the other side respond?
No survey answers this. It needs people who have sat in that seat and made that call under the same pressure.
Where should scarce things go?
Allocation questions often have exact answers once the constraints are written down honestly, and writing them down is most of the work.
What should we learn first, and when do we stop?
We rank the unknowns by how much each would move the decision, and we tell you when more research will not change it.
Who decides, and how will they decide?
Committees, boards, regulators, and voters follow rules and agendas that shape the outcome as much as the merits do.
Who would actually know?
Not the highest title. The person the information passed through, or the person who solved the same problem in a neighboring industry.
How will it move over time, and how big a bet is it?
Capacity cycles, contagion, tipping points, feedback, and the arithmetic of sizing a position: the pure mathematics that decides whether a plan survives motion.
What do the filed numbers say, and what does the price assume?
A price is a forecast and the statements are the record. We solve for what a buyer today must believe, read how the business actually earns, and name the question the filings cannot answer.

Six steps, stated in advance.

1. State the decision and the money behind it.
Not the topic. The choice, the alternatives, the deadline, and what is at stake.
2. List what has to be true.
The five to seven assumptions the thesis rests on, each as a sentence that could be false.
3. Find the crux.
The one or two assumptions that would flip the decision if they fell. Most theses have one.
4. Rank the unknowns by what they would change.
Then research the top of that list, not the top of yours.
5. Go get the evidence.
Structured interviews with two or three screened Advisors, a sweep of the record, and where the question needs it, a designed survey or experiment. Three to ten days.
6. Say what changed, and whether to stop.
What moved, why, where the transcripts support it, and whether further research is worth doing at all.
Every Vista brief ends with one sentence most research firms cannot write: whether more research would change this decision enough to justify its cost. When the answer is no, we say so, and we say it about our own work.

The Desk draws on the Library, as your decision warrants.

When you describe a decision to the Desk on our homepage, it is matching what you tell it against a library of formal structures a decision can have: the ways a question can turn out to be a known kind of problem. When one fits, the Desk may name the model it comes from, says the move in plain English, asks the one question that matters next, and tells you what evidence would settle it and how a Research Director would go and get it. It works the arithmetic in front of you, with figures you supply or that it retrieves, and for a publicly traded company it runs the financial statement models on the filed numbers. It does not give you a probability of its own, and it does not tell you what to do. It shows you the shape of your question and what it would take to answer it. Most questions do not need a model at all, and the Desk does not invent one. Either way the engagement is the same: the right people interviewed, the record swept, one report with the transcripts. That is the beginning of every engagement, and it is free.

The entries

232 models, mapped.

Each one gives the model as it is taught, what it was originally built to answer, what it earns its keep on now, and the mathematics in one line. Open an entry for the full treatment: where it began, when it applies, what we would ask, what evidence would settle it, where the method breaks, and the sources.

232 of 232

Deciding under uncertainty

Whether to act, wait, stage, or learn more, and how much any of it is worth.

Expected utility and risk aversion

Expected value is not the decision

We separate what the bet is worth on average from what it is worth to you, given the size of the loss you cannot absorb.

Born to answer
Bernoulli, 1738: why nobody pays much to play a game of infinite expected value.
What it does now
Sizing a bet whose worst case is a loss the fund cannot absorb.
The mathematics
EU = sum of p(s) x U(X(s))
The full entry
Where it began

Daniel Bernoulli posed it in 1738 as the St. Petersburg game: a coin is flipped until it lands heads, and the pot doubles with every tail. The expected payout is infinite, and nobody will pay more than a few coins to play. His answer, that the value of money to a person bends, was the birth of utility. Pratt's 1964 paper turned the bend into a measurable number, the coefficient of risk aversion, which is why one investor's acceptable bet is another's ruin.

Why it works now

The bend was always real; what was missing was the distribution to apply it to. A base case with a bull and a bear beside it is not a distribution. Today the interviews can be designed to elicit ranges and tails from operators, the record can be read at scale for how often the bad state actually arrived, and a fund's own constraints can be captured at scoping. The arithmetic is unchanged and still done outside the conversation. What changed is that the inputs are obtainable inside a research engagement instead of being assumed.

When it applies

Two options have similar average payoffs but very different downsides, or a fund is sizing a position whose worst case is permanent impairment.

What we would ask

What is the loss that would actually change how you operate, not the loss that would merely hurt?
Is the downside a bad quarter or a permanent impairment?

What it needs

A distribution of outcomes, not a point estimate; the client's real constraints (mandate, concentration, liquidity, career risk).

How we would get it

Operators and authorities on the outcome distribution, especially the tail; the client's own constraints captured at scoping rather than assumed.

Where it breaks

Probabilities asserted rather than derived. Utility used as a cover for whatever the client already wanted to do.

For example

Two private-credit positions carry the same expected return. One has a small chance of a total loss that would breach a concentration limit and trigger redemptions; the other does not. On average they are twins. To this fund they are not, and the research question becomes the size and shape of that tail, not the average.

The mathematics in fullEV = sum over states of p(s) x X(s); the decision uses EU = sum of p(s) x U(X(s)) with U concave, and the gap between EV and the certainty equivalent is the price of the risk. Taught in

MMSS 300; DECS-430; MECN-451; MECS 550-1

Sources

Pratt (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica 32(1/2), 122. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913738
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185

Decision trees and backward induction

Research is a decision, so is waiting

We lay out the choices and the unknowns in the order they will actually arrive, so that doing it in stages, or finding something out first, shows up as an option with a value.

Born to answer
Raiffa, 1968: a wildcatter deciding whether to drill, or to survey first.
What it does now
Finding the tranche, pilot, or milestone the yes-or-no framing hid.
The mathematics
V = max over branches, solved from the leaves back
The full entry
Where it began

Howard Raiffa's 1968 lectures built decision analysis around a wildcatter deciding whether to drill an oil well. The tree had two branches until Raiffa added a third: pay for a seismic survey first. Drawn that way, the survey is a decision node placed before the drilling decision, and its value is visible on the page. Kellogg still teaches trees with cases of the same shape.

Why it works now

Trees were used sparingly because filling in the chance nodes required data nobody had time to gather. Now the branches an investor actually faces, tranche, pilot, milestone, wait, can be enumerated in one conversation, and the chance nodes populated from comparable cases retrieved from the record and from Advisors who have run the staged version. The Desk draws the tree in words. The Research Director fills it from the interviews. Nobody in the conversation solves it.

When it applies

A single yes-or-no decision is on the table but the client could in fact invest in tranches, run a pilot, wait for a milestone, or research first.

What we would ask

What do you learn between now and the next point at which you could change course?
Is there a version of this where you commit less now and more later?

What it needs

The real sequence of decisions and information events, with what each intermediate result would reveal.

How we would get it

Advisors who have run the staged version of this decision; the record on how comparable milestones resolved.

Where it breaks

The tree omits the branch that mattered, usually wait or stage; the chance-node probabilities are asserted.

For example

A growth investor sees invest twenty-five million or pass. Drawn as a tree, a third branch appears: fund ten now against a retention milestone in two quarters, which is worth more than either original branch precisely because the milestone resolves the crux variable before the rest of the money goes in.

The mathematics in fullAt chance nodes V = sum of p(i) x V(i); at decision nodes V = max over branches; solved from the leaves back, so an information node placed before a decision node raises the value of the tree. Taught in

DECS-433; MECN-451; MMSS 300

Sources

Raiffa, Howard (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty. Addison-Wesley. (book)
Bertsimas, Dimitris and Freund, Robert M. (2004). Data, Models, and Decisions: The Fundamentals of Management Science. Dynamic Ideas. (book)

Value of information

What is the answer worth?

Before we research anything we ask whether any result could change what you do. If no result would, the research is worth nothing, however interesting.

Born to answer
Howard, 1966: what a seismic survey is worth before you drill.
What it does now
Refusing to sell research that no result could act on.
The mathematics
EVPI = E[max U] - max E[U]
The full entry
Where it began

Ronald Howard's 1966 paper gave the idea its name: information is worth the difference between the decision you would make with it and the one you would make without it. The teaching case in that tradition is the same wildcatter, asking how much a seismic survey is worth before drilling, and the answer is sometimes zero, because no survey result would change the decision to drill.

Why it works now

The idea was easy to state and hard to use, because it requires knowing what each possible answer would do to the decision, and that took a modeling exercise nobody commissioned. Today the Desk can work a client's decision back to the questions whose answers would flip it in the first conversation, and the whole engagement can be organized around those questions instead of around a topic. This is the single most commercially important idea in the Library, and it now costs a conversation rather than a study.

When it applies

A client has a list of open questions and is about to work through them in order, or is proposing research that could not change the decision whatever it found.

What we would ask

Which result, if we came back with it, would make you not do this?
And which would make you do it larger?

What it needs

The decision and its alternatives stated explicitly; the plausible results of each proposed study and what each would trigger.

How we would get it

This is scoping, not fieldwork: the Research Director works the decision back to the questions whose answers would flip it, then designs the study around those.

Where it breaks

The decision is already made and the study is theater; the set of actions was drawn too narrow for anything to flip.

For example

An investment team has forty diligence questions on a software company. Thirty-one of them cannot change the decision at any plausible answer. Two can. The engagement becomes those two, and the report says so.

The mathematics in fullEVPI = E[max over a of U(a, s)] - max over a of E[U(a, s)]; a real study is worth EVSI = E over results of [max over a of E[U | result]] minus the no-study value, and is pursued only when EVSI exceeds its cost. Taught in

MECN-451; DECS-433; MMSS 300

Sources

Howard (1966). Information Value Theory. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 2(1), 22-26. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSSC.1966.300074
Howard (1988). Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise. Management Science 34(6), 679-695. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.34.6.679
Raiffa, Howard (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty. Addison-Wesley. (book)

Learn the math
The question

A wildcatter has the lease on a prospect and a rig available next month. Her geologist, who has been right often enough to be worth listening to, puts the chance of oil at 30%. The well will cost $2 million whether it finds anything or not; if it finds oil, the oil is worth $10 million. Then a seismic contractor calls. For $500,000 his crew will shoot the prospect and tell her whether the rock looks good or bad. His surveys are right about 80% of the time. Should she pay?

Most people answer by asking whether the survey would tell her something she does not know. It would. That is the wrong test. The right one, and the subject of this lesson, is whether anything the survey could say would make her do something different. The same question decides whether an investment team should spend a month on forty diligence questions, and it usually turns out that most of them could not change the decision at any plausible answer.

The idea in one paragraph

Information has no value of its own. It is worth something only because it can change what you do, and it is worth exactly the improvement in your decisions that it buys, averaged over everything it might say, before you know what it will say. If every possible answer would leave you doing what you were going to do anyway, the information is worth nothing, however interesting, however accurate, however much it narrows the uncertainty. Information is a steering wheel: it is worth exactly the turns it can make you take. Ronald Howard put this into one equation in 1966, and from it come two limits a person can compute before spending a cent: what a perfect answer would be worth, which no real study can beat, and what a particular imperfect study is worth, which is what you should be willing to pay for it.

The math, step by step

The decision without any information. Write p for the chance of oil, V for what the oil is worth and C for the cost of the well. All money is in $ millions. Drilling is worth, on average, (p x V) - C: with chance p you get V, and you pay C either way. Walking away is worth 0. So drill if and only if (p x V) - C > 0, that is, if p > C / V. Here C / V = 2 / 10 = 0.2: drill whenever the chance of oil is above 20%. With p = 0.3, drilling is worth (0.3 x 10) - 2 = 1.0, and she drills. Call that V_none = 1.0: the best she can do knowing only what she knows today.

The decision with perfect information. Now imagine a clairvoyant who will tell her, before she decides, whether the oil is there. If he says oil, she drills and makes 10 - 2 = 8. If he says dry, she walks away and makes 0. She does not know yet which he will say, but she knows he will say oil 30% of the time. So, judged today, deciding with the clairvoyant is worth (0.3 x 8) + (0.7 x 0) = 2.4. Call that V_perfect.

The expected value of perfect information. The clairvoyant is worth the difference:

EVPI = V_perfect - V_none = 2.4 - 1.0 = 1.4

$1.4 million. Look at where that number comes from. In the 30% of worlds with oil, the clairvoyant changes nothing: she would have drilled anyway. All of his value is in the 70% of worlds where the hole is dry, where he saves her the $2 million: 0.7 x 2 = 1.4. That is the general shape. Perfect information is worth the chance that your current choice is wrong, times what that mistake costs.

The general formula. Write the states of the world as s (oil or dry), your possible actions as a (drill or walk), and U(a, s) for what action a pays in state s. E[...] means the average over the states, each weighted by its chance, so E[U(drill, s)] = (0.3 x 8) + (0.7 x (-2)) = 1.0. Without information you pick the single action with the best average: V_none = max over a of E[U(a, s)]. With perfect information you pick the best action in each state, then average: V_perfect = E[max over a of U(a, s)]. So

EVPI = E[max over a of U(a, s)] - max over a of E[U(a, s)]

Read it in words: the average of the best minus the best of the averages. Why can it never be negative? Let a* be the action you would take without information. In every state, the best action pays at least as much as a* does, so max over a of U(a, s) >= U(a*, s) state by state. Average both sides over the states and the left side is V_perfect and the right side is V_none.

An imperfect test, and Bayes' rule. A real survey does not see the oil; it reads the rock and is sometimes wrong. Say it reads "good" 80% of the time when there is oil and "bad" 80% of the time when the hole is dry. To use it she needs the chance of oil after each reading, and the clearest way to get it is to count. Picture 100 prospects like hers. 30 hold oil and 70 are dry. The survey reads good on 80% of the 30, which is 24, and on 20% of the 70, which is 14. So it reads good 38 times out of 100, and 24 of those 38 hold oil. Writing P(oil | good) for the chance of oil given a good reading:

P(oil | good) = 24 / 38 = 0.6316
P(oil | bad)  = 6 / 62  = 0.0968

That is Bayes' rule, P(oil | good) = P(good | oil) P(oil) / P(good), done with whole prospects instead of symbols. Notice that the survey's 80% is not the chance of oil after a good reading. That chance is 63%, because so many of the good readings come from the many dry holes.

The decision after each reading. After a good reading, drilling is worth (0.6316 x 10) - 2 = 4.316: drill. After a bad one, (0.0968 x 10) - 2 = -1.032: walk away. Before the survey is shot, she knows it will read good 38% of the time and bad 62% of the time. So deciding after the survey is worth

V_test = (0.38 x 4.316) + (0.62 x 0) = 1.64

The expected value of sample information. The survey is worth V_test less what she could do without it:

EVSI = 1.64 - 1.0 = 0.64

$640,000. At $500,000 the survey is worth buying; at $700,000 it would not be. And the same reasoning as before says where the value lives: the survey changes her decision only on a bad reading, so its worth is what that reading saves. On the 62 bad readings she avoids the $2 million well (1.24), but six of those 62 prospects held oil she now walks away from, which costs 0.06 x 10 = 0.6. And 1.24 - 0.6 = 0.64.

In general, with r for the result of the study:

EVSI = E over r of [max over a of E[U(a, s) | r]] - max over a of E[U(a, s)]

Two facts follow, each in one line. EVSI is never negative: sorting the 100 prospects by their reading does not change what drilling all 100 would have paid, so averaging the payoff of a* across the results gives back its plain average, V_none, and after each result the best action does at least as well as a*. And EVSI is never more than EVPI: after each result, choosing one action for all the states still possible can do no better than choosing the best action in each of them. So the clairvoyant's $1.4 million is a ceiling on what any survey of this prospect can be worth, however good.

When a test is worth exactly nothing. Now take a weaker survey, right 60% of the time. Count the 100 prospects again: it reads good on 18 of the 30 with oil and on 28 of the 70 dry ones, so 46 good readings and 54 bad, of which 12 hold oil. After a bad reading the chance of oil is 12 / 54 = 0.2222, still above the 20% line, and drilling is still worth (0.2222 x 10) - 2 = 0.222. She drills whatever the survey says. Its value is zero. Not small: zero. Yet it moves her odds from 30% to 39% or 22%. It is informative and worthless at once, a steering wheel not connected to the axle.

0.00.40.81.21.650%60%70%80%90%100%How often the survey reads the rock correctlyWorth of the survey, $ millionperfect information, $1.4 millionworth nothing below 63%80%: $0.64 million
A survey is worth nothing until it is good enough to change the decision. For this prospect a reading of "bad" stops the drilling only if the survey is right at least 63% of the time; below that, it moves the odds and changes nothing. At 80% it is worth $0.64 million, and no survey, however good, is worth more than the $1.4 million of a perfect answer.

For this prospect the line falls at 63% accuracy: below it, a bad reading never pulls the chance of oil under 20%, and the survey cannot change the decision. Above it, the survey's worth rises in a straight line to the $1.4 million of a perfect answer.

Where information is worth most. Change the prior instead. If the geologist were sure there was oil, or sure there was none, a clairvoyant would tell her nothing she would act on. Below the 20% line she walks away, and a clairvoyant is worth the oil he finds, p x 8; above it she drills, and he is worth the dry holes he spares her, (1 - p) x 2. The two meet at 20%, where both come to $1.6 million. Information is worth most where she is closest to indifferent.

0.00.40.81.21.60%20%40%60%80%100%Chance of oil before any testWorth of the information, $ millionpeak at 20%: $1.6 millionour prospect, 30%: $1.4 millionA perfect answer (EVPI)The 80% seismic survey (EVSI)
Information is worth most where you are closest to a coin toss between the actions. For this well the line is a 20% chance of oil: there a perfect answer is worth $1.6 million. Near certainty either way it is worth little, because you would make the same choice whatever it said.
A worked example

The Library's own example is the one that matters in practice. An investment team has forty diligence questions about a software company and is about to work through them in order. Apply the steering wheel test to each one: is there an answer this question could plausibly come back with that would make the team walk away, or invest a different amount? Suppose thirty-one of the forty fail the test. Whatever the customer interviews say about the user interface, whatever the reference checks say about the founder's management style, the team would invest; those questions are the 60% survey. Two of them pass it clearly: if the largest customer is not renewing, or if the gross margin depends on a hosting discount that expires next year, the team would not invest at the price. The other seven are worth a quick look to see which side of the line they fall on. The engagement becomes those two questions and that look, and the report says so.

You can put numbers on any one of them with nothing more than the arithmetic above. Suppose the team gives a 25% chance that the largest customer is leaving, that the investment is worth $6 million more than its cost if the customer stays and $15 million less if it leaves. Investing is worth (0.75 x 6) - (0.25 x 15) = 0.75, so without the answer they invest. A perfect answer would save the $15 million loss in the 25% of worlds where the customer leaves: EVPI = 0.25 x 15 = 3.75. That is the most the whole effort spent answering that question could be worth, and it tells the team how hard to work for it. For one of the thirty-one, the EVPI is zero, and no amount of work changes that.

The usual mistakes
  1. Valuing information by how much it tells you. Symptom: a study chosen because it is precise, or new, or because it "reduces uncertainty". The 60% survey reduces uncertainty and is worth nothing. Fix: before commissioning anything, write down what you will do after each possible result. If the actions are all the same, stop.
  2. The wrong baseline. Symptom: a study valued against doing nothing instead of against the best decision without it. Deciding after the 80% survey is worth $1.64 million, and it is tempting to call that the survey's value. But she could already make $1.0 million without it. The survey is worth the difference, $0.64 million. Fix: the comparison is always with your best choice given what you know today.
  3. Reading the test backwards. Symptom: "the survey is right 80% of the time, so a good reading means an 80% chance of oil." It means 63%, because the 70 dry prospects produce 14 false good readings. Fix: count a hundred cases, as above, every time.
  4. Adding the values of studies. Symptom: two surveys valued at twice one survey. A second independent 80% survey, shot alongside the first, raises the value of deciding from $0.64 million to $0.80 million: it adds $0.16 million, a quarter of what the first was worth. (With two good readings the chance of oil is 87%, with one of each it is back at 30%, with two bad it is 2.6%; she drills unless both read bad. Count 1,000 prospects: both read bad on 460 of them, and 12 of those 460 hold oil, so deciding after both surveys is worth (0.46 x 2) - (0.012 x 10) = 0.80 more than drilling blind.) The second study mostly tells her what the first already did, and no pile of studies can pass the $1.4 million of a perfect answer. Fix: value each study given the others, and stop when the next one adds less than it costs.
  5. Leaving out what waiting costs. Symptom: research that is worth its fee and still a bad idea. If the survey takes six months and the rig, or the price, or a competitor's offer for the lease, will not wait, the delay is a cost like the fee. Fix: count it in the price of the study.
Where the model breaks

The Library's entry names two ways this goes wrong. The first is that the decision is already made, and the study is theater: if no result would actually be allowed to stop the drilling, the arithmetic of EVSI is beside the point, because its every branch assumes the decision-maker will act on what is found. The honest question, the entry's own, is "which result, if we came back with it, would make you not do this?" If the answer is none, the research is worth nothing to that person. The second is a set of actions drawn too narrow. If the wildcatter's only choices are drill or walk away, the 60% survey is worthless; if she could also sell half the lease to a partner, a bad reading might change that choice, and the survey might be worth something after all. A study can look worthless only because the menu was too short.

Two more limits belong beside them. The numbers are only as honest as the probabilities fed in: a geologist who says 30% to sound confident has already decided the answer. And the method weighs money as money; for a wildcatter who would be ruined by a dry hole, losses that end the game count for more than their average, and the survey's worth to her has to be computed with that in the payoffs, not read off the expected money. This lesson describes a calculation, not advice about any investment.

Check yourself

1. A study can come back with three results, and after every one of them you would still go ahead. What is it worth?

Answer: nothing. Its value is the improvement in the decision it buys, and it buys none. It may be worth reading for other reasons, but it is not worth paying for to make this decision.

2. Why can no imperfect study of the wildcatter's prospect ever be worth more than $1.4 million?

Answer: because after any reading she still has to choose one action for all the worlds the reading leaves possible, and a clairvoyant lets her choose the best action in each world separately. Doing the best for each world can never be worse than doing the best on average, so the clairvoyant's $1.4 million is a ceiling.

3. Suppose the geologist had said 15% instead of 30%. With the same well and the same 80% survey, what is perfect information worth, and what is the survey worth?

Answer: at 15% the well is worth (0.15 x 10) - 2 = -0.5, so without information she walks away. A clairvoyant changes her mind only when there is oil, worth 0.15 x 8 = 1.2. For the survey, count 100 prospects: 15 with oil, 85 dry; it reads good on 12 of the 15 and 17 of the 85, 29 in all. After a good reading the chance of oil is 12 / 29 = 0.4138, and drilling is worth (0.4138 x 10) - 2 = 2.138, so she drills; after a bad one it is 3 / 71, about 4%, and she still walks. The survey is worth 0.29 x 2.138 = 0.62, $620,000. Now the survey's value is in the good readings, not the bad ones, because now it is the good reading that changes her mind.

Teach me more
  • DA 2. The Value of Perfect Information, George E. Apostolakis, MIT OpenCourseWare, ESD.72 Engineering Risk Benefit Analysis, Spring 2007 (14 slides). The clairvoyant worked carefully for a land-lease decision: why a perfect source leaves a posterior of 1 whatever the prior, why the tree is redrawn with the chance node before the decision, and EVPI as the ceiling on what any source is worth ($195,000 less $150,000 is $45,000). The lecture before it, DA 1, has the imperfect survey.
  • Oil Wildcatter's Problem with Sounding Test, SAS/OR documentation, PROC DTREE (one page of the procedure's examples). The classic wildcatter with three states (dry, wet, soaking), a test with a full table of likelihoods, and a $60,000 test whose value of information comes to about $40,100 ($180,100 with the test against $140,000 without), so the test is not worth buying. It is a software example rather than a lesson and does not show the Bayes step, which makes it a good exercise: work its posteriors by counting, as above.
  • Decision Analysis for the Professional, Peter McNamee and John Celona, 4th edition, SmartOrg (a free book under a Creative Commons license, 357 pages). Read the sections "The Value of Perfect Information" (chapter 3) and "The Value of Imperfect Information" (chapter 4): the practitioner's version, with the tree reordered and the warning that the value of learning two uncertainties at once is not the sum of the value of learning each alone.

The papers behind the Library entry are Howard, "Information Value Theory", IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, 1966; Howard, "Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise", Management Science, 1988; and Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty, 1968, where decision trees and the value of information are worked at length.

Sensitivity and analysis ranking

The one question to answer next

We rank the unknowns by how much each would move the decision, per dollar and per day, and start with the top of that list rather than the top of yours.

Born to answer
Howard, 1988: spend the budget on the uncertainties the decision turns on.
What it does now
Ranking forty diligence questions by what each would change per week.
The mathematics
q* = argmax (EVSI - cost) / time
The full entry
Where it began

Howard's 1988 account of decision analysis in practice describes the cycle used at large companies: identify the uncertainties, find which ones the decision is sensitive to, and spend the analysis budget on those, resolving the most valuable first. The ranking, not the analysis, was the contribution; it told the team where to stop reading and start asking.

Why it works now

The ranking used to require a quantitative model of the decision before any research began, so it was reserved for the largest capital projects. Now a client's forty open questions can be laid against the decision in one sitting, each scored by what its plausible answers would change per week of effort, and the plan can be re-ranked as each answer arrives. The Research Director does the ranking; the Desk shows the client that it will be done, which is often the first thing that distinguishes Vista from a call.

When it applies

Time or budget will not cover every open question, or the client is spending on the questions that are easiest to answer rather than the ones that matter.

What we would ask

If you could resolve only one uncertainty before the committee meets, which one would you choose, and why that one?
What does it cost, in time as well as money, to answer each of the others?

What it needs

For each candidate question: what it would cost, how long it would take, and what its plausible answers would do to the decision.

How we would get it

A ranked research plan is the first deliverable; the fieldwork follows the ranking, and the plan is re-ranked as answers arrive.

Where it breaks

The ranking is done by interest rather than decision leverage; the cost of the slow answers is ignored.

For example

Eight enterprise-customer interviews, a competitor pricing study, more market-size work, and one former executive. Ranked by what each could change per week of effort, the former executive goes first, the customers second, and the market-size work is dropped because no plausible result would move anything.

The mathematics in fullChoose q* = argmax over studies q of (EVSI(q) - cost(q)) / time(q); re-solve after each result, since the value of the remaining studies changes as beliefs move. Taught in

MECN-451; MECS 560-1

Sources

Howard (1988). Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise. Management Science 34(6), 679-695. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.34.6.679
Kantorovich (1960). Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production. Management Science 6(4), 366-422. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.366

Optimal stopping

When to stop paying for research

We tell you when further research is unlikely to change the decision enough to justify its cost, including research from us.

Born to answer
Wald, 1945: stop inspecting once the evidence crosses a threshold.
What it does now
Telling a client to stop paying for research, including ours.
The mathematics
Stop when the best remaining net VOI is at or below zero
The full entry
Where it began

Abraham Wald developed sequential analysis during the Second World War for inspecting munitions: instead of testing a fixed number of items, stop as soon as the accumulated evidence crosses a threshold either way. It cut inspection effort by a large fraction and was classified until 1945. Bellman's dynamic programming later gave the general form: stop when the value of continuing falls below the value of acting.

Why it works now

A research firm paid by the hour has no reason to compute a stopping rule and every reason not to. A firm on a fixed fee can state the rule in advance and mean it. What AI adds is the ability to track, across every interview and document, whether the recommendation is still moving, so that saturation is observed rather than declared. The stopping sentence in a Vista brief is Wald's rule applied to a client's money.

When it applies

The client is on the third round of diligence and each round moves the picture less; or a firm paid by the hour keeps finding one more source.

What we would ask

What did the last round of work change about the decision?
Is there any remaining question whose plausible answers would flip it?

What it needs

A record of what each round of research changed; the plausible range of the remaining unknowns.

How we would get it

Stated as a rule at scoping: the engagement ends when the recommendation is stable across the plausible results of every remaining study, and the report says so in one sentence.

Where it breaks

Self-serving in either direction: hourly firms never stop, fixed-fee firms stop early. The defense is stating the rule before the work starts.

For example

After the customer interviews and the former executive, the thesis is fragile on one variable that no obtainable evidence will resolve before the deadline. The honest sentence is that more research will not settle it, that the decision is being made under that uncertainty, and that the client should stop paying, including paying us.

The mathematics in fullStop when U(stop | state) is at least -cost(q) + E[V(state after q)] for every remaining study q; equivalently when the best remaining net value of information is at or below zero. Taught in

MECS 560-2; MECN-451

Sources

Wald (1945). Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 16(2), 117-186. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177731118
Bellman (1954). The theory of dynamic programming. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60(6), 503-515. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1954-09848-8

Real options

Waiting has a value, and sometimes a price

We work out whether the next quarter resolves a variable this decision turns on, in which case waiting is worth something, and whether the window will still be open, in which case it is not.

Born to answer
McDonald and Siegel, 1986: an irreversible investment worth waiting on.
What it does now
Whether the next quarter resolves the crux, and whether the window stays open.
The mathematics
Invest only when V exceeds a threshold V* above cost
The full entry
Where it began

McDonald and Siegel's 1986 paper asked when a firm should make an irreversible investment whose value fluctuates, and found that the usual rule, invest when value exceeds cost, is wrong. The right rule waits until value exceeds cost by a wide margin, in their calibration roughly double, because investing kills the option to invest later on better information. Dixit and Pindyck built the real-options field on it.

Why it works now

The model needs to know how fast the uncertainty resolves and whether the window stays open, which used to be guesses. Both are now researchable: operators can say how quickly the crux variable actually clears in their industry, and the record shows how often comparable windows closed. The Desk asks the two questions that decide it, what would you know in six months and who can take this away from you meanwhile, and the engagement answers them.

When it applies

An irreversible commitment under high uncertainty: a plant, an acquisition, a platform bet, a market entry; or the reverse, a client waiting for certainty that will never arrive while a competitor moves.

What we would ask

What would you know in six months that you do not know now?
Who else can take this decision away from you in the meantime?

What it needs

How much of the uncertainty resolves with time versus never; the reversibility of the commitment; the competitive clock.

How we would get it

Operators on how fast the crux variable actually resolves in this industry; the record on comparable windows that closed.

Where it breaks

The option is illusory because the seller walks or the competitor enters; or the uncertainty is permanent and waiting only delays.

For example

A buyer can close a carve-out now or wait for the target's next two quarters of results. The wait is worth a great deal if those quarters reveal whether the churn is structural, and worth nothing if a strategic bidder is already in the data room.

The mathematics in fullInvest now only when value V exceeds a threshold V* strictly above the cost I; the gap V* - I grows with the volatility of V and with the irreversibility of I, and shrinks to zero when the option can be taken away. Taught in

DECS-433; MECN-451

Sources

McDonald, Siegel (1986). The Value of Waiting to Invest. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4), 707. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884175
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. (book)

Learn the math
The question

A developer owns a lot beside a highway and can put up a cold-storage warehouse on it for $10 million. Tenants would pay about $1 million a year today. Next spring a large food distributor decides whether to open a regional hub down the road. If it comes, rents jump to $1.5 million a year and stay there; if it goes elsewhere, they fall to $0.5 million and stay there. The odds are even. Money costs 10% a year. The spreadsheet says build: the warehouse is worth $11 million and costs $10 million, a profit of $1 million in today's money.

Her banker says the same. Her father, who built warehouses for forty years, says wait for the distributor. He cannot explain why in a way the spreadsheet accepts, and he is right. Waiting a year is worth almost three times as much as building now. This lesson is about why, how to measure it, and when the father would be wrong: when waiting only delays, and when someone else builds on the lot next door while she waits.

The idea in one paragraph

Building is a one-way door. Before you walk through it you can still choose; after, you cannot, and the $10 million is gone whatever the news turns out to be. Standing at the door therefore has a value of its own, the right to walk through later on better information, and walking through kills that right. So the correct rule is not "go when the payoff exceeds the cost" but "go when the payoff exceeds the cost by enough to pay for the right you are giving up." How much is enough depends on three things: how much the news can still change your mind, what you give up each year by not having built (the rent you are not collecting), and whether someone with a key to the same door may walk through it first. Robert McDonald and Daniel Siegel turned this into a formula in 1986, and Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck built a field on it.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the spreadsheet. All money is in $ millions. If she builds today she collects this year's rent of 1.0 now, and from next year on a rent that is 1.5 or 0.5 with even odds, 1.0 on average, every year forever. A payment of R a year forever, starting next year, is worth R / r today at interest rate r (the sum R/1.1 + R/1.1^2 + ... is a geometric series that adds up to R / 0.1). So

V today = 1.0 + (1.0 / 0.1) = 1.0 + 10 = 11
NPV of building now = 11 - 10 = 1.0

NPV is net present value: what the warehouse is worth today less what it costs. The textbook rule says build whenever it is positive.

Step 2: the same number, world by world. Split today's decision by what the distributor will do. Next year, a warehouse in the high world is worth 1.5 + (1.5 / 0.1) = 16.5 (that year's rent plus the rest forever); in the low world, 0.5 + (0.5 / 0.1) = 5.5. Brought back a year, those are 16.5 / 1.1 = 15 and 5.5 / 1.1 = 5. So, as of today:

build now, high world:  1.0 + 15 - 10 =  6.0
build now, low world:   1.0 +  5 - 10 = -4.0
average:  (0.5 x 6.0) + (0.5 x (-4.0)) = 1.0

Same 1.0. But look at the low world: she would be stuck with a $10 million building worth $5 million.

Step 3: wait a year. If she waits, she sees the news before she spends. In the high world she builds next year and has 16.5 - 10 = 6.5 then, which is 6.5 / 1.1 = 5.909 today. In the low world she does not build: 5.5 is less than 10, so she keeps her money and has 0.

wait:  (0.5 x 5.909) + (0.5 x 0) = 2.9545

Waiting is worth $2.95 million against $1.0 million for building now. The difference, $1.95 million, is the value of the option to wait, and building today throws it away.

Step 4: where the $1.95 million comes from. Compare the worlds one at a time. In the high world, waiting costs a little: a year's rent of 1.0, less the 0.909 she saves by paying the 10 a year later (10 - (10 / 1.1) = 0.909), so 6.0 - 5.909 = 0.091. In the low world, waiting saves her the whole loss of 4.0. So

value of waiting = (0.5 x 4.0) - (0.5 x 0.091) = 2.0 - 0.045 = 1.9545

Waiting costs about $91,000 in the good world and saves $4 million in the bad one. All of the value lives in the bad world, in the mistake she does not make. This is the same shape as the value of information: news is worth what it lets you avoid doing.

Step 5: the hurdle. How cheap would the building have to be before building today beats waiting? Call the cost I and set the two equal:

11 - I = (0.5 x (16.5 - I)) / 1.1
11 - I = 7.5 - (0.4545 x I)
3.5 = 0.5455 x I
I = 6.42

(The equation assumes she still would not build in the low world at that cost, and she would not: 5.5 is below 6.42.) She should build today only if the warehouse costs less than $6.42 million, that is, only if it is worth at least 11 / 6.42 = 1.71 times its cost. The spreadsheet's hurdle is 1.0 times. The extra 0.71 is the price of the one-way door.

Step 6: the continuous version. Real projects do not wait for one announcement; their value wanders a little every day. McDonald and Siegel asked the question in that setting. Write V for the value of the finished project (what it would be worth if built now), I for the cost, r for the interest rate, and delta for the cash the finished project would pay each year as a fraction of its value, the rent you forgo while you wait. A rule of the form "invest the first time V reaches some level V*" is the natural candidate, and the question is which V*.

First, without any uncertainty. Suppose V grows smoothly at mu = r - delta a year: an asset whose whole return is the interest rate r, and which pays out delta of that in cash, grows by the difference. (Every asset here earns r on average, with no premium for risk; that is the convention under which the formula holds exactly.) Interest now compounds continuously, so a dollar due in T years is worth e^(-r x T) today, the smooth twin of 1 / 1.1^T. Starting from V, the project reaches V* after T years, where V x e^(mu x T) = V*, so T = ln(V* / V) / mu, and

e^(-r x T) = e^(-(r / mu) x ln(V* / V)) = (V / V*)^(r / mu)

Call the exponent beta. The plan "invest at V*" is worth (V* - I) x (V / V*)^beta today. Today's V is fixed, so choosing V* means maximizing (V* - I) x V*^(-beta). Differentiate with the product rule and set the result to zero:

V*^(-beta) - (beta x (V* - I) x V*^(-beta - 1)) = 0

Multiply through by V*^(beta + 1), which is positive:

V* - (beta x (V* - I)) = 0
V* = (beta / (beta - 1)) x I

That is the whole result. Everything else is finding beta. With r = 4% and mu = 2%, beta = 2 and V* = 2 x I: even with no uncertainty, a growing project is worth waiting for, because a dollar of cost spent later is cheaper than one spent now. A shorter road gives the same answer, as a check: each year of waiting saves the interest on the cost, r x I, and forgoes the project's payout, delta x V, so wait while V is below (r / delta) x I. With r = 4% and delta = 2% that is 2 x I, and in general beta / (beta - 1) = r / (r - mu) = r / delta. But if delta = r, the project does not grow, beta is infinite, the multiple is 1, and the rule is the spreadsheet's: invest the moment V reaches I.

Now with uncertainty. Let V keep the same average drift but jitter with volatility sigma (the standard deviation of its yearly percentage change). One fact from the calculus of random motion has to be borrowed here, and it can be stated plainly: when V jitters, the average change of a curved function F(V) picks up an extra term, 0.5 x sigma^2 x V^2 x F''(V) per year. The jitter pays off on a curve that bends upward, the way a gamble's average beats its middle. The value of the right to invest, F(V), pays no cash, so its average growth must equal the interest it ought to earn, r x F:

(mu x V x F'(V)) + (0.5 x sigma^2 x V^2 x F''(V)) = r x F(V)

Try F(V) = A x V^beta. Then V x F' = beta x F and V^2 x F'' = beta x (beta - 1) x F, every F cancels, and what is left is a quadratic for beta:

(0.5 x sigma^2 x beta x (beta - 1)) + ((r - delta) x beta) - r = 0

The quadratic has one negative root and one positive. The negative one would make F enormous as V fell toward zero, where the right to build a worthless project should be worth nothing, so it is thrown out. The positive one is above 1 whenever delta > 0: at beta = 1 the left side is (r - delta) - r = -delta, below zero, and a parabola that opens upward and is negative at 1 crosses zero to the right of it. With sigma = 0 the equation is linear and gives beta = r / mu, the deterministic answer, which is a good check. Below the threshold F(V) = A x V^beta, and at V* she builds, so the right is worth exactly V* - I there: A = (V* - I) / V*^beta and F(V) = (V* - I) x (V / V*)^beta, the same form as before with the new beta ((V / V*)^beta is again the average discount for the random time V takes to reach V*). So the calculus above goes through unchanged and the threshold is still V* = (beta / (beta - 1)) x I.

The numbers. Take r = delta = 4%, so the project does not drift at all, and sigma = 20%. Then 0.5 x sigma^2 = 0.02 and the quadratic is

(0.02 x beta x (beta - 1)) - 0.04 = 0
beta^2 - beta - 2 = 0
(beta - 2) x (beta + 1) = 0,  so beta = 2
V* = (2 / (2 - 1)) x I = 2 x I

Without uncertainty this project would be built the moment it was worth its cost. With 20% volatility it should wait until it is worth twice its cost. All of that gap is the value of waiting to learn. McDonald and Siegel's own calibrations put the threshold at about this size, and it surprised a profession that had taught "NPV greater than zero" for a generation.

Below the threshold. The right to invest is worth F(V) = (V* - I) x (V / V*)^beta. With I = 1: a project worth exactly its cost is worth (2 - 1) x (1 / 2)^2 = 0.25 as an option, a quarter of the cost, though its NPV is zero. A project worth 1.5 has an NPV of 0.5 and an option value of (2 - 1) x (1.5 / 2)^2 = 0.5625: waiting is still better. At V* = 2 the option and the NPV are both 1, and the slope of the option, beta x (V* - I) / V* = 2 x 1 / 2 = 1, is the slope of V - I. The curve touches the line and does not cross it. That touch, called smooth pasting, is what the derivative set to zero above was finding.

-0.50.00.51.01.50.51.01.52.02.5Value of the finished project, V (cost I = 1)Worth today, in units of the costV = I: the option is worth 0.25V* = 2: invest hereWorth of the right to invest, F(V)Worth of investing now, V - I
The right to invest is worth more than investing, until the two meet. With these numbers a project worth exactly its cost is still worth a quarter of that cost as an option, and the right moment to commit is when the project is worth twice what it costs. There the curve touches the line, with the same slope.

The neighbor with a key. Suppose a rival may take the opportunity, arriving at rate lambda a year, and if the rival comes first the right to invest is simply gone (once you have built, you are safe). In any short stretch of time dt there is now a chance lambda x dt of losing the whole of F, an average loss of lambda x F a year that the right's growth must make up on top of the interest, so r in the last term becomes r + lambda:

(0.5 x sigma^2 x beta x (beta - 1)) + ((r - delta) x beta) - (r + lambda) = 0

At sigma = 20% and r = delta = 4%, a rival arriving at 10% a year gives beta = 3.19 and a threshold of 1.46 times the cost; at 50% a year, beta = 5.72 and 1.21 times. As lambda grows, the multiple falls toward 1 and the spreadsheet's rule comes back. That is the entry's sentence in numbers: the gap grows with volatility and shrinks to nothing when the option can be taken away.

How the bar rises with volatility, all at r = delta = 4% and no rival:

volatility 10%:  beta = 3.37,  V* = 1.42 x I
volatility 20%:  beta = 2.00,  V* = 2.00 x I
volatility 30%:  beta = 1.57,  V* = 2.76 x I
volatility 40%:  beta = 1.37,  V* = 3.73 x I
1x2x3x4x0%10%20%30%40%50%Volatility of the project value, a yearThreshold V* as a multiple of the cost20%: twice the costNo rivalRival arrives at 10% a yearRival arrives at 50% a year
The more the value swings, the higher the bar, because a commitment you cannot undo throws away more information. A rival who may take the opportunity pulls the bar back down: the option is worth less when it may not be there next year.
A worked example: the warehouse, three ways

The warehouse above is a teaching case; its numbers are round assumptions, chosen so every step can be checked by hand, and its two-world shape follows the widget factory in chapter 2 of Dixit and Pindyck's book. Three versions of it carry the whole lesson.

With the distributor's decision pending, building now is worth $1.0 million and waiting $2.95 million. Wait.

With nothing to learn. Suppose instead everyone knows the rent will be $1 million a year forever. Waiting a year gives (11 - 10) / 1.1 = 0.909, less than the 1.0 of building now. The father is wrong here: there is no news to wait for, and waiting only gives up a year's rent of $1 million to save about $909,000 of interest. Uncertainty that will never resolve is not a reason to wait.

With a rival. Suppose a competing developer may build on the next lot during the year, and if it does, the distributor's business goes there and her opportunity is gone. With chance q of that, waiting is worth (1 - q) x 2.9545. Waiting beats building now while (1 - q) x 2.9545 > 1.0, that is, while q < 1 - (1.0 / 2.9545) = 0.66. At a 50% chance of the rival, waiting is worth 0.5 x 2.9545 = 1.48: still wait. At 75%, 0.25 x 2.9545 = 0.74: build now. The entry's two questions are exactly these two numbers: what would you know in six months (the spread between 16.5 and 5.5), and who can take this away from you meanwhile (q).

The usual mistakes
  1. "NPV is positive, so go." Symptom: a project with a modest positive NPV and a big pending piece of news gets approved this quarter. Fix: compute the value of waiting, not just of going. The warehouse's NPV of $1.0 million hid a better plan worth $2.95 million.
  2. Treating any uncertainty as a reason to wait. Symptom: "the market is uncertain, let's hold off," year after year. Fix: ask what specifically will be known in six months that is not known now. If the answer is nothing, waiting is the no-news warehouse: it only delays.
  3. Forgetting the clock. Symptom: the option is valued as if it will still be there next year when a competitor, a seller with other bidders, or a lapsing license may take it. Fix: put a number on q or lambda. Above about a 66% chance of losing it, the warehouse should be built now.
  4. Forgetting what waiting costs. Symptom: a model that says wait forever. Set delta = 0 in the quadratic and beta = 1, so the threshold beta / (beta - 1) is infinite. Real projects pay cash, and the cash you do not collect while you wait is what forces a decision. Fix: put the forgone cash in.
  5. Putting a hurdle on a step that can be undone. Symptom: a trial order, a lease with a break clause or a pilot plant held to the same bar as a plant. Fix: the premium is paid for irreversibility. If the low world can be exited at little loss, the 4.0 that waiting saved shrinks, and so does the reason to wait.
Where the model breaks

The entry names two conditions, and they are the two that matter most. The option is illusory when the seller walks or a competitor enters: then lambda is large and the threshold collapses to the cost, or the opportunity is simply gone. And when the uncertainty is permanent, when time will not tell you anything the warehouse's no-news case did not already know, waiting only delays. Beyond those, the continuous formula assumes the project's value wanders like a random walk with steady volatility, that the cost is known and fixed, and that you can invest all at once at any moment; real projects are lumpy, staged and argued over by committees. The formula shows why the bar sits above the cost and which way each force moves it. When an option has to be priced for a real decision rather than recognized, that is a finance specialist's work, as the entry says.

Check yourself

1. A project is worth exactly what it costs. Its NPV is zero. Why is the right to undertake it worth anything?

Because you do not have to undertake it now. If its value rises you can invest later at a profit; if it falls you do nothing and lose nothing. A right that pays off on the upside and costs nothing on the downside is worth more than zero. With 20% volatility and r = delta = 4%, it is worth a quarter of the cost: (2 - 1) x (1 / 2)^2 = 0.25.

2. In the warehouse, the chance that a rival builds next door during the year is 50%. Wait or build? What if it is 75%?

Waiting is worth (1 - 0.5) x 2.9545 = 1.48 against 1.0 for building: wait. At 75%, waiting is worth 0.25 x 2.9545 = 0.74: build now. The two are equal at q = 1 - (1.0 / 2.9545) = 0.66.

3. A plant costs $10 million. The interest rate is 5%, the plant would pay out 5% of its value a year, and its value has 20% volatility. At what value should the firm build? If the plant would be worth $15 million today, should it build now?

The quadratic is (0.5 x 0.04 x beta x (beta - 1)) + ((0.05 - 0.05) x beta) - 0.05 = 0, that is (0.02 x beta^2) - (0.02 x beta) - 0.05 = 0, or beta^2 - beta - 2.5 = 0. The root above 1 is beta = (1 + sqrt(11)) / 2 = 2.158. The threshold is (2.158 / 1.158) x 10 = 1.863 x 10 = $18.63 million. At $15 million the NPV is $5 million, but the right to wait is worth (18.63 - 10) x (15 / 18.63)^2.158 = 8.63 x 0.805^2.158 = 5.41, which is $5.41 million. Waiting is worth more than building: wait.

Teach me more
  • Financial Engineering in Energy Markets, lecture 1, Afzal Siddiqui (University College London), 28 slides, September 2011. Slides 8 to 10 work Dixit and Pindyck's own widget factory (a $1,600 factory, a $200 price that goes to $300 or $100): $600 to build now, $773 to wait, $173 for the flexibility. The same steps as the warehouse with different numbers, which makes it a good second pass. Slide 6 says in one line that a threat of entry lowers the value of waiting; slides 11 to 14 price the option with a risk-free portfolio, in denser algebra.
  • Real options (investment options), Imperial College London, M3A22 lecture 30, 4 pages, December 2015. The shortest correct derivation of the continuous threshold: the same equation as above, value matching, smooth pasting ("think of a rope stretched tightly over a convex surface") and the factor p1 / (p1 - 1). Written for mathematics students; its drift is our r - delta.
  • Valuation, Packet 3: Real Options, Aswath Damodaran (NYU Stern), lecture slides, updated January 2026. Slide 10 explains why an option is worth something only with a restriction on competition (the neighbor with a key, in plain words); slides 25 to 30 treat the option to delay, which he values as an option that expires with the life of a patent, its cost of delay being next year's cash flow as a share of value (our delta), rather than with the open-ended threshold of this lesson.

Monte Carlo simulation and Jensen's inequality

The base case is not the expected case

We replace bull, base, and bear with the whole spread of outcomes, because a plan built on average inputs does not produce the average result.

Born to answer
Jensen, 1906; Ulam at Los Alamos, 1949: answers from many random trials.
What it does now
Replacing bull, base and bear with the whole spread of outcomes.
The mathematics
E[f(X)] is not f(E[X]) whenever f bends
The full entry
Where it began

The mathematics is Jensen's 1906 inequality on convex functions. The name is Sam Savage's, from his joke about the statistician who drowned crossing a river that was on average three feet deep. Monte Carlo itself was born at Los Alamos in the late 1940s, when Stanislaw Ulam, playing solitaire while convalescing, realized that many random trials could answer questions the equations could not, and Metropolis and Ulam published the method in 1949.

Why it works now

Running the simulation was never the hard part; deciding what to put in it was. Distributions invented at a desk produce a histogram of assumptions. What is now practical is eliciting ranges and co-movements from the people who have watched the variables move, reading the record for their historical spread, and feeding a model the client already owns. Vista designs the inputs. The client or a specialist runs the model. The Desk explains why the base case is not the expected case.

When it applies

The model has a base case with a bull and a bear beside it; the thesis depends on several uncertain inputs at once; or the inputs move together in bad states.

What we would ask

Which three inputs, if they came in at their worst plausible values together, would break the plan?
Do those inputs tend to go wrong at the same time?

What it needs

Ranges rather than points for the inputs that matter, and the correlations among them; which the interviews are designed to elicit.

How we would get it

Advisors asked for ranges and for what moves together, not for point forecasts; the record for the historical spread of the same variables.

Where it breaks

The input distributions are made up, so the histogram is a picture of assumptions; correlations are ignored and the tails are understated.

For example

A leveraged buyout model shows a comfortable base case. Run across the ranges the operators actually gave for growth, margin, and exit multiple, with the three falling together in a downturn, the probability of a covenant breach is not a footnote. It is the crux, and it points at the one variable to research next.

The mathematics in fullY = f(X1..Xk) with each X drawn from its range and correlated where they move together; by Jensen, E[f(X)] is not f(E[X]) whenever f bends, and leverage makes f bend. Taught in

MECN-451; DECS-433

Sources

Metropolis, Ulam (1949). The Monte Carlo Method. Journal of the American Statistical Association 44(247), 335-341. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1949.10483310
Jensen (1906). Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes. Acta Mathematica 30(0), 175-193. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02418571
Bertsimas, Dimitris and Freund, Robert M. (2004). Data, Models, and Decisions: The Fundamentals of Management Science. Dynamic Ideas. (book)

Learn the math
The question

A buyout fund is about to sign. The model on the screen has three tabs: bull, base and bear. The base case is comfortable. Next year's revenue grows 3%, the margin holds at 20%, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA, the figure lenders watch) come to $103 million, and debt of $550 million is 5.3 times that, safely inside the covenant's limit of 6 times. The bear case breaches the covenant, but everyone in the room knows the bear case is "the bad scenario", and nobody has put a number on how likely it is.

Here is the question this lesson answers: if every input in the base case is the true average, is the base case the average outcome? Almost everyone assumes so. It is wrong, sometimes by a little and sometimes by the whole deal, and the error has a name. Sam Savage calls it the flaw of averages, and tells it as the story of the statistician who drowned crossing a river that was, on average, three feet deep. The average depth was correct. He did not drown in the average. He drowned in the deep part.

The idea in one paragraph

A plan turns uncertain inputs into an outcome. If that turning is a straight line, feeding in the average inputs gives the average outcome, and the base case is honest. But almost nothing in business is a straight line. A plant that is full cannot sell the extra demand of a good year but feels every lost unit of a bad one. A loan covenant does nothing until it is breached and then does a great deal. Equity in a leveraged company loses at most what was put in but can gain many times over. Wherever the plan bends, the average of the outcomes is not the outcome of the averages, and the direction of the error depends on which way it bends. The cure is to stop feeding the plan one number per input and feed it the whole range instead, many times over, with the inputs that move together allowed to move together, and then look at the spread of what comes out. That is a Monte Carlo simulation. The base case becomes one dot in a cloud, and the question changes from "does the base case work?" to "how often does the plan fail, and which input makes it fail?"

The math, step by step

Step 1: a plan that bends. Start with the cleanest case, Savage's own. A plant can make CAP = 100,000 units a year and earns $10 on each unit it sells. Demand next year, D, is uncertain: say 80,000, 100,000 or 120,000, each equally likely (an assumption, chosen to keep the arithmetic in view). Profit is

profit(D) = 10 x min(D, 100,000)

where min takes the smaller of the two. Average demand is (80,000 + 100,000 + 120,000) / 3 = 100,000. Profit at average demand is 10 x 100,000 = $1,000,000. Now average the profits instead:

profit(80,000)  = 10 x 80,000  = $800,000
profit(100,000) = 10 x 100,000 = $1,000,000
profit(120,000) = 10 x 100,000 = $1,000,000   (the plant is full)
average profit = (800,000 + 1,000,000 + 1,000,000) / 3 = $933,333

The plan built on average demand promises $1,000,000. The plant, on average, earns $933,333. The $66,667 gap is not a rounding error and not bad luck. It is 10 x (20,000 / 3): the margin times the average demand the plant could not serve. The good year's 20,000 extra units were turned away at the gate; the bad year's 20,000 missing units were not made up by anything.

$0k$400k$800k$1,200k60k80k100k120k140kDemand next year, unitsProfit, $average profit $933kprofit at average demand $1,000kthe plant is full
A plant that is full cannot sell the extra demand of a good year, but it feels every unit of a bad one. The average of the outcomes ($933,333) sits below the outcome of the average ($1,000,000): the flaw of averages in one picture.

In the chart, the profit line climbs and then goes flat. The three dots sit on the line. The dashed line joins the two outer ones, and it is the picture Step 2 is about: a straight segment between two points on a curve that bends downward lies below the curve. The larger dot at 100,000 is the average of the three profits, $933,333. It sits below the $1,000,000 the line reaches there, and it would sit lower still, on the dashed line at $900,000, if the middle year could not happen and demand were only ever 80,000 or 120,000. That gap between a curve and the straight line across it is the whole lesson.

Step 2: why it always happens, in one inequality. Call a function f concave if it bends downward like the profit line, so that any straight segment joining two points on its graph lies on or below the graph, and convex if it bends upward like a bowl. Write X for an uncertain input with average mu (the Greek letter, read "mew"), and E[...] for "the average of" over all the ways X can turn out. The claim, proved by the Danish engineer Johan Jensen in 1906, is:

if f is convex:   E[f(X)] >= f(E[X])
if f is concave:  E[f(X)] <= f(E[X])

Here is the proof for a convex f, and it is short. A convex curve lies above every one of its tangent lines. (That follows from the definition: between its two endpoints a chord lies above a convex curve, and beyond them the chord's extension lies below it; slide the two endpoints together and the chord becomes the tangent, with the curve on or above it everywhere.) Take the tangent at the average, mu. It has slope f'(mu) and passes through the point (mu, f(mu)), so for every possible x:

f(x) >= f(mu) + (f'(mu) x (x - mu))

Now average both sides over the ways X can turn out. The left side becomes E[f(X)]. On the right, f(mu) and f'(mu) are fixed numbers, so they come out of the average unchanged, and the average of (X - mu) is zero, because mu is the average of X:

E[f(X)] >= f(mu) + (f'(mu) x E[X - mu]) = f(mu) + (f'(mu) x 0) = f(mu)

That is Jensen's inequality. For a concave f, every tangent lies above the curve, every inequality flips, and the average outcome falls short of the outcome at the average. At a corner, like the plant's at 100,000, there is no single tangent, but any line through the corner that stays on one side of the curve does the same job; any line of slope between 0 and 10 through the plant's corner lies on or above the profit line everywhere, which is all the proof needs.

Step 3: how big the gap is. Jensen tells you the direction. A second step tells you the size, at least when the curve is smooth and the spread is modest. Write the curve near mu with one more term than the tangent line, the curvature term from a first calculus course (Taylor's expansion):

f(x) ~ f(mu) + (f'(mu) x (x - mu)) + ((1/2) x f''(mu) x (x - mu)^2)

Average it. The middle term averages to zero, as before. The last term averages to (1/2) x f''(mu) x Var(X), because the average of (X - mu)^2 is the definition of the variance Var(X), the square of the spread (the standard deviation). So

E[f(X)] - f(E[X])  ~  (1/2) x f''(mu) x Var(X)

Read it as a sentence: the error of the base case grows with how sharply the plan bends (f'') times how uncertain the input is (the variance). Either one alone is harmless. A straight-line plan (f'' = 0) has no error however uncertain the input; a certain input (variance 0) has no error however bent the plan. Check it on f(x) = x^2, where f'' = 2, with X equally likely to be 8 or 12, so mu = 10 and Var(X) = 4: the average of the squares is (64 + 144) / 2 = 104, the square of the average is 100, and the formula gives (1/2) x 2 x 4 = 4, exactly the difference. (For x^2 the formula is exact, because the curve has no terms beyond the square.)

Step 4: leverage is what bends a plan. The entry says leverage makes the plan bend, and now you can see why. A lender's payoff is flat (paid in full) until the borrower's earnings fall below what the debt needs, and then it falls: concave, like the plant. A covenant is a cliff: nothing happens until the line is crossed, then everything does. And the owner's equity, max(value - debt, 0), is zero below the debt and rises one for one above it: convex, like a bowl. The same leveraged company bends one way for its lenders and the other way for its owners, so the base case is wrong in opposite directions for the two sides of the table.

Step 5: two inputs at once. Most plans multiply. EBITDA is revenue times margin: EBITDA = 500 x (1 + g) x m, where 500 is this year's revenue in $ millions, g next year's growth and m next year's margin. The average of a product is not the product of the averages unless the two are uncorrelated, which independent inputs are. In general

E[(1 + g) x m] = (E[1 + g] x E[m]) + Cov(g, m)

where Cov(g, m), the covariance, measures how much g and m move together. It equals the correlation (a number from -1 to 1) times the two spreads. For the buyout below, with growth uncertain by 6 points around 3%, margin by 2 points around 20%, and a correlation of 0.7 because both fall in a downturn, the extra term is 500 x (0.7 x 0.06 x 0.02) = 0.42, so average EBITDA is $103.42 million, not $103 million. The shift in the average is small. What correlation does to the tails is not, and that is Step 6.

Step 6: Monte Carlo, or averaging by brute force. Once there are three uncertain inputs, a covenant cliff and an option-shaped equity payoff, no formula gives E[f(X)] cleanly. So we compute it the way Stanislaw Ulam saw it could be computed: draw the inputs at random from their ranges, run the plan on each draw, and repeat. The law of large numbers says the average over the draws closes in on the true average as the draws pile up. The share of draws that breach the covenant closes in on the true chance of a breach, and how close it gets is itself computable. If p is the true chance and N the number of draws, the share you observe wanders around p with a standard error of

SE = sqrt((p x (1 - p)) / N)

so quadrupling the draws halves the error. (Where the formula comes from: each draw is a yes or no, counted as 1 or 0, with chance p of a 1. Its average is p, its square averages to p as well, so its variance is p - p^2 = p x (1 - p). Variances of independent draws add, so the sum of N draws has variance N x p x (1 - p); the average is that sum divided by N, and dividing a quantity by N divides its variance by N^2, which leaves (p x (1 - p)) / N. The standard error, the typical size of the miss, is the square root of that.) With p near 0.17 and N = 400,000, SE = sqrt((0.1715 x 0.8285) / 400,000) = 0.0006, six hundredths of a percentage point: plenty.

The one technical step left is drawing inputs that move together. Take two independent draws z1 and z2 from the standard bell curve (average 0, spread 1). Then

z_g = z1
z_m = (rho x z1) + (sqrt(1 - rho^2) x z2)

are each standard bell curves, and their correlation is rho (the Greek letter "row"). The check takes one line: the variance of z_m is rho^2 + (1 - rho^2) = 1, and the covariance of z_g with z_m is rho x Var(z1) = rho. Scale each to its own average and spread (g = 0.03 + (0.06 x z_g), m = 0.20 + (0.02 x z_m)), and the inputs fall together in the bad draws as often as rho says. With three inputs the same idea, built one row at a time, is called the Cholesky factor; the lesson's code builds it by hand in ten lines.

A worked example

Here is the buyout from the opening, priced with round numbers stated as assumptions. Revenue this year is $500 million. Next year's growth averages 3% with a spread (standard deviation) of 6 points; the margin averages 20% with a spread of 2 points; the exit multiple averages 9 times EBITDA with a spread of 1.5. Debt is $550 million and the covenant says debt may not exceed 6 times EBITDA, so EBITDA must stay above 550 / 6 = $91.67 million.

The base case, every input at its average:

EBITDA   = 500 x 1.03 x 0.20 = $103.0 million
leverage = 550 / 103 = 5.34 times
headroom = (103 / 91.67) - 1 = 12.4% above the covenant line
equity at exit = (9 x 103) - 550 = $377 million

Comfortable. Now the bear case the model shows: growth and margin each one spread worse, together. EBITDA = 500 x (1.03 - 0.06) x (0.20 - 0.02) = 500 x 0.97 x 0.18 = $87.3 million, below the line. So the bear case breaches. But how likely is the bear case? The model never says. If growth and margin are independent, both landing a spread or more below average happens about 2.5% of the time (one chance in six, squared: 0.1587 x 0.1587 = 0.0252). If they fall together with a correlation of 0.7, it happens 8.4% of the time, more than three times as often. The bear tab looks the same either way.

Now run the whole spread, 400,000 simulated years, each input drawn from a bell curve with the average and spread above, first with the inputs independent and then with growth and margin correlated at 0.7 and the exit multiple at 0.5 with each (multiples fall in the same downturns that cut growth and margins):

chance of a covenant breach, inputs independent:   17.1%   (17.14% by direct integration, no simulation)
chance of a covenant breach, inputs moving together: 22.2%
average EBITDA:                                     $103.0 million and $103.4 million
average equity at exit:                             $377.7 million and $396.1 million
$60$75$90$105$120$135$150EBITDA next year, $ millionHow oftencovenant line $91.7mbase case $103mGrowth and margin independentMoving together (0.7)
The base case clears the covenant; the spread of outcomes does not. About one year in six falls below the line, and more than one in five when growth and margin fall together: a fact the base case cannot show.

Three things to take from those four lines. First, the plan that "clears the covenant with 12% to spare" breaches it about one year in six, and more than one year in five once you admit that growth and margin fall together. That figure is the crux the entry promised: not a footnote to the base case but the question the deal turns on, and it points at the input to research next. Second, the habit of testing one input at a time cannot see this. Holding margin at its average, growth alone breaches 3.0% of the time; holding growth at its average, margin alone breaches 13.6% of the time. Neither number is the answer, and no rule turns the pair into 17.1%, let alone 22.2%. Third, the same correlation that fattens the bad tail fattens the good one: average equity rises from $377.7 million to $396.1 million, because the covariance term of Step 5 adds to the average of a product, and the equity holder's payoff is convex. The base case, $377 million, understates what the owners expect and overstates how safe the lenders are, at the same time. That is Step 4 in money.

The example is invented; its inputs are assumptions and every figure above follows from them in the lesson's code. A real model would take its ranges and correlations from the record of the company and its industry, and from people who have watched those numbers move, which is where the entry says the work really lies.

The usual mistakes

Running the simulation with every input independent. Symptom: a tidy, narrow histogram and a small chance of disaster. Fix: ask which inputs fall together in a bad year (demand and price, growth and margin, earnings and the multiple the market pays) and set a correlation for each pair. In the example, ignoring it took five points off the chance of a breach.

Reading the bear case as a probability. Symptom: "the bear case breaches, but that's the bear case." Fix: a scenario has no probability until you give it one. The same bear tab was a 2.5% event or an 8.4% event depending on a correlation the tab never showed.

Testing one input at a time. Symptom: a tornado chart of sensitivities and no joint answer. Fix: sensitivities show which inputs matter; only the joint simulation shows how often the plan fails. Use the first to choose what to research and the second to decide.

Inventing the ranges. Symptom: a histogram that reproduces the analyst's mood. Fix: take spreads from the record (how much has this margin actually moved in ten years?) and from people who have lived through the swings; ask them for ranges and for what moves together, never for a point forecast.

Reporting more digits than the simulation earned. Symptom: "a 17.15% chance" from 2,000 draws. Fix: compute the standard error, sqrt((p x (1 - p)) / N), and report no finer than it allows. At 2,000 draws it is almost a full point.

Where the model breaks

The simulation is exactly as good as what is put into it. If the ranges are made up, the histogram is a picture of the assumptions, drawn with great precision, and the precision is a trap. If the correlations are ignored, the tails come out too thin. And if every input is drawn from a bell curve when the real thing has fat tails, the rare disasters are understated however many draws you run: a million draws from the wrong distribution are still the wrong distribution. Monte Carlo does not tell you what can happen; it tells you what follows from what you said could happen. That is why the entry puts the hard work in eliciting the inputs, and why Vista designs the inputs while the client or a specialist runs the model.

Check yourself

1. A concert hall seats 2,000. Ticket demand for a show is uncertain but averages exactly 2,000. Is expected ticket revenue above, equal to, or below the revenue the hall would earn at average demand?

Answer: below. Revenue is the price times the smaller of demand and 2,000, the same shape as the plant: flat above capacity, so concave. Demand above 2,000 is turned away; demand below it is lost. By Jensen, the average revenue falls short of the revenue at the average demand, unless demand is certain.

2. A company's assets will be worth either $70 million or $130 million, equally likely, and it owes $90 million. What is the owners' stake worth at the average asset value, and what is the average of the owners' stake?

Answer: at the average, 100 - 90 = $10 million. On average, the owners get 130 - 90 = 40 in the good case and nothing in the bad case (they can lose no more than their stake), so (40 + 0) / 2 = $20 million. The payoff max(value - debt, 0) is convex, so the average outcome is above the outcome at the average, here twice as large.

3. You run a simulation with 10,000 draws and 17% of them breach a covenant. A colleague says the true chance is probably 20%. Is that plausible?

Answer: the standard error is sqrt((0.17 x 0.83) / 10,000) = sqrt(0.00001411) = 0.0038, under four tenths of a point. 20% is (0.20 - 0.17) / 0.0038, about 8 standard errors away. If the model is right, the true chance is not 20%. If your colleague believes 20%, the argument is about the inputs, not about the number of draws.

Teach me more
  • The Flaw of Averages, Sam Savage, Harvard Business Review, November 2002 (two pages; the full text is for subscribers). Where the name and the river joke come from, with Savage's real cases (a drug company's stocking decision, Orange County's 1994 losses, the Red River flood of 1997) and his plea to plan with a distribution instead of a number. It never states Jensen's inequality or derives the size of the gap; Steps 1 to 3 above are that missing half.
  • Jensen's Inequality As An Intuition Tool, Party at the Moontower (about 11 minutes' reading). The best informal tour of convexity with payoffs: dice whose prize is the square of the roll, a commute where a slow day costs more than a fast day saves, and a call option on a stock that usually goes nowhere, which is Step 4's equity holder in miniature. It uses a little calculus and skips the proof.
  • Jensen's inequality, Wikipedia. The statement in its general forms, with the proof behind Step 2 (a supporting line under the curve at the average, which is the tangent wherever the curve is smooth), the reference to Jensen's 1906 paper in Acta Mathematica, and the note that Hölder proved an earlier version in 1889. Terse and complete; read it after this lesson, not before.
  • Stan Ulam, John von Neumann, and the Monte Carlo Method, Roger Eckhardt, Los Alamos Science, special issue 1987 (13 pages, on a University of Washington course page). How the method began: Ulam's question in 1946, while convalescing and playing solitaire, about the chance a Canfield solitaire comes out, and how he and von Neumann turned it into a way of computing what equations could not. History more than mathematics, and the best account of why Step 6 works at all.

The papers behind the Library entry are Jensen, "Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes", Acta Mathematica, 1906, and Metropolis and Ulam, "The Monte Carlo Method", Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1949. The plant in Step 1 follows Savage's own capacity example ("The Flaw of Averages", San Jose Mercury News, 8 October 2000), with round numbers of ours.

Heavy tails

Near misses are data about the disaster

We treat the incidents that almost happened as evidence about the one that could, and fit the tail from them instead of from the calm years.

Born to answer
Mandelbrot, 1963: cotton price moves far larger than a bell curve allows.
What it does now
Fitting the disaster from the near misses nobody counted.
The mathematics
P(X > x) falls like a power of x, not exponentially
The full entry
Where it began

Benoit Mandelbrot's 1963 study of cotton prices showed that the big moves came far more often than a bell curve allows, and that the tails, not the middle, held the risk. The management version is taught at Kellogg through the Boeing 737 MAX: a rare disaster that the near-miss record had been describing for some time to anyone who counted it.

Why it works now

Near misses were always the evidence and were never collected, because nobody read every incident report. Reading every incident report is now cheap. Former plant, safety, and quality leaders can be asked for the count that never reached the board, the record can be swept for comparable events at peers, and the tail can be fitted from what almost happened rather than from the calm years. Where the fit needs real extreme-value statistics, a specialist does it; recognizing that it is needed is now a conversation.

When it applies

A rare, severe event dominates the thesis: recall, outage, safety failure, regulatory action, fraud; and the client is reasoning from the years in which it did not happen.

What we would ask

How many near misses has this business had, and who counted them?
What would the event cost, and is that a bad year or the end?

What it needs

Incident and near-miss history, including the ones not reported; comparable events at peers; the size of the loss conditional on the event.

How we would get it

Former operators, safety and quality leads, and regulators on the near-miss record; the record on comparable failures and their consequences.

Where it breaks

The tail is fitted to a handful of observations; the absence of the event is read as evidence of its impossibility.

For example

An industrial company has had no serious incident in a decade and four near misses in two years. The decade is not the evidence. The four are, and the interviews with former plant managers are where the count comes from.

The mathematics in fullFit the frequency of severe events from the full incident distribution rather than the severe ones alone; the loss is E[L | event] x P(event), and heavy tails with exponent below two make the sample average an unreliable estimate of either term. Taught in

MECN-451; MECNX-435

Sources

Mandelbrot (1963). The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices. The Journal of Business 36(4), 394. https://doi.org/10.1086/294632
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. https://doi.org/10.1137/070710111

Ambiguity and Knightian uncertainty

Some uncertainties have no defensible number

When the evidence cannot supply a probability, we say so, and we design the decision to be robust across the range of beliefs the evidence actually permits, rather than pretending to one number.

Born to answer
Ellsberg, 1961: people prefer the urn whose mix they know.
What it does now
Saying when the evidence supports a range of beliefs and no single number.
The mathematics
max over acts of min over priors of E[U]
The full entry
Where it began

Daniel Ellsberg's 1961 experiment offered people two urns, one with a known fifty-fifty mix of colors and one with an unknown mix, and found that most preferred to bet on the known urn whichever color they were betting on. No single probability can explain that. Gilboa and Schmeidler in 1989 and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji in 2005 built decision theories in which a careful person holds a set of beliefs rather than one, and is not being irrational when the set is wide.

Why it works now

For decades the practical consequence was nil, because nobody could say how wide the set of defensible beliefs actually was. Now the record can be searched for whether a reference class exists at all, and Advisors can be asked for the range a careful person could hold, so the width of the set becomes a finding rather than a mood. The Desk says when a question has no defensible number, and the engagement reports which decisions survive the whole range instead of pretending to a point.

When it applies

The client wants a probability for something with no comparable history: a novel regulation, a first-of-kind technology, a geopolitical break; or a report has supplied a precise number that nothing supports.

What we would ask

What class of past cases would this belong to, and does one exist?
Across the range of beliefs a careful person could hold, which decision holds up?

What it needs

Honesty about the reference class: whether one exists, and how wide the range of defensible beliefs is.

How we would get it

Authorities on whether any base rate exists; operators on what the plausible range is; the report gives a range of priors and the decision that survives all of them.

Where it breaks

Ambiguity used as an excuse not to estimate the estimable; or a single number reported where a range of priors was the truth.

For example

A fund wants the probability that a proposed rule takes effect as drafted. There is no base rate for this rule. The honest deliverable is the range a careful reader of the record would hold, and which position sizes survive the whole range.

The mathematics in fullRather than a single prior, a set of priors; the robust choice maximizes the minimum expected utility over the set, or, with smooth ambiguity, an ambiguity-averse aggregate of the expected utilities across it. Taught in

MECS 550-1; MMSS 300

Sources

Ellsberg (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75(4), 643. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884324
Gilboa, Schmeidler (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18(2), 141-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(89)90018-9
Klibanoff, Marinacci, Mukerji (2005). A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity. Econometrica 73(6), 1849-1892. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00640.x

The outside view

The outside view before the inside view

Before we argue about this case, we look at how the whole class of cases like it turned out, and we run the failure post-mortem before the failure.

Born to answer
Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Flyvbjerg on project overruns.
What it does now
Starting from how the class of comparable deals actually turned out.
The mathematics
Forecast = the class distribution, then adjust
The full entry
Where it began

Kahneman and Lovallo's 1993 paper distinguished the inside view, which reasons from the specifics of the case, from the outside view, which starts from how similar cases turned out, and showed that the inside view produces bold forecasts and timid choices. Bent Flyvbjerg turned the outside view into a procedure, reference class forecasting, first for transport projects, where the class of comparable projects predicted cost overruns the planners never did, and it was adopted into official appraisal guidance.

Why it works now

The outside view was rarely taken because assembling the reference class was a research project in itself. It is now the cheapest part of an engagement: the record can be read for how the class of comparable deals, migrations, launches, or turnarounds actually resolved, and the Advisors can be asked the pre-mortem question directly. The Desk starts from the class and asks what makes this case different, which is the reverse of how most investment memos are written.

When it applies

A forecast built from the specifics of the deal, the plan, or the team, with no reference to how similar deals, plans, and teams have done; or a projection everyone in the room finds persuasive.

What we would ask

What is the class of comparable cases, and how did they actually turn out?
If this has failed two years from now, what is the most likely reason?

What it needs

A defensible reference class and its outcome distribution; the plan's own assumptions listed so they can be checked against it.

How we would get it

The record for the reference class; operators who have seen the failures; a structured pre-mortem with the Advisors as the second half of each interview.

Where it breaks

The reference class is chosen to flatter; the bias story is applied after the fact and cannot be falsified.

For example

A platform migration plan promises eighteen months. The class of comparable migrations at companies of this size ran twice the planned time in most cases. The research starts from that distribution and asks what makes this one different, rather than starting from eighteen months and asking what could go wrong.

The mathematics in fullForecast = distribution of outcomes in the reference class, then adjust for the case at hand; the adjustment is the inside view and should be smaller than the decision maker wants it to be. Taught in

MECNX-435; MECN-451

Sources

Kahneman, Lovallo (1993). Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking. Management Science 39(1), 17-31. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.1.17
Flyvbjerg (2006). From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right. Project Management Journal 37(3), 5-15. https://doi.org/10.1177/875697280603700302
Kahneman, Tversky (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review 80(4), 237-251. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747

Learn the math
The question

Some years before he won the Nobel prize, Daniel Kahneman sat on a team of academics and teachers in Israel writing a curriculum for a new high school subject. In time the team began to discuss how long the work would take, and everyone wrote a number of months on a slip of paper. The estimates ran from 18 to 30. Then one member put a different question to the team's most distinguished curriculum expert: think of other teams you have known at the stage we are at now; how long did they take to finish? After a while, with some discomfort, he answered that about 40% of them never finished at all; they gave up. Of the rest, he could not think of one that finished in less than seven years, nor of one that took more than ten. Was this team better than those? No, he said; if anything slightly below average.

The same man held both answers in his head. He knew the record of the class, and he had still forecast from the case in front of him. The team did not stop. It finished eight years later, and the curriculum was rarely used. (The story is Kahneman's own, told in Lovallo and Kahneman's 2003 article and retold by Bent Flyvbjerg in the 2006 paper below.)

This lesson is about the second question Kahneman asked, and about what to do once you have its answer. The Library entry gives it as one line: start from how the whole class of similar cases turned out, then adjust for the case at hand, and make the adjustment smaller than you want to. By the end you should be able to build the class, read a forecast off it, and compute how far the specifics of your case have earned the right to move it.

The idea in one paragraph

Every forecast can be made two ways. The inside view builds it from the specifics: this team, this plan, these steps, these risks, added up. It is vivid and it feels like knowledge, but it leaves out everything that has not yet been imagined, and in a project that is most of what goes wrong: the key engineer who leaves, the vendor that slips, the scope that grows. The outside view ignores the specifics at first and asks how a whole set of similar cases actually turned out. It knows nothing about this team, but it has quietly counted every surprise those other teams met, including the ones nobody imagined. The method is to start with the outside view as the anchor, then let the specifics of the case pull the forecast toward the inside view, but only as far as those specifics have proved, in the past, that they actually predict outcomes. Most specifics predict much less than they seem to, so the honest forecast usually lands much nearer the class than the plan.

The math, step by step

Step 1: turn the class into a distribution. The entry's example is a platform migration planned at eighteen months. Suppose we can find twenty comparable migrations, at companies of similar size, and for each we know its planned time and its actual time. Their exact durations differ, so we compare them on one scale: the ratio of actual to planned time. A ratio of 1.0 means on plan; 2.0 means twice as long. Here are the twenty ratios, sorted (they are invented, round numbers chosen as assumptions to keep the arithmetic in view):

1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.9
2.1  2.2  2.3  2.5  2.7  2.9  3.1  3.4  3.8  4.5

That list is the outside view. Before any argument about this team, three facts can be read straight off it. Only one of the twenty finished on plan: a 5% record. The middle of the class, the median, lies between the tenth and eleventh values, (1.9 + 2.1) / 2 = 2.0: half the migrations took at least twice as long as planned. And the average ratio is the sum divided by the count, 44.0 / 20 = 2.2. Applied to our plan, the outside view says the middle outcome is 18 x 2.0 = 36 months and the average is 18 x 2.2 = 39.6 months. The plan's eighteen months sits at the very bottom of the class.

Why a ratio and not a number of months? Because it is the plan that gets things wrong, and the ratio measures exactly that. A team that plans eighteen months and a team that plans six both carry their own optimism; the ratio lets them share a scale. Choosing the scale is part of choosing the class.

0x1x2x3x4x5xTwenty comparable migrations, shortest overrun to longestActual time / planned timethe plan: 18 months (1.0x)half finished within 2.0x: 36 months16 of 20 within 2.9x: 52 monthsadjusted forecast 1.84x: 33 months
The outside view in one picture: the plan sits at the bottom of the class, where one project in twenty finished. The adjusted forecast moves only part of the way back toward it.

In the chart each bar is one past migration. The plan is the dotted line at 1.0. The dashed lines mark the time half the class stayed within and the time sixteen of the twenty stayed within. The solid line is where this lesson will end up, once the case has had its say.

Step 2: choose how sure you need to be. A single forecast hides a decision: how much risk of overrunning are you willing to carry? Bent Flyvbjerg's version of the method, reference class forecasting, makes that choice explicit. Pick an acceptable chance of overrun, say 20%. Then find the ratio that 80% of the class stayed at or under, and multiply the plan by it. With twenty cases, 80% is sixteen of them, so we count up the sorted list to the sixteenth value, 2.9:

acceptable chance of overrun 50%:  ratio 2.0  ->  18 x 2.0 = 36.0 months   (uplift 100%)
acceptable chance of overrun 20%:  ratio 2.9  ->  18 x 2.9 = 52.2 months   (uplift 190%)
acceptable chance of overrun 10%:  ratio 3.4  ->  18 x 3.4 = 61.2 months

The uplift is the ratio minus one, written as a percentage: how much must be added to the plan to reach that level of safety. Notice what the table does. It turns "is eighteen months realistic?", which invites argument, into "how often are we willing to be late?", which is a decision someone can own.

Step 3: let the case move the forecast, by the right amount. Now the team speaks up. This migration is different, they say: the team is strong, the scope is clear, the old system is well documented. Their own estimate is the plan, a ratio of 1.0. Some of what they say may be true. How far should it move us from the class?

Kahneman and Amos Tversky worked out the answer in the 1970s: the principle in a 1973 paper on prediction, the step-by-step procedure for forecasters in a 1979 chapter. Write B for the baseline, the average of the class (2.2), I for the inside estimate (1.0), and r for the correlation between the kind of evidence the team is offering and the outcome that followed, across past cases. The correlation runs from 0 (the evidence told you nothing about how projects turned out) to 1 (it told you everything). The forecast is

forecast = B + (r x (I - B))

Read it as a sentence: start at the class, then travel from the class toward the inside view a fraction r of the way. With r = 0 you stay at the class; with r = 1 you take the inside view whole. Suppose that, in the record, how good a migration plan looked at the start correlated about 0.3 with how it actually ran (an assumption; the true figure is something to look up, not to guess generously). Then

forecast = 2.2 + (0.3 x (1.0 - 2.2)) = 2.2 - 0.36 = 1.84
in months: 18 x 1.84 = 33.12, about 33 months

If the team had something much stronger, say it had done this very migration twice before and that kind of evidence correlated 0.5 with outcomes, the forecast would be 2.2 + (0.5 x (1.0 - 2.2)) = 1.60, or 28.8 months. Better evidence buys a bigger move. It never buys eighteen months unless the evidence is perfect.

Two things hide inside that formula. I is not the plan as such; it is what the team now believes, after weighing its own case, written on the class's scale. Here the team believes it will finish on plan, so I = 1.0. And r is not the correlation between plans and outcomes. Every project in the class had a plan, and on the ratio scale every plan said 1.0, so plans as such predicted nothing; r is the correlation, across the past cases, between the kind of evidence this team is citing (how good the plan looked, how clear the scope was) and how those cases turned out. The rule as written also takes for granted that such estimates, across the class, were centered on the class and spread about as widely as the outcomes. Step 5 shows what changes when the estimate's own spread is known.

Step 4: why r, and not more. It is worth seeing where this rule comes from, because it is the whole reason the adjustment should be "smaller than the decision maker wants it to be". Put the outcome and the inside estimate in standard units: subtract each one's average and divide by its spread, so each has average 0 and spread 1. Call them Y (the outcome) and X (the inside estimate), with correlation rho (the Greek letter, read "row"). In standard units the average of X^2 and of Y^2 is 1 (each is its variable's variance), and the correlation is simply the average of X x Y (that is what a correlation is: the average product of two standardized variables). A forecast that moves a fraction b of the way toward the inside view predicts b x X. Its average squared error is

E[(Y - (b x X))^2] = E[Y^2] - (2 x b x E[X x Y]) + (b^2 x E[X^2])
E[(Y - (b x X))^2] = 1 - (2 x b x rho) + b^2

where E[...] means "the average of" over many cases, and the first line is just the square (Y - (b x X))^2 = Y^2 - (2 x b x X x Y) + (b^2 x X^2) averaged term by term. The result is a parabola in b. To find its lowest point, take the derivative with respect to b and set it to zero:

-(2 x rho) + (2 x b) = 0,   so   b = rho

The best fraction to move is exactly the correlation. (Without calculus: the same parabola can be written 1 - rho^2 + (b - rho)^2, since (b - rho)^2 = b^2 - (2 x b x rho) + rho^2; the squared term is never negative and is zero only at b = rho, so the error can never fall below 1 - rho^2. The evidence can remove at most rho^2 of the error, 9% when rho = 0.3, however hard you lean on it.) That is Kahneman and Tversky's rule, and it is the same line a statistician would fit by least squares. Now compare three forecasters when rho = 0.3:

outside view only,    b = 0:    error = 1 - 0 + 0               = 1.00
the rule,             b = 0.3:  error = 1 - (2 x 0.3 x 0.3) + 0.09 = 0.91
inside view whole,    b = 1:    error = 1 - (2 x 0.3) + 1        = 1.40
0.81.01.21.40.000.250.500.751.00How far you move from the class toward the inside view (b)Average squared erroroutside view only: 1.00move by r = 0.3: 0.91inside view whole: 1.40
Why the adjustment should be smaller than you want: when the evidence about the case correlates 0.3 with the outcome, moving 0.3 of the way is best, and trusting the case completely is worse than ignoring it.

The last line is the sting. When the evidence correlates 0.3 with the outcome, taking the inside view whole gives a larger error than ignoring it entirely. In general, the whole inside view, with error 2 - (2 x rho), does worse than the class alone, with error 1, whenever rho is below 0.5. Most of the specifics people find persuasive (a strong team, a clear plan, a confident sponsor) sit well below 0.5, because every team in the class was told the same things about itself. The lesson's code checks the parabola by simulating 200,000 cases with correlation 0.3: the three errors come out at 1.00, 0.91 and 1.40.

Step 5: the same answer, seen as Bayes. The Library entry lists Bayesian updating as part of this model's machinery, and the connection is short. Treat the class as your prior: the outcome for a case like this has average 2.2 and spread (standard deviation) s_c, which for the twenty ratios computes to 0.957. Treat the team's estimate as a noisy measurement of this project's outcome, missing it by a typical amount s_e. Then the best estimate moves from the prior toward the measurement by the weight

w = s_c^2 / (s_c^2 + s_e^2)

the share of the total uncertainty that belongs to the class rather than to the measurement. (Where it comes from: the best way to combine two independent readings of one quantity is to weight each by one over its variance; the measurement's share is (1 / s_e^2) / ((1 / s_c^2) + (1 / s_e^2)), and multiplying top and bottom by s_c^2 x s_e^2 gives the line above.) If teams' own estimates typically miss their own outcomes by 1.5 (an assumption, in the same ratio units), then w = 0.916 / (0.916 + 2.25) = 0.289, and the forecast is 2.2 + (0.289 x (1.0 - 2.2)) = 1.853, about 33.4 months.

This is Step 4's rule in raw units, not a second rule. If the estimate is the outcome plus independent noise, its correlation with the outcome is s_c / sqrt(s_c^2 + s_e^2) = 0.957 / 1.779 = 0.538, and the outcome's spread divided by the estimate's spread is the same 0.538; the slope of the least-squares line in raw units is the product of the two, 0.538 x 0.538 = 0.289, which is w. (That product is also the general form of Step 3's rule when the estimate is spread more widely than the outcomes: multiply r by the ratio of the two spreads.) The Bayes route gives 33.4 months and the correlation route 33.1 only because Step 3 assumed r = 0.3 while a typical miss of 1.5 implies 0.289. Two routes, one idea: a piece of evidence moves you in proportion to how much it has been worth before.

Step 6: the pre-mortem, which feeds r. The entry pairs the reference class with one more question: "If this has failed two years from now, what is the most likely reason?" That is Gary Klein's pre-mortem. It is not arithmetic, but it does two arithmetical jobs. It tells you which way the case differs from the class (a reason to fail that the class shared, or one it did not), and it keeps the team honest about how strong its evidence really is, which is the size of r.

A worked example

The numbers in the steps above are the worked example: the entry's own case, a migration planned at eighteen months, set against an invented class of twenty comparable projects. Gathered in one place:

the plan                                        18 months   (ratio 1.0)
share of the class that finished on plan        1 of 20, 5%
middle of the class (50% chance of overrun)     36 months   (ratio 2.0)
average of the class                            39.6 months (ratio 2.2)
20% chance of overrun                           52.2 months (ratio 2.9)
adjusted for the team's case, r = 0.3           33.1 months (ratio 1.84)
adjusted, with much stronger evidence, r = 0.5  28.8 months (ratio 1.60)
the Bayes version, s_e = 1.5                    33.4 months (ratio 1.853)

A careful reader will notice two different questions in that table. The adjusted forecast, about 33 months, is the best single guess of when the project will finish. The uplifts, 36 or 52 months, are budgets: how much time to set aside to be late only half the time, or only one time in five. A board needs both.

The real thing looks just like Step 2. In the summer of 2004 the United Kingdom's Department for Transport and HM Treasury adopted Flyvbjerg's method for the appraisal of large transport projects, the first use of reference class forecasting in practice. His team sorted completed projects into classes and read the uplifts off each class's record of cost overruns (in constant prices, at the time of the decision to build):

class                      projects   50% chance of overrun   20% chance of overrun
roads                        172             15%                     32%
rail                          46             40%                     57%
bridges and tunnels           34             23%                     55%

The paper's own examples are the arithmetic of Step 2. A motorway estimated at £100 million, to be at least 80% sure of staying within budget, is budgeted at 100 x 1.32 = £132 million; accepting even odds of an overrun, 100 x 1.15 = £115 million. A metro estimated at £300 million becomes 300 x 1.57 = £471 million at the 80% level on the table's figure; the paper prints £504 million there, which is 300 x 1.68, matching the 68% uplift the paper gives for rail at a 10% chance of overrun; trust the table over that one example. At the 50% level it is 300 x 1.40 = £420 million. And the paper says, in so many words, what Step 3 says: a team may use a lower uplift only if it has evidence that it is better at estimating than the teams in its class were.

Every figure in this section comes from the lesson's code, which asserts each one. The twenty ratios and the two correlations are assumptions; in real work they come from the record of comparable projects and from people who have run them, which is where the entry says the research lies. The United Kingdom's figures are Flyvbjerg's, as printed in his Table 4 and text.

The usual mistakes

Choosing the class that flatters the case. Symptom: "the right comparison is the three migrations that went well." Fix: write the rule for membership before you look at the outcomes (similar size, similar technology, similar ambition), and if two reasonable classes disagree, report both. The entry names this as the first way the model fails.

Taking a class too small to mean anything. Symptom: a reference class of three. Fix: widen the class until it has enough cases to show a spread, then adjust for the ways your case differs. A broad class with twenty cases beats a perfect match with two.

Adjusting by the strength of the story, not the strength of the evidence. Symptom: the forecast ends up back at the plan, because the team's case was so convincing. Fix: ask what the evidence has predicted before. A vivid detail with a correlation of 0.2 earns a move of a fifth of the way, however vivid it is.

Reading the median as the budget. Symptom: "the class says 36 months, so we planned 36." Fix: 36 months is late half the time. Decide how often you can afford to be late, then read that line off the class (Step 2).

Using the bias story after the fact. Symptom: "it overran because of the planning fallacy." Fix: the outside view is a forecasting method, not an explanation. It earns its keep only if it was written down before the outcome; afterwards, the bias can be made to explain anything, which is the entry's second failure condition.

Where the model breaks

The method assumes the past class and the present case come from the same world. When the world changes (a new technology, a new regulator, a market that has never existed), the class may describe a game no longer being played, and the right answer is a wider range, not a confident number. It assumes the class can be chosen without looking at the answer; a class picked to flatter makes the outside view an inside view in disguise. And the Kahneman and Tversky rule assumes you can put a number on r. When nobody has measured how well a kind of evidence predicts, the honest course is to say so and to use a small r, because the record of human forecasting says that evidence which feels decisive rarely is.

Check yourself

1. A founder tells you her new restaurant will be profitable in its first year because the chef is brilliant and the location is perfect. What is the reference class, and what is the first question to ask about it?

Answer: new restaurants of a similar kind and size, opened in similar markets. The first question is what share of them were profitable in their first year, before anything is said about this chef or this location. Only then ask how much "brilliant chef" and "perfect location" have predicted for the others, since most founders in the class believed the same about theirs.

2. A team says its evidence is so strong that the forecast should sit exactly on its plan. In the language of Step 3, what are they claiming?

Answer: that r = 1, a perfect correlation between their kind of evidence and the outcome. With r = 1 the formula returns the inside estimate unchanged. Unless the same evidence has, in the past, predicted outcomes without error, the claim is too strong, and Step 4 shows the cost: below r = 0.5, a forecast that trusts the case completely does worse than one that ignores it.

3. In a class of start-up software products, 60% reach their first-year sales target. Your product team, on the specifics, puts its own chance at 90%. Past experience suggests this kind of team assessment correlates about 0.4 with whether targets are met. What chance would you write down?

Answer: 60 + (0.4 x (90 - 60)) = 60 + 12 = 72%. The team's case earns a move of four tenths of the way from the class toward its view: a real adjustment, and much smaller than the team would like.

4. Lovallo and Kahneman's 2003 article lays out the method in five steps and closes with this example: your intuitive forecast of a film's ticket sales is $95 million, films in its reference class averaged $40 million, and you put the correlation between such forecasts and their outcomes at 0.6. The article prints the regressed estimate as 95 + (0.6 x (40 - 95)) = 62, $62 million. Is that the rule of Step 3?

Answer: no. The rule starts at the class and moves a fraction r of the way toward the forecast: 40 + (0.6 x (95 - 40)) = 40 + 33 = 73, $73 million. The printed line starts at the forecast and moves r of the way toward the class, which keeps (1 - r) of the forecast's distance; it is the right answer for a correlation of 0.4, not 0.6. Try the extremes: at a correlation of 1 the printed line would throw a perfectly reliable forecast away and land on the class average, and at 0 it would keep a worthless forecast whole, the reverse of what reliability should do, and the reverse of the article's own point that the less reliable the prediction, the more it must be regressed toward the mean. Step 4 is how you settle such a disagreement: the error is lowest at b = r, not at b = 1 - r. Kahneman and Tversky's own worked example, in the 1977 report that became the 1979 chapter, runs the right way: a book forecast at 12,000 copies, a class that averages 4,000, a correlation of 0.6, and a regressed estimate of 4,000 + (0.6 x (12,000 - 4,000)) = 8,800 copies.

Teach me more
  • From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right, Bent Flyvbjerg, Project Management Journal, 2006 (free on arXiv; about 17 pages of text, then tables and figures). The source of Step 2 and the United Kingdom's table: the three steps of the method, the curriculum story, how the uplifts were read off each class, and the Edinburgh tram, the first project appraised this way. It never shows how far a case may move from its class beyond one paragraph; Steps 3 and 4 above are that missing half.
  • The outside view, Jason Collins, chapter 23 of his course notes on behavioural economics and corporate decision making (about 2,000 words). A plain, short tour of the inside and outside views with the curriculum story and Lovallo and Kahneman's five steps, quoted from their 2003 article with its film example. Good to read first, or to send to a colleague; then do question 4 above on the example's arithmetic.
  • When Should You Deviate From the Base Rate?, Ryan Beck, Metaculus (about 2,000 words). A forecaster's practical guide to choosing a reference class and deciding when the case in front of you justifies leaving it, with worked examples. The closest thing on the web to Step 3 in practice.
  • Reference class forecasting, Wikipedia. A quick overview with the three steps and the Edinburgh tram's numbers. Terse; read it after this lesson.

The papers behind the Library entry are Kahneman and Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction", Psychological Review, 1973, which gives the principle of Step 3 (their 1979 chapter "Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures" turns it into the procedure); Kahneman and Lovallo, "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts", Management Science, 1993, which names the inside and outside views; and Flyvbjerg, "From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right", Project Management Journal, 2006, which turns the outside view into the procedure of Step 2. The curriculum story and the five steps of question 4 are in Lovallo and Kahneman, "Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions", Harvard Business Review, July 2003.

The limits of subjective probability

The question has no answer worth buying

Some questions cannot be answered defensibly from any evidence obtainable in the time available. When that is true we say so before you spend, and it is often the most useful sentence in the conversation.

Born to answer
Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961: uncertainty that admits no probability.
What it does now
Declining the question before the client spends on it.
The mathematics
No structure applies, and naming that is the discipline
The full entry
Where it began

Frank Knight drew the line in 1921 between risk, which can be measured, and uncertainty, which cannot, and Ellsberg's urns made the line experimentally real. Gilboa's modern treatment keeps the honest case: some questions have no probability that a careful person could defend, and the rational response is to decide in a way that does not require one.

Why it works now

The temptation to manufacture a number has grown with the tools that can produce one. The discipline that has become cheaper is the opposite: checking, quickly and thoroughly, whether anyone anywhere is positioned to know the thing, and if nobody is, saying so before the client spends. The Desk does this in the conversation. It is the entry in the Library that exists to refuse.

When it applies

The question turns on something nobody can observe in time (a private decision not yet made, a hidden preference, a future negotiation), or on a quantity with no comparable history and no one positioned to know it.

What we would ask

Who, anywhere, is actually positioned to know this today?
If nobody is, what decision would you make under that uncertainty, and is that the real question?

What it needs

Candor about what is observable; a reframing of the decision so it can be made under the uncertainty rather than after resolving it.

How we would get it

None sold. The Research Director reframes the decision to the question that can be answered, if there is one, and otherwise declines.

Where it breaks

Declining what could have been partially answered; substance first, handoff last is the rule for everything short of this case.

For example

A client wants to know whether a specific acquirer will bid for a specific target next quarter. Nobody outside that acquirer's board knows, and they will not say. The answerable question is what the target is worth to that acquirer and what a bid would need to look like, which is a different engagement.

The mathematics in fullNo structure applies; this is the boundary of the library, and naming it is the discipline. Taught in

MECS 550-1

Sources

Ellsberg (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75(4), 643. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884324
Gilboa, Itzhak (2009). Theory of Decision under Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press. (book)

Framing and the strategy table

The option you did not list

Most decisions arrive as a choice between two things. Before analyzing either, we generate the alternatives that were never listed, and we separate what has already been decided from what is being decided now and what can be deferred.

Born to answer
Howard at Stanford: the decision hierarchy and generated alternatives.
What it does now
Finding the third option a yes-or-no memo left out.
The mathematics
A strategy is one coherent path across the dimensions
The full entry
Where it began

Howard's decision analysis at Stanford insists that the quality of a decision is decided before any analysis, by the frame and the alternatives, and it supplies two tools: the decision hierarchy, which separates what is taken as given from what is being decided and what is deferred, and the strategy table, which lays out every dimension of a strategy with its options so that whole strategies can be composed rather than two options compared. The Stanford text calls the failure to recognize alternatives one of the most expensive errors in practice.

Why it works now

Alternatives were generated in a workshop by whoever was in the room. The table can now be built in a conversation, with the dimensions and options drawn from comparable decisions in the record and from Advisors who have seen the versions that were never listed. The Desk asks what has already been decided that this decision takes as given, and what the client would do if both listed options were unavailable.

When it applies

A yes-or-no decision; a choice between two options that both feel wrong; a plan whose alternatives were set by whoever wrote the memo.

What we would ask

What has already been decided that this decision takes as given, and should it?
If both of these options were unavailable, what would you do?

What it needs

The decision hierarchy stated explicitly, and a structured search for alternatives across the dimensions of the strategy.

How we would get it

The Research Director builds the strategy table with the client and the Advisors before any evidence is gathered: each dimension of the decision, its options, and the coherent combinations.

Where it breaks

Analyzing the two listed options with great care; the answer was a third one.

For example

A board is deciding whether to sell a division or keep it. Laid out as a table, there are also a partial sale, a joint venture, a carve-out with a service agreement, and a run-off. Two of those are worth more than either original option, and the research is redirected to them.

The mathematics in fullA decision hierarchy separates the givens, the decision, and the deferred; a strategy table lists each dimension of the strategy with its options, and a strategy is one coherent path across the columns. Taught in

MS&E 252 and 352 (Stanford); MECN-451

Sources

Howard, Ronald A. and Abbas, Ali E. (2016). Foundations of Decision Analysis. Pearson. (book)
Howard (1988). Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise. Management Science 34(6), 679-695. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.34.6.679

Spin glasses and the NK model (Parisi; Kauffman; Levinthal)

Rugged landscapes: why the best local answer is not the best answer

We ask whether a company's choices interact. When each choice's payoff depends on the others, the landscape of possible configurations is rugged, with many peaks, and a company that improves one thing at a time climbs to the nearest peak and stops there, usually far below the best. Parisi showed in the physics of disordered systems that such landscapes have an enormous number of local minima arranged in a hierarchy of valleys; Kauffman's NK model gave a tunable version in which the number of interactions sets the ruggedness, and Levinthal brought it to organizations, where a firm's form at founding decides which peak it climbs and local adaptation never finds another. We count the choices, estimate how many of them interact, compute how many peaks that implies and how far a local climber is likely to fall short, and ask whether the company is still improving step by step on a peak it reached long ago, and what a coordinated move of many choices at once would cost and could find.

Born to answer
Physical Review Letters, 1979; Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1987; Management Science, 1997.
What it does now
Whether step-by-step improvement is trapped on a local peak.
The mathematics
Expected local optima 2^N / (N + 1) when K = N - 1
The full entry
Where it began

Sewall Wright drew fitness landscapes in 1932 to picture how populations climb toward better combinations of genes. David Sherrington and Scott Kirkpatrick wrote down in 1975 a solvable model of a spin glass, a magnet whose random couplings cannot all be satisfied at once, and Giorgio Parisi solved it between 1979 and 1983 with a method, replica symmetry breaking, that revealed an enormous number of low-energy states arranged in a hierarchy of valleys within valleys; Kirkpatrick, Daniel Gelatt and Mario Vecchi (1983) turned the physics into simulated annealing, a way of searching such landscapes by sometimes accepting worse moves. Stuart Kauffman and Simon Levin (1987) built the general theory of adaptive walks on rugged landscapes, and Kauffman and Edward Weinberger (1989) the NK model, whose single parameter K tunes a landscape from one smooth peak to a field of thousands. Daniel Levinthal (1997) brought the NK model to organizations in Management Science, Jan Rivkin (2000) showed that complex strategies resist imitation for the same reason, and Giovanni Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) gave managers' mental maps a role in choosing where to search. Parisi shared the 2021 Nobel Prize in physics with Manabe and Hasselmann; Kauffman and Levinthal are not laureates, and the business application is theirs.

Why it works now

The record of a company's design changes and their results, and the configurations its rivals run, can now be assembled from filings, product histories and public data, and the ruggedness the interactions imply, the expected number of peaks and the price of a coordinated move can be computed outside the conversation. Which interactions are real, and which configurations were tried and abandoned, is still known to the executives who ran the redesigns.

When it applies

A company whose performance has plateaued after years of incremental improvement while a rival with a different design is winning; a turnaround or a redesign that changes many things at once; a question whether a successful configuration can be copied piece by piece (Rivkin 2000 says not, when the pieces interact); a decision between optimizing the current model and trying a different one; a research or product portfolio choosing between many small bets and a few large ones. Not to be confused with research-saturation, which asks when to stop paying for more research; the-alternative-not-listed, which looks for the option a memo left out; evolutionary-dynamics, which asks which practices spread in a population; or dynamic-capabilities, which reads a firm's record of reconfiguring: this asks whether the choices interact so strongly that step-by-step improvement is trapped, and what would be needed to find a higher peak.

What we would ask

Of the company's main design choices, how many have a payoff that depends on how the others are set, rather than standing on their own?
When did the company last change several of those choices at once, what did it find, and what would it cost to try a different configuration now?

What it needs

The list of design choices that define the business (product architecture, channel, pricing model, organization, technology, locations), evidence on which of them interact (a change in one that raised or lowered the return to another), the record of incremental improvements and their diminishing returns, the configurations rivals use and their results, and the cost and reversibility of a coordinated change.

How we would get it

The Desk maps the choices and their interactions from the record of changes and their results, computes the ruggedness the interactions imply, the expected number of peaks and the likely gap between a local peak and the best, and prices a coordinated move against the plateau. What the record cannot show is which interactions are real and which configurations were tried and abandoned; former executives who ran redesigns and people who have built the rival's configuration know that.

Where it breaks

Choices that do not interact, so the landscape is smooth and step-by-step improvement finds the top; a plateau that is a market limit, not a local peak; a long jump treated as a cure, when a random distant configuration is usually worse than a well-climbed local peak and the expected tries to find a better one double with each improvement already made (Kauffman and Levin 1987); the model's peaks read as real options when no one knows the landscape, which is why Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) give the manager's mental map a role; and interactions assumed to be many because the business is complicated, when the test is whether one change moved the return to another.

For example

A company's business is defined by ten binary choices. If none of them interacts with another, the landscape has one peak and improving one choice at a time reaches it. If each choice's payoff depends on all nine others, the expected number of local peaks is 2^10 / 11, about 93, and a company that improves one choice at a time climbs to whichever of the 93 is nearest its starting point, with no way to tell how far below the best it stopped. With twenty interacting choices there are about 50,000 peaks. A rival that arrived with a different configuration sits on a different peak, and copying it one choice at a time means descending first, which is why complex strategies are hard to imitate. Jumping to a distant configuration is a lottery whose odds worsen with success: after ten improvements a random jump needs about 1,024 tries to find a better spot on average, which is why mature companies stop jumping, and why the ones that do usually jump with a map, a rival's design or a founder's.

The mathematics in fullIn Kauffman's NK model each of N binary choices contributes a fitness that depends on its own state and on K others, drawn at random; total fitness is the average. With K = 0 the landscape has one peak and local search finds it; with K = N - 1 the fitness values are independent across configurations, the expected number of local optima is 2^N / (N + 1), adaptive walks to a local optimum are short, and the expected fitness of local optima falls toward the mean as N grows (Kauffman and Levin 1987; Kauffman and Weinberger 1989). On such a landscape the expected number of random long jumps needed to find a fitter configuration doubles after each success, 2^s after s improvements. Levinthal (1997): firms are configurations of N attributes with interaction K; local search leads each to the peak nearest its founding form, so the founding form persists and diversity survives when K is high. In the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick spin glass the energy H = -sum over pairs of J_ij s_i s_j, with random couplings, has a number of metastable states that grows exponentially with N, organized in a hierarchy of valleys (Parisi 1979, 1983; Mezard, Parisi and Virasoro 1987); simulated annealing escapes poor minima by accepting worse moves with a probability that falls as the temperature is lowered (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi 1983). Where it comes from

Sherrington and Kirkpatrick (1975), Solvable Model of a Spin-Glass, Physical Review Letters; Parisi (1979), Infinite Number of Order Parameters for Spin-Glasses, and (1983), Order Parameter for Spin-Glasses, Physical Review Letters; Mezard, Parisi and Virasoro, Spin Glass Theory and Beyond (1987); Parisi's Nobel lecture (2023), Multiple equilibria, Reviews of Modern Physics; Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi (1983), Optimization by Simulated Annealing, Science; Kauffman and Levin (1987), Towards a general theory of adaptive walks on rugged landscapes, and Kauffman and Weinberger (1989), The NK model of rugged fitness landscapes, Journal of Theoretical Biology; Kauffman, The Origins of Order (1993), the chapter on the structure of rugged fitness landscapes; Levinthal (1997), Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes, Management Science; Rivkin (2000), Imitation of Complex Strategies, Management Science; Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), Administrative Science Quarterly; Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003), Management Science; March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993) on exploration and exploitation; Kauffman and Levinthal are not Nobel laureates; the physics is Parisi's and the business application is theirs

Sources

Sherrington, Kirkpatrick (1975). Solvable Model of a Spin-Glass. Physical Review Letters 35(26), 1792-1796. https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.35.1792
Parisi (1979). Infinite Number of Order Parameters for Spin-Glasses. Physical Review Letters 43(23), 1754-1756. https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.43.1754
Parisi (1983). Order Parameter for Spin-Glasses. Physical Review Letters 50(24), 1946-1948. https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.50.1946
Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, Vecchi (1983). Optimization by Simulated Annealing. Science 220(4598), 671-680. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.220.4598.671
Kauffman, Levin (1987). Towards a general theory of adaptive walks on rugged landscapes. Journal of Theoretical Biology 128(1), 11-45. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(87)80029-2
Kauffman, Weinberger (1989). The NK model of rugged fitness landscapes and its application to maturation of the immune response. Journal of Theoretical Biology 141(2), 211-245. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80019-0
Levinthal (1997). Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes. Management Science 43(7), 934-950. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.7.934
Rivkin (2000). Imitation of Complex Strategies. Management Science 46(6), 824-844. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.6.824.11940
Gavetti, Levinthal (2000). Looking Forward and Looking Backward: Cognitive and Experiential Search. Administrative Science Quarterly 45(1), 113-137. https://doi.org/10.2307/2666981
Rivkin, Siggelkow (2003). Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies Among Elements of Organizational Design. Management Science 49(3), 290-311. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.3.290.12740
Levinthal, March (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal 14(S2), 95-112. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250141009
March (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. Organization Science 2(1), 71-87. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.71
Parisi (2023). Nobel Lecture: Multiple equilibria. Reviews of Modern Physics 95(3). https://doi.org/10.1103/revmodphys.95.030501
Mezard, Parisi and Virasoro (1987). Spin Glass Theory and Beyond. World Scientific. (book)
Kauffman (1993). The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University Press. (book)

Weitzman's Pandora's rule (optimal sequential search)

Pandora's box: which option to check first, and when to stop

When several options can each be checked at a cost, and only the best one found will be kept, we give each option one number, its reservation value, worked out from that option alone: its cost to check and the spread of what checking might find. Then we check options in descending order of that number, and stop as soon as the best result in hand beats the number of every option still unchecked. Martin Weitzman proved in 1979 that this simple rule is the best possible policy, and he called it Pandora's rule. Its lesson runs against instinct: the order of checking is not the order of expected value. Only the upside counts toward the number, so an option with a long right tail can rightly be checked before a safer option with a higher average: a lucky first look ends the search early. And the number falls as the check gets dearer, so cheap checks widen the search and dear ones narrow it.

Born to answer
Weitzman, 1979: check the option with the highest reservation value first; stop when the best found beats every unchecked one.
What it does now
Which costly check to make first, and when the search has found enough.
The mathematics
c_i = E[max(X_i - z_i, 0)]; open in descending z_i; stop when y > every remaining z_i
The full entry
Where it began

Martin Weitzman, then at MIT, wrote the paper in 1978 under a Department of Energy contract and posed a general search problem, with job search, shopping for the lowest price and research and development as its interpretations. His opening example was research and development: of two uncertain technologies that would do the same job, which should be developed first, when only the better will be used? One project was cheaper, faster, safer and higher in expected value; the other was dearer, slower and mostly a long shot; and the long shot should be researched first. To state the general case he imagined Pandora before a row of closed boxes, each costing something to open and each hiding a prize, and he named it himself: the section is headed Pandora's Problem, with a footnote apologizing to connoisseurs of Greek mythology, and he called the solution Pandora's rule. Later work kept the name as Pandora's box problem and Weitzman's rule. The rule belongs to the same family of index results that John Gittins published the same year for bandit problems: a hard dynamic choice reduced to one number per option.

Why it works now

The cost of a look has fallen for some checks and not for others: a filing, a dataset or a model run is nearly free, while an hour with the right former executive is still dear and scarce. That makes the order of checks matter more, not less, because cheap looks can be spent freely and dear ones should go first to the options with the widest upside. Generating options is cheaper than ever; checking them is not, and once a budget caps the checks, options beyond what it can check help only when they can be ranked before they are checked.

When it applies

A list of experts to interview, hypotheses to test, sites to survey, candidates to screen, deals to diligence or suppliers to qualify, where each look costs time or money, the looks come one at a time, and in the end one answer or one option is used. Also a checking budget: with budget B and cost c a check, only B / c options can be looked at, and the question is which and in what order. Not to be confused with value-of-information: value of information prices one look; Pandora's rule orders many looks and says when to stop. The two meet at the stopping point, since z is the level at which one more look just pays for itself; they part on the order, and ranking looks by their value taken one at a time is the error the rule corrects. Nor with search-and-matching, which is about frictions in whole markets, or rugged-landscapes, where the options are linked and one finding moves the odds of the next. The order of checks that this entry sets is also how falsification-before-conviction is made cheap: a dated test is a way of lowering the cost of opening a box. And the best option found is, on average, worse than it looked when it was picked (winners-curse, noise-audit) whenever the check itself is noisy.

What we would ask

For each option still unchecked, what does a check cost, and what is the best it could plausibly turn up and how likely is that?
Does the best result in hand already beat what every unchecked option could reasonably offer, so the search should stop?

What it needs

The options; for each, the cost of a check (time, money, the goodwill of a busy person) and a rough distribution of what the check might show, above all its upper end; how long each check takes and the cost of waiting; and the fallback, what is kept if nothing better turns up.

How we would get it

The Desk lists the options, prices each check, sketches what each could turn up, computes the reservation values, and sets the order and the stopping point; it says which numbers are assumptions. What it cannot know from records is the upper tail of each option, how good the best answer could be; people who have done such checks before, and the people being checked, can say what a good result looks like and how often it comes.

Where it breaks

The rule assumes independent boxes with known distributions. When prizes are correlated, so that opening one box teaches something about the others, or when the distributions are only guessed, the index is a guide, not an optimum; Weitzman himself said so, and offered it as a rough planning guide and a screening device. It also assumes each box must be opened before its prize can be taken (Doval, 2018, drops that, and the simple ranking stops being optimal), that only the best prize matters (Olszewski and Weber, 2015), that the searcher is neutral to risk, and that a box once found can be recalled. With a hard cap on how many boxes may be opened, the rule picks the order within the chosen set but not which boxes make the set. It says nothing about which options get generated in the first place; and once the budget caps the checks, generating more options beyond what the budget can check adds value only if they can be ranked before checking. And the probabilities in any worked figure are illustrations, not measurements. This is not investment advice.

For example

Two boxes, each costing $5 to open. A safe box holds $60 for certain; its reservation value z solves 5 = 60 - z, so z = $55. A long shot holds $200 with probability 0.2 and nothing otherwise; its mean is $40, but its z solves 5 = 0.2 x (200 - z), so z = $175. Open the long shot first: if it pays, stop; if not, open the safe box. That policy is worth -5 + 0.2 x 200 + 0.8 x (-5 + 60) = $79, against $78 for the safe box first, even though the safe box alone ($55) beats the long shot alone ($35): ranking the looks by their value one at a time opens the safe box first and gives up $1. The order turns on the cost: z falls by $1 for each $1 of cost on the safe box and by $5 on the long shot, so at $35 a check both reservation values are $25 and above it the safe box comes first. Weitzman's own example has the same twist: a dearer, slower, riskier project, worth 19.7 alone against 55.5, should be researched first (56.3 against 55.9). For a budget, $50,000 at $5,000 a check allows k = 10 checks of options alike before checking; the best of them averages at most m(10) = 1.54 standard deviations above the mean, reached only if all ten are checked, and halving the cost to $2,500 raises the bound to m(20) = 1.87. In diligence, three people could settle a question: an analyst at $1,000 whose usable answer is worth $6,000 for certain (z = $5,000), a former executive at $2,000 with a 25 percent chance of a decisive answer worth $40,000 (z = $32,000), and a customer at $500 with an even chance of an answer worth $12,000 (z = $11,000). The rule interviews the former executive first, then the customer, then the analyst, and is worth $14,000, the same as the full optimum; the surest first is worth $13,250, and the cheapest first $13,750 even when it skips a call that can no longer help. The values are assumptions stated for the illustration.

The mathematics in fullBox i holds a prize X_i with known distribution F_i, independent of the others; opening it costs c_i and takes time t_i, with discount factor beta_i = e^(-r t_i); a fallback x_0 can always be kept. The reservation value z_i solves c_i = beta_i E[max(X_i - z_i, 0)] - (1 - beta_i) z_i, which without discounting is c_i = E[max(X_i - z_i, 0)]: the cost of a look equals the expected amount by which the prize beats z_i. Pandora's rule: open the closed box with the highest z_i; stop when the best prize found, y, exceeds every remaining z_i; keep y (Weitzman 1979). Because the right side counts only the part of X_i above z_i, mass below z_i does not affect it, a mean preserving spread never lowers z_i (and raises it when the spread reaches above z_i), and dz_i / dc_i = -1 / P(X_i > z_i) without discounting, so z_i falls as c_i rises, with time t_i and with the rate r. For a prize of R with probability p and nothing otherwise, without discounting and when p R > c_i, z_i = (p R - c_i) / p. With a budget B, at most k = B / c boxes; for boxes alike before checking, each normal with mean mu and spread sigma, the expected best of the k checked is at most mu + m(k) sigma, where m(k) is the expected maximum of k standard normals, which grows like sqrt(2 ln k) and never exceeds it (m(10) = 1.54, m(20) = 1.87, m(100) = 2.51). Where it comes from

Weitzman (1979), Optimal search for the best alternative, Econometrica 47(3), 641-654, which states the problem as Pandora's Problem and proves Pandora's rule optimal; Gittins (1979), Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices: the index idea of which Weitzman's rule can be read as a case; What came after: Chade and Smith (2006) on choosing a set all at once; Olszewski and Weber (2015) on payoffs that depend on more than the best prize; Kleinberg, Waggoner and Weyl (2016) on auctions when bidders pay to look; Doval (2018) and Beyhaghi and Kleinberg (2019) on taking a box without opening it; The bound on the best of k checked options uses the expected maximum of k standard normals (Harter, 1961, tabulated it); The worked figures are Vista's illustrations, the two boxes from the conversation of 25 October 2026; the paper's own example is reproduced in pandora-parts/examples.py

Sources

Weitzman (1979). Optimal Search for the Best Alternative. Econometrica 47(3), 641. https://doi.org/10.2307/1910412
Gittins (1979). Bandit Processes and Dynamic Allocation Indices. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 41(2), 148-164. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
Chade, Smith (2006). Simultaneous Search. Econometrica 74(5), 1293-1307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00705.x
Olszewski, Weber (2015). A more general Pandora rule? Journal of Economic Theory 160, 429-437. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.009
Kleinberg, Waggoner, Weyl (2016). Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23-24. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940760
Doval (2018). Whether or not to open Pandora's box. Journal of Economic Theory 175, 127-158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.005
Beyhaghi, Kleinberg (2019). Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 131-132. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329626

Weighing evidence

How much each source and each fact should move a belief, and how to know when it did.

Bayesian updating

The thesis as a list of things that must be true

We break the thesis into the five to seven assumptions it rests on, say how each stands on the evidence, and record what moved each one and why.

Born to answer
Bayes, 1763: inferring a ball's position from where later balls fall.
What it does now
The thesis as five to seven claims, each with what moved it.
The mathematics
Odds(H | E) = Odds(H) x likelihood ratio
The full entry
Where it began

Thomas Bayes's essay, published in 1763 after his death, imagined a ball rolled onto a table and its position inferred from where later balls landed to its left or right: with each new ball, the belief about the first one's position updates. Laplace made it a working method. The odds form, in which each piece of evidence multiplies the odds by how much likelier it is under one hypothesis than the other, is what a working analyst actually uses.

Why it works now

The ledger was never kept because writing down every assumption and what moved it was clerical work nobody did. AI makes the clerical part free: every interview and document can be tagged to the assumption it bears on and the direction it moved it. What must not change is that the movement is stated in words, more likely than not, the evidence conflicts, unresolved, and not as a number that nothing calibrates. Vista keeps the ledger in the brief and preserves it afterward, which is how a track record starts.

When it applies

A thesis stated as a narrative rather than as claims that could be false; or a client who cannot say which assumption the whole thing rests on.

What we would ask

What has to be true for this to work? Say it as a sentence that could be false.
Which of those, if it fell, takes the rest with it?

What it needs

Each assumption stated falsifiably, with the evidence for and against it kept separate and traceable to its source.

How we would get it

The report opens with the ledger: each assumption, a plain-language confidence band (more likely than not; the evidence conflicts; unresolved), what moved it, and where the transcript supports it. No invented percentages.

Where it breaks

Numbers dressed as calibrated probabilities that are in fact intuition; a ledger written after the conclusion to justify it.

For example

A thesis on a software company reduces to seven sentences. Two are well supported, three conflict, and one is unresolved and decisive: that customers past two hundred seats face real switching costs. The engagement is built around that sentence.

The mathematics in fullOdds(H | E) = Odds(H) x LR; stated in prose as which direction each piece of evidence moved each assumption and how strongly, with the likelihood ratio the reason and never a displayed number. Taught in

DECS-430; MATH 385

Sources

Bayes (1763). An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London(53), 370-418. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstl.1763.0053

Learn the math
The question

An analyst walks into the investment committee with a thesis on a software company, and it is a good story. The product is loved, the big customers are locked in, the new pricing will stick, the sales team is finally fixed, and the market is about to double. Every sentence is plausible. Three weeks later she comes back from a round of customer interviews, and the committee asks the only question that matters: what changed?

She cannot say. Some calls sounded good and some sounded bad, and her conviction drifted upward the way conviction does when you have spent three weeks on something. Nobody wrote down which call bore on which part of the story, how much it should have moved it, or whether two of the good calls were really the same person's opinion heard twice.

This lesson is about the ledger that fixes that: the thesis broken into the handful of sentences that must be true, and for each sentence, a running record of what moved it and by how much. The arithmetic underneath is Bayes' rule in its odds form, which is the simplest useful formula in all of evidence: new odds equal old odds times the likelihood ratio. By the end you will be able to update an assumption by hand, spot the most common way a ledger fools its keeper, and see why a thesis of seven likely sentences can still be unlikely.

The idea in one paragraph

A belief is never "proven" by a piece of evidence; it is pushed. How hard it is pushed depends on one comparison: how much more likely you were to see this evidence if the assumption is true than if it is false. Evidence you would have seen either way, however vivid, pushes nothing. Evidence that is four times likelier if the assumption is true quadruples the odds in its favor, whatever the odds were before. Because each push multiplies, pushes can be added on a logarithmic scale, like weights on a balance, and a ledger is simply the list of weights with the reason for each. Two cautions travel with it. A weight may be entered only once, so an echo of an earlier source weighs nothing. And a thesis needs all of its sentences at once, so its strength is far below that of its typical sentence.

The math, step by step

Step 1: Bayes' rule, from counting. Take 100 situations like the one in front of you. In 40 of them the assumption H is true; in 60 it is false. A piece of evidence E shows up in 30 of the 40 where H is true and in 15 of the 60 where it is false. You have just seen E. Among the 45 situations that produce E, H is true in 30, so the chance H is true, given E, is 30 out of 45, or 66.7 percent.

That is the whole of Bayes' rule. Written with symbols, P(H) is the chance of H before the evidence (here 0.40), P(E | H) is the chance of E when H is true (0.75), and P(E | not H) is the chance of E when H is false (0.25). The count of situations with both H and E is 100 x P(H) x P(E | H), which is 30, and the count with E at all is the sum of the two ways it can happen. Divide:

P(H | E) = (P(H) x P(E | H)) / ((P(H) x P(E | H)) + (P(not H) x P(E | not H)))

= (0.40 x 0.75) / ((0.40 x 0.75) + (0.60 x 0.25)) = 0.30 / 0.45 = 0.667

The bottom line of the fraction, the total chance of seeing E, is what makes the formula awkward to use in your head. The next step gets rid of it.

Step 2: the odds form. Odds compare the two sides directly: the odds on H are P(H) / P(not H). Before the evidence the odds were 40 to 60, or 2/3. Now write Bayes' rule once for H and once for not H, calling the awkward bottom line P(E), the total chance of seeing E:

P(H | E)     = (P(H) x P(E | H)) / P(E)
P(not H | E) = (P(not H) x P(E | not H)) / P(E)

Divide the first line by the second. The P(E) is the same in both, so it cancels:

P(H | E) / P(not H | E) = (P(H) / P(not H)) x (P(E | H) / P(E | not H))

In words:

new odds = old odds x likelihood ratio

The likelihood ratio, LR = P(E | H) / P(E | not H), is the evidence's whole contribution: here 0.75 / 0.25 = 3. So the new odds are (2/3) x 3 = 2, two to one in favor, which is 30 situations against 15 in the count above, and turning odds back into a chance, 2 / (1 + 2), gives 66.7 percent again. Same answer, but now the old belief and the new evidence sit in separate boxes, and you can argue about each one on its own. To convert in general: a chance p is odds of p / (1 - p), and odds of o are a chance of o / (1 + o).

Step 3: what the likelihood ratio says, and what it does not. Notice what the ratio does not ask: it does not ask how likely E is if H is true. It asks how much likelier. A customer saying "we love the product" might be very likely if the product is sticky, 90 percent say, but if customers say it 80 percent of the time anyway, to every vendor who calls, the ratio is 0.90 / 0.80 = 1.125 and the remark barely moves anything. The question a ledger keeper asks of every new fact is therefore: would I have been surprised to see this if my assumption were false? A ratio above 1 pushes toward the assumption, a ratio below 1 pushes away, and a ratio of exactly 1, evidence equally likely either way, leaves the odds where they were, however much it felt like news.

Step 4: several pieces of evidence, and the scale on which they add. If a second piece of evidence arrives, apply the same rule again, with the new odds as the old:

final odds = starting odds x LR(1) x LR(2) x ... x LR(n)

There is one condition hidden in that line, and it is the most important sentence in this lesson: each ratio must be computed given everything already entered. When the pieces are independent sources, that is just each ratio on its own. When the second piece is the first piece heard again, its ratio, given the first, is 1.

Multiplying many numbers is clumsy, so take logarithms, and the products become sums. Alan Turing did exactly this at Bletchley Park in the Second World War, working on the German naval Enigma. As his assistant I. J. Good later told it, he measured evidence in "bans", the base-10 logarithm of the factor by which the odds are multiplied (so one ban is a factor of 10), and in "decibans", a tenth of a ban, named by analogy with the decibel:

weight of evidence in decibans = 10 x log10(LR)

A ratio of 10 is 10 decibans, a ratio of 2 is about 3, a ratio of 3 is about 4.8, and a ratio of 1/2 is minus 3. The starting odds go on the same scale (odds of 2/3 are about minus 1.8 decibans). Then the final belief is just the starting weight plus the weights of the evidence: in Step 2, minus 1.8 plus 4.8 is 3.0, the weight of the final odds of 2. To come back from a weight w to odds, undo the logarithm: odds are 10 to the power w / 10. Good added a remark worth keeping beside any ledger: a deciban or half a deciban is about "the smallest change in weight of evidence that is directly perceptible" to intuition. A ratio of about 1.26 is one deciban; anything smaller, no one can honestly feel. Here is the picture to keep: a balance scale. Every piece of evidence is a weight placed on one pan or the other, and its size is set by the likelihood ratio, not by how loud it was. An echo of an earlier source is a weight of zero. The ledger is the list of weights, with a line saying why each one is as heavy as it is.

Step 5: a thesis is a conjunction. The thesis stands only if all its sentences are true together. If the sentences were independent, the chance of the whole would be the product of the chances of the parts:

P(all true) = p(1) x p(2) x ... x p(n)

Seven sentences, each 80 percent likely, give 0.8 to the seventh power, or 21 percent. At 90 percent each, 48 percent; at 70 percent each, 8 percent. At 80 percent each, the whole drops below a coin toss at the fourth sentence. This is why the ledger lists every assumption rather than the story as a whole: the story inherits the weakness of all its parts at once, and a vivid story hides that.

0%25%50%75%100%1246810Assumptions that must all be trueChance the whole thesis holdsa coin tossseven at 80%: 21%each 90% likelyeach 80% likelyeach 70% likely
Why the ledger lists every assumption. Strong links make a weak chain when there are enough of them, unless they stand or fall together.

Two refinements make this useful rather than merely gloomy. First, leverage: settling sentence i as true multiplies the whole by 1 / p(i). Settling a sentence already at 90 percent lifts the thesis by a factor of 1.11; settling one at 50 percent doubles it. That is the arithmetic behind the entry's second question, "which of those, if it fell, takes the rest with it?": the weakest load-bearing sentence is where research buys the most. Second, correlation: sentences that are really one question asked three ways stand or fall together and must be counted once, not three times. The independence in the product above is an assumption, and a ledger keeper says which sentences share a cause.

A worked example

Here is the software company from the Library entry, as a teaching case with round numbers we have assumed for the arithmetic. Its thesis reduces to seven sentences. One is unresolved and decisive: customers past two hundred seats face real switching costs. Start it at even odds, 1 to 1, because nothing is known yet. Then four pieces of evidence arrive. For each, the keeper writes the two chances that matter, the chance of hearing this if the sentence is true and if it is false, and enters the ratio.

evidence                                          P(E | true)  P(E | false)   LR    odds   chance
start                                                                                  1     50%
IT director, 400 seats: a move would take a year      0.60         0.15        4      4      80%
Former customer, 600 seats: left in one quarter        0.10         0.40       1/4     1      50%
Second interview repeating the first one's source       same         same        1      1      50%
Renewal record: on time in each of eight quarters      0.50         0.20       5/2    5/2     71%

In decibans the four entries are plus 6.0, minus 6.0, zero and plus 4.0, and they add to plus 4.0, which is the weight of a ratio of 5/2: the file taken as a whole. The first two entries cancel exactly, which is what the ledger's words "the evidence conflicts" mean in arithmetic. The third entry is the trap. The second interviewee cited the same vendor case study as the first director; given the first interview, hearing it again was no surprise either way, so its ratio is 1. A keeper who counted it as fresh, at the first interview's ratio of 4, would have ended at odds of 10 to 1, 91 percent, instead of 5 to 2, 71 percent. Nearly twenty points of confidence, earned by nothing.

0%25%50%75%100%01234Pieces of evidence entered in the ledgerChance the assumption is trueeven odds71%91% if the echo is countedcounted onceecho counted as new
One assumption, four entries. Each piece of evidence multiplies the odds by its likelihood ratio; the echo of an earlier source multiplies by one. Count it again and the ledger claims a confidence nothing earned.

And then the whole thesis. Suppose, purely for the arithmetic, that the two well-supported sentences sit at 90 percent, one other at 70 percent, the three where evidence conflicts at 50 percent each, and the decisive one at the 71 percent the ledger just reached. If all seven are independent, the thesis holds (0.9 x 0.9 x 0.7 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.714), about 5.1 percent of the time. If the three conflicting sentences are really one question asked three ways, they count once, and the figure is about 20 percent, four times higher. Neither number belongs in a client report, where the decisive sentence would read "more likely than not", with the renewal record as the reason and the two interviews set down as conflicting; the point is which question the research should go after, and how much it matters whether the three doubtful sentences are one doubt or three.

A real case: the mammography problem

In 1995 Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage gave people this problem. One percent of women screened at a certain age have breast cancer. If a woman has it, the mammogram is positive 80 percent of the time. If she does not, it is positive 9.6 percent of the time. A woman's test is positive; what is the chance she has cancer?

In odds form: the starting odds are 1 to 99. The likelihood ratio is 0.80 / 0.096, about 8.33. The new odds are (1/99) x 8.33, about 0.084, a chance of 7.8 percent. On the deciban scale, the starting weight is about minus 20 and the test adds about plus 9: a heavy weight on a pan that began far lower. To two decimals they are minus 19.96 and plus 9.21, which sum to minus 10.75, and 10 to the power minus 1.075 is the same odds of about 0.084. The same answer by counting: of 1,000 women, 10 have cancer and 8 of them test positive; of the 990 who do not, about 95 test positive; so 8 of the 103 positives have cancer, 7.8 percent.

The paper reports that physicians and students typically answer 70 to 80 percent, about ten times too high. Its real finding is about the format: across the fifteen problems of its first study, the students reasoned their way to the Bayesian answer 16 percent of the time when the problems were put in probabilities, and 46 percent of the time when the same problems were put in counts like the 8 of 103 above. The counts carry the starting odds along with them; the percentages let them fall out of sight.

An older question, put by Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger and Thomas Graboys to 60 people at four Harvard teaching hospitals in 1978 (20 house officers, 20 fourth-year medical students and 20 attending physicians), has the same shape: a disease in 1 person in 1,000, a test with a 5 percent false positive rate. Treat the test as catching every true case and the answer is about 2 percent, roughly one sick person among about 50 healthy people who test positive. Eleven of the 60 gave the right answer; the most common answer, given by 27, was 95 percent. When Arjun Manrai and colleagues put the same question to 61 physicians and students, in a replication published in 2014, 14 got it right. The lesson of both studies is the lesson of Step 2: the likelihood ratio, however strong, is only half of the answer, and the starting odds are the other half.

The usual mistakes
  • Asking how likely the evidence is if you are right, and stopping. Symptom: every supportive interview moves the ledger up. Fix: write the second number, how likely you would have been to hear it if you were wrong, before you enter anything; the ratio is the entry.
  • Counting an echo as a second witness. Symptom: three sources, one origin, and its weight entered three times. Fix: for each entry, ask where the source got it; if the answer is an earlier entry, its ratio given that entry is about 1.
  • Forgetting the starting odds. Symptom: a striking test result treated as near certainty, as in the mammography problem. Fix: write the starting odds on the first line of the ledger, and say where they came from.
  • Treating the thesis as strong because each part is. Symptom: seven "likely" sentences and a committee told the case is compelling. Fix: multiply, then ask which sentences share a cause, and say so.
  • Dressing intuition as arithmetic. Symptom: a ledger full of percentages to one decimal place, none of them measured. Fix: as the Library entry requires, state each movement in words (more likely than not; the evidence conflicts; unresolved), and keep the likelihood ratio as the reason given, not a number displayed as if calibrated.
Where the model breaks

The entry names two failures, and the arithmetic explains both. First, numbers that look calibrated but are intuition: the odds form is exact, but the ratios fed into it are judgments, and a judgment multiplied four times is still a judgment, now with false precision. That is why the ledger states direction and strength in words and keeps the ratio as the reasoning behind them. Robert Kass and Adrian Raftery's scale for Bayes factors (1995), which are likelihood ratios for whole hypotheses, is a reasonable guide to the words: a ratio from 1 to 3 is "not worth more than a bare mention", 3 to 20 is "positive", 20 to 150 "strong", and above 150 "very strong". By that scale, every entry in the worked example above is modest: the two interviews, at ratios of 4 and 1/4, are no more than "positive" for their sides, and the renewal record, at 5/2, is not worth more than a bare mention. Second, a ledger written after the conclusion to justify it: the update only means something if the ratios were judged before you knew where they would lead. A ledger that is kept from the first day, with each entry dated and traced to its source, can be checked later; one assembled at the end cannot. Beyond the entry's two, the method assumes you have named the right hypotheses: evidence can only shift weight between the possibilities on the page, and a ledger that never wrote down the alternative that turns out to be true will push confidently toward the wrong one.

Check yourself

1. A manager says, "Our biggest customer just renewed, which is exactly what we expected if the product is sticky." What do you need to know before you enter that renewal in the ledger?

Answer: how likely the renewal was if the product is not sticky. If big customers renew almost regardless (a long contract, inertia, no time to run a switch), the ratio is near 1 and the renewal weighs almost nothing, however welcome it is.

2. Two analysts each report that a supplier is running short of capacity, and each counts the other's report as confirmation. When is that right, and when is it double counting?

Answer: it is right only if each found it independently, from different evidence. If one read the other's note, or both read the same trade article, the second report's ratio, given the first, is about 1, and the finding goes in the ledger once.

3. An assumption starts at a chance of 1 in 4. Then evidence arrives that is three times likelier if the assumption is true, and then evidence that is twice as likely if it is false. Where does it end?

Answer: a chance of 1 in 4 is odds of 1 to 3. Then (1/3) x 3 x (1/2) = 1/2, odds of 1 to 2, which is a chance of (1/2) / (1 + (1/2)) = 1/3, one in three. The order of the two pieces does not matter: the product is the same either way.

Teach me more
  • Bayes theorem, the geometry of changing beliefs, Grant Sanderson, 3Blue1Brown (YouTube, 15 minutes 11 seconds). The best picture anywhere of where Bayes' rule comes from: first a count of librarians and farmers, then a population drawn as a square and sliced by the evidence, which is Step 1 here. It stays with probabilities and never reaches the odds form; watch it before Step 2.
  • The medical test paradox, and redesigning Bayes' rule, Grant Sanderson, 3Blue1Brown (YouTube, 21 minutes 13 seconds). By its own chapter list, it moves from the paradox of an accurate test that is usually wrong (0:00) to the Bayes factor, the likelihood ratio of Step 3 (5:53), and a reworked Bayes' rule built on it (11:00), then sets that against the usual formula (14:42). The companion to Steps 2 and 3 and to the mammography case.
  • Bayes' rule: Odds form, from the Arbital guide to Bayes' rule (Nate Soares, Eliezer Yudkowsky and others), now hosted on LessWrong. A short written page that does exactly Step 2: prior odds times the relative likelihoods, worked on a murder mystery (two suspects at odds of 1 to 2, a clue ten times likelier if the first did it, odds of 5 to 1 after). The parent guide, Bayes' rule, links on to the log-odds form of Step 4.

For the history, I. J. Good, "Studies in the History of Probability and Statistics. XXXVII. A. M. Turing's Statistical Work in World War II", Biometrika 66(2), 1979, pp. 393 to 396, tells the story of the ban and the deciban in four pages. The two studies are Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, "How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats", Psychological Review 102(4), 1995, pp. 684 to 704, and Casscells, Schoenberger and Graboys, "Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results", New England Journal of Medicine 299(18), 1978, pp. 999 to 1001, whose counts are tabulated in Manrai and others, JAMA Internal Medicine 174(6), 2014. The scale of words is from Kass and Raftery, "Bayes Factors", Journal of the American Statistical Association 90(430), 1995, pp. 773 to 795.

Informant accuracy

Who is reliable about what

We weight each source by what they were positioned to know, not by their title. A former salesperson is a strong source on pricing and a weak one on technology, and the report says which is which.

Born to answer
Romney, Weller and Batchelder, 1986: competence with no answer key.
What it does now
Weighting a source by what they were positioned to see.
The mathematics
Weight source i by its reliability r(i, d) in domain d
The full entry
Where it began

Romney, Weller, and Batchelder's 1986 cultural consensus model came from anthropology, where informants are asked about their own culture and there is no answer key. The model estimates each informant's competence from how much they agree with the others, and recovers the consensus answers without knowing them in advance. Competence, it turned out, is specific to the domain of the questions.

Why it works now

Expert networks have always sold access and left reliability to the client's intuition. What is now feasible is to record, for every Advisor, what they could observe from where and when, to tag each claim in a transcript by the domain it belongs to, and to weight the synthesis accordingly, so that a former salesperson counts heavily on pricing and lightly on technology. Over many engagements that becomes a dataset about which kinds of sources are reliable about which kinds of claims, which no one has ever built.

When it applies

Evidence from several sources of unequal access, recency, and incentive is being averaged as if it were equal; or a senior title is being treated as expertise on everything.

What we would ask

What did this person actually see, from where, and how long ago?
What do they gain if you believe them?

What it needs

For each source: role, access, recency, incentives, conflicts, and independence from the other sources.

How we would get it

Advisors are chosen by vantage point, and each interview records what the Advisor could and could not observe; the synthesis weights claims by that record, not by seniority.

Where it breaks

A single universal credibility score per source; reliability treated as a trait rather than as domain-specific.

For example

Three sources agree the product is winning. One is a former sales lead who saw the pipeline, one a customer who saw the product, one an analyst who saw the pitch. On pricing, the first counts most; on product fit, the second; the third counts on neither.

The mathematics in fullFor source i on domain d, a reliability r(i, d) enters the likelihood ratio of that source's report; the aggregate is a weighted sum of log likelihood ratios, with weights for reliability, relevance, recency, and independence. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (informant accuracy); DECS-430

Sources

Romney, Weller, Batchelder (1986). Culture as Consensus: A Theory of Culture and Informant Accuracy. American Anthropologist 88(2), 313-338. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1986.88.2.02a00020

Informational cascades

Five sources, or one source heard five times

Before we count confirming sources we check whether they saw the thing themselves or heard it from each other. Five customers who share an implementation partner are closer to one observation than to five.

Born to answer
Banerjee and Bikhchandani, 1992: diners choosing the fuller restaurant.
What it does now
Counting independent clusters of evidence, not voices.
The mathematics
Log odds add only across independent evidence
The full entry
Where it began

Abhijit Banerjee's 1992 model has diners choosing between two restaurants: each sees a private signal and the choices of those ahead, and after a few people the crowd follows the crowd regardless of what anyone privately knows. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch published the general theory of informational cascades the same year and used it to explain fads and fashions that flip on almost nothing.

Why it works now

A research firm used to count confirming sources. It could not trace where each source got the story, so five agreeing calls looked like strong evidence even when four had heard it from the fifth. Provenance is now traceable: transcripts can be read for who saw what directly and who is repeating, and Advisors can be recruited from deliberately separate channels. The brief counts independent clusters, not voices.

When it applies

Consensus among sources is being treated as strong evidence; the sources share a channel, a consultant, a conference, or an outage; or a market view has converged quickly.

What we would ask

How did each of these people come to know this? Did any of them see it directly?
Do they talk to each other, or to the same third party?

What it needs

The provenance chain of each claim; a map of which sources share upstream sources.

How we would get it

Advisors recruited deliberately from different channels and vantage points; the report clusters evidence by independence and counts clusters, not voices.

Where it breaks

A cascade is read as convergent evidence; independence is asserted because the sources have different job titles.

For example

Six channel partners report the same competitor weakness. Five learned it from the same distributor's sales kickoff. The evidence is one distributor's claim plus one independent observation, and the report says so.

The mathematics in fullLog odds add across pieces of evidence only when they are independent; with pairwise correlation rho among n confirming sources, the effective number of observations approaches 1/rho rather than n. Taught in

MECN-451; DECS-430

Sources

Banerjee (1992). A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3), 797-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118364
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 992-1026. https://doi.org/10.1086/261849

Signaling and cheap talk

What they said versus what it cost them

We separate claims, which cost nothing, from signals, which would have been expensive for a liar, from commitments, which are hard to reverse. The plan is weighed on the second and third.

Born to answer
Spence, 1973: education as a costly signal; Crawford and Sobel, 1982.
What it does now
Separating what management said from what it spent.
The mathematics
A signal separates when c(s, high) < c(s, low)
The full entry
Where it began

Michael Spence's 1973 model explained why education pays even if it teaches nothing: a degree is costly to obtain, more costly for the less able, so it separates the types and employers rationally reward it. Crawford and Sobel's 1982 paper showed the mirror case: when talk is free and interests differ, what gets communicated is coarse at best, and the wider the difference in interests, the less can be said.

Why it works now

Reading a management team for costly actions rather than statements has always been what good analysts did by instinct on a handful of names. It can now be done systematically across filings, hiring data, pricing behavior, insider transactions, and contract terms, and then tested in interviews with operators who know what a real commitment looks like in that industry. The Desk sorts the deck into claims, signals, and commitments before the first Advisor is recruited.

When it applies

Management says the pipeline is strong, the seller says the customer is loyal, the founder says the round is oversubscribed; or the client is reading intent into statements that cost the speaker nothing.

What we would ask

What have they done that would have been foolish if the claim were false?
What have they done that they cannot easily undo?

What it needs

The actions taken, their cost to the actor, and their reversibility; a record of what was said against what was done.

How we would get it

Operators who can say what a real commitment looks like in this industry; the record (hiring, capital spend, contracts, insider purchases, pricing discipline) checked against the claims.

Where it breaks

The supposedly costly action was cheap for the sender; the receiver reads intent into noise.

For example

A CEO describes an extremely strong enterprise pipeline. The company has also hired forty salespeople, refused to discount in the quarter, and the CEO has bought stock. The sentence is talk; the three actions are the evidence, and the interviews test whether they were costly.

The mathematics in fullA signal separates types only when its cost differs across them, c(s, honest) < c(s, bluffing); a costless message is informative only when the speaker's interests are aligned with the listener's, which in a sale they are not. Taught in

MMSS 311-1; MECN-452; MECS 465

Sources

Spence (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Crawford, Sobel (1982). Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica 50(6), 1431. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390

Learn the math
The question

Two software companies are raising money in the same month, and their chief executives give the same speech. "Our enterprise pipeline has never been stronger." One of them is right. The other is hoping, or worse. An investor across the table hears the identical sentence twice and has to decide which company to back at a higher price.

Listen harder and you learn nothing, because the sentence was free to say. Anyone would say it, whatever the truth. But the investor also knows three other things about the first company: in the last six months it hired forty salespeople, it refused to discount at quarter end, and its chief executive bought a million dollars of the company's stock with his own money. The second company did none of those things. This lesson is about why those three actions are evidence and the sentence is not, how to tell when an action really proves something, and what can and cannot be learned from talk when the speaker wants something from you.

The idea in one paragraph

A claim costs the speaker nothing, so a liar can make it as easily as an honest person, and it separates nobody. An action is evidence only if it would have been foolish for someone whose claim was false: only if it costs the bluffer more than being believed is worth to him, while costing the honest speaker less. That difference in cost, not the size of the cost, is what does the work. And talk is not always useless: when speaker and listener want roughly the same thing, words carry information; as their interests pull apart, what can be believed gets coarser, until nothing can be said at all. Think of a poker table. The players talk all evening, and nobody at a good table listens. They watch the chips. A bet is a sentence that costs money to say, and it costs most to the player holding the worse hand.

The math, step by step

Step 1: why free talk moves nothing. Write P(strong) for the chance, before you hear anything, that a company's pipeline is real; call it 50%. Bayes' rule says how much a message should move it:

P(strong | says "strong") = P(says | strong) x P(strong) / P(says)

The bar reads "given": P(strong | says "strong") is the chance the pipeline is strong given that the chief executive said it was. P(says) is the chance of hearing the sentence from a company picked at random: (P(says | strong) x P(strong)) + (P(says | weak) x P(weak)). A company with a real pipeline says "strong". So does a company without one, because the sentence costs nothing and being believed is worth a great deal. Both chances of saying it are 1, so

P(strong | says "strong") = (1 x 0.5) / ((1 x 0.5) + (1 x 0.5)) = 0.5

The belief after the sentence is the belief before it. That is the whole problem in one line: a message that every type sends is a message that tells you nothing about the type. Economists call this pooling: the types pool together behind the same words.

Step 2: what a costly action has to do. Now give each company a possible action s, a number of salespeople to hire. Write B for what being believed strong is worth to a company: a better price on its round, say. Write c(s, type) for what the action costs a company of that type. The listener's rule is simple: believe "strong" if and only if you see the action.

For the action to mean anything, two things must both be true.

  • The weak company must not want to copy it. Copying wins it B and costs it c(s, weak), so it stays away only if B <= c(s, weak).
  • The strong company must still want to take it. Taking it wins B and costs c(s, strong), so it goes ahead only if B >= c(s, strong).

Put them together:

c(s, strong) <= B <= c(s, weak)

This can hold only if c(s, strong) < c(s, weak): the action must cost the honest type less than the bluffer. That is the condition in the Library's entry, and it is the heart of Michael Spence's 1973 paper. Spence's case was education: a degree is worth taking for a worker an employer would pay more anyway, because school is easier and cheaper for the more able, and the less able find it too costly to copy. The degree separates the types even if it taught nothing. Notice what does not appear in the condition: whether the action is useful, whether it is large, whether it is impressive. Only that its cost differs, and in the right direction.

Step 3: the forty salespeople, priced. Here are round numbers, stated as assumptions. A salesperson costs $200,000 a year. At a company with a real pipeline, each new hire closes deals worth $150,000 of profit in the year, so the hire's net cost is 200,000 - 150,000 = 50,000. At a company with no pipeline there is nothing for the hire to close, and the net cost is the full $200,000. Being believed is worth B = $6 million. Write n for the number of hires, and measure money in $ millions:

c(n, strong) = 0.05 x n
c(n, weak)   = 0.20 x n

The weak company stays away when 0.20 x n >= 6, that is, when n >= 30. The strong company still hires when 0.05 x n <= 6, that is, when n <= 120. So any number of hires from 30 to 120 separates the two companies.

024681012020406080100120140Salespeople hiredNet cost of the hires, $ millionwhat being believed is worth, $6 milliona bluffer pays $8 million for 40the real pipeline pays $2 millionhires here prove something: 30 to 120Company with no pipelineCompany with a real pipeline
A costly action separates the honest from the bluffer only where it costs the bluffer more than being believed is worth and costs the honest less. With these numbers that band runs from 30 to 120 hires. Forty is inside it; twenty is not, and twenty hires would have proved nothing.

Forty is inside the band. The bluffer would pay 0.20 x 40 = 8 to win 6, a loss of $2 million, so it does not copy. The honest company pays 0.05 x 40 = 2 to win 6, a gain of $4 million, so it hires. Twenty hires would be outside the band: they would cost the bluffer only 0.20 x 20 = 4, less than the 6 that being believed is worth, so the bluffer would hire twenty too, both companies would look alike again, and the twenty hires would prove nothing. In the chart, the band's two ends are the two conditions of Step 2. The band is wide because the costs differ by a factor of four: 120 / 30 = 0.20 / 0.05 = 4. If the two costs were equal, the band would close to nothing. That is the poker table's rule with numbers on it: a bet of forty chips says something only because the player with the worse hand cannot afford to make it.

Inside the band, seeing the hires, Bayes' rule now gives

P(strong | hired 40) = (1 x 0.5) / ((1 x 0.5) + (0 x 0.5)) = 1

because a weak company never hires forty. In the model, the action settles the question. In life it settles it less firmly, and Step 5 says how much less.

Step 4: the other two actions, in words and one number. Refusing to discount at quarter end is the same kind of signal. If the pipeline is real, the deals a discount would have pulled forward still close next quarter, and the company has given up only a little time. If it is not real, those deals never close, and the quarter is simply missed. The cost differs by type, which is the whole test.

The stock purchase is the purest of the three. Suppose the chief executive buys $1 million of stock, and suppose (as assumptions) that the stock falls 30% if the pipeline turns out to be weak and rises 20% if it turns out to be strong. A bluffing chief executive expects to lose 1 x 0.30 = 0.30, $300,000. An honest one expects to gain 1 x 0.20 = 0.20, $200,000. The cost to the honest sender is not merely smaller; it is negative.

Step 5: when the signal is less certain than it looks. Two things weaken a signal, and both are about cost. First, the cost to the bluffer may be lower than you think. If the forty salespeople are paid only on commission, and recruiting and training one costs $10,000, the bluffer's cost of forty hires is 0.01 x 40 = 0.4, far below 6. The bluffer hires them all, and the bottom of the band moves out to 6 / 0.01 = 600 hires. The same forty hires that proved something at a fixed salary prove nothing on commission. Second, some weak companies take the action because they believe their own story. If one weak chief executive in ten is convinced and hires forty anyway, then

P(strong | hired 40) = (1 x 0.5) / ((1 x 0.5) + (0.1 x 0.5)) = 0.5 / 0.55 = 0.909

The signal still moves the belief a long way, from 50% to about 91%, but it no longer settles it, and the interviews the entry recommends are where the remaining doubt is resolved.

Step 6: when talk can say something. Talk is not always worthless. It fails in Step 1 because the two types want opposite things from the listener. Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel asked in 1982 what happens when the speaker and listener want nearly the same thing. The example their paper works goes like this. A state of the world t lies somewhere between 0 (worst) and 1 (best), every value equally likely, and only the speaker knows it. The listener will take an action y, a number, and wants it to match the state: y = t. The speaker wants the action a little higher than the state, y = t + b, where b is the bias, the size of the difference in interests. Each side loses by the square of its miss.

The speaker cannot be believed to the decimal point: if he could, he would always shade his report up by b. What can be believed is a coarse report: the line from 0 to 1 is cut into N intervals, the speaker says only which one the state is in, and the listener answers each message with the middle of its interval: when the loss is the square of the miss, the best single guess is the average, and the average of a state spread evenly over an interval is its middle.

Where do the cuts go? Take the speaker whose state sits exactly on a cut, a_i, between interval i and the one above it. He must be indifferent between the two messages, or the speakers just below the cut would switch. The listener's answers are the midpoints, (a_(i-1) + a_i) / 2 and (a_i + a_(i+1)) / 2, and this speaker wants a_i + b. Because he loses by the square of his miss, equal loss means equal distance, so indifference means a_i + b sits exactly halfway between the two midpoints:

(a_i + b) - ((a_(i-1) + a_i) / 2) = ((a_i + a_(i+1)) / 2) - (a_i + b)

Multiply both sides by 2 and move every term with a letter to the side it is positive on:

(4 x a_i) + 4b = a_(i-1) + (2 x a_i) + a_(i+1)

Take 3 x a_i and a_(i-1) from both sides:

(a_(i+1) - a_i) = (a_i - a_(i-1)) + 4b

Each interval is longer than the one below it by exactly 4b. If the first has length d, the lengths are d, d + 4b, d + 8b, and so on, and they must add to 1:

(N x d) + (4b x (0 + 1 + ... + (N - 1))) = 1

The sum of 0 through N - 1 is N x (N - 1) / 2, so (N x d) + (2b x N x (N - 1)) = 1, and

d = (1 - (2b x N x (N - 1))) / N

The first interval must have positive length, so a partition into N messages exists only when

2b x N x (N - 1) < 1

That one inequality is the result. The larger the bias b, the smaller the largest N that satisfies it. With b = 0.05, N = 3 works (2 x 0.05 x 3 x 2 = 0.6) and N = 4 does not (2 x 0.05 x 4 x 3 = 1.2). The three intervals have lengths d = (1 - 0.6) / 3 = 0.1333, then 0.1333 + 0.2 = 0.3333, then 0.5333: the cuts fall at 0.1333 and 0.4667. The top message, call it "strong", covers every state from 0.4667 to 1, more than half the line. The intervals widen toward the top. That is the upward bias at work: the speaker standing on a cut leans toward the message above, so the answer to that message has to sit farther from him than the answer to the message below, and each interval is longer than the one beneath it by 4b.

0.00.20.40.60.81.0The true state, from worst (0) to best (1)b = 0every state can be toldb = 0.017 messagesb = 0.053 messagesb = 0.102 messagesb = 0.251 message, nothing said
When talk is free, how much can be said depends on how far apart the speaker's interests are from the listener's. The wider the gap, the fewer and coarser the messages that can be believed, until at a bias of one quarter nothing can be said at all.

With b = 0.10 only two messages survive (cut at 0.3). With b = 0.01, seven. And once b reaches one quarter, even N = 2 fails (2 x 0.25 x 2 x 1 = 1, not below 1), and nothing the speaker says can be believed. Economists call this babbling: whatever is said, the listener does best to ignore it. How much does the coarse report help? Measure the listener's remaining uncertainty by the variance of the state. A state spread evenly over an interval of length L has variance L^2 / 12 (a standard fact about the uniform distribution); the state lands in that interval with chance L, so the interval contributes L^3 / 12. With no message the variance is 1 / 12, so the share of the uncertainty the message removes is 1 - (sum of L^3). At b = 0.05 it is 1 - (0.1333^3 + 0.3333^3 + 0.5333^3) = 1 - 0.1911, about 81%. At b = 0.10, 1 - (0.3^3 + 0.7^3) = 0.63. At b = 0.01, about 96%. At one quarter, zero.

This is the second half of the entry's rule: a costless message is informative only when interests are aligned. In a sale they are not. A seller's bias toward a higher price is not a small b; it is the whole point of the conversation. So the honest reading of "the customer is loyal" from the person selling you the customer list is close to babbling, and the reading of the same sentence from a former employee with nothing to sell is worth more.

A worked example

Put the Library's example through the steps. A chief executive describes an extremely strong enterprise pipeline. Sort what you know into three piles.

The claims: the description of the pipeline, the words "oversubscribed", the slide that says "record demand". Each would be said by a company with no pipeline at all. Step 1 says they leave your belief where it was.

The signals: the forty hires, the refusal to discount, the purchase of stock. For each, ask the entry's first question: what have they done that would have been foolish if the claim were false? Then price it, as in Step 3. Forty salaried hires cost a bluffer $8 million against $6 million gained: foolish if false, so evidence. Forty commission-only hires cost a bluffer $400,000: not foolish if false, so not evidence. The stock purchase costs a bluffer an expected $300,000 and pays an honest buyer $200,000: evidence, and the strongest of the three, provided it was a purchase in the open market and not an option exercised on a schedule.

The commitments: anything hard to undo. A five-year lease on a sales office, a contract that penalizes the company if it fails to deliver, capacity bought ahead of demand. Ask the entry's second question: what have they done that they cannot easily undo? A commitment is a signal whose cost to the bluffer arrives later and cannot be avoided.

Then the interviews, which test the one assumption Step 3 cannot check from the outside: whether the costs really differ. A former sales leader in the industry can say whether new hires are paid salary or commission, how long they take to close a first deal, and what it costs to let them go. That is the number on which the whole reading rests.

Research on insider trading tells the same story with real data. Josef Lakonishok and Inmoo Lee studied insiders' trades at companies on the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq from 1975 to 1995 and found that what information the trades carry comes from purchases, while insider selling appeared to have no predictive ability. That is Step 3 in the record: a sale has many innocent reasons (a house, a tax bill, a portfolio that needs spreading out), so a bluffer and an honest insider sell alike; a purchase costs the insider money if the company's prospects are worse than the price says. Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy and Lukasz Pomorski went a step further in 2012. They set aside the insiders whose trading follows a predictable, routine pattern and kept the rest, the "opportunistic" traders. A portfolio built on the opportunistic trades earned value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points a month; the routine trades earned essentially nothing. That is the third of the usual mistakes below, measured: an action the sender did not choose at the moment of the claim tells you nothing about the claim.

The usual mistakes
  1. Counting the size of the action instead of the difference in its cost. Symptom: a large expenditure read as conviction because it is large. A company with a big cash balance can spend lavishly on almost anything; the spending tells you about its cash, not its pipeline. Fix: price the action for the bluffer, not for the honest company. If a bluffer could afford it, it proves nothing.
  2. Forgetting that the bluffer can copy. Symptom: twenty hires read as proof. Fix: find the bottom of the band, B / c(per unit, weak). Below it the bluffer copies the action, and both companies look alike.
  3. Reading a scheduled action as a chosen one. Symptom: an executive's stock purchase counted as a signal when it was a grant, an exercise on a fixed date, or a purchase under a plan set up months ago. Fix: ask whether the sender chose the action when the claim was made, at a cost that depended on the claim being true.
  4. Treating all talk as noise. Symptom: dismissing a customer's account of why it renewed because "talk is cheap". The customer has no stake in your decision, so its bias is small and Step 6 says its words can carry a good deal. Fix: ask how far apart the speaker's interests are from yours before deciding how much the words can bear.
  5. Treating the signal as the fact. Symptom: a separating action read as certainty. Step 5 shows one convinced bluffer in ten takes the belief from 100% to about 91%. Fix: let the signal move the belief, and keep the interviews for the rest.
Where the model breaks

The entry names two failures. The first: the supposedly costly action was cheap for the sender. The commission-only sales force, the stock bought with money the executive was about to receive in a bonus anyway, the "refusal to discount" in a quarter when no customer asked for one. In each case the condition c(s, strong) < c(s, weak) was assumed, not checked, and the action separates nobody. The second: the receiver reads intent into noise. A company that hires because a competitor is hiring, or that holds prices because its pricing committee meets once a year, has sent no message at all, and treating its action as one invents a signal that no one sent.

Two more limits belong beside them. A separating action has a price for the honest sender too: in Step 3 the real company pays at least $1.5 million (30 hires) only to be believed, which is why signals can be wasteful from the point of view of everyone together, the point Spence's model makes about education. And the model assumes the listener knows the costs. When the costs are uncertain, so is the reading, which is why the entry sends the analyst to people who know what a real commitment costs in that industry. This lesson describes a way of weighing evidence, not advice about any investment.

Check yourself

1. A founder says her round is oversubscribed. Another founder says the same, and has also turned down a term sheet from a large fund at a higher valuation than the one she accepted. Which statement is evidence, and why?

Answer: the refusal. The sentence costs nothing and would be said by a founder whose round was struggling, so it leaves the belief where it was. Turning down money is foolish if the round is not in demand: a founder with no other offers would take it. The cost of the refusal depends on the claim being true, which is the test.

2. In Crawford and Sobel's example, the speaker's bias is b = 1/12. How many messages can be believed, and where is the cut?

Answer: we need 2b x N x (N - 1) < 1, that is N x (N - 1) < 6. N = 2 gives 2, which works; N = 3 gives 6, which is not below 6. So two messages. The first interval has length d = (1 - (2 x (1/12) x 2 x 1)) / 2 = (1 - (1/3)) / 2 = 1/3, so the cut is at one third and the second interval runs from one third to 1. The message removes 1 - ((1/3)^3 + (2/3)^3) = 1 - ((1/27) + (8/27)) = 2/3 of the listener's uncertainty.

3. Go back to the salespeople. Suppose a company with no pipeline could place its new hires on another product line, so its net cost per hire is $120,000 instead of $200,000. Everything else is the same. Do forty hires still prove anything? If not, how many would?

Answer: forty hires now cost the bluffer 0.12 x 40 = 4.8, $4.8 million, less than the $6 million that being believed is worth, so the bluffer copies them and they prove nothing. The band now starts at 6 / 0.12 = 50 hires. At 50 the honest company pays 0.05 x 50 = 2.5, still well below 6, so 50 hires would separate the two. The same action means less when the bluffer has a cheaper way to take it.

Teach me more
  • Lecture 23: Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education, Ben Polak, Open Yale Courses, ECON 159 Game Theory (a lecture of more than an hour, in four chapters on the page). The best spoken introduction to Spence: why a degree can pay even if it teaches nothing, worked through with the class, and a frank discussion of what the signal costs society. It has no cheap talk; Step 6 above is the half it leaves out.
  • Cheap Talk, Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1996 (16 pages; the page offers the full text free). The gentlest account of the second half of this lesson, with almost no notation. Sally and the Rayco Corporation are played three times: when she wants whichever job fits her ability, her word is believed and no costly signal is needed; when she wants the demanding job whatever her ability, nothing she says can be believed; in between, where she would like to seem a little abler than she is, only coarse talk survives, which is Step 6 without the arithmetic.
  • Signaling Games, Joel Sobel, encyclopedia article on his UCSD page, 31 May 2007 (28 pages, of which the last five are references). Written by one of the two authors of the cheap talk model: separating equilibria, why there are many of them and how economists choose among them, then a section on cheap talk and the partition equilibrium, and applications from advertising to biology. Dense, but the one place both halves of this lesson are set side by side by someone who built them.
  • Cheap talk, Wikipedia. The uniform and quadratic example of Step 6 in symbols, with the same boundaries written as t_i = (t_1 x i) + (2b x i x (i - 1)), the bias of 1/20 giving at most three messages, and a figure of the one, two and three message equilibria. Terse: it says the number of messages "must be small enough so that the numerator is positive" without saying why; Step 6 gives the why.

The papers behind the Library entry are Spence, "Job Market Signaling", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, and Crawford and Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, 1982. The two studies of insider trading are Lakonishok and Lee, "Are Insider Trades Informative?", The Review of Financial Studies, 2001, and Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, "Decoding Inside Information", The Journal of Finance, 2012.

Calibration and proper scoring rules

Was the seventy percent right seventy percent of the time?

We record what we said, in the words and bands we said it, and we score it when the outcome arrives, so that our judgment has a track record rather than a reputation.

Born to answer
Brier, 1950: scoring a forecaster's stated chance of rain.
What it does now
Making a research firm's judgment checkable years later.
The mathematics
Brier = mean of (p - outcome) squared
The full entry
Where it began

Glenn Brier's 1950 paper gave weather forecasters a score for probability forecasts: the squared distance between the stated chance of rain and whether it rained, averaged over many days. Meteorology adopted it and became, as a result, one of the few professions whose seventy percent means seventy percent.

Why it works now

Investment research has never been scored, because the forecasts were buried in prose and revised in memory. A brief whose ledger is written in explicit bands and preserved unaltered can be scored when the outcomes arrive, and the outcomes can now be captured from the record as they happen. This takes years to mature and Vista says so. It is the only route to a research firm whose judgment has a track record rather than a reputation.

When it applies

A research provider, an analyst, or an internal team makes confident calls with no record of how past calls turned out; or the client wants to know whether Vista's own bands mean anything.

What we would ask

Of the last twenty calls like this, how many resolved the way they were called?
Were the confident ones more often right than the hedged ones?

What it needs

Predictions preserved unaltered at the time they were made, with resolution dates and outcomes.

How we would get it

Every Vista brief keeps its ledger as written; outcomes are captured as they resolve; the score is reported to clients when the history is long enough to mean something, and not before.

Where it breaks

Forecasts revised after the fact; bands so wide they cannot be wrong; a score reported on a handful of cases.

For example

A provider says a merger is very likely to close. It closes. That is one observation. Twenty such calls with outcomes, scored, are a track record; the difference is why Vista keeps its ledgers.

The mathematics in fullBrier = (1/N) x sum of (p(i) - y(i))^2; calibration means that among forecasts near p, the realized frequency is near p. The library of predictions must be preserved to be scorable. Taught in

DECS-430; MECN-451

Sources

Brier (1950). Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability. Monthly Weather Review 78(1), 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0493(1950)078<0001:VOFEIT>2.0.CO;2

Learn the math
The question

Every quarter since late 1968, a panel of a few dozen professional forecasters has answered the same question for the survey the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia now runs: what is the chance that the economy's real output falls next quarter? Their average answer has a name, the Anxious Index. In the survey of November 2008 it read 74.8% for the first quarter of 2009. Output fell. In the survey of February 2020 it read 14.9% for the second quarter of 2020. Output fell by more than at any time in the record.

So, were they any good? Notice how hard that is to answer from one case. The 74.8% looks like a hit, but a 74.8% forecast is supposed to miss a quarter of the time. The 14.9% looks like a miss, but a 14.9% forecast is supposed to see the bad thing happen about once in seven tries. A single probability can never be right or wrong. Only a record of them can.

That is the problem this model solves. Without it, a forecaster's reputation is built from the calls people remember: the dramatic hit is retold, the confident miss is quietly revised, and the hedged ones ("a meaningful risk", "very likely") cannot be checked at all. With it, every call is written down in numbers at the time, and the record is scored when the outcomes arrive.

The idea in one paragraph

Picture a forecaster's umbrella stand. Each day she says "70% chance of rain", that day's umbrella goes in the seventy row. After a year, walk down that row and count the wet umbrellas. If about seven in ten are wet, her seventy means seventy: she is calibrated. Do the same for the ten row, the thirty row, the ninety row. Calibration alone is not enough, though, because a forecaster who says the same dull average every day can be perfectly calibrated and tell you nothing; the useful forecaster also puts days into very different rows, and the rows turn out very different. One number, Glenn Brier's score, rewards both at once, and it has a remarkable property: no forecaster can improve their expected score by saying anything other than what they truly believe.

The math, step by step

The symbols. We have N forecasts. For the i-th one, p_i is the stated probability, a number from 0 to 1 (70% is 0.7), and y_i is what happened, written 1 if the event occurred and 0 if it did not.

Step 1: the score. Brier's score is the average squared distance between what was said and what happened:

BS = (1/N) x ((p_1 - y_1)^2 + (p_2 - y_2)^2 + ... + (p_N - y_N)^2)

Zero is perfect (said 1 and it happened, said 0 and it did not, every time). One is the worst possible (certain and wrong, every time). Lower is better.

Try ten days. A forecaster says 70% every day, and it rains on seven of them. On a wet day she is 1 - 0.7 = 0.3 away, which squares to 0.09; on a dry day she is 0.7 away, which squares to 0.49. Her score is ((7 x 0.09) + (3 x 0.49)) / 10 = (0.63 + 1.47) / 10 = 0.21. A bolder colleague says "certain" every day: zero on the seven wet days, 1^2 = 1 on the three dry ones, a score of 0.30. A timid one says 50% every day: 0.5^2 = 0.25 every day, a score of 0.25. The honest seventy wins.

Step 2: why honesty wins, every time. Was that a coincidence of these ten days? Suppose the true chance of rain is q, and the forecaster says p. Her expected score on that day is the score if it rains times the chance it rains, plus the score if it does not times the chance it does not:

E(p) = (q x (1 - p)^2) + ((1 - q) x p^2)

Which p makes this smallest? Take the derivative with respect to p and set it to zero. The derivative of (1 - p)^2 is -2(1 - p), and of p^2 is 2p, so

E'(p) = (-2q x (1 - p)) + (2(1 - q) x p) = -2q + 2qp + 2p - 2qp = 2(p - q)

The 2qp terms cancel, and what is left is zero only at p = q. The second derivative is 2, positive, so this is a minimum, not a maximum. There is an even cleaner way to see it. Multiply out E(p): q x (1 - 2p + p^2) + p^2 - (q x p^2) = q - 2qp + p^2. Now multiply out (q x (1 - q)) + (p - q)^2 = q - q^2 + p^2 - 2pq + q^2 = q - 2qp + p^2. They are the same, so

E(p) = (q x (1 - q)) + (p - q)^2

The first part, q(1 - q), depends only on the weather; no forecaster can avoid it. The second part is the penalty for saying something other than what you believe, and it is exactly the square of the distance between the two. At q = 0.7, saying 0.7 costs 0.21, saying 0.9 costs 0.21 + (0.2^2) = 0.25, saying 1.0 costs 0.21 + (0.3^2) = 0.30. A score with this property is called proper: the best strategy is the truth.

Not every sensible-looking score has it. Score instead by the plain distance |p - y|, without squaring. The expected score becomes (q x (1 - p)) + ((1 - q) x p) = q + (p x (1 - 2q)), a straight line in p. When q is above one half the line falls as p rises, so the best thing to say is 100%. At q = 0.7, honesty costs 0.42 and false certainty only 0.30. That score teaches forecasters to exaggerate, which is the opposite of what we want.

Step 3: calibration, written down. Group the forecasts into rows by what was said: all the forecasts near 10%, all near 20%, and so on. For row k, let n_k be how many forecasts it holds, p_k what they said, and o_k the share of them that came true. Calibration means o_k is close to p_k in every row. A reliability diagram plots o_k against p_k; a calibrated forecaster's points sit on the diagonal.

Step 4: taking the score apart. Here is the piece that makes the score a diagnosis and not just a grade. Inside one row, every forecast says p_k, and a share o_k of the outcomes are 1. So n_k x o_k of the row's forecasts miss by 1 - p_k and the rest miss by p_k, and the row's total is n_k x ((o_k x (1 - p_k)^2) + ((1 - o_k) x p_k^2)): exactly n_k times the E(p) of Step 2, with o_k in place of q. The identity of Step 2 then gives

sum over row k of (p_k - y)^2 = n_k x ((p_k - o_k)^2 + (o_k x (1 - o_k)))

Now let o (no subscript) be the share of all N events that happened, the base rate. Add up the second part over all the rows. Since the rows together hold every event, sum of (n_k x o_k) = N x o. And the spread of the rows around the base rate can be written sum of (n_k x (o_k - o)^2) = sum of (n_k x o_k^2) - (N x o^2) (multiply out (o_k - o)^2 = o_k^2 - (2 x o_k x o) + o^2, add up with the weights n_k, and use sum of (n_k x o_k) = N x o on the middle term), so sum of (n_k x o_k^2) = (N x o^2) + sum of (n_k x (o_k - o)^2). Subtract the second from the first:

sum of (n_k x o_k x (1 - o_k)) = (N x o x (1 - o)) - sum of (n_k x (o_k - o)^2)

Divide everything by N, and the whole score falls into three pieces. This is Allan Murphy's decomposition (1973):

BS = REL - RES + UNC
REL = (1/N) x sum of (n_k x (p_k - o_k)^2)         reliability: how far the rows sit off the diagonal
RES = (1/N) x sum of (n_k x (o_k - o)^2)           resolution: how different the rows turn out from each other
UNC = o x (1 - o)                                  uncertainty: how hard the question is, which no one controls

Read it as a sentence: the score is the miscalibration, minus the credit for sorting events into rows that really differ, plus a floor set by the world. A forecaster who says the base rate every time has REL = 0 and RES = 0, so scores exactly UNC. That is the benchmark to beat. The share of the benchmark a forecaster removes, 1 - (BS / UNC), is called the Brier skill score.

(The decomposition is exact when each row's forecasts all say the same number. When a row holds forecasts from, say, 10% to 20%, replacing each by the row's average changes the score a little: in the worked example below, the three pieces add to 0.0985 while the true score is 0.0968.)

Step 5: how many cases before the score means anything. A row of n forecasts that each truly had chance p will come true a share of times that wanders around p with a standard deviation of sqrt(p x (1 - p) / n) (the spread of the share of heads in n tosses of a coin that lands heads with chance p). For 13 forecasts at 64%, that is sqrt((0.64 x 0.36) / 13) = 0.133, thirteen points. A row that came true 54% of the time instead of 64% is inside that wobble. This is the arithmetic behind the entry's warning about a score reported on a handful of cases.

A worked example: fifty-seven years of recession odds

Here is the whole record of the Anxious Index from the survey of the fourth quarter of 1968 to the survey of the first quarter of 2026: 230 forecasts, each the chance that real output would fall in the following quarter. For the outcome we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis's real GDP as revised to October 2026, and count a quarter as a fall when its level is below the quarter before. (Two honest cautions: the forecasters were judged at the time by first estimates, not by figures revised years later, and before 1992 the survey asked about real GNP. Neither changes the picture below, but both mean these are our outcomes, not the survey's own.)

Output fell in 29 of the 230 quarters, a base rate of 12.6%. The forecasters' chances added up to 44.4: they expected about forty-four falls and saw twenty-nine. Grouped into rows:

0%20%40%60%80%0%20%40%60%80%What the forecasters said (average chance in the group)How often it happenedperfect calibrationBase rate 12.6%2 of 686 of 886 of 318 of 307 of 13
The Philadelphia Fed's Survey of Professional Forecasters, surveys of 1968 Q4 to 2026 Q1: the mean chance that real output would fall in the next quarter (the Anxious Index), 230 forecasts grouped by what was said, against whether real GDP fell, in BEA data as revised to October 2026. The labels give falls out of forecasts in each group.

Every row sits below the diagonal. When the forecasters said about 7%, output fell 2.9% of the time (2 of 68); about 14%, 6.8% (6 of 88); about 24%, 19.4% (6 of 31); about 39%, 26.7% (8 of 30); about 64%, 53.8% (7 of 13). Over five decades, this panel of professionals has leaned consistently toward alarm. How sure can we be? In the 10% to 20% row, 88 forecasts averaging 13.6% should have produced about 12 falls; seeing 6 or fewer would happen by chance only about 3.5% of the time (treating the quarters as independent draws, which flatters the test a little, because falls come in runs). In the top row, as Step 5 showed, the gap is inside the wobble. The lean is real at the bottom of the scale and unproven at the top.

And yet the rows climb steadily from left to right. Quarters the forecasters marked as dangerous really were more dangerous: 54% of the top row fell against 3% of the bottom one. That is resolution, and it is what the forecasts are for. The score puts the two together:

  • The forecasters' Brier score: 0.0968.
  • Saying the base rate of 12.6% every quarter: 0.126 x 0.874 = 0.1102.
  • The forecasters' skill: 1 - (0.0968 / 0.1102) = 0.121, about 12% of the benchmark removed.

But 12.6% is the base rate known only in hindsight, in October 2026. A fairer rival is a clerk who, each quarter, says the share of quarters that had fallen so far in the record since 1947 (17.2% when the survey began). The clerk scores 0.1115, and the forecasters beat the clerk by 0.131, about 13%. The decomposition gives the reasons: reliability costs them 0.0052, resolution earns them 0.0168, against an uncertainty of 0.1102. In plain words, their lean toward alarm gives back about a third of what their judgment earns.

The individual quarters tell the same story in miniature. The three highest readings, 74.8% for early 2009, 74.1% for early 1975 and 74.0% for the second quarter of 2009, all came true. But eight of the 29 falls arrived when the index said under 20%, among them both quarters of the 2020 collapse (18.1% and 14.9%), and for each of the four quarters of 2023 the index said between 34% and 47%, for a fall that never came. The February 2020 forecast alone cost (1 - 0.149)^2 = 0.725 in that one quarter, as much as six and a half average quarters of the base-rate benchmark (0.1102 each). A scoring rule does not forgive a pandemic; it simply counts it, and over 230 quarters one such quarter is a fact about the world, not a judgment of the forecasters.

The usual mistakes
  • Judging a probability by one outcome. "They said 15% and it happened, so they were wrong." Symptom: the reputations of forecasters swing with each event. Fix: score the record, never the call.
  • Confusing calibration with skill. Saying the base rate every time is perfectly calibrated and useless. Symptom: a reliability diagram with one dot on the diagonal. Fix: look at resolution, or at skill against a benchmark the forecaster could actually have known.
  • Using an improper score. Counting hits ("right if over 50%") or averaging |p - y| rewards forecasters who round toward certainty. Symptom: the confident forecasters rank highest while their 90% calls come true 70% of the time. Fix: use a proper score, such as Brier's or the logarithmic score.
  • Scoring words. "Very likely" cannot be scored, because one reader hears 70% and another 95%. Symptom: no one can tell after the fact what was claimed. Fix: write the number at the time, and never revise it.
  • Reading a score from a handful of cases. Five outcomes cannot tell an 80% forecaster from a 60% one (question 3 below). Fix: report the score with its count, and wait for the count to mean something.
Where the model breaks

The entry names three failures, and each is a failure of the record, not of the arithmetic. Forecasts revised after the fact cannot be scored at all, which is why the predictions must be preserved unaltered at the time they were made. Bands so wide they cannot be wrong ("somewhere between 5% and 95%") give the score nothing to grade and the reader nothing to use. And a score reported on a handful of cases is noise wearing a number, as Step 5 showed. Three more limits follow from the math. The score depends on the questions asked: a forecaster of desert rain will beat one of New England rain with the same skill, so compare forecasters only on the same questions or by skill against the same benchmark. Calibration is a property of many forecasts, never of one, so it can never say whether this particular call was sound. And a calibrated record describes the past; a forecaster whose world changes may lose the calibration they earned, which is why the entry says the discipline takes years to mature.

Check yourself

1. A forecaster's 30% calls came true 30% of the time over 500 forecasts. Is she a good forecaster?

Answer: she is calibrated in that row, which is necessary but not sufficient. If every one of her forecasts was 30% and the base rate is 30%, she has no resolution and her skill is zero. Look at her other rows and at her score against the base rate.

2. Over these 230 quarters a clerk who knew the final base rate would have said 12.6% every time. What would the clerk's Brier score be, and why can no forecaster who says one number every quarter do better?

Answer: 0.126 x 0.874 = 0.1102. A forecaster who says one number p every quarter scores exactly (o x (1 - o)) + (p - o)^2, where o is the share that happened: the identity of Step 2 with the base rate in place of q. That is smallest at p = o. To do better a forecaster must say different numbers in different quarters, and be right about which quarters deserve which.

3. A forecaster made five calls at 80%; three came true. Score them, then score the same calls as if she had said 60%. If her true chance really was 60% each time, how much did she expect to lose per call by saying 80%?

Answer: at 80%, ((3 x 0.2^2) + (2 x 0.8^2)) / 5 = (0.12 + 1.28) / 5 = 0.28. At 60%, ((3 x 0.4^2) + (2 x 0.6^2)) / 5 = (0.48 + 0.72) / 5 = 0.24. By Step 2 the expected penalty for saying 0.8 when the truth is 0.6 is (0.8 - 0.6)^2 = 0.04 per call, and it equals the difference here exactly only because three out of five is exactly 60%; with five calls, chance could easily have made it look larger or smaller.

Teach me more
  • 12.B Statistical Concepts: Probabilistic Data, ECMWF Forecast User Guide (European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts; one long web page, which the site rates a 38-minute read). The best plain-prose tour of the whole subject as forecasters practice it: reliability diagrams, sharpness, the Brier score and skill score, the reliability, resolution and uncertainty split, and the same calculus argument as Step 2 that the honest probability minimizes the expected score, with pictures from real weather forecasts. One caution: a line there says the Brier score is the area between the reliability curve and the diagonal, which it is not (the gap to the diagonal measures only the reliability part of Step 4). It goes on to verification tools (rank histograms, ROC curves) a beginner can skip.
  • Forecast verification: methods, issues and FAQ, the WMO Joint Working Group on Forecast Verification Research (one very long reference page). The working definitions, with formulas: the Brier score, the reliability diagram and Murphy's 1973 decomposition, beside every other common verification score. A reference to look things up in, not a course; its notation for the rows is terser than Step 4 here.
  • Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation, Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E. Raftery, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 2007 (20 pages, the authors' copy). The standard modern account of why a proper score makes honesty the best policy; its first example is the Brier score. Graduate mathematics after the opening pages, and it writes scores so that higher is better, the reverse of this lesson.
  • The Anxious Index, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The forecasts scored above: what the index is, a chart of it since 1968, and how it got its name from a 2002 newspaper article; the survey's Probability Variables page, linked from there, holds the mean probability of a decline for every survey since 1968 Q4.

The paper behind the Library entry is Glenn W. Brier, "Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability", Monthly Weather Review, 1950, on the Library's reading list. The decomposition is Allan H. Murphy, "A New Vector Partition of the Probability Score", Journal of Applied Meteorology, 1973.

Regression to the mean

Last year's best performer

Whatever was measured at an extreme was partly luck, and the luck does not repeat. We separate the part of last year's result that was skill from the part that was noise before anyone is rewarded, punished, or bought.

Born to answer
Galton, 1886: tall parents, somewhat less tall children.
What it does now
Not paying a premium for last year's luck.
The mathematics
Next = mean + r x (this value - mean)
The full entry
Where it began

Galton discovered it in 1886 measuring parents and children, and it has been rediscovered by every generation since. Tversky and Kahneman's 1971 paper on belief in the law of small numbers showed that trained scientists ignore it too, and Kahneman later told the story of flight instructors who believed praise made pilots worse and criticism made them better, because a great landing was followed by a worse one and a bad landing by a better one, whatever the instructor said.

Why it works now

Rewarding last year's best and punishing last year's worst has been organizational reflex because separating skill from noise required several periods of data for the unit and its peers, and nobody assembled them. The record can now be assembled quickly and the persistence of the measure estimated. The Desk asks how much the measure swings for reasons nobody controls, and how much of the recovery would have happened anyway.

When it applies

A manager, fund, region, product, or salesperson selected because of an extreme result; a turnaround credited to an intervention that followed a bad year; a rank list used to allocate.

What we would ask

How much does this measure vary from year to year for reasons nobody controls?
If you had done nothing after the bad year, how much of the recovery would have happened anyway?

What it needs

Several periods of the measure for the unit and its peers, enough to estimate how much of the variation is persistent.

How we would get it

The record for the measure across periods and peers; operators on what drives the year-to-year swings.

Where it breaks

Reading every reversal as an effect; punishing after bad luck and crediting the punishment.

For example

A fund allocates to the three regional managers with the best results last year. Their results were the most extreme of thirty, and the year-to-year correlation of the measure is low. Most of their advantage was noise, and next year's leaders will be different names.

The mathematics in fullExpected next value = mean + r x (this value - mean), where r is the correlation between periods; the further from the mean the observation, the larger the expected fall back, and with r near zero the extreme is almost entirely noise. Taught in

MATH 385; MATH 386-1

Sources

Galton (1886). Regression Towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature. The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 15, 246. https://doi.org/10.2307/2841583
Tversky, Kahneman (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin 76(2), 105-110. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031322

Probability encoding

How to ask an expert for a number

An expert asked for a forecast gives an anchored, overconfident one. We ask in a fixed order that starts from the extremes and checks for consistency, so that the range an Advisor gives us is one we can defend.

Born to answer
Spetzler and Stael von Holstein, 1975, at Stanford.
What it does now
Asking an Advisor for a range that is worth something.
The mathematics
Elicit the 10th and 90th fractiles before the 50th
The full entry
Where it began

Carl Spetzler and Carl-Axel Stael von Holstein's 1975 paper, from the Stanford decision analysis group, set out the protocol for encoding an expert's probability: fix the quantity precisely, elicit the extremes before the center, alternate the form of the question, check for consistency, and calibrate. Tversky and Kahneman's 1974 catalogue of anchoring and overconfidence is the reason the protocol exists. Ronald Howard's Stanford course still teaches it.

Why it works now

Vista's product is asking experts questions, and asking for a quantity badly produces a confident wrong answer. The protocol was known for fifty years and used by a handful of decision analysts, because applying it took training and time. It can now be built into every structured interview, with the fractiles asked in the right order and the consistency checks run as the conversation happens. The Desk asks whether the client's own experts start from a central number or from the extremes.

When it applies

Any engagement in which Advisors will be asked for ranges, probabilities, or timing; a client whose own experts have produced narrow ranges that keep being wrong.

What we would ask

When your team estimates a range, do they start from a central number or from the extremes?
How often do outcomes fall outside the ranges your experts give?

What it needs

A structured protocol applied consistently across Advisors; calibration checks on quantities with known answers.

How we would get it

Every Vista interview that asks for a quantity uses the protocol: the surprising values first, the central estimate last, consistency checks between fixed-value and fixed-probability questions.

Where it breaks

Anchoring on the first number mentioned; an expert with a stake in the answer; ranges reported without the protocol that produced them.

For example

Three operators are asked when a competitor's plant will reach full capacity. Asked directly, all three say eighteen months. Asked first for the date they would be surprised to see it beat, then the date they would be surprised to see it miss, the honest range runs from twelve to thirty-six months, and the thesis has to survive the whole range.

The mathematics in fullElicit the tenth, ninetieth, and then fiftieth fractiles before any central estimate; alternate fixed-value and fixed-probability questions; calibration means that about ten percent of outcomes should fall below the stated tenth fractile. Taught in

MS&E 252 (Stanford); MECN-451

Sources

Spetzler, Stael von Holstein (1975). Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis. Management Science 22(3), 340-358. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.22.3.340
Tversky, Kahneman (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185(4157), 1124-1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Howard, Ronald A. and Abbas, Ali E. (2016). Foundations of Decision Analysis. Pearson. (book)

Estimating a hidden total: capture-recapture (Petersen; Lincoln; Chao), the German tank problem, exported cases

How big is what we cannot see?

The count everyone quotes is often only the part of something that has surfaced: confirmed cases, reported defects, discovered frauds, units a private rival admits to selling. When some of the hidden whole leaks into view by a route whose odds can be estimated, the size of the whole follows from the leak. Three methods do this. If a known share of the hidden whole shows up somewhere else (cases detected abroad among travelers, failures reported to a regulator), the total is the leaked count divided by that share. If two independent sources each catch part of it, the overlap between them says how much both missed: capture-recapture. If items carry serial numbers that run from one, the highest number in a sample says how many exist: the German tank problem. We find the leak, estimate its odds, compute the hidden total, and set it beside the official count; a gap of ten times or more is a warning that the official count is not the thing to trust.

Born to answer
Danish fisheries, 1890s; Allied economic intelligence, 1940s; Imperial College, January 2020.
What it does now
How big a problem is when only the part that leaked can be counted.
The mathematics
N about x / q; N about n1 n2 / m; N about M (1 + 1/k) - 1
The full entry
Where it began

The Danish fisheries biologist C. G. J. Petersen marked plaice in the 1890s and counted the population from the share of marked fish later recaught, and Frederick Lincoln did the same for waterfowl from bird bands in 1930; the method became capture-recapture, and Anne Chao (1987) extended it to populations whose members are not equally easy to catch. In the Second World War, Allied statisticians estimated German tank production from the serial numbers on captured tanks and found far fewer than intelligence reports claimed; after the war, German records sided with the statisticians (Ruggles and Brodie 1947). In January 2020, epidemiologists at Imperial College, the University of Hong Kong and Hokkaido University estimated the size of the Wuhan outbreak from the cases found in travelers abroad, and each put it in the thousands or tens of thousands while the confirmed count was in the dozens or hundreds, weeks before markets took notice.

Why it works now

Flight volumes, regulators' databases, product registrations and serial numbers in filings and photographs are public and searchable, so the leaked count and its odds can be assembled and the hidden total computed in code the day the first leak appears. Whether the routes are independent, and who is easier to catch, is known to the people who keep the lists.

When it applies

An official count comes from an interested or overwhelmed source (an outbreak's confirmed cases, a company's reported incidents, a regulator's tally of complaints), or the total cannot be counted directly (a private rival's unit sales, the size of a fraud, the number of affected products in the field), and some part of it surfaces by a route whose odds can be estimated: travel, independent lists, serial numbers. Not to be confused with tail-risk-and-near-misses, which reads small failures as data about a large one, or who-did-you-hear-from, which asks whether the sample that reached us is biased: this entry estimates the size of a whole from the fraction of it that leaked.

What we would ask

By what route does part of this hidden total come into view, and how likely is any one item to take that route?
Are there two independent ways of catching it, or serial numbers in what has been caught?

What it needs

The count that leaked and the odds of leaking (for travel, the outbound volume, the window in which a case would be caught and the population it is drawn from); or two lists made independently and the number of items on both; or the serial numbers of a sample of items and the size of the sample.

How we would get it

The Desk finds the leak, assembles the counts and the odds of leaking from public data (flight volumes, regulators' databases, two independent lists, serial numbers in filings, registrations or photographs) and computes the hidden total and its range in code. What the data cannot show is whether the routes are really independent and whether some items are much easier to catch than others; epidemiologists, statisticians and the people who keep the lists know that.

Where it breaks

The two lists are not independent (the same easy cases appear on both, so the overlap is too large and the total too small); some items are far more catchable than others, which biases the estimate downward unless the method allows for it (Chao 1987); travelers are not like the population, or travel is cut; detection abroad is incomplete; serial numbers skip, restart or are assigned in blocks; and a small leaked count gives a wide range, which must be reported with the estimate.

For example

On 17 January 2020, Imperial College estimated from three cases found in travelers abroad that Wuhan had about 1,723 infections, against 41 confirmed; on 31 January a Lancet study put the figure at about 75,815 by 25 January (Wu, Leung and Leung 2020), and a third team reached thousands from thirteen exported cases (Nishiura and coauthors 2020). The arithmetic in its simplest form: if 1 resident in 600 flies abroad within the window in which a case would be caught, three cases abroad imply about 3 x 600 = 1,800 at home. For capture-recapture: two independent complaint databases list 120 and 150 failures of a product, and 30 appear in both, so the total is about 120 x 150 / 30 = 600, or 588 with Chapman's correction for small samples. For serial numbers: five units sold by a private rival carry serials whose highest is 1,210, so about 1,210 x (1 + 1/5) - 1 = 1,451 have been made.

The mathematics in fullLeak: with x items observed and each hidden item leaking with probability q, N is about x / q. Capture-recapture (Petersen; Lincoln): two independent samples of sizes n1 and n2 with m items in both give N about n1 n2 / m, or (n1 + 1)(n2 + 1) / (m + 1) - 1 (Chapman); with unequal catchability, Chao (1987) gives a lower-bound estimate built from the counts caught once and twice. Serial numbers: with k serials drawn from 1 to N and the largest M, the minimum-variance unbiased estimate is M (1 + 1/k) - 1. Each estimate carries a range that widens as the leaked count shrinks. Where it comes from

Petersen (1896) and Lincoln (1930): marking fish and banding waterfowl to count a population from the share recaptured.; Ruggles and Brodie (1947), An Empirical Approach to Economic Intelligence in World War II, Journal of the American Statistical Association 42(237): estimating German tank production from the serial numbers on captured tanks.; Chao (1987), Biometrics 43(4): capture-recapture when some individuals are easier to catch than others.; Imai, Dorigatti, Cori, Riley and Ferguson (17 January 2020), Imperial College COVID-19 Report 1; Wu, Leung and Leung (2020), The Lancet 395(10225); Nishiura and coauthors (2020), Journal of Clinical Medicine 9(2): epidemic size from exported cases.

Sources

Chao (1987). Estimating the Population Size for Capture-Recapture Data with Unequal Catchability. Biometrics 43(4), 783. https://doi.org/10.2307/2531532
Wu, Leung, Leung (2020). Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study. The Lancet 395(10225), 689-697. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30260-9
Nishiura, Jung, Linton and others (2020). The Extent of Transmission of Novel Coronavirus in Wuhan, China, 2020. Journal of Clinical Medicine 9(2), 330. https://doi.org/10.3390/jcm9020330

Detection and the aimed search (Becker; Silverglate)

Show me the man: why a close enough watch always finds something

We read a violation found under targeted scrutiny as a measure of the scrutiny as much as of the conduct. If a firm or a person breaks some rule with a small chance p on any day, the chance that a watch of n days finds at least one breach is 1 - (1 - p)^n, which climbs toward certainty for anyone watched long enough. Gary Becker (1968) made the chance of being caught a variable of economics; Harvey Silverglate (2009) argued that federal criminal law has grown so broad and vague that ordinary professionals break it without knowing it, so that the choice of whom to watch decides who is charged. So we never compare a finding against one target with the record of others unless the others were watched as closely, and we compare counts per unit of attention, not the bare fact that something was found. Then we apply the two tests that separate a fair inquiry from a hunt: is the same rule applied to peers in the same way, and is a good answer accepted when it is given?

Born to answer
Becker, 1968: the chance of being caught; Silverglate, 2009: the reach of federal law.
What it does now
What a finding says about conduct once the attention that produced it is counted.
The mathematics
P(at least one) = 1 - (1 - p)^n; compare p n at equal attention
The full entry
Where it began

The Gospel of Luke records the pattern twice. In a synagogue on the Sabbath, 'The scribes and the Pharisees watched him, to see whether he would heal on the Sabbath, that they might find an accusation against him' (Luke 6:7, WEB); and when he went to eat at the house of one of the rulers of the Pharisees on a Sabbath, 'they were watching him' (Luke 14:1, WEB). This entry, and four beside it on regulatory capture, raising rivals' costs, the scapegoat and the double bind, came into the Library from a reading of those verses. Victor Hugo drew the watcher for whom no answer is good enough: Inspector Javert, in Les Misérables (1862), follows Jean Valjean for years and cannot accept the evidence of the life he has made. Economics came later. Gary Becker (1968) made the chance of being caught a variable of choice; A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000) surveyed the theory of enforcement that followed; Jonathan Feinstein (1990) separated what is done from what is detected; Harvey Silverglate's Three Felonies a Day (2009) argued that the reach of federal criminal law leaves the choice of target to the prosecutor; and Simi Kedia and Shiva Rajgopal (2011) found the SEC more likely to investigate firms near its offices.

Why it works now

Scrutiny used to be judged by anecdote. Enforcement actions, comment letters, restatements, inspections and short reports are now recorded and searchable, so the rate at which comparable targets are found to break a rule under comparable attention can be computed outside the conversation and set beside any single finding. How a particular search was chosen and run is still known best to the people who ran it or were subject to it.

When it applies

A short seller's report, a regulator's sweep, an inspection, an audit, a journalist's investigation or an authority's case aimed at one company or one person, and the question is how much the finding says about conduct, once the attention that produced it is counted: a short report on one company in an industry where every company's filings could be read the same way; an enforcement action against a firm the regulator has publicly singled out; an authority's case against one official (the attempt in August 2025 to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook over allegations about her mortgage applications, which she challenged, is a live example, named here only as an example of the question; the entry takes no side). Not to be confused with how-big-is-what-we-cannot-see, which estimates a hidden total from the part that surfaces; manipulation-screen, which reads a company's own statements for the patterns of companies later caught; or regulatory-and-political-risk, which asks what a regulator will decide next: this asks what a finding means when the search was aimed.

What we would ask

How closely was this company or person watched compared with peers, and for how long, and would the same search of a peer's records have found something too?
When the target answered the charge, was the answer heard and tested, or was each answer met with a new charge?

What it needs

What was found and how (the search that found it, its length and its depth); the same measure for comparable firms or people under comparable attention; the base rate of the violation where attention is routine; the target's answer and how it was received; and the stakes and record of the party doing the watching.

How we would get it

The Desk sets the finding beside the rate at which comparable firms are found to break the same rule under routine attention (enforcement data, restatements, comment letters, inspection records), computes the chance that a search of the same depth would find something in a careful target, and reads the record of the answer and its reception. What the record cannot show is how the search was chosen and run; former enforcement staff, auditors, compliance officers and the journalists who covered the case know that.

Where it breaks

The watched assumed innocent because the watching was hostile. Wirecard, a German payments company, was examined for years by Dan McCrum of the Financial Times and by short sellers; Germany's financial regulator banned new short positions in its shares for two months in February 2019 and filed a complaint against the reporters; in June 2020 the company said that €1.9 billion of its cash probably did not exist, and filed for insolvency. The watchers were right, and the two tests, not the watcher's motive, decide. Also: a finding compared with peers who were never examined; the bare fact of a finding read as a rate; a single violation taken as the measure of a character, when anyone watched long enough shows one; and the opposite error, every finding treated as manufactured, when only about a third of corporate frauds are detected in normal times (Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2024), short interest builds before misconduct is revealed (Karpoff and Lou, 2010), and the market's penalty for misrepresentation far exceeds the legal one (Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008).

For example

Suppose a firm commits some technical breach with a chance of 1 percent on any day. Watched every day for a year, the chance that at least one breach is found is 1 - 0.99^365, about 97.4 percent; over three years it is 99.998 percent, a near certainty. A far more careful firm, at 0.2 percent a day, is still found out 88.8 percent of the time over three years (51.8 percent in one). Set side by side, a finding barely tells the two apart: the ratio of the two chances is 1.88 after a year of daily watching and 1.13 after three. What does tell them apart is the count: about 10.95 breaches against 2.19 over three years, a ratio of 5. And a peer looked at only four times a year, at the same 1 percent chance per look, is found out 3.9 percent of the time. A finding against the watched firm, and silence about its unwatched peers, says by itself almost nothing about which is worse; counts per look, compared at equal attention, say a good deal.

The mathematics in fullIf a breach occurs with probability p in each of n independent periods of observation, P(at least one is found) = 1 - (1 - p)^n, which tends to 1 as n grows for any p > 0. The evidence a finding carries about a target's type is the likelihood ratio P(finding | careless) / P(finding | careful) = [1 - (1 - p1)^n] / [1 - (1 - p0)^n], which falls toward 1 as n grows: under a long enough watch a finding is expected of both. The count of breaches, with mean p n, keeps the ratio p1 / p0 at every n, so rates per unit of attention, compared at equal attention, carry the information a bare finding loses. Observed violations are the product of conduct and detection, P(observed) = P(violation) x P(detected | violation); Feinstein (1990) built detection-controlled estimation to separate the two, and Li (2010) found that ignoring undetected fraud biases the estimated effects of its causes downward. Becker (1968): offenders weigh the probability and size of punishment, so enforcement chooses, in effect, how many offenses to permit. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011): the SEC is more likely to investigate firms near its offices, and those firms restate less, so where the regulator looks shapes both what is done and what is found. Where it comes from

Becker (1968), Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy; Polinsky and Shavell (2000), The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature; Silverglate, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent (2009); Detection and its measurement: Feinstein (1990), Detection Controlled Estimation, Journal of Law and Economics; Li (2010); Wang, Winton and Yu (2010); Kedia and Rajgopal (2011); Who finds misconduct and what it costs: Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010, 2024); Karpoff and Lou (2010); Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008); Luke 6:7 and 14:1 in the World English Bible; Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (1862); The worked figures are Vista's illustration; the Wirecard dates are from the public record of the case

Sources

Becker (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76(2), 169-217. https://doi.org/10.1086/259394
Polinsky, Shavell (2000). The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. Journal of Economic Literature 38(1), 45-76. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.1.45
Kedia, Rajgopal (2011). Do the SEC's enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct? Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(3), 259-278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.01.004
Li (2010). Corporate Financial Fraud: An Application of Detection Controlled Estimation. Working paper, SSRN 1698038. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1698038
Wang, Winton, Yu (2010). Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs. The Journal of Finance 65(6), 2255-2292. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01615.x
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2024). How pervasive is corporate fraud? Review of Accounting Studies 29(1), 736-769. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-022-09738-5
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2010). Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? The Journal of Finance 65(6), 2213-2253. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x
Karpoff, Lou (2010). Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct. The Journal of Finance 65(5), 1879-1913. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01597.x
Karpoff, Lee, Martin (2008). The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43(3), 581-611. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000004221
Silverglate (2009). Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent. Encounter Books. (book)

Countersignaling (Feltovich, Harbaugh and To)

Countersignaling: why the best guest takes the low seat

We read a missing signal as evidence when the sender could easily have sent it. Nick Feltovich, Rick Harbaugh and Ted To (2002) showed that when an audience has other information about quality, the middle signals to separate itself from the bottom, while the top skips the signal, or sends its opposite, because it expects to be recognized anyway: the plain office, the brand without a logo, the conservative guidance, the low seat at the feast. So we ask who could afford the signal and did not send it, what else the audience knows that separates the top from the bottom, and whether the modesty is confidence or strategy. The seating arithmetic says when the low seat is the better choice: the more likely the host is to recognize merit, the lower the seat a confident guest should take.

Born to answer
Feltovich, Harbaugh and To, 2002: why the best decline the signal the middle sends.
What it does now
What a missing signal means when the sender could have afforded it.
The mathematics
High seat only if p < (1 - 2q) / (1 + 2 lambda)
The full entry
Where it began

The seating arithmetic is older than signaling theory. At the same Sabbath dinner where they were watching him, Jesus noticed how the guests chose the best seats and told a parable: the guest who takes the place of honor may see the host bring a more honorable guest and say 'Make room for this person,' and go down in shame to the lowest place, while the guest who takes the lowest place may hear 'Friend, move up higher'; 'For everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted' (Luke 14:7 to 11, WEB). The counsel was already in Proverbs (25:6 and 7), where it is better to be told 'Come up here' in the king's presence than to be put lower. This entry and the one on hubris in acquisitions came into the Library from that parable. The verses that follow (Luke 14:12 to 14) turn from the guest to the host, who is to invite those who cannot repay, which is why humility put on to win the higher seat is the counterfeit of the thing and not the thing; Charles Dickens drew the counterfeit in Uriah Heep (David Copperfield, 1850). Economics found the rest late. Michael Spence (1973) showed why a costly signal separates types; Nick Feltovich, Rick Harbaugh and Ted To (2002) showed why the best sometimes decline it, with experiments in which subjects learned to countersignal; and Jonah Berger and Morgan Ward (2010) found the most expensive goods the least likely to carry a visible logo.

Why it works now

Who sends which signal used to be judged by impression. Guidance against results, the logos on products, the credentials firms display, insider trading around announcements and the language of calls are now recorded across whole industries, so who declines a signal its peers send, and whether the low seat was followed by being moved up, can be measured outside the conversation. Whether a particular modesty is sincere is still known best to the people who have watched the firm for years.

When it applies

A company or a person conspicuously declines a signal its peers send: conservative guidance from a company that could promise more; a manager who does not market the fund; a firm without the industry's usual credentials, awards or logos; an executive who talks results down; and the reverse case, a company that suddenly starts sending a signal it never needed. Not to be confused with cheap-talk-or-costly-signal, which separates claims from costly actions; screening-menus, which designs choices that make types sort themselves; earnings-thresholds, which reads results managed to land just above a bar; or hubris-in-acquisitions, which reads the bidder who takes the high seat: this asks what the absence of a signal says when the sender could have afforded it.

What we would ask

Could this company or person have sent the usual signal cheaply, and what else does the audience know about it that would separate it from the weakest?
Has the modesty been followed by results above the low seat it took, and does it come with trading by insiders that agrees with it?

What it needs

The signals peers send and their cost; what the audience can learn without the signal (a track record, a reputation, independent data, the people who know the firm); the record of guidance against results, or claims against outcomes, over several periods; and evidence on whether the modesty is a habit or a tactic (insider buying, selling or share issuance around it).

How we would get it

The Desk compares the firm's signals with its peers', sets its guidance or claims against what it delivered, and works the seating arithmetic with chances read from that record. What the record cannot show is whether the modesty is sincere; former employees, customers and the analysts who have followed the firm through several cycles know that.

Where it breaks

Every low profile read as confidence, when the bottom also sends no signal: the theory needs other information that separates the top from the bottom, and without it silence means weakness; conservative guidance read as modesty when it is a walk-down to a beatable target timed to sales of stock (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004; Matsumoto, 2002); nonconformity read as status by an audience that does not know the setting's norms, where the effect disappears (Bellezza, Gino and Keinan, 2014); and the counterfeit taken for the real thing. Humility adopted as a strategy for the higher seat is the opposite of what it imitates: humblebragging, bragging dressed as humility, lowers liking and perceived competence because it is seen as insincere (Sezer, Gino and Norton, 2018), and Uriah Heep, the clerk in Dickens's David Copperfield (1850) who never stops calling himself humble while he works to take over his employer's firm, is its portrait.

For example

The parable's seating, scored on a simple scale on which a loss is felt 2.25 times as hard as a gain of the same size (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). A guest who takes the high seat keeps it, +1, unless the host moves the guest to the bottom, -2, felt as -4.5, which happens with probability p. A guest who takes the low seat has 0, unless the host moves the guest up, +2, with probability q. The high seat is worth taking only if 1 - p (1 + 2 x 2.25) > 2q, that is p < (1 - 2q) / 5.5: below 14.55 percent when the host moves up one low-seated guest in ten, and below 9.09 percent when the host moves up one in four. A guest with a 10 percent chance of being moved down should take the high seat at the first table (0.45 against 0.2) and the low seat at the second (0.45 against 0.5). Without loss aversion the thresholds would be 26.67 and 16.67 percent: the fear of the public demotion is what makes the low seat wise. The same arithmetic governs guidance, where a company confident that its results will be recognized does better to guide low and be moved up.

The mathematics in fullFeltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002): senders of low, medium and high quality; other information, noisy but correlated with quality, that separates high from low with some probability; and a costly signal. In the countersignaling equilibrium the medium type signals, because without the signal it may be mistaken for the low type, while the high type does not, because the other information already separates it from the low type and declining the signal separates it from the medium. The seating arithmetic, with losses weighted by lambda (2.25 in Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) on a linear scale: EV(high seat) = (1 - p)(+1) + p(-2 lambda) and EV(low seat) = q(+2), so the high seat is chosen only when p < (1 - 2q) / (1 + 2 lambda); the threshold falls as q, the chance that merit is recognized, rises, and reaches zero at q = 1/2. Spence (1973): a signal separates types only when its cost differs between them; countersignaling adds that declining a signal can separate them too, when the audience has other information. Where it comes from

Luke 14:7 to 14 and Proverbs 25:6 and 7 in the World English Bible; Spence (1973), Job Market Signaling, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002), Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling, RAND Journal of Economics; Araujo, Gottlieb and Moreira (2007); Quiet signals in markets: Berger and Ward (2010); Han, Nunes and Drèze (2010); Bellezza, Gino and Keinan (2014); the counterfeit, Sezer, Gino and Norton (2018); Guidance and beatable targets: Matsumoto (2002); Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004); Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki (2006); Charles Dickens, David Copperfield (1850); the loss weight from Tversky and Kahneman (1992); the seating arithmetic is Vista's formalization

Sources

Feltovich, Harbaugh, To (2002). Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 630. https://doi.org/10.2307/3087478
Araujo, Gottlieb, Moreira (2007). A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics 38(4), 1020-1043. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x
Spence (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Berger, Ward (2010). Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption. Journal of Consumer Research 37(4), 555-569. https://doi.org/10.1086/655445
Han, Nunes, Drèze (2010). Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence. Journal of Marketing 74(4), 15-30. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.74.4.015
Bellezza, Gino, Keinan (2014). The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity. Journal of Consumer Research 41(1), 35-54. https://doi.org/10.1086/674870
Sezer, Gino, Norton (2018). Humblebragging: A distinct, and ineffective, self-presentation strategy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 114(1), 52-74. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000108
Cotter, Tuna, Wysocki (2006). Expectations Management and Beatable Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance? Contemporary Accounting Research 23(3), 593-624. https://doi.org/10.1506/fj4d-04un-68t7-r8ca
Matsumoto (2002). Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises. The Accounting Review 77(3), 483-514. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483
Richardson, Teoh, Wysocki (2004). The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives. Contemporary Accounting Research 21(4), 885-924. https://doi.org/10.1506/khnw-pjyl-adub-0rp6
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574

Falsification and severe testing (Popper; Duhem and Quine; Lakatos; Mayo)

What result would prove us wrong? Falsification before conviction

We state, before taking a position, the specific, dated result that would make us change our mind, and who decides whether the test failed fairly. Karl Popper's argument (1934; English 1959) is that a claim earns its place by what it forbids: a claim compatible with every outcome says nothing, while a claim that forbids something can be refuted by a test and can be trusted more once it has survived one. So a claim is stated so that it can fail: the measure, its source, the date, the threshold at which it is confirmed, the threshold at which it is falsified, and what the zone between them means (cannot tell). Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine add the caution that a test never meets a hypothesis alone but a bundle of it with assumptions about measurement and conditions, so the test names the assumptions it holds fixed before the data arrive, and a failure is read against the hypothesis only if those assumptions held. Imre Lakatos adds what to do afterward: a revision that predicts a new fact is progress, and a revision that only rescues the old claim is not. Every Vista inquiry carries this in its dated checkpoint, with a confirm clause, a falsify clause and a void clause.

Born to answer
Popper, 1934: a claim earns its place by what it forbids; Duhem, 1906, and Quine, 1951: a test meets a bundle.
What it does now
Whether a thesis names the result that would end it, and who judges.
The mathematics
A pass is strong only if P(pass | claim false) is small; P(H | fail) depends on the assumptions held fixed
The full entry
Where it began

The instruction is older than the philosophy. 'Test all things, and hold firmly that which is good' (1 Thessalonians 5:21, WEB), and 'Beloved, don't believe every spirit, but test the spirits, whether they are of God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world' (1 John 4:1, WEB). Pierre Duhem argued in 1906 that a physicist never tests one hypothesis alone but a group of them with the instruments and assumptions behind the experiment. Karl Popper, in Vienna, published Logik der Forschung in 1934 and made refutability the mark of a claim worth taking seriously; he later contrasted Einstein's prediction that starlight bends near the sun, which the eclipse of 1919 could have contradicted, with theories that seemed to fit every case that arrived. Willard Van Orman Quine (1951) widened Duhem's point to all of what we believe: statements about the world face experience together, not one at a time. Thomas Kuhn (1962) showed scientists treating a failed prediction as a puzzle inside a paradigm until anomalies pile up; Imre Lakatos (1970) asked whether a changed theory predicts new facts or only patches old failures. Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos (2006) turned the idea into a measure, severity. Experiments on how people reason followed: in Peter Wason's task (1960), built so that confirming evidence alone would mislead, only six of 29 subjects reached the right rule without first announcing a wrong one, and Joshua Klayman and Young-won Ha (1987) showed that testing the cases expected to fit, the positive test strategy, is often sound.

Why it works now

A test used to need memory and goodwill to be fair. Filings, prices, transcripts and forecast archives are now dated and public, so a claim can be written down with its thresholds before the data arrive and scored from a record anyone can fetch, and the chance that a false claim would pass by luck can be computed outside the conversation. Whether the measure means what it appears to mean is still known best to the people who produce it.

When it applies

A thesis stated as a direction rather than a result ('this will outperform', 'demand is strong', 'the moat is widening'); a conviction held with no named result that would end it; a forecast too loose to score; a model whose misses are always blamed on conditions; a position held for a reason that has quietly changed; or a report about to say what was confirmed after the data came in. Not to be confused with belief-ledger, which breaks a thesis into the assumptions that must be true and records how each stands; calibration-track-record, which scores a forecaster's stated probabilities against outcomes after the fact; or reference-class-forecast, which sets an outside base rate before the inside view: this asks what single result, named in advance, would count against the claim, and who would judge it.

What we would ask

What specific, dated result would make us change our mind, and what would count as the claim passing, failing or being undecided?
Which assumptions does the test hold fixed, who decides whether it failed fairly, and was that settled before the data arrived?

What it needs

The claim in one sentence; the measure, its source, its date and the rule for counting; the thresholds for confirmed, falsified and cannot tell; the auxiliary assumptions the test leans on (how the measure is built, which sample, which period, which comparison), written down before the data; who scores it and from what record; and what the position will be after each outcome.

How we would get it

The Desk turns a vague claim into the sharpest version the evidence allows: the measure, the date, the three zones and the assumptions held fixed. It checks the thresholds against the record to date, so the test can fail, and works out the chance that the test would pass a false claim by luck, which is its severity. What the record cannot show is whether the measure means what it appears to mean to the people who produce it; practitioners who build or audit the measure, such as a leasing officer, an accountant or a data engineer, know that.

Where it breaks

Unfalsifiable read as false: a claim that cannot be tested is unscored, not wrong, and the right response is to sharpen it, not to dismiss it. A test fixed after the data arrived, with thresholds chosen once the answer was known, which is hindsight dressed as a prediction. One failed test treated as the end of a good model when an auxiliary assumption broke (Duhem and Quine), and the opposite, an assumption invoked after every miss so that nothing ever counts, which Lakatos called a degenerating research programme. A prediction too vague to fail, which proves nothing. A test so lenient that a false claim would pass by luck, or so strict that a true one would fail by chance. A claim made falsifiable by making it trivial. A literal reading of Popper that forgets that science and investing run on claims that are probable and revised, not refuted at a stroke (Gelman and Shalizi). Seeking only confirming cases is the habit to watch (Wason, 1960), though Klayman and Ha found that testing cases expected to have the property is often a sound strategy, so the habit is a risk, not a verdict.

For example

A claim that a stock will outperform can be read in twelve ways: three benchmarks (the broad index, its sector and its peers) at four horizons (three, six, nine and twelve months). Even if the twelve readings were independent coin flips, at least one would favor the claim 99.98 percent of the time. They overlap, so Vista simulated a stock with no edge at all, a random walk of monthly excess returns with 6 percent monthly volatility, in 100,000 runs: some reading favored the claim in about 83 percent of them, and the one sharp reading (the broad index at twelve months) in 50.1 percent, a coin flip. The vague claim is almost certain to be called right; the sharp one carries risk. Inquiry No. 16 states the sharp kind: new AI colocation leases announced from 8 October 2026 to 30 September 2027 by the named publicly traded former miners have a median of at least $1.7 million per megawatt-year (confirmed); a median below $1.5 million falsifies it; between the two, the checkpoint says it cannot tell. The 19 leases to date show $1.79 million, so the confirm line sits 5.0 percent below that figure and the falsify line 16.2 percent below it, and the zone between is $0.2 million wide. A median of $1.42 million falsifies, $1.60 million leaves it undecided and $1.81 million confirms. How severe the test is depends on stated assumptions: with 10 new leases, an assumed spread of $0.4 million between leases and a true value of $1.4 million, the chance of clearing $1.7 million by luck is 0.9 percent, and if the true value is $1.7 million the chance of being called falsified is 5.7 percent. Duhem and Quine, in numbers: suppose the model is believed at 60 percent, the assumption that the leases are measured alike at 80 percent, and the prediction fails. The model falls to 31.0 percent, a loss of 29.0 points, and the assumption to 65.5 percent, a loss of 14.5 points; had the measure been checked and fixed before the data, the same failure would take the model to 15.8 percent. The habit is missing where it matters: the returns to a published stock-return predictor were about a quarter lower out of sample and more than half lower after publication (McLean and Pontiff, 2016).

The mathematics in fullLet the claim be that a measure is at least c, falsified below f, with f less than c, and let n observations have spread s, so the standard error is s / sqrt(n). A false claim with true value m below c passes by luck with probability 1 - Phi((c - m) / (s / sqrt(n))); a true claim with value m at or above c is called falsified with probability Phi((f - m) / (s / sqrt(n))). Mayo and Spanos (2006): a pass supports a claim only to the degree that the test would probably have given a less favorable result if the claim were false, the severity of the test. A bundle of a hypothesis H and an assumption A predicts a result with P(fail | H and A) low and P(fail | otherwise) high, so P(H | fail) = the sum over A of P(H, A) P(fail | H, A) / P(fail), which is the Duhem and Quine problem written as a Bayesian update (Vista's illustration; Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, on how model checking falls outside confirmation alone). With P(H) = 0.60, P(A) = 0.80, P(fail | H and A) = 0.10 and P(fail | otherwise) = 0.80: P(fail) = 0.46, P(H | fail) = 31.0 percent and P(A | fail) = 65.5 percent; with A fixed in advance, P(H | fail) = 0.06 / 0.38 = 15.8 percent. Popper: the content of a claim is what it forbids, so a bolder claim risks more and is worth more when it survives. Ioannidis (2005): the share of claimed findings that are true is PPV = (1 - beta) R / (R - beta R + alpha) for power 1 - beta, level alpha and R true relationships per false one, 61.5 percent at R = 0.10, 80 percent power and alpha = 0.05, and 13.8 percent at R = 0.01. Where it comes from

Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Logik der Forschung, 1934; English 1959); Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906; English 1954); Quine (1951), Two Dogmas of Empiricism, The Philosophical Review; Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in Lakatos and Musgrave, editors, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); Severity and the statistics: Mayo and Spanos (2006); Mayo, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing (2018); Gelman and Shalizi (2013); How people test ideas: Wason (1960); Klayman and Ha (1987); Nickerson (1998); and scoring forecasts: Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment (2005); Mellers and others (2014); When published tests fail to hold: Ioannidis (2005); Open Science Collaboration (2015); McLean and Pontiff (2016); Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2016); The worked figures, the simulation, the severity calculation and the Duhem and Quine update are Vista's illustration; the lease figures are those printed in Vista Inquiry No. 16

Sources

Popper (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London (first published in German as Logik der Forschung, 1934). (book)
Duhem (1906). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton University Press, 1954 (translated by Philip Wiener from La theorie physique, 1906). (book)
Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press (contains Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, pp. 91-196). (book)
Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press. (book)
Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review 60(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2181906
Mayo, Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(2), 323-357. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl003
Mayo (2018). Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars. Cambridge University Press. (book)
Gelman, Shalizi (2013). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 66(1), 8-38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x
Wason (1960). On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12(3), 129-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470216008416717
Klayman, Ha (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review 94(2), 211-228. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211
Nickerson (1998). Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises. Review of General Psychology 2(2), 175-220. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175
Tetlock (2005). Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?. Princeton University Press. (book)
Mellers, Ungar, Baron and others (2014). Psychological Strategies for Winning a Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament. Psychological Science 25(5), 1106-1115. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614524255
Ioannidis (2005). Why Most Published Research Findings Are False. PLoS Medicine 2(8), e124. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 349(6251). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4716
Mclean, Pontiff (2016). Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability? The Journal of Finance 71(1), 5-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12365
Harvey, Liu, Zhu (2016). ... and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. Review of Financial Studies 29(1), 5-68. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv059

Learn the math
The question

On the morning of 29 May 1919, under a sky that had rained until shortly before totality, two British teams photographed the stars around the eclipsed sun, one at Sobral in Brazil and one on the island of Principe off West Africa. They were testing a number written down years earlier. Einstein's new theory of gravity said that starlight grazing the sun's edge would bend by 1.75 seconds of arc. A Newtonian calculation gave half that, about 0.87. Light that did not bend at all would show zero. Whatever the plates showed, one of those claims was going to look bad, and everyone knew in advance which result would embarrass which theory.

Now set beside it a sentence heard every day in investing: "this stock will outperform." Outperform what? Over what period? By how much? Each listener fills in the blanks, and after the fact the speaker can choose the blanks that make the sentence true. Einstein's claim could have failed on a particular morning, in front of witnesses. The stock call cannot fail at all, which is exactly why it tells us nothing.

This model is the discipline of turning the second kind of claim into the first: before taking a position, write down the specific, dated result that would make us change our mind.

The idea in one paragraph

A claim is worth what it forbids. Karl Popper's insight was that a theory compatible with every possible outcome says nothing about the world, while a theory that rules outcomes out can be caught, and earns trust each time it is not. The memorable picture is the archer who shoots first and paints the target around the arrow afterward: a perfect record, and no skill shown. Falsification asks us to paint the target first. Two refinements make it practical. Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine pointed out that no test meets a claim alone; it meets the claim bundled with assumptions about how things were measured, so a fair test names those assumptions before the data arrive. And Deborah Mayo turned the idea into a number, severity: a pass counts only to the degree that the test would probably have failed if the claim were false.

The math, step by step

Step 1: why a vague claim almost always "wins". "Outperform" can be read against three benchmarks (the broad index, the sector, the peers) at four horizons (three, six, nine and twelve months): twelve readings. Suppose the stock has no edge at all, so each reading is a coin flip. The claim is called wrong only if all twelve go against it, which has probability 0.5^12 = 1/4,096. So some reading favors it with probability

1 - (0.5^12) = 1 - 0.000244 = 0.99976, that is, 99.98%

The twelve readings are not really independent (a stock ahead of the index at nine months is likely ahead at twelve), so the Library entry simulates a stock with no edge, monthly excess returns drawn at random with 6% volatility, 100,000 times. Some reading favors the claim in about 83% of the runs. The one sharp reading, the broad index at twelve months, favors it in 50.1%: a coin flip. The vague claim will be "right" five times in six whatever happens. The sharp one takes a real risk, and only a claim that takes a risk can teach us anything.

Step 2: the three zones. A sharp claim names a measure m, its source, its date, and two lines. Call the confirm line c and the falsify line f, with f below c:

m >= c          confirmed
f <= m < c      cannot tell
m < f           falsified

Why a middle zone? Because a single line invites quarrels over results that land a hair either side of it, and because, as Step 3 shows, measurement wobbles. The middle zone admits in advance that some results will not settle the matter.

Vista Inquiry No. 16 states its test this way. The measure is the median rent of new AI colocation leases announced by the named former Bitcoin miners from 8 October 2026 to 30 September 2027, in $ millions per megawatt-year. Confirm at c = $1.7 million, falsify below f = $1.5 million. The 19 leases to date had a median of $1.79 million, so the confirm line sits 5.0% below the record, since (1.70 / 1.79) - 1 = -5.0%, and the falsify line 16.2% below it, since (1.50 / 1.79) - 1 = -16.2%. Both lines could plausibly be crossed. That is the point: a line the record could never reach would make a claim that cannot fail, which is Step 1 again in disguise.

Step 3: severity, or how hard was the test? Here is the one piece of statistics the lesson needs. Suppose the result is an average of n observations whose spread (standard deviation) is s. The average wobbles less than one observation does: its standard deviation, called the standard error, is

SE = s / sqrt(n)

Why sqrt(n)? The variance is the square of the standard deviation, s^2, and the variances of independent draws add. So the sum of n draws has variance n x s^2. The average is that sum divided by n, and dividing a quantity by n divides its variance by n^2, so the average has variance (n x s^2) / n^2 = s^2 / n and standard deviation s / sqrt(n). If the true value is mu, the average lands roughly on a bell curve centered at mu with width SE. The chance it lands at or above a line c is the area of the bell to the right of c. We measure that distance in standard errors, z = (c - mu) / SE, and read the area from the standard normal curve (a table at the back of any statistics book, or a spreadsheet's NORM.S.DIST), written Phi(z) for the area to the left of z:

P(pass by luck | claim false, true value mu) = 1 - Phi((c - mu) / SE)
P(called falsified | claim true, true value mu) = Phi((f - mu) / SE)

The first is the number Mayo asks for. A test is severe when it is small: a false claim would have been caught. The second is the fairness check: a true claim should rarely be thrown out by bad luck. A good test keeps both small, and the only levers are the lines and the amount of evidence.

The entry's assumptions for the lease test: ten new leases, a spread of $0.4 million between leases, and two cases to test, a false claim whose true value is $1.4 million and a true claim whose true value is $1.7 million. Then SE = 0.40 / sqrt(10) = 0.40 / 3.162 = 0.1265, and

z = (1.70 - 1.40) / 0.1265 = 2.37      area to the right: 0.9%
z = (1.50 - 1.70) / 0.1265 = -1.58     area to the left:  5.7%
$1.1$1.3$1.5$1.7$1.9$2.1Median rent of the new leases, $ million per megawatt-yearHow likely each result isfalsifiedcannot tellconfirmedIf the true rent is $1.4 million (claim false)If the true rent is $1.7 million (claim true)
Draw the target before you shoot. The two lines were written down on 8 October 2026, before any new lease was announced. A test is severe when the curve for "the claim is false" barely reaches the confirm zone, and fair when the curve for "the claim is true" barely reaches the falsify zone.

A false claim would clear the confirm line by luck less than once in a hundred tries; a true claim would be called falsified about one time in eighteen. One honest refinement: the test counts a median, not an average, and a median of ten wobbles more. Measured by simulation, the median of ten draws spreads about 1.18 times as wide as their average (for very many draws the factor approaches sqrt(pi / 2) = 1.25), so SE becomes about $0.15 million, the chance of a lucky pass about 2% and the chance of an unlucky falsification about 9%. The test is a little softer than the entry's round figures suggest, and still a real test.

Step 4: Duhem and Quine, in numbers. A test never meets a hypothesis H alone. It meets H together with an auxiliary assumption A, here, say, "the new leases are measured the same way as the old ones." The prediction follows only from both. So when the prediction fails, which one is to blame? Bayes' rule answers, once we say how strongly we believed each beforehand.

The entry's numbers: we believe H at P(H) = 0.60 and A at P(A) = 0.80, independently. If both hold, the test fails only 10% of the time; if either is false, it fails 80% of the time. The test fails. Lay out the four possible worlds and the chance of each world and a failure together:

H true,  A true:   (0.60 x 0.80) x 0.10 = 0.048
H true,  A false:  (0.60 x 0.20) x 0.80 = 0.096
H false, A true:   (0.40 x 0.80) x 0.80 = 0.256
H false, A false:  (0.40 x 0.20) x 0.80 = 0.064
all four together:                total = 0.464

The total is the chance of a failure at all. Bayes' rule says the belief in H after the failure is the share of that total lying in worlds where H is true:

P(H | fail) = (0.048 + 0.096) / 0.464 = 0.144 / 0.464 = 31.0%
P(A | fail) = (0.048 + 0.256) / 0.464 = 0.304 / 0.464 = 65.5%

The blame is shared: H falls 29.0 points, A falls 14.5. Now suppose we had checked the measurement before the data arrived, so that A is known to hold. Only two worlds remain:

P(H | fail) = (0.60 x 0.10) / ((0.60 x 0.10) + (0.40 x 0.80)) = 0.06 / 0.38 = 15.8%

The same failure now costs H 44.2 points instead of 29.0. That is the practical meaning of Duhem and Quine: fixing the assumptions in advance is what gives a failed test its teeth. Leave them loose, and every miss can be blamed on the measurement.

Step 5: what to do after a failure. Imre Lakatos drew the line between rescuing a theory and improving it. By the 1840s Uranus was straying from the path Newton's gravity predicted for it. Urbain Le Verrier rescued the theory with a new assumption, an unseen planet beyond Uranus, and the assumption made a new prediction that could fail: where in the sky to look. On the night of 23 to 24 September 1846 Johann Galle looked, and found Neptune less than a degree from the spot. That rescue was progress. In 1859 Le Verrier tried the same move on a small drift in Mercury's orbit and proposed another unseen planet, later called Vulcan. It was never found; the drift, about 43 seconds of arc a century in the modern figure, waited for Einstein's theory to explain it in 1915. The test of a revision is whether it predicts something new that could fail. A revision that only explains away the last miss is the archer repainting the target.

A worked example: the eclipse, scored

The 1919 results were reported with a "probable error", the old astronomers' measure of spread: half of all errors fall within one probable error, which makes it 0.6745 standard deviations. So a probable error of 0.12 is a standard deviation of 0.12 / 0.6745 = 0.178, which is why Daniel Kennefick's modern table prints the Sobral result as 1.98 plus or minus 0.18.

  • Sobral, 4-inch lens: 1.98 seconds of arc, probable error 0.12 (standard deviation 0.178). Distance from Einstein's 1.75: (1.98 - 1.75) / 0.178 = 1.29 standard deviations, comfortably inside the wobble. Distance from the Newtonian 0.87: (1.98 - 0.87) / 0.178 = 6.24 standard deviations. If the Newtonian value were right, a reading this high would turn up less than once in a billion tries.
  • Principe: 1.61, probable error 0.30 (standard deviation 0.445). Einstein: (1.61 - 1.75) / 0.445 = -0.31. Newton: (1.61 - 0.87) / 0.445 = 1.66. Consistent with Einstein, and only weakly against Newton.

Had the teams written a line in advance halfway between the two predictions, at (1.75 + 0.87) / 2 = 1.31, a measurement as precise as Sobral's would land on the wrong side of it by luck only 0.7% of the time, whichever theory was true: a severe and fair test. One as loose as Principe's would hand Newton a false pass 16.1% of the time. Same eclipse, very different severities; precision is what made the test sharp.

There was a third result, and it is the best part of the story. The larger astrographic telescope at Sobral produced diffuse, out-of-focus star images (the team's report blamed the sun's heat on the mirror that fed the lens), and its plates gave 0.93 seconds of arc, close to Newton's value. The team set it aside. That is Step 4 in the flesh: the result was read as a failure of an auxiliary assumption ("the instrument held its focus and its scale"), not of the hypothesis. Was that fair? In 1980 the philosophers John Earman and Clark Glymour charged that data favoring Newton had been thrown out. In 1979, though, astronomers at the Royal Greenwich Observatory had remeasured the 1919 plates with a modern machine: the astrographic plates came out at 1.55, plus or minus 0.34, and the 4-inch plates at 1.90, plus or minus 0.11, both on Einstein's side. Kennefick, writing in Physics Today in 2009, argues that the original decision was scientifically sound. The argument lasted sixty years for one reason: the assumption about the instrument was judged after its plates were measured, not before. Fix it in advance, and there is nothing to argue about.

The usual mistakes
  • Painting the target after the shot. Thresholds chosen once the data are in. Symptom: every checkpoint is "confirmed", and the lines always sit just below the result. Fix: date the test, and write the lines before the measure is published.
  • Reading "unfalsifiable" as "false". A claim that cannot be tested is unscored, not wrong. Symptom: a good insight dismissed because it was phrased loosely. Fix: sharpen it into a measure, a date and three zones, then score it.
  • One failure, and the model is thrown away. Symptom: a sound model abandoned after a miss caused by a broken measurement. Fix: Step 4; ask which assumption the failure points at, and check it.
  • The opposite: an excuse for every miss. Symptom: each failed prediction is followed by a new reason the conditions were unusual, and no new prediction. Fix: Step 5; a rescue must predict something new that could fail.
  • Testing only cases expected to fit. In Peter Wason's 1960 number task, built so that confirming examples alone would mislead, only six of 29 subjects reached the right rule without first announcing a wrong one. Klayman and Ha later showed that testing expected cases is often a sound strategy, so this is a risk to watch, not a verdict. Fix: ask what result the claim forbids, and go and look for it.
Where the model breaks

An unfalsifiable claim is unscored, not false. A test fixed after the data arrived is hindsight dressed as prediction. One failed test should not end a good model when an assumption broke, and an assumption invoked after every miss means nothing ever counts, which Lakatos called a degenerating research programme. A test can be too lenient, passing false claims by luck, or too strict, failing true ones by chance; Step 3 measures both. A claim can be made falsifiable by making it trivial, and passing such a test proves nothing worth knowing. Finally, a literal reading of Popper forgets that science and investing run on claims that are probable and revised, not refuted at a stroke, which is why this lesson keeps returning to probabilities and to Bayes' rule.

Check yourself

1. A manager says, "Our strategy will add value over a full market cycle." What would you need to add to make this claim falsifiable?

Answer: the measure (return against which benchmark, before or after fees), its source, the dates the cycle starts and ends (written now, not chosen later), a confirm line, a falsify line, and what result in between means "cannot tell". Without the dates, "a full market cycle" can always be extended until the claim looks right.

2. In the lease test, why does adding more leases make the test both more severe and fairer at once?

Answer: both error chances depend on the standard error s / sqrt(n). More leases shrink it, so the bell curves narrow: the curve for a false claim reaches less far past the confirm line, and the curve for a true claim reaches less far below the falsify line. Moving a line can only trade one error for the other; more evidence reduces both.

3. You believe a model at 50% and its measurement assumption at 90%. If both hold, the test fails 5% of the time; otherwise it fails 70% of the time. The test fails. What do you now believe about the model and about the assumption? And what would you believe about the model had the assumption been checked in advance?

Answer: the four worlds, in the order of Step 4, give (0.5 x 0.9) x 0.05 = 0.0225, (0.5 x 0.1) x 0.70 = 0.035, (0.5 x 0.9) x 0.70 = 0.315 and (0.5 x 0.1) x 0.70 = 0.035, a total of 0.4075. The model: (0.0225 + 0.035) / 0.4075 = 0.0575 / 0.4075 = 14.1%, a fall of 35.9 points from 50. The assumption: (0.0225 + 0.315) / 0.4075 = 0.3375 / 0.4075 = 82.8%, a fall of 7.2 points from 90. Because the assumption was believed strongly, almost all the blame lands on the model. Checked in advance: (0.5 x 0.05) / ((0.5 x 0.05) + (0.5 x 0.70)) = 0.025 / 0.375 = 6.7%.

Teach me more
  • Karl Popper, Stephen Thornton, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1997, revised July 2026; a long article, roughly 9,000 words with its bibliography). The most careful free account of falsifiability, of the problem of auxiliary assumptions, and of Popper's rules against ad hoc rescues. Dense in places and sympathetic to Popper; sections 2 to 4 are the part this lesson builds on.
  • Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave and Charles Pigden, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016, revised June 2026; longer still). The clearest statement of Step 5: the hard core and protective belt of a research programme, and the test of progress, a new fact predicted and confirmed (its example is the return of Halley's comet), against patching old failures.
  • Statistics Wars: Interview with Deborah Mayo, Blog of the American Philosophical Association, 7 March 2019 (a short interview, about 1,000 words). Severity in her own words: "A claim is severely tested to the extent it has been subjected to and passes a test that probably would have found flaws, were they present." It assumes some familiarity with the argument between frequentist and Bayesian statisticians.
  • Testing relativity from the 1919 eclipse: a question of bias, Daniel Kennefick, Physics Today, March 2009 (a feature article). The worked example's history in full: the predictions, the three instruments, the discarded plates, the 1979 remeasurement, and the case that the original decision was sound.

The eclipse figures above are those printed by Dyson, Eddington and Davidson in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (1920); the Wason figure is from his 1960 paper's own summary. The Library entry's sources, all on its reading list, are Popper (1934; English 1959), Duhem (1906), Quine (1951), Lakatos (1970) and Mayo and Spanos (2006).

The paradox of confirmation (Hempel; Hosiasson-Lindenbaum; Good)

The white shoe and the black raven: which evidence counts, and how it was gathered

We judge a confirming case by how much more likely it was if the claim is true than if it is false, which is its likelihood ratio, and we ask how the case was gathered before we count it. Carl Hempel posed the puzzle in 1945. The claim 'all ravens are black' says the same thing as 'everything that is not black is not a raven', so if a black raven supports the first, a white shoe seems to support the second, and so the first; that is the paradox. The answer that Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum (1940) anticipated and I. J. Good (1960) set out in numbers is that both cases can support the claim, but by very different amounts, and the amount depends on the draw. A raven picked at random and found black was a real chance for the claim to fail, because there are few ravens; a thing picked because it is not black and found not to be a raven was hardly a chance at all, because non-black things are countless; and a shoe picked as a shoe and then seen to be white was no chance at all, because the claim says nothing about shoes. So the evidence that counts comes from the draws that could have broken the claim.

Born to answer
Hempel, 1945: if a black raven confirms that all ravens are black, so does a white shoe.
What it does now
Which supporting cases could have broken the claim, and has anyone drawn them.
The mathematics
A case counts by P(E | H) / P(E | H'), which depends on the pool it was drawn from
In the inquiries: No. 18, The Paper Railway
The full entry
Where it began

Jean Nicod had proposed in the 1920s that a law such as 'all ravens are black' is supported by each of its instances, a black raven. Carl Hempel, a philosopher who had left Germany for the United States, showed in Mind in 1945 that Nicod's rule, together with the harmless idea that two ways of saying the same thing are supported by the same evidence, makes a white shoe evidence about ravens. Hempel accepted the conclusion and blamed the feeling of paradox on what we already know about shoes. Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, a Polish logician of the Lvov and Warsaw school, had already written in 1940 an axiomatic theory of degrees of confirmation pointing to the probabilistic answer, and I. J. Good, who had worked with Alan Turing on the wartime codebreaking at Bletchley Park where evidence was weighed by its likelihood ratio, gave it numbers in 1960: the white shoe helps, but so little that only an enormous pile of them would matter. In 1967 Good added that in some worlds a black raven can count against the law. Nelson Goodman's grue (1955) and W. V. Quine's essay on natural kinds (1969) turned the question toward which categories evidence can be projected along at all.

Why it works now

Counting the right pool used to be the hard part, because the failures left no record that was easy to reach. Filings, price histories and databases that keep the companies that stopped trading now let the counterexamples be drawn on purpose and counted, and the likelihood ratio of each kind of case can be computed outside the conversation. Why an exception happened is still known best to the people who were there.

When it applies

A general claim supported by a pile of agreeable cases: 'every great company has this trait', 'founder-led firms outperform', 'every stock that met this screen went up'; a list of successes with no count of the failures beside them; a case study of winners; a thesis whose support is many observations that would have looked the same if it were false; or a request to say which of several pieces of evidence matters most. Not to be confused with belief-ledger, which records how each assumption of a thesis stands; falsification-before-conviction, which names in advance the result that would end a claim; or the entry on the survivors, the responders and the eager, which asks who was in a position to be in a sample at all: this asks, for each confirming case, how it was drawn and how much it could have told us if the claim were false.

What we would ask

How was each confirming case found, and would it have looked any different if the claim were false?
Where are the cases that could break the claim, such as the great companies that lack the trait and the companies with the trait that failed, and has anyone looked at them?

What it needs

The claim in one sentence, written as 'every A is B' or as a rate; how each supporting case was drawn (from the A's, from the non-B's, or from whatever came to hand); rough sizes of the pools involved; the cases that would contradict it and where they would be found; and whether failures that left the record (companies that stopped trading, funds that closed) are in the data.

How we would get it

The Desk rewrites the claim so the pools are plain, says which draws could break it, works the likelihood ratio of each kind of case with the sizes given, and asks for the sample of counterexamples: the great companies without the trait and the firms with the trait that failed, including those that no longer report. What the record cannot show is why the exceptions happened; people who ran or financed the firms that failed, or that succeeded without the trait, know that.

Where it breaks

A ratio near one read as zero: when the draw comes from the right pool, a weak case is small, not zero, and many of them can add up. A large pile of cases from the wrong pool read as strong evidence, which is the habit the paradox warns against, and survivorship (Denrell, 2003) is the same error in business: the failures are missing, so a risky practice can look like a cause of success. The paradox taken too literally: Quine (1969) held that non-black and non-raven are not natural kinds, the kind of category induction works with, which is one reason a white shoe feels irrelevant, and Goodman's grue (1955) is the sister puzzle, showing that the same cases fit 'green' and 'grue' alike, so which category the claim uses matters before any counting. The standard Bayesian answer leans on an assumption about how learning that a thing is not black changes the claim, which Vranas (2004) argues is rarely defended; and Good (1967) showed that in some worlds even a black raven can count against the claim, so the ratio depends on the background, not only on the case. This is never a license to ignore a disconfirming case: one great company without the trait counts against 'every great company has it' however many non-great companies were checked. Seeking only agreeable cases is the habit to watch (Wason, 1960), though Klayman and Ha (1987) found that testing cases expected to fit is often sound, and Fitelson and Hawthorne (2010) link the two puzzles.

For example

Take 100 ravens and 950,000 things that are not black, and set the claim that every raven is black against one alternative: exactly one raven is not black. Draw a raven at random and find it black: that was certain if the claim holds and 99 in 100 if it does not, a likelihood ratio of 1 / (1 - 1/100) = 1.010101, about 1 percent of support. Draw a non-black thing at random and find it is not a raven: certain if the claim holds and 949,999 in 950,000 if it does not, a ratio of 1 / (1 - 1/950,000) = 1.00000105, about a ten-thousandth of 1 percent. Measured by how far each moves the odds, the raven carries about 9,596 times the support. Ten black ravens give a ratio of 1.1057, taking a belief of 50 percent to 52.5 percent, and it would take about 95,000 non-black non-ravens to match them. A white shoe picked as a shoe and then seen to be white has a ratio of exactly 1: the claim says nothing about shoes, so it carries no evidence at all. The investing version, with illustrative sizes: the claim is that every one of 50 great companies has trait T, against an alternative in which 5 of them lack it, and 3,000 publicly traded companies lack T. A great company found to have T gives a ratio of 1.1111; a company without T found not to be great gives 1.00167; the first carries about 66.6 times the support. The draw that can break the claim is a great company without T: checking 20 of the 50 great companies at random finds one with a 93.3 percent chance if the alternative holds, while checking 20 companies without T finds one with only a 3.3 percent chance.

The mathematics in fullFor a claim H against an alternative H', a case E moves the odds by the likelihood ratio: P(H | E) / P(H' | E) = [P(E | H) / P(E | H')] x [P(H) / P(H')]. With r ravens and N non-black things, and the alternative that one raven is not black: a raven drawn at random and found black has ratio 1 / (1 - 1/r); a non-black thing drawn at random and found not to be a raven has ratio 1 / (1 - 1/N); with r = 100 and N = 950,000 these are 1.010101 and 1.00000105, and the excesses over one stand in the ratio (N - 1) / (r - 1) = 9,596 (Vista's illustration of the answer of Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, 1940, and Good, 1960). A case drawn from a pool the two hypotheses describe alike, such as a shoe picked as a shoe, has P(E | H) = P(E | H') and ratio exactly 1. Ratios multiply: k black ravens give 1.010101^k, 1.1057 at k = 10, matched by n = ln(1.1057) / ln(1.00000105), about 95,000, non-black non-ravens. The chance that a random sample of m from a pool of M holding x exceptions finds at least one is 1 - C(M - x, m) / C(M, m): 93.3 percent for m = 20, M = 50, x = 5, and 3.3 percent for m = 20, M = 3,000, x = 5. Where it comes from

Hempel (1945), Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.), Mind 54(213), 1-26, reprinted with a postscript in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (1965); Hosiasson-Lindenbaum (1940), On confirmation, Journal of Symbolic Logic; Good (1960), The Paradox of Confirmation, and Good (1967), The White Shoe is a Red Herring, both in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), the new riddle of induction; Quine, Natural Kinds, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969); Later Bayesian work: Maher (1999); Vranas (2004); Fitelson and Hawthorne (2010); How people test ideas: Wason (1960); Klayman and Ha (1987); and learning from survivors: Denrell (2003); Heckman (1979); The worked figures, including the investing illustration, are Vista's; the raven figures follow proposal 9 of 13 October 2026

Sources

Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Free Press, New York (reprints Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, Mind, 1945, with a postscript). (book)
Hosiasson-Lindenbaum (1940). On confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 5(4), 133-148. https://doi.org/10.2307/2268173
Goodman (1955). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press. (book)
Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. (book)
Maher (1999). Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox. Philosophy of Science 66(1), 50-70. https://doi.org/10.1086/392676
Vranas (2004). Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55(3), 545-560. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.3.545
Fitelson, Hawthorne (2010). The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24(1), 207-241. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00191.x
Denrell (2003). Vicarious Learning, Undersampling of Failure, and the Myths of Management. Organization Science 14(3), 227-243. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.2.227.15164
Wason (1960). On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12(3), 129-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470216008416717
Klayman, Ha (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review 94(2), 211-228. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211
Heckman (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47(1), 153. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912352

The narrative fallacy (Taleb) and hindsight bias (Fischhoff)

The story that fits too well: the narrative fallacy and hindsight

We treat an explanation found after the outcome as weak evidence, because one is nearly always there to be found, and we count only a prediction written down before the outcome as a real test. Two habits work together. The narrative fallacy, Nassim Taleb's name for it (The Black Swan, 2007, chapter 6), is the pull to tie loose facts into a story with a cause, which makes the facts easier to remember and makes the story feel truer than the facts allow. Hindsight bias, measured by Baruch Fischhoff in 1975 and reviewed by Neal Roese and Kathleen Vohs in 2012, is the feeling, once the outcome is known, that it was more predictable than it was; people who are told what happened judge it more likely than people who are not, and feel they knew it all along. The cost is measurable: in Biais and Weber's (2009) experiments, investment bankers more prone to hindsight underestimated volatility and performed worse. Put the two together and any price move, any company's rise or fall, arrives already explained. So the question to ask of a story is not whether it fits, since a story chosen after the outcome is chosen because it fits, but whether it was written down, with a result that would have proved it wrong, before anyone knew.

Born to answer
Fischhoff, 1975: knowing the outcome makes it seem to have been predictable.
What it does now
Which parts of an account were written before the outcome, and which were found after it.
The mathematics
A story that would have been found anyway has likelihood ratio 1 / P, where P = 1 - (1 - p)^n
The full entry
Where it began

In the early 1970s Baruch Fischhoff, then a graduate student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman taught, gave people accounts of past events and told some of them how the events ended. Those told an outcome judged it more likely than those who were not; he published the finding in 1975 as 'Hindsight is not equal to foresight'. Nassim Taleb, a former options trader, named the related habit the narrative fallacy in The Black Swan (2007): the need to fit a story or a pattern to a series of facts, which compresses them and makes them easier to remember at the cost of treating chance as cause. Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) traced both to a mind that builds the most coherent story from what it has and does not ask what is missing. Guilbault and coauthors (2004) pooled 95 studies of the effect, and Roese and Vohs (2012) gathered nearly four decades of work into one account of its memory, its sense-making and its motives.

Why it works now

Explanations now arrive within minutes of a move, so a story is almost always waiting. What is new is that predictions can be time stamped and kept: a forecast written down, dated and scored later is cheap to make, and a record of them shows which accounts were tests and which were stories. What people truly expected beforehand is still best learned from the notes they made at the time.

When it applies

An explanation of why a stock moved, written after it moved ('shares fell on worries about X'); a post-mortem of a deal, a fund or a forecast; a case study of a company that won, told as though the win were bound to come; a thesis that is persuasive mainly because its parts hang together; a report that reads well and tests little. It is also a check on Vista's own writing: of each sentence in an inquiry or an essay, ask whether it is story or test. Not to be confused with excess-volatility-and-narratives, Shiller's account of stories that spread and move prices (the stories as causes in the market), or with which-evidence-counts, which asks how each confirming case was drawn: this entry is about the explanations analysts and writers build after the fact, and how little their existence proves. The remedy is in falsification-before-conviction (name the refuting result first), belief-ledger (write what must be true), calibration-track-record (score the predictions) and reference-class-forecast (start from how often such things happen).

What we would ask

Was this explanation written down before the outcome, with a result that would have proved it wrong, or was it found afterward?
How many other stories were available that day, and would one of them have fit just as well had the outcome gone the other way?

What it needs

The explanation in one sentence and when it was first written; the outcome it explains; a rough count of the other plausible explanations available at the time (other headlines, other drivers); and any prediction made in advance, with the result that would have counted against it.

How we would get it

The Desk separates the parts of an account that are story from the parts that are test, asks when each claim was first written, counts the rival explanations that were available, works the arithmetic of how often some story would have fit by chance, and turns the story into a prediction that a later date can settle. What the record cannot show is what the people involved expected beforehand; their notes, memos and forecasts written at the time, and the people who wrote them, can.

Where it breaks

The rule read as a ban on stories: stories are how people understand and remember, and the entry never says do not tell stories, only do not count the story as the evidence. A true cause dismissed because it came with a story: some explanations are right, and an after-the-fact account can be checked against records made at the time, such as a filing, a guidance change or a trade time stamp, which then makes it evidence. Stories that are not independent counted many times: ten articles retelling one account are one account. Hindsight corrected into its opposite, the view that nothing could have been foreseen, which is as unearned as the view that everything could. The arithmetic depends on the counts and chances assumed, which are illustrations, not measurements. This is not investment advice.

For example

Take a day with 10 plausible headlines, each with a 20 percent chance of seeming relevant to a given price move once the move is known. The chance that at least one of them seems to explain it is 1 - 0.8^10 = 89.3 percent; with 5 headlines at 10 percent each it is 41.0 percent (the same formula as watched-closely, where a close enough watch nearly always finds something). Now ask what the story is worth as evidence. If the move had the cause the story names, a story is there for sure; if it was noise, a story is there anyway 89.3 percent of the time. The likelihood ratio, how much more likely the evidence is under one account than the other, is 1 / 0.893 = 1.12 on the busy day and 1 / 0.41 = 2.44 on the quiet one, so from even odds the story moves the belief only to 52.8 percent, or 70.9 percent on the quiet day. Set that beside a prediction written before the day: suppose the account, if right, calls a large fall 80 percent of the time, and a fall that large happens on 10 percent of days by luck. A prediction that comes true has a likelihood ratio of 0.80 / 0.10 = 8, taking even odds to 88.9 percent; it would take about 18 busy-day stories to match it, and that only if the stories were independent, which they rarely are. A prediction that fails has a ratio of 0.20 / 0.90 = 0.222, taking even odds down to 18.2 percent: the advance prediction can lose, which is exactly why it counts.

The mathematics in fullWith n candidate explanations, each seeming relevant with chance p, the chance that at least one fits after the fact is P = 1 - (1 - p)^n: 89.3 percent for n = 10, p = 0.20, and 41.0 percent for n = 5, p = 0.10. If a story is certain when the named cause is real and appears with chance P when the move is noise, the likelihood ratio of 'a story exists' is 1 / P, and the posterior odds are the prior odds times that ratio: 1.12 and 2.44 here, or 52.8 and 70.9 percent from a prior of 50 percent. A prediction recorded in advance that comes true with chance h if the account is right and chance b by luck has ratio h / b if it comes true and (1 - h) / (1 - b) if it does not: with h = 0.80 and b = 0.10, 8 and 0.222, or 88.9 and 18.2 percent from 50 percent. Matching one such hit with independent after-the-fact stories takes ln 8 / ln 1.12, about 18 of them (Vista's illustration). Where it comes from

Taleb, The Black Swan (2007), chapter 6, which names the narrative fallacy; Fischhoff (1975), Hindsight is not equal to foresight: the effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 288-299; Roese and Vohs (2012), Hindsight bias, Perspectives on Psychological Science; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway and Posavac (2004), a meta-analysis of 95 studies; In markets: Biais and Weber (2009), Hindsight bias, risk perception, and investment performance; Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011): the mind prefers a coherent story to a complete one; Shiller (2017), Narrative Economics, on stories that spread and move prices, cross-referred in excess-volatility-and-narratives; The worked figures are Vista's illustrations; the headline figures follow proposal 10 of 13 October 2026

Sources

Roese, Vohs (2012). Hindsight Bias. Perspectives on Psychological Science 7(5), 411-426. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612454303
Biais, Weber (2009). Hindsight Bias, Risk Perception, and Investment Performance. Management Science 55(6), 1018-1029. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1000
Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, Posavac (2004). A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 26(2-3), 103-117. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2004.9646399
Taleb (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., with the postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility (first published by Random House, 2007). Random House Trade Paperbacks. (book)
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)
Shiller (2017). Narrative Economics. American Economic Review 107(4), 967-1004. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.4.967

Strategic response

What the other side does when you move, and what that does to the plan.

Nash equilibrium

Assume the competitor is not asleep

We ask what a competent competitor does after you move, and whether your plan still works once they have.

Born to answer
Cournot, 1838, two sellers of mineral water; Nash, 1951, in general.
What it does now
What a competent rival does the day after you move.
The mathematics
No player gains by changing strategy alone
The full entry
Where it began

Antoine Augustin Cournot analyzed two sellers of mineral water in 1838 and found the outcome where each produces its best quantity given the other's, which John Nash generalized in 1951 to any number of players and any game. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer's 1985 paper added the practical taxonomy: when moves are strategic substitutes a rival meets aggression by backing off, when they are complements by matching it, and the sign decides whether a plan works.

Why it works now

Every investment model that assumed passive competitors did so because modeling the response required knowing the rival's payoffs, and nobody outside the rival knew them. Former executives of the rival do, and they can be recruited. The Desk asks the two questions, what is the best thing your strongest competitor can do after you move and does the plan survive it, and the engagement puts the people who ran that competitor on the record.

When it applies

A plan (price rise, entry, new product, acquisition, channel change) whose model assumes rivals stay where they are; or a client puzzled by a rival's move.

What we would ask

If you do this, what is the best thing your strongest competitor can do in response?
Does your plan still work if they do it?

What it needs

The rivals' real payoffs and constraints, which are usually not the ones the client assumes; who moves first and who can observe whom.

How we would get it

Former executives of the competitors, who know how those companies actually decide; channel partners and customers who saw past responses.

Where it breaks

The game is mis-specified: wrong players, wrong moves, wrong information; or several stable outcomes exist and one was picked for convenience.

For example

A company plans a price increase on the assumption that its main rival follows. The rival's former head of pricing, interviewed, explains that the rival's incentive plan rewards share, not margin, and it will not follow. The plan is a different plan.

The mathematics in fullA set of strategies is stable when no player gains by changing alone, given the others; with strategic substitutes (quantities, capacity) a rival responds to aggression by retreating, with strategic complements (prices) by matching, and the sign decides the plan. Taught in

MMSS 211-2; MECN-452; MECN-441

Sources

Nash (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. The Annals of Mathematics 54(2), 286. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
Bulow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy 93(3), 488-511. https://doi.org/10.1086/261312
Gibbons, Robert (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. (book)

Entry deterrence and reputation

Will they enter, and can you stop them?

We work out whether the incumbent's threats are credible, which usually means whether it has already spent money it cannot get back, and whether a reputation for fighting is real or a story.

Born to answer
Selten's chain store; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Dixit, 1980.
What it does now
Whether a moat is sunk commitment or a story.
The mathematics
A threat is credible only if carrying it out is optimal
The full entry
Where it began

Reinhard Selten's chain-store paradox asked why an incumbent would fight entrants when fighting costs more than accommodating, and backward induction said it never would. Kreps and Wilson, and Milgrom and Roberts, resolved it in 1982: a small chance that the incumbent is genuinely tough makes fighting early entrants worthwhile as reputation. Avinash Dixit in 1980 showed the other route, capacity built before entry that cannot be unbuilt, which turns a threat into a fact.

Why it works now

Whether a moat is real used to be argued from the incumbent's rhetoric. What can now be established is what the incumbent has actually sunk, what it did the last three times someone entered, and what each response cost it, from the record and from former executives of both the incumbent and the entrants. The Desk asks what has been committed that cannot be reversed. The interviews answer it.

When it applies

A client is deciding whether to enter a market with an aggressive incumbent, or is an incumbent deciding how to respond to entry, or is underwriting a company whose moat is an entry barrier.

What we would ask

What has the incumbent already committed that it cannot reverse?
When someone last entered, what did the incumbent actually do, and did it pay for it?

What it needs

The incumbent's sunk commitments, its history of responses to entry, and what those responses cost it.

How we would get it

Former executives of the incumbent and of past entrants; the record of past entries and the price and capacity responses that followed.

Where it breaks

The threat is not credible because carrying it out would hurt the incumbent more than accommodating; or the moat was regulatory and the regulation is changing.

For example

A venture investor is underwriting an entrant against a dominant incumbent said to crush competition. The last three entrants were bought, ignored, and out-priced respectively; the interviews establish which of those this entrant resembles and what the incumbent's capacity position makes credible now.

The mathematics in fullA threat is credible only when carrying it out is the incumbent's best response at the point of entry; irreversible investment before entry changes that best response, and a reputation for toughness is worth more the more entrants remain to be deterred. Taught in

MMSS 311-1; MECN-441; MECS 449

Sources

Dixit (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal 90(357), 95. https://doi.org/10.2307/2231658
Milgrom, Roberts (1982). Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 280-312. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Repeated games and tacit collusion

Why the truce holds, and when it breaks

We look at what keeps rivals from cutting price: how much future business they expect from each other, how well they can see each other's moves, and whether anyone is about to leave the game.

Born to answer
Green and Porter, 1984, on a nineteenth-century railroad cartel.
What it does now
What holds pricing discipline, and who is about to leave the game.
The mathematics
Cooperation holds while gain G is below the discounted future loss
In the inquiries: No. 1, The Chocolate Truce
The full entry
Where it began

Green and Porter's 1984 model explained price wars without anyone cheating: when rivals cannot see each other's prices and only observe a noisy market, a bad quarter looks like a secret price cut, and the punishment phase that follows is what keeps the truce credible the rest of the time. The theory was built with a nineteenth-century railroad cartel in mind, whose periodic price wars Porter had studied.

Why it works now

Underwriting pricing discipline in a concentrated industry has always meant guessing at three things: how transparent prices are among rivals, how long each expects to be in the game, and whether anyone is about to leave. All three are now questions former pricing and sales leaders across the rivals can answer, and the record shows what preceded every past price break. The Desk asks who is about to sell, retire, or exit, because that is what shortens the shadow of the future.

When it applies

An industry with stable prices that the thesis assumes will stay stable; or a price war the client did not expect; or a rival that is about to be sold, exit, or change hands.

What we would ask

How quickly would the others see a secret price cut, and what would they do?
Is anyone in this market about to leave it, sell, or retire?

What it needs

Transparency of pricing among rivals, the horizon each expects, and the events that shorten it.

How we would get it

Former pricing and sales leaders across the rivals; the record of past price breaks and what preceded them.

Where it breaks

The end of the game is nearer than assumed; punishment is not credible; deviations cannot be observed clearly enough to punish.

For example

A thesis rests on rational pricing in a four-player market. One of the four is being prepared for sale, which shortens its horizon and changes its incentives in the last year. The interviews with former executives of that player are where the thesis is tested.

The mathematics in fullCooperation holds when the one-period gain from cutting, G, is at most the discounted future loss delta x (V(cooperate) - V(punish)) / (1 - delta); anything that lowers delta or blurs observation of the cut breaks the truce. Taught in

MMSS 311-1; MECN-441; MECN-452

Sources

Green, Porter (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica 52(1), 87. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462
Fudenberg, Maskin (1986). The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica 54(3), 533. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911307
Kreps, Wilson (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

Nash bargaining and alternating offers

The outside option decides the split

We establish what each side gets if talks fail, because that, not the argument in the room, decides most negotiations, and we research the other side's outside option as hard as yours.

Born to answer
Nash, 1950; Rubinstein, 1982: patience decides the split.
What it does now
Researching the other side's fallback, not only your own.
The mathematics
Maximize (u1 - d1) x (u2 - d2)
The full entry
Where it began

John Nash's 1950 paper solved the bargaining problem from four axioms and found that the split depends on what each side gets if talks fail. Ariel Rubinstein's 1982 model of alternating offers showed the same thing dynamically: the more patient party captures more of the surplus, and impatience is expensive. Kellogg teaches the Nash scheme in its game theory course as a tool for actual negotiations.

Why it works now

Negotiators have always known their own fallback and guessed the other side's. The other side's fallback is now researchable: former executives and advisors from that side's world can say what a failed deal actually costs a party in that position, and the record shows the alternatives and the timing pressure. The Desk asks who is more able to wait. The engagement finds out before the first meeting instead of after the last.

When it applies

A client preparing a negotiation (acquisition, partnership, supply contract, renewal, joint venture) who knows their own fallback and is guessing the other side's.

What we would ask

What happens to them if this does not close? Not what they say, what actually happens.
Who is more able to wait?

What it needs

Both sides' fallbacks, patience, and ability to commit, established from evidence rather than posture.

How we would get it

Former executives and advisors from the other side's industry on what a failed deal costs a party in that position; the record on the other side's alternatives and timing pressure.

Where it breaks

The outside options are misread (the seller does have another buyer, or does not); a commitment was not credible.

For example

A buyer believes a founder must sell. The founder's former CFO, interviewed, explains that the company just refinanced and the founder can run it for years. The buyer's leverage was imaginary, and the negotiation plan changes before the first meeting.

The mathematics in fullThe split maximizes (u1 - d1) x (u2 - d2), where d1 and d2 are the payoffs if no deal is reached; in alternating offers the more patient side captures more, so improving your own d or worsening theirs moves the outcome more than any concession. Taught in

MECN-452; MECS 540-2; MMSS 311-1

Sources

Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Rubinstein (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50(1), 97. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531
Muthoo, Abhinay (1999). Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge University Press. (book)

The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem

Deals that should close and do not

When both sides would gain from a deal and it still is not closing, the cause is usually private information about value or a reputation for holding out, and we design the research to find which.

Born to answer
Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983: some worthwhile trades must fail.
What it does now
Diagnosing a stalled deal that makes obvious economic sense.
The mathematics
No mechanism guarantees trade under two-sided private values
The full entry
Where it began

Myerson and Satterthwaite proved in 1983 that when a buyer and a seller each privately know their own value, no bargaining procedure can guarantee trade whenever trade is worth doing; some good deals must fail. James Fearon's 1995 paper applied the same logic to war: rational states fight because of private information they have reason to misrepresent and because they cannot commit. Abreu and Gul showed in 2000 how a reputation for stubbornness lets a party win by waiting.

Why it works now

A stalled deal used to be read as irrationality or bad faith. It can now be diagnosed: what each side privately knows, what each has committed to in public, and what waiting costs each of them are all things former participants in comparable stalemates can speak to, and the record shows the public positions. The Desk asks which side's cost of delay is real. That tells the client who folds first and when.

When it applies

A transaction that makes obvious economic sense is stalled; a negotiation has become a waiting game; or a client wants to know whether a stalled deal will close.

What we would ask

What does each side know about the value that the other does not?
Is someone holding out because folding once would cost them in every future deal?

What it needs

What each side privately knows, what each has committed to publicly, and each side's cost of continued delay.

How we would get it

Advisors who have been on the other side of comparable stalemates; the record of the parties' public positions and the costs of waiting.

Where it breaks

The efficiency of the deal is assumed to guarantee it closes; the hold-out is read as irrational when it is reputational.

For example

A strategic buyer and a target agree the combination creates value and have not closed in nine months. Each believes the other is overstating its walk-away. The interviews establish which side's cost of delay is real, which tells the client who folds first and when.

The mathematics in fullWith private values on both sides, no mechanism guarantees efficient trade whenever a deal is worth doing; delay is the cost that separates types, and a party with a reputation for holding out can win by waiting even when waiting is expensive. Taught in

MECS 465; MECS 540-2

Sources

Myerson, Satterthwaite (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29(2), 265-281. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Abreu, Gul (2000). Bargaining and Reputation. Econometrica 68(1), 85-117. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00094
Fearon (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49(3), 379-414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324

Global games and bank runs

Everyone runs because everyone else might

We look at whether the outcome depends on what each participant believes the others will do, in which case small changes in confidence can flip a whole market, and we find the participants whose beliefs matter most.

Born to answer
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Carlsson and van Damme, 1993.
What it does now
Whose beliefs about everyone else's beliefs decide a run.
The mathematics
Each participant acts when its estimate crosses a threshold
The full entry
Where it began

Carlsson and van Damme's 1993 paper on global games showed that when players have slightly different information about the fundamentals, a coordination game with many possible outcomes collapses to one: each player acts when its own estimate crosses a threshold. Morris and Shin applied it to currency attacks, and Baliga and Sjöström's 2004 work on arms races formalized Schelling's reciprocal fear of surprise attack, where each side arms because it fears the other might.

Why it works now

Runs and panics were treated as sentiment because the decision rules of the large participants were unknowable. They are knowable: treasurers, portfolio managers, and operators at the kind of institutions that hold the deposits, the bonds, or the platform positions can be asked what they would do and what public news would change what they believe about each other. The Desk finds the participants whose beliefs matter most. The engagement asks them.

When it applies

A run, a panic, a rush for the exit, a standards war, a platform tipping point; or a thesis that assumes a stable equilibrium in a market with two. Not to be confused with bank-runs, which asks whether the contract itself invites a run (short claims on long or illiquid assets, promised at more than they would fetch if everyone came) and which remedy closes the gap: this entry asks whose beliefs about everyone else's beliefs decide a coordination break, and what public news would move them.

What we would ask

If the largest three participants believed the others would stay, would they stay?
What single piece of public news would change what everyone believes everyone else believes?

What it needs

The participants' payoffs from staying versus leaving as a function of how many others leave; what information is common to all of them.

How we would get it

Operators on the actual decision rules of the large participants; the record on comparable coordination breaks and what triggered them.

Where it breaks

The model assumes participants know each other's payoffs precisely when they only estimate them; multiple equilibria are collapsed to one.

For example

A thesis on a regional lender assumes deposits are sticky. The question is not the average depositor's loyalty but whether the largest depositors believe the others will stay; the interviews go to treasurers of the kind of companies that hold those deposits.

The mathematics in fullWith a small amount of private information about fundamentals, the many equilibria of a coordination game collapse to one threshold: each participant acts when its estimate of the fundamental crosses a cutoff, so the size of the crowd that moves is a function of public news, not of mood. Taught in

MECS 540-2; MMSS 311-1

Sources

Carlsson, van Damme (1993). Global Games and Equilibrium Selection. Econometrica 61(5), 989. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951491
Baliga, Sjostrom (2004). Arms Races and Negotiations. Review of Economic Studies 71(2), 351-369. https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00287
Diamond, Dybvig (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91(3), 401-419. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155

Commitment and audience costs

A threat is only as good as its cost to withdraw

We test whether a commitment (a price floor, a no-sale promise, a walk-away, a regulatory pledge) would actually be kept when the moment comes, which depends on what breaking it would cost, not on how firmly it was said.

Born to answer
Schelling, 1960: burning the bridges behind the army.
What it does now
Whether a pledge by a counterparty or a government will hold.
The mathematics
Credible when reversal costs more than honoring
The full entry
Where it began

Thomas Schelling's 1960 book turned commitment into strategy: the general who burns the bridges behind his army, the negotiator who ties his own hands, the focal point two strangers pick when told to meet in New York without communicating. James Fearon's 1994 paper added audience costs: a leader who makes a public threat pays a domestic price for backing down, which is exactly what makes the threat believable.

Why it works now

Whether a government, a regulator, or a counterparty will honor a pledge used to be judged from the firmness of its language. The cost of reversal is now the thing to research, and it can be: who the pledge was made in front of, what reversing it has cost that party before, and what it would cost now, from former officials and from the record. The Desk asks what backing down would cost them, and treats the answer, not the rhetoric, as the probability.

When it applies

A plan relies on a promise or a threat by the client, a counterparty, a regulator, or a government; or a client is trying to make its own commitment believable.

What we would ask

What would it cost them, publicly and privately, to back down?
Have they backed down from something like this before?

What it needs

The audience in front of which the commitment was made and the cost of reversal before it; the history of reversals.

How we would get it

Advisors who have watched the party in question honor or abandon commitments; the record of prior reversals and their consequences.

Where it breaks

Firmness of language is mistaken for cost of reversal; the audience that would punish a reversal is assumed rather than identified.

For example

A government has pledged a subsidy regime through the decade. The pledge was made to voters and investors before an election. The interviews establish what reversing it would cost after the election, which is the actual probability the thesis depends on.

The mathematics in fullA commitment is credible when reversing it is more costly than honoring it at the moment of decision; audience costs, sunk investment, and reputation are the three ways that cost is created, and each can be researched. Taught in

MECS 540-2; MMSS 211-3

Sources

Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. (book)
Fearon (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3), 577-592. https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796

Replicator dynamics and stable strategies

Which practices survive in an industry

Instead of asking what a rational competitor would do, we ask which strategies are gaining share in the population of firms and which are losing it, because an industry converges on what works whether or not anyone planned it.

Born to answer
Maynard Smith and Price, 1973: why animal contests rarely end in death.
What it does now
Which business practices gain share whether or not anyone planned it.
The mathematics
dx(i)/dt = x(i) x (payoff of i minus the average)
The full entry
Where it began

John Maynard Smith and George Price asked in 1973 why animal contests are so rarely fights to the death, and answered with the evolutionarily stable strategy: a mix of behavior that no rare alternative can invade. Taylor and Jonker wrote the dynamics down in 1978 as the replicator equation, in which a strategy's share grows when it does better than the population average. MMSS teaches it in both game theory courses because it explains convergence without assuming anyone is rational.

Why it works now

Watching which practices gain and lose share across an industry used to require a trade association's survey and a decade. The share of each strategy in a market can now be read from filings, job postings, pricing pages, and the trade press year by year, and operators can say which practices are being copied. The Desk asks which practices are gaining share among the firms in this market. The population answers the question the argument cannot.

When it applies

A thesis that assumes rivals stay irrational or old-fashioned; a practice spreading through an industry; a question about whether a business model will be copied or will fade.

What we would ask

Which practices are gaining share among the firms in this market, and which are losing it?
Could a single entrant doing something different take share from the incumbents, or would it be squeezed out?

What it needs

The mix of strategies in the industry over time, and the relative performance of each in the current mix.

How we would get it

Operators across the industry on which practices are winning and being copied; the record for share by strategy over time.

Where it breaks

Payoffs treated as fixed when they shift as the mix changes; entry and imitation ignored.

For example

A thesis assumes an incumbent's high-touch sales model will keep beating a rival's self-serve model. Across the industry, self-serve is gaining share every year and the high-touch firms are the ones being acquired or shrinking. The population, not the argument, says where this ends.

The mathematics in fulldx(i)/dt = x(i) x (f(i)(x) - fbar(x)): the share of a strategy grows when its payoff exceeds the average; a strategy that cannot be invaded by a rare alternative is where the industry settles. Taught in

MMSS 211-2; MMSS 311-1

Sources

Maynard Smith, Price (1973). The Logic of Animal Conflict. Nature 246(5427), 15-18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
Taylor, Jonker (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40(1-2), 145-156. https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(78)90077-9

The Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs

Bank runs: liquid promises on illiquid assets

We test whether a set of promises can be kept if everyone asks at once. Diamond and Dybvig showed that an institution which funds long or illiquid assets with claims that can be withdrawn on demand at a fixed value does something useful, it lets people who turn out to need cash early have it without making everyone hold cash, and that the same contract has two equilibria: one in which only those who need cash withdraw and everyone else is paid in full later, and one in which everyone withdraws because everyone else is expected to, the assets are sold at a loss, and the last in line get nothing. The run equilibrium exists whenever the promised payment exceeds what the assets would fetch if all were sold at once. We compute that gap, who is first in line and what they know, and whether a gate, a suspension, insurance or matched maturities removes the second equilibrium.

Born to answer
Journal of Political Economy, 1983.
What it does now
Whether a set of promises survives everyone asking at once.
The mathematics
A run is an equilibrium whenever r_1 > L
The full entry
Where it began

Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig published their model in the Journal of Political Economy in 1983, building on John Bryant's of 1980: a bank that turns long loans into deposits payable on demand is doing something valuable, and the same contract makes a run a self-fulfilling equilibrium, which suspension of convertibility or deposit insurance can remove. Diamond's 1984 paper explained why banks exist at all, as delegated monitors of borrowers; Charles Jacklin and Sudipto Bhattacharya (1988) and Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (1998) showed that runs set off by bad news about the assets behave differently from pure panics; Itay Goldstein and Ady Pauzner (2005) gave the run a probability by adding private signals, which joins this entry to the global games of coordination-and-panic. The crisis of 2008 showed runs on institutions that were not banks, on money market funds in the week of Lehman Brothers' failure and on the repo market, and the 2022 Nobel Prize in economics went to Diamond, Dybvig and Ben Bernanke; the runs on regional banks in the United States in March 2023, conducted largely by phone, followed within months.

Why it works now

Redemption terms, gates, maturities and the asset book are in the documents of every fund and bank, and what a full redemption would fetch against what is promised, and the gain to a holder who leaves first, can be computed outside the conversation for every such claim a portfolio holds. What the largest holders would do, and when, is still known to the treasurers and allocators who hold the claims.

When it applies

A bank, a money market or bond fund, a private credit or real estate fund with periodic redemptions, a stablecoin, a broker holding client money, a repo or prime brokerage book, a company that funds long projects with commercial paper: anything that promises cash on demand or at a date against assets that take longer to sell at full value; a thesis that redemptions will stay orderly; a redemption gate or a suspension and what it signals. Not to be confused with coordination-and-panic, which asks whose beliefs about everyone else's beliefs decide a coordination break and what public news would move them, or distress-screen, which reads solvency from the statements: this asks whether the contract itself invites a run, how large the gap is, and which remedy closes it.

What we would ask

If every holder asked for their money this quarter, what would the assets fetch, and how does that compare with what has been promised?
Who can get out first, what do they know that the others do not, and what do the gate or suspension terms say they will be paid if they wait?

What it needs

The amount that can be withdrawn and when (deposit terms, redemption windows and gates, notice periods, maturities of the funding), the assets' value if sold within that window (cash, maturities, the discount on a quick sale from past sales or secondary prices), the promised payment per unit, who the holders are and how concentrated, what they can observe about the assets, and the remedies in the documents: suspension of convertibility, gates, side pockets, insurance, a lender of last resort.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the funding terms and the asset book, computes what a full redemption would fetch against what is promised, works out the gain to a holder who leaves first against one who stays under the gate and suspension terms, and reads the holder list for concentration. What the record cannot show is what the largest holders would do and when; treasurers and allocators at the kind of institutions that hold these claims, and people who ran redemptions in earlier episodes, know that.

Where it breaks

A falling price read as a run: a run needs claims that can be presented before the assets mature, at a value above what they fetch when everyone comes, not merely a loss; promises that match the assets (a closed-end fund, a term loan, equity) cannot be run on; a remedy that itself signals trouble, so a gate meant to stop a run starts one elsewhere; runs set off by information about the assets rather than by expectations about other holders, which Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998) show behave differently and may be efficient; and the model gives the possibility of a run, not its probability, which needs the global games version (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005).

For example

A bank takes $1 from each of 100 depositors, promises $1.10 to anyone who withdraws at the end of the first year, and lends the money for two years at a return of 60 percent; a loan sold after one year fetches only its face value. Twenty-five depositors will need their money early. If only they withdraw, the bank pays $27.50, sells $27.50 of loans, and the remaining $72.50 grows to $116, which is $1.55 for each of the 75 who waited, more than the $1.10 they gave up: nobody else has a reason to leave. But if all 100 try to withdraw, the loans fetch $100 against promises of $110: the first 90 are paid in full, the next gets the last dollar and nine get nothing, so a depositor who expects the others to run is right to run too. The second equilibrium exists because $1.10 is more than the $1 the assets fetch when everyone comes. Suspending withdrawals after the 25th removes it: a patient depositor who is refused today knows $1.55 waits next year. The same arithmetic applies to a private credit fund with $1 billion of net assets, $100 million in cash and loans that sell at 85 cents on the dollar inside a quarter. If 30 percent of holders redeem at net asset value, the fund pays $100 million from cash and sells $235 million of loans to raise $200 million; the holders who stayed are left with 95 cents per dollar, a loss of 5 percent for staying, which is why they too would leave. A 5 percent quarterly gate caps the outflow at $50 million, inside the cash, so no loan is sold and nobody gains by running.

The mathematics in fullDiamond and Dybvig (1983): N depositors each place 1; a fraction t need to consume at date 1; the asset returns R > 1 at date 2 and L (here 1) if liquidated at date 1; the contract pays r_1 > 1 at date 1 to anyone who asks, served in order of arrival. If only the t N impatient withdraw, each patient depositor receives (N - t N r_1 / L) R / ((1 - t) N) at date 2, which exceeds r_1 when the bank is sound, so waiting is an equilibrium. If all withdraw, only N L / r_1 can be paid in full, and a run is also an equilibrium whenever r_1 > L. Suspension of convertibility at t N withdrawals, or deposit insurance, removes the run equilibrium; in a fund, a gate of g per period removes it when g x NAV is within the cash and near-cash. With private signals about the assets the two equilibria collapse to one threshold and the run has a probability (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005), which is where coordination-and-panic takes over. Where it comes from

Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, Journal of Political Economy; Bryant (1980), A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance, Journal of Banking and Finance, the model before it; Diamond (1984), Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of Economic Studies: why banks exist; Diamond and Rajan (2001), Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility, Journal of Political Economy: why fragility is the point; Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998) on information-based runs; Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs, Journal of Finance; Gorton (1988), Banking Panics and Business Cycles, Oxford Economic Papers, the historical record; Schmidt, Timmermann and Wermers (2016), Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds, American Economic Review; Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) on mutual fund outflows, Journal of Financial Economics; The Nobel lectures of Diamond, Financial Intermediaries and Financial Crises, and Dybvig, Multiple Equilibria, Journal of Political Economy (2023); Bagehot, Lombard Street (1873), the chapters on panics and the Bank of England's duty in them

Sources

Diamond, Dybvig (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91(3), 401-419. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155
Diamond (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. The Review of Economic Studies 51(3), 393. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297430
Diamond, Rajan (2001). Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking. Journal of Political Economy 109(2), 287-327. https://doi.org/10.1086/319552
Goldstein, Pauzner (2005). Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs. The Journal of Finance 60(3), 1293-1327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00762.x
Jacklin, Bhattacharya (1988). Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications. Journal of Political Economy 96(3), 568-592. https://doi.org/10.1086/261552
Allen, Gale (1998). Optimal Financial Crises. The Journal of Finance 53(4), 1245-1284. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00052
Schmidt, Timmermann, Wermers (2016). Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds. American Economic Review 106(9), 2625-2657. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140678
Carlsson, van Damme (1993). Global Games and Equilibrium Selection. Econometrica 61(5), 989. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951491
Bagehot (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Henry S. King and Co. (book)

Raising rivals' costs (Salop and Scheffman; Krattenmaker and Salop)

Raising rivals' costs: fighting with the rule book instead of the price

We ask whether an incumbent is defending its share by making its own product better or by making its rival's costs higher. Steven Salop and David Scheffman showed in 1983 that a firm can gain more by raising a rival's costs than by cutting its own price: the strategy is credible, needs no sacrifice of profit today, and works without driving the rival out, because a rival with higher costs simply cannot undercut. Thomas Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) turned it into a two-step test: does the conduct unavoidably and significantly raise competitors' costs, and does that let the incumbent raise its own price? A rule is the cheapest instrument, because the government collects the cost from the rival: a license required in every state, a dealer franchise law, a compliance standard written around the incumbent's existing process. We measure what the rule adds to the rival's cost of each unit and to the incumbent's, and how far the difference lifts the price the incumbent can charge.

Born to answer
Salop and Scheffman, 1983: raising a rival's costs, a weapon cheaper than a price war.
What it does now
Whether an incumbent defends its share with the rule book rather than the price.
The mathematics
Margin gain k_E - k_I a unit; price ceiling c_E + k_E
The full entry
Where it began

Oliver Williamson (1968) read the Pennington case as large coal producers supporting an industry-wide wage agreement that raised the costs of smaller, more labor-intensive rivals more than their own. Steven Salop and David Scheffman named the strategy in 1983 and generalized it in 1987: raising a rival's costs is credible where predatory pricing is not, because it pays at once and needs no rival to exit. Thomas Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) turned it into a two-step test of exclusion. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996) found it at the founding of Standard Oil, whose power in the 1870s rested on railroads charging rival refiners higher rates, and Ann Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas (1987) in workplace safety and environmental rules that fell harder on small, nonunionized firms. The large modern cases are rules: the car dealers' state franchise laws (Lafontaine and Scott Morton, 2010) and occupational licensing, which covered 29 percent of American employees in a survey designed for the purpose (Kleiner and Krueger, 2013).

Why it works now

Who asked for a rule, what it costs each kind of firm to comply and how prices moved after it took effect are now public in lobbying disclosures, comment dockets, licensing fee schedules and filings, so the cost a rule adds to each unit on each side, and the price ceiling it lifts, can be computed outside the conversation. The real cost of compliance for a new firm is still known best to the people who paid it.

When it applies

An incumbent answers an entrant through rules, licenses, standards or lawmakers rather than through price or product: state-by-state licensing pressed against federally regulated event contracts; dealer franchise laws against car makers that sell directly; compounding rules against telehealth sellers of compounded drugs; occupational licensing written by the profession it licenses; a safety or environmental rule whose cost falls more heavily on small or new firms; an exclusive contract that takes a key input or sales channel off the market. Not to be confused with entry-and-deterrence, which asks whether an incumbent can make entry unprofitable with sunk capacity or a reputation for fighting; competitor-response, which forecasts how a rival will answer a move; price-war-or-truce, which reads price competition among established rivals; or regulatory-capture, which asks whose side the rule-maker is on: this asks whether a cost imposed on a rival is the incumbent's real defense, and what it is worth to the incumbent.

What we would ask

How much does the rule add to the rival's cost of each unit sold, and how much to the incumbent's, which may already comply or spread the cost over a larger volume?
Is the incumbent spending to make its own product better or cheaper, or to make the rival's dearer, and who asked for the rule?

What it needs

The rule and who proposed and backed it (lobbying records, comment letters, trade association positions); the compliance cost per unit for the incumbent and for the entrant, fixed and variable, across the jurisdictions involved; the entrant's cost and price before the rule; the incumbent's volume and margin; and the rule's benefit to customers (safety, quality, fraud prevented), measured where possible.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the rule and the record of who sought it, estimates the cost it adds per unit for each side from filings, licensing fees and compliance budgets, and computes the price ceiling and the incumbent's margin before and after. What the record cannot show is the real cost of compliance for a new firm and how the incumbents coordinated; former compliance and government affairs officers at the entrant and the incumbents, licensing regulators and trade association staff know that.

Where it breaks

Every rule that hurts an entrant called a weapon, when a license or a standard may protect customers from real harm (Leland, 1979; Shapiro, 1986), and the test is whether that protection would justify the rule if the incumbent gained nothing; harm to a competitor confused with harm to competition, which Krattenmaker and Salop's second step exists to separate; a cost that falls on both sides counted as if it fell only on the rival; the price ceiling assumed to rise by the whole cost added, when demand or a third supplier may cap it; and the incumbent's motive read from its rhetoric rather than from who paid for the rule and who gains. Leland adds a warning the other way: standards set by the profession or the industry itself are likely to be set too high.

For example

An incumbent makes a product for $80 a unit; an entrant can make it for $85, and the entrant's cost caps the price at $85, leaving the incumbent $5 a unit, $50 million a year on 10 million units. A licensing rule that adds $6 a unit to the entrant's cost and $1 to the incumbent's, which already complies, lifts the ceiling to $91 and the incumbent's margin to $10: $100 million a year. The rule costs the incumbent $10 million a year and returns $50 million, and customers pay $60 million a year more. The same $10 margin earned by cutting its own cost by $5 would leave the price at $85 and customers paying nothing more. The arithmetic is the same whether the cost is a license in every state, a dealer law that bars direct sales (state franchise laws, Lafontaine and Scott Morton conclude, all but guarantee dealer profitability at manufacturers' expense) or a compliance standard; the research question is the two costs per unit, and who asked for the rule.

The mathematics in fullLet c_I and c_E be the incumbent's and the entrant's costs per unit, with c_I < c_E, and let the entrant's cost cap the price (a limit price, or price competition with a cost advantage): p = c_E, and the incumbent earns c_E - c_I a unit. A rule that adds k_E to the entrant's cost and k_I to the incumbent's lifts the ceiling to c_E + k_E and the margin to (c_E + k_E) - (c_I + k_I), a gain of k_E - k_I a unit, positive whenever the rule falls harder on the rival; customers pay k_E more a unit. Krattenmaker and Salop (1986): the conduct harms competition when it raises rivals' costs unavoidably and significantly and that lets the excluding firm raise its price above the competitive level. Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987): raising rivals' costs is credible where predatory pricing is not, because it pays at once and needs no rival to exit. Bartel and Thomas (1987): safety and environmental rules whose compliance costs and enforcement fell unevenly gave large unionized firms gains that offset much of their own cost. Where it comes from

Salop and Scheffman (1983), Raising Rivals' Costs, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, and (1987), Cost-Raising Strategies, Journal of Industrial Economics; Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, Yale Law Journal; Williamson (1968), Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Granitz and Klein (1996) on Standard Oil and the railroads, Journal of Law and Economics; Predation through regulation: Bartel and Thomas (1987); Stigler (1971) on licensing and entry; Licensing and its two sides: Leland (1979); Shapiro (1986); Kleiner (2000); Kleiner and Krueger (2013); Lafontaine and Scott Morton (2010) on dealer franchise laws; The worked figures are Vista's illustration

Sources

Salop, Scheffman (1987). Cost-Raising Strategies. The Journal of Industrial Economics 36(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098594
Krattenmaker, Salop (1986). Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price. The Yale Law Journal 96(2), 209. https://doi.org/10.2307/796417
Granitz, Klein (1996). Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case. The Journal of Law and Economics 39(1), 1-47. https://doi.org/10.1086/467342
Bartel, Thomas (1987). Predation through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Journal of Law and Economics 30(2), 239-264. https://doi.org/10.1086/467137
Lafontaine, Scott Morton (2010). Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(3), 233-250. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.24.3.233
Kleiner (2000). Occupational Licensing. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4), 189-202. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.4.189
Kleiner, Krueger (2013). Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics 31(S1), S173-S202. https://doi.org/10.1086/669060
Shapiro (1986). Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing. The Review of Economic Studies 53(5), 843. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297722
Leland (1979). Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards. Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1328-1346. https://doi.org/10.1086/260838
Stigler (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160

The double bind (Bateson, Jackson, Haley and Weakland)

The double bind: a question built so every answer loses

We recognize a question whose permitted answers all lose, and we answer the frame instead of choosing inside it. Gregory Bateson, Don Jackson, Jay Haley and John Weakland (1956) described the double bind: a person faced with contradictory demands at different levels, and forbidden both to comment on the contradiction and to leave, cannot win whatever he does. The same structure is built on purpose into hostile questions in hearings, interviews, negotiations and conference calls, such as whether a margin is falling because of pricing or because of costs, asked of a company whose margin is not falling. We list the answers the question allows and what each concedes, add the answers it does not allow (reject the premise, answer with the data, change the choice set, appeal to the purpose of the rule, act in the open), and compute whether stepping outside the frame pays, which depends on whether a good answer will be accepted.

Born to answer
Bateson, Jackson, Haley and Weakland, 1956: the situation in which no answer wins.
What it does now
Whether to answer inside a loaded question's frame, and when stepping out pays.
The mathematics
Step out when p > (max u(a_i) - b) / (g - b)
The full entry
Where it began

Gregory Bateson, Don Jackson, Jay Haley and John Weakland, working in Palo Alto, published Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia in Behavioral Science in 1956, building on Bertrand Russell's theory of logical types: a message and a message about that message can contradict each other, and a person who can neither comment on the contradiction nor leave is caught. Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin and Don Jackson carried the idea into the study of communication in Pragmatics of Human Communication (1967). Joseph Heller's Catch-22 (1961) gave the trap its everyday name: a pilot who asks to be grounded as insane shows, by asking, that he is sane. The logic textbooks' loaded question, which asks whether a man has stopped beating his wife, is the double bind in one sentence. The clinical claim did not survive testing (Ringuette and Kennedy, 1966), but the structure did, in studies of organizations caught between conflicting signals (Hennestad, 1990), of paradox in management (Smith and Lewis, 2011), and of how people answer and evade in interviews (Bull, 1994; Clayman, 2001).

Why it works now

The questions and answers of conference calls, hearings and interviews are now transcribed and searchable, so how often a management or an official declines a question, how the audience responded, and what was conceded can be measured outside the conversation. How a particular asker will receive a particular answer is still known best to those who have faced that asker.

When it applies

Management, a board, an official or a negotiator faces a question or a demand framed so that each permitted answer concedes something damaging: an analyst's either-or question on a call; a legislator's or regulator's question that presumes a violation; a counterparty's offer of two terms, both bad; contradictory instructions from a board or a regulator, where meeting one breaks the other; and the investor's side of it, judging whether a management that declined to choose inside a loaded question evaded it or answered it. A question that can be answered truthfully, by choosing one option or by saying that nothing has been decided yet, is a fair question and not a double bind, however much each answer reveals. Not to be confused with agenda-and-median, which reads how control of the choices put to a vote decides the outcome; negotiation-and-outside-options, which values the alternatives away from the table; framing-invariance, which asks whether the same facts stated as gains or as losses flip a decision; or credible-commitment, which asks whether a threat will be carried out: this asks whether the choice set itself is the trap, and what it costs to step out of it.

What we would ask

What does each answer the question allows concede, and does the question carry a premise the facts do not support?
If the frame is rejected, with the data or with a better question, will the answer be heard and judged on its merits, or read as evasion?

What it needs

The exact words of the question and its premises; the facts that bear on each premise; what each permitted answer would concede, and to whom; the audience's record of accepting or punishing answers that reject a question's terms (for a company, the market's reaction to past non-answers; for an official, the record of the body asking); and the asker's interest.

How we would get it

The Desk sets out the question's premises and checks each against the record, scores the permitted answers and the reframing, and reads how this audience has treated non-answers and reframed answers before. What the record cannot show is how the asker will receive a particular answer; investor relations officers, former officials who have sat on both sides of such questions, and the analysts who ask them know that.

Where it breaks

The clinical theory taken as settled: Bateson and his coauthors proposed the double bind as a cause of schizophrenia, a hypothesis later work did not support (judges expert in the concept could not even agree on when it was present, Ringuette and Kennedy, 1966), and the entry uses only the structure of the trap; every hard question called a trap, when most either-or questions are honest: the test is whether every answer the question allows concedes a premise the facts do not support, and a question with a truthful answer inside it, or a truthful 'not yet decided' beside it, is fair, while a refusal to answer a fair question is read as bad news (Hollander, Pronk and Roelofsen, 2010); the reframe used to dodge a fair question, which listeners often miss when it is fluent (Rogers and Norton, 2011) but the record eventually exposes; and the cost of stepping out of the frame ignored, when it depends on an audience willing to accept a good answer, the second test in watched-closely.

For example

Scored for illustration on a scale where 0 is no damage, a question allows two answers that cost 4 and 6 points. Rejecting its premise with the data costs only 1 point if the answer is accepted, and 8 if it is read as evasion. Stepping outside the frame pays only if the chance p that it is accepted satisfies p x (-1) + (1 - p) x (-8) > -4, that is p > 4/7, about 57.1 percent: at a 60 percent chance the expected cost is 3.8 points, better than the best answer inside the frame, and at 50 percent it is 4.5, worse. The arithmetic says what the record of conference calls says: managers decline to answer about 11 percent of analysts' questions, most often negative, uncertain or detailed ones (Gow, Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2021), and investors read the silence as bad news, so a rejected premise must come with the data that make the rejection acceptable.

The mathematics in fullA question offers answers a_1, ..., a_k whose payoffs u(a_i) are all below zero, so choosing inside the frame yields max_i u(a_i). An answer outside the frame, a_0, is accepted with probability p and pays g, or is read as evasion and pays b < max_i u(a_i); its expected payoff p g + (1 - p) b beats the best answer inside the frame when p > (max_i u(a_i) - b) / (g - b). The threshold falls as the reframed answer improves (g up) and as evasion is punished less (b up), and rises with the asker's hostility. Bateson and coauthors' conditions for a true double bind: two or more persons; a repeated experience; a primary negative injunction; a secondary injunction that conflicts with the first at a more abstract level; and a third that forbids leaving the field. The remedy in the study of communication (Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967) is to comment on the frame, which the bind forbids. Where it comes from

Bateson, Jackson, Haley and Weakland (1956), Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, Behavioral Science; Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication (1967); The test of the clinical claim: Ringuette and Kennedy (1966), Journal of Abnormal Psychology; The structure in organizations: Hennestad (1990), Journal of Management Studies; Smith and Lewis (2011), Academy of Management Review; Answers and evasions: Bull (1994); Clayman (2001); Rogers and Norton (2011); on conference calls, Hollander, Pronk and Roelofsen (2010) and Gow, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2021); Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (1961); the worked figures are Vista's illustration

Sources

Bateson, Jackson, Haley, Weakland (1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia. Behavioral Science 1(4), 251-264. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830010402
Ringuette, Kennedy (1966). An experimental study of the double bind hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 71(2), 136-141. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023159
Hennestad (1990). The Symbolic Impact of Double Bind Leadership: Double Bind and the Dynamics of Organizational Culture. Journal of Management Studies 27(3), 265-280. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1990.tb00247.x
Smith, Lewis (2011). Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing. Academy of Management Review 36(2), 381-403. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2009.0223
Bull (1994). On Identifying Questions, Replies, and Non-Replies in Political Interviews. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 13(2), 115-131. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x94132002
Clayman (2001). Answers and evasions. Language in Society 30(3), 403-442. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0047404501003037
Rogers, Norton (2011). The artful dodger: Answering the wrong question the right way. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 17(2), 139-147. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023439
Hollander, Pronk, Roelofsen (2010). Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research 48(3), 531-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00365.x
Gow, Larcker, Zakolyukina (2021). Non-Answers During Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research 59(4), 1349-1384. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12371
Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967). Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. W. W. Norton. (book)

Forward guidance and the forward guidance puzzle (Woodford; Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson)

Talk as a policy tool: forward guidance and anchored expectations

We ask how much a central bank's statement about future rates should move the long rates, asset prices and spending of today, and how far the statement is believed. Michael Woodford's argument (2005, and the model of Interest and Prices, 2003) is that because households and firms look ahead, what the bank is expected to do later moves spending and prices now, so a bank that explains its intentions and commits to a path can steer the economy with less movement in the rate itself, and an anchor on inflation expectations keeps a shock from shifting them. This is a commitment problem in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977): a promise about later has force only if it is believed to be kept when the later arrives. Campbell and coauthors (2012) separate a commitment to a future action (Odyssean) from a forecast of policy (Delphic). The model has a known weakness, the forward guidance puzzle: a promise about rates far in the future has an implausibly large effect today, larger the further off it is (McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016), and measured effects on expectations were 28 and 8 times smaller on output and inflation than the standard model implies (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2023). Fixes differ in kind: shorter horizons for households (perpetual youth), uninsurable risk, cognitive discounting (Gabaix, 2020), or no common knowledge (Angeletos and Lian, 2018).

Born to answer
Kydland and Prescott, 1977: a promise has value if kept; Woodford, 2005: talk as a tool.
What it does now
How much a spoken path should move today, and when it is not believed.
The mathematics
effect of a one-quarter cut N quarters ahead = q sigma d^N; the basic model has d = 1
The full entry
Where it began

Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott showed in 1977 that a policymaker who can re-optimize each period does worse than one bound by a rule, because people who anticipate the re-optimization change what they do: the value of a promise is that it is kept. Michael Woodford's 2005 Jackson Hole paper made central bank communication a tool of policy within his model of Interest and Prices: because what the bank is expected to do later moves spending and prices now, explaining the path is part of setting it. The Federal Reserve began announcing explicit paths for its rate in the years after the financial crisis, and economists then found in their own models that promises about the far future were implausibly powerful. Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2023) measured the gap with surveys and gave the problem its name, the forward guidance puzzle.

Why it works now

Central banks used to say as little as possible. Statements, projections and the dot plot are now published on a schedule, and the movement of the curve, of forecasters' expectations and of surveys of households is dated and public, so the size of a promise's effect can be set beside the model's. Whether the people who set prices and wages believe a given promise is still known best to the people who set them.

When it applies

A Fed statement, a dot plot or a promise to hold rates; a question of how much a stated path should move the long end of the curve, rate-sensitive stocks or spending; whether a promise has stopped working because it is not believed or because people stopped expecting inflation to return to target; a scenario in which the anchor on inflation expectations is tested. Not to be confused with credible-commitment, which asks whether a threat or promise between two parties is believable given its cost to carry out, or expectations-gap, which asks how disappointment follows from a distance between what was expected and what came: this asks how large the effect of a spoken path should be and how far it fades with the horizon and with doubt.

What we would ask

How far ahead is the promise, and how much of its effect survives that horizon under the model's discount on distant news?
Is the promise believed, and are inflation expectations anchored enough that a surprise does not move them?

What it needs

The promised path and its horizon; the market's response in the curve and in survey expectations; evidence of how the promise is understood (surveys of forecasters and households); a measure of how firmly inflation expectations are anchored to the target; and the bank's record of keeping or revising earlier promises.

How we would get it

The Desk works the effect of the promise under no discounting and under a stated discount on distant news, applies a credibility weight, translates the path into the movement of long rates the expectations hypothesis implies, and sets that beside the market's actual move. It never predicts the next statement. What the data cannot show is whether the people who set prices and wages believe the path; people who run treasury desks, who set pricing and pay, or who staff the central bank, see that.

Where it breaks

The forward guidance puzzle: in the standard model the effect of a promise grows with its horizon, which the evidence does not support (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2023), so the model's size for a distant promise is an upper bound, not an estimate. Disclosing a forecast is not a commitment, and markets treat the two differently (Campbell and coauthors, 2012). A promise that is not believed has no force, and a bank that reverses loses credibility for the next one. The response of firms and households depends on what they actually know (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015). The survey literature finds communication can move markets and improve predictability (Blinder and coauthors, 2008), which is not the same as moving spending by the model's amount. Whether any one statement worked is judged after the fact and is not proved by a market move on the day. Neutral on politics and on the independence of any central bank.

For example

In the basic model a one-point cut in the policy rate for one quarter, promised to happen N quarters ahead, raises today's output gap by the same amount whatever N is. Put an illustrative sensitivity sigma = 1 and let each quarter of distance keep a fraction d of the effect. With d = 1 the effect is 1.00 at 8 quarters and 1.00 at 20 quarters, which is the puzzle. With d = 0.95 the effect is 0.95^8 = 0.66 at 8 quarters and 0.95^20 = 0.36 at 20. If the promise is believed only half the time, a promise 8 quarters out has an expected effect of 0.5 x 0.66 = 0.33. For comparison, measured effects were 28 times smaller than the standard model's on output expectations, so a model effect of 1.00 would correspond to about 0.04. What a promise does to a yield follows from averaging: a policy rate half a point lower in year 2 only moves the 2-year yield by 0.5 x 1/2 = 0.25 points and the 10-year yield by 0.5 x 1/10 = 0.05 points, so a promise about one year changes the long end very little. Anchoring: if expected inflation is the weight a times the target plus 1 - a times last period's inflation, a one-point inflation surprise raises expected inflation by 0.10 points at a = 0.9 and by 0.50 points at a = 0.5, so the same surprise is ten percent or half absorbed depending on how firm the anchor is. These are Vista's illustrations with stated weights, not estimates for the Fed.

The mathematics in fullBasic New Keynesian demand: x_t = E_t x_(t+1) - sigma (i_t - E_t pi_(t+1) - r^n_t). Solving forward, x_0 = -sigma sum over t of (i_t - E pi_(t+1) - r^n_t), so a one-quarter change in i at date N shifts x_0 by sigma times the change whatever N: no discounting of the distant. With a per-quarter weight d on distant news (cognitive discounting, Gabaix, 2020, or perpetual youth, Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2023), x_0 falls by sigma d^N. With belief probability q the expected effect is q sigma d^N. Under the expectations hypothesis an n-year yield is the average of expected short rates, so a change c in the policy rate in one future year moves the n-year yield by c / n. Anchoring: E pi_(t+1) = a pi* + (1 - a) pi_t, so a surprise of s in inflation moves expectations by (1 - a) s. Where it comes from

Woodford (2005), Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness (Jackson Hole symposium); Woodford, Interest and Prices (2003); Kydland and Prescott (1977); The puzzle and its fixes: Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2023); McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016); Gabaix (2020); Angeletos and Lian (2018); Evidence: Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano (2012); Blinder and coauthors (2008); Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015); The discount weight, the credibility weight and the anchor weight are Vista's illustration; the 28 and 8 times figures are those reported by Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson

Sources

Woodford (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press. (book)
Kydland, Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85(3), 473-491. https://doi.org/10.1086/260580
Del Negro, Giannoni, Patterson (2023). The Forward Guidance Puzzle. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics 1(1), 43-79. https://doi.org/10.1086/724214
McKay, Nakamura, Steinsson (2016). The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited. American Economic Review 106(10), 3133-3158. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150063
Gabaix (2020). A Behavioral New Keynesian Model. American Economic Review 110(8), 2271-2327. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20162005
Angeletos, Lian (2018). Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge. American Economic Review 108(9), 2477-2512. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161996
Campbell, Evans, Fisher, Justiniano (2012). Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2012(1), 1-80. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2012.0004
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, Jansen (2008). Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 46(4), 910-945. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.46.4.910
Coibion, Gorodnichenko (2015). Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. American Economic Review 105(8), 2644-2678. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20110306

Private information and incentives

What the seller knows, what the bidder should fear, what a contract will actually reward.

Adverse selection

Why is this for sale?

We treat the fact that something is offered as evidence about it. Owners who know their asset is bad sell readily; so the research asks what the seller knows and why they are selling now.

Born to answer
Akerlof, 1970: the used car market unravels.
What it does now
Reading the fact that something is for sale as evidence about it.
The mathematics
Quality offered = E[q | the seller accepts p]
The full entry
Where it began

George Akerlof's 1970 paper started with used cars: owners know which cars are lemons and buyers do not, so buyers pay for average quality, owners of good cars withdraw, quality falls, and the market can vanish. Rothschild and Stiglitz showed in 1976 that insurers face the same problem and respond with menus of contracts that make customers reveal their risk by what they choose.

Why it works now

Diligence on a company for sale used to be a data-room exercise, which is precisely the information the seller chose to show. The seller's private information and motive are now researchable from outside the room: former employees and advisors of the seller, prior sale attempts, the buyers who walked and what they saw. The Desk asks why now, and who passed. The engagement is built to find out what the seller knows.

When it applies

An asset, a company, a loan book, a portfolio, or a customer contract is on offer, and the seller knows more about it than the buyer can learn from the data room.

What we would ask

Why is the seller selling now, and what has changed for them that the data room does not show?
Who else looked and passed, and what did they see?

What it needs

The seller's private information and motives; the history of the asset with previous owners and previous bidders.

How we would get it

Former employees and advisors of the seller; the record of prior sale attempts, withdrawn processes, and the buyers who walked.

Where it breaks

The seller has a legitimate reason to sell that the analysis dismisses; or the buyer assumes the data room is the whole truth.

For example

A specialty lender is selling a loan book at an attractive yield. The former head of underwriting, interviewed, explains the vintage that was originated under a relaxed policy in the year before the sale. The yield is the price of that vintage.

The mathematics in fullAt any price p, the quality offered is E[q | seller accepts p], which falls as p falls; the buyer who ignores this pays for the average and receives the below-average, and the market can unravel entirely. Taught in

MMSS 311-1; MECN-452; MECS 465

Sources

Akerlof (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), 629. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326

The winner's curse

Why are you the one winning?

In a competitive process, winning is itself evidence that your estimate was the most optimistic in the room. We find out who else looked, who passed, and at what price, before you congratulate yourself.

Born to answer
Capen, Clapp and Campbell, 1971: Gulf of Mexico lease auctions.
What it does now
Asking who looked and passed before celebrating a win.
The mathematics
E[V | you won] is below E[V | your estimate]
The full entry
Where it began

Three petroleum engineers at Atlantic Richfield, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell, published the winner's curse in 1971 after noticing that the companies winning Gulf of Mexico lease auctions earned poor returns on them: the winner is the bidder whose estimate was most optimistic. Richard Thaler's 1988 account includes the classroom version, an auction for a jar of coins, in which the winner reliably overpays.

Why it works now

The correction requires knowing how many sophisticated parties looked and why the ones who passed did, which used to be gossip. It is now obtainable: advisors to other bidders in the same or comparable processes can be recruited, the process record shows the withdrawals, and the reasons can be put on the record. The Desk asks why you are the one winning. The engagement finds what the two bidders who walked after diligence saw.

When it applies

A competitive auction or financing where the client is the high bidder, or is about to be; or a client puzzled that it keeps winning the deals it wants.

What we would ask

How many sophisticated parties evaluated this, and how many passed?
What did the ones who passed know?

What it needs

The number and quality of other bidders, their reasons for passing, and the dispersion of estimates.

How we would get it

Advisors who advised other bidders in the same or comparable processes; the record of the process and its withdrawals.

Where it breaks

The bidders are treated as having independent private values when the asset has one true value everyone is estimating; the client's own optimism is not modeled.

For example

A fund wins a competitive process for an industrial asset against six bidders. Two withdrew after diligence on the same environmental issue the fund's advisors called immaterial. The interviews go to people who saw what those two saw.

The mathematics in fullWith a common value V and noisy estimates, E[V | you won] is less than E[V | your estimate], and the gap grows with the number of bidders; the correction is to bid as if you have already learned that everyone else estimated lower. Taught in

MECN-452; DECS-430; MMSS 311-1

Sources

Capen, Clapp, Campbell (1971). Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations. Journal of Petroleum Technology 23(06), 641-653. https://doi.org/10.2118/2993-PA
Thaler (1988). Anomalies: The Winner's Curse. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(1), 191-202. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.191
Milgrom, Weber (1982). A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica 50(5), 1089. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865

Auction theory

The format decides who wins and what they pay

Whether a client is selling or bidding, we work out how the rules of the process shape the result: sealed or open, one round or several, reserve or none, and how the other side will bid under them.

Born to answer
Vickrey, 1961; Myerson, 1981: the format decides the outcome.
What it does now
A company's exposure to the rules of auctions it runs or enters.
The mathematics
Truthful bidding is optimal under a second price
The full entry
Where it began

William Vickrey's 1961 paper introduced the sealed-bid second-price auction, in which bidding your true value is the best strategy, and showed that different formats can raise the same expected revenue. Roger Myerson's 1981 paper characterized the revenue-maximizing auction and earned its share of a Nobel. Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz showed in 2007 that the search-advertising auctions run by Google and Yahoo were a generalized second-price format with their own quirks.

Why it works now

Auction theory was applied to spectrum and search advertising by the few firms that could hire the theorists. What has changed for an investor is that a company's exposure to auction rules, as a seller of inventory, a bidder for contracts, or a platform running the auction, can now be read from the record and tested with people who have run comparable processes. The Desk asks whether the bidders know their own values or are all guessing at the same one, because the two cases behave differently.

When it applies

A client is designing a sale process, entering one, bidding for spectrum or ad inventory or a contract, or underwriting a business whose revenue comes from auctions it runs or bids in.

What we would ask

Do the bidders each know their own value, or are they all estimating the same unknown?
Can the bidders talk to each other, and can the seller change the rules midway?

What it needs

Whether values are private or common; the number of bidders; the seller's ability to commit to the rules; the possibility of collusion.

How we would get it

Advisors who have run or advised in comparable processes; the record of comparable auctions and their outcomes.

Where it breaks

Bidders collude; the seller cannot commit; the format assumes rational bidders in a room with none.

For example

A company's revenue is set in online ad auctions. Its thesis assumes those auctions are competitive. The former head of an ad exchange, interviewed, explains how a change in the auction format two years earlier moved margin from the platform to the bidders, and what the next change would do.

The mathematics in fullTruthful bidding is a best response in a second-price format and not in a first-price one; under standard assumptions formats that allocate to the same bidder raise the same expected revenue, so the seller's lever is the reserve and the entry of bidders, not the format. Taught in

MECN-452; MECN-446; MECS 465

Sources

Vickrey (1961). Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. The Journal of Finance 16(1), 8-37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
Myerson (1981). Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58-73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Edelman, Ostrovsky, Schwarz (2007). Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American Economic Review 97(1), 242-259. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.242

Moral hazard and the informativeness principle

The plan rewards what it measures

We read every incentive plan, earnout, and management contract by asking what measured thing it rewards and what unmeasured thing it therefore sacrifices, because that is what the people under it will do.

Born to answer
Holmstrom, 1979: paying an agent whose effort you cannot see.
What it does now
Reading an earnout or a pay plan for what it will actually reward.
The mathematics
Include a signal only if it informs about effort
The full entry
Where it began

Bengt Holmström's 1979 paper set up the problem of paying an agent whose effort cannot be seen and proved the informativeness principle: any signal that carries information about the effort, however noisy, belongs in the contract, and any that does not should be left out. The trade-off between insurance and incentives that every compensation plan embodies is the one his model made explicit.

Why it works now

Reading an earnout, a management plan, or a supplier contract for what it will actually reward has always been possible and rarely done thoroughly, because the terms were long and the second-order effects took an expert to see. The terms can now be read completely, the measured quantity identified, and the question put to former executives who worked under comparable plans: what would a clever person do to hit this number. The Desk asks what is measured and who controls the measurement.

When it applies

An earnout, a management incentive plan, a sales compensation change, a supplier contract, or a portfolio company whose behavior the client cannot explain until they read the pay plan.

What we would ask

What exactly is measured, and who controls the measurement?
What would a clever person do to hit the number without doing the thing you wanted?

What it needs

The full contract terms, the measurement process, and the noise in the measure relative to the effort it is meant to reward.

How we would get it

Former executives who worked under comparable plans; operators on how such measures are gamed in this industry; the record of past plans and what followed them.

Where it breaks

The measure is gameable, the agent controls it, or the plan rewards the measured task at the expense of the unmeasured one.

For example

A portfolio company's management is paid on annual EBITDA. Maintenance capex has fallen for three years. The two facts are one fact, and the interviews with former plant managers establish what the deferred maintenance will cost.

The mathematics in fullPay w(y) on an observable y to maximize E[y - w(y)] subject to the agent choosing effort to maximize E[u(w(y)) - c(e)]; a noisy measure with a risk-averse agent forces weak incentives, and a signal belongs in the contract only if it adds information about effort. Taught in

MECS 465; MECN-441

Sources

Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320
Salanie, Bernard (2005). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd ed. MIT Press. (book)

Screening: price discrimination when selling, procurement when buying

Let them sort themselves

When you cannot tell the types apart, we design the offer so that each type picks the version meant for it, whether you are selling to customers or buying from suppliers, and we test whether the menu you have is doing that or leaking. Which contract is distorted, and which type earns the rent, depends on which side the designer is on.

Born to answer
Mussa and Rosen, 1978: a menu that makes each type reveal itself.
What it does now
The tier or contract the wrong type takes because its limits never bind.
The mathematics
Distort the contract others would imitate; the imitator keeps its efficient level and earns the rent
In the inquiries: No. 18, The Paper Railway
The full entry
Where it began

Mussa and Rosen's 1978 paper showed how a seller who cannot tell customers apart offers a menu of qualities and prices so that each type selects the version meant for it, and found the cost of doing so: the cheap version, the one the valuable customer would imitate, gets less quality than it would if the seller could tell them apart, and the valuable customer keeps the efficient quality and earns the rent. Rothschild and Stiglitz found the same structure in insurance the same decade. When the designer buys, the form is the same and the roles turn around: Baron and Myerson (1982), regulating a firm whose costs the regulator cannot see, set payments from the firm's own cost report so that it never gains by misreporting. It is then the high-cost seller that supplies less, paid enough to be no worse off than declining, and the low-cost seller that keeps its efficient level and earns the rent.

Why it works now

Whether a menu is sorting customers or suppliers, or leaking value, could only be inferred from aggregate take-up. Contract-level data can now be read for who is taking which tier or contract, and the people themselves can be asked which limit would actually bind for them. The Desk asks which type is taking the version meant for another and why it can live with it. That is a question for the customers or the suppliers, not the product or procurement team, and the engagement asks them.

When it applies

Pricing tiers, insurance plans, loan products, term sheets, or service levels where the seller cannot observe which customer is which and the wrong customers are picking the wrong tier; or the same problem from the buying side, in procurement contracts, licenses and permissions, or pay plans where the buyer cannot observe which supplier, rights holder or worker has the low cost, and the wrong ones are taking the wrong contract.

What we would ask

Which type is taking the contract meant for another: valuable customers on the cheap tier, or low-cost suppliers on the terms written for high-cost ones?
What is it about that contract that they can live with, and what would have to change for it to bind on them?

What it needs

The distribution of types (what each customer values, or what each supplier's cost is), and the current take-up of each tier or contract by type.

How we would get it

Customers and former sales leaders on who buys what and why; on the buying side, former procurement and licensing managers and the suppliers themselves on what each contract costs them to meet; a designed choice exercise where the current data cannot separate the types.

Where it breaks

Arbitrage undoes the segmentation; the contract meant for one type is generous enough that the type the menu guards against takes it (when selling, the low tier is too good and the high-value customer takes it; when buying, the terms written for high-cost suppliers pay enough that low-cost suppliers claim them); competitors offer the type that earns the rent a better menu; and the selling result carried over to a buyer: on the buying side it is the high-cost supplier that supplies less, and is not made worse off by it, while the low-cost supplier earns the rent.

For example

A software company's mid tier is taken by enterprises that would have paid for the top tier, because the mid tier's limits do not bind for them. The research is which limit would bind, which is a question for the customers, not the product team. On the buying side, a manufacturer buying a part from suppliers whose costs it cannot see offers a large order and a smaller one. The smaller order, written for high-cost suppliers, is cut below what the manufacturer would buy if it knew their costs and paid just enough to cover them, so that low-cost suppliers gain less by claiming to be high-cost; the low-cost suppliers take the large order at its efficient size and earn the rent.

The mathematics in fullA menu of (quantity, payment) pairs is designed so each type prefers its own. The allocation of the type whose contract others would imitate is distorted away from its efficient level, to shrink the rent the other type earns by imitating; that type keeps its efficient allocation and earns the rent. When the designer sells (Mussa and Rosen), the low-value buyer gets less quality; when the designer buys, the high-cost seller supplies less, and is not made worse off by it. These results need three conditions: the types are ordered by a single-crossing condition (the higher-value buyer values each increment more, or the lower-cost seller saves more on each unit), the private information has one dimension, and no rival offers the same types a menu of its own. With several dimensions of private information, or with competing designers, which contract is distorted, and whether any is, can change, so the distortion is a result of the model to be checked against the case, not a finding. Taught in

MECN-446; MECS 465; MMSS 211-1

Sources

Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), 629. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326
Baron, Myerson (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica 50(4), 911. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912769

Learn the math
The question

In 1849 a French engineer, Jules Dupuit, looked at the third-class carriages of the new railways and noticed something odd. They had no cover and wooden benches, and everyone assumed the companies were saving money. Dupuit said they were not. In our translation of his French: it is not because of the few thousand francs it would take to cover the third-class carriages or pad their benches that a company runs open carriages with wooden seats. "Its aim is to stop the traveler who can pay for second class from going in third. One strikes the poor, not because one wants them to suffer personally, but to frighten the rich." He offered a test. If the state handed such a company 100,000 francs to put roofs on its third-class carriages and another 100,000 to pad the seats, the company would refuse the gift, because 200,000 francs spent improving third class could cut its takings by two million.

The rain on the third-class passenger was aimed at the second-class one. That is the whole of this model in one image, and Dupuit went on to say why it happens: what each traveler is willing to pay is unknown to the company, so it must guess, and it guards against the traveler who could pay more by making the cheaper seat worse. This lesson works out how much worse, why the first-class carriage is never made worse at all, what the traveler who could pay more keeps anyway, and what changes when the one designing the menu is not selling but buying.

The idea in one paragraph

When a seller cannot tell its customers apart, it cannot charge each what that customer would pay. What it can do is offer a menu, and let each customer choose. The danger in a menu is that the customers who would pay most simply choose the cheap item. So the cheap item has to be made worse on purpose: not to save money, but to make it less tempting to the customers it was not meant for. The arithmetic says three things. The premium item stays exactly as good as it should be. The cheap item gets worse than it should be, and the cut is deeper the more valuable customers there are to protect. And the valuable customers still keep something, a rent that the seller can shrink but never take away, because they always have the option of pretending to be cheap. Turn the whole thing around, a buyer choosing among suppliers whose costs it cannot see, and the same arithmetic holds with the roles swapped: it is the order written for the expensive supplier that gets cut, and the cheap supplier that keeps the rent.

The math, step by step

Step 1: two kinds of customer. Write q for the quality of the product, any amount from zero up: legroom, speed, a roof. A customer of type theta (the Greek letter, read "theta") values quality q at theta x q dollars and pays a price P, so the customer's gain is

(theta x q) - P

There are two types. A premium customer values a unit of quality at theta_H = $10; a cheap customer at theta_L = $6. One customer in three is premium: lambda = 1/3 (read "lambda"). Making quality q costs the seller q^2 / 2 for each customer, so each extra unit costs more than the last. All of these are round numbers, stated as assumptions.

Step 2: if the seller could tell them apart. Then it would sell each type the quality that creates the most value, and take all of it. The value created for a type is (theta x q) - (q^2 / 2). Its slope in q is theta - q: positive while the next unit is worth more to the customer than it costs, zero where the two are equal. So the best quality is q = theta: 10 for the premium customer, 6 for the cheap one. The seller charges each its whole value, 10 x 10 = $100 and 6 x 6 = $36, against costs of 100 / 2 = $50 and 36 / 2 = $18, and earns $50 and $18. The average over customers is

(1/3 x 50) + (2/3 x 18) = 86/3 = $28.67

That is the most there is to have, and the seller cannot have it, because it cannot see which customer is which.

Step 3: why the same menu now fails. Offer the same two items, (quality 6, $36) and (quality 10, $100), to everyone. The cheap customer takes the cheap item and gains nothing, which is fine. But look at the premium customer. The premium item gives it 100 - 100 = 0. The cheap item gives it (10 x 6) - 36 = $24. It takes the cheap item. To keep the premium customer on the premium item, the seller must lower the premium price until the premium item is at least as good: 100 - P_H >= 24, so P_H can be at most 100 - 24 = $76. Profit on a premium customer falls from $50 to 76 - 50 = $26, and the average to

(1/3 x 26) + (2/3 x 18) = 62/3 = $20.67

The $24 the premium customer keeps is called its information rent: what it earns from knowing something the seller does not, namely its own type. Notice where the rent comes from. It is the premium customer's value of the cheap item over what the cheap item costs it to buy: (theta_H - theta_L) x q_L = 4 x 6. The rent grows with the quality of the cheap item.

Step 4: the two lines that bind. A menu is two pairs, (q_L, P_L) and (q_H, P_H). It works if four things hold:

  • the cheap customer is willing to buy at all: (theta_L x q_L) - P_L >= 0;
  • the premium customer is willing to buy at all: (theta_H x q_H) - P_H >= 0;
  • the cheap customer prefers its own item: (theta_L x q_L) - P_L >= (theta_L x q_H) - P_H;
  • the premium customer prefers its own item: (theta_H x q_H) - P_H >= (theta_H x q_L) - P_L.

The seller wants prices as high as possible, so it pushes until something stops it. Two of the four stop it; the other two then hold on their own. The cheap customer's willingness to buy stops P_L: the seller charges the cheap customer its whole value, P_L = theta_L x q_L. The premium customer's preference for its own item stops P_H: the seller raises the premium price until the premium customer is exactly indifferent between the two items. The premium customer's willingness to buy then takes care of itself, because it can always take the cheap item and gain (theta_H - theta_L) x q_L, which is at least zero. And the cheap customer never wants the premium item, because the premium item is priced for someone who values quality more; the check is two lines below. Put the two binding lines together:

P_L = theta_L x q_L
P_H = (theta_H x q_H) - ((theta_H - theta_L) x q_L)

The premium customer pays its whole value of the premium item, less its rent. The rent depends only on q_L. Nothing in it depends on q_H.

Now the check on the cheap customer. Its gain from the premium item is (theta_L x q_H) - P_H. Put in the price:

(theta_L x q_H) - (theta_H x q_H) + ((theta_H - theta_L) x q_L) = -((theta_H - theta_L) x (q_H - q_L))

That is negative whenever the premium item carries more quality than the cheap one, which it always will here. The cheap customer is charged the premium customer's valuation on every unit of quality above q_L and feels only its own, lower one. With the numbers of Step 5 the gain comes to -(4 x 6) = -$24.

Step 5: the profit, and where the qualities go. Put those prices into the seller's average profit:

profit = lambda x [(theta_H x q_H) - (q_H^2 / 2) - ((theta_H - theta_L) x q_L)]
+ (1 - lambda) x [(theta_L x q_L) - (q_L^2 / 2)]

Read it in words: from each premium customer, all the value its item creates, less its rent; from each cheap customer, all the value its item creates.

The premium quality q_H appears in one place only, the value its item creates, so the seller sets it exactly where it was in Step 2: q_H = theta_H = 10. This is the result economists call no distortion at the top. Making the premium item worse would not reduce the rent at all; it would only destroy value.

The cheap quality q_L appears twice: in the value the cheap item creates, and in the rent. Take the slope of the profit in q_L and set it to zero:

(1 - lambda) x (theta_L - q_L) - (lambda x (theta_H - theta_L)) = 0

so

q_L = theta_L - ((lambda / (1 - lambda)) x (theta_H - theta_L))

With our numbers, lambda / (1 - lambda) = (1/3) / (2/3) = 1/2, and q_L = 6 - (1/2 x 4) = 4. The cheap item gets quality 4, not 6.

$16$18$20$220123456Quality of the cheap versionAverage profit a customercut to 4: $22efficient 6: $20.67no cheap version: $16.67
The cheap version is worth degrading, a little. Each unit of quality taken from it lowers what the premium buyer could get by trading down, so the premium price can rise. The best cut stops at 4, where the next unit removed would cost more on the cheap buyers than it earns on the premium ones.

The prices follow from Step 4: P_L = 6 x 4 = $24, the rent is 4 x 4 = $16, and P_H = 100 - 16 = $84. The seller earns 84 - 50 = $34 on a premium customer and 24 - (16 / 2) = $16 on a cheap one, an average of

(1/3 x 34) + (2/3 x 16) = $22

against $20.67 with the cheap item left at its efficient quality. Check the menu once more. The premium customer gains 100 - 84 = $16 from its own item and (10 x 4) - 24 = $16 from the cheap one: exactly indifferent, as Step 4 said. The cheap customer would lose 84 - (6 x 10) = $24 by taking the premium item.

Step 6: the same answer as a balance. The slope condition is easier to see as a pair of scales. Cut one unit of quality from the cheap item. On one side, the seller loses some of the value that unit created for the cheap customers: (1 - lambda) x (theta_L - q_L) per customer on average, two thirds of what that unit was worth to a cheap customer above its cost. On the other side, the seller saves a unit of rent on every premium customer: lambda x (theta_H - theta_L), one third of $4, the same at every level. At the efficient quality of 6 the first side is zero, because a cheap customer values the last unit at exactly what it costs, so the first cut is free. Each further cut costs more. At 4 the two sides balance at (2/3) x (6 - 4) = 4/3 and (1/3) x 4 = 4/3.

012340123456Quality of the cheap versionPer unit of quality, $balance at 4surplus lost on cheap buyersrent saved on premium buyers
The whole calculation as a balance. On one side, the rent the premium buyers keep; on the other, the value lost on the cheap buyers. The first unit cut is free, because at the efficient level a cheap buyer values the last unit at exactly its cost.

Step 7: how deep the cut goes. The formula in Step 5 says the cut grows with lambda / (1 - lambda), the number of premium customers to protect for each cheap customer served. With one premium customer in ten, q_L = 6 - ((1/9) x 4) = 5.56; one in four, 4.67; one in three, 4; one in two, 2. The quality reaches zero, and the seller stops offering the cheap item at all, when

theta_L - ((lambda / (1 - lambda)) x (theta_H - theta_L)) = 0

Multiply by 1 - lambda and collect terms: theta_L - (lambda x theta_L) = lambda x (theta_H - theta_L), so theta_L = lambda x theta_H, and lambda = theta_L / theta_H = 6 / 10 = 0.6. When six customers in ten or more are premium, protecting the premium price is worth more than everything the cheap customers could bring, and the cheap item disappears. With no cheap item and one customer in three premium, the seller would earn (1/3) x 50 = $16.67: less than $22, which is why at one in three it keeps the cheap item, degraded.

Step 8: the buying side, the same arithmetic turned around. Now the designer buys. A manufacturer needs a part. The next unit is worth 12 - q dollars to it when it already has q units, so q units are worth (12 x q) - (q^2 / 2). A supplier makes the part at a cost of $2 a unit or $6 a unit; the supplier knows which, the manufacturer does not, and one supplier in three is the low-cost kind. The manufacturer offers a menu of (order size, payment) pairs.

If it could see costs, it would buy where the next unit is worth exactly its cost, 12 - q = c: 10 units from a low-cost supplier and 6 from a high-cost one, and pay each its cost. It cannot, and the danger now runs the other way. A low-cost supplier can claim to be high-cost and take the high-cost contract, earning (6 - 2) = $4 on every unit of it. So the binding lines are turned around: the high-cost supplier is paid just its cost, a payment T_high = 6 x q_high, enough that it is not made worse off by taking the contract; and the low-cost supplier must be paid enough above its own cost that it does not pretend, a rent of (6 - 2) x q_high. Here the rent depends on the size of the high-cost order, so that is the order the manufacturer cuts. The same slope condition gives

q_high = (12 - 6) - ((lambda / (1 - lambda)) x (6 - 2)) = 6 - (1/2 x 4) = 4

where lambda = 1/3 is now the share of low-cost suppliers. The high-cost supplier gets an order of 4 units, not 6, paid 6 x 4 = $24, exactly its cost. The low-cost supplier gets its efficient order of 10 and is paid (2 x 10) + 16 = $36: its cost of $20 plus a rent of 4 x 4 = $16. It is exactly indifferent: $16 from its own contract, 24 - (2 x 4) = $16 from pretending. The manufacturer's average gain is $22 against $20.67 with the high-cost order left at 6, the very numbers of Step 5. The arithmetic is the same; which contract is cut and who keeps the rent are swapped. This is the trap the Library entry warns about: carry the selling answer to a buyer and you would cut the wrong contract and expect the wrong supplier to earn the rent.

A worked example

Dupuit's railway is a story. Raymond Deneckere and Preston McAfee collected cases with the numbers attached, in a 1996 paper they called "Damaged Goods". Two of them show Step 5 almost in pure form, because in both the cheap version cost more to make than the good one.

In May 1990 IBM introduced the LaserPrinter E, a lower-priced version of its LaserPrinter. As the paper reports it, the two machines used the same engine and virtually identical parts. The E printed text at 5 pages a minute against the LaserPrinter's 10, and PC Magazine's lab found why: the E's controller carried extra firmware chips whose effect was to insert waiting time, so the cheaper printer had more parts in it, not fewer. Graphics came out at the same speed on both. An owner could buy an upgrade for $1,099 that made the E identical to the LaserPrinter, bringing the total to $200 more than buying the LaserPrinter outright. And in 1991, Intel sold its 486SX processor for $333 against $588 for the 486DX; the early 486SX was a full 486DX with its mathematics coprocessor disabled.

Read the printer through the steps.

  • Who are the types? Buyers who print a great deal of text and whose time is worth a lot (an office) and buyers who print a little (a home, a small business). The first values speed more per page than the second: theta_H above theta_L.
  • Why slow the cheap printer, at a cost? Step 3. A printer as fast as the LaserPrinter at the lower price would have been taken by the offices, and the LaserPrinter's price would have had to fall to keep them. Slowing the E for text, the thing offices print most, lowers what an office gains by trading down, which is exactly the rent term (theta_H - theta_L) x q_L. The cost of the extra chips is the price of that protection, the way Dupuit's company would have paid to keep its carriages open.
  • Why leave graphics alone? The paper does not say; the model suggests a reason. It cuts the dimension that the valuable type values more. If offices and home users valued graphics speed about equally, slowing graphics would cost the home buyers as much as it deterred the offices, and buy little.
  • Why is the top untouched? Step 5. The LaserPrinter itself was not made worse; nothing about the E's price depended on it.
  • Why does the upgrade cost $200 more than the LaserPrinter? The entry's first failure is arbitrage. If an office could buy the E and upgrade it for less than the LaserPrinter's price, the menu would leak through the upgrade. Priced at $200 above, the upgrade is no back door.

None of this needs IBM's own account of its reasons, which the paper does not give; it shows only that the design fits the model's predictions point by point. Deneckere and McAfee also make a claim the two-type lesson above cannot: that damaging goods this way can leave every buyer better off, because the home buyers would otherwise have been offered nothing they could afford. Step 7 is the simplest form of it: drop the cheap version and the cheap customers are not served at all.

The entry's own example is the same arithmetic in software: enterprises taking the mid tier because its limits do not bind for them. The question to ask is the one the printer answers: which limit would bind for the valuable type and barely touch the other? That is a question for the customers, which is why the entry sends the analyst to them.

The usual mistakes
  1. Degrading the premium version too. Symptom: a plan to "simplify every tier" that trims features from the top tier as well. Fix: Step 5. The premium quality does not appear in the rent, so degrading it only destroys value the seller could have charged for. Cut from the bottom, never from the top.
  2. Reading the cheap version's poverty as a cost saving. Symptom: the cheap version's limits are justified by what they save to make, and judged by whether the saving is worth it. Fix: ask what the limit does to the premium customer's temptation. A limit that saves nothing to make can still be the right one, and a limit that saves a lot can be the wrong one if premium customers do not mind it.
  3. Carrying the selling result to a buyer. Symptom: a procurement or licensing menu designed so that the large, efficient supplier gets squeezed. Fix: Step 8. When you buy, the contract that is cut is the one written for the high-cost seller, and the low-cost seller keeps the rent. Ask which contract the type you are guarding against would imitate, and cut that one.
  4. Taking premium customers on the cheap tier as proof the menu is wrong. Symptom: "a third of our enterprise accounts are on the mid tier" read as a failure of pricing. Fix: first ask which limit of the mid tier binds for them. If none does, the menu is leaking, as the entry's own example says, and the fix is a limit that binds. If one does and they still choose it, the top tier's extras are worth less to them than its price, and the menu is sorting them correctly.
  5. Assuming the rent can be taken away. Symptom: a plan that prices the premium tier at its customers' whole value. Fix: Step 4. As long as a cheap item exists, the premium customer can take it, and its gain from doing so is a floor under what it must keep. The seller can shrink that gain by degrading the cheap item, or remove it by dropping the cheap item, but only by giving up the cheap customers too (Step 7).
Where the model breaks

The entry names its failures. Arbitrage undoes the segmentation: if cheap customers can resell, or premium customers can buy the cheap item and upgrade it themselves, the menu sorts no one. The cheap item can be too generous: if its limits do not bind on the premium customer, the premium customer takes it and the menu leaks; on the buying side, terms written for high-cost suppliers that pay too well are claimed by low-cost ones. Competitors can offer the premium customer a better deal than its rent, and then the seller's menu is no longer the premium customer's only choice; the model assumes a single designer. And, as Step 8 shows, the selling answer carried to a buyer cuts the wrong contract.

Two more limits belong beside them. The lesson's two types are a simplification: with many types, the same logic distorts every type but the top one, by amounts that depend on how the types are spread, and the menu becomes a schedule. And the model needs the distribution of types, which is exactly what the designer does not know well. That is why the entry sends the analyst to the customers or the suppliers themselves, to learn which limit would bind for whom. This lesson describes a way of thinking about menus, not advice about any investment.

Check yourself

1. A software company sells a basic plan and a professional plan. A manager proposes taking a feature out of both plans to cut support costs, arguing that what is fair for one is fair for the other. What does the model say about each half of the proposal?

Answer: the two halves are different. Taking a feature out of the basic plan can raise profit even if it saves nothing to support, because it makes the basic plan less tempting to professional customers, and so lets the professional price rise (Steps 3 to 5). Taking a feature out of the professional plan does nothing of the kind: the professional customers' rent depends only on what the basic plan offers them, so a worse professional plan simply destroys value the company could have charged for. It is worth doing only if the support saving is larger than what professional customers would have paid for the feature, which is an ordinary cost question, not a screening one.

2. A studio licenses music from rights holders. Some can supply a track cheaply, some only at a high cost, and the studio cannot tell which is which. It offers a large license and a small one. Which license should be set below the size the studio would choose if it could see costs, and which rights holders keep a rent?

Answer: the small license, written for the high-cost rights holders, is set below its efficient size, and they are paid just enough to cover their cost, so they are no worse off. The low-cost rights holders take the large license at its efficient size and keep a rent, because they could always claim to be high-cost and take the small license at a profit. This is Step 8, and the reverse of the selling result: carrying Steps 3 to 5 over would have cut the wrong license.

3. Go back to the seller of Steps 1 to 5, but now one customer in two is premium. Find the cheap item's quality, both prices, the rent and the seller's average profit. Compare it with leaving the cheap item at quality 6, and with dropping it.

Answer: lambda / (1 - lambda) = 1, so q_L = 6 - (1 x 4) = 2. Then P_L = 6 x 2 = $12, the rent is 4 x 2 = $8, and P_H = 100 - 8 = $92. The seller earns 92 - 50 = $42 on a premium customer and 12 - (4 / 2) = $10 on a cheap one, an average of (42 + 10) / 2 = $26. Left at quality 6, the top price would be $76 and the average ((76 - 50) + 18) / 2 = $22. Dropping the cheap item, the seller charges the premium customers $100 for a cost of $50 and earns 50 / 2 = $25 on average. The degraded cheap item beats both, but only by a dollar over dropping it: at one in two the seller is close to the 0.6 of Step 7, where the cheap item disappears.

Teach me more
  • Damaged Goods, Raymond J. Deneckere and R. Preston McAfee, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5(2), 1996, pp. 149 to 174 (a scan of the printed paper on McAfee's site, 26 pages). The source of the worked example: the IBM LaserPrinter E, the Intel 486SX and Sony's MiniDisc, each a product made worse at a cost so that it could be sold for less, followed by the theory of when doing so helps every buyer. The cases need no mathematics; the theory that follows does.
  • Lecture 7: Screening and Optimal Mechanism Design, Yihu Hou, Advanced Microeconomics, Renmin University of China, 2026 (40 slides). The clearest pictures of the two-type menu: the four constraints, why two of them can be dropped, the rent (theta_H - theta_L) x q_L, the effective cost of the cheap version's quality as a weighted sum, and a slide showing the basic and premium menu with the basic contract degraded on purpose. It assumes the vocabulary of an earlier lecture, and its worked numbers are for a continuum of types, not two.
  • Microeconomic Theory, chapter 16: The Principal-Agent Model: Hidden Information, Guoqiang Tian, lecture notes for ECON 632, Texas A&M, January 2026 (a 505-page book draft; the chapter starts on PDF page 17). Section 16.2 is the seller's problem as in Steps 1 to 7, with "no distortion at the top" and a shutdown section; section 16.3.1, on PDF page 30, is Baron and Myerson's regulator, the buying side of Step 8, in about a page. Written for graduate students. Note that Tian calls the low-cost firm the "low" type, so in the buying case his labels run the other way from the seller's.
  • De l'influence des péages sur l'utilité des voies de communication, Jules Dupuit, 1849 (a scan of the offprint from the Annales des ponts et chaussées, 84 pages, in French). The railway carriages are on pages 65 and 66 of the offprint, followed by Dupuit's own explanation: the company does not know what each traveler would pay, and guards against the one who could pay more.

The papers behind the Library entry are Mussa and Rosen, "Monopoly and Product Quality", Journal of Economic Theory, 1978; Rothschild and Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976; and Baron and Myerson, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs", Econometrica, 1982. Two clear sets of free notes could not be linked here: Thomas A. Weber's EPFL notes "Screening" (2016), which prove each binding constraint in words, have a broken secure address; and a twenty-minute video by Selcuk Ozyurt, solving the screening problem's second-best contract, is the middle part of a series and was not watched in full.

The revelation principle (Gibbard; Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin; Holmstrom; Myerson)

Would the truth pay under these rules?

When a number comes from someone who knows more than the reader and is paid according to what it says (a sales forecast, a budget request, a reserve estimate, management guidance), we ask one question before trusting it: under the rules that pay the reporter, would the truth be the best answer to give? Roger Myerson's revelation principle makes that question complete. Whatever any set of rules can achieve when people hold private information, a set of rules under which each person simply reports what they know, and finds honesty their best reply, achieves as well. So the best any process could do is found by searching the honest ones alone, and a real process is judged against that bound. We write down how the reporter is paid as a function of the report and the outcome, check in code whether a higher or lower report pays more than the truth, and where one does, read the report for the direction it is bent. Then we ask whether the reader can promise not to use the report against the reporter later, because where this year's report sets next year's target, honesty stops paying even under rules that look honest.

Born to answer
Econometrica, 1973 and 1979; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982.
What it does now
Whether a reported number can be taken at its word, and the best any rules could do.
The mathematics
Search the honest direct mechanisms: U(t, t) >= U(t, s) for every t and s
The full entry
Where it began

Allan Gibbard (1973) first stated the principle for rules under which honesty is best whatever others do. The Bayesian form, where each participant knows only the odds of the others' private information, was reached independently by Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), by Bengt Holmstrom, and by Roger Myerson (1979), who showed that the outcomes reachable with incentive-compatible mechanisms include those of every other mechanism. Myerson (1982) carried it to principal-agent problems in which agents both know things and do things the principal cannot see, and reduced the search for the best rules to a linear program; the Nobel committee, giving the 2007 prize to Leonid Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson, credited him with establishing the principle's generality and usefulness. Practice had reached for the idea first. A Soviet reform that Martin Weitzman modeled in 1976 made an enterprise manager's bonus depend on the plan target the manager proposed as well as on how far it was met, so that a low target no longer paid; the forecast plan Jacob Gonik described at IBM Brazil in 1978 had the same shape and made the honest forecast the best-paid one. Russ W. Rosenzweig, Vista's founder, learned game theory from Myerson himself, in the Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences program at Northwestern in 1992, and that year Myerson was among the professors he set out to ask whether they ever consulted, the question that led to Round Table Group (The Scholars' Treasure, chapter 1, pages 1 and 14).

Why it works now

Pay plans are filed in proxy statements and plan documents, guidance and its outcomes sit on the record for years, and a payoff written as a function of report and outcome can be checked in code in minutes, for every report a company's people make. What the documents cannot say is whether last year's report quietly set this year's target, and how the people under the plan read it; former sales and finance leaders know that.

When it applies

A thesis rests on a figure supplied by an interested party who knows more: guidance from managers paid for beating targets set from their own forecasts, a pipeline built from sales representatives' estimates, a budget request, a reserve or loss estimate, a bid in a procurement, a valuation from the party that is selling. Also when a client asks whether a better process exists for a sale, a pay plan or a regulated price: the answer is bounded by the honest processes alone. Not to be confused with screening-menus, which designs the menu that makes customers sort themselves; incentive-contracts, which asks what a plan rewards in effort; auction-design-and-bidding, which compares formats for a sale; or why-deals-fail, whose impossibility result is proved with this principle: this entry asks whether a report can be taken at its word, and what the best possible rules would do.

What we would ask

If the person who wrote this number had written a higher one, or a lower one, would that person have been paid more?
Will this report be used to set the reporter's next target, budget or price, and does the reporter know it?

What it needs

How the reporter is paid as a function of the report and of the outcome (the bonus plan, the earnout, the rule for setting quotas or budgets, the procurement rule), from the proxy statement, the plan documents or interviews; what the reporter knew when reporting; whether past reports have been used to set later targets; and the record of reports against outcomes, which shows the sign and size of any bend.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the pay plan in the proxy statement or the plan documents, writes the reporter's payoff as a function of the report and the outcome, and checks in code whether a report above or below the truth pays more; it sets the record of forecasts or guidance beside what followed. What the documents do not show is how the plan works in practice, whether targets are quietly reset from last year's report, and how the people under it read it. Former sales and finance leaders, and the consultants who built such plans, know that.

Where it breaks

The pay rule on paper is not the one in force (discretion, informal resets, a manager's private view of who forecast well); the reporter does not know the truth or cannot affect the outcome, so a rule that rewards honesty has nothing to elicit; the reader cannot commit, and reports are ratcheted into the next target, so honesty stops paying (Weitzman; Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole); several reporters can coordinate, and the honest equilibrium sits beside a dishonest one the principle does not rule out; and a rule that makes reports honest can still be a poor rule: Chen (2005) found Gonik's forecast plan earned the firm less than a menu of simple linear contracts, because it could not ask for more effort when the market was good.

For example

Jacob Gonik described in 1978 a plan used in IBM's Brazilian sales operations: each representative forecasts sales, the bonus rises with the forecast, rises further at a lower rate for selling above it, and falls at a higher rate for falling short. In an illustrative version paying $5,000 of bonus per $1 million forecast, $3,000 per $1 million sold above the forecast and $7,000 per $1 million short of it, a representative who expects $10 million earns $50,000 by forecasting $10 million and $46,000 by forecasting $8 million or $12 million. With sales equally likely to be $8, $10 or $12 million, the honest forecast still pays most: $47,333 against $46,667 for a forecast of $9 million or $11 million. A plan that pays only for beating the forecast, $5,000 for each $1 million above it, pays $10,000 for a forecast of $8 million and nothing for an honest $10 million. Managers paid the second way will guide low and then beat, and the beat is the plan at work, not news about demand.

$0K$10K$20K$30K$40K$50K$60K$6M$8M$10M$12M$14MForecast submitted ($ millions); expected sales are $10 millionBonusForecast plan (Gonik)Beat-the-forecast planhonest forecast: $50,000sandbag to $6M: $20,000
Would the truth pay? A representative expects $10 million of sales. The forecast plan (blue) pays $5,000 per $1 million forecast, $3,000 per $1 million sold above it and takes back $7,000 per $1 million short: it pays $50,000 for the honest forecast and $46,000 for $8 million or $46,000 for $12 million. A plan that pays only for beating the forecast (cyan) pays $10,000 for a forecast of $8 million and nothing for the honest one. Gonik described a plan of the first shape at IBM Brazil in 1978; the figures are an illustration.
$30K$35K$40K$45K$50K$7M$8M$9M$10M$11M$12M$13MForecast submitted ($ millions); sales equally likely $8, $10 or $12 millionExpected bonusbest: $10M, $47,333best: $8M, $46,000Shortfall penalty $7,000Shortfall penalty $11,000
The rule picks which honest number it hears. With sales equally likely to be $8, $10 or $12 million, the plan above pays most, $47,333, for a forecast of $10 million, the middle case. Raise the shortfall penalty to $11,000 per $1 million and the best forecast falls to $8 million, paying $46,000. The best forecast sits where the chance of falling short equals (a - v) / (u - v): 1/2 in the first plan, 1/4 in the second. An illustration from the entry's own arithmetic.
The mathematics in fullA mechanism asks each participant for a message and maps the messages to an outcome. The revelation principle: for any mechanism and any equilibrium of it, there is a direct mechanism, in which each participant reports a type t, under which reporting the true type is an equilibrium and the outcome is the same; the direct mechanism simply carries out, for each report, what that type would have done in the original. So the best achievable outcome solves a problem over direct mechanisms subject to incentive compatibility, U(t, t) >= U(t, s) for every true type t and every report s, and participation, U(t, t) >= the type's outside option; with finitely many types and private actions as well as private information, it is a linear program (Myerson, 1982). In the forecast plan, with bonus a F + v (x - F) when sales x exceed the forecast F and a F - u (F - x) when they fall short, and u > a > v > 0, a representative who knows x is paid most at F = x; under uncertainty the slope of the expected bonus in F is (a - v) - (u - v) G(F), where G(F) is the chance that sales fall below F, so the best forecast is the quantile with G(F) = (a - v) / (u - v). With a = 5, v = 3 and u = 7 (thousands of dollars per $1 million) that is 1/2: the median. The principle assumes the designer can commit; if a report is later used against the reporter, the incentive constraints change and honesty may not survive. Where it comes from

Gibbard (1973), Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica: the principle for rules under which honesty is best whatever others do.; Myerson (1979), Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Econometrica: the outcomes reachable with incentive-compatible mechanisms include the equilibrium outcomes of every other mechanism.; Myerson (1982), Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics: the principle with private actions as well as private information, solved by linear programming.; Gonik (1978), Tie Salesmen's Bonuses to Their Forecasts, Harvard Business Review 56(3): the forecast plan at IBM Brazil, as described and analyzed by Chen (2005), Management Science 51(1).

Sources

Myerson (1979). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47(1), 61. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
Myerson (1982). Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 67-81. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
Gibbard (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica 41(4), 587. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
Weitzman (1976). The New Soviet Incentive Model. The Bell Journal of Economics 7(1), 251. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003200
Chen (2005). Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning. Management Science 51(1), 60-75. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0217
Freixas, Guesnerie, Tirole (1985). Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect. The Review of Economic Studies 52(2), 173. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297615
Myerson, Satterthwaite (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29(2), 265-281. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320
Myerson (2008). The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. American Political Science Review 102(1), 125-139. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080076

Learn the math
The question

It is the last week of the quarter, and a sales director asks each of her twelve representatives for next quarter's forecast. The factory will build to those numbers, finance will hire to them, and the chief executive will turn them into guidance for investors. Nobody knows a territory better than the person who works it, which is why she asks. But each representative is also paid a bonus, and the bonus is measured against a quota, and the quota is set from the forecast.

So the forecast that comes back is "conservative." Nobody lies, exactly. Each representative writes a number a little below what he believes, beats it three months later, collects the bonus, and the company announces a beat. Meanwhile the factory built too little, and the investor who read the guidance learned less than he thought.

This lesson is about one question that should be asked of every number supplied by someone who knows more than you and is paid according to what the number says: under the rules that pay the reporter, would the truth be the best answer to give? It is also about a theorem, Roger Myerson's revelation principle, which turns that question from a hunch into something you can compute, and which says something surprising: to find the best that any process could possibly do, you need only search the processes in which telling the truth pays.

The idea in one paragraph

A report is an action, and people choose actions by what they pay. So before trusting a forecast, a budget request or a reserve estimate, write down how the reporter is paid as a function of the report and of what later happens, and ask whether a higher or lower report would have paid more than the truth. If one would, the report is bent, and the rules tell you which way. The revelation principle adds the deep part. However clever a process is, with haggling, deadlines, auctions or negotiation, whatever it achieves can be achieved as well by a plain process that asks each person for what they know and makes honesty their best reply. So the best possible rules are found by searching honest ones alone, and any real process can be judged against that bound. One condition rides on all of it: the person setting the rules must be able to promise not to use the report against the reporter later. Where this year's honest answer becomes next year's harder target, honesty stops paying, whatever the rules on paper say.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the payoff as a function of the report. Here is a forecast plan of the shape Jacob Gonik described in 1978 for IBM's sales operations in Brazil, with round illustrative rates (the Library's, not IBM's). A representative forecasts sales F and then sells S, both counted in units of $1 million. The bonus, counted in units of $1,000, is

bonus = (a x F) + (v x (S - F))     if sales beat the forecast (S at least F)
bonus = (a x F) - (u x (F - S))     if sales fall short (S below F)

with a = 5 for each $1 million forecast, v = 3 for each $1 million sold above the forecast, and u = 7 for each $1 million short of it. The order of the three rates is the whole design: u > a > v. A bigger forecast pays more, selling past your forecast pays something but less, and missing your forecast costs more than the forecast earned.

Start with a representative who knows for certain that sales will be $10 million. Forecasting the truth pays 5 x 10 = 50, or $50,000. Forecasting $8 million pays (5 x 8) + (3 x 2) = 40 + 6 = 46, or $46,000: the $2 million shaded off the forecast loses $5,000 per $1 million and earns back only $3,000 per $1 million as overselling. Forecasting $12 million pays (5 x 12) - (7 x 2) = 60 - 14 = 46: the extra forecast earns $5,000 per $1 million but the shortfall costs $7,000 per $1 million. Each $1 million of forecast moved toward the truth gains a - v = 2 from below and u - a = 2 from above. The truth is the peak.

Step 2: the representative does not know the future. Real representatives know their territory, not next quarter. Say sales are equally likely to be $8, $10 or $12 million. Now each forecast is a bet, and we compare average bonuses:

forecast 10:  (36 + 50 + 56) / 3 = 47.33
forecast 9:   (38 + 48 + 54) / 3 = 46.67
forecast 11:  (34 + 48 + 58) / 3 = 46.67
forecast 8 or 12:                   46.00

(For the forecast of 10: sales of 8 pay 50 - (7 x 2) = 36, sales of 10 pay 50, sales of 12 pay 50 + (3 x 2) = 56.) The honest middle forecast still pays most, $47,333 against $46,667. But "honest" now needs a definition, because the representative holds a range, not a number. The next step finds exactly which point of the range the plan pulls out.

Step 3: the slope rule. Write G(F) for the chance that sales fall below F. Raise the forecast by a sliver h and watch the average bonus. Three things happen at once:

  • The forecast term rises by a x h, whatever happens.
  • If sales end above the forecast (chance 1 - G(F)), the overselling pay shrinks by v x h, because there is h less to oversell.
  • If sales end below the forecast (chance G(F)), the shortfall penalty grows by u x h.

So the average bonus changes by (a - (v x (1 - G(F))) - (u x G(F))) x h, and dividing by h gives the slope:

slope of the average bonus = (a - v) - ((u - v) x G(F))

(In calculus terms: the average bonus is (a x F) + (v x E[(S - F)+]) - (u x E[(F - S)+]), where E[(S - F)+] is the average amount by which sales beat F (counting zero when they do not) and E[(F - S)+] the average amount by which they fall short, and the derivatives of the two averages with respect to F are -(1 - G(F)) and G(F).) Because G(F) only grows as F grows, the slope only falls: it starts positive at the bottom of the range, where G is 0 and the slope is a - v, and ends negative at the top, where G is 1 and the slope is a - u. The best forecast is where it crosses zero:

G(F) = (a - v) / (u - v)

With a = 5, v = 3, u = 7, that is 2 / 4 = 1/2: the forecast that sales are as likely to beat as to miss, the median of what the representative believes. That is the plan's precise meaning of an honest forecast, and it holds for any belief about sales, not just three outcomes. With sales spread evenly from $8 million to $12 million, the median is $10 million, and its average bonus is $48,000 against $46,000 for a forecast at either end.

Now the rule pays its way. You can read the bend in a forecast straight from the rates, without knowing anything about the market:

  • Cut the reward for overselling to v = 1, and the quantile becomes 4 / 6 = 2/3: the forecast sits above the median, at about $10.67 million when sales are spread evenly from 8 to 12. Forecasts bend up.
  • Raise the penalty for falling short to u = 11, and the quantile becomes 2 / 8 = 1/4: the forecast sits at $9 million, which pays $47,000 on average against $46,000 for the median. Forecasts bend down.
  • Break the order, letting overselling pay as much as forecasting (v at least a), and the slope is never positive: forecast as little as you are allowed.
-4-20+289101112Forecast, $ millions (true sales spread evenly from 8 to 12)Bonus against the honest forecast, $ thousandsthe honest forecast pays thispeak at 9peak at 8the plan as writtena harsher penalty for falling shortthe plan, with a ratchet on next year
Same salesperson, same market, three sets of rules. Only the first makes the truth the best-paid answer; the other two bend the forecast down, and the bend can be read from the rules alone.

Step 4: what a beat means. Compare a plan that pays only for beating the forecast, $5,000 for each $1 million above it and nothing for the forecast itself. Here a = 0, v = 5 and u = 0, so the slope is -(5 x (1 - G(F))), negative for as long as any chance of beating the forecast remains: the representative who expects $10 million earns 5 x (10 - 8) = 10, or $10,000, by forecasting $8 million, and nothing by forecasting the truth. Under such a plan the forecast is not a forecast; it is a floor, chosen to be beaten. Managers paid this way will guide low and then beat, and the beat is the plan at work, not news about demand. The investor's version of the question is now concrete: read the pay plan, find the slope, and know the direction of the bend before reading the number.

Step 5: the ratchet. Everything so far assumed that the report touches only this year's pay. Suppose instead that each $1 million of this year's forecast raises next year's target by $1 million, and next year's bonus falls by b = 2, $2,000, for each $1 million of target. The representative now pays for an honest forecast twice, once this year and once next, and the slope picks up a new term:

slope = (a - v) - ((u - v) x G(F)) - b

With b = 2, the slope is 2 - (4 x G(F)) - 2, which is never positive: the best forecast is the lowest possible, $8 million. Check it in dollars. Moving the forecast from $10 million down to $8 million costs $2,000 this year (an average of $46,000 instead of $48,000) and saves $4,000 next year ($2 million less target, at $2,000 per $1 million): $2,000 better off for forecasting low. The plan on paper rewards honesty; the use of the report destroys it. Weitzman, who had modeled the Soviet reform in 1976, wrote about this in 1980 as the "ratchet principle", and Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) analyzed it as the ratchet effect, the name it has kept. With half the weight, b = 1 (or the same b = 2 with next year's dollars counted at half), the quantile falls to (2 - 1) / 4 = 1/4, a forecast of $9 million.

Here is the picture to keep. The rules lay a floor, and the report is a marble. The marble rolls downhill, toward whatever the rules pay best, and comes to rest in the floor's lowest spot. Good rules are a floor whose lowest spot is the truth. The ratchet is someone tilting the floor after you have placed the marble, and everyone who has been ratcheted once places the marble knowing the tilt is coming.

Step 6: the principle itself. So far we have checked one set of rules. Myerson's theorem is about all of them at once. A mechanism is any set of rules that collects messages from people (bids, offers, forecasts, threats, silence) and maps them to an outcome (who gets what, who pays what). People who hold private information choose their messages strategically, and an equilibrium is a way of choosing in which nobody, given what they know, gains by choosing differently.

The revelation principle: take any mechanism and any equilibrium of it. Build a new, direct mechanism that asks each person one thing, "what do you know?", and then does, on their behalf, exactly what a person who knows that would have done in the old mechanism. Under the new rules, telling the truth is an equilibrium, and the outcome is the same.

The proof is the sentence "I'll play for you." Suppose that in the direct mechanism some person gained by misreporting, claiming to know s when they know t. Then in the old mechanism, that person could have gained the same way, by playing the strategy that a person who knew s would play. But the old strategies were an equilibrium, so no such gain existed. Hence no lie pays in the new mechanism either.

What this buys is enormous. The search for the best rules, which looks like a search over every conceivable procedure, shrinks to a search over direct mechanisms that satisfy two lists of inequalities: honesty, U(t, t) >= U(t, s) for every true type t and every report s (a person of type t does at least as well reporting t as reporting anything else), and participation, U(t, t) >= the type's outside option. Myerson (1982) showed that with finitely many types this is a linear program.

Watch it work on the smallest case there is. A seller has one item and one buyer, who values it at $10 with chance q and $6 otherwise; only the buyer knows which. The seller could post $10 today and, if refused, $6 tomorrow. But a $10 buyer then waits a day (gaining $4 instead of nothing), so everyone buys at $6. The direct mechanism that does the same thing is "tell me your value, and pay $6." Could any procedure, haggling included, do better? The principle says: search the direct menus. Let the low type get the item with chance z and pay p(L), and the high type get it for sure and pay p(H). Participation for the low type allows p(L) up to 6 x z. Honesty for the high type says that what it keeps from the truth, 10 - p(H), must be at least what it would keep by claiming to be low, (10 x z) - (6 x z) = 4 x z, so p(H) is at most 10 - (4 x z). The seller's average revenue is then

revenue = (q x (10 - (4 x z))) + ((1 - q) x (6 x z)) = (10 x q) + (z x (6 - (10 x q)))

which is a straight line in z. A straight line is best at an end. If q is below 0.6, the best is z = 1: sell to everyone at $6. If q is above 0.6, z = 0: sell only to the $10 buyer, at $10, and accept losing the $6 buyer. At q = 0.5 the best any process can do is $6 (selling only at $10 earns $5; a halfway lottery, z = 1/2, earns $5.50); at q = 0.7 it is $7. A brute-force search of every direct menu on a grid, in the code behind this lesson, finds the same two answers. No negotiation, auction or deadline game can beat them, because each of those is just some mechanism, and every mechanism's outcome is on the list we searched. The same reasoning, run on a buyer and a seller who both hold private values, gives Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) theorem that no rules, without money from outside, can guarantee every gain from trade is realized; the Library's entry on why deals fail is built on it.

A worked example: reading guidance with the forecast plan

Gonik's account of the IBM Brazil plan is the cleanest public case of rules built to make the truth the best-paid answer; the rates above are illustrative, but the shape (forecast pays, overselling pays less, missing costs more) is the one he described. Weitzman's model of the Soviet reform of the 1970s had the same shape for enterprise managers proposing their own plan targets, for the same reason: under the older rule a low target always paid.

For an investor the use is direct. Take a company whose managers' bonuses are set against targets drawn from their own budgets, as many proxy statements describe. Read the plan and write the payoff as a function of the budget and the result. If it pays only for beating the target (Step 4), or if this year's result sets next year's target (Step 5), expect the guidance to sit low and the beats to be routine, and discount the beats accordingly: a company that beats in nearly every quarter under such a plan is telling you about its plan more than its market. If the plan looks like Gonik's, with the rates in the order u > a > v, the guidance has a claim to be the median of what management believes, which is a different and more useful number. And in both cases ask the second question, which no document answers: will this report be used to set the next target? That is what former sales and finance leaders, and the consultants who built such plans, can say.

The usual mistakes
  1. Trusting the label. A plan called "pay for accuracy" can still bend. The symptom is a plan described in words rather than rates. The fix is to write the payoff as a function of report and outcome and compute the slope (a - v) - ((u - v) x G(F)).
  2. Forgetting the future. The plan on paper pays for the truth, but the report also sets next year's quota, budget or price. The symptom is honest-looking rules with persistently low forecasts. The fix is to add the cost of the report's later use to the slope, as in Step 5, and to ask the people under the plan how targets are really set.
  3. Reading a beat as news. Under a beat-only plan the beat was chosen in advance. The fix is to set the record of reports beside outcomes: a bend shows as outcomes that land on the same side of the report again and again, and the usual gap is its size.
  4. Thinking the principle says people are honest. It says something about rules, not character: whatever any rules achieve, some honest rules achieve too. Real processes are rarely direct, and need not be. The principle supplies the benchmark, not the procedure.
  5. Taking "honest is an equilibrium" for "honest is what happens." The direct mechanism makes honesty one equilibrium. If several reporters can coordinate, a dishonest equilibrium can sit beside it, and the principle does not rule it out.
Where the model breaks

The rule on paper may not be the rule in force: discretion, informal resets, or a manager's private view of who forecasts well can replace the formula, and then the formula's slope tells you little. The reporter may not know the truth, or may have no influence over the outcome, and then a rule that rewards honesty has nothing to draw out. The reader may be unable to commit, so that reports are ratcheted into the next target and honesty stops paying (Weitzman; Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole). Several reporters may coordinate, and an honest equilibrium can sit beside a dishonest one. And a rule that makes reports honest can still be a poor rule: Chen (2005) found that Gonik's forecast plan earned a firm less than a menu of simple linear contracts would, because it could not ask for more effort when the market was good. Honesty is one thing a set of rules can buy; it is not the only thing worth buying.

Check yourself
  1. A plan pays $4,000 per $1 million forecast, $2,000 per $1 million sold above the forecast, and $6,000 per $1 million short of it. Where in the representative's beliefs does the best forecast sit?

Answer: at the quantile G(F) = (a - v) / (u - v) = (4 - 2) / (6 - 2) = 1/2, the median. The rates differ from the lesson's, but the honest point is the same, because only the ratio of the two gaps matters.

  1. A company's managers are paid only for beating a profit target that they themselves propose each year, and the company has beaten its own guidance in eleven of the last twelve quarters. What do the beats tell you about demand?

Answer: very little by themselves. With nothing paid for the target itself (a = 0) and nothing lost for missing it, the slope is negative for as long as a beat is possible, so the guidance is chosen low to be beaten (Step 4). The information is in the size of the beats against the record, in anything that moves guidance against the managers' interest, and in what people who worked under the plan say about how the targets were set.

  1. Take the lesson's plan (a = 5, v = 3, u = 7) and sales spread evenly from $8 million to $12 million, so that G(F) = (F - 8) / 4. Each $1 million of forecast now costs $1,000 of next year's bonus. What forecast pays best, and how much does it beat the median forecast of $10 million by, counting both years?

Answer: the slope is 2 - (4 x G(F)) - 1, which is zero where G(F) = 1/4, so F = 8 + (4 x (1/4)) = 9, $9 million. This year's average bonus at $9 million is $47,500 against $48,000 at $10 million, and next year's cost is $9,000 against $10,000, so the two years together come to $38,500 against $38,000: $500 better for shading the forecast by $1 million. (A forecast of $8 million also nets $38,000; the peak is between them, where the slope says.)

Teach me more
  • Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle, course notes for Brown University's CSCI 1440/2440 (2025), 7 pages. The theorem and its proof as a machine that plays your equilibrium strategy for you, with a worked auction: a strange auction in which bidders shade their bids turns into the ordinary second-price auction once the machine bids for them. The best short treatment for a student ready for a little notation.
  • Mechanism Design Theory: scientific background, the Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2007), 29 pages. Read the introduction and section 2.1. The introduction says who found what (Gibbard first; Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, Holmstrom, Myerson and others for the Bayesian form) and states the limit, that the principle does not address other equilibria; section 2.1 gives the proof in one paragraph of plain words. The rest is graduate level.
  • Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning, Fangruo Chen, Management Science (2005), 16 pages. Sections 1 and 5 set out Gonik's forecast plan as a menu of contracts indexed by the forecast, with the same ordering of rates as this lesson, and explain why a menu of simple linear contracts can do better for the firm. The model in between is heavy going; skip it on a first read.

Transaction costs and incomplete contracts (Williamson; Grossman, Hart and Moore)

Make or buy: who should own the asset

We ask who should own an asset by asking whose investment in it would be held up without ownership. Williamson showed that when one side must make an investment specific to the other, worth much less in any other use, the gap between its value in place and its value elsewhere, the appropriable quasi-rent, can be bargained away after the money is spent, so contracts are written to protect it or the asset is brought inside the firm. Grossman, Hart and Moore made the choice exact: a contract cannot list every contingency, so ownership is the right to decide what the contract leaves out, that right sets each side's fallback in later bargaining, and an asset should go to the party whose investment matters most, with assets that are worth more together under one owner. We measure each side's specific investment, the value it loses outside the relationship and the share of the gain each side would keep without ownership, then ask whether a long-term contract, joint ownership or integration restores the incentive to invest.

Born to answer
Economica, 1937; Journal of Political Economy, 1986 and 1990.
What it does now
Who should own an asset so that the investments it needs get made.
The mathematics
Investor keeps d + beta (G - d); invests only if that exceeds c
In the inquiries: No. 19, Late, or Gone
The full entry
Where it began

Ronald Coase asked in 1937 why firms exist at all if prices coordinate production, and answered that using the market has costs of its own. Oliver Williamson built transaction cost economics on that answer through the 1970s and in The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985): the hazard is an investment specific to one counterparty, which once sunk can be exploited by the other side, and firms, long contracts and integration are the governance structures that answer it. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) named the appropriable quasi-rent and told the much-debated story of General Motors and Fisher Body; Monteverde and Teece (1982) found that automobile components needing specific engineering know-how were more often made in house, and Paul Joskow (1985) that power plants built at the mouth of a coal mine were tied to it by long contracts or ownership. Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1986), and Hart and John Moore (1990), reframed ownership as the residual right to decide what an incomplete contract leaves out, which made the choice of owner a question of whose investment matters most. Williamson shared the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics with Elinor Ostrom, and Hart the 2016 prize with Bengt Holmstrom.

Why it works now

Supply contracts, segment disclosures, switching histories and the terms of past renegotiations sit in filings and in the record of a relationship, and each side's specific investment and the split it would keep under each form of ownership can be computed outside the conversation. How the renegotiations really went, and what each side believed it could extract, is still known only to the people who sat in them.

When it applies

A company depends on one supplier or one customer for something it cannot cheaply get elsewhere (an AI developer and its chip maker or its power, a drug company and its manufacturer, a retailer and its logistics provider), and the question is whether to build, buy the supplier, sign a long contract or stay at arm's length; the rationale of an acquisition that cites control or synergies; a counterparty investing in something that is worth little away from the deal, before the deal closes. Not to be confused with negotiation-and-outside-options, which predicts the split from each side's fallback today; incentive-contracts, which asks what a pay plan rewards; or profiting-from-innovation, which divides an innovation's profit among the innovator, imitators and asset owners: this asks who should own an asset so that the investments it needs get made.

What we would ask

What would each side's investment in this relationship be worth if the relationship ended, and how much of it is sunk before the other side can renegotiate?
Which side's investment matters more to the value created, and can a contract written today cover the decisions that will matter in five years?

What it needs

Each side's investment that is specific to the other (its cost, and its value in the next-best use), the gain it creates inside the relationship, the record of past renegotiations and price changes once the money was sunk, the contract's term and what it leaves to later decisions, the number of alternative suppliers or customers and the time and cost of switching, and the cost of owning the asset (capital, management and the loss of the other side's incentive).

How we would get it

The Desk reads supply contracts, segment disclosures and the history of renegotiations and switching, estimates each side's specific investment and its value elsewhere, and computes each side's return on its investment under separate ownership, a long-term contract and integration. What the record cannot show is how the renegotiations actually went and what each side believed it could extract; former procurement and sales executives on both sides, and the counsel who wrote the contracts, know that.

Where it breaks

An asset called specific when competitive suppliers exist, so the quasi-rent is small; integration assumed to end the problem, when it moves the holdup inside the firm and dulls the acquired side's incentive, the cost Grossman and Hart weigh against the gain; the theory read as a prediction of integration whenever quasi-rents are high, when Whinston (2003) showed the property rights version predicts something different and Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) found many boundaries set by other things, such as relational contracts sustained by the value of the relationship (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002); and the model says who should own, not what either side will pay.

For example

An AI developer buys its chips from one supplier. Rewriting its software for that supplier's chips is worth $400 million in present value and would cost $300 million; on another supplier's chips the rewrite is worth nothing. Once the money is spent the supplier can reopen the price, and with equal bargaining power the developer keeps half of the gain: $200 million against a cost of $300 million, so it does not write the software, and $100 million of value is never created. The supplier could also invest: $100 million to tune its chips to the developer's models, worth $150 million, which the supplier keeps in full only if it owns the design. If the developer owned the chip design, or a contract fixed the price for the life of the software, it would keep the $400 million and invest, while the supplier, keeping half of $150 million, would not: net value created, $400 million less $300 million, $100 million. If the supplier owns everything, it tunes and the developer does not rewrite: $150 million less $100 million, $50 million. Separate ownership with no contract creates nothing. The asset belongs with the side whose investment matters more, here the developer, and the research question is the size of each side's specific investment and whether a contract can fix the price for long enough.

The mathematics in fullLet a party's investment, at cost c, create a gain G inside the relationship and nothing outside it. Under separate ownership the gain is split ex post by Nash bargaining, so the investor expects d + beta (G - d), with d its fallback and beta its bargaining weight; with d = 0 and beta = 1/2 it keeps G / 2 and invests only when G / 2 > c, though G > c would make the investment worth making (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). Ownership of the asset raises the owner's fallback and so its share, and lowers the other side's; the efficient owner is the party whose investment responds most, and strictly complementary assets should be owned together. Williamson's measure is the appropriable quasi-rent, the value of the asset in its present use less its value in the next-best use (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978): the larger it is, and the longer and less complete the contract that protects it, the more likely the asset is brought inside the firm. Where it comes from

Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica; Williamson (1979), Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, and (1981), The Economics of Organization, American Journal of Sociology; The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985), chapters 1 to 4 on asset specificity and governance; Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics; Grossman and Hart (1986), The Costs and Benefits of Ownership, and Hart and Moore (1990), Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, both Journal of Political Economy; Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995), chapters 1 to 4; Williamson's Nobel lecture (2010), Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, and Hart's (2017), Incomplete Contracts and Control, both American Economic Review; Nash (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica: the split of the gain is Vista's formalization of the verbal argument, as in profiting-from-innovation

Sources

Coase (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4(16), 386-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
Williamson (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology 87(3), 548-577. https://doi.org/10.1086/227496
Grossman, Hart (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 691-719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404
Hart, Moore (1990). Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 98(6), 1119-1158. https://doi.org/10.1086/261729
Holmström, Roberts (1998). The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 73-94. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.73
Whinston (2003). On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/19.1.1
Lafontaine, Slade (2007). Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 45(3), 629-685. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.629
Hart, Moore (2008). Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(1), 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1
Baker, Gibbons, Murphy (2002). Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 39-84. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445
Monteverde, Teece (1982). Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry. The Bell Journal of Economics 13(1), 206. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003441
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Williamson (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. Free Press. (book)
Hart (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press). (book)

Learn the math
The question

Picture a software team that has just spent a year and $300 million rewriting its whole system to run on one company's chips. The rewrite is brilliant. On those chips it is worth $400 million to the business. On anyone else's chips it is worth nothing, because it was written for one machine and no other. Now the chip company calls. The price per chip is going up.

The team cannot walk away. Walking away means throwing out the rewrite, and the chip company knows it. The money is spent; it will never come back whatever the team does. So the only thing left to argue about is how the $400 million is divided, and the chip company, which did nothing to earn it, can demand a large part of it.

Now run the film backward to the day before the rewrite began. A team that sees this call coming does the arithmetic and does not start the rewrite at all. Nobody is cheated, nobody breaks a promise, and $100 million of value is simply never created. That is the problem this model is about. Economists call it hold-up. The question it asks is the oldest in the theory of the firm: when should a company buy what it needs from someone else, and when should it own the thing outright?

The idea in one paragraph

Some investments are worth much more inside one relationship than anywhere else: a factory built next to one customer, software written for one supplier's chips, a plant tooled for one buyer's parts. Once the money is sunk, the other side can reopen the terms and take part of the gain, because the investor has nowhere better to go. Seeing that coming, the investor invests less, or not at all. Contracts can help, but no contract can foresee everything, and whatever it leaves out will be decided later by whoever has the right to decide. That right is what ownership is. Owning an asset improves your position in every later argument about the things the contract forgot, so ownership should go to the side whose investment most needs protecting. The model does not say "integrate whenever you depend on someone". It says: find the investment that will not get made, and give its maker the fallback that makes it worth making.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the gain that can be taken. Let an investment cost c and create a gain G inside the relationship. Outside the relationship it is worth some smaller amount, d. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) named the difference, G - d, the appropriable quasi-rent, and it is the measure of what Williamson called asset specificity. Read the phrase piece by piece. Quasi-rent: a return above what is needed to keep the asset where it is, because the cost is already sunk. Appropriable: the other side can take it, because it vanishes if the relationship ends. With the software, G = $400 million and d = 0, so the whole $400 million is up for grabs.

Step 2: how the gain is split after the money is spent. Once the investment is sunk, the two sides bargain over the gain. The standard way to model a bargain between two parties who each need the other is Nash's (1950): each side first gets its fallback, what it would have if talks failed, and then they divide what is left over. Nash divided it equally; later writers let each side have a bargaining weight, a share of what is left over that reflects how strong a bargainer it is. To keep the arithmetic to one line, suppose the other side has no fallback of its own from this investment (the chip company gets nothing from a rewrite nobody runs). Then what is left over after fallbacks is G - d, and if the investor's weight is beta (read "beta", a number between 0 and 1), the investor ends up with

d + (beta x (G - d))

Its fallback, plus its share of the part of the gain that exists only if they agree. With equal bargaining power, beta = 1/2. With d = 0, the investor keeps G / 2.

Step 3: the decision made before. The investor pays the whole cost c but keeps only d + (beta x (G - d)). It invests only if

d + (beta x (G - d)) > c

The investment is worth making for the two sides together whenever G > c. Put the two conditions side by side. With d = 0 and beta = 1/2, the investor needs G / 2 > c, that is G more than twice the cost. Every investment with a gain between one and two times its cost is worth making and does not get made. The software: G = 400, c = 300. Together, 400 > 300, so it should be written. Alone, the team keeps 400 / 2 = $200 million against a cost of $300 million, so it is not. That is the $100 million of the opening scene.

Notice what is not in this calculation: any villain. The chip company does not have to be greedy; it only has to bargain the way anyone bargains, after the fact. The damage is done before anyone negotiates anything, in the investment that is never made.

Step 4: the fallback is the lever. Everything that protects the investor works through d. Rearrange Step 3 for equal bargaining power:

d + ((G - d) / 2) > c
(d / 2) + (G / 2) > c
d > (2 x c) - G

The second line collects the two halves of d (a whole d, less half of it); the third doubles both sides and moves G across.

With our numbers, (2 x 300) - 400 = 200. The developer invests once its fallback is more than $200 million, half the software's value. Suppose the rewrite would keep 60% of its value on another supplier's chips. Then d = 0.6 x 400 = $240 million, the quasi-rent shrinks from $400 million to 400 - 240 = $160 million, and the developer keeps 240 + ((400 - 240) / 2) = $320 million, above its $300 million cost. It invests, with no contract and no change of ownership. Specificity, not dependence, is what makes hold-up bite.

$200$250$300$350$4000%25%50%75%100%Share of its value the software keeps on other chipsDeveloper keeps, $ millionscost of the rewrite: $300locked in: $200break-even at 50%60%: $320
Hold-up is about the fallback. The more of the software's value that would survive a break with the supplier, the less the supplier can take by reopening the price. Owning the chip design, or a contract that fixes the price, works the same way: it raises the developer's fallback.

For a bargaining weight other than one half, the same steps give the fallback needed as

d > (c - (beta x G)) / (1 - beta)

At beta = 0.6 it is (300 - 240) / 0.4 = $150 million. At beta = 0.75 it is zero, since 0.75 x 400 = 300: an investor strong enough to keep three quarters of the gain covers its cost with no fallback at all, and anything above three quarters makes the rewrite pay.

Step 5: what ownership does. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) asked what ownership adds when a contract could, in principle, fix the price. Their answer: a contract cannot list every decision the next five years will bring (a new chip generation, a change of design, a delay). Whatever the contract leaves out, the owner of the asset decides. That residual right of control is what it means to own something, and it moves d. If the developer owns the chip design, a breakdown in talks no longer leaves it with nothing: it can take the design elsewhere, so its fallback rises, and the supplier's fallback falls by the same logic. A long contract that fixes the price for the life of the software does the same job for as long as it lasts.

The entry's example has two investments, so ownership has a cost as well as a benefit. The supplier can spend $100 million tuning its chips to the developer's models, worth $150 million inside the relationship. In money, in millions:

  • Separate ownership, no contract. The developer keeps 400 / 2 = 200 against 300: no rewrite. The supplier keeps 150 / 2 = 75 against 100: no tuning. Value created: 0.
  • The developer owns the design, or holds a fixed-price contract for the software's life. The supplier can no longer reopen the price, so in the language of Step 4 the developer's fallback is the whole gain, d = 400, and nothing is left to bargain away. It keeps the full 400 and invests. The supplier, now the weaker side, keeps at most 75 and does not tune. Value: 400 - 300 = 100.
  • The supplier owns everything. It keeps the full 150 and tunes; the developer keeps 200 and does not rewrite. Value: 150 - 100 = 50.
  • If both could be protected at once, both would invest: 100 + 50 = 150. No form of ownership reaches it here.

Whoever owns, the other side becomes the one held up. That is Grossman and Hart's point against the older view that bringing an activity inside the firm ends the problem: it moves the problem to whoever no longer owns. The rule is to give the asset to the side whose investment matters more, here the developer, 100 against 50.

Step 6: not all or nothing, with calculus. Real investments are not a yes or a no. Suppose investing i (in millions of dollars) creates value A x sqrt(i), so each extra dollar does less than the one before, with A = 40. The value net of cost is (A x sqrt(i)) - i. The slope of sqrt(i) is 1 / (2 x sqrt(i)) (the power rule, with the exponent one half), so the slope of the net value in i is

(A / (2 x sqrt(i))) - 1

which is the extra value from one more dollar less the dollar itself. Set it to zero: sqrt(i) = A / 2, so i = A^2 / 4 = 1,600 / 4 = 400. Investing $400 million creates 40 x 20 = $800 million, net $400 million. That is the efficient amount.

An investor who keeps only the share beta maximizes (beta x A x sqrt(i)) - i instead. The same steps give sqrt(i) = (beta x A) / 2 and

i = (beta^2 x A^2) / 4

At beta = 1/2 the investment is ((1/4) x 1,600) / 4 = $100 million, a quarter of the efficient amount, not half. The investor stops where its own share of the next dollar's return is a dollar; at i = 100 the next dollar creates 40 / (2 x 10) = $2 of value, of which it keeps $1. Value created: 40 x 10 = $400 million, net $300 million. Put the general answer in. At share beta the investor chooses sqrt(i) = (beta x A) / 2, so the value created is A x sqrt(i) = (beta x A^2) / 2 and the amount invested is (beta^2 x A^2) / 4. Take one from the other: the net value is (A^2 / 4) x ((2 x beta) - beta^2), which is $400 million at beta = 1, $375 million at three quarters, $300 million at one half and $175 million at one quarter.

$0$100$200$300$4000%25%50%75%100%Share of the gain the investor keeps$ millionsvalue created: $300invested: $100all kept: $400 on $400
Keeping half the gain does not mean investing half as much. The investor stops where its own share of the next dollar's return falls to a dollar, so at one half it invests a quarter of the efficient amount, and three quarters of the value is still created because the first dollars are the most productive.

Two lessons sit in that curve. The cut to investment is severe (it goes with the square of the share), but the loss of value is milder, because the first dollars invested are the most productive and those still get spent. And the loss grows fastest as the share falls further: from three quarters to one half costs $75 million; from one half to one quarter costs $125 million.

A worked example

The cleanest real case is the one Oliver Hart chose for his Nobel lecture in 2016, and the one Paul Joskow measured thirty years earlier: a power plant built at the mouth of a coal mine.

Most American coal plants in Joskow's data bought coal mined in one region and shipped by rail, barge or truck, often by two of the three. A small number were different. They were sited next to one particular mine, planned to take all or most of their coal from it, and usually built at the same time as the mine. Joskow called this a classic case of what Williamson named site specificity, and Hart's lecture tells why it matters. Ten years in, say, the important impurity in the coal turns out to be ash. High-ash coal is cheaper for the mine to dig and dearer for the plant to burn, and the contract, which could not foresee every impurity, may let the mine ship it. The plant can renegotiate, but the mine is in the stronger position, because the plant has no good alternative: bringing coal from a different mine to a plant built beside this one is very expensive.

Read it through the steps.

  • What is specific, and how specific? Step 1. The plant's location. Next to its mine, coal arrives for almost nothing; anywhere else it would arrive by rail at real cost. The quasi-rent is the transport cost the plant saves by staying with this mine, for the life of a plant that runs for decades. The mine's investment is specific too: a mine opened to feed one plant may have no other nearby buyer.
  • What happens without protection? Step 3. Hart's lecture gives the answer in the plant's own decision: a plant that expects to be at the mercy of the mine may choose not to depend on it in the first place, and locate at an equal distance between several mines instead, paying more to transport coal for ever. That is the $100 million of the opening scene, paid in freight.
  • What protects it? Steps 4 and 5. Either ownership (the plant and the mine under one owner) or a contract long enough to cover the life of the investment, so that the fallback is fixed in writing before the money is sunk.

Joskow then looked at what the parties actually did. In his 1987 paper in the American Economic Review he collected 277 coal contracts between utilities and suppliers. They averaged 12.75 years, running from 1 year to 50. Fourteen of them supplied mine-mouth plants. Holding the size of the contract, the region and the date fixed, a mine-mouth plant's contract was predicted to run about 16 years longer than other plants' contracts, and the estimate was precise. A footnote in the same paper puts the governance choices in proportion: about 15% of utility coal came from suppliers the utility owned, about 15% from spot purchases, and about 70% under contracts of one to fifty years. Another footnote reports that common ownership was much more likely for mine-mouth plants than for others, but that contracts governed about half of the mine-mouth plants built since 1960.

That is the model's prediction and its limit in one set of numbers. Where the quasi-rent is largest, the parties protect it most, with ownership or with contracts that run for decades. But they do not always integrate, because a long enough contract can raise the fallback almost as well (mistake 4 below).

One more story is told about this model more than any other, and it is worth knowing that it is disputed. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) told how General Motors, supplied with car bodies by Fisher Body under a long cost-plus contract, was held up by Fisher until it bought the company outright in 1926. Later historians (Coase, Freeland, and Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, all in 2000) read the record differently and argue that the hold-up may never have happened. The coal contracts are a better teacher, because they are counted rather than told.

The usual mistakes
  1. Calling an asset specific because a company depends on it. Symptom: "they buy all their chips from one supplier, so they are held up." Fix: Step 4. Dependence is not specificity. Ask what the investment would be worth with the next-best partner. If it keeps most of its value elsewhere, the quasi-rent is small and so is the problem, however concentrated the purchases.
  2. Assuming integration ends the problem. Symptom: an acquisition justified by "control" with no word about what the acquired side will now invest. Fix: Step 5. Ownership moves the hold-up to whoever no longer owns; the acquired managers, now employees, have less reason to make their own specific investments. Count both sides' investments before and after, as in the four cases of Step 5.
  3. Choosing the owner by the size of the investment, not by what it would add. Symptom: "the developer spends more, so the developer should own." Fix: compare the net value created under each owner. Usually the bigger investor is the right owner, but the test is the value lost when its investment is not made, which depends on gain and cost together.
  4. Predicting integration whenever quasi-rents are large. Symptom: surprise that a deeply dependent pair stays separate for decades. Fix: long contracts, the value of a continuing relationship, and reputation can all protect a specific investment (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002; Holmstrom and Roberts 1998). The model says ownership is one answer to hold-up, not the only one; read the contract and the history before reading the org chart.
  5. Reading the model as a price forecast. Symptom: "under the property rights theory the supplier will raise prices 20% next year." Fix: the model says who should own the asset so that the right investments get made. Bargaining over price is a different question, answered from each side's fallback today (the Library's negotiation entry).
Where the model breaks

The entry names its failures. An asset called specific when competitive suppliers exist has a small quasi-rent, and then nothing here applies. Integration assumed to end the problem moves the hold-up inside the firm and dulls the acquired side's incentive, the cost Grossman and Hart weigh against the gain. The theory read as a prediction that firms integrate whenever quasi-rents are high runs into the evidence: Whinston (2003) showed that the transaction cost and property rights versions predict different things, so evidence for the one is not evidence for the other, and Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) found many firm boundaries set by other things entirely, such as relational contracts that last because both sides value the relationship. And the model says who should own, not what either side will pay.

Two limits belong beside them. The lesson's numbers assume both sides know the values and costs and bargain to the obvious split; real bargains happen under doubt about what the other side can do, and talks sometimes fail. And the two-investment example made each investment all or nothing; with many investments on each side, the best owner depends on how much each responds to its share, which is the question the entry sends the analyst to answer. This lesson describes a way of thinking about ownership, not advice about any investment.

Check yourself

1. A retailer buys all its delivery from one logistics company and has done so for ten years. A board member says the retailer is "held up" and should buy the logistics company. What two questions does the model ask first?

Answer: first, what specific investment is at stake, and what it would be worth with another logistics provider (Step 4). If the retailer could switch with modest cost and lose little, the quasi-rent is small and dependence alone proves nothing. Second, whose investment would go unmade, and whose would be lost after the purchase (Step 5): if the logistics company's own specific investments (routes, depots, software built for this retailer) matter more, buying it could make things worse, because its managers would no longer keep the gain from them.

2. In the entry's example, suppose the supplier's tuning were worth $500 million instead of $150 million, still at a cost of $100 million. Who should own the chip design now?

Answer: compare the cases of Step 5. If the developer owns, it rewrites (net 100), and the supplier keeps half of 500, which is 250, against a cost of 100, so it tunes as well: net 100 + 400 = 500. If the supplier owns, it tunes (net 400) and the developer keeps 200 against 300 and does not rewrite: net 400. The developer should still own, but for a new reason: the supplier's investment is now so valuable that even half of it covers the cost, so it gets made without ownership, and ownership is best spent protecting the investment that would not.

3. The rewrite would keep 30% of its value on another supplier's chips. With equal bargaining power, does the developer invest? If not, what bargaining weight would it need, and how much more fallback would a long contract have to supply instead?

Answer: the fallback is 0.3 x 400 = $120 million, and the developer keeps 120 + ((400 - 120) / 2) = $260 million, below the $300 million cost: no. It needs 120 + (beta x 280) > 300, so beta > 180 / 280, about 0.643; at 0.6 it would keep $288 million and still not invest. Instead, from Step 4, it needs a fallback above $200 million, so a contract would have to protect another 200 - 120 = $80 million of value in present terms.

Teach me more
  • Class Notes: Theories of the Firm, Kevin Bryan, University of Toronto, Rotman School (16 pages). The best free worked example of the property rights result in dollars, a widget maker and a sprocket maker who each could invest $5, adapted from Aghion and Holden: under a 50-50 split neither invests, and the owner should be the one whose investment adds more. It covers Coase and Williamson first. The Nash split appears only in a footnote, which is what Steps 2 and 3 above spell out.
  • Incomplete Contracts and Control, Oliver Hart, Nobel lecture, 8 December 2016, as printed in the Nobel Foundation's yearbook, The Nobel Prizes (27 pages). The power plant and the coal mine of the worked example in Hart's own words, on printed pages 373 to 375, with why ownership is the right to decide what the contract left out and what the mine's manager loses when the plant buys the mine. Light on mathematics. The lecture page at nobelprize.org has the video and slides.
  • Control Rights, Robert Gibbons, MIT OpenCourseWare 15.963 Advanced Strategy, lecture note 3, spring 2008 (12 pages). A management school's account of why owning an asset matters, by one of the authors of the relational contracts paper cited in mistake 4. Its model of a can plant and two soft drink makers writes the bargained price as the fallback plus half of the rest, the formula of Step 2 in symbols, and adds a point this lesson leaves out: effort spent only on raising one's own fallback can be pure waste. It tells the General Motors and Fisher Body story as Klein, Crawford and Alchian told it, so read that part with the dispute above in mind.
  • Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, Oliver E. Williamson, Nobel lecture, 8 December 2009 (22 pages). The older half of the story: asset specificity, the hazard of hold-up, and governance chosen to match the transaction, from the economist who built it.

The papers behind the Library entry are Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937); Klein, Crawford and Alchian, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (1978); Grossman and Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership" (1986); and Hart and Moore, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm" (1990). The coal evidence is Joskow, "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets", American Economic Review 77(1), 1987, pp. 168 to 185.

The hubris hypothesis (Roll; Malmendier and Tate)

Hubris in acquisitions: the bidder who took the seat of honor

We judge an acquisition by the price paid against the gains the market can see, and by what the market says on the day it is announced. Richard Roll (1986) proposed that many takeovers are made by bidders who trust their own valuation over the market's: if there are no gains at all, the bidder's loss is the target's premium, and the bidder who wins is the one who most overrated the prize. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008) found chief executives they classified as overconfident 65 percent more likely to make acquisitions, with announcement returns of minus 90 basis points against minus 12 for the others. We infer from the announcement the synergies the market prices, set them against the premium, and ask whether this bidder listens to the reaction or is the guest who will be asked to make room.

Born to answer
Roll, 1986: bidders who trust their own valuation over the market's.
What it does now
Whether a premium is paid for gains the market can see, and whether the bidder listens.
The mathematics
S = bidder's move + target's move; overpayment = P - S
The full entry
Where it began

The Greeks called it hubris, the pride that takes what belongs to others or to the gods, and expected nemesis to follow. Richard Roll borrowed the word in 1986 for bidders who act on valuations above the market's that are really errors, and argued that the evidence on takeovers fits hubris as well as it fits taxes, synergy or poor target management. Mathew Hayward and Donald Hambrick (1997) found premiums in 106 large acquisitions rising with the acquirer's recent performance, the press's praise of its chief executive and the chief executive's self-importance, and shareholders' losses rising with them. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate measured overconfidence by chief executives' own portfolios and found it in investment (2005) and in acquisitions and the market's reaction to them (2008), and in Superstar CEOs (2009) found award-winning chief executives underperforming after their awards. Matthew Billett and Yiming Qian (2008) found chief executives' first deals greeted neutrally and their later deals badly, the pattern of self-attribution: success credited to skill, and the next price raised.

Why it works now

Deal terms, premiums, financing, both sides' share prices around an announcement, and chief executives' holdings and awards are now recorded for every deal between publicly traded companies, so the synergies a market prices, the premium they would justify and a chief executive's record of deals can be computed outside the conversation within an hour of an announcement. How the price was set inside the bidder is still known best to those who were in the room.

When it applies

A company announces or is weighing a large acquisition at a large premium, especially one paid with cash it has at hand, by a chief executive with a long record of deals, recent acclaim or a board that does not check the chief executive; an acquirer's shares fall on the announcement and management says the market does not understand; a bidding contest in which the winner's premium rises with each round; an investor deciding whether a serial acquirer's next deal will repeat its last. Not to be confused with winners-curse, which corrects a bid for what winning a common-value auction reveals; sunk-cost-and-escalation, which reads spending to justify past spending; planning-fallacy, which sets a plan against the record of similar plans; or countersignaling, which reads the bidder who holds back: this asks whether the premium is paid for gains that exist, and whether the bidder will hear the market's answer.

What we would ask

What synergies does the market price on the announcement, from the moves in the bidder's and the target's shares, against the premium paid?
Has the chief executive's record of deals, recent acclaim or a weak board shaped the price, and has the company ever walked away from a deal after a bad reaction?

What it needs

The premium and the form of payment; the bidder's and the target's share prices before and after the announcement, with the market's move; the chance the deal closes; management's synergy estimate, with its timing and its cost; the chief executive's record of acquisitions and their returns, recent awards and press, and personal holdings; the board's composition; and the record of deals the company abandoned.

How we would get it

The Desk computes both sides' abnormal returns around the announcement, the synergies they imply, the share of the premium the synergies cover and the premium they would justify, and sets the chief executive's record of deals beside them. What the record cannot show is how the price was set inside the company; former corporate development officers, the bankers who advised on the deal or lost it, and directors who have sat on acquirers' boards know that.

Where it breaks

Hubris inferred from personality, confidence or a chief executive's manner: the entry judges the price paid and the market's reaction, never character; the announcement return read as the final word, when it mixes the deal's value with news about the bidder itself (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, model acquisitions driven by the market's misvaluation of the acquirer's own shares) and with the chance the deal closes; the average deal read as a bad one, when the combined announcement return of merging firms was positive from 1973 to 1998 (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001) and the losses of 1998 to 2001 came mostly from a few large deals by very highly valued firms (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005); and the market's reaction ignored by the analyst as well as the bidder, when acquirers that listen cancel more of the deals the market dislikes (Luo, 2005; Kau, Linck and Rubin, 2008).

For example

A company worth $50,000 million pays a 40 percent premium, $4,000 million, in cash for a target worth $10,000 million. On the announcement its shares fall 5 percent, $2,500 million. If the deal is sure to close, the bidder's change is the synergies less the premium, so the market prices the synergies at $4,000 million less $2,500 million, $1,500 million: they cover 37.5 percent of the premium and would justify a premium of 15 percent. On the market's reading, $2,500 million of the premium is a transfer to the target's shareholders that the bidder will not earn back. In Roll's limit, with no synergies at all, the bidder would lose the whole premium, 8 percent of its value. Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) used the same logic on the 1994 contest for Paramount and estimated that Viacom overpaid by more than $2 billion. The research question is whether management's synergy case can close the gap between $1,500 million and $4,000 million, and whether this bidder, told to make room, would listen.

The mathematics in fullWith a premium P and synergies S, a cash deal certain to close moves the bidder by S - P and the target by P, so the combined change is S: the market's estimate of the synergies is the sum of the two dollar moves, and the overpayment is P - S (the combined gain is how Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988, measured synergies). With a chance c of closing, the observed moves are scaled by c, and the estimate must be divided by it. Roll (1986): if S = 0, the bidder loses P and the target gains P, so in a world of pure hubris the combined return is zero and the bidder's loss mirrors the target's gain. The winner's curse adds selection: among n bidders with unbiased but noisy estimates, the highest is biased upward, and the bias grows with n. Malmendier and Tate (2008): chief executives classified as overconfident by their own portfolios are 65 percent more likely to acquire, most in diversifying deals funded internally, and the market's reaction to their deals is worse. Hayward and Hambrick (1997): premiums rise with recent performance, press praise and a weak board, and so do the acquirer's losses. Where it comes from

Roll (1986), The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, Journal of Business; Malmendier and Tate (2005), CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, Journal of Finance; (2008), Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction, Journal of Financial Economics; (2009), Superstar CEOs, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Administrative Science Quarterly; Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003), Financial Management; Billett and Qian (2008); Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert and Roll (2016); Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013); The market's verdict and whether bidders hear it: Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001); Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005); Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007); Luo (2005); Kau, Linck and Rubin (2008); Shleifer and Vishny (2003); The worked figures are Vista's illustration

Sources

Roll (1986). The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business 59(2), 197. https://doi.org/10.1086/296325
Malmendier, Tate (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89(1), 20-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002
Malmendier, Tate (2005). CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. The Journal of Finance 60(6), 2661-2700. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x
Malmendier, Tate (2009). Superstar CEOs . Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4), 1593-1638. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1593
Hayward, Hambrick (1997). Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1), 103. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393810
Hietala, Kaplan, Robinson (2003). What Is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies. Financial Management 32(3), 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/3666381
Billett, Qian (2008). Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers. Management Science 54(6), 1037-1051. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0830
Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, Roll (2016). CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51(1), 113-137. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109016000065
Ben-David, Graham, Harvey (2013). Managerial Miscalibration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1547-1584. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt023
Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford (2001). New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2), 103-120. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.2.103
Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz (2005). Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. The Journal of Finance 60(2), 757-782. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00745.x
Masulis, Wang, Xie (2007). Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns. The Journal of Finance 62(4), 1851-1889. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x
Luo (2005). Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1951-1982. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00784.x
Kau, Linck, Rubin (2008). Do managers listen to the market? Journal of Corporate Finance 14(4), 347-362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.002
Shleifer, Vishny (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70(3), 295-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00211-3

Markets, pricing, and choice

What people will choose, what they will pay, and how a market is really shaped.

Discrete choice and conjoint analysis

Do not ask what they would pay

Asking people what they would pay is close to worthless. We make them choose between realistic alternatives and read what they give up, which is where the willingness to pay actually shows.

Born to answer
McFadden's BART forecast; Green and Srinivasan, 1978.
What it does now
Reading willingness to pay from trade-offs instead of asking.
The mathematics
P(j) = exp(V(j)) / sum over k of exp(V(k))
The full entry
Where it began

Daniel McFadden built discrete choice modeling in the early 1970s and used it to forecast ridership on the Bay Area Rapid Transit system before it opened, from how people chose among the alternatives they already had; the forecast held up. Green and Srinivasan's 1978 review brought the same logic to consumer research as conjoint analysis: present realistic bundles, record the choices, and recover what each attribute is worth.

Why it works now

A proper choice study needed a specialist to design and estimate it and a panel to field it, so it was reserved for consumer products with large budgets. The design is now the cheap part: Advisors and customers define the real alternatives and attributes in the interviews, and the Desk can explain the move in one sentence. Vista designs the study and brings in a specialist to field and estimate it. It does not run a survey business, and it says so.

When it applies

A pricing, packaging, or product decision rests on a survey of stated intentions, on management's belief about value, or on a handful of customer conversations that asked the direct question.

What we would ask

Who exactly is the buyer, and what are the real alternatives in front of them, including doing nothing?
Which two or three attributes do they actually trade off against price?

What it needs

A defined buyer population, a realistic set of alternatives and attributes, and enough respondents from the actual buyer population to estimate trade-offs.

How we would get it

Advisors and customers define the attributes and alternatives; a designed choice exercise among qualified buyers produces the trade-offs; Vista designs it and brokers the fielding rather than running a survey business.

Where it breaks

Stated choices differ from purchases; the sample is not the buyer; the price range shown anchors the answers; the attributes are the product team's, not the buyer's.

For example

A medical device company believes hospitals will pay a premium for a feature. Hospital purchasing leads, presented with realistic bundles, trade that feature away for service response time every time. The premium is in the wrong place.

The mathematics in fullP(choose j) = exp(V(j)) / sum over k of exp(V(k)), with V(j) = beta x attributes(j); willingness to pay for an attribute is the ratio -beta(attribute) / beta(price), estimated from choices rather than asked. Taught in

MMSS 386-2 (qualitative-choice models); MECN-446

Sources

Green, Srinivasan (1978). Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook. Journal of Consumer Research 5(2), 103-123. https://doi.org/10.1086/208721
Train (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press (book). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805271

Price elasticity of demand

How much volume does a price change buy or lose?

Pricing power is a number, the volume lost per point of price, and it is almost never known and almost always asked about directly, which does not work. We infer it from what happened when prices actually moved.

Born to answer
Marshall, 1890, and every intermediate microeconomics course since.
What it does now
Inferring elasticity from what happened when prices actually moved.
The mathematics
(P - MC) / P = -1 / e
In the inquiries: No. 10, The Lighter Ring
The full entry
Where it began

Alfred Marshall named elasticity in 1890, and every intermediate microeconomics course since, including MMSS Turbo Micro, has taught that a seller's power is the volume lost per point of price. The classic measurement failure is as old as the concept: asking customers what they would pay produces an answer, and the answer is wrong.

Why it works now

The elasticity at the current price is now inferable rather than asked: past price moves can be matched to customer-level volume responses in the client's own data, competitor responses can be read from the record, and category buyers can be asked what the next increase would trigger. The Desk asks what happened to volume the last two times prices moved, and who left. The engagement puts the largest customer's buyer on the record.

When it applies

A thesis rests on the company's ability to raise prices; a company is deciding on a price change; or a market's pricing discipline is being underwritten from the outside.

What we would ask

When did prices last move, and what happened to volume, customer by customer if possible?
Who left, and where did they go?

What it needs

Past price changes with volume responses, ideally at the customer level; competitor responses to those changes; the customers' alternatives.

How we would get it

Former pricing leaders and category buyers on real responses to past increases; the record of price moves and share shifts; a designed choice exercise where the history is silent.

Where it breaks

The elasticity is estimated from a survey; competitors respond and the estimate assumed they would not; the past increase coincided with something else.

For example

An investor underwrites a consumables business as having pricing power. The last two increases held volume, but the category buyer at the largest customer, interviewed, explains that the third will trigger a dual-sourcing program already approved. The power is real and it is nearly used up.

The mathematics in fullElasticity e = (dQ/Q) / (dP/P); a single profit-maximizing price satisfies (P - MC) / P = -1/e, so the whole question is e at the current price, which is inferred from natural experiments, discontinuities, or designed choices, never from asking. Taught in

MMSS 211-1; MECN-430; MECN-446

Sources

Frank, Robert H. Microeconomics and Behavior. McGraw-Hill. (book)
Besanko, David and Braeutigam, Ronald. Microeconomics, 5th ed. Wiley. (book)

Bundling and versioning

One price leaves money on the table

We work out which customers value what, and whether versions, bundles, or quantity terms would capture value a single price leaves behind, and whether the customers could undo it by trading among themselves.

Born to answer
Adams and Yellen, 1976: why a bundle beats two separate prices.
What it does now
Capturing the value that a single price leaves behind.
The mathematics
Bundle when component values are negatively correlated
The full entry
Where it began

Adams and Yellen's 1976 paper showed with a handful of customers and two goods why bundling raises profit when customers who value one good highly value the other little: the bundle captures value that two separate prices leave behind. Stigler had seen the same logic earlier in the block booking of films. Mussa and Rosen supplied the theory of versions.

Why it works now

The correlation of values across components, which decides whether a bundle works, was invisible because nobody could ask enough customers. It is now the object of a designed choice exercise among qualified buyers, informed by interviews that say which segments exist. The Desk asks who gets the most out of the product and how you would tell them apart at the point of sale. The engagement sizes the segments.

When it applies

A single price for a product whose customers value it very differently; a bundle whose logic nobody can state; or a competitor's tiering that is winning.

What we would ask

Which customers get the most out of this, and how would you tell them apart at the point of sale?
Could the customers who pay less resell to the ones who pay more?

What it needs

The distribution of value across customers and the correlation of values across components; the feasibility of keeping segments apart.

How we would get it

Customers and former sales leaders on value by segment; a choice exercise across candidate bundles among qualified buyers.

Where it breaks

Arbitrage; segments that cannot be identified at the point of sale; competitors who unbundle.

For example

A data vendor sells one enterprise license. Its customers split into a group that values the history and a group that values the feed, and the two groups' values run opposite. A bundle captures more than two separate prices would, and the research is the size of the two groups.

The mathematics in fullBundling profits when reservation values for the components are negatively correlated across customers; a menu of versions works when the low version is degraded just enough that the high-value customer will not take it. Taught in

MECN-446; MECN-430

Sources

Adams, Yellen (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(3), 475. https://doi.org/10.2307/1886045
Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6

Strategic substitutes and complements

What works for a monopolist backfires in an oligopoly

In a market with a few players, the success of any strategy depends on how the others respond. We map the industry's structure first and then ask which moves soften competition and which invite it.

Born to answer
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985.
What it does now
Whether aggression here invites retreat or matching.
The mathematics
The sign of the rival's best response decides the move
The full entry
Where it began

The theory of strategic interaction among a few firms runs from Cournot and Bertrand through the game-theoretic industrial organization of the 1980s; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer's 1985 taxonomy of strategic substitutes and complements is the working tool, and Fudenberg and Tirole gave the postures their nicknames. Kellogg's competitive strategy course teaches it through cases in which a move that would work for a monopolist backfires in an oligopoly.

Why it works now

Mapping an industry's structure and each player's incentives took a consulting engagement. The structure can now be assembled from filings and trade press quickly, and the incentives from former executives across the players, so that the history of moves and responses is on the table before the strategy is chosen. The Desk asks how many players actually set price here and what the last aggressive move provoked.

When it applies

A strategy (product proliferation, positioning, loyalty programs, capacity additions, a price cut) in a concentrated industry; or a thesis that reads margins without reading structure.

What we would ask

How many players actually set price here, and what does each one want?
What did the last aggressive move in this industry provoke?

What it needs

Industry structure, each player's cost position and incentives, and the history of moves and responses.

How we would get it

Former executives across the players; the record of past moves; the trade press and regulatory filings for structure.

Where it breaks

The industry is assumed to behave like its average firm; the response is assumed away; the structure is changing (entry, consolidation, substitutes).

For example

A company plans to fill every price point with a variant to crowd out a rival. In its three-player market the rival's former strategy head explains that the last such move triggered a capacity race that cut everyone's margin for four years.

The mathematics in fullWhether a move is strategic substitute or complement decides the response: aggression met by retreat in the first case and by matching in the second; the sign is a property of the industry, and it can be established from history before it is modeled. Taught in

MECN-441; MECS 449; MMSS 211-2

Sources

Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)
Bulow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy 93(3), 488-511. https://doi.org/10.1086/261312

Prospect theory in markets

Customers, and managers, are not the model

We look for the places where the people in the market do not behave as the textbook assumes: reference prices, loss aversion, sunk-cost pricing, anchors; and we check whether the client's own managers are doing it too.

Born to answer
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991: the Cornell coffee mugs.
What it does now
Why a price cut and a price rise do not mirror each other.
The mathematics
Value v(x) from a reference point, steeper in losses
The full entry
Where it began

Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler's 1991 review reported the coffee mug experiments at Cornell, where students given a mug demanded about twice as much to sell it as others would pay to buy it. Arkes and Blumer's 1985 theater experiment sold season tickets at different discounts and found that people who paid full price attended more, because the sunk cost felt like a reason. Al-Najjar, Baliga, and Besanko showed in 2008 that managers who fold sunk costs into prices survive in markets that the textbook says should punish them.

Why it works now

Behavioral anomalies were explanations offered after the fact. They can now be turned into predictions and tested: customers can be asked what number they compare a price to, responses to increases and decreases can be measured separately in the data, and former pricing managers can say how prices were really set. The Desk asks whether the reaction to a cut and to a raise was symmetric, and where the reference price came from.

When it applies

Pricing that customers react to asymmetrically; managers who price off fully loaded cost including sunk investment; a market where the standard model keeps being wrong in the same direction.

What we would ask

When you raised the price and when you cut it, was the reaction symmetric?
What number are your customers comparing your price to, and where did that number come from?

What it needs

Customer responses to increases and decreases separately; the reference points in the buyers' heads; the cost allocation the managers price from.

How we would get it

Customers and category buyers on reference prices and reactions; former pricing managers on how prices were actually set.

Where it breaks

Every anomaly is called behavioral after the fact; the bias story is never turned into a testable prediction.

For example

A subscription business finds cuts win few customers and increases lose many. The asymmetry is loss aversion around the reference price, and the research is what that reference price is and whether it can be moved before the next increase.

The mathematics in fullValue is v(x) relative to a reference point, steeper for losses than gains; managers who allocate sunk cost into price behave as if the reference were fully loaded cost, and a market of such managers prices differently from the textbook one. Taught in

MECN-943; MECNX-435

Sources

Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Al-Najjar, Baliga, Besanko (2008). Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing. The RAND Journal of Economics 39(1), 214-237. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00011.x
Arkes, Blumer (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1), 124-140. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4

The Bass diffusion model

Exponential for a while, then not

Adoption follows an S-curve driven by early adopters and then by imitation, and the two things that matter, the ceiling and the timing of the inflection, are invisible in the early data that looks exponential. We find them from comparable adoptions.

Born to answer
Bass, 1969, fitting the adoption of color television.
What it does now
Finding the ceiling and the inflection the early data cannot show.
The mathematics
Adopters = (p + q F) x (M - cumulative)
The full entry
Where it began

Frank Bass's 1969 model fitted the adoption of color televisions, refrigerators, room air conditioners, and other durables with two parameters, innovation and imitation, and a ceiling, and predicted the timing of the color television peak. It became the standard forecasting model for new products, and its lesson has not changed: the early data look exponential and are not.

Why it works now

The ceiling and the inflection, which the early data cannot identify, used to be assumed. Both can now be researched: comparable adoption curves can be retrieved from the record with their inflection points, and the people who have not adopted can be interviewed about why. The Desk asks what the ceiling is and how you know, and which past adoption this most resembles. The engagement finds the non-adopters.

When it applies

A growth thesis extrapolated from early adoption; a market whose size is inferred from its growth rate; a product whose adoption has stalled unexpectedly.

What we would ask

What is the ceiling, and how do you know? Who will never adopt this, and why?
Which past adoption does this most resemble, and where was its inflection?

What it needs

The addressable ceiling from evidence; the imitation dynamics of this category; comparable adoption curves with their inflection points.

How we would get it

Operators who lived through the comparable adoptions; customers who have not adopted on why; the record of comparable curves.

Where it breaks

The S-curve is fitted to its own first third; the ceiling is assumed; the growth is subsidy-driven and mistaken for organic imitation.

For example

A venture thesis extrapolates two years of triple-digit growth. The comparable category inflected at eleven percent penetration, and the non-adopters, interviewed, have a reason that the product does not address. The ceiling, not the growth rate, is the thesis.

The mathematics in fullAdoptions at t = (p + q x F(t)) x (M - cumulative adopters): innovation rate p, imitation rate q, ceiling M; early data identifies p and q poorly and M not at all, so M comes from research, not from the curve. Taught in

MECN-451; MMSS 1995 (exponential growth and decline)

Sources

Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215

Pareto and power laws

Is this market a few customers wearing a crowd?

We ask whether the market is driven by a small tail, because when it is, the average customer is nearly meaningless and the thesis lives or dies on a handful of names.

Born to answer
Pareto in the 1890s on income; Gabaix on city sizes, 1999.
What it does now
Whether a market is its average customer or a handful of names.
The mathematics
P(X > x) = (x_min / x)^alpha
The full entry
Where it began

Vilfredo Pareto found in the 1890s that income follows a distribution in which a small fraction of people hold most of the wealth, and the same shape turned up in city sizes, which Xavier Gabaix explained in 1999. Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman's 2009 paper tested twenty-four datasets and found that many claimed power laws were not, which is the caution the Library carries.

Why it works now

Concentration was a line in the risk factors. It can now be measured from the client's data and the record, customer by customer and partner by partner, and the largest accounts themselves can be interviewed. The Desk asks what share of revenue, profit, or leads the top five percent produce, and what is left if two of them leave. When the answer is most of it, the thesis is those names, and the engagement goes to them.

When it applies

A total addressable market computed as customers times average spend; a customer base described by its average; a channel where three partners produce most of the leads.

What we would ask

What share of revenue, profit, or leads comes from the top five percent?
If two of those left, what is left?

What it needs

The concentration of value across customers, products, channels, and geographies, from the data rather than from the deck.

How we would get it

The record for concentration; interviews with the operators who know which accounts actually carry the business; the largest customers themselves where reachable.

Where it breaks

A lognormal is mistaken for a power law; the tail is extrapolated from a handful of observations; the concentration is treated as a risk factor rather than as the thesis.

For example

A marketplace thesis rests on average take rate across thousands of sellers. Twelve sellers produce most of the volume and are negotiating fees as a group. The market is those twelve, and the interviews go to them.

The mathematics in fullP(X > x) = (x_min / x)^alpha; below alpha of two the variance is infinite and sample averages never settle, so any thesis stated in averages is a thesis about a number that does not exist. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (rank-size and Pareto laws); MECN-451

Sources

Gabaix (1999). Zipf's Law for Cities: An Explanation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 739-767. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556133
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. https://doi.org/10.1137/070710111

Mixture and latent class models

The healthy average hides the cohort that is leaving

We test whether one customer base is really several, because a stable average can conceal a segment that is deteriorating fast, and the segment is where the thesis is decided.

Born to answer
Pearson, 1894, fitting Naples crabs as two populations.
What it does now
The cohort deteriorating underneath a flat average.
The mathematics
p(x) = sum of pi(k) f(x | theta(k))
The full entry
Where it began

Karl Pearson fitted the first mixture model in 1894 to measurements of crabs from Naples, suspecting one population was really two, and it was. Dempster, Laird, and Rubin's 1977 expectation-maximization algorithm made estimating hidden classes routine: guess the classes, assign the units, re-estimate, repeat.

Why it works now

Segments used to be named by the marketing department and confirmed by nobody. Customer-level data can now be split by cohort, channel, and usage in minutes, and the candidate segments proposed by the people who know the customers can be tested against it. The Desk asks whether any group looks different when the base is split by how, when, and through whom customers bought. The engagement finds the cohort that is leaving under a flat average.

When it applies

Aggregate retention or satisfaction that looks fine while something feels wrong; a customer base described as one thing; a new cohort behaving differently from the old ones.

What we would ask

If you split customers by how they bought, when they bought, and what they use, does any group look different?
Which group is growing?

What it needs

Customer-level data that can be split by cohort, channel, and usage; qualitative segments proposed by the people who know the customers.

How we would get it

Advisors and customers propose the candidate segments; the data says whether the segments are real; the report says which segment carries the risk.

Where it breaks

Segments named by the analyst before the data confirmed them; a mixture fitted to noise; the number of segments chosen for the story.

For example

A company reports flat net retention. Split by cohort, customers acquired through a partner channel in the last two years churn at three times the rate of the rest and are now a third of the base. The average is flat because the old cohort is still there.

The mathematics in fullp(x) = sum over classes k of pi(k) x f(x | theta(k)); the classes and their shares are estimated from the data, and a segmentation that changes with the number of classes assumed is a story, not a finding. Taught in

MMSS 386-2; DECS-431

Sources

Dempster, Laird, Rubin (1977). Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete Data Via the <i>EM</i> Algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 39(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1977.tb01600.x

Externalities and the Coase theorem

Who should own the spillover

When one party's activity imposes a cost or a benefit on another, the question is not who is at fault but who can fix it most cheaply and whether the two can bargain. We find out what the bargaining costs and who holds the right.

Born to answer
Coase, 1960: cattle straying into a neighbor's crops.
What it does now
Who should own a spillover, and whether the parties can bargain.
The mathematics
With low transaction costs the assignment does not change the outcome
The full entry
Where it began

Ronald Coase's 1960 paper used a rancher whose cattle stray onto a farmer's crops, and sparks from a railway that set fields alight, to make the point that when the parties can bargain cheaply, the efficient outcome is reached whichever of them holds the right; the assignment changes who pays, not what happens. When bargaining is costly, which is most of the time, the assignment decides the outcome.

Why it works now

The costs on each side of a spillover, and the cost of a deal among the parties, used to be assumed. They are now researchable: operators can say what abatement actually costs, former regulators can say how the right has been assigned and reassigned, and the record shows comparable bargains. The Desk asks who can fix the problem most cheaply and whether the two sides can actually bargain.

When it applies

Pollution, congestion, noise, data, shared platforms, or any business whose activity lands costs or benefits on parties outside the transaction; a regulation that assigns the right to one side.

What we would ask

Who can reduce the harm at the lowest cost, the one causing it or the one suffering it?
Can the two sides actually bargain, or are there too many of them?

What it needs

The cost of abatement on each side, the number of parties, and the transaction costs of a deal among them.

How we would get it

Operators on the real cost of abatement; former regulators on how the right has been assigned and re-assigned; the record on comparable bargains.

Where it breaks

Assuming the polluter should always pay when the sufferer could adapt more cheaply; assuming bargaining is possible among thousands.

For example

A logistics company's night deliveries impose noise on a neighborhood, and a proposed rule would ban them. The cheapest fix is quieter trucks, which the company would buy for less than the ban costs it, if the rule assigned the right and let the parties settle. The research is the cost on each side.

The mathematics in fullWith a clear assignment of the right and low transaction costs, the parties bargain to the efficient outcome whichever side holds the right; the distribution changes, the efficiency does not. With high transaction costs, the assignment decides the outcome. Taught in

MMSS 211-1; MECS 540-2

Sources

Coase (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44. https://doi.org/10.1086/466560

Hotelling's spatial competition

Why rivals end up next to each other

When customers pick the nearest option, competitors are pulled toward the middle of the market and end up nearly identical. We ask whether this market rewards moving to the center or being the one firm that does not.

Born to answer
Hotelling, 1929: two sellers on a beach converge on the middle.
What it does now
Whether to move toward the center of a market or away from it.
The mathematics
Location alone pulls together; price competition pushes apart
The full entry
Where it began

Harold Hotelling's 1929 paper put two sellers on a beach with customers spread along it, each customer walking to the nearer seller, and showed that both sellers end up side by side in the middle. Anthony Downs applied the same logic to political parties in 1957, which is why MMSS teaches it in the formal political models course as electoral competition. Add price competition and the sellers move apart, because being close invites undercutting.

Why it works now

Positioning has been decided from a two-by-two drawn in a workshop. The distribution of customer preferences along the dimension that matters can now be measured from choices and from interviews, and former strategy leaders can say what past moves toward or away from the center actually did. The Desk asks whether customers choose the closest option or have strong preferences for the extremes.

When it applies

A positioning decision: where to put a product, a store, a price point, or a platform relative to rivals; a market where all the competitors look the same; a political or standards contest.

What we would ask

Do customers choose the closest option to what they want, or do they have strong preferences for the extremes?
If you moved toward your rival, would you take their customers or start a price war?

What it needs

The distribution of customer preferences along the dimension that matters, and whether firms compete on position, price, or both.

How we would get it

Customers on how they actually choose; former strategy leaders on past positioning moves and their consequences.

Where it breaks

Assuming the center is always best; with price competition, firms often do better apart than together.

For example

Two regional grocers have converged on the same format in the same suburbs, and margins have compressed. The model says that is exactly what competing on location alone produces. The research question is whether a differentiated position exists that customers would pay for.

The mathematics in fullWith customers spread along a line and each choosing the nearest seller, two sellers choosing location alone converge on the center; add price competition and they separate, because proximity invites undercutting. Taught in

MMSS 211-3; MECN-441

Sources

Hotelling (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214
Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65(2), 135-150. https://doi.org/10.1086/257897

Clustering and multidimensional scaling

Which markets behave alike

Before a thesis assumes what worked in one market transfers to another, we measure which markets, customers, or products actually behave alike, on the dimensions that matter, rather than on the map.

Born to answer
The MMSS network curriculum: which units resemble which.
What it does now
Which of twenty new markets actually resemble the three that worked.
The mathematics
Merge nearest pairs by distance on the chosen dimensions
The full entry
Where it began

Hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling were taught in the 1995 MMSS network unit as ways to find which units in a population resemble each other and to draw the resemblance on a page. Hotelling's 1933 principal components is the older cousin: reduce many measurements to the few directions that carry the variation.

Why it works now

Rollout decisions have grouped markets by geography because geography was the available dimension. The dimensions that actually drive behavior, density, competitive intensity, labor cost, channel mix, can now be assembled for every candidate market and the grouping done on those. The Desk asks on which dimensions these markets resemble each other and whether those are the dimensions that drove the result.

When it applies

An expansion from one market to the next; a portfolio of products or regions treated as one; a claim that a result in one segment generalizes.

What we would ask

On which dimensions do these markets resemble each other, and are those the dimensions that drove the result?
Which pair that looks alike on the map behaves most differently in the data?

What it needs

Data on the units across the dimensions that matter, and a defined notion of similarity.

How we would get it

Operators on which dimensions actually drive behavior; the data grouped on those dimensions rather than on geography.

Where it breaks

Grouping on what is easy to measure; letting the clustering method decide the number of groups.

For example

A retailer plans to roll out a format that worked in three cities to twenty. Grouped by customer density, competitive intensity, and labor cost rather than by region, only six of the twenty resemble the three, and the rollout plan is a different plan.

The mathematics in fullDefine a distance between units on the chosen dimensions; hierarchical clustering merges the nearest pairs step by step, and multidimensional scaling lays the units out so that distances on the page approximate the distances in the data. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling)

Sources

Hotelling (1933). Analysis of a complex of statistical variables into principal components. Journal of Educational Psychology 24(6), 417-441. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0071325
Dempster, Laird, Rubin (1977). Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete Data Via the <i>EM</i> Algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 39(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1977.tb01600.x

Two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole; Armstrong)

Two-sided platforms: whom to charge and whom to subsidize

We treat a platform's two prices as one decision. Rochet and Tirole showed that a market is two-sided when the split of the total price between the two sides changes the volume of business, not only its level: buyers join for the sellers and sellers for the buyers, so the platform charges the side whose members bring the other side less, and often pays the side whose members bring more. We measure how much each side's participation is worth to the other, how each side responds to its own price and whether members join one platform or several, then test the platform's actual prices against what those figures imply and ask which side a rival could take away.

Born to answer
Payment cards and the interchange fee, 2002; the general model, 2003.
What it does now
Which side of a platform to charge, and which to subsidize.
The mathematics
p_B / eta_B = p_S / eta_S = p - c; p_i = f_i - alpha_j n_j + markup
The full entry
Where it began

William Baxter asked in 1983 why banks in a card network pay each other an interchange fee, and saw that a card has two customers, the cardholder and the merchant, who must both be brought on board. Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole built the theory from that case: payment card associations in 2002, then in 2003 a general model of platforms competing for two sides, with the result that each side's price is set by the elasticities together and that the platform's business model is the split. Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien (2003) gave the chicken and egg problem its formal statement, Mark Armstrong (2006) the membership version with its competitive bottlenecks, Geoffrey Parker and Marshall Van Alstyne (2005) the explanation of free products, and Rochet and Tirole (2006) the definition that a market is two-sided only when the structure of prices, not merely their level, moves volume. Tirole received the 2014 Nobel Prize in economics for his analysis of market power and regulation.

Why it works now

Fee schedules, participation on each side and the response to past price changes are public for most large platforms, and the cross-side values and the profit-maximizing split can be estimated and computed outside the conversation. How much each side values the other at the margin, and which side a rival could peel away, is still known best to the people who ran the platform's pricing experiments and to its largest participants.

When it applies

A marketplace, app store, payment network, exchange, advertising-funded medium, operating system, dating or labor platform, or any business that sells to two groups whose value depends on each other's presence; a thesis that one side's low or zero price is a loss; a question whether a platform can raise one side's price; a regulatory question about a platform's fees. Not to be confused with tipping-and-lock-in, which asks whether adoption passes a threshold and whether it can be reversed; segmentation-and-bundling, which prices one good to different customers; or matching-markets, which asks how a platform's matching rule favors one side: this asks how the total price should be divided between two sides that need each other.

What we would ask

How much more would a seller pay to be on this platform for every additional thousand buyers, and how much would a buyer pay for every additional hundred sellers?
Do the members of each side use one platform or several, and which side could a rival take away by subsidizing it?

What it needs

Each side's participation and how it has responded to past price changes on that side (own-price elasticity), the value one side's members place on the other side's numbers (from willingness to pay, retention when the other side grows, or past subsidies), the cost of serving a member or a transaction on each side, whether members use one platform or several, and the platform's actual fees on each side.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles each side's fees, participation and response to past price changes from filings, fee schedules and public data, estimates the cross-side values, computes the profit-maximizing split and sets it beside the platform's actual prices. What the data cannot show is how much each side values the other at the margin and what would make it switch; former pricing managers at platforms and the largest participants on each side know that.

Where it breaks

A business with one kind of customer called a platform because it uses software (a subscription product whose users gain nothing from each other's presence is one-sided); a two-sided business read as one-sided, so a zero price is read as a loss leader; the externality assumed when it is small, which the response to past price changes would show; multi-homing ignored, which turns the subsidized side into the one that can be charged (Armstrong's competitive bottleneck); and the per-transaction formula applied where fees are for membership, or the reverse, since the two give different prices (Rochet and Tirole 2006).

For example

A marketplace can sign up as many as 1 million buyers and 1 million sellers. A buyer's value of joining is a standalone amount spread evenly from $0 to $12 a month plus $1.20 for every million sellers on the platform; a seller's is spread the same way plus $8.40 for every million buyers. The fees that maximize profit are $3 a month to buyers and $9 to sellers: in Armstrong's terms each fee is the ordinary markup of $10 less the value a member brings the other side, $7 for a buyer and $1 for a seller. Each side signs up 833,333 members and the platform earns $10 million a month. The best single fee charged to both sides would be $6; it would sign up 591,000 buyers and 914,000 sellers and earn $9.03 million, 9.7 percent less, with the side that brings the most value thinned the most.

The mathematics in fullRochet and Tirole (2003): with a per-transaction price p_B to buyers and p_S to sellers, volume D_B(p_B) x D_S(p_S) and a cost c per transaction, the platform's prices satisfy p_B / eta_B = p_S / eta_S = p - c, where p = p_B + p_S and eta_i is side i's demand elasticity at its price, and (p - c) / p = 1 / (eta_B + eta_S): the division of the total price is set by the two elasticities, not by the cost of serving each side. Armstrong (2006), for membership fees: with n_j members on the other side, each worth alpha_j to a member of side i, side i's fee is p_i = f_i - alpha_j n_j + phi_i / phi_i', the cost of serving the member, less the value the member brings the other side, plus the ordinary monopoly markup, so the side that brings more is charged less and may be paid. A market is two-sided when the split of p between the sides moves volume (Rochet and Tirole 2006). Where it comes from

Rochet and Tirole (2003), Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of the European Economic Association: the model and the price structure; Rochet and Tirole (2006), Two-sided markets: a progress report, RAND Journal of Economics: the definition of two-sidedness; Armstrong (2006), Competition in two-sided markets, RAND Journal of Economics: membership fees and competitive bottlenecks; Rochet and Tirole (2002), Cooperation among Competitors, RAND Journal of Economics: payment cards and the interchange fee; Baxter (1983), Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper, Journal of Law and Economics, the first analysis; Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Chicken and Egg, RAND Journal of Economics; Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Two-Sided Network Effects, Management Science; Weyl (2010), A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, American Economic Review; Rysman (2009), The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Tirole's Nobel lecture (2015), Market Failures and Public Policy, American Economic Review; Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers (2016)

Sources

Rochet, Tirole (2002). Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 549. https://doi.org/10.2307/3087474
Rochet, Tirole (2003). Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4), 990-1029. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493212
Rochet, Tirole (2006). Two-sided markets: a progress report. The RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 645-667. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x
Armstrong (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 668-691. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x
Caillaud, Jullien (2003). Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers. The RAND Journal of Economics 34(2), 309. https://doi.org/10.2307/1593720
Parker, Van Alstyne (2005). Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design. Management Science 51(10), 1494-1504. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0400
Weyl (2010). A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms. American Economic Review 100(4), 1642-1672. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1642
Rysman (2009). The Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(3), 125-143. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.3.125
Tirole (2015). Market Failures and Public Policy. American Economic Review 105(6), 1665-1682. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000024
Evans and Schmalensee (2016). Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms. Harvard Business Review Press. (book)
Tirole (2017). Economics for the Common Good, Translated by Steven Rendall. Princeton University Press. (book)

The permanent income random walk and the hand-to-mouth share (Friedman; Hall; Hall and Mishkin)

Spending moves only on news, and who gets the money decides how much is spent

We treat household spending as following expected lifetime resources, so that only news about those resources moves it, and then ask who receives a given check. Milton Friedman (1957) and the life-cycle theory say a household spends out of what it expects to have over a long horizon, so a one-time gift is spread over many years and a lasting change in income is spent at once. Robert Hall (1978) drew the testable consequence: if households look ahead, nothing known last period should help predict this period's change in spending, so changes in spending follow no pattern except what news brings, the same test the market applies to prices. Hall and Frederic Mishkin (1982) measured the exception in household data: the fit was good for about 80 percent of families and poor for the remaining 20 percent, whose spending tracked current income. So the share of a windfall that is spent depends on who receives it and whether it is seen as lasting; later work on tax rebates and stimulus payments found large first-quarter responses even in households with some wealth (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland, 2013; Boehm, Fize and Jaravel, 2025).

Born to answer
Friedman, 1957: spend out of permanent income; Hall, 1978: changes in spending are news; Hall and Mishkin, 1982: 80 and 20.
What it does now
How much of a check is spent, and by whom.
The mathematics
first-year spend = lambda G + (1 - lambda) G r / (1 + r)
The full entry
Where it began

Milton Friedman argued in A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957) that households spend out of permanent income, so a transitory change in income moves spending far less than a lasting one. Robert Hall, in 1978, drew a sharp test: if consumers look ahead rationally, consumption follows a random walk, and nothing known last period helps predict this period's change. He found income had no predictive power and stock prices did. With Frederic Mishkin in 1982 he measured how well a panel of households fit the theory and found about 80 percent of families fit and 20 percent consume what they earn, so who receives a windfall matters. Later tests of tax refunds, rebates and stimulus payments found larger responses than the smoothing households alone would give. The Royal Swedish Academy named Hall's work among the foundations of the 2026 prize.

Why it works now

A test of whether spending follows news used to need a household panel and years. Rebates, payments and card spending now arrive dated and in near real time, and the interest rate, the size of the check and the form of payment can be set beside the responses measured in earlier episodes. Who actually received the money, and what they understood about it, is still known best to the people who lend to or sell to them.

When it applies

A tax cut, a rebate, a tariff refund, a change in a benefit or a pay raise whose effect on consumer spending and retail sales has to be sized; a change seen as temporary against one seen as lasting; a claim that something predictable is not yet in spending; a read of retail or consumer-credit companies after a transfer. Not to be confused with mental-accounting, which asks how people sort money into purposes and spend differently from each pot, or will-they-pay, which asks what a customer will pay for a product: this asks how much of a change in resources reaches spending, by whom, and when.

What we would ask

Is the change in resources seen as temporary or lasting, and by whom is it received: households that smooth spending, or households that spend what comes in?
What share of a windfall does the evidence for this group and this form of payment support, and over what months does the spending arrive?

What it needs

The size of the transfer or change; whether it is one-time or lasting and how it is announced; the split of recipients by liquid wealth and income; an interest rate for the smoothing households; the timing of receipt; and household spending data for the months after.

How we would get it

The Desk works the two limits, a household that smooths and a household that spends what comes in, mixes them by the recipients' split, and states the interest rate and the share it assumed. It sets the result beside measured responses to earlier rebates and payments. What the data cannot show is who among the recipients actually received the money, what they understood about it, and what they bought; people who run consumer lending, card portfolios or retail planning see that.

Where it breaks

Hall's result is about spending responding to news; it is never a claim that spending cannot be forecast at all, since news arrives in patterns, seasons repeat, and lagged information other than income and spending can matter (Hall found stock prices did predict spending). Later tests found spending responds to predictable income changes more than the theory allows (Flavin, 1981; Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Souleles, 1999; Parker, 1999), but also that spending is smoother than income for reasons the simple theory misses (Campbell and Deaton, 1989; Carroll, 1997). Measured responses differ widely by the form of payment and the households (Boehm, Fize and Jaravel, 2025), so one share is never right for every transfer. The 80 and 20 split is an estimate from one panel on food spending, not a constant. A transfer can also change prices, hours and taxes, none of which this entry sees. Neutral on whether any particular tax or transfer is wise.

For example

Give every household a one-time $1,000, and assume an interest rate of 4 percent for the households that smooth. A household that smooths spends the interest value of the gift, $1,000 x 0.04 / 1.04 = $38.46 a year; a household that spends what comes in spends all $1,000. If one household in five is of the second kind, first-year spending per $1,000 is 0.2 x $1,000 + 0.8 x $38.46 = $230.77, about $231, and $200 of it comes from the fifth that spends everything. The interest rate is an assumption and moves the figure little: at 2 percent the total is $215.69 and at 6 percent $245.28, because most of the response comes from the households that spend what comes in. A lasting $1,000 a year raise is the opposite case: smoothers also spend all of it each year, so the total is $1,000 in the first year. The test in numbers: news that lifetime resources are 1 percent higher moves spending from 100.00 to 101.00 at once, and the expected change after that is zero, so a raise announced months in advance should have moved spending when it was announced, not when it arrived. Measured responses to actual rebates were larger than the smoothing households alone would give: households spent 20 to 40 percent of the 2001 rebates on nondurable goods in the quarter received (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006), and 12 to 30 percent of the 2008 payments, 50 to 90 percent counting durables (Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland, 2013). These are Vista's illustrations with stated assumptions, not a forecast of any transfer.

The mathematics in fullPermanent income: c_t = (r / (1 + r)) (A_t + sum over s of E_t y_(t+s) / (1 + r)^s), so consumption follows the annuity value of wealth plus the expected present value of income. With a quadratic utility and a discount rate equal to the interest rate, marginal utility and so consumption follow c_(t+1) = c_t + e_(t+1) with E_t e_(t+1) = 0 (Hall, 1978): the change is the news, and no lagged variable predicts it. A one-time gift G received at time zero raises c by G r / (1 + r) a year for ever, here 1,000 x 0.04 / 1.04 = 38.46; a lasting rise of d in income raises c by d. With a share lambda of income going to households that consume current income (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Hall and Mishkin, 1982 estimated lambda near 0.2 on families), the first-year response to a one-time G is lambda G + (1 - lambda) G r / (1 + r) = 0.2 x 1,000 + 0.8 x 38.46 = 230.77. Where it comes from

Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957); Hall (1978); Hall and Mishkin (1982); Tests and extensions: Flavin (1981); Campbell and Deaton (1989); Campbell and Mankiw (1989); Zeldes (1989); Carroll (1997); Hall (1988); Evidence on payments: Parker (1999); Souleles (1999); Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006); Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland (2013); Boehm, Fize and Jaravel (2025); The worked figures, the interest rate and the share of households are Vista's illustration; the measured responses are those reported in the papers named

Sources

Hall (1978). Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy 86(6), 971-987. https://doi.org/10.1086/260724
Hall, Mishkin (1982). The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income: Estimates from Panel Data on Households. Econometrica 50(2), 461. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912638
Friedman (1957). A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton University Press for the NBER. (book)
Flavin (1981). The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income. Journal of Political Economy 89(5), 974-1009. https://doi.org/10.1086/261016
Campbell, Deaton (1989). Why is Consumption So Smooth? The Review of Economic Studies 56(3), 357. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297552
Campbell, Mankiw (1989). Consumption, Income, and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 4, 185-216. https://doi.org/10.1086/654107
Zeldes (1989). Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy 97(2), 305-346. https://doi.org/10.1086/261605
Carroll (1997). Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 1-55. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555109
Parker (1999). The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes. American Economic Review 89(4), 959-973. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.959
Souleles (1999). The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds. American Economic Review 89(4), 947-958. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.947
Johnson, Parker, Souleles (2006). Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001. American Economic Review 96(5), 1589-1610. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1589
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, McClelland (2013). Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008. American Economic Review 103(6), 2530-2553. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2530
Boehm, Fize, Jaravel (2025). Five Facts about MPCs: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. American Economic Review 115(1), 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240138
Hall (1988). Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption. Journal of Political Economy 96(2), 339-357. https://doi.org/10.1086/261539

Cause and effect

Whether X did cause Y, whether it would, and for whom.

Ordinary least squares

The transparent baseline any fancier model must beat

Before anything elaborate, we fit the simple, checkable relationship, and we insist that anything more complicated beat it; and we remember that what it shows is association, not cause.

Born to answer
Galton, 1886, and the transparent baseline ever since.
What it does now
The simple relationship any elaborate model has to beat.
The mathematics
beta = (X'X)^-1 X'Y
The full entry
Where it began

Francis Galton measured the heights of parents and their adult children in 1886 and found that the children of tall parents were tall, but less so, and the children of short parents short, but less so: regression toward mediocrity, from which the method took its name. Every econometrics course since, MMSS's included, has taught it as the transparent baseline and the place where causal claims quietly begin.

Why it works now

The baseline is faster to fit than it has ever been, which is not the change that matters. The change is that the omitted variables an industry insider would name in a sentence can now be asked for, in the interviews, before the regression is run, and that an elaborate model can be held to the discipline of beating the simple one. The Desk asks what else changed at the same time. That question is most of applied econometrics.

When it applies

A claim that some observable predicts an outcome (sales hiring predicts bookings, reviews predict churn, turnover predicts performance); or a complex model whose value over a simple one is unstated.

What we would ask

What is the simplest relationship in the data, and does the elaborate model actually do better than it?
What else changed at the same time that could explain the pattern?

What it needs

The data at the right grain; the variables that could drive both sides of the relationship.

How we would get it

The record and the client's own data; Advisors on which omitted variables matter in this industry.

Where it breaks

Omitted variables, reverse causation, selection into the sample, a specification chosen after seeing the results.

For example

A deck shows that customers who use a feature renew more. The feature's users are also the largest and longest-tenured customers, and once that is held constant the relationship disappears. The feature is a marker, not a cause.

The mathematics in fullY = X beta + e with beta-hat = (X'X)^-1 X'Y; each coefficient is an association holding the other regressors fixed, and an omitted driver of both X and Y appears as a coefficient on X. Taught in

MATH 386-1; DECS-431

Sources

Galton (1886). Regression Towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature. The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 15, 246. https://doi.org/10.2307/2841583
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Cengage. (book)

Potential outcomes

Compared to what?

Every causal claim is a comparison with a world that did not happen. We state that world explicitly, and then ask what could stand in for it: a control group, a comparison period, a threshold, a natural experiment. Before-and-after on its own settles nothing.

Born to answer
Rubin, 1974: one outcome you see, one you never will.
What it does now
Making every causal claim name the world that did not happen.
The mathematics
tau = Y(1) - Y(0), only one ever observed
The full entry
Where it began

Donald Rubin's 1974 paper wrote the causal question in its modern form: every unit has an outcome under the treatment and an outcome without it, only one of which can ever be observed, and every method is a way of estimating the other. The setting was educational programs, and the framework now underlies the entire MMSS econometrics sequence.

Why it works now

Management decks are full of causal claims supported by before-and-after charts, and readers have always lacked the time to ask what else happened. The comparison group is usually available in the record, the market, the closest competitor, the regions that did not get the change, and it can now be assembled quickly. The Desk asks what would have happened to the same business over the same period without the change. The brief grades the causal evidence honestly.

When it applies

A claim that something caused something (the new CEO caused growth, the price change caused churn, the redesign lifted conversion, advertising drove bookings) supported by a before-and-after chart.

What we would ask

What would have happened to the same business over the same period without the change?
Who did not get the change, and how did they do?

What it needs

A defensible stand-in for the counterfactual: units that did not receive the treatment, a period the treatment could not have affected, or a rule that assigned it.

How we would get it

The Research Director identifies the comparison group or the natural experiment in the record; Advisors say what else changed; the report grades the causal evidence honestly.

Where it breaks

The identifying assumption fails on the facts: the comparison group differs in the way that matters, the trends were not parallel, the instrument has a second channel.

For example

A management deck credits a new sales leader with a doubling of bookings. The market doubled in the same year and the closest competitor's bookings doubled too. The comparison group was available all along; it was just not in the deck.

The mathematics in fulltau(i) = Y(i, 1) - Y(i, 0), only one of which is observed; every method is a way to estimate the unobserved term, and the assumption that licenses it (parallel trends, exclusion, no manipulation at the cutoff) is a statement about the unobserved world that the data cannot test. Taught in

MATH 386-2; DECS-431

Sources

Rubin (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66(5), 688-701. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0037350

Learn the math
The question

A regional manager runs a new promotion in three of her six stores. A year later the three promoted stores grew their sales 12.3%, the other three grew 2%, and the deck says the promotion added ten points of growth. The board nods. It is a clean chart with a big gap.

Here is what the chart does not show. She picked the three stores she expected to grow fastest, because that is where she thought the promotion would do the most good. Those stores would have grown about 10% with no promotion at all. The promotion really added about two points to them. The other eight points were there before anyone printed a coupon.

Nobody in the room lied. The deck simply compared two things that cannot answer the question. The question was what the promotion did to the promoted stores. The answer needs a number nobody can ever see: how those same stores would have done, in the same year, without it. This lesson is about that missing number, why every causal claim is secretly a claim about it, and how good evidence stands in for it.

The idea in one paragraph

Every causal claim is a comparison with a world that did not happen. "The promotion lifted sales" means sales with the promotion were higher than sales would have been without it, for the same stores in the same year. One of those two numbers is in the books; the other never happened and never will. So no data set, however large, contains the effect directly. What we can do is find something that stands in for the missing world: stores that did not get the change, a period the change could not have touched, a rule that handed it out, or best of all a lottery. Each stand-in works only under an assumption about the world we cannot see. The work is to name that assumption out loud and ask whether the facts make it believable. A before-and-after chart with no stand-in names no assumption at all, which is why on its own it settles nothing.

The math, step by step

Step 1: two outcomes for every unit. Take any unit, a store, a person, a company, and call it i. Give it a yes-or-no treatment: D(i) = 1 if it gets the change, D(i) = 0 if not. Now imagine, before the change happens, two outcomes for that same unit:

Y(i, 1) = the outcome unit i would have with the change
Y(i, 0) = the outcome unit i would have without it

These are called potential outcomes. Both are well defined before anything happens; they are what the unit would do in each of the two worlds. The effect of the change on that unit is simply the difference:

tau(i) = Y(i, 1) - Y(i, 0)

That is the whole definition of a causal effect. It is about one unit, and it compares the unit with itself.

Step 2: we only ever see one of them. Once the change happens, unit i lives in one world, and we observe only that world's outcome. The outcome we see is

Y(i) = (D(i) x Y(i, 1)) + ((1 - D(i)) x Y(i, 0))

Read it with D(i) = 1: the second term vanishes and we see Y(i, 1). With D(i) = 0, the first term vanishes and we see Y(i, 0). The other potential outcome, the counterfactual, is gone for good. Paul Holland, in 1986, called this the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference: for no unit can we observe tau(i), because we can never observe both of its terms. Every causal method in statistics and economics is a way of estimating the missing term from other units, and every method needs an assumption to do it.

Step 3: averages, because single units are hopeless. Since tau(i) is never seen for anyone, we aim at averages. Three are worth naming, with E[ ] meaning "the average of":

ATE = E[ Y(1) - Y(0) ]                    the average effect over everyone
ATT = E[ Y(1) - Y(0) | D = 1 ]            the average effect on those who got the change
ATU = E[ Y(1) - Y(0) | D = 0 ]            the average effect on those who did not

The bar | reads "among". The ATT is usually what a deck claims ("the promotion lifted our promoted stores"), and the ATE is what you need to decide whether to roll the change out everywhere. They can differ, because people and businesses often choose a change precisely where they expect it to do the most, or the least.

Step 4: the naive comparison, taken apart. The obvious estimate is the gap between the average outcome of those who got the change and those who did not:

naive = E[ Y | D = 1 ] - E[ Y | D = 0 ]

By Step 2, the treated show us their Y(1) and the untreated show us their Y(0), so

naive = E[ Y(1) | D = 1 ] - E[ Y(0) | D = 0 ]

Now do the one trick this lesson rests on: subtract and add the same unseen quantity, E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ], the average outcome the treated would have had without the change. Subtracting and adding the same thing changes nothing:

naive = E[ Y(1) | D = 1 ] - E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ]  +  E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ] - E[ Y(0) | D = 0 ]

Group the first two terms and the last two:

naive = ATT + ( E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ] - E[ Y(0) | D = 0 ] )

= effect on the treated + selection bias

The second bracket is selection bias: how differently the two groups would have done if neither got the change. It is not a sampling accident and it does not shrink with more data. If the treated were headed somewhere different all along, the naive gap carries that difference, at full size, forever.

If what you want is the ATE rather than the ATT, there is one more piece. Let pi be the share of units treated. Everyone is either treated or not, so the ATE is the weighted average of the two groups' effects:

ATE = (pi x ATT) + ((1 - pi) x ATU)

Write pi x ATT as ATT - ((1 - pi) x ATT), which is the same thing, and collect the two terms that carry (1 - pi):

ATE = ATT - ((1 - pi) x (ATT - ATU))
ATT = ATE + ((1 - pi) x (ATT - ATU))

Put that in place of the ATT in the two-piece result:

naive = ATE + selection bias + ((1 - pi) x (ATT - ATU))

The last term is the gap between whom the change helps and whom it was given to. In words: the naive comparison equals the true average effect only if the groups would have done the same without the change and the change helps both groups equally. Neither is ever guaranteed by the data. Both are statements about outcomes nobody saw.

Step 5: the stores, with both columns visible. Go back to the six stores and play God for a moment: suppose we could see both potential outcomes, sales growth in percent.

store   Y(0)   Y(1)   tau

A 12 14 2 B 10 13 3 C 9 10 1 D 3 7 4 E 2 6 4 F 1 3 2

The true average effect over all six is (2 + 3 + 1 + 4 + 4 + 2) / 6 = 16 / 6, about 2.67 points. The manager promoted A, B and C. Their effect averages (2 + 3 + 1) / 3 = 2 points (the ATT); the effect on D, E and F would have averaged (4 + 4 + 2) / 3, about 3.33 (the ATU). The world shows us only the Y(1) column for A, B, C and the Y(0) column for D, E, F:

naive = ((14 + 13 + 10) / 3) - ((3 + 2 + 1) / 3) = 12.33 - 2 = 10.33

Ten points, against a true effect on the promoted stores of two. The missing column for A, B, C averages (12 + 10 + 9) / 3 = 10.33, so the selection bias is 10.33 - 2 = 8.33 points, and indeed 2 + 8.33 = 10.33. The three-piece version checks too: 2.67 + 8.33 + (0.5 x (2 - 3.33)) = 2.67 + 8.33 - 0.67 = 10.33. The naive figure is about five times the real effect on the promoted stores, and it is not even pointing at the stores the promotion helps most: it helps D, E and F more.

Step 6: why a lottery fixes it. Now suppose the manager had drawn three stores out of a hat. There are 6! / (3! x 3!) = 720 / (6 x 6) = 20 possible draws, all equally likely (6! is 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1). For each one we could compute the naive gap. The values run from minus 5 points (if the draw is D, E, F) to plus 10.33 (if it is A, B, C, her own pick), but their average over all twenty draws is exactly 2.67, the true average effect.

0123-6-30+3+6+9+12Naive difference (points of growth) for one drawDrawstrue average effect 2.67the manager's pick
A lottery is not right every time; it is right on average, and it knows how wrong it can be. Twenty possible draws, centered exactly on the true effect. Choosing on purpose picked one of the two draws furthest from it.

Here is why it must be so. Every store lands in the treated group in exactly 10 of the 20 draws and in the untreated group in the other 10. So averaged over draws, the treated group's mean of Y(1) is the mean of Y(1) over all six stores, and the untreated group's mean of Y(0) is the mean of Y(0) over all six. Their difference is the mean of Y(1) - Y(0): the ATE. Put in the language of Step 4, a lottery makes treatment independent of the potential outcomes, so E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ] = E[ Y(0) | D = 0 ]: the selection bias is zero on average, and so is the last term, because the treated are a fair sample of everyone.

A lottery is not right every time. Twelve of the twenty draws land within 3 points of the truth, and the typical miss (the standard deviation of the twenty values) is about 3.63 points. What the lottery buys is that its errors are pure luck, centered on the truth, with a size we can calculate. Jerzy Neyman worked out that size in 1923: for a difference in means under random assignment the variance is

(S1^2 / n1) + (S0^2 / n0) - (St^2 / N)

where S1^2 and S0^2 are the variances of Y(1) and Y(0) across all N units, St^2 is the variance of the unit effects (each variance is the sum of squared distances from the mean, divided by N - 1), and n1 and n0 are the group sizes. The square root of this variance is the typical miss. For the six stores it gives exactly the 3.63 we got by listing every draw. Repeat the six store types a hundred times each, 600 stores, and assign 300 by lottery: the typical miss falls to about 0.33 points, about eleven times smaller. The bias that choice creates does not shrink with size; the luck a lottery creates does. That is the whole case for randomization in two sentences.

Step 7: when there is no lottery. Most of the time nobody drew from a hat, and we need a stand-in for E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ] that comes with an assumption we can defend. The four common ones, each with the statement about the unseen world it rests on:

stand-in                        what must be true of the world we cannot see
a comparison group              without the change, the two groups would have

had the same average outcome (or the same trend)

an earlier period               nothing else that matters changed between the periods
a threshold rule                units just above and just below the cutoff would

have done the same; nobody sorted across the line

a natural experiment            the luck that assigned the change touches the

outcome only through the change

Every row is about Y(0) for the treated, which no data contain. Economists have names for these: the same trend is parallel trends, no sorting across the line is no manipulation at the cutoff, and the last row is the exclusion restriction. That is why the entry says these assumptions are statements the data cannot test. Data can make them more or less believable: if the groups matched before the change, a shared trend after it is more plausible; if units bunch just above a cutoff, someone sorted. But no test can prove them, and a careful brief says which one it leans on.

One more assumption hides under all of them. Writing Y(i, 1) and Y(i, 0) as properties of unit i alone assumes that unit's outcome does not depend on who else got the change, and that "the change" means one thing. Statisticians call it SUTVA, the stable unit treatment value assumption. A promotion that pulls customers from the unpromoted stores next door breaks it: the comparison stores' Y(0) is no longer the world without the promotion, it is a world with a promotion nearby.

A worked example

In the mid-1970s, a federally funded program called the National Supported Work Demonstration gave people with very poor job prospects 12 to 18 months of supervised work. For men the target was former drug addicts, former offenders and young people who had dropped out of high school; the men in this sample were mostly young, mostly without a diploma, and most of them earned nothing at all in 1975. The places were rationed by lottery: between March 1975 and June 1977, eligible applicants were randomly assigned either to the program or to a control group that was left on its own. Because of the lottery, the control group answers the question the deck in our opening never could: what would the participants have earned without the program?

Robert LaLonde used the experiment in 1986 for a different purpose. He kept the trainees, threw away the lottery losers, and replaced them with comparison groups built from two large national surveys, the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the way an analyst without an experiment would. Then he asked whether the usual econometric methods would recover the experiment's answer. Rajeev Dehejia and Sadek Wahba later published the subset of LaLonde's men with earnings for both 1974 and 1975, which is the version computed here from their public files: 185 trainees, 260 lottery losers, 2,490 men from the PSID and 15,992 from the CPS.

The experiment. Average earnings in 1978, after the program, were $6,349 for the trainees and $4,555 for the lottery losers:

effect on the trainees = 6,349.14 - 4,554.80 = $1,794.34

How far could the luck of the draw have moved that number? This is Step 6's question, and the answer is Step 6's formula. Its last term needs the spread of the unit effects, which nobody can see, so it is left out; that can only make the answer larger, the cautious direction. What remains is called the standard error. With standard deviations of $7,867 and $5,484 in the two groups,

sqrt((7,867.40^2 / 185) + (5,483.84^2 / 260)) = about $671

so the estimate is 1,794.34 / 671 = about 2.67 standard errors from zero, and the usual 95% interval, 1.96 standard errors either side, runs from about $479 to about $3,109. A real effect, imprecisely measured: about 39% on top of what the lottery losers earned.

The naive comparisons. Same trainees, but compare them with the survey men:

against the PSID: 6,349.14 - 21,553.92 = -$15,204.78
against the CPS:  6,349.14 - 14,846.66 = -$8,497.52

On these comparisons the program cut earnings by fifteen thousand or eighty-five hundred dollars a man.

$0$5,000$10,000$15,000$20,000$25,000Trainees (lottery winners)$6,349Lottery losers$4,555Survey group: CPS$14,847Survey group: PSID$21,554Average earnings in 1978
Same trainees, three comparisons. Against the men who lost the lottery, the program raised earnings by about $1,794. Against men from national surveys, who were never going to earn what the trainees earned, it seems to destroy them. The trainees did not change; the stand-in for their missing outcome did.

Taken apart with Step 4. The lottery losers give us what almost never exists: a credible measurement of E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ], what the trainees would have earned without the program, $4,555. So we can put a number on the selection bias of each survey comparison:

PSID: 4,554.80 - 21,553.92 = -$16,999.12
CPS:  4,554.80 - 14,846.66 = -$10,291.86

and the decomposition closes exactly: 1,794.34 + (-16,999.12) = -15,204.78. The survey men were not a stand-in for the trainees' missing world. They were older (about 35 against 26 on the PSID), more often married (87% against 19%), far more often had a diploma, and above all they already earned far more: $19,063 on average in 1975 against $1,532 for the trainees, more than twelve times as much. The lottery groups, by contrast, matched before the program: $1,532 against $1,267 in 1975, and $2,096 against $2,107 in 1974. The pre-program numbers do not prove anything about 1978, but they show which comparison group even resembles the trainees, which is the most the data can say about the unseen world.

LaLonde's point, and the reason this case is in every course, was that adjusting the survey comparisons with the standard econometric methods of the day did not replicate the experimental answer, and he warned of large and unknown biases from getting the model of selection wrong. (His own estimate on his larger sample of 722 men was $886; the $1,794 is for the Dehejia and Wahba subset.) Dehejia and Wahba later showed that matching the survey men to the trainees much more carefully, on prior earnings above all, came much closer on this sample. Jeffrey Smith and Petra Todd then found matching estimates on these data highly sensitive to which variables went into the match and which sample of men was used. The lesson of the whole exchange is the lesson of this model: everything depends on the stand-in, and the stand-in is only as good as the assumption that it shares the treated group's missing outcome.

The usual mistakes

1. Before-and-after as proof. Symptom: "Bookings doubled after the new sales leader arrived." Fix: the year before is a stand-in for the counterfactual only if nothing else that matters changed. Ask what the market, the closest competitor and the units that did not get the change did over the same period. The entry's own example: the market and the competitor doubled too.

2. Comparing choosers with non-choosers. Symptom: "Customers who used the new feature churned half as much." Fix: the users chose the feature, and whoever chooses it was probably less likely to leave anyway. That gap is Step 4's selection bias. Look for a rollout that was random, staggered by date, or set by a rule.

3. Thinking more data cures bias. Symptom: "We have two million customers, so the difference is real." Fix: a large sample shrinks the luck (Step 6), never the selection bias (Step 4). Nearly sixteen thousand CPS men did not bring the survey comparison any closer to the experiment.

4. Confusing whose effect you measured. Symptom: "The pilot stores gained two points, so rolling out everywhere adds two points." Fix: the pilot measured the ATT on the stores chosen for it. If they were chosen because they suited the change, the ATE across all stores can be smaller; in the six stores it happened to be larger. Say which average you have and which one the decision needs.

5. Forgetting spillovers. Symptom: the treated stores rose and the untreated nearby stores fell. Fix: if the change moves customers between units, the untreated are no longer the world without the change (SUTVA, Step 7), and the gap between them overstates the effect. Compare with units far enough away not to be touched.

Where the model breaks

The framework itself does not break; the stand-ins do. The entry names the three ways: the comparison group differs in the way that matters (the PSID men, who already earned twelve times as much); the trends were not parallel (the groups would have drifted apart without the change); or the instrument has a second channel (the luck that assigned the change also touched the outcome some other way). Each is a failure of an assumption about outcomes no one observed, which is why it can be argued about but never settled by the data alone. And when there is no believable stand-in at all, the honest answer is not a number but a grade: the causal evidence is weak, and here is the comparison that would make it strong.

Check yourself

1. A company's sales rose 30% in the year it changed its logo. What exactly is the causal question, in the language of this lesson, and what single number would answer it?

Answer: the question is the effect on this company in this year, Y(1) - Y(0), where Y(1) is the sales it had with the new logo (observed, up 30%) and Y(0) is the sales it would have had in the same year with the old logo (never observed). The number that answers it is Y(0); the 30% says nothing until something stands in for it, such as the growth of close competitors that kept their logos.

2. A hospital reports that patients who chose its new treatment lived longer than patients who did not. Name the term in Step 4 that worries you, and say in one sentence which way it probably pushes.

Answer: the selection bias, E[ Y(0) | D = 1 ] - E[ Y(0) | D = 0 ]. If healthier patients are more likely to choose (or be offered) a new treatment, they would have lived longer without it too, so the bias is positive and the naive gap overstates the benefit.

3. People who chose to take a training course earned $52,000 the next year; people who did not earned $40,000. The course was oversubscribed, so places were allocated by lottery among applicants, and the applicants who lost the lottery earned $47,000. Estimate the effect on those who took the course, the selection bias in the naive comparison, and the share of the naive gap that is bias.

Answer: the naive gap is 52,000 - 40,000 = $12,000. The lottery losers stand in for the course takers' missing outcome, so the effect on the treated is 52,000 - 47,000 = $5,000. The selection bias is 47,000 - 40,000 = $7,000, and 5,000 + 7,000 = 12,000 as Step 4 requires. The bias is 7,000 / 12,000, about 58% of the naive gap.

Teach me more
  • Potential Outcomes and Randomization, Scott Cunningham, chapter 3 of Causal Inference: The Remix (free online; a very long chapter, about 25,000 words). The best single treatment on the web of this lesson's Steps 2 to 6: the switching equation, ATE, ATT and ATU, the same three-piece decomposition of the naive difference derived line by line and checked on a small table of ten patients, why randomization removes the bias, and SUTVA; it goes on to randomization inference, which this lesson does not cover. Read it after this lesson, with Step 4 open beside it; its notation puts the 1 and 0 as superscripts, Y^1 and Y^0.
  • Introduction to Causal Inference, Brady Neal, lecture notes of 17 December 2020 (PDF, 132 pages; chapter 2, "Potential Outcomes", is thirteen of them). The cleanest short statement of individual effects, the fundamental problem and the assumptions (exchangeability, positivity, no interference, consistency) in the notation of modern statistics and machine learning. Chapter 2 does not do the selection bias decomposition, and it assumes a probability course. His course page, bradyneal.com/causal-inference-course, links lecture videos on the same chapter (not watched for this lesson).
  • Causality, Experiments, and Potential Outcomes, Joshua Angrist, Marginal Revolution University, Mastering Econometrics (a video with a transcript, lecture notes, a problem set and Stata code; the transcript was read for this lesson, the video was not watched). A Nobel laureate introduces potential outcomes as "the road not taken", then reads the tables of a randomized trial of laptops in West Point classrooms: first that the groups matched before the treatment, which is what the 1974 and 1975 earnings did in the worked example, then the difference and its standard error.
  • NSW data files, Rajeev Dehejia's NBER page. The data behind the worked example, as plain text with the column order stated: compute the $1,794 and the -$15,205 yourself in a few lines of any language.

The Library entry's source is Donald B. Rubin, "Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies", Journal of Educational Psychology 66(5), 1974, pp. 688 to 701. The worked example rests on Robert J. LaLonde, "Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs with Experimental Data", American Economic Review 76(4), 1986, pp. 604 to 620, and Rajeev H. Dehejia and Sadek Wahba, "Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies: Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs", Journal of the American Statistical Association 94(448), 1999, pp. 1053 to 1062; the data files are on Rajeev Dehejia's NBER page. The later critique is Jeffrey A. Smith and Petra E. Todd, "Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of nonexperimental estimators?", Journal of Econometrics 125(1-2), 2005, pp. 305 to 353. The name for the missing-outcome problem is from Paul W. Holland, "Statistics and Causal Inference", Journal of the American Statistical Association 81(396), 1986, pp. 945 to 960, and the variance formula from Jerzy Neyman's 1923 paper, translated in Statistical Science 5(4), 1990, pp. 465 to 472. For the most common stand-in of all, a comparison group watched before and after the change, see the Library's lesson on difference-in-differences ("Before and after, with someone who did not get it").

Difference-in-differences

Before and after, with someone who did not get it

We compare the change in the group that received the treatment with the change in a group that did not, over the same period. It is much stronger than before-and-after alone and it still rests on one assumption we state out loud.

Born to answer
Ashenfelter and Card, 1985: the earnings dip before a training program.
What it does now
Measuring a change against the group that did not get it.
The mathematics
(T after - T before) - (C after - C before)
The full entry
Where it began

Ashenfelter and Card's 1985 study compared the earnings of people who entered a federal training program with a comparison group before and after, and found the famous dip: trainees' earnings fell just before they enrolled, which is why before-and-after alone overstated the program's effect. Card and Krueger's minimum wage comparison of New Jersey and Pennsylvania made the design famous a decade later, and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan showed in 2004 how easily it produces false precision when the errors are handled carelessly.

Why it works now

The design needs outcomes for a treated group and an untreated one before and after, which a company usually has and has never lined up. The data can now be organized that way in an afternoon, and Advisors can say what else differed between the groups. The Desk asks who got the change and who did not, and whether the two were moving together before it. The estimate is a specialist's; the design is Vista's.

When it applies

A change was introduced to some customers, regions, products, or plants and not others, and the client wants to know what it did.

What we would ask

Who got the change and who did not, and were the two groups moving in parallel before it?
What else happened to the treated group that did not happen to the others?

What it needs

Outcomes for both groups before and after; evidence that the groups trended together before the change.

How we would get it

The client's data or the record for both groups; Advisors on what else differed between them.

Where it breaks

The trends were not parallel; the control group was contaminated; the treated group was chosen because it was already changing.

For example

A company claims its new pricing lifted revenue per customer by eighteen percent. Customers on the new pricing rose eighteen percent; comparable customers still on the old pricing rose eleven. The effect is seven, and the report says so with the assumption attached.

The mathematics in fulltau = (Y(treated, after) - Y(treated, before)) - (Y(control, after) - Y(control, before)); valid under parallel trends, and the standard errors must respect that outcomes within a group are correlated over time. Taught in

MATH 386-2; DECS-431

Sources

Ashenfelter, Card (1985). Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics 67(4), 648. https://doi.org/10.2307/1924810
Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004). How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 249-275. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839588

Learn the math
The question

In 1852 the Lambeth Water Company moved its intake on the Thames from opposite Hungerford Market, in the middle of London, upstream to Thames Ditton, where the river was, in John Snow's words, "quite free from the sewage of London". Its rival south of the river, the Southwark and Vauxhall Company, kept drawing from the tideway. In many streets the pipes of both companies ran side by side, and a household's supplier depended on a decision made years before by a landlord or a previous tenant.

When cholera came back in 1854, Snow went house to house. In the first seven weeks, by his Table IX, the houses supplied by Southwark and Vauxhall lost 315 people to cholera for every 10,000 houses; the houses supplied by Lambeth lost 37. That is a striking comparison, but a skeptic can answer it: perhaps Lambeth's customers were richer, or lived on higher ground, or were simply luckier. Snow had a second comparison that answers the skeptic, and it is the subject of this lesson. In his Table XII he set the deaths of 1854 beside the deaths of 1849, when both companies drew the same dirty water, for the same districts. In the twelve sub-districts served by Southwark and Vauxhall alone, deaths rose from 2,261 to 2,458. In the sixteen served partly by Lambeth, they fell from 3,905 to 2,547. Whatever made 1854's epidemic different from 1849's (the weather, the strain, the season) hit both groups. Whatever made the districts different from each other (wealth, height, crowding) was there in both years. Only the water had changed, and only for one group.

That is the design the Library entry calls "before and after, with someone who did not get it", and economists call difference-in-differences. Every business uses its weak form ("since we changed the pricing, revenue is up 18%") and most of them stop there. By the end of this lesson you should be able to compute the strong form, say the one assumption it rests on and why it can be checked but never proved, choose the scale on which to compare, and size the error bars honestly.

The idea in one paragraph

You changed something for some people and not for others, and now you want to know what the change did. Looking only at the people who got it, before and after, mixes the change with everything else that moved in the same months: the season, the economy, a competitor's price cut, the slow drift every business has. So you borrow a second group that did not get the change and watch it over the same months. Whatever happened to them is your best guess of what would have happened to the first group anyway. Take the second group's change away from the first group's change, and what is left is the effect. The whole method fits on a napkin, and so does its weakness: it works only if the two groups would have moved together had nothing been done. That cannot be proved, because the world in which the first group was left alone never happened. It can be made believable, by showing the two groups moving together for years before the change, and it must be said out loud. Picture two boats tied to the same tide. You cannot see the tide, but if one boat rose two feet and its twin rose one, the extra foot is something you did to the first boat, provided they were floating on the same water all along.

The math, step by step

Step 1: four numbers and one subtraction. Write Y for the outcome you care about (revenue per customer, employment per store, deaths per household). Two groups: the treated group got the change, the control group did not. Two times: before the change and after it. That gives four averages, one in each cell of a two by two table:

Y(T, before)   Y(T, after)
Y(C, before)   Y(C, after)

The treated group's change is Y(T, after) - Y(T, before). It contains the effect of the change plus everything else that happened to that group over the period. The control group's change, Y(C, after) - Y(C, before), contains only the everything else, if the two groups share it. Subtract:

tau = (Y(T, after) - Y(T, before)) - (Y(C, after) - Y(C, before))

That is the whole estimator, the formula in the Library entry. The name says what it does: a difference (after minus before) of differences (treated minus control). You can do the subtractions in the other order, first across groups and then across time, and get the same number, because both are the same four terms with the same signs.

Step 2: what the subtraction assumes. Say precisely what tau is supposed to measure. Write Y0(T, after) for the treated group's outcome after the change had the change not happened. Nobody ever sees it. The effect we want is

effect = Y(T, after) - Y0(T, after)

Add and subtract Y(T, before), which changes nothing, and regroup:

effect = (Y(T, after) - Y(T, before)) - (Y0(T, after) - Y(T, before))

(Check it: the two copies of Y(T, before) cancel, leaving the line above.) The first bracket is observed. The second is the change the treated group would have had without the change, also unseen. Now compare with tau: they are equal exactly when

Y0(T, after) - Y(T, before) = Y(C, after) - Y(C, before)

In words: without the change, the treated group would have moved by the same amount as the control group did. This is the parallel trends assumption, and it is the only assumption the design makes. When it fails, tau is wrong by exactly the gap between the two trends:

tau - effect = (Y0(T, after) - Y(T, before)) - (Y(C, after) - Y(C, before))

Notice what the assumption does not require. The two groups may start at completely different levels; the level difference is subtracted away. They must only have been heading the same way.

Step 3: the entry's example, and the question "parallel in what?" The Library entry has a company whose customers on new pricing raised their revenue 18% while comparable customers still on the old pricing raised theirs 11%. Put round numbers on it, as assumptions: revenue per treated customer goes from $500 to $590, and per control customer from $400 to $444. In percent:

tau = 18% - 11% = 7 percentage points

and in dollars, the same table gives

tau = (590 - 500) - (444 - 400) = 90 - 44 = $46

Which is right? They make different assumptions. The percent version assumes that without the new pricing the treated customers would have grown 11%, to 500 x 1.11 = $555, so the effect is 590 - 555 = $35, which is 7% of $500. The dollar version assumes they would have gained the control group's $44, to $544, so the effect is $46. "Parallel trends" means parallel on some scale, and the two scales cannot both be parallel when the groups start at different levels.

The data before the change decide it. Suppose both groups grew 6% a year for the two years before the change (again assumptions, rounded to the dollar here):

treated:   $445   $472   $500   then $590
control:   $356   $377   $400   then $444

In percent the two groups rose together, 6% and 6% each year. In dollars they did not: the treated group gained about $27 and $28, the control group about $21 and $23, so their dollar gap widened every year before anyone touched the pricing. On this history, the percent version is the believable one and the honest answer is $35, not $46. The general rule: check the pre-change years on the scale you intend to use, and use the scale on which they are parallel.

$300$400$500$600-2-10+1Year (0 = the last year before the new pricing)Revenue per customernew pricing$590$555 without ittreated customerscontrol customerstreated, growing 11% like the control
Parallel in percent, not in dollars: both groups grew 6% a year before the new pricing, so the treated group's counterfactual is the control's 11% growth, $555, and the effect is $35.

Step 4: the same thing as a regression. The four-cell formula is a regression in disguise, and seeing it this way is how the design grows to many groups and many years. Code two switches: D is 1 for the treated group and 0 for the control, and P is 1 after the change and 0 before. Then fit

Y = a + (b x D) + (c x P) + (tau x D x P)

Read the four cells off it. Control before (D = 0, P = 0): a. Treated before: a + b. Control after: a + c. Treated after: a + b + c + tau. So a is the control group's starting level, b is the starting gap between the groups, c is the control group's change (the "everything else"), and the treated group's change is c + tau. Subtract the control's change from the treated group's change and only tau is left. With the dollar numbers above, a = 400, b = 100, c = 44 and tau = 46; with the outcome measured in logarithms instead (the percent version, because a change in the logarithm is close to a percent change: ln(1.18) = 0.166, near 18%), tau comes out at ln(590 / 500) - ln(444 / 400) = 0.061. A difference of logarithms is the logarithm of a ratio, so undo it: e raised to 0.061, less one, is (1.18 / 1.11) - 1 = 6.3%: the treated customers ended 6.3% above where 11% growth would have put them. That is the same $35 as before (35 / 555 = 6.3%), measured against the counterfactual $555 instead of the starting $500, which is why it sits a little under the 7 points you get by subtracting growth rates. With many groups and many years the regression keeps the same form, with a separate starting level for every group and a separate "everything else" for every year.

Step 5: the error bars, and why they are usually too narrow. The estimate is a difference of averages, so it comes with noise, and here the design hides a trap that Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan made famous. Outcomes in the same group are correlated from year to year: a state that has a bad year tends to have a bad next year too. The usual textbook formula for the error bar treats every group-year as a fresh, independent draw. It is not.

How much does that matter? Take one group's yearly noise e(1), e(2), ... with variance s^2 and a correlation rho between neighboring years that fades geometrically, rho^2 two years apart, rho^3 three apart (the simplest model of persistence). The variance of a sum is the sum of the variances plus twice the covariance of every pair, and the covariance of two years k apart is s^2 x rho^k. Divide by T^2 to get the variance of the average of T years:

var(average) = (s^2 / T) x [1 + ((2 / T) x (sum of rho^k over every pair of years k apart))]

If the years were independent, the bracket would be 1 and the formula would be the textbook s^2 / T. In a long run of years, each year has a neighbor one year away, another two years away and so on, so each year's share of the pair sum approaches rho + rho^2 + rho^3 + ..., and the bracket becomes a geometric series:

1 + (2 x (rho + rho^2 + rho^3 + ...)) = 1 + ((2 x rho) / (1 - rho)) = (1 + rho) / (1 - rho)

(The middle step is the geometric series: rho + rho^2 + ... = rho / (1 - rho) when rho is below 1.) At rho = 0.8 that is 1.8 / 0.2 = 9. The average of many correlated years is nine times noisier than the independent formula says, so its error bar, the square root, is three times wider. For the case that matters here, one group's average over ten years after a change minus its average over ten years before, the lesson's code adds up every pair exactly and finds the true variance 3.84 times the independent formula, an error bar sqrt(3.84) = 1.96 times wider. (Less than 9, for two reasons: ten years is not a long run, and the slow-moving part of the noise sits in both the before and the after average, so some of it cancels in the difference.)

What does that do to a test? A researcher who uses the narrow error bar calls a result significant when it is more than 1.96 narrow error bars from zero, which is only 1.96 / 1.96 = 1.0 true error bar. (The two 1.96s are a coincidence: the first is the bell curve's 5% cutoff, the second is how much too narrow the error bar is.) A pure noise estimate lands more than one true error bar from zero 31.7% of the time, by the familiar rule that 68.3% of a bell curve lies within one standard deviation of its center. So about one "effect" in three is found where there is none. The lesson's code checks this by simulation: 50 groups, 20 years of noise with rho = 0.8, a change that does nothing given to 25 groups at random halfway through, 2,000 repetitions. The usual formula finds a significant effect in 30.9% of them. The cure is simple: collapse each group to a single number, its after-average minus its before-average, and compare the 25 treated numbers with the 25 controls by an ordinary two-group test. That version finds one in 5.5% of the repetitions, about the 5% it promises. With few groups, this is also the honest statement of how much you know: 50 groups give you 50 pieces of evidence, not 1,000.

0%10%20%30%40%Called significant, percentevery group-year as independentone change per group30.9%5.5%the promised 5%
Error bars that treat correlated years as independent find an effect in about one study in three when there is none; collapsing each group to one change restores the promised one in twenty.
A worked example

First, Snow's own numbers. Deaths are counts, and the two groups of districts are of different sizes, so compare them in percent, as Step 3 suggests:

Southwark and Vauxhall only (12 sub-districts):   2,261 to 2,458,   up 8.7%
partly Lambeth (16 sub-districts):                3,905 to 2,547,   down 34.8%

Had the partly-Lambeth districts followed the Southwark and Vauxhall districts' trend, they would have had 3,905 x 1.087 = 4,245 deaths in 1854. They had 2,547, which is (2,547 / 4,245) - 1 = -0.40, that is 40% fewer. And this understates the effect of clean water, because these districts were only partly on Lambeth's pipes: the households still drinking Southwark and Vauxhall water are averaged in. (Snow's third group, four sub-districts on Lambeth alone, fell from 162 to 37, but look before you use it: 154 of the 162 deaths in 1849 were in Streatham, and Snow writes that its high mortality that year was caused by an outbreak in Drouett's asylum for pauper children. A base year with a one-off shock in it is Ashenfelter's dip in another form; see the mistakes below.)

Then the case that made the design famous. On 1 April 1992 New Jersey raised its minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.05 an hour, 18.8%; neighboring eastern Pennsylvania stayed at $4.25. David Card and Alan Krueger had their interviewers survey 410 fast-food restaurants (Burger King, KFC, Roy Rogers and Wendy's) in both states early in 1992, before the rise, and again from 5 November to 31 December, after it. They counted full-time-equivalent employees per store: full-time workers plus managers plus half of the part-time workers. From the data file Card posts on his Berkeley page, the four cells are (standard errors in parentheses):

state              before           after           change
Pennsylvania       23.33 (1.35)     21.17 (0.94)     -2.16
New Jersey         20.44 (0.51)     21.03 (0.52)     +0.59
tau = (21.03 - 20.44) - (21.17 - 23.33) = 0.59 - (-2.16) = +2.75 employees per store

(To three places the changes are -2.166 and +0.588, and the difference is 2.754. These four means and standard errors are the ones quoted everywhere from the paper's Table 3; the paper itself is a scanned image, so the lesson's code holds the figures as computed from the data, from 77 Pennsylvania and 321 New Jersey stores before, and 77 and 319 after.) Read it with the lesson's tools. New Jersey's stores started smaller, which does not matter (Step 2). New Jersey employment rose slightly, but almost all of the 2.75 comes from Pennsylvania's fall of more than two workers a store: the design says New Jersey's stores would have fallen too without the rise. That is the parallel trends assumption made concrete, and it is the whole question: was eastern Pennsylvania's year the right picture of New Jersey's year without the law?

Now Step 5. Collapse to one change per store, using the 75 Pennsylvania and 309 New Jersey stores with employment in both waves (stores that closed for good count as zero): Pennsylvania's average change is -2.28 with a standard error of 1.25, New Jersey's +0.47 with 0.48. The difference is again 2.75, with a standard error sqrt(1.25^2 + 0.48^2) = 1.34, so the 95% interval runs from about 0.1 to 5.4. But notice what that error bar counts. The stores are 384 pieces of evidence about stores; about states there are two. A shock that hit eastern Pennsylvania's whole regional economy that year moves all 75 Pennsylvania stores together, and no store-level error bar can see it. That is Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan's warning at its starkest.

The result was surprising to many economists and was challenged. Neumark and Wascher (2000) used payroll records from a different sample of restaurants and found the opposite sign; Card and Krueger (2000) replied with the Bureau of Labor Statistics' payroll records for the industry and found no relative job loss in New Jersey. This lesson takes no side in the minimum wage debate, which is a live one. Notice instead where the argument went: no one disputed the subtraction. The dispute was about the data, how employment was measured and in which stores, and about whether Pennsylvania was the right control. That is where every difference-in-differences argument goes, and why the entry says the report states the assumption with the number.

1819202122232425early 1992, beforeNov to Dec 1992, afterFull-time-equivalent employees per store18.27 if NJ had followed PAPennsylvaniaNew JerseyNew Jersey on Pennsylvania's trend
Card and Krueger's four cells, computed from their data: the estimate of 2.75 workers a store rests mostly on Pennsylvania's fall, which the design takes as the picture of New Jersey without the higher minimum wage.
The usual mistakes

Choosing the "before" at a dip. Symptom: a program looks wonderful because its participants were at a low point when they joined. Ashenfelter found exactly this in federal training programs: trainees' earnings fell in the year before they enrolled (many had just lost a job), then recovered whether or not the training helped. Invented numbers show the size of it. Trainees usually earn $10,000, drop to $8,000 the year before enrolling and earn $10,500 after; comparable non-trainees earn $10,000 throughout. Measured from the dip year, the effect is (10,500 - 8,000) - (10,000 - 10,000) = $2,500. Measured from two years before, it is (10,500 - 10,000) - 0 = $500. Fix: look at several years before, and never start the clock at a moment the treated group chose because something had just gone wrong.

Picking the treated group because it was already changing. Symptom: the stores that got the new layout were the ones whose managers asked for it, the growing ones. Fix: ask how the treated group was chosen, and plot both groups for as many years before as you can. Diverging lines before the change mean the design will credit the change with a trend that was already there.

A control group the change reached anyway. Symptom: the "untreated" customers heard about the new pricing and asked for it, or the treated stores took sales from the control stores next door. Fix: choose a control the change could not touch, and ask, as the entry does, what else differed between the groups.

Parallel on the wrong scale. Symptom: an effect that shrinks or grows when you switch from dollars to percent. Fix: Step 3. Check the years before on the scale you use.

Error bars that count years as if they were independent. Symptom: a tight confidence interval from a handful of groups observed for many years. Fix: Step 5. Collapse to one before-and-after change per group, or use standard errors clustered by group, and remember that the number of independent pieces of evidence is close to the number of groups.

Many groups, changes at different dates. Symptom: a regression with a separate start date for each group gives an answer that is hard to interpret, sometimes even of the wrong sign. Goodman-Bacon (2021) showed that the usual two-way regression then quietly uses groups treated early as controls for groups treated late; if effects grow over time, those comparisons are biased. Fix: compare each treated group only with groups not yet treated, as the newer estimators do.

Where the model breaks

The entry names three ways, and each is a broken version of Step 2's single assumption. The trends were not parallel: something other than the change made the two groups diverge, and the design hands that divergence to the change. The control group was contaminated: it got some of the change, or reacted to it, so its trend is no longer "what would have happened anyway". The treated group was chosen because it was already changing: the reason for the change and the trend are the same thing, and no subtraction can separate them. In the image of the two boats: the tide was not the same for both, the second boat was tied to the first, or the first was chosen because it was already rising. The design never proves the assumption; years of parallel movement before the change make it believable, and nothing makes it certain. That is why the entry says the report states the assumption with the number. And the estimate itself, with its correctly sized error bars, is a specialist's job, as the entry says; the design, who got the change and who did not, and whether they were moving together before it, is the question anyone can ask.

Check yourself

1. A chain raises prices in its western stores. Sales per store in the west fall 3%; in the eastern stores, which kept their prices, sales fall 5% over the same months. What does difference-in-differences say, and what must you believe for it to be right?

Answer: -3% - (-5%) = +2 percentage points: by this design the price rise did not hurt sales; it was followed by sales 2 points better than the east. You must believe that, without the price rise, western sales would have fallen 5% like the east's. If the west had been declining more slowly than the east for years already, the 2 points are the old trend, not the prices.

2. Why does it not matter that the treated group started at a much higher level than the control?

Answer: because the level difference appears in both the before and after comparisons and is subtracted away (in the regression of Step 4 it is b, which never touches tau). What matters is whether the two groups would have changed alike.

3. Thirty regions, observed for 16 years, eight before and eight after a policy given to 15 of them. Yearly noise in a region has a year-to-year correlation of 0.8. Roughly how much wider is the honest error bar than the one that treats every region-year as independent, and what share of tests of a policy that does nothing would the narrow error bar call significant at the 5% level?

Answer: the lesson's code adds up the correlations for eight years on each side and finds the true variance of a region's change 3.11 times the independent formula, so the honest error bar is sqrt(3.11) = 1.76 times wider. A narrow test calls a result significant beyond 1.96 narrow error bars, which is 1.96 / 1.76 = 1.11 honest ones, and pure noise falls that far from zero about 27% of the time (26.6%) instead of 5%.

Teach me more
  • Introduction to Differences-in-Differences, Joshua Angrist, Marginal Revolution University, YouTube (11 minutes 22 seconds). The gentlest start anywhere: one natural experiment from the Depression, Mississippi split between a Federal Reserve district that lent freely to troubled banks and one that did not (Richardson and Troost), with almost no algebra. It stops before the error bars; come back to Step 5 afterwards.
  • Difference-in-Differences, chapter 18 of Nick Huntington-Klein, The Effect (free online; about 16,000 words). The best written explanation of why parallel trends can be tested before the change but never proved after it, with placebo tests, the plot of the years before, and a clear section on changes at different dates. The regression notation arrives fast; read Step 4 first.
  • Difference-in-Differences, chapter 9 of Scott Cunningham, Causal Inference: The Mixtape (free online; about 23,000 words, with code). Snow, Card and Krueger and the algebra of potential outcomes, for a reader ready for more notation. One caution: its Table 9.2 is, in its own words, a modified reconstruction of Snow's Table XII, with rates per 10,000 households that do not appear in Snow's book; Snow's own figures are the death counts used above.
  • How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004. The source of Step 5: placebo laws given to states at random, found "significant" far too often with the usual error bars, and the corrections that work.

The entry's sources also include Ashenfelter and Card (Review of Economics and Statistics, 1985), the training programs and the dip before enrollment. Snow's book, On the Mode of Communication of Cholera (second edition, 1855), is free at Project Gutenberg; Table XII is on page 90.

Regression discontinuity

The people just above and just below the line

When a rule assigns something by a threshold (a credit score, a size cutoff, an eligibility date), the units just either side of the line are nearly identical except for the treatment, and comparing them is close to an experiment.

Born to answer
Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960, either side of a scholarship cutoff.
What it does now
Reading a rule's effect from the units just either side of its line.
The mathematics
Compare the limits as X approaches the cutoff
The full entry
Where it began

Thistlethwaite and Campbell's 1960 paper compared students just above and just below the test-score cutoff for a National Merit certificate, who were nearly identical in everything but the award, and read the award's effect from the gap between them. Imbens and Lemieux's 2008 guide is the modern practitioner's manual.

Why it works now

Thresholds are everywhere in business and regulation and were rarely exploited, because nobody thought of a size cutoff or an eligibility date as an experiment. The rules and the outcomes on both sides of them can now be found in the record quickly, and operators can say whether the threshold was gamed. The Desk asks whether a rule with a cutoff decided who got this. When one did, the cleanest evidence obtainable is sitting either side of the line.

When it applies

A treatment was assigned by a cutoff: a loan program, a regulatory threshold, a pricing tier, a promotion rule; and the client wants its effect.

What we would ask

Is there a rule with a threshold that decided who got this?
Could anyone have moved themselves across the line on purpose?

What it needs

The assignment rule, outcomes on both sides of it, and enough units near the threshold.

How we would get it

The record for the rule and the outcomes; operators on whether the threshold was gamed.

Where it breaks

Units manipulated their position at the cutoff; the effect near the line is not the effect far from it.

For example

A regulation applies to firms above a revenue threshold. Firms just above and just below it differ in nothing but the regulation, and the comparison of their subsequent growth is the cleanest evidence obtainable on what the regulation costs.

The mathematics in fullEffect = lim of E[Y | X just above c] - E[Y | X just below c], where c is the cutoff assigning treatment; identification requires no manipulation of X at c and continuity of everything else across it. Taught in

MATH 386-2

Sources

Thistlethwaite, Campbell (1960). Regression-discontinuity analysis: An alternative to the ex post facto experiment. Journal of Educational Psychology 51(6), 309-317. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0044319
Imbens, Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. Journal of Econometrics 142(2), 615-635. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.001

Instrumental variables

Something that moved the cause and nothing else

When the supposed cause was chosen by the people it affected, we look for something that shifted it from outside, and affected the outcome only through it. Finding one is the hard part, and we say plainly when there is none.

Born to answer
Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996; the Vietnam draft lottery.
What it does now
When the cause was chosen by the people it affected.
The mathematics
Effect = Cov(Z, Y) / Cov(Z, D)
The full entry
Where it began

Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin's 1996 paper clarified what an instrument identifies: the effect for the people the instrument moved. The teaching example is Angrist's use of the Vietnam draft lottery, which assigned military service by birthdate for reasons unrelated to later earnings, to measure the effect of service on earnings.

Why it works now

Finding a valid instrument is still the hard part and always will be; no tool changes that. What has changed is that the accidents, rules, and shocks that moved a variable for reasons unrelated to the outcome, a regulatory change in some states, a supply disruption, a policy phased in by region, can be surfaced from the record and from Advisors far faster than before. The Desk asks what moved the cause for reasons that had nothing to do with the outcome. It says plainly when there is nothing.

When it applies

The cause and the effect choose each other: advertising and sales, sales intensity and growth, adoption and productivity, expansion and performance.

What we would ask

What moved the cause for reasons that had nothing to do with the outcome?
Could that thing have affected the outcome any other way?

What it needs

A source of variation in the cause that is unrelated to the outcome except through the cause; and the honesty to say when none exists.

How we would get it

Advisors on the accidents, rules, and shocks that moved the variable in this industry; the record for them.

Where it breaks

The instrument has a second channel; it is weak; it identifies the effect only for the units it moved.

For example

Does advertising drive bookings, or do companies advertise when bookings are strong? A regulatory change that restricted advertising in some states and not others moved advertising for reasons unrelated to demand, and the comparison across states answers the question.

The mathematics in fullZ shifts D and affects Y only through D; the effect is Cov(Z, Y) / Cov(Z, D), estimated in two stages, and it is the effect for the units Z moved, not for everyone. Taught in

MATH 386-2

Sources

Angrist, Imbens, Rubin (1996). Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434), 444-455. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1996.10476902

Heterogeneous treatment effects

For whom, not whether

An average effect hides the customers for whom it is large and the ones for whom it is zero. We ask which segments the product, the policy, or the change actually works for, because a thesis that assumes it generalizes usually does not.

Born to answer
Athey and Imbens, 2016: an honest search for where an effect lives.
What it does now
Which customers a product works for, rather than the average.
The mathematics
CATE(x) = E[Y(1) - Y(0) | X = x]
The full entry
Where it began

Athey and Imbens's 2016 paper built causal trees, which search for the subgroups where a treatment's effect differs while keeping the estimates honest by splitting the sample. It formalized what every experienced operator knows: the average effect of a product, a policy, or a change hides the customers for whom it is large and the ones for whom it is nothing.

Why it works now

Heterogeneity used to be discovered by accident after a launch failed in a segment. It can now be looked for on purpose: customers across segments can be interviewed about what changed for them, the data split by the characteristics the Advisors name, and the market thesis tested against the segment the client actually plans to sell to. The Desk asks for which customers it worked best and what they have in common.

When it applies

A claim that a product improves something by an average amount; a thesis that a result in one segment or geography will transfer to others; a pilot that worked.

What we would ask

For which customers did it work best, and what do they have in common?
Is the segment you plan to sell to more like the ones where it worked or the ones where it did not?

What it needs

Outcomes by segment with enough units per segment; the characteristics that could predict where the effect lives.

How we would get it

Customers across segments on what changed for them; the data split by the characteristics the Advisors say matter.

Where it breaks

Segments chosen after seeing the results; too few units per segment; the effect in the pilot segment assumed for the market.

For example

A workflow product improves productivity eight percent on average. In firms with a dedicated administrator it improves twenty; in firms without one it improves nothing. The market thesis was built on the average, and the addressable market is the first kind of firm.

The mathematics in fullCATE(x) = E[Y(1) - Y(0) | X = x]; estimated by splitting on covariates chosen before the outcome is examined, with honest sample splitting so the segments are not fitted to the noise. Taught in

MATH 386-2

Sources

Athey, Imbens (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(27), 7353-7360. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1510489113

Randomized controlled experiments

Sometimes the answer is to try it on a few

When the decision can be tested on a slice before it is made for everyone, the cleanest evidence obtainable is an experiment, and we design it so that it is large enough to detect the effect that would matter.

Born to answer
Fisher at Rothamsted in the 1920s, testing fertilizer on plots.
What it does now
Testing a decision on a random slice before making it for everyone.
The mathematics
Sample needed scales with 1 / (effect size squared)
The full entry
Where it began

Ronald Fisher designed the first randomized field experiments at Rothamsted in the 1920s to test fertilizers on plots of land, and randomization has been the gold standard since. Kohavi and colleagues' 2009 guide brought it to the web, where Microsoft and Amazon learned that most confident product ideas fail a controlled test, and that the test must be large enough to see the effect that matters.

Why it works now

A business decision can be tested on a random slice before it is made for everyone, and most are not, because designing the test was a specialist's job and the sample-size arithmetic an afterthought. The design is now the deliverable: Advisors and the client's operators shape it, the smallest effect that matters sets the sample, and the client runs it. The Desk asks whether this could be tried on a random slice first. When it can, that is the cleanest evidence there is.

When it applies

A pricing change, a product change, a channel, or a policy that could be rolled out to a random subset first; or a pilot that was run without a control or without enough units.

What we would ask

Could you try this on a random slice of customers, regions, or products before you decide?
How small an effect would still matter, and how many units does it take to see it?

What it needs

Random assignment, a control group, an outcome measured the same way in both, and a sample large enough for the smallest effect that matters.

How we would get it

Vista designs the experiment with the Advisors and the client's operators; the client runs it; the report reads it, including the null.

Where it breaks

The pilot was not random; the sample was too small and the null is meaningless; the outcome was measured differently in the two arms; the experiment changed behavior by being observed.

For example

A company wants to know whether a lower price increases lifetime value. It can offer the lower price to a random half of new customers in two regions for a quarter. The design is the deliverable; the quarter is the evidence.

The mathematics in fullWith random assignment, E[Y | treated] - E[Y | control] is the average effect; the sample needed to detect an effect of size d at conventional thresholds scales with 1/d^2, so halving the smallest effect that matters quadruples the sample. Taught in

MATH 386-2; DECS-430

Sources

Kohavi, Longbotham, Sommerfield (2009). Controlled experiments on the web: survey and practical guide. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 18(1), 140-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10618-008-0114-1
Cohen (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin 112(1), 155-159. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.155

Selection and nonresponse bias

The survivors, the responders, and the eager

Who you heard from decides what you learned. Customers who answer differ from customers who do not; surviving customers cannot tell you about churn; experts who volunteer differ from experts who know. We design the sample before we trust the finding.

Born to answer
The 1936 Literary Digest poll; Heckman, 1979.
What it does now
Recruiting the churned customers, not the seller's reference list.
The mathematics
E[Y | observed] is not E[Y]
The full entry
Where it began

The Literary Digest polled millions of its readers in 1936 and predicted a landslide for Landon; Roosevelt won in one, because the readers were not the electorate. James Heckman's 1979 paper gave selection its statistics with the case of women's wages, observed only for the women who chose to work. Groves's 2006 review showed that a low response rate does not by itself bias a survey; the difference between those who answer and those who do not does.

Why it works now

Reference calls chosen by the seller and surveys answered by the happy have always been the sample a buyer got. The missing population can now be found and recruited deliberately: churned customers, investors who passed, employees who left. The Desk asks who was in a position to be in this sample and who was not. The engagement interviews the ones who were not.

When it applies

A finding from a customer survey, a set of reference calls chosen by the seller, a panel of volunteers, or any sample whose members chose to be in it.

What we would ask

Who was in a position to be in this sample, and who was not?
Did the ones who declined differ from the ones who answered in the way that matters?

What it needs

The mechanism that put each unit in the sample; some evidence about the ones who are missing.

How we would get it

The Research Director recruits from the missing population deliberately: churned customers, passed investors, former employees who left; the report weights accordingly.

Where it breaks

The sample selected itself and the finding is the selection; the missing units are assumed to resemble the present ones.

For example

A seller provides ten reference customers, all happy. The research recruits five customers who left in the last two years. The reference calls describe the product; the churned customers describe the decision.

The mathematics in fullE[Y | observed] differs from E[Y] whenever the probability of being observed depends on Y; the bias in a mean is roughly the nonresponse rate times the gap between respondents and nonrespondents, so the gap has to be estimated, not assumed away. Taught in

MATH 386-2; DECS-430

Sources

Heckman (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47(1), 153. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912352
Groves (2006). Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 70(5), 646-675. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfl033

Panel data and fixed effects

Compare the company to itself

When companies, regions, or customers differ in ways nobody can measure, we compare each one to itself over time rather than to each other, which removes everything about the unit that does not change.

Born to answer
Nickell, 1981, on the bias in short dynamic panels.
What it does now
Comparing a plant to its own past rather than to other plants.
The mathematics
y(i,t) = a(i) + b x(i,t) + e(i,t)
The full entry
Where it began

Panel data, the same units observed repeatedly over time, let an analyst compare each unit to itself and remove everything about it that does not change. Stephen Nickell's 1981 paper is the standard warning about the method: with a lagged outcome and few periods, the fixed-effects estimate is biased in a known direction. The 1996 MMSS curriculum taught panel studies and lagged regression as a unit.

Why it works now

Companies have always had panel data on their own plants, regions, and customers and rarely analyzed it as such, because organizing it took a project. It can now be organized in an afternoon, and Advisors can say which permanent differences between units would otherwise contaminate a cross-section comparison. The Desk asks whether the same units are observed before and after, or different ones.

When it applies

A cross-section comparison where the units differ in unmeasured ways; repeated observations of the same customers, plants, or firms; a claim that a change worked because the changed units are now better than the unchanged ones.

What we would ask

Do you observe the same units before and after, or different units?
What about each unit never changes and could explain the difference?

What it needs

Repeated observations of the same units over time, with the change occurring at different times for different units.

How we would get it

The client's own panel data; Advisors on what fixed differences between units matter.

Where it breaks

Fixed effects remove permanent differences, not changing ones; with short panels and lagged outcomes the estimates are biased.

For example

Plants that adopted a new maintenance system have less downtime than plants that did not. The adopting plants were also newer. Comparing each plant to its own downtime before and after adoption, the effect is a third of the cross-section estimate.

The mathematics in fully(i,t) = a(i) + b x(i,t) + e(i,t): the unit effect a(i) absorbs everything permanent about unit i, so b is estimated only from changes within units; with a lagged outcome on the right and few periods, b is biased. Taught in

MATH 386-1; MMSS 1996 (panel studies)

Sources

Nickell (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica 49(6), 1417. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911408
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Cengage. (book)

The two cultures of statistical modeling

Predict, or explain

A model that forecasts well can be a black box, and a model you will act on must identify a cause. We ask which of the two the decision needs, because the same data answers them differently and the wrong one is confidently wrong.

Born to answer
Breiman, 2001: fitting a mechanism versus predicting well.
What it does now
Whether a churn model is a forecast or a lever.
The mathematics
Out-of-sample error, or an identifying assumption
The full entry
Where it began

Leo Breiman's 2001 paper on the two cultures of statistical modeling drew the line between models that fit a mechanism and models that predict without one, and argued that prediction on held-out data was the honest test of the second. Stanford's data science core teaches both cultures, and Athey and Imbens's causal trees are the modern attempt to keep the predictive machinery while identifying a cause.

Why it works now

Every company now has a model that predicts something, and every executive wants to act on its top feature, which is the mistake the distinction exists to prevent. What has changed is that both questions can be answered, separately and quickly, once someone asks which one the decision needs. The Desk asks whether the client needs to know which customers will leave or what would make them stay.

When it applies

A machine-learning model presented as a reason to intervene; a churn or default score used to decide what to change; an executive asking why when the model only says what.

What we would ask

Do you need to know which customers will leave, or what would make them stay?
If you act on this model's most important feature, do you expect the outcome to change?

What it needs

Clarity about the decision; for prediction, held-out accuracy; for explanation, an identifying assumption.

How we would get it

The Research Director states which question is being answered; a prediction is validated out of sample, an explanation is designed with a counterfactual, and the report does not confuse them.

Where it breaks

Using a predictor to choose an intervention; demanding a causal story from a forecasting tool.

For example

A lender's model predicts default from three hundred features, and the top feature is the number of times a customer checked their balance. The model is a good predictor and a useless lever: stopping customers from checking their balance would change nothing. What would change default is a different question, with a different design.

The mathematics in fullA predictor minimizes out-of-sample error and is validated by holding data back; an explanation identifies the effect of changing X on Y and is validated by the credibility of its identifying assumption; a feature that predicts an outcome is not thereby a lever on it. Taught in

Stanford data science core; MATH 386-2

Sources

Breiman (2001). Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures. Statistical Science 16(3). https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1009213726
Athey, Imbens (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(27), 7353-7360. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1510489113

Stochastic climate models and optimal fingerprinting (Hasselmann)

Fingerprinting a cause in noisy data

We state what pattern a cause would leave before we look for it. Hasselmann faced the problem of telling a human warming signal from the weather's own long swings, and his answer had two parts. First, a slow system fed by fast random shocks wanders in long swings of its own, so a trend is not evidence of a cause until the swings the system produces by itself have been measured. Second, a cause leaves a pattern across places, groups or variables that noise does not share, and the best test weights the data toward the directions where the expected pattern is strong and the noise is weak: the optimal fingerprint, the expected pattern divided by the covariance of the noise. We write down the pattern a proposed cause would produce, estimate the noise from periods and units without the cause, compute the weighted projection and its standard error, and say whether the signal stands out and how much more data would make it do so.

Born to answer
Tellus, 1976; Journal of Climate, 1993.
What it does now
Whether data carry the pattern a stated cause would leave.
The mathematics
f = C^-1 g; a_hat = (f . y) / (f . g); SNR = a sqrt(g' C^-1 g)
The full entry
Where it began

Klaus Hasselmann, who founded the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology in Hamburg in 1975, published in 1976 a stochastic model of climate in which the slow parts of the system, the oceans above all, integrate the fast random forcing of the weather, as a heavy particle integrates the kicks of molecules in Brownian motion; the result is long swings with no slow cause, which Claude Frankignoul and Hasselmann (1977) showed in sea-surface temperatures. The question that followed was how a human signal could ever be told from those swings. Thomas Bell (1986) derived the optimal weighting of data for the purpose, Hasselmann (1979, 1993) the optimal fingerprint, the expected pattern of the signal divided by the covariance of the noise, and Gabriele Hegerl, Hans von Storch, Hasselmann and colleagues (1996) made the first detection of greenhouse warming with it; Myles Allen and Simon Tett (1999) added the consistency checks that the method now carries. The attribution statements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change rest on this machinery. Hasselmann shared the 2021 Nobel Prize in physics with Syukuro Manabe and Giorgio Parisi; the business application of the fingerprint is Vista's reading.

Why it works now

Sales, prices and traffic by region, product and customer are recorded at a resolution that lets the noise covariance be estimated from the history and the fingerprint, the effect and its standard error be computed outside the conversation for any claimed cause. What a cause should look like across the units, when the mechanism is unclear, is still known to the operators who have run it elsewhere.

When it applies

A change in sales, margins, prices, traffic or demand attributed to a policy, a campaign, a product change, a competitor's move or a macro shift, where the quantity swings on its own; a claim that a trend has a cause; a question whether a signal in a monitoring system is noise; a question whether an intervention worked across many stores, regions or accounts at once with no clean control. Not to be confused with before-after-with-control, which compares treated and untreated units through a change; spurious-trends, which warns that two rising series need not be related; regression-benchmark, which fits what moves with what; or trend-or-reversion, which asks whether one series has memory: this asks whether the data carry the specific pattern a stated cause would leave, weighted by where the noise is quiet.

What we would ask

Before looking at the data, what pattern across regions, products or customers would this cause produce, and what pattern would the usual noise produce?
Measured in periods without the cause, how large are the swings this quantity makes on its own, and how are they correlated across the units?

What it needs

The expected pattern of the cause across units (which regions, products, customers or variables it should move, and by how much relative to each other), a history without the cause long enough to estimate the noise's variance and its correlation across units, the observed changes, and any other causes active at the same time with their own expected patterns.

How we would get it

The Desk writes down the expected pattern, estimates the noise covariance from the history, computes the optimal fingerprint, the estimated effect and its standard error, and the amount of further data needed to reach a stated confidence. What the data cannot supply is the pattern itself when the mechanism is unclear; operators who have run the policy or the campaign elsewhere, and the analysts who watch the units, know what it should look like.

Where it breaks

The pattern chosen after the data are read, which turns the test into a description; noise estimated from a period that already contains the cause or a different regime; a cause whose pattern looks like the noise's own main swing, which no weighting can separate; several causes active at once without their own patterns (the multi-pattern case needs each pattern stated); an effect declared on a signal-to-noise ratio below two; and the stochastic model's lesson forgotten, that a quantity which only integrates random shocks will show long swings that look like trends.

For example

A retailer cuts prices in all its stores and sales rise. If the cut worked, the pattern should be a rise of about 1 unit in rural stores and 2 in urban stores, where competitors are near, for every unit of the true effect. The month's changes were 1.5 in rural stores and 1.0 in urban stores; urban stores are noisier, with a variance of 4 against 1. An unweighted projection of the changes on the pattern gives an effect of 0.70 with a standard error of 0.82. The optimal fingerprint divides the pattern by the noise variances, weighting rural stores twice as heavily as urban ones, and gives an effect of 1.00 with a standard error of 0.71: a signal-to-noise ratio of 1.4, not yet distinguishable from noise. A second month with the same pattern would bring it to 2.0. And before any of this, the noise itself: a quantity with a five-year memory fed by random shocks has a year-to-year correlation of 0.82 and swings for years at a time with no cause at all.

The mathematics in fullHasselmann (1976): a slow variable x driven by fast noise obeys dx/dt = -lambda x + w(t), with white noise w, so its spectrum is red, its variance is s_w^2 / (2 lambda) and its autocorrelation at lag k is exp(-lambda k): long swings with no slow cause. Hasselmann (1993): observations y = a g + n, with g the expected pattern of the cause, a its amplitude and n noise of covariance C. The optimal fingerprint is f = C^-1 g, the estimate is a_hat = (f . y) / (f . g) with variance 1 / (g' C^-1 g), and the signal-to-noise ratio is a sqrt(g' C^-1 g), the largest any linear filter can reach; the unweighted projection a_u = (g . y) / (g . g) has variance g' C g / (g . g)^2. With m independent periods the ratio grows as sqrt(m). Several causes with patterns g_1 to g_p are estimated together by generalized least squares (Hasselmann 1997; Allen and Tett 1999), and attribution asks that the amplitudes be consistent with the causes' predicted sizes. Where it comes from

Hasselmann (1976), Stochastic climate models, Part I, Tellus; Frankignoul and Hasselmann (1977), Part II, Tellus; Bell (1986), Theory of Optimal Weighting of Data to Detect Climatic Change, Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences; Hasselmann (1993), Optimal Fingerprints for the Detection of Time-dependent Climate Change, Journal of Climate; Hasselmann (1997), the multi-pattern method, Climate Dynamics; Hegerl, von Storch, Hasselmann, Santer, Cubasch and Jones (1996), Journal of Climate, the first application; Allen and Tett (1999), Checking for model consistency in optimal fingerprinting, Climate Dynamics; Hasselmann (1998), the Bayesian approach, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society; Hannart, Pearl, Otto, Naveau and Ghil (2016), the counterfactual reading, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society; von Storch and Zwiers, Statistical Analysis in Climate Research (1999), the chapters on detection; The 2021 Nobel Prize in physics was shared by Hasselmann, Syukuro Manabe and Giorgio Parisi; the business application of the fingerprint is Vista's reading

Sources

Hasselmann (1976). Stochastic climate models: Part I. Theory. Tellus A: Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography 28(6), 473. https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.v28i6.11316
Frankignoul, Hasselmann (1977). Stochastic climate models, Part II Application to sea-surface temperature anomalies and thermocline variability. Tellus 29(4), 289-305. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-3490.1977.tb00740.x
Hasselmann (1993). Optimal Fingerprints for the Detection of Time-dependent Climate Change. Journal of Climate 6(10), 1957-1971. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(1993)006<1957:offtdo>2.0.co;2
Hegerl, von Storch, Hasselmann, Santer, Cubasch, Jones (1996). Detecting Greenhouse-Gas-Induced Climate Change with an Optimal Fingerprint Method. Journal of Climate 9(10), 2281-2306. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(1996)009<2281:dggicc>2.0.co;2
Bell (1986). Theory of Optimal Weighting of Data to Detect Climatic Change. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 43(16), 1694-1710. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0469(1986)043<1694:toowod>2.0.co;2
Hasselmann (1998). Conventional and Bayesian approach to climate-change detection and attribution. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 124(552), 2541-2565. https://doi.org/10.1002/qj.49712455202
Hannart, Pearl, Otto, Naveau, Ghil (2016). Causal Counterfactual Theory for the Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related Events. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 97(1), 99-110. https://doi.org/10.1175/bams-d-14-00034.1
von Storch and Zwiers (1999). Statistical Analysis in Climate Research. Cambridge University Press. (book)

Learn the math
The question

A retailer cuts prices in every store at once, and next month sales are up. Did the cut work? Sales were going to move anyway: weather, paydays, a competitor's opening and slow drifts nobody can explain all push the number around, and there is no untouched group of stores to compare against, because every store got the cut.

One tempting answer is to look at the chart and declare victory; the other is to give up, no control group, no conclusion. Klaus Hasselmann faced the same problem with a larger stake: the world was warming, the climate had always wandered on its own, and there is only one Earth. His way through it, worked out between 1976 and 1993, fits the retailer as well as the planet.

The idea in one paragraph

Listening for a friend's voice across a loud party, two things help. You know what your friend sounds like before you start, so no loud stranger fools you. And you turn toward the quieter corner of the room, because a faint voice is easier to pick out where the band is not playing. Hasselmann's method does both, with arithmetic. Before looking at the data you write down the pattern the cause would leave: which stores, regions or products it should move, and by how much relative to each other. Then you measure the noise in periods without the cause and give the quiet places more weight. Out comes an estimate of the cause's strength, an honest error bar, and how much more data would make it stand out. One warning comes first: a slow system fed by fast random shocks wanders in long swings of its own, so a trend by itself proves nothing.

The math, step by step

Step 1: why noise can look like a trend. Hasselmann's first insight (1976) was about the noise. Weather is fast: each year's shock is nearly independent of the last. The ocean is slow: it soaks up each shock and lets it fade. Write z(t) for the slow quantity (ocean temperature, or a store's underlying demand) and w(t) for the fast shocks. The slow quantity forgets a little of itself each moment and absorbs whatever arrives:

dz/dt = -(lambda x z) + w(t)

where lambda is a rate and 1 / lambda is the memory's length. In whole years the same idea reads

z(t + 1) = (phi x z(t)) + e(t),   with phi = exp(-lambda)

where e(t) is this year's shock, independent from year to year, with variance 1 (a choice of scale). For a five-year memory, lambda = 0.2 and phi = exp(-0.2) = 0.82: each year keeps 82% of last year's level.

How far does such a series wander? Once settled, its variance V is the same this year as next. Take the variance of both sides (scaling a quantity by phi scales its variance by phi^2, and the shock is independent of the past, so the two pieces add):

V = (phi^2 x V) + 1,   so   V = 1 / (1 - phi^2) = 1 / (1 - 0.670) = 3.03

The slow series swings 1.74 times as widely as the shocks driving it (the square root of 3.03), and it swings slowly: since each year keeps phi of the last, its correlation with itself k years apart is phi^k, still 0.55 at three years and 0.37 at five. Nothing slow pushes it. It only adds up the kicks, as a heavy particle in water drifts under the strikes of molecules; that picture, Brownian motion, was Hasselmann's own analogy.

-3-2-1012301020304050607079YearsIn standard deviationsThe weather: independent shocks each yearThe ocean: the same shocks, added up with a five-year memory
Hasselmann's first lesson, drawn. The same random kicks, fed into something slow, come out as long swings. A trend in the slow series is not evidence of a cause until you know how far it wanders on its own.

The cost in plain numbers: take ten years of such a series and run the ordinary trend test, which assumes each year is independent and calls a trend real if chance alone would produce it only 5% of the time. On truly independent noise the code finds a false "significant trend" in 5% of ten-year windows, as advertised; on the slow series, in 41%. The test is not wrong; it was built for a different noise. Ten years with a five-year memory carry about the information of 1.75 independent years (the formula is in the code). So the first half of the method: before asking what caused a trend, measure how far the thing wanders on its own.

Step 2: the pattern, and the best way to weigh the evidence. Now the retailer, with rural and urban stores. Before the month's figures are opened, the analyst writes down what the cut should do: urban stores, with competitors nearby, should respond about twice as strongly. That is the pattern,

g = (1, 2)    (rural, urban), per unit of the cut's true effect

The cut's true strength is an unknown a. What the analyst sees is the pattern scaled by that strength, plus noise:

y = (a x g) + n

From months without a price cut, the noise variance is 1 in rural stores and 4 in urban (urban sales are twice as jumpy, by standard deviation). This month y = (1.5, 1.0).

Any sensible estimate of a compares what happened with what the pattern predicts, with weights f1 on rural and f2 on urban:

a_hat = ((f1 x y1) + (f2 x y2)) / ((f1 x g1) + (f2 x g2))

With no noise, y would equal a x g and this returns exactly a whatever the weights; every choice is aimed at the right answer. The weights decide only how much the noise shakes it. The two noises are independent, so the variance of the top line is (f1^2 x 1) + (f2^2 x 4), and

Var(a_hat) = ((f1^2 x 1) + (f2^2 x 4)) / ((f1 x g1) + (f2 x g2))^2

Only the ratio of the weights matters, so set f1 = 1 and f2 = w. With g = (1, 2):

V(w) = (1 + (4 x w^2)) / (1 + (2 x w))^2

Find the smallest value with calculus. By the quotient rule, the derivative is zero where

(8 x w) x (1 + (2 x w))^2 = (1 + (4 x w^2)) x 2 x (1 + (2 x w)) x 2

Divide both sides by 4 x (1 + (2 x w)), which is positive:

(2 x w) x (1 + (2 x w)) = 1 + (4 x w^2)
(2 x w) + (4 x w^2) = 1 + (4 x w^2)
w = 0.5

So the best weights are (1, 0.5), and V(0.5) = (1 + 1) / (1 + 1)^2 = 0.5. Look at them: each store type's pattern divided by its noise variance, 1 / 1 and 2 / 4. Repeat the calculus with general numbers and that is what always comes out:

f_i = g_i / s_i^2    (the pattern, divided by the noise variance)

This is the optimal fingerprint. The pattern says where to look; dividing by the noise says how much to trust each place. Urban stores are where the cut should show most, but also where the noise is loudest, and the noise wins: per unit of pattern, rural stores get twice the weight.

The unweighted projection, which uses the pattern itself as the weights (w = 2, the natural first try), gives

a_u = ((1 x 1.5) + (2 x 1.0)) / ((1 x 1) + (2 x 2)) = 3.5 / 5 = 0.70,   standard error sqrt(V(2)) = sqrt(17 / 25) = 0.82

The optimal fingerprint gives

a_hat = ((1 x 1.5) + (0.5 x 1.0)) / ((1 x 1) + (0.5 x 2)) = 2.0 / 2.0 = 1.00,   standard error sqrt(0.5) = 0.71
-4-2024-3-2-101234Change in rural storesChange in urban storeswhat happened (1.5, 1.0)the cause at full strength (1, 2)The pattern the price cut should leave, at every strengthThe noise: one and two standard deviations
The fingerprint as geometry. Distance from the line counts for more where the noise ellipse is narrow and for less where it is wide; dividing the pattern by the noise variance is how the arithmetic says it.

The chart shows why. Each month is a point in a plane, rural change across and urban change up. Noise fills a tall ellipse, because urban stores swing more; a working cut pushes the point along the line through (1, 2). Read (1.5, 1.0) one axis at a time: rural stores alone say strength 1.5 / 1 = 1.5 with noise variance 1; urban stores alone say 1.0 / 2 = 0.5 with noise variance 4 / 2^2 = 1, because dividing by the pattern's 2 also divides the noise. Two equally trustworthy readings, so the best estimate is their plain average, 1.00. The unweighted projection leaned on the urban reading, which only looked more important because the pattern is bigger there.

Step 3: how sure, and how long to wait. The signal-to-noise ratio is the estimate over its standard error: 1.00 / 0.71 = 1.4. The entry's rule is not to declare an effect below 2, so this month's honest answer is: consistent with the cut working at about full strength, not yet distinguishable from noise.

How much more data? Call the sum of g_i^2 / s_i^2 the information the data carry about a; here it is (1 / 1) + (4 / 4) = 2, and the variance of the optimal estimate is 1 over it, 1 / 2 = 0.5, as found. Each independent month adds the same information, so with m months the variance is 1 / (2 x m) and the ratio grows as the square root of m. A second month like the first brings it to 1.41 x sqrt(2) = 2.0. If the true effect is 1, the unweighted projection, with its ratio of 1.21 a month, needs (2 / 1.21)^2 = 2.7 months, so three; the fingerprint needs two. Weighting well is worth a month of waiting. One caution from Step 1: "independent months" must be checked, not assumed; noise with memory repeats itself from month to month and adds less than this arithmetic promises.

Step 4: shared shocks, and the control the fingerprint finds by itself. So far the two kinds of store had separate noise. Often a heat wave or a payday moves all stores together. That shared movement is the covariance c between the two noises, and the noise becomes a table (a matrix) with the variances on its diagonal and c off it:

C = [[1, c], [c, 4]]

The fingerprint becomes f = C^-1 g, the pattern "divided" by the whole table. For a 2 x 2 table the inverse is a formula: swap the two diagonal entries, flip the sign of the other two, and divide by the determinant (1 x 4) - (c x c):

C^-1 = [[4, -c], [-c, 1]] / (4 - c^2)

Multiply by g = (1, 2): the top row gives 4 - (2 x c), the bottom 2 - c, and 4 - c^2 is (2 - c) x (2 + c), so the factor (2 - c) cancels:

f = C^-1 g = (2, 1) / (2 + c),   and the information g' C^-1 g = ((1 x 2) + (2 x 1)) / (2 + c) = 4 / (2 + c)

(g' is g written as a row; g' C^-1 g is the sum of each g_i times its weight f_i, which in Step 3 was the sum of g_i^2 / s_i^2.) The weights stay 2 to 1 whatever c is, so the estimate stays 1.00, but the error bar moves. With no shared shock (c = 0) the information is 2, as before. A shared shock of covariance 1 cuts it to 1.33 and raises the standard error from 0.71 to 0.87; an opposing shock (c = -1, rural up when urban is down) raises it to 4 and the standard error falls to 0.50. This is the heart of the method: a shared shock pushes both stores up together, which is what the price cut does too, and noise that resembles the signal is the noise that hurts. In the limit, noise lying exactly along the pattern leaves one reading, the pattern direction, which the weather can mimic; no weighting can do better, and the entry lists this as a failure.

Now a different cause. The retailer launches home delivery in urban stores only, so the pattern is g = (0, 1). Urban sales rise 2.0 and rural 1.0, and the shared shock has covariance 1, so the determinant is 4 - 1 = 3. The naive reading uses urban stores alone: an effect of 2.0 with a standard error of 2. By the same inverse, the fingerprint is

f = C^-1 g = ((4 x 0) - (1 x 1), (-1 x 0) + (1 x 1)) / 3 = (-1/3, 1/3)

The rural stores, which the launch never touched, enter with a minus sign. The fingerprint has found its own control group: it uses rural stores to measure the shared shock and subtracts it:

a_hat = (((-1/3) x 1.0) + ((1/3) x 2.0)) / (1/3) = 1.0,   standard error sqrt(3) = 1.73

Half the urban rise was weather everyone shared. (By regression: urban noise moves one for one with rural noise, so subtract the rural change, 2.0 - (1 x 1.0) = 1.0.) The Library's before-after-with-control is close kin: there the control group is chosen by hand; here the fingerprint chooses it, and its weight, from the noise.

Step 5: the general statement. With any number of units (regions, products, customers or variables), the observations are y = (a x g) + n, the noise has covariance table C, and

f = C^-1 g,    a_hat = (f . y) / (f . g),    Var(a_hat) = 1 / (g' C^-1 g)

No other linear weighting gives a smaller variance; that is the sense of "optimal". Statisticians call the same estimate generalized least squares. With several causes at once (a price cut and a competitor's closing, each with its own pattern), the patterns go in together and the strengths are estimated jointly; Hasselmann (1997) and Allen and Tett (1999) built that out, with checks that the leftover noise looks like the noise assumed.

A worked example

The scale is a planet's, but the arithmetic is Steps 1 to 5. In 1996 Gabriele Hegerl, Hans von Storch, Hasselmann, Benjamin Santer, Ulrich Cubasch and Phil Jones published the first detection of greenhouse warming with an optimal fingerprint (Journal of Climate, volume 9). The pattern g was the warming a climate model predicted from rising greenhouse gases, mapped across the globe. The noise C came from long runs of climate models with no change in greenhouse gases, and from the observed record with an estimated warming signal taken out, because the real world offers no period without the cause. The observation y was the trend in near-surface temperature over the latest 20 and 30 years, ending in 1994. Dividing the pattern by the noise, so that regions where the climate wanders most on its own counted for less, raised the signal-to-noise ratio by roughly 10% to 30% over the plain pattern, and the observed trend's projection onto the fingerprint was compared with the spread of the same projection across the no-change runs.

The result, in the paper's words: the hypothesis that the trend is natural variability is rejected "with a risk of less than 2.5% to 5%". Notice the care. It is a range because the answer depended on which noise estimate was used; the 5% came from one model run holding what the authors called a questionable extreme event, and they said their noise estimate had large uncertainties. They stopped short of attributing the warming to greenhouse gases alone, since that needed the other causes' patterns too (Step 5's several causes, which later work supplied). That restraint is part of the method: detection says the change is unlikely to be noise; attribution says which cause, and needs every candidate's pattern. The same machinery, extended to several causes, sits under the attribution statements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and it is part of the work for which Hasselmann shared the 2021 Nobel Prize in physics with Syukuro Manabe, "for the physical modelling of Earth's climate, quantifying variability and reliably predicting global warming" (Giorgio Parisi received the other half).

Every step of that study is one this lesson took with two stores: the pattern stated before the test, the noise taken from a world without the cause, quiet directions weighted up, the result reported as a ratio of signal to noise. For a business the parts are easier to find: the pattern from how the cause should work (where competitors are near, which customers are price sensitive), the noise from the company's own months without the cause.

The usual mistakes
  1. Choosing the pattern after seeing the data. Symptom: the "expected pattern" matches this month's changes remarkably well. Fix: write it down, with its reasons, before the data are opened. A pattern fitted to the data describes the data; it tests nothing.
  2. Measuring the noise in the wrong period. Symptom: a history that already contains the cause, or a different regime (before a merger, before a pandemic). Fix: estimate the noise from periods and units without the cause under comparable conditions, and say which.
  3. Treating a slow series as independent draws. Symptom: a "significant" trend in a quantity known to drift (inventory, market share, a subscriber base). Fix: measure the memory first; ten years with a five-year memory are worth fewer than two independent ones.
  4. Weighting by where the signal is loudest. Symptom: all the attention on the stores or regions where the effect should be biggest. Fix: weight by pattern over noise variance; the loudest place for the signal is often the loudest place for the noise.
  5. Declaring an effect too early. Symptom: a ratio of 1.4 reported as "the cut worked". Fix: report the estimate, its standard error and the months still needed; the entry's bar is 2.
Where the model breaks

The entry names the breaking points, and the lesson has met each: a pattern chosen after the data are read; noise measured from a period that contains the cause, or from a different regime; a cause whose pattern looks like the noise's own main swing (Step 4's limit); several causes at once without each pattern stated; an effect declared on a ratio below two; and the first lesson forgotten, that a quantity which only adds up random shocks shows long swings that look like trends. Beyond these, the method is linear: it assumes the cause scales the pattern without changing its shape. When a cause behaves differently in kind at different strengths, or the noise itself changes when the cause arrives, the fingerprint is a first look, not a verdict. And the pattern is only as good as the understanding behind it; where the mechanism is unclear, the entry sends you to operators who have run the policy elsewhere.

Check yourself
  1. A marketing team ran a campaign and, after seeing the results, notes that the regions that grew fastest were "exactly the ones the campaign targeted most heavily." Why is this weak evidence, even if the fit is close? Answer: the pattern was named after the data were seen, so it can only describe them. A fair test writes down, before the results, which regions should grow and by how much relative to each other, then asks how well the data match that pattern compared with how well ordinary noise would.
  2. In the retailer's example, the price cut should have twice the effect in urban stores, yet the optimal fingerprint gives urban stores half the weight per unit of pattern that rural stores get. Why? Answer: the weight is the pattern divided by the noise variance. Urban stores have twice the pattern but four times the noise variance, so 2 / 4 = 0.5 against 1 / 1 = 1. A place where the signal is strong but the noise is stronger still is a poor place to look.
  3. Three regions should respond to a cause in the pattern (1, 1, 3). Their noise variances, independent, are 1, 2 and 9, and this period's changes were 0.8, 1.6 and 2.7. Find the optimal weights, the estimate, its standard error and the signal-to-noise ratio. About how many periods like this one would bring the ratio to 2? Answer: the weights are 1 / 1, 1 / 2 and 3 / 9, that is 1, 0.5 and 0.33. The information is (1 x 1) + (0.5 x 1) + ((1/3) x 3) = 2.5. The estimate is ((1 x 0.8) + (0.5 x 1.6) + ((1/3) x 2.7)) / 2.5 = (0.8 + 0.8 + 0.9) / 2.5 = 1.00, with standard error 1 / sqrt(2.5) = 0.63, a ratio of 1.58. The ratio grows with the square root of the number of periods, so reaching 2 needs (2 / 1.58)^2 = 1.6 periods: two. (The unweighted projection would give 0.95 with a standard error of 0.83.)
Teach me more
  • Scientific Background on the Nobel Prize in Physics 2021, the Nobel Committee for Physics (5 October 2021, a 17-page PDF; Hasselmann's work fills the climate half, a section about stochastic theories and a shorter one about fingerprinting). The best free account of both halves of his work: the slow and fast split, Step 1's equation and its red spectrum, the Brownian motion analogy, the first test on ocean temperatures, and the point this lesson turns on, that a signal may be detected where the noise is weakest rather than where the signal is strongest. Written for physicists, with no worked numbers; read it after Steps 1 to 5.
  • Detecting greenhouse-gas-induced climate change with an optimal fingerprint method, Hegerl, von Storch, Hasselmann, Santer, Cubasch and Jones, Journal of Climate 9 (1996), pages 2281 to 2306; the abstract, free at the University of East Anglia's repository. Worth reading for its hedges alone: two sources for the noise, a range of risk rather than one number, and the line drawn between detection and attribution.
  • Stochastic climate models: Part I. Theory, Klaus Hasselmann, Tellus 28 (1976), pages 473 to 485, open access with a PDF. The original paper; its abstract states the whole idea in a paragraph (the climate as an integrator of random weather, red spectra, the analogy with large particles struck by much smaller ones), and the body is advanced.
  • Stochastic climate models, Part II, Claude Frankignoul and Klaus Hasselmann, Tellus 29 (1977), pages 289 to 305, open access with a PDF. The first test on real data: mid-latitude sea-surface temperature anomalies explained as the ocean's slow response to fast atmospheric forcing, white input giving a red response. Step 1's red noise in the actual ocean.
  • Optimal fingerprints for the detection of time-dependent climate change, Klaus Hasselmann, Journal of Climate 6 (1993); the free abstract at OSTI. One paragraph stating the rule this lesson derives: the optimal fingerprint is the assumed signal pattern multiplied by the inverse of the noise covariance.

When, not whether

Timing questions, which are usually the ones that decide the outcome.

Survival analysis and hazard models

Not whether, but when

Whether something will happen and when it will happen are different questions, and the second one usually decides the outcome. We answer it from the history of comparable cases, not from opinion.

Born to answer
Kaplan and Meier, 1958; Cox, 1972, on clinical survival times.
What it does now
When a borrower refinances or a customer leaves, not whether.
The mathematics
h(t | X) = h0(t) exp(X beta)
The full entry
Where it began

Kaplan and Meier's 1958 paper showed how to estimate a survival curve when many of the patients were still alive at the end of the study, and David Cox's 1972 model let the characteristics of each patient shift the hazard, the chance the event happens next given it has not happened yet. Both were built for clinical survival times, and they transferred whole to customers, loans, and companies.

Why it works now

Whether a borrower refinances, a customer churns, or a chief executive leaves was answered with a probability when the decision turned on a date. Comparable durations can now be assembled from the record, including the cases still running, and Advisors who have watched the clock in that industry can say what shortens it. The Desk asks whether the question is whether or when, and which answer changes the decision. Timing questions get timing machinery.

When it applies

A question about timing: when a customer churns, a company needs capital, a CEO leaves, a competitor enters, a regulator acts, a contract renews, a covenant is breached; or a probability question that is really a timing question in disguise.

What we would ask

Is the question whether this happens, or when? And which answer changes the decision?
In comparable cases, how long did it take, and what shortened it?

What it needs

A set of comparable cases with their durations, including the ones in which the event has not yet happened; the characteristics that shift the timing.

How we would get it

The record for comparable durations; Advisors who have seen the clock run in this industry on what accelerates it.

Where it breaks

Cases still alive at the end of the data are dropped or treated as if the event never comes; the covariates were measured after the process began.

For example

A credit investor asks whether a borrower will need to refinance. The borrower will; every borrower does. The question is whether it happens inside the fund's horizon, and the comparable cases put the hazard sharply higher in the eighteen months around a maturity wall the deck does not mention.

The mathematics in fullThe hazard h(t) is the chance the event occurs in the next interval given it has not yet; survival S(t) = exp(-H(t)); h(t | X) = h0(t) x exp(X beta) lets the characteristics shift the timing, and the shape of h0 (rising, falling, spiking at dates) is the finding. Taught in

MMSS 1996 (event history and proportional hazards); MATH 386-2

Sources

Cox (1972). Regression Models and Life-Tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 34(2), 187-202. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1972.tb00899.x
Kaplan, Meier (1958). Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations. Journal of the American Statistical Association 53(282), 457-481. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1958.10501452

Learn the math
The question

A credit fund holds a loan to a company whose bonds come due in three years. The investment committee asks the analyst one question: will the company have to refinance? The analyst says yes, with complete confidence, and is right, and has told the committee nothing. Every borrower refinances eventually. What the committee needed to know was whether the refinancing, and the trouble that can come with it, lands inside the fund's fifteen-month horizon or after it. That is a question about when, and it needs different arithmetic from a question about whether.

Now suppose the analyst tries to answer it from history. She gathers fifty comparable borrowers and asks how long each took to hit trouble. Thirty did, and she averages their times. The other twenty are still fine, so she leaves them out. She has just made the most common mistake in the subject: she has judged how long a party lasts by asking only the guests who have already gone home. The ones still dancing are exactly the ones who would have made the average longer.

This lesson builds the arithmetic that fixes both problems: a way to describe timing (the hazard), a way to learn it from records where many cases are still running (Kaplan and Meier's curve), and a way to let the characteristics of each case speed up or slow down its clock (Cox's model).

The idea in one paragraph

Picture each case walking along a road, and at every step there is some chance it falls through a trapdoor. The chance of falling through on this step, given that you have not fallen yet, is the hazard. Some roads have trapdoors evenly spread; some have a stretch where they cluster, like the months around a maturity wall; some get safer the further you walk, like a new restaurant that survives its first year. Two roads can lose the same share of walkers by the end and still be completely different roads, and if your decision has a deadline, the road is what matters. To learn the road from history you must count every walker for as long as you watched them, including those still walking when you stopped watching; they tell you that the trapdoors they passed did not take them. And if some walkers are heavier than others, Cox's insight is that you can measure how much more often they fall without ever having to know where the trapdoors are.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the hazard and the survival curve. Write T for the time until the event (a churn, a default, a relapse). The survival curve S(t) is the chance the event has not happened by time t; it starts at 1 and falls. The hazard h(t) is the chance it happens in the next small interval, given that it has not happened yet, per unit of time. In whole periods (months, weeks) the hazard h_j is just a conditional probability, and surviving to the end of period j means surviving each period in turn:

S(j) = (1 - h_1) x (1 - h_2) x ... x (1 - h_j)

That product is the whole of survival analysis in one line. In continuous time the same idea is a differential equation. The chance of the event in a sliver dt is the fall in S, which is -S'(t) x dt; dividing by the chance of having reached t, which is S(t), and by dt, gives

h(t) = -S'(t) / S(t) = -d/dt ln S(t)

because the derivative of ln S is S' / S (the chain rule). Integrate both sides from 0 to t, using ln S(0) = ln 1 = 0:

ln S(t) = -H(t),   so   S(t) = exp(-H(t))

where H(t), the area under the hazard curve from 0 to t, is the cumulative hazard: the total risk you have walked through. This is the entry's formula, and it says something useful in plain words: survival depends only on how much risk you have accumulated, not on when you met it. Timing enters through the shape of h.

Step 2: the simplest road, a constant hazard. A subscription business loses 2% of its remaining customers each month, as a continuous rate: h = 0.02. Then H(t) = 0.02 x t and

S(12) = exp(-(0.02 x 12)) = exp(-0.24) = 0.787

so 78.7% of a cohort is still subscribed after a year. The median life is where S = 0.5: exp(-(0.02 x t)) = 0.5, so t = ln 2 / 0.02 = 34.7 months. The mean is the area under the survival curve. (Why: at each moment t, the share of the cohort still subscribed is S(t). Add up those shares over every moment and you have added up every month that every customer lived, divided by the size of the cohort, which is the average life.) Here

mean = area under exp(-(0.02 x t)) from 0 to infinity = 1 / 0.02 = 50 months

(the antiderivative of exp(-(0.02 x t)) is -exp(-(0.02 x t)) / 0.02, which runs from -1 / 0.02 at 0 up to 0 at infinity).

Notice the mean is longer than the median: a few very long lives pull it up. And notice the oddity of a constant hazard. A customer who has lasted a year has exactly the same 78.7% chance of lasting another year as a new one: exp(-(0.02 x 24)) / exp(-(0.02 x 12)) = exp(-0.24). The road has no memory. Real roads usually do, and that is why the shape matters.

Step 3: a road with a spike. Back to the borrower. Suppose (round numbers, an assumption for teaching) the chance of a distressed refinancing is 0.5% a month in ordinary times and 5% a month in the eighteen months around its maturity wall, months 18 to 36. Over four years the cumulative hazard is

H(48) = (0.005 x 18) + (0.05 x 18) + (0.005 x 12) = 0.09 + 0.90 + 0.06 = 1.05

and the chance it happens within four years is 1 - exp(-1.05) = 65.0%. A second analyst, who knows only that 65% and spreads it evenly, uses a flat hazard of 1.05 / 48 = 0.0219 a month. The two agree perfectly about whether. Now ask about the fund's fifteen months:

spiked:  H(15) = (0.005 x 15) = 0.075,      1 - exp(-0.075) = 7.2%
flat:    H(15) = (0.0219 x 15) = 0.328,     1 - exp(-0.328) = 28.0%

One analyst says the event is unlikely inside the horizon; the other says it is more than one chance in four. Same "whether", opposite advice. The two lines cross near month 29 (by month 30 it is 49.8% against 48.1%), and from there the spiked borrower is the riskier one. This is what the entry means when it says the shape of the baseline hazard is the finding.

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%0612182430364248Months from todayChance it has happened by thenthe fund's horizonA hazard that spikes at the maturity wall (months 18 to 36)The same four-year odds spread evenly
Whether and when. Both curves end at the same height at four years; they disagree about almost everything that happens inside a fifteen-month horizon. The shape of the hazard is the finding.

Step 4: learning the curve when the story is unfinished. History hands you records of two kinds: cases where the event happened at a known time, and cases still running when the data stop. The second kind is called censored. A censored case at time c tells you one true thing: the event had not happened by c. Kaplan and Meier (1958) used exactly that, and nothing more. Go back to the product in Step 1. At each time t_j when at least one event happens, estimate the hazard by what you saw:

h_j = d_j / n_j

where d_j is the number of events at t_j and n_j is the number of cases still at risk just before t_j: not yet had the event and not yet censored. Then multiply:

S(t) = (1 - (d_1 / n_1)) x (1 - (d_2 / n_2)) x ... , over every event time up to t

A censored case is counted in every n_j up to the moment it was last seen, and then simply leaves the count. It never makes the curve step down. It is neither thrown away (the analyst's mistake) nor counted as an event (the opposite mistake). That is the product-limit estimate, and the worked example below computes one by hand.

Step 5: a hazard from events and exposure. If you are willing to assume the hazard is constant, there is a shortcut that every actuary knows, and it is worth deriving because it shows why censored cases carry information. The likelihood is the chance of seeing exactly the records you saw, written as a function of the unknown h; the estimate is the h that makes that chance largest. A case that had the event at time t contributes h x exp(-(h x t)) (the chance of surviving to t, times the hazard at t); a case censored at c contributes only exp(-(h x c)), the chance of getting that far. Multiply over all cases and take logs, which turns the product into a sum. With d events and T the total time watched, events and censored alike,

ln L(h) = (d x ln h) - (h x T)

Differentiate and set to zero: (d / h) - T = 0, so

h = d / T,   events divided by exposure

Every censored case adds to T, the exposure, though not to d. Leave them out and you shrink T, inflate the hazard, and shorten every life you estimate.

Step 6: letting characteristics shift the clock. Cox (1972) wrote the hazard of a case with characteristics X as

h(t | X) = h0(t) x exp(X x beta)

h0(t) is the baseline road, any shape at all. exp(X x beta) multiplies it, the same factor at every t. With one yes or no characteristic (X = 1 or 0), exp(beta) is the hazard ratio: how many times more often the X = 1 cases fall through, at every step of the road.

The clever part is how beta is estimated without knowing h0. At each moment an event happens, ask: of everyone at risk right now, what was the chance it would be this one? That chance is this case's hazard over the sum of everyone's. Take three cases at risk, two with a hazard ratio of 4 and one at the baseline; the chance the event befalls a particular one of the first two is

(h0(t) x 4) / ((h0(t) x 4) + (h0(t) x 4) + (h0(t) x 1)) = 4 / 9 = 0.444

and h0(t) cancels from top and bottom, whatever it is. Multiply these chances over every event time and you have Cox's partial likelihood, a function of beta alone. Choose the beta that makes the events you saw most likely (the lesson's code does it by Newton's method, a few lines). The road itself, h0, can then be read from the data afterward, and as Step 3 showed, its shape (rising, falling, spiking at dates) is often the more important finding.

Two practical notes. The log-rank test, the standard test of whether two survival curves differ, is this same likelihood examined at beta = 0 (up to a small adjustment for tied times): at each event time it compares how many events each group had with how many it would have had if the events had fallen in proportion to who was at risk. And when several events share one recorded time (weeks, months), the cases leave the risk set together; the methods of Breslow and of Efron are two ways of handling that, and they give slightly different answers.

A worked example

The real case is the one Cox himself used in 1972: a trial of the drug 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP) for children with acute leukemia whose cancer was in remission, reported by Freireich and colleagues in 1963 and tabulated by Gehan (1965). Twenty-one patients received the drug and twenty-one a placebo, and the event is relapse, counted in weeks. (The trial matched patients in pairs and randomized within each pair; Gehan and Cox, and this lesson after them, analyzed the two groups as separate samples.) Every placebo patient relapsed within 23 weeks. On the drug, nine relapsed and twelve were still in remission when last seen, at times from 6 to 35 weeks. The data are public as gehan in R's MASS package; every figure below comes from the lesson's code.

The wrong answers first. Leave out the twelve still in remission, as the analyst did, and the nine relapse times (6, 6, 6, 7, 10, 13, 16, 22, 23) average 12.1 weeks with a median of 10. Count the twelve as if they had relapsed when last seen and the average is 359 / 21 = 17.1 weeks. Both are too short, and the first is badly so, because the twelve were the patients doing best.

The product-limit curve, by hand. At week 6 all 21 drug patients are at risk and 3 relapse:

S(6) = 1 - (3 / 21) = 0.857

One more patient was last seen in remission at week 6 and leaves the count; 17 remain at risk at week 7, and 1 relapses:

S(7) = (18 / 21) x (16 / 17) = 0.807

Another patient was last seen at week 9, so 15 are at risk at week 10, and 1 relapses: 0.807 x (14 / 15) = 0.753. Carry on and the curve steps to 0.690 at week 13, 0.627 at week 16, 0.538 at week 22 and 0.448 at week 23, where it crosses one half. So the median remission on the drug is 23 weeks; on placebo, whose curve has no censored cases, it is 8 weeks. After week 23 the drug curve stays flat at 44.8% to the end of the data, because no one else relapsed while being watched.

0%25%50%75%100%061218243036Weeks since remission beganShare still in remissionplacebo: half relapsed by week 8drug: half by week 236-MP (21 patients; dots: still in remission when seen last)Placebo (21 patients, every relapse seen)
The product-limit estimate, drawn. Each step down is one week in which someone relapsed, and its depth is the share of those still in remission that week who relapsed. A patient still in remission when last seen never makes the curve step, and only leaves the count of those at risk.

Events over exposure. The drug patients were watched for 359 patient-weeks in all and had 9 relapses; the placebo patients for 182 patient-weeks with 21:

drug:     h = 9 / 359  = 0.0251 a week, median ln 2 / 0.0251 = 27.6 weeks
placebo:  h = 21 / 182 = 0.1154 a week, median ln 2 / 0.1154 = 6.0 weeks

a ratio of 0.1154 / 0.0251 = 4.6. The constant-hazard medians (27.6 and 6.0) are near the curve's (23 and 8) but not on them, which says the hazard was not quite constant.

Cox's model. With X = 1 for placebo, the partial likelihood is highest at beta = 1.572 by Efron's handling of ties (1.509 by Breslow's), a hazard ratio of exp(1.572) = 4.82, with a 95% confidence interval (the range of ratios the data leave plausible) of about 2.1 to 10.8. In words: at every week of remission, a child on placebo was nearly five times as likely to relapse that week as a child on the drug. The log-rank test makes the same point as a test: the placebo group had 21 relapses where 10.75 were expected if the drug did nothing, a chi-square statistic of 16.8 on one degree of freedom; a gap that large would arise by luck about four times in a hundred thousand trials.

Reading it as the entry asks. "Does the drug prevent relapse?" is the whether question, and the honest answer from 35 weeks of data is: we cannot yet say, since the drug curve still stands at 44.8% when the record stops. "Does it delay relapse, and by how much?" is the when question, and the data answer it firmly: the median moves from 8 to 23 weeks, and the hazard falls to about a fifth (1 / 4.82 = 0.21). Replace children with borrowers, relapse with default and the drug with a covenant, and this is exactly the analysis the entry asks a credit investor to make.

The usual mistakes
  1. Dropping the cases still running. Symptom: average durations that look too short, or churn that looks too fast, from a data set full of active customers. Fix: keep every case for as long as it was watched; censored cases add exposure and stay in the risk set until they leave.
  2. Answering whether when the decision turns on when. Symptom: a probability over the life of the deal quoted for a decision with a deadline. Fix: ask which answer changes the decision, and if it is the date, compute the chance inside the horizon from the shape of the hazard.
  3. Assuming the road has no memory. Symptom: a constant churn or default rate applied to a cohort of any age. Fix: plot the hazard by age; early churn, seasoning in loans, and spikes at renewal dates or maturities are the rule.
  4. Measuring the characteristics after the clock started. Symptom: a characteristic that looks protective because only survivors lived long enough to acquire it (customers who bought a second product churn less, but you had to stay to buy it). Fix: measure characteristics at the start, or let them change over time in the model; the entry lists this as a failure.
  5. Reading the hazard ratio as a ratio of probabilities. Symptom: "placebo patients were five times as likely to relapse." Over 23 weeks all of them did. Fix: say "five times the risk at each moment", and turn it into survival curves with S1(t) = S0(t)^HR before quoting a probability.
Where the model breaks

The entry warns that cases still alive at the end of the data get dropped or treated as if the event never comes, and that characteristics measured after the process began mislead; both are the mistakes above. Beyond them, the product-limit curve assumes censoring is uninformative: a case that leaves the record has the same prospects as those who stay. When the riskiest borrowers stop reporting, or the unhappiest customers are the ones whose accounts are moved, the curve is too kind. Cox's model assumes the hazard ratio is the same at every time; a covenant that helps in year one and not in year three breaks it, and the fix is to let the effect vary with time. When two kinds of event compete (a loan can default or be repaid early), treating the other kind as censored answers a hypothetical question, not the practical one. And a model fitted to comparable cases is only as good as the comparison: a maturity wall in 2026 is not a maturity wall in 2009 if rates and lenders differ. That is where the entry sends you to Advisors who have watched the clock run in that industry.

Check yourself
  1. A churn report says: "Of customers who cancelled this year, the average life was 14 months." Why is this not the average life of a customer? Answer: it counts only customers who have already left. Everyone still subscribed is missing, and they are disproportionately the long-lived ones, so the true average is longer. A Kaplan-Meier curve using every customer, with the active ones censored at today's date, fixes it.
  2. Two companies each have a 40% chance of a covenant breach within five years. One's risk is spread evenly, the other's is concentrated in year five. For a three-year holding period, which is riskier, and what one number would you ask for? Answer: the even one. Its five-year cumulative hazard is -ln 0.6 = 0.511, so three years carry (0.511 x 3) / 5 = 0.306 and a chance of 1 - exp(-0.306) = 26.4% inside the holding period, about two thirds of its five-year risk; the other carries almost none. Ask for the hazard by year, or equivalently the chance of a breach within three years.
  3. One hundred loans have a hazard of default of 1% a month for their first twelve months and 4% a month for the next twelve. About how many are still current at 24 months? How many would a flat 1% a month predict? Answer: H(24) = (0.01 x 12) + (0.04 x 12) = 0.60, so S(24) = exp(-0.60) = 0.549, about 55 loans. A flat 1% gives exp(-(0.01 x 24)) = exp(-0.24) = 0.787, about 79. Extrapolating the first year would miss about 24 defaults (78.7 - 54.9 = 23.8).
Teach me more
  • Chapter 7, Survival Models, Germán Rodríguez, lecture notes for Princeton's WWS 509, his course in generalized linear models (revised September 2010, 34 pages). Best for the derivations: the hazard as f(t) / S(t), S(t) = exp(-H(t)), the mean as the area under S, the likelihood for censored data, proportional hazards and the Weibull, then the piecewise exponential model and its equivalence to Poisson regression, with a worked study of infant and child mortality in Colombia. Steps 1, 2, 5 and 6 above, at a graduate pace.
  • Introduction to survival analysis, the lifelines documentation (a web page, about ten minutes). Best for the intuition of censoring: it simulates two populations, shows what the data look like at a cutoff, and then reveals the true lifetimes so you can see how much dropping the censored cases understates them. Its companion page, Estimating univariate models, fits Kaplan-Meier and Nelson-Aalen curves to how long political leaders stay in office, with code you can run.

Markov chains

The retention number is stable; the transitions are not

We describe the customer base, the loan book, or the pipeline as states and the rates of moving between them, because aggregate figures can look flat while the movements underneath have already turned.

Born to answer
Markov, 1906, counting vowels and consonants in Pushkin.
What it does now
The transitions turning underneath a stable retention number.
The mathematics
p(t + 1) = p(t) P
The full entry
Where it began

Andrey Markov's chains date to 1906, and his first published application was to the sequence of vowels and consonants in Pushkin's verse. The idea that a system's next state depends on its current state and a table of transition probabilities became the workhorse of everything from credit ratings to customer lifecycles.

Why it works now

Aggregate retention has been the number everyone reported because unit-level state histories were tedious to build. They can now be built from a company's own data in hours, with the states defined by the operators who know what at risk really looks like. The Desk asks how many customers who were healthy a year ago are at risk now, and which transition changed most. The number under the number becomes visible.

When it applies

A stable aggregate (net retention, delinquency rate, pipeline conversion) that the client suspects is hiding something; a base that is aging; a pipeline that is filling at the top and emptying in the middle.

What we would ask

Of the customers who were healthy a year ago, how many are at risk now?
Which transition has changed most, and when did it change?

What it needs

Unit-level state histories over several periods; a state definition that the operators agree is real.

How we would get it

The client's data, with the states defined by the operators who know what at risk actually looks like; former operators on which transitions predict the next.

Where it breaks

The process has memory the model ignores; the transitions are estimated from too few moves; the states are defined by the analyst rather than the business.

For example

A software company reports net retention above one hundred and ten percent for six quarters. The transition from expanded to at-risk has doubled in the last three, and the aggregate is held up by expansion in the oldest cohort. The clock is visible in the transitions and invisible in the number.

The mathematics in fullp(t + 1) = p(t) x P with P(i, j) the probability of moving from state i to state j; the long-run mix solves pi = pi x P, and a small rise in the transition out of the healthy state compounds into a large change in the mix a year out. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (matrix models and stochastic processes); DECS-430

Learn the math
The question

A software company reports its customer numbers every quarter, and the investor letter says the same thing it said last year: about 92 percent of the accounts signed a year ago are still customers. The line on the chart is as flat as a table top. The chief financial officer is proud of it, and on the evidence of that line, she should be.

Down the hall, the head of customer success keeps a different list. Every account is tagged each quarter as healthy or at risk: usage falling, the champion gone, the renewal call not returned. She has noticed something the investor letter cannot show. A year ago, about 5 healthy accounts in 100 slipped to at risk in a quarter. This quarter it was 10. Nothing else on her sheet has moved. The lost accounts this quarter number exactly what they did a year ago.

Who is right? Both, for now. The retention line counts accounts that have already left. Her sheet counts the movements that decide who leaves next. This lesson is about reading a business as a set of states and the chances of moving between them, and about why the movements turn long before the totals do. The tool is the Markov chain, and by the end you will be able to compute, by hand, how far the retention line will fall, how long an account now stays, and where the mix of the whole book settles.

The idea in one paragraph

Put every unit of a business in one of a few states: a customer is healthy, at risk or lost; a loan is current, late or defaulted. Each period, every unit either stays where it is or moves, and a table says how likely each move is from each state. The whole book next period is the whole book this period, sent through the table. Two things follow. First, totals are slow: a reported total is a stock, filled and drained by flows, and when one flow doubles, the stock takes several periods to show it. Second, the table itself is the forecast: run it forward and it tells you the mix a year out, how long a unit lasts and where the book settles if the table holds. So the question to ask of a flat total is never only "what is the number?" but "which move changed?"

The math, step by step

Step 1: states and the transition table. Name the states: Healthy (H), At risk (R) and Lost (L). For each pair of states, write P(i, j) for the chance that a unit in state i this quarter is in state j next quarter. Arrange the chances in a table, one row for where a unit starts and one column for where it ends. Here is the company's table a year ago, quarterly:

from \ to      H      R      L
Healthy      0.94   0.05   0.01
At risk      0.30   0.50   0.20
Lost         0      0      1

Read the first row as a sentence: of the accounts healthy this quarter, 94 percent are healthy next quarter, 5 percent are at risk and 1 percent are lost. Each row must sum to 1, because a unit has to end up somewhere. The Lost row says a lost account stays lost; a state you can enter but never leave is called absorbing.

This table is a Markov chain, and it makes one strong assumption, named for Andrey Markov, who studied such chains from 1906: where a unit goes next depends only on where it is now, not on how it got there. An account at risk this quarter has the same 20 percent chance of being lost whether it turned at risk last quarter or three years ago. Hold on to that sentence; it is where the model breaks, and we will come back to it.

This quarter the table changed in one cell. Healthy to at risk went from 0.05 to 0.10, and Healthy to healthy fell from 0.94 to 0.89 to keep the row summing to 1. Everything else is as before.

Step 2: one quarter, then two. Write the book as a row of shares, p(t) = (H, R, L), the fraction of units in each state at quarter t. To get next quarter, ask of each state: where can a unit arrive from? A unit is healthy next quarter if it was healthy and stayed, or was at risk and recovered. So

H(t + 1) = (H(t) x P(H, H)) + (R(t) x P(R, H)) + (L(t) x P(L, H))

and the same for R and L, each using its own column of the table. That is all that matrix multiplication is: the row p(t) times the table P gives the row p(t + 1), written

p(t + 1) = p(t) x P

Take a cohort of 1,000 accounts signed together, all healthy: p(0) = (1, 0, 0). After one quarter, under the old table, the cohort is simply the first row: 940 healthy, 50 at risk, 10 lost. After two:

H(2) = (0.94 x 0.94) + (0.05 x 0.30) = 0.8836 + 0.0150 = 0.8986
R(2) = (0.94 x 0.05) + (0.05 x 0.50) = 0.0470 + 0.0250 = 0.0720
L(2) = (0.94 x 0.01) + (0.05 x 0.20) + (0.01 x 1) = 0.0094 + 0.0100 + 0.0100 = 0.0294

So 898.6 healthy, 72.0 at risk and 29.4 lost, and the three still sum to 1,000. Notice where the second quarter's 19.4 losses come from: 940 x 0.01 = 9.4 from healthy accounts dropping straight out, and 50 x 0.20 = 10 from the 50 that were at risk a quarter earlier. Already the small pool loses more accounts than the large one.

Step 3: a year out, before and after. Repeat the step four times. Under the old table and under the new one, the cohort after one year is:

after 4 quarters      healthy   at risk   lost
old table              838.6      83.8     77.6
new table              733.8     153.2    113.0

The retention line, the share still a customer, reads 92.2 percent against 88.7 percent. The pool at risk is 1.83 times what it would have been. And look at the first quarter: losses were 10 under either table, exactly, because no account was at risk yet, and the only cell that changed feeds the at-risk pool, not the exit. In the second quarter losses were 19.4 under the old table and 28.9 under the new. The change shows up in the losses only after it has filled the pool.

0%10%20%30%40%024681012Quarters since the cohort signedShare of the cohortat risk after a year: 15.3%lost after a year: 11.3%at risk, beforeat risk, afterlost, beforelost, after
The number under the number. One transition doubles. A year later the at-risk pool is 1.83 times what it would have been; the lost share, the figure a retention report shows, has moved three and a half points, and most of the damage is still in the pool, waiting.

Here is the memorable picture. The at-risk pool is a bathtub. Healthy accounts turning at risk are the tap. The tub has two drains: one carries recovered accounts back to healthy, the other empties onto the floor, and water on the floor is lost for good. Each drain passes a fixed share of whatever is in the tub, 30 percent and 20 percent a quarter, so what reaches the floor depends on the level in the tub, not on the tap. The retention line watches only the floor. Open the tap twice as wide, and at first no more reaches the floor than before; the level in the tub rises first, and the floor gets wetter only as it does. Three years out, the cohort has lost 265.0 accounts under the old table and 380.5 under the new. The difference was decided in the quarter the tap opened.

Step 4: how long an account stays. Write t_H for the expected number of quarters an account spends as a customer, healthy or at risk, starting healthy, and t_R starting at risk. Think one quarter ahead. A healthy account is a customer for this quarter, the 1, and then it finds itself healthy, at risk or lost, and carries on from there:

t_H = 1 + (P(H, H) x t_H) + (P(H, R) x t_R)
t_R = 1 + (P(R, H) x t_H) + (P(R, R) x t_R)

The lost state adds nothing, since a lost account spends no more quarters as a customer. These are two equations in two unknowns, and high school algebra solves them. From the second equation under the old table, t_R = 1 + (0.30 x t_H) + (0.50 x t_R), so 0.50 x t_R = 1 + (0.30 x t_H) and

t_R = 2 + (0.6 x t_H)

Put that into the first equation:

t_H = 1 + (0.94 x t_H) + (0.05 x (2 + (0.6 x t_H)))

= 1.1 + (0.97 x t_H)

0.03 x t_H = 1.1,  so  t_H = 36.7 quarters, about 9.2 years, and t_R = 24 quarters

Under the new table the second equation is unchanged, so t_R = 2 + (0.6 x t_H) still holds, and the first becomes

t_H = 1 + (0.89 x t_H) + (0.10 x (2 + (0.6 x t_H))) = 1.2 + (0.95 x t_H)
0.05 x t_H = 1.2,  so  t_H = 24 quarters, 6 years, and t_R = 16.4 quarters

One cell moved by five points, and a new healthy account's expected life fell from 36.7 quarters to 24, by a third (34.5 percent). If a customer is worth so much a quarter, then before any discounting a third of what each new customer is worth just went with it, and no reported number has moved yet.

For readers who know matrices: this is the fundamental matrix of an absorbing chain. Write Q for the part of the table among the states you can leave (here the 2 by 2 block of H and R). Then N = (I - Q)^-1, and its entry in row i, column j is the expected number of quarters a unit starting in i spends in j. Under the old table the healthy row of N is 33.3 quarters healthy and 3.3 at risk, which sum to the 36.7 we found; under the new, 20 and 4, summing to 24. The two equations above are that matrix inverse, done by substitution.

Step 5: where the book settles. A company keeps signing new accounts, so it is worth asking what the whole book looks like if every lost account is replaced at once by a new, healthy one, keeping the book at 1,000. Follow one seat in that book. The seat turns at risk with chance a, the Healthy to at risk cell. (A healthy account that is lost outright, the 0.01, is replaced by a healthy newcomer, so its seat stays healthy.) It returns to healthy with chance b, which now counts two routes: the account recovers (0.30), or it is lost and its seat refilled with a healthy newcomer (0.20). So a = 0.05 and b = 0.50 under the old table, and a = 0.10, b = 0.50 under the new.

Write pi for the share of seats at risk, so the mix of the book is the row (1 - pi, pi). The book is settled when sending that row through the seat's two-state table gives the same row back; this is the Library's pi = pi x P. Since the shares no longer change, the seats flowing into the at-risk state each quarter must equal the seats flowing out:

(1 - pi) x a = pi x b,   so   pi = a / (a + b)

Old table: 0.05 / 0.55 = 9.1 percent at risk. New table: 0.10 / 0.60 = 16.7 percent. Losses per quarter in a settled book of 1,000 are ((1 - pi) x 0.01 x 1,000) + (pi x 0.20 x 1,000): 27.3 under the old table and 41.7 under the new, 1.53 times as many.

How sensitive is the settled mix to the tap? Differentiate pi = a / (a + b) with respect to a by the quotient rule:

d pi / d a = ((a + b) - a) / (a + b)^2 = b / (a + b)^2

At the old table, 0.50 / 0.55^2 = 1.65: near there, each point added to the Healthy to at risk chance adds about 1.65 points to the share of the book at risk, before a single extra loss is counted.

How fast does the book get there? Write the at-risk share next quarter from this quarter: pi(t + 1) = ((1 - pi(t)) x a) + (pi(t) x (1 - b)) = a + ((1 - a - b) x pi(t)). The settled share satisfies the same line, pi = a + ((1 - a - b) x pi). Subtract one from the other:

pi(t + 1) - pi = (1 - a - b) x (pi(t) - pi)

The gap to the settled mix shrinks by the factor (1 - a - b) every quarter, 0.40 under the new table. Starting from the old settled 9.1 percent, the at-risk share runs 13.6, 15.5, 16.2 and 16.5 percent over the next four quarters. Losses follow behind: 27.3 in the quarter of the change, then 35.9, 39.4, 40.7 and 41.3. Meanwhile the number of accounts turning at risk jumped at once, from about 45 a quarter to 91.

02040608010002468Quarters after the changeAccounts per 1,000turning at risk before: 45lost before: 27turning at risk: 91lost a year later: 41turning at risk each quarterlost each quarter
The tap and the drain. The flow into at risk jumps the quarter the transition changes; the losses a report counts follow it only over the next year.
A worked example

Markov and the vowels of Eugene Onegin. In 1913 Andrey Markov took the first 20,000 letters of Pushkin's verse novel Eugene Onegin, the whole first chapter and sixteen stanzas of the second, and sorted every letter into vowel or consonant. It was not a parlor game. Markov had invented his chains in 1906 to answer a rival who claimed that the law of large numbers needs independent events, and the poem was his showcase: real data, plainly dependent, behaving as his chains said it would.

He counted 8,638 vowels and 11,362 consonants. Then he counted how often a vowel came right after a vowel: 1,104 times. So after a vowel, the next letter was a vowel with chance 1,104 / 8,638 = 0.128. Every other vowel had to follow a consonant, 8,638 - 1,104 = 7,534 of them, so after a consonant the next letter was a vowel with chance 7,534 / 11,362 = 0.663. That is a two-state chain:

from \ to      vowel   consonant
vowel          0.128     0.872
consonant      0.663     0.337

If letters were independent, a vowel would follow a vowel 43 percent of the time, as often as vowels occur at all, and about 3,731 of the 19,999 pairs of neighboring letters would be two vowels. Markov counted 1,104, fewer than a third of that. Russian alternates.

Now use Step 5. The chain's settled share of vowels is b / (a + b), where a is the chance of leaving the vowel state (0.872) and b the chance of entering it from a consonant (0.663):

pi = 0.663 / (0.872 + 0.663) = 0.663 / 1.535 = 0.432

Markov's count gives 8,638 / 20,000 = 0.432. The chain, built only from what follows what, recovers how common vowels are. And the speed factor is 1 - a - b = 1 - 0.872 - 0.663 = -0.535, the very difference, 0.128 minus 0.663, that Markov printed in his paper. Being negative, it means the gap from the settled share flips sign every letter: a vowel makes the next letter less likely than usual to be a vowel, which makes the one after more likely. The expected run of vowels is 1 / (1 - 0.128) = 1.15 letters, of consonants 1 / 0.663 = 1.51. (A run continues with the same chance p each letter, so its expected length is 1 / (1 - p).)

Swap vowels and consonants for healthy and at risk, and you have the customer book. The same arithmetic that reads a poem reads a ledger.

The usual mistakes
  • Reading the stock and calling it the flow. Symptom: "retention is flat, so nothing has changed." Fix: retention is the water on the floor. Ask for the transitions, above all the one out of the healthy state, quarter by quarter. Step 3 shows a doubled transition with losses unchanged in the first quarter.
  • Rows that do not sum to one. Symptom: a table built from percentages of the total book, or with lost accounts left out of the row. Fix: each row is the fate of the units that started in that state, and must sum to 1. If it does not, a destination is missing.
  • Building the chain on a cohort and then quoting a settled mix. Symptom: a long-run share quoted for a group with an absorbing state, where everyone is lost eventually. Fix: a cohort with an exit has a lifetime (Step 4), not a settled mix; a book that replaces its losses has a settled mix (Step 5). Say which one you mean.
  • Comparing two quarters of a stock instead of two quarters of a cell. Symptom: the at-risk share is up four or five points and is called a blip. Fix: the share lags the cell. In Step 5 the share rose from 9.1 to 13.6 percent in one quarter because the cell behind it had doubled, and it keeps rising for a year after; ask which cell moved before deciding it is noise.
  • Averaging the table over years. Symptom: one table estimated from five years of moves, presented as today's. Fix: estimate the table year by year. The point of the model is that the table can turn; averaging hides exactly the turn you are looking for.
Where the model breaks

The entry names three ways, and each is a real limit.

First, memory. The chain assumes the future depends only on the present state. Real customers remember: an account that has been at risk for three quarters is usually closer to leaving than one that turned at risk last month. If that is so, the table that pools them will understate the losses to come from an aging pool. The fix is to give memory a state of its own: split At risk into "at risk, first quarter" and "at risk, longer". The chain is again Markov in the new states, at the cost of more cells to estimate.

Second, too few moves. Every cell is estimated from the units that made that move. With 200 healthy accounts, a 5 percent transition is 10 moves, and its standard error is sqrt((0.05 x 0.95) / 200) = 0.015, so a rough 95 percent band runs from about 2 to 8 percent. A doubling to 10 percent stands out; a rise to 8 percent, which is 16 moves against 10, six accounts, cannot be told from noise. With 2,000 accounts the band shrinks to about plus or minus 1 point. Before reading a turn in a cell, count the moves behind it.

Third, states defined by the analyst instead of the business. "At risk" defined as "usage down 20 percent" may be a definition that fits the spreadsheet and not the customers. If the operators who make the renewal calls would not call those accounts at risk, the transitions describe a fiction. The states have to be the ones the people who run the business agree are real, and then the table is theirs, not ours.

And one more, implicit in all of it: projecting with a table assumes the table holds. Steps 3 to 5 run the new table forward as if it will stay. It may not; the turn may reverse. The chain tells you what the present table implies, which is the right question to ask, not a promise of what happens.

Check yourself

1. In Step 3, losses in the first quarter are 10 under both tables. Why does the doubled transition not raise them at once?

Answer: losses come from two cells, Healthy to lost (0.01, unchanged) and At risk to lost (0.20, unchanged). A new cohort starts with nobody at risk, so in the first quarter every loss comes through the Healthy to lost cell, which did not move. The doubled cell feeds the at-risk pool, and the extra accounts in it are lost only in later quarters, through the 0.20 cell.

2. A book that replaces its losses has a = 0.04 and b = 0.36. What share of the book is at risk once it settles? If a rises to 0.06, what then, and what does the derivative say about the first step of that rise?

Answer: 0.04 / (0.04 + 0.36) = 0.04 / 0.40 = 10 percent; then 0.06 / 0.42 = 14.3 percent. The derivative at the start is b / (a + b)^2 = 0.36 / 0.40^2 = 2.25: each point added to a, near 0.04, adds about 2.25 points to the settled share at risk. Two points of a add 4.3 points in fact, a little less than 4.5, because the curve flattens as a grows.

3. A different company's quarterly table: from healthy, 0.90 healthy, 0.08 at risk, 0.02 lost; from at risk, 0.40 healthy, 0.40 at risk, 0.20 lost. How many quarters does a new, healthy account stay a customer, on average?

Answer: from the at-risk equation, t_R = 1 + (0.40 x t_H) + (0.40 x t_R), so 0.60 x t_R = 1 + (0.40 x t_H) and t_R = (1 + (0.40 x t_H)) / 0.60. Put it into t_H = 1 + (0.90 x t_H) + (0.08 x t_R): t_H = 1 + (0.90 x t_H) + 0.1333 + (0.0533 x t_H), so 0.0467 x t_H = 1.1333 and t_H = 24.3 quarters, about six years. Then t_R = (1 + 9.71) / 0.60 = 17.9 quarters.

Teach me more
  • Markov Chains Explained Visually, Victor Powell, with text by Lewis Lehe (Setosa). A short interactive page where you watch a chain hop between states and can edit the table and see it run. The best five minutes for the picture of states and moves. It stops there: no multiplying a book by the table, no settled mix, no absorbing states; Steps 2 to 5 pick up where it leaves off.
  • Markov Chains Clearly Explained! Part 1, Normalized Nerd (YouTube, 9 minutes 24 seconds). A three-state restaurant example, simulated to show long-run frequencies, then the row-times-table step and the settled distribution pi = pi x A. Clear and quick; it solves for the settled mix with an eigenvector, which this lesson replaces with the balance of flows in Step 5.
  • Lecture 18: Markov Chains III, John Tsitsiklis, MIT OpenCourseWare 6.041SC (video, 51 minutes 50 seconds). A master teacher on absorption: the chance of ending in each absorbing state and the expected time to get there, by the same one-step-ahead equations as Step 4. Lecture 17 in the same unit covers the settled mix and the balance equations. University pace; Lecture 18 opens with a review of the settled mix and a telephone-line example (the chance a call is blocked) before it turns to absorption.
  • Introduction to Probability, Charles Grinstead and J. Laurie Snell (free PDF from Dartmouth), Chapter 11, "Markov Chains", pp. 405 to 470. The standard textbook treatment, with absorbing chains from p. 416 and the long-run behavior of chains that never absorb after that. Assumes comfort with matrices; read the absorbing-chain section after Step 4 here.

For the story of the vowels, Brian Hayes, "First Links in the Markov Chain", American Scientist 101(2), 2013, tells it well, and Markov's paper is in English as "An Example of Statistical Investigation of the Text Eugene Onegin Concerning the Connection of Samples in Chains", Science in Context 19(4), 2006, pp. 591 to 600.

Poisson processes

Is six in a quarter a signal or a coincidence?

Complaints, incidents, departures, regulatory inquiries, and outages arrive at a natural rate. When a cluster arrives well above it, we quantify how unusual that is before anyone calls it noise or calls it a crisis.

Born to answer
Bortkiewicz, 1898, on Prussian cavalrymen killed by horse kicks.
What it does now
Whether four executive departures in a quarter is a signal.
The mathematics
P(N = k) = exp(-lt) (lt)^k / k!
The full entry
Where it began

Ladislaus Bortkiewicz applied the Poisson distribution in 1898 to deaths of Prussian cavalrymen from horse kicks, corps by corps and year by year, and showed that rare events arriving at a steady rate produce clusters by chance more often than intuition allows. The same arithmetic says when a cluster is too large to be chance.

Why it works now

A run of executive departures or product incidents was read by gut. The base rate for a company of that kind can now be found from the record, and the events themselves examined for a shared cause, which collapses several events into one. The Desk asks what the normal rate is and where that number comes from, and whether the events shared a cause or only a quarter. Four departures under one new executive is one event with a name.

When it applies

A run of adverse events (executive departures, product failures, customer incidents, regulatory inquiries, security breaches) that the client cannot tell from bad luck.

What we would ask

What is the normal rate of this event for a company of this kind, and where does that number come from?
Did the events share a cause, or only a quarter?

What it needs

The historical rate of the event for this company and its peers; the timing and causes of the recent events.

How we would get it

The record for the base rate; operators and former employees on whether the events are one event or several.

Where it breaks

The window is chosen after the cluster; the events are not independent and the count is inflated; the base rate is assumed rather than found.

For example

Four vice presidents leave a company in one quarter. At the company's historical rate, four in a quarter is very unlikely by chance; the interviews establish that three of the four report to the same new executive, which makes it one event with a name.

The mathematics in fullWith events arriving at rate lambda, P(N(t) = k) = exp(-lambda t) (lambda t)^k / k!, so k events where lambda t were expected has a computable improbability; if the events share a cause they are not independent and the count must be reduced to the number of causes. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (stochastic processes); DECS-430

Dynamic programming

Decide the order before the answer

When a decision recurs over time, the right move now depends on the moves it leaves open later. We work backward from the last decision to the first, which often reverses what looked obvious.

Born to answer
Bellman, 1954: solve the last stage first and work backward.
What it does now
Choosing the first move for the options it leaves open.
The mathematics
V(s, t) = max [ payoff + E V(s', t + 1) ]
The full entry
Where it began

Richard Bellman's dynamic programming, published in 1954, solves a multistage decision by starting from the last stage and working backward, so that each early choice is valued for the choices it leaves open. He later admitted he chose the name partly because his sponsor disliked the word research.

Why it works now

Multiyear programs, capacity plans, and roadmaps have been solved forward, greedily, because working backward required a model of what would be learned at each stage. The stages and what each reveals can now be laid out in a conversation, and operators who ran comparable programs can say where the sequence went wrong. The Desk asks what the last decision in the sequence is and which early choice forecloses the most later ones. The answer often reverses the obvious first step.

When it applies

A multi-year program of investments, a product roadmap, a capacity plan, a phased acquisition; or a client deciding the first step without having thought about the last.

What we would ask

What is the last decision in this sequence, and what does it need to be true when you get there?
Which early choice forecloses the most later ones?

What it needs

The sequence of decisions, what each one forecloses, and what is learned between them.

How we would get it

Operators who have run comparable multi-stage programs on where the sequence went wrong; the record on comparable programs.

Where it breaks

The problem is solved forward, greedily; the value of keeping options open is ignored; the horizon is cut short.

For example

A manufacturer plans three capacity additions over six years. Solved forward, the first is the largest. Solved backward from the demand uncertainty that resolves after the first, the first is the smallest, and the program is cheaper in every scenario but the best one.

The mathematics in fullV(state, t) = max over actions of [ payoff(action, state) + E[V(next state, t + 1)] ], solved from the final period backward; the early action is chosen for the states it leaves reachable, not for its own payoff. Taught in

MECS 560-2; MMSS 300

Sources

Bellman (1954). The theory of dynamic programming. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60(6), 503-515. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1954-09848-8

Committees and institutions

How groups, boards, regulators, and voters actually decide.

The Condorcet jury theorem

A committee is not a single mind

A group of imperfect decision makers can be far better or far worse than its members, depending on whether their errors are independent and on the rule they vote by. We look at how the committee that will decide actually decides.

Born to answer
Condorcet, 1785; Galton's ox at the 1907 country fair.
What it does now
Whether an investment committee is many minds or one.
The mathematics
Majority accuracy rises in n only if errors are independent
The full entry
Where it began

Condorcet proved in 1785 that a majority of independent members who are each more likely right than wrong becomes more reliable as the group grows, and Francis Galton found the same thing at a Plymouth livestock fair in 1907, where the median of nearly eight hundred guesses of an ox's weight came within one percent of the truth. Austen-Smith and Banks showed in 1996 that the result fails when members vote strategically, and later work showed it fails when their errors are correlated.

Why it works now

Presenting to an investment committee has always meant guessing how it decides. How it decides is now researchable: former members of comparable committees can say whether views form independently or after the same senior voice, and the record shows what the committee has done before. The Desk asks whether the members form their views independently and what rule decides. A committee that hears the same expert before voting is one mind with several votes.

When it applies

An investment committee, a board, a credit committee, a panel of buyers, or any group whose decision is the outcome; or a client preparing to present to one.

What we would ask

Do the members form their views independently, or after hearing the same person?
What rule decides: majority, unanimity, or one voice?

What it needs

The committee's rule, its information flow, and the independence of its members' judgments.

How we would get it

Former members of comparable committees on how the decision is really made; the record of the committee's past decisions.

Where it breaks

A committee that hears the same expert before voting is one mind with several votes; unanimity rules are assumed to be conservative when they can be the opposite.

For example

A client will present to an investment committee that requires unanimity. Its members read the same memo and defer to the same senior partner. The research is not the memo; it is what that partner believes, and what would change it.

The mathematics in fulln independent members each right with probability p above one half are right by majority with probability rising toward one in n; with correlated errors the gain vanishes, and under unanimity a strategic voter may vote against private evidence, so the rule shapes the outcome. Taught in

MECS 540-3; MMSS 211-3

Sources

Austen-Smith, Banks (1996). Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review 90(1), 34-45. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082796
Galton (1907). Vox Populi. Nature 75(1949), 450-451. https://doi.org/10.1038/075450a0

Median voter and agenda setting

Whoever sets the agenda sets the answer

In any group that votes, the order in which options come up and the option that stands if nothing passes shape the result as much as the votes do. We find out who controls the agenda and what the default is.

Born to answer
Black, 1948; Romer and Rosenthal, 1978, on school budget votes.
What it does now
Why the obvious option keeps losing a board vote.
The mathematics
Majority rule selects the median ideal point
The full entry
Where it began

Duncan Black showed in 1948 that under majority rule with single-peaked preferences the median voter's preference wins, and Anthony Downs built a theory of party competition on it in 1957. Romer and Rosenthal's 1978 agenda-setter model, which they went on to test against Oregon school budget referenda, showed the other half: whoever sets the agenda, and whatever happens if the proposal fails, can move the outcome a long way from the median. Kenneth Arrow had proved in 1950 that no voting rule escapes all such trouble.

Why it works now

Why the obvious option keeps losing in a board, a rulemaking, or a standards body used to be a mystery attributed to politics. The agenda setter, the default, and the members' rankings can now be established from former participants and from the record of past votes. The Desk asks what happens if nothing passes and who benefits, and who decides what comes to a vote and in what order.

When it applies

A board vote, a shareholder proposal, a regulatory rulemaking, a standards committee, a legislature; or a client who cannot understand why the obvious option keeps losing.

What we would ask

What happens if nothing passes, and who benefits from that?
Who decides which options are put to a vote, and in what order?

What it needs

The decision rule, the status quo, the agenda setter, and the members' rankings of the options.

How we would get it

Former participants in the body on how agendas are really set; the record of past votes and the defaults that prevailed.

Where it breaks

The aggregation rule is chosen by whoever wants the result; preferences are assumed single-peaked when they are not.

For example

A shareholder proposal that most holders support keeps failing. The board controls the agenda and pairs it each year with an alternative that splits its supporters. The research is the pairing, not the support.

The mathematics in fullUnder majority rule with single-peaked preferences the outcome is the median member's ideal point; an agenda setter who controls the alternative to the status quo can move the outcome a long way from the median toward its own. Taught in

MMSS 211-3; MECS 540-3

Sources

Black (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56(1), 23-34. https://doi.org/10.1086/256633
Romer, Rosenthal (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33(4), 27-43. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03187594
Arrow (1950). A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 328-346. https://doi.org/10.1086/256963
Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65(2), 135-150. https://doi.org/10.1086/257897

Political economy of institutions

Regulators and governments are players with payoffs

We treat the regulator, the ministry, or the legislature as an actor with its own incentives, audiences, and commitment problems, and we research those rather than reading the press release.

Born to answer
Fearon, 1994: leaders, audiences, and the cost of backing down.
What it does now
Pricing a regulator as an actor with incentives, not as weather.
The mathematics
The institution best-responds to the audience that punishes it
The full entry
Where it began

James Fearon's 1994 paper on audience costs and his 1995 paper on rationalist explanations for war treated states and leaders as actors with incentives, audiences, and commitment problems rather than as weather. MMSS teaches the same formal political models to undergraduates; Kellogg's political economy sequence teaches them at the doctoral level.

Why it works now

Political and regulatory risk has been priced from headlines because the decision makers inside the institutions were unreachable. Former regulators, former officials, and the advisors who have worked the institution can now be recruited like any other Advisor, and the record shows which provisions survive every budget cycle and which are revised in each. The Desk asks who inside the institution decides and what they answer to.

When it applies

A thesis exposed to a regulatory decision, a subsidy, a tariff, a license, an election, or a policy reversal; or a client trying to price political risk from headlines.

What we would ask

Who inside the institution decides this, and what do they answer to?
What would it cost them to reverse course, and have they paid that cost before?

What it needs

The decision maker's incentives, the audiences in front of which commitments were made, and the history of reversals.

How we would get it

Former regulators, former officials, and the advisors who have worked the institution; the record of comparable decisions and their timing.

Where it breaks

The institution is treated as a monolith; the reversal cost is assumed from rhetoric; the timing is guessed from the calendar.

For example

A renewable developer's returns depend on a tariff regime. The former director of the agency that administers it, interviewed, explains which provisions are politically untouchable and which are revised every budget cycle. The thesis is exposed to the second kind.

The mathematics in fullThe institution's choice is a best response given its payoffs and the audiences that punish reversal; commitment problems and asymmetric information explain policy conflicts that would otherwise be settled by bargaining, and both can be researched. Taught in

MMSS 211-3; MECS 540-2; MECS 540-3

Sources

Fearon (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3), 577-592. https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796
Fearon (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49(3), 379-414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324

Social choice and strategic voting

Governance is a voting game

Shareholder votes, board contests, activist campaigns, and creditor committees are decided by rules, coalitions, and the strategic misreporting of preferences. We model who votes, under what rule, and who can be brought across.

Born to answer
Arrow, 1950; Gibbard, 1973: every rule can be manipulated.
What it does now
Finding the swing holder's real price in a contested vote.
The mathematics
No non-dictatorial rule is immune to manipulation
The full entry
Where it began

Kenneth Arrow's 1950 impossibility theorem showed that no rule for combining individual rankings into a group ranking satisfies a short list of reasonable conditions at once, and Allan Gibbard proved in 1973 that any non-dictatorial rule over three or more options can be manipulated by strategic voting. Shareholder votes, board contests, and creditor committees are the corporate versions.

Why it works now

Contested votes used to be counted by stated positions. The swing holder's real incentives, and what it took to move that holder in comparable situations before, can now be found from former activists, proxy advisors, and governance specialists, and from the record of past votes. The Desk asks which coalition wins under this rule and who the swing is. The research is that holder's price, not the headcount.

When it applies

An activist situation, a contested merger vote, a creditor committee, a founder-control structure, or a governance change that the thesis depends on.

What we would ask

Under this rule, which coalition wins, and who is the swing?
Who might vote against their stated position, and why?

What it needs

The rule, the holders and their preferences, the coalitions available, and the incentives to misreport.

How we would get it

Former activists, proxy advisors, and governance specialists on how comparable votes were won; the record of the holders and their past votes.

Where it breaks

Stated positions are taken as votes; the swing holder's incentives are not researched; the rule is misread.

For example

A merger requires a majority of the minority. The largest minority holder has stated opposition and has also been in a comparable situation twice, both times settling for a small price bump before the vote. The research is that holder's price, not the vote count.

The mathematics in fullAny non-dictatorial rule over three or more options can be manipulated by strategic voting; the outcome is a coalition outcome under the rule, and the swing member's incentives, not the headcount, decide it. Taught in

MECS 540-3; MMSS 211-3

Sources

Gibbard (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica 41(4), 587. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
Arrow (1950). A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 328-346. https://doi.org/10.1086/256963

Public goods and the commons

Everyone benefits, nobody pays

When a group shares an interest and each member gains most by letting the others do the work, the thing does not get done. We ask who bears the cost, who captures the benefit, and what would make contributing individually worthwhile.

Born to answer
Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968.
What it does now
Why the consortium everyone wants goes unfunded.
The mathematics
Contribute only when the share B/n exceeds the cost c
The full entry
Where it began

Paul Samuelson wrote down the mathematics of a good that everyone consumes and nobody can be excluded from in 1954, and showed why the market underprovides it. Mancur Olson's 1965 book explained why large groups with a shared interest fail to act on it while small groups with concentrated stakes do, and Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay on the commons made the overuse of a shared resource the most cited example in the field.

Why it works now

Whether a consortium, a standard, or a shared piece of infrastructure will actually get funded has always been a matter of reading personalities. The distribution of stakes can now be mapped from the record, and former participants in comparable efforts can say why they held or failed. The Desk asks who pays for this and what they get that the free riders do not, and whether a small group has enough at stake to carry it alone.

When it applies

A consortium, standards body, industry association, shared infrastructure, open-source dependency, or joint venture that everyone wants and nobody funds; a common resource being run down.

What we would ask

Who pays for this, and what do they get that the free riders do not?
Is there a small group whose stake is large enough to carry it alone?

What it needs

The distribution of stakes across members, the cost of contributing, and whether contribution can be observed and rewarded.

How we would get it

Former participants in comparable consortia and shared efforts on why they held or failed; the record of who funded what.

Where it breaks

Assuming shared interest produces shared action; ignoring that small groups with concentrated stakes act and large groups with diffuse ones do not.

For example

A thesis depends on an industry standard being adopted. Every firm wants the standard and every firm gains most by waiting for the others to bear the switching cost. The three largest have enough at stake to move alone, and the research is whether they will.

The mathematics in fullEach member contributes c and the group gains B shared by n; a member contributes only when its share B/n exceeds c, so large groups with diffuse benefits underprovide, and a common resource is overused because each user bears 1/n of the damage it causes. Taught in

MMSS 300; MMSS 211-1; MMSS 211-2

Sources

Hardin (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859), 1243-1248. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
Samuelson (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics 36(4), 387. https://doi.org/10.2307/1925895
Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. (book)

The economic theory of regulation and capture (Stigler; Peltzman; Laffont and Tirole)

Regulatory capture: whose side is the rule-maker on?

We treat a moat made of a rule as a moat owned by whoever controls the rule. George Stigler argued in 1971 that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry it governs and run mainly for its benefit, because a few firms with large stakes organize while millions with small stakes do not; Sam Peltzman showed that a regulator seeking support balances the groups in front of it rather than serving one alone, and Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole that capture is worth buying where the agency knows what its overseer does not. We ask four things of any profit that rests on a rule: who writes, enforces and can withdraw it; who pays for the regulator and where its senior staff go next; who loses from the rule and whether they are organized; and how often rules like it have been withdrawn. Then we value the profit with a yearly chance that the rule goes, because a rule can be unwritten by the office that wrote it.

Born to answer
Stigler, 1971: regulation acquired by the industry it governs; Laffont and Tirole, 1991.
What it does now
Whose side the rule-maker is on, and what a moat made of a rule is worth.
The mathematics
V = profit / (r + h); each payer bears T / N, each recipient gains T / n
The full entry
Where it began

George Stigler opened his 1971 paper with the state's power to coerce, to tax, to license and to fix prices, as a resource an industry can acquire, and the thesis that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit; he drew his evidence from state limits on truck weights, from occupational licensing, and from the Civil Aeronautics Board, which had not let a new trunk airline begin service since it was created in 1938. Richard Posner (1974) set the public interest and interest group theories side by side; Sam Peltzman (1976) generalized Stigler's model so that the regulator balances the groups whose support it needs; Gary Becker (1983) made regulation an equilibrium among competing pressure groups; and Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991) asked what an overseer should do when its agency knows more than it does and the industry would pay for that knowledge. Political scientists had come first, Marver Bernstein's life cycle of regulatory commissions (1955) among them, and the deregulation of airlines, trucking and telecommunications showed that captured rules can be undone. Daniel Carpenter and David Moss, editors of Preventing Regulatory Capture (2014), argued that capture is often presumed rather than shown, that strong and weak capture differ, and that capture can be measured and limited.

Why it works now

Who funds a regulator, where its staff go, who lobbied and commented on a rule and how long comparable rules lasted were once known only to insiders. Lobbying disclosures, comment dockets, agency budgets and public career records are now searchable, so how much of a profit rests on a rule, who stands behind the rule, and what the profit is worth under two or three chances of withdrawal can be computed outside the conversation. How the people inside an agency weigh the interests in front of them is still known best to those who have worked there.

When it applies

A thesis whose profits rest on a rule rather than on the product: a score, test or standard that a regulator or a government-sponsored buyer requires; a license, a certificate of need or a cap on the number of sellers; a tariff, a reimbursement rate or a mandated product; a regulator funded by fees from the firms it oversees; or a contest over which regulator governs a new product, such as the dispute between Kalshi, an exchange for event contracts overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and state gaming regulators, where licensed sportsbooks and tribes have stakes of their own (a live dispute, named here only as an example of the question; the entry takes no side). Not to be confused with regulatory-and-political-risk, which treats a regulator as a player with payoffs and audiences and asks what it will decide next; raising-rivals-costs, which asks whether an incumbent is using a rule to handicap a rival; collective-action, which explains why a large group with small stakes does not organize; or agenda-and-median, which reads how control of the choices put to a vote decides the outcome: this asks whose side the rule-maker is on, and how long a profit made by a rule will last.

What we would ask

Who writes, enforces and can withdraw the rule that protects these profits, who pays for that regulator, and where have its senior staff gone after leaving?
Who loses from the rule, are they organized, and has this rule-maker, or one like it, recently withdrawn or diluted a rule of the same kind?

What it needs

The rule and its history (who proposed it, who commented, when it was last revised); the regulator's funding and the career paths of its senior staff; the lobbying and comment record; the parties that lose from the rule and whether they are organized; the record of comparable rules withdrawn or diluted; and the share of the company's profit that depends on the rule.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the rule, the docket of comments, the regulator's budget and fee sources, lobbying disclosures and public career records, computes how much of the profit the rule protects, and values that profit under two or three yearly chances of withdrawal. What the record cannot show is how the people inside the agency weigh the interests in front of them; former staff of the regulator, former government affairs officers of the regulated firms and of the firms the rule keeps out, and the advisers who have argued before the agency know that.

Where it breaks

Capture inferred from the fact that a rule favors an incumbent: many rules that help incumbents also protect customers (a safety standard, a capital requirement, a licensing examination), and the test is whether the rule's benefit to the public would justify it if the incumbent gained nothing; the revolving door read as proof of favor, when Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014) found the flows of bank regulators into industry inconsistent with a quid pro quo, Agarwal, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014) found no support for the revolving door as the reason state supervisors were more lenient, and Kempf (2020) found that the prospect of a bank job made rating analysts more accurate; one study taken as settled, when Correia (2014) found politically connected firms less likely to face SEC enforcement actions and Heese, Khan and Ramanna (2017) found them more likely to receive SEC comment-letter reviews; Stigler's 'as a rule' read as a law, when the deregulation of airlines, trucking and telecommunications from the late 1970s went against industries the old rules had protected; and a rule treated as permanent because it is old.

For example

A rule that keeps $500 million a year of profit for a few firms is worth, discounted at 8 percent, $500 million / (0.08 + h), where h is the yearly chance that the rule is withdrawn: $5,000 million if that chance is 2 percent, about $2,778 million if it is 10 percent. The profits have not changed, but 44.4 percent of their value has gone with a change in the rule-maker's mind. Why such a rule lasts is the arithmetic of concentrated stakes: if it costs each of 50 million households $2 a year and gives each of five firms $20 million a year, the same $100 million is not worth an afternoon of any household's time and is worth a lobbying budget to every firm. Fair Isaac's Classic FICO score was for decades the score required on the mortgages Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy. Their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, said in July 2025 that they would accept VantageScore 4.0, opened that score to all lenders on 3 September 2026 and put the two scores on one pricing grid on 28 September 2026; Fair Isaac's shares fell about 16.7 percent on 4 September (from about $1,119 to $932) and 26.5 percent on 29 September, about 38.8 percent across the two days. The research question for any such moat is the one the market answered late: who could change the rule, and what would make them want to.

The mathematics in fullA profit p a year that lasts until the rule protecting it is withdrawn, with a constant yearly hazard h, is worth V = p / (r + h) at discount rate r: the survival model's exit rate is added to the discount rate, so a change in the hazard from h1 to h2 changes the value by the factor (r + h1) / (r + h2). Who organizes: a transfer T spread over N payers and n recipients costs each payer T / N and gives each recipient T / n, and a group acts when its members' stake exceeds the cost of organizing (Stigler 1971; Olson 1965). Peltzman (1976): a regulator maximizing political support, which rises with the regulated firms' profit and falls with the price consumers pay, chooses a price between the competitive and the monopoly price, so neither side gets all it wants. Laffont and Tirole (1991): an agency that knows something its overseer does not can sell that knowledge to the industry; the remedy is to lower the stakes that make capture worth buying, at the cost of weaker incentives for the regulated firm. Becker (1983): competing pressure groups reach an equilibrium that favors the group whose pressure is cheapest to produce, and rising deadweight costs strengthen the taxpayers' side. Where it comes from

Stigler (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science; Posner (1974), Theories of Economic Regulation, the same journal; Peltzman (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and Economics; Becker (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Laffont and Tirole (1991), The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Dal Bó (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy; Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965); Bernstein's life cycle of regulatory commissions (1955); Carpenter and Moss, editors, Preventing Regulatory Capture (2014); The evidence on the revolving door and on influence: Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014); Agarwal, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2014); Correia (2014); Heese, Khan and Ramanna (2017); Kempf (2020); The Fair Isaac dates and share price moves are from the Federal Housing Finance Agency's announcements and the market record as gathered in Vista's research files; the hazard arithmetic is Vista's formalization

Sources

Stigler (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160
Posner (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2), 335. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003113
Peltzman (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics 19(2), 211-240. https://doi.org/10.1086/466865
Becker (1983). A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371. https://doi.org/10.2307/1886017
Laffont, Tirole (1991). The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), 1089-1127. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937958
Dal Bó (2006). Regulatory Capture: A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj013
Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, Trebbi (2014). Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking . The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(2), 889-938. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju003
Lucca, Seru, Trebbi (2014). The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. Journal of Monetary Economics 65, 17-32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.05.005
Correia (2014). Political connections and SEC enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(2-3), 241-262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.004
Heese, Khan, Ramanna (2017). Is the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviews. Journal of Accounting and Economics 64(1), 98-122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.06.002
Kempf (2020). The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 135(1), 41-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.012
Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. (book)
Carpenter and Moss, editors (2014). Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It. Cambridge University Press. (book)

The Taylor rule on a New Keynesian base (Taylor; Woodford; Wicksell)

Reading the Fed: the rate rule, the neutral rate and the output gap

We set the policy rate a simple rule would call for, then compare it with the rate the central bank has set and the path the market expects, and ask what the gap says. In the form John Taylor set down in 1993, the rate equals the neutral real rate, plus inflation, plus half of inflation's distance from the target, plus half of the output gap, the distance of output from what the economy could produce without straining prices. Michael Woodford's work (Interest and Prices, 2003; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) gives the rule a foundation: households spend according to the expected path of real interest rates, firms that cannot change prices often set them according to expected demand, and the central bank follows a rule for its rate, so a rule that raises the real rate when inflation rises (the Taylor principle) keeps inflation from running away. The neutral rate is Knut Wicksell's natural rate (1898), the real rate that neither speeds up nor slows the economy. The foundation also carries a sharp lesson: after a supply shock such as an energy price jump, measured output falls, but the output the economy could reach if prices adjusted freely falls further, so a rule that raises the rate can be right even as output drops.

Born to answer
Wicksell, 1898: the natural rate; Taylor, 1993: a rule that fit the Fed; Woodford, 2003: its foundation.
What it does now
What rate the rule gives, and how wide its error is.
The mathematics
i = r* + pi + 0.5 (pi - pi*) + 0.5 y; the range of the answer is the range of r* plus b times the range of y
The full entry
Where it began

Knut Wicksell argued in 1898 that prices rise when the bank rate sits below a natural rate that equates saving and investment, and fall when it sits above. John Taylor, in 1993, set down a rule that described the Fed's rate since 1987 with a handful of numbers and became the shorthand for how a central bank should respond. Michael Woodford gave the rule a foundation: in Interest and Prices (2003), built on his papers with Julio Rotemberg in the 1990s, households and firms look ahead, prices are sticky, and the central bank's rule is the third equation. Calvo's 1983 model of staggered prices supplies the sluggish prices, and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) showed how it rewrites the old argument about rules. The Royal Swedish Academy named the foundation, with Robert Hall's consumption work, in the 2026 prize in economic sciences.

Why it works now

A rate rule used to be a lecture. Inflation, output, estimates of the neutral rate and the market's expected path are now public and dated, so a rule can be run at the central inputs and at the ends of the ranges in code, and the gap between the rule and the policy rate can be set beside the width of its error. Whether the committee weights the unobserved inputs as the rule assumes is still known best to the people in the room.

When it applies

A question about what rate a central bank should have set, how far the market's expected path sits from a rule, or whether a rate rise after an energy or tariff shock is a mistake or the textbook response; a rate-sensitive position (banks, homebuilders, utilities, long-duration growth stocks) read against the rate path; a Fed scenario in which the rate and the reasons for it must be separated. Not to be confused with feedback-and-delay, which asks how a system oscillates when a correction arrives late, or regulatory-and-political-risk, which asks how a rule change by a government changes a company's position: this asks what rate a stated rule implies and how much room the unobserved inputs leave.

What we would ask

What rate does the rule give at the central inputs, and how far does it move when the neutral rate and the output gap are each given a plausible range?
Is the gap between the rule and the policy rate or the market's path large compared with that range, and does a supply shock explain it?

What it needs

The policy rate and the market's expected path (futures or the central bank's projections); inflation on the measure the bank targets and its target; an estimate of the output gap and of the neutral real rate, each with a stated range, preferably with the real-time vintage the bank itself saw; and the weights on inflation and the gap the rule uses.

How we would get it

The Desk works the rule at the central inputs and at the ends of the ranges for the neutral rate and the gap, and sets the policy rate and the market's path beside the result. It does not say what the central bank will do. What the filings and data cannot show is how the committee itself weighs the unobserved inputs and the risks around them; people who have sat on or staffed such a committee, or who build the bank's own estimates of the gap and the neutral rate, know that.

Where it breaks

A rule describes what a central bank has tended to do; it never predicts the next decision, and a committee that departs from it is not thereby wrong. Neither the neutral rate nor the output gap is observed: estimates of the neutral rate carry wide error bands (Laubach and Williams, 2003), and revisions to the estimated gap are as large as the gap itself (Orphanides and van Norden, 2002), so a rule run on today's numbers can read differently once they are revised (Orphanides, 2001). The weights are conventions, not constants; estimated rules changed after 1979 (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). Near the zero lower bound the rule can call for a negative rate and cannot be followed (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). The simple model has no trade-off between inflation and the gap; with real wage rigidity one appears (Blanchard and Gali, 2007), so a rate rise after a supply shock is a judgment about that trade-off, not a theorem. Neutral on politics and on the independence of the central bank.

For example

Take a neutral real rate of 2 percent, an inflation target of 2 percent, inflation at 3 percent and no output gap. The rule gives 2 + 3 + 0.5 x (3 - 2) + 0.5 x 0 = 5.5 percent. The real rate it implies is 5.5 - 3 = 2.5 percent, above the 2 percent neutral rate, which is the Taylor principle at work: the nominal rate rises by more than the rise in inflation. If the neutral rate is really 1 percent the rule gives 4.5 percent, and if it is 3 percent, 6.5 percent; with an output gap of -2 instead of 0 the rule gives 4.5 percent. Letting both unknowns range, with the neutral rate from 1 to 3 percent and the gap from -2 to 0, the rule's answer spans 3.5 to 6.5 percent, three full points. A policy rate of 4.0 percent sits 1.5 points below the central 5.5 percent and inside that band, so the gap alone does not show the rate is too low. A supply shock shows the lesson: with inflation at 4 percent and measured output 1 point below trend the rule gives 6.5 percent. If the output the economy could reach with free price adjustment fell 2 points below trend, the welfare-relevant gap is -1 - (-2) = +1 point, so the economy is running above what it can sustain even though measured output is down, and a rise is the textbook call. These are Vista's illustrations with stated inputs, not a reading of any actual decision.

The mathematics in fullTaylor's form: i = r* + pi + a (pi - pi*) + b y, with r* the neutral real rate, pi inflation, pi* the target, y the output gap, and a = b = 0.5 in Taylor's 1993 example. The real rate is i - pi = r* + a (pi - pi*) + b y, which exceeds r* whenever pi exceeds pi* and y is not far negative; the Taylor principle is that the coefficient on inflation, 1 + a, exceeds 1. In the New Keynesian system, x_t = E x_(t+1) - sigma (i_t - E pi_(t+1) - r^n_t) and pi_t = beta E pi_(t+1) + kappa x_t, with x the gap, r^n the natural rate and kappa the slope of the Phillips curve linking the gap to inflation (Calvo's staggered pricing, 1983; Gali and Gertler, 1999); the rule closes the system and the Taylor principle makes the equilibrium determinate (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003). A supply shock moves the natural rate of output as well as actual output, so what matters is the gap between them. Uncertainty in r* and y passes through the rule one for one and by the weight b: the rule's range is the sum of the range of r* and b times the range of y, here 2 + 0.5 x 2 = 3 points. Where it comes from

Taylor (1993), Discretion versus policy rules in practice, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; Wicksell, Interest and Prices (1898; English 1936); Woodford, Interest and Prices (2003); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000); Gali, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle; Building blocks: Calvo (1983), staggered prices; Gali and Gertler (1999) on inflation dynamics; Blanchard and Gali (2007) on the trade-off; What the rule cannot see: Laubach and Williams (2003); Orphanides (2001); Orphanides and van Norden (2002); Eggertsson and Woodford (2003); The worked figures are Vista's illustration with stated inputs

Sources

Woodford (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press. (book)
Rotemberg, Woodford (1997). An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12, 297-346. https://doi.org/10.1086/654340
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999). The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature 37(4), 1661-1707. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.4.1661
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000). Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 147-180. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554692
Laubach, Williams (2003). Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4), 1063-1070. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303772815934
Orphanides (2001). Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data. American Economic Review 91(4), 964-985. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.964
Orphanides, Norden (2002). The Unreliability of Output-Gap Estimates in Real Time. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(4), 569-583. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465302760556422
Blanchard, Gali (2007). Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39(s1), 35-65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00015.x
Eggertsson, Woodford (2003). Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003(1), 139-233. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2003.0010
Wicksell (1898). Interest and Prices: A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money. Macmillan, London, 1936 (translated by R. F. Kahn from Geldzins und Gueterpreise, 1898). (book)
Gali (2015). Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework and Its Applications. Princeton University Press, second edition. (book)

The fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper; Sims; Woodford; Cochrane)

When deficits, not the central bank, set the price level

We ask whether the price level is held by the central bank's control of money and rates or by the government's budget, and we run the budget identity to see what a revision of expected surpluses would do to prices. The fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995; Cochrane, 2023) says the real value of the government's nominal debt must equal the present value of its expected future primary surpluses, the difference between taxes and spending apart from interest. If new spending is not expected to be paid for with future taxes or lower spending, then the real value of the debt is too high, and the price level adjusts upward until it falls to the present value, whatever the central bank intends. The theory also says the opposite regime exists: if the government is expected to adjust surpluses to its debt (a Ricardian regime, in the sense of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001), the central bank can control prices in the usual way. Sargent and Wallace (1981) had made a related point about the limits of monetary control when deficits must be financed. Cochrane (2001) shows that the maturity of the debt decides whether news of deficits shows up as inflation now or later.

Born to answer
Sargent and Wallace, 1981: deficits limit monetary control; Woodford and Sims, 1994 to 1995: the price level equates debt to surpluses.
What it does now
What expected surpluses imply for prices if nothing else adjusts.
The mathematics
B / P = PV of real primary surpluses; P rises by 1 / (1 - f) - 1 when the PV falls by f
The full entry
Where it began

Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace asked in 1981 what happens to a central bank's control of inflation when the government's deficits must be financed, and called the answer unpleasant arithmetic. Eric Leeper (1991) and Christopher Sims (1994) separated the regimes in which monetary policy or fiscal policy anchors the price level. Michael Woodford (1995) showed that the price level can be determinate even if the central bank pegs the rate, because it must equate the real value of government nominal liabilities with the present value of surpluses; John Cochrane (2001, 2023) pressed the theory through inflation history and debt maturity. Willem Buiter (2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) are the leading critics. The Royal Swedish Academy named Woodford's fiscal work as a complement or alternative to the main model of the 2026 prize.

Why it works now

Debt, deficits and the maturity of the Treasury's borrowing used to appear in reports once a year. They are now published daily and monthly, and expected surpluses, long yields and breakeven inflation can be set beside the identity in code. What the authorities themselves expect and intend is still known best to the people who write the budget and run the bank.

When it applies

A scenario of a fiscal or central bank independence crisis; a large new spending program with no stated financing; a rise in long yields and falling bond prices alongside doubts about the budget; a question of whether the dollar, Treasuries, gold or inflation-protected bonds should price a deficit path. Not to be confused with regulatory-and-political-risk, which asks how a rule change by a government alters a company's position, or credible-commitment, which asks whether a promise is believable given its cost to carry out: this asks how a budget identity ties the price level to expected surpluses.

What we would ask

What do the expected primary surpluses, discounted, add up to against the nominal debt outstanding, and is the gap closed by prices, by later taxes and spending, or by lower bond prices?
Which regime does the evidence favor: one in which surpluses respond to debt, or one in which they do not?

What it needs

The amount and maturity of the nominal debt; the path of expected primary surpluses and the rate used to discount them; the share of the debt held by the central bank; the evidence on how surpluses have responded to debt in the past; and a statement of what fiscal and monetary authorities have said about financing.

How we would get it

The Desk writes the debt-valuation identity with the numbers supplied, shows what a stated revision of expected surpluses does to the price level if nothing else adjusts, and then shows the other regime in which later surpluses rise. It does not pick the regime. What the data cannot show is what budget writers and the central bank themselves expect and intend; people who staff budget offices, debt management or a central bank, and who read how markets price the long end, know that.

Where it breaks

The fiscal theory of the price level is a contested view and is presented as one, never as settled. Its critics argue it confuses a budget constraint that must always hold with an equilibrium condition (Buiter, 2002), and that regimes in which surpluses respond to debt are as plausible and fit postwar American data better (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001). The identity says only that something must adjust, and the theory's claim is that in a non-Ricardian regime it is the price level; if taxes and spending adjust, if bond prices fall, or if the central bank resists, the price effect shrinks or disappears. Maturity matters (Cochrane, 2001), and so does the share of the debt in real or foreign-currency terms. The present value of surpluses is not observed and depends on the discount rate. Nothing here predicts a crisis or an inflation rate, and the illustration is a mechanism, not a forecast. Neutral on politics, on any government's budget and on the independence of any central bank.

For example

Let nominal debt be 100 and the present value of expected real primary surpluses be 100, so the price level is 100 / 100 = 1.00. Suppose expectations are revised so that the present value falls 10 percent to 90, and nothing else changes: all the debt is nominal and the central bank does not respond. The price level must rise to 100 / 90 = 1.11, which is 11.1 percent higher, and the real value of the debt falls to 100 / 1.11 = 90, 10 percent lower. A smaller shortfall of 5 percent gives 100 / 95 = 1.053, 5.3 percent higher. In the other regime, if later surpluses are expected to be raised back to 100, the price level stays at 1.00 and the burden falls on taxpayers instead. In practice the burden is shared: with long-term debt, part of the adjustment is a fall in bond prices, and what the market expects the central bank to do changes the split (Cochrane, 2001). The numbers are Vista's illustration of the mechanism with stated assumptions, not a statement about any government's debt.

The mathematics in fullGovernment budget: B_(t-1) / P_t = sum over s of E_t (primary surplus_(t+s) in real terms) / (1 + r)^s, where B is nominal debt, P the price level and r the real discount rate (Woodford, 1995; Cochrane, 2023). Holding B and the surplus path fixed, P = B / PV, so a fall in PV by the fraction f raises the price level by 1 / (1 - f) - 1: f = 0.10 gives 11.1 percent, f = 0.05 gives 5.3 percent. Leeper's classification (1991): when monetary policy is active (it raises the rate more than one for one with inflation) fiscal policy must be passive (surpluses adjust to debt) for a unique stable equilibrium; when fiscal policy is active and monetary policy passive, the budget sets the price level. With long-term bonds the nominal debt value depends on bond prices, so unexpected inflation also lowers the real value of the debt through the bond price (Cochrane, 2001). Where it comes from

Leeper (1991), Equilibria under active and passive monetary and fiscal policies, Journal of Monetary Economics; Sims (1994), A simple model for study of the determination of the price level, Economic Theory; Woodford (1995); Cochrane (2001); Cochrane, The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (2023); Sargent and Wallace (1981); Critics and tests: Buiter (2002); Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001); The worked figures are Vista's illustration of the identity with stated assumptions

Sources

Woodford (1995). Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 43(1), 1-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(95)00038-0
Cochrane (2001). Long-Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Econometrica 69(1), 69-116. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00179
Cochrane (2023). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Princeton University Press. (book)
Sargent (1981). Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Quarterly Review 5(3). https://doi.org/10.21034/qr.531
Buiter (2002). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: A Critique. The Economic Journal 112(481), 459-480. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00726
Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba (2001). Is the Price Level Determined by the Needs of Fiscal Solvency? American Economic Review 91(5), 1221-1238. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1221

Finding the right people

Who knows, who is central, and who occupies the same position in a neighboring world.

Network centrality

The person the information passed through

Instead of asking who had the highest title, we ask who occupied the position through which the relevant information passed, and we put that person on the panel.

Born to answer
Freeman, 1978; Granovetter on weak ties, 1973.
What it does now
Interviewing the analyst everyone called, not the executive who signed.
The mathematics
Ax = lambda x: central when tied to the central
The full entry
Where it began

Linton Freeman's 1978 paper sorted out what centrality means, distinguishing the person with the most ties from the person who sits on the most paths between others. Mark Granovetter had found in 1973 that Boston job seekers heard about their jobs more often from acquaintances than from close friends, because weak ties reach into other circles. Network analysis was a named part of the MMSS curriculum in the 1990s.

Why it works now

Expert search has been keyword search on titles, which finds the people who signed off and misses the person who ran the model and briefed all of them. The map of who talked to whom about a decision can now be built from the first two interviews and the record, and the panel recruited from its center. The Desk asks whose desk the decision crossed and who everyone called.

When it applies

An expert search that has produced impressive titles and thin knowledge; a question about how a decision was really made inside an organization or an industry.

What we would ask

When this was decided, whose desk did it cross, and who did everyone call?
Who is connected to the most people who would know?

What it needs

A map of who talked to whom about the question, built from the first interviews and from the record.

How we would get it

The Research Director builds the map from the first two interviews and the record, then recruits from its center rather than from its org chart.

Where it breaks

The network is drawn from one starting point and finds only that point's contacts; centrality is confused with seniority.

For example

A client wants to understand a pricing decision at a supplier. The senior executives who signed it off know the outcome. The mid-level analyst who ran the model and briefed all of them knows the reasoning, and is the interview.

The mathematics in fullDegree centrality counts a person's ties; eigenvector centrality solves A x = lambda x so a person is central when tied to central people; the boundary of the network drawn decides whose centrality is being measured. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (network analysis and centrality)

Sources

Freeman (1978). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social Networks 1(3), 215-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7
Bonacich (1987). Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures. American Journal of Sociology 92(5), 1170-1182. https://doi.org/10.1086/228631
Granovetter (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 78(6), 1360-1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469

Structural equivalence

The expert on a market that has no experts

When a market is too new or too small to have experts, we look for people who occupy the same structural position in a neighboring industry and have solved the same problem in different clothes.

Born to answer
Lorrain and White, 1971: same position, no direct tie.
What it does now
Finding an expert for a market that has none.
The mathematics
Distance d(i, j) is small when tie patterns match
The full entry
Where it began

Lorrain and White's 1971 paper defined structural equivalence: two people occupy the same position in a network when they have the same pattern of ties to everyone else, whether or not they know each other. The idea let sociologists find roles rather than names, and it is the formal version of noticing that an exchange operator and a cloud capacity allocator are solving the same problem.

Why it works now

A first-of-kind market has no experts, and the search used to stop there. The question can now be restated as a structure, a liquidity manager, an allocator of a scarce shared resource, a two-sided market operator, and the industries where that structure is mature can be searched for the people who have solved it. The Desk asks what problem the business actually solves, stripped of its industry vocabulary, and who has solved that exact problem somewhere else.

When it applies

A first-of-kind market, technology, or business model where the usual expert search returns nobody with direct experience.

What we would ask

What problem does this business actually solve, stripped of its industry vocabulary?
Who has solved that exact problem somewhere else?

What it needs

A structural description of the role or problem, independent of the industry, and a search across industries for the same structure.

How we would get it

The Research Director restates the question as a structure (a liquidity manager, an allocator of a scarce shared resource, a two-sided market operator) and recruits from the industries where that structure is mature.

Where it breaks

The analogy is superficial; the structural match is asserted rather than checked against the mechanics.

For example

A client is underwriting a marketplace for a resource that has never been traded. There are no experts on that marketplace. There are exchange operators, transportation network planners, and cloud capacity allocators who have run the same coordination problem, and two of them are the panel.

The mathematics in fullTwo actors are structurally equivalent when their patterns of ties match, d(i, j) = sqrt of sum over k of (A(i, k) - A(j, k))^2 small, whether or not they are connected to each other; the search is for small d across industries, not for shared keywords. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (structural equivalence and network roles)

Sources

Lorrain, White (1971). Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1(1), 49-80. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1971.9989788

Cultural consensus analysis

Several partial accounts, one reconstructed fact

When nobody saw the whole thing, we interview several people who each saw part, and we recover the fact from the pattern of their agreement rather than from any one account.

Born to answer
Romney, Weller and Batchelder, 1986, in anthropology.
What it does now
Rebuilding what happened from several partial accounts.
The mathematics
Agreement between sources estimates each one's competence
The full entry
Where it began

The cultural consensus model of Romney, Weller, and Batchelder in 1986 solved the anthropologist's problem of informants who each know part of the culture and none of whom can be checked against an answer key: the pattern of agreement among them estimates each one's competence and recovers the consensus. It is, in effect, a method for reconstructing a fact from several partial accounts.

Why it works now

Finding out what really happened inside a company or a deal has always meant interviewing several people who each saw a piece, and then trusting the most vivid one. Parallel structured interviews that ask each about the same facts can now be run and compared systematically, so the overlap scores the accounts and the contested facts are weighted by it. The Desk asks who saw which part and where the accounts overlap.

When it applies

A question about what really happened inside a company, a deal, or a negotiation, where every available source saw only a piece and some have reasons to shade it.

What we would ask

Who saw which part of this, and where do their accounts overlap?
On the parts that overlap, do they agree?

What it needs

Several sources with different vantage points and, ideally, no coordination; a structured interview that asks each about the same facts.

How we would get it

Parallel structured interviews; the synthesis scores each source by agreement with the others on the overlapping facts and weights the contested facts accordingly.

Where it breaks

The sources have coordinated; the overlap is too small to estimate agreement; one source dominates the synthesis by being vivid.

For example

A client wants to know why a competitor abandoned a product line. The former product head, the former CFO, and a former channel partner each saw part of it. On the facts all three saw, two agree and one does not, and the reconstruction weights the contested facts toward the two.

The mathematics in fullWith independent informants, the agreement between each pair estimates each informant's competence, and the consensus answer to each question is recovered by weighting each informant by that competence, without knowing the answers in advance. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (informant accuracy)

Sources

Romney, Weller, Batchelder (1986). Culture as Consensus: A Theory of Culture and Informant Accuracy. American Anthropologist 88(2), 313-338. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1986.88.2.02a00020

The gravity model

Who will trade with whom

Interaction between two parties scales with their size and falls with the distance between them, and distance can be commercial, institutional, or cultural as well as geographic. We use it to predict partnerships, encroachment, and where a customer will migrate.

Born to answer
Tinbergen, 1962, predicting trade from size and distance.
What it does now
Which distance actually binds: regulation, systems, or miles.
The mathematics
F = G x M(i)^a x M(j)^b / D^c
The full entry
Where it began

Jan Tinbergen borrowed Newton's gravity in 1962 to predict trade between countries from their sizes and the distance between them, and it fit remarkably well. Anderson and van Wincoop's 2003 paper resolved the border puzzle, why Canadian provinces traded so much more with each other than with equally close American states, by showing that relative trade costs, not miles, are the distance that matters. Gravity models were in the MMSS curriculum of the mid-1990s.

Why it works now

The insight for an investor is that distance can be regulatory, cultural, or institutional, and those distances were never measured because nobody could. Operators can now say which dimension of distance actually binds in a market, and the record of past interactions can be fitted to find out. The Desk asks what the real distance is between two parties, and who is large and close that the plan ignored.

When it applies

A question about which buyers a seller will reach, which partners will form, which competitor will encroach on which territory, or where an expansion will succeed.

What we would ask

Between these two, what is the real distance: geography, regulation, relationships, language, or systems?
Who is large and close, and therefore likely, that the plan has ignored?

What it needs

Sizes of the parties and a defensible measure of the distances between them on the dimensions that matter here.

How we would get it

Operators on which dimensions of distance actually bind in this market; the record of past interactions for the fit.

Where it breaks

Distance is measured on the dimension that is easy to measure rather than the one that binds; the fit is extrapolated outside the data.

For example

A distributor plans expansion into an adjacent region on the strength of proximity. The binding distance is not miles but a certification regime that its current customers do not require and the new ones do; the model, once the right distance is used, points at a different region.

The mathematics in fullF(i, j) = G x M(i)^a x M(j)^b / D(i, j)^c, with D a weighted combination of geographic, commercial, institutional, and network distance; the weights are the research question. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (gravity models)

Sources

Anderson, van Wincoop (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle. American Economic Review 93(1), 170-192. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321455214

Allocating scarce things

Where budget, capacity, slots, and attention should go, often with an exact answer.

Linear programming

The research budget is itself an allocation

Given a budget, a deadline, and a cap on interviews, we choose the set of studies that buys the most decision value inside the constraints, and we tell you which constraint is costing you the most.

Born to answer
Kantorovich, 1939, planning a Leningrad plywood trust.
What it does now
Choosing the studies that buy the most decision inside a deadline.
The mathematics
max sum of EVSI(q) x(q) subject to cost and time
The full entry
Where it began

Leonid Kantorovich invented linear programming in 1939 to plan production at a Leningrad plywood trust, and his 1960 paper in Management Science brought the work to the West; George Dantzig's simplex method made it computable for the United States Air Force after the war. The shadow price, what one more unit of a constraint is worth, was there from the start.

Why it works now

A research engagement is an allocation of a budget and a deadline across candidate studies, and it has never been solved as one. It can be: each study's value to the decision, cost, and time can be laid out and the plan solved, with the shadow price of the deadline reported. The Desk asks what the budget and the deadline really are, and what one more week would be spent on. The report names the workstreams left out and what they would have cost.

When it applies

An engagement, or a client's own diligence, with more candidate questions than time or money; a client asking whether to enlarge the budget.

What we would ask

What is the deadline and what is the budget, really?
If we could add one more week or one more interview, what would you want it spent on?

What it needs

For each candidate study: its value to the decision, its cost, and its time; the binding constraints.

How we would get it

The research plan is solved as an allocation; the shadow price of the deadline and the budget is reported, which is the argument for or against enlarging the engagement.

Where it breaks

The objective is information rather than decision value; a constraint is invented to force the plan.

For example

Six workstreams, a fixed fee, and seventy-two hours. Four fit. The two left out are named in the report with what they would have cost and what they might have changed, so the client can buy them if the decision warrants.

The mathematics in fullChoose x(q) in {0, 1} to maximize the sum of EVSI(q) x x(q) subject to the sum of cost(q) x x(q) at most the budget and the sum of time(q) x x(q) at most the deadline; the shadow price of each constraint is the gain from relaxing it by one unit. Taught in

MECS 560-1; MECN-451

Sources

Kantorovich (1960). Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production. Management Science 6(4), 366-422. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.366

Constrained optimization

Write down the constraints and the answer often falls out

Where should the capital, the capacity, the inventory, or the people go? Many such questions have exact answers once the objective and the constraints are written down honestly, and writing them down is most of the work.

Born to answer
Kantorovich and Dantzig; the shadow price of a binding constraint.
What it does now
Where capital and capacity go once the constraints are honest.
The mathematics
At the optimum, gradients of the binding constraints combine
The full entry
Where it began

The same Kantorovich and Dantzig work made allocation a solved problem once the objective and constraints were written down, and MECS teaches the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that generalize it. The lesson that survived seventy years is that writing the constraints down honestly, including the political ones, is most of the work.

Why it works now

Capital has been allocated across divisions by last year's share because the true returns and the binding constraints were never assembled in one place. They can be assembled now, from the client's data and from operators who know which constraints are real and which are habits, and the formal solution can be run as a benchmark for the judgment. The Desk asks what is being maximized, which constraint binds today, and what one more unit of it would be worth.

When it applies

A capital allocation across plants, products, regions, or funds; a capacity decision; an inventory or network design question dressed up as a judgment call.

What we would ask

What are you maximizing, and what are the constraints you cannot relax?
Which constraint is binding today, and what would one more unit of it be worth?

What it needs

The objective stated honestly; the constraints, including the political ones; the data for the coefficients.

How we would get it

Operators on the real constraints and on which are negotiable; the record for the coefficients; the formal solution as a benchmark for the judgment.

Where it breaks

The objective is mis-stated; a constraint is political and unwritten; the solution is applied without the judgment it was meant to inform.

For example

A company allocates capital to its divisions by last year's share. Written as an allocation with the true returns and the covenant constraints, one division should receive nothing and another twice its share; the shadow price on the covenant is the argument for refinancing.

The mathematics in fullMaximize f(x) subject to g(i)(x) at most zero and h(j)(x) equal to zero; at the optimum the gradient of f is a nonnegative combination of the gradients of the binding constraints, and each multiplier is the value of relaxing its constraint by one unit. Taught in

MECS 560-1; MATH 285

Sources

Kantorovich (1960). Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production. Management Science 6(4), 366-422. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.366

Deferred acceptance

Some markets match rather than price

Where the good cannot be priced, who gets which slot, seat, organ, school, or partner is decided by matching rules, and the rules decide who can game the market. We read the rules the way a market designer would.

Born to answer
Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth's redesign of the physician match.
What it does now
Reading a marketplace's matching rules for who they favor.
The mathematics
Stable when no pair would both rather have each other
The full entry
Where it began

Gale and Shapley's 1962 paper on college admissions and stable marriage gave the deferred acceptance algorithm, which always finds a matching no pair would both want to abandon, and showed that the side that proposes gets its best stable outcome. Alvin Roth and Elliott Peranson used it in 1999 to redesign the match that assigns American medical graduates to residencies, and the design has run every year since.

Why it works now

Marketplace and staffing businesses run matching rules that determine who is happy and who churns, and investors have read the churn as a marketing problem. The rules can now be read as a market designer would, the outcomes measured from the platform's data, and operators of comparable markets asked where the rules were gamed. The Desk asks which side proposes and which side has to accept what it is offered.

When it applies

A marketplace, staffing, or platform business whose economics depend on how it matches the two sides; a hiring or admissions process; an allocation with no price.

What we would ask

Which side proposes, and which side has to accept what it is offered?
Can the participants improve their outcome by misreporting what they want?

What it needs

The matching rule, the preferences on both sides, and the complementarities that break stability.

How we would get it

Operators of comparable matching markets on where the rules were gamed; the record of the platform's matching outcomes.

Where it breaks

Participants misreport strategically; couples and complementarities make no stable match exist; the design favors one side without saying so.

For example

A staffing platform's thesis assumes both sides are happy with its matches. Its rule lets clients propose and forces workers to accept the best offer so far. That is the client-optimal stable match, and the workers' churn, which the thesis calls a marketing problem, is the design.

The mathematics in fullA matching is stable when no pair would both prefer each other to their assigned partners; deferred acceptance produces a stable match that is optimal for the proposing side and worst for the other, so the choice of proposer is a distributional decision. Taught in

MECS 560-1; MECS 470

Sources

Gale, Shapley (1962). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly 69(1), 9-15. https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726
Roth, Peranson (1999). The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. American Economic Review 89(4), 748-780. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748

Mean-variance portfolio theory

Attractive on its own, wrong for this portfolio

An investment is not evaluated alone. We ask what it adds to what the client already holds, which depends on how it moves with the rest, especially in the bad states.

Born to answer
Markowitz, 1952: risk is covariance, not standalone variance.
What it does now
What a position adds to the book that already exists.
The mathematics
max w'mu - (lambda / 2) w'Sigma w
The full entry
Where it began

Harry Markowitz's 1952 paper showed that what an asset adds to a portfolio depends on how it moves with the rest, not on its own risk, and that a set of positions can be chosen to give the most return for a given variance. It was the beginning of modern portfolio theory and of his Nobel.

Why it works now

The theory has always been applied to listed securities with long price histories and almost never to a private position, a lender, or a portfolio company, whose co-movements with the rest of a book are not in any database. They can now be researched: Advisors can say which exposures co-move in that sector and how comparable positions behaved in past stresses, and the client's book can be captured at scoping. The Desk asks what the client already holds that goes wrong in the same states this does.

When it applies

A position that looks attractive standalone but adds sector, rate, regulatory, or liquidity concentration; a client evaluating the deal rather than the portfolio it enters.

What we would ask

What do you already hold that goes wrong in the same states this does?
In the last stress, how did the closest thing you own to this behave?

What it needs

The client's existing exposures and how this position covaries with them, in stressed periods as well as calm ones.

How we would get it

Advisors on the exposures that co-move in this sector; the record on how comparable positions behaved in past stresses; the client's own book captured at scoping.

Where it breaks

Correlations estimated in calm periods and assumed in stressed ones; the position judged on its own merits alone.

For example

A fund likes a specialty lender. Its book already holds two positions that draw on the same wholesale funding market. On its own the lender is fine; in the portfolio it triples an exposure that no one had named, and the research question becomes that funding market.

The mathematics in fullThe contribution of an asset to portfolio risk depends on its covariance with the portfolio, not on its own variance; maximize w'mu - (lambda / 2) x w'Sigma w with the weights summing to one, and re-estimate Sigma in stressed periods. Taught in

MECN-451; DECS-430

Sources

Markowitz (1952). Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance 7(1), 77-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x

The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching model

Search and matching: vacancies and unemployment at the same time

We model a market where finding a counterparty takes time. Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides showed why jobs and job seekers coexist: each side must search, matches form at a rate that depends on how many of each are looking, and the wage is bargained once they meet, so unemployment and vacancies trace a curve, more of one with less of the other, and a tight market slows every hire while a slack one slows every job search. The same structure fits any market where buyers and sellers must find each other: housing, used equipment, recruiting, specialized talent, deals, expert networks. We measure the stocks on both sides, the rate at which matches form, how long each side waits and how the matching rate responds when one side grows, then say what a shift in either stock does to the time to fill, the time to find and the split of the surplus.

Born to answer
Journal of Political Economy and Review of Economic Studies, 1982; Review of Economic Studies, 1994.
What it does now
What a shift in either side of a search market does to waiting times and the split.
The mathematics
M = A u^eta v^(1 - eta); u = s / (s + f(theta))
The full entry
Where it began

George Stigler wrote in 1961 that finding a price takes search, and Peter Diamond showed in 1971 that even a little search cost can give every seller the monopoly price. Diamond's two 1982 papers put search at the center of unemployment: in one, traders on an island who must find each other to exchange coconuts have several equilibria and no unique natural rate of unemployment; in the other, the wage is bargained once a worker and a job have met, so neither side's search is rewarded at its social value. Dale Mortensen had modeled job search since the 1970s, and Christopher Pissarides in 1985 and in Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (1990) assembled the pieces into the model that carries the three names, with the matching function and the curve of unemployment against vacancies named for William Beveridge; Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) made job destruction endogenous too. Arthur Hosios (1990) found the condition for the bargained split to be efficient, Barbara Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) surveyed the estimates of the matching function, and Robert Shimer (2005) showed that the model moves too little over the cycle, which Robert Hall (2005) and Marcus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii (2008) answered in different ways. The three shared the 2010 Nobel Prize in economics.

Why it works now

Stocks and flows of job seekers, vacancies, listings and buyers are published monthly and by platforms daily, so the matching function can be fitted and finding and filling rates, durations and the steady state computed outside the conversation for any search market a portfolio depends on. Why matches fail to form, and what each side will accept, is still known to the recruiters and operators inside it.

When it applies

A staffing, recruiting or marketplace business whose revenue is a flow of matches; a labor shortage or a glut and what it does to wages and hiring times; a company's time to fill critical roles; a housing or used-asset market with inventory and buyers both high; a question whether a tight market will loosen on its own. Not to be confused with matching-markets, which reads the rules of a market that matches without prices (Gale and Shapley); queues-and-littles-law, which gives waiting time from arrivals and the number in the system; or time-to-event, which fits the hazard of one kind of event: this has two sides searching for each other, a matching rate that depends on both stocks, and a bargained price.

What we would ask

How many are looking on each side right now, and how many matches form each month?
When one side doubled in the past, how much did the number of matches rise, and how much longer did the other side wait?

What it needs

The stocks of searchers on each side (unemployed and vacancies, listings and buyers, open roles and candidates), the flow of matches per period, separations or exits, the record of how matches responded when the stocks moved (to estimate the matching function's elasticity), the cost of posting or searching, and the split of the surplus (wages against productivity, fees against value).

How we would get it

The Desk assembles stocks and flows from labor statistics, listings, filings and platform data, fits the matching function, computes finding and filling rates and their durations, and solves the steady state for a shift in either stock. What the data cannot show is why matches fail to form, what each side will accept and how hard each is really searching; recruiters, hiring managers and the people who run the marketplace know that.

Where it breaks

A slow market read as a search market when a price or a rule is what stops it clearing; the matching function fitted on too few episodes, so its elasticity is a guess; the two sides treated as symmetric when one side's search intensity or participation moves; the model's cyclical weakness, that plausible shocks move vacancies and unemployment too little (Shimer 2005; Hall 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008 on the other side); and the steady state applied to a transition, which takes months to arrive.

For example

A labor market has 1,000 workers, 60 of them unemployed, and 40 open jobs. Matches form at half the square root of the product of the two stocks, 0.5 x sqrt(60 x 40) = 24.5 hires a month: 41 percent of the unemployed find work each month, an average spell of 2.4 months, and 61 percent of vacancies fill, an average 1.6 months to fill. With 2.6 percent of jobs ending each month the unemployment rate settles at 2.6 / (2.6 + 40.8) = 6.0 percent, which is where it is. Now employers post 80 vacancies instead of 40. Hires rise to 34.6 a month, up 41 percent for twice the postings, because the pool of workers did not grow; the time to fill a vacancy rises to 2.3 months, the finding rate to 58 percent, and unemployment settles at 4.3 percent. A recruiting firm paid per hire sees 41 percent more revenue and each client waiting 40 percent longer.

The mathematics in fullMatches per period M = A u^eta v^(1 - eta), with u unemployed and v vacancies (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001 find constant returns and eta near one half); tightness theta = v / u; the job finding rate is f = M / u = A theta^(1 - eta) and the vacancy filling rate q = M / v = A theta^(-eta), with mean durations 1 / f and 1 / q. With separations at rate s, the steady state is u / L = s / (s + f(theta)), the Beveridge curve. The wage is the Nash split of the match surplus, w = beta (p + c theta) + (1 - beta) z in Pissarides's form, with p productivity, c the vacancy cost and z the value of not working; job creation sets the cost of a vacancy equal to the expected profit of a filled job, c / q(theta) = (1 - beta)(p - z) / (r + s). Hosios (1990): the split is efficient only when beta equals the elasticity eta. Where it comes from

Diamond (1982), Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy, and Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium, Review of Economic Studies; Diamond (1971), A model of price adjustment, Journal of Economic Theory, the paradox before them; Mortensen (1986), Job search and labor market analysis, Handbook of Labor Economics; Pissarides (1985), Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacancies, and Real Wages, American Economic Review; Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies; Pissarides, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (2000), chapter 1 on the matching function, the Beveridge curve and wage bargaining; Hosios (1990) on efficiency; Burdett and Mortensen (1998) on wage dispersion; Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Elsby, Michaels and Ratner (2015), the surveys; Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), Journal of Economic Literature; Shimer (2005), Hall (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), American Economic Review: the cyclical puzzle and its answers; The Nobel lectures of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides, American Economic Review (2011)

Sources

Diamond (1982). Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 90(5), 881-894. https://doi.org/10.1086/261099
Diamond (1982). Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium. The Review of Economic Studies 49(2), 217. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297271
Mortensen, Pissarides (1994). Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 397-415. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896
Hosios (1990). On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 279. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297382
Petrongolo, Pissarides (2001). Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function. Journal of Economic Literature 39(2), 390-431. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390
Rogerson, Shimer, Wright (2005). Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 43(4), 959-988. https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014
Shimer (2005). The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies. American Economic Review 95(1), 25-49. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828572
Hall (2005). Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness. American Economic Review 95(1), 50-65. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828482
Hagedorn, Manovskii (2008). The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited. American Economic Review 98(4), 1692-1706. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1692
Elsby, Michaels, Ratner (2015). The Beveridge Curve: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 53(3), 571-630. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.53.3.571
Burdett, Mortensen (1998). Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment. International Economic Review 39(2), 257. https://doi.org/10.2307/2527292
Gale, Shapley (1962). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly 69(1), 9-15. https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726
Pissarides (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd ed. MIT Press. (book)

The Hall and Jorgenson user cost of capital

Taxes and the yearly cost of owning a machine

We turn the price of a machine, the cost of funds, the rate at which it wears out and the tax treatment into one number, the yearly cost of owning a dollar of that capital, and ask how a change in depreciation rules, expensing or credits moves it and so the amount of capital worth owning. Robert Hall and Dale Jorgenson (1967) derived the rental cost per dollar of machine as the cost of funds plus depreciation, scaled up by the corporate tax and down by the present value of the depreciation allowances and any investment credit the tax code gives. A firm wants more of a machine when its yearly cost falls, because the output the machine adds is then worth more than the cost of owning it. Faster write-offs, expensing and credits all lower the cost; a higher rate of tax with slow allowances raises it.

Born to answer
Hall and Jorgenson, 1967: one yearly number for owning capital under a tax code.
What it does now
How expensing, write-offs and credits move the desired stock of machines.
The mathematics
c = (r + delta) (1 - tau z - k) / (1 - tau); desired stock proportional to 1 / c
The full entry
Where it began

Dale Jorgenson in the early 1960s asked what a firm should pay to own a machine for a year, and Robert Hall and Jorgenson, in a 1967 article in the American Economic Review, built the answer into one expression that tax policy could be set against: the price of the machine, the cost of funds, depreciation, the corporate tax and the value of the allowances and credits. It gave economists and tax writers a number to compare across rules, and it gave empirical work a target: whether investment really falls when the cost rises. Later studies used tax reforms as experiments, and bonus depreciation made a natural test. The 2026 prize in economic sciences was awarded for other work of Robert Hall; this entry is not part of the Academy's citation.

Why it works now

The tax code's depreciation schedules and rates used to be a table in a manual. They are now published, and the yearly cost under each can be computed in a line of code and set beside the measured response of firms to earlier changes. The hurdle rate and the plans a given firm already has are still known best to the people who write its capital budget.

When it applies

A change in depreciation rules, expensing or a credit, or the expiry of one; capital spending by data centers, chip plants, factories moved back from abroad or the equipment makers that sell into them; a question of whether a tax change should move investment, and by roughly what percentage at the margin. Not to be confused with return-on-new-capital, which measures what a company has earned on the capital it has added, or capacity-and-allocation, which asks where scarce capacity should go: this asks how the yearly cost of owning equipment, and so the desired amount of it, responds to the cost of funds and the tax code.

What we would ask

What is the yearly cost of owning a dollar of this equipment under the current rules and under the proposed ones?
How much would the desired capital stock change, and how much of that change is likely to arrive in a given year given adjustment lags and what firms already planned?

What it needs

The machine's price; the cost of funds; the depreciation rate and the allowance schedule; the corporate tax rate; any credit and whether it reduces the basis; the elasticity of desired capital to its cost (the share of output going to capital in a simple Cobb-Douglas case); and evidence on how firms of different size and cash position responded to earlier changes.

How we would get it

The Desk works the cost under each treatment, the percentage change in the desired stock for each change in the rules, and sets that beside measured responses to earlier changes. It does not say what any company will spend. What the filings cannot show is the firm's own hurdle rate, its cash position and its plans; people who prepare capital budgets and tax planning inside manufacturers, or who sell the equipment, know that.

Where it breaks

The model gives the desired stock of capital, not the timing or any firm's plan: investment responds with lags, adjustment costs and uncertainty, and a firm may have already planned the spending. Estimates of how much investment responds to the cost of capital differ by method, episode and firm: bonus depreciation raised investment in eligible equipment sharply (House and Shapiro, 2008), by 10.4 and 16.9 percent in two episodes with small firms responding 95 percent more than large ones (Zwick and Mahon, 2017); a temporary incentive pulls spending forward and is not the same as a permanent one. Financing constraints and firm cash flows can matter more than the formula's cost of funds. The tax rate, the discount rate and whether the allowance is credited against the basis are assumptions. Neutral on tax policy and on any change to it. Hall and Jorgenson's article is listed in the reading list as a book row because it is not indexed as an article at Crossref.

For example

Take a machine worth $100, a cost of funds of 8 percent, depreciation of 10 percent a year and a corporate tax rate of 21 percent. Let z be the present value of the allowances per dollar. If the allowances match true wear (exponential, at 10 percent), z = 0.10 / 0.18 = 0.556 and the yearly cost is $100 x 0.18 x (1 - 0.21 x 0.556) / (1 - 0.21) = $20.13. If the allowance is straight line over ten years, z is 0.1 x the annuity factor for ten years at 8 percent, 0.67, and the cost is $19.57. With full expensing (z = 1) the tax drops out and the cost is $18.00, the cost of funds plus depreciation. A straight line write-off plus a 7 percent credit (assumed not to reduce the basis) brings it to $17.98. The desired stock moves in proportion to one over the cost: from straight line to full expensing the cost falls from $19.57 to $18.00 and the desired stock rises 19.57 / 18.00 - 1 = 8.7 percent; from allowances that match wear to full expensing it rises 20.13 / 18.00 - 1 = 11.8 percent. That is the amount the firm would like to hold in the long run, not the first year's extra spending. These are Vista's illustrations with stated rates, not the law for any year.

The mathematics in fullRental cost per dollar of capital: c = (r + delta) (1 - tau z - k) / (1 - tau), with r the cost of funds, delta the rate of depreciation, tau the corporate tax rate, z the present value of the depreciation allowances per dollar and k the investment credit (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). With allowances equal to true economic wear, z = delta / (r + delta) and c = r / (1 - tau) + delta; with full expensing z = 1, k = 0 and c = r + delta. For straight-line allowances over T years, z = (1 / T) (1 - (1 + r)^(-T)) / r. With Cobb-Douglas production and capital's share alpha, the desired stock is K* = alpha p Y / c, so the desired stock changes by c_old / c_new - 1 when the cost moves. Where it comes from

Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, American Economic Review 57(3), pp. 391-414; Evidence on how investment responded to tax changes: House and Shapiro (2008); Zwick and Mahon (2017); The worked figures, the rates and the credit are Vista's illustration; the measured responses are those reported in the papers named

Sources

Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Tax Policy and Investment Behavior. American Economic Review 57(3), 391-414 (not indexed at Crossref). (book)
House, Shapiro (2008). Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation. American Economic Review 98(3), 737-768. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.737
Zwick, Mahon (2017). Tax Policy and Heterogeneous Investment Behavior. American Economic Review 107(1), 217-248. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140855

Dynamics and pure mathematics

How things move over time, how much of a bet to take, and the pure mathematics that decides whether a plan survives the movement.

The cobweb model

Why capacity arrives just as demand leaves

When supply responds to price with a lag, because a ship, a fab, or a plant takes years to build, the market cycles on its own. We ask how long the lag is and where in the cycle the decision sits.

Born to answer
Ezekiel, 1938: farmers planting on last season's price.
What it does now
Shipping, fabs and chemicals, where capacity arrives after the peak.
The mathematics
q(t) = S(p(t - L)), supply on a lagged price
The full entry
Where it began

Mordecai Ezekiel's 1938 paper named the cobweb theorem after the shape the price and quantity trace on a diagram when supply responds to last season's price: farmers plant when prices are high, the crop arrives, prices fall, they plant less, prices rise. The same mathematics governs any market where capacity takes years to build, and difference equations were part of the MMSS curriculum in the 1990s.

Why it works now

The order book of capacity under construction, the single number that tells you where the cycle is, has always existed and rarely been read against demand. It can now be assembled from filings, trade press, and operators quickly, and the history of past cycles retrieved for the turning points. The Desk asks how long it takes for capacity to arrive and how much is on order right now.

When it applies

Shipping, semiconductors, chemicals, agriculture, real estate, mining, or any business where capacity takes years to add and cannot be removed quickly; a thesis that extrapolates today's price.

What we would ask

How long from the decision to add capacity until it arrives, and how much is on order right now?
Where are we in the cycle, and what did the last peak look like?

What it needs

The order book of capacity under construction, the lag, and the history of past cycles.

How we would get it

Operators on the real lead times and the capacity in the pipeline; the record of past cycles and their turning points.

Where it breaks

Treating today's price as a level rather than a point on a cycle; ignoring the capacity already ordered.

For example

Freight rates are at a decade high and a thesis buys shipping equity. The order book for new vessels is at a decade high too, and they arrive in three years. The model says the rates fall as the ships arrive, as they did last time, and the question is only how far.

The mathematics in fullSupply at t responds to the price at t minus the lag: q(t) = S(p(t - L)), while demand clears at the current price; with a lag the system spirals around the equilibrium, converging when supply is less responsive than demand and diverging when it is more. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (difference equations); MMSS 211-1

Sources

Ezekiel (1938). The Cobweb Theorem. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(2), 255. https://doi.org/10.2307/1881734

Learn the math
The question

In the autumn of a drought year, corn sells for $30 a bushel against a usual $20. Every farmer in the county reads the same price, and every one of them does the sensible thing: plants more next spring. The rains come back, the barns fill, and the next autumn corn sells for $12. Burned, the farmers plant less. The autumn after that, it is $26.40.

Nobody in this story is foolish. Each decision is reasonable given the price on the day it was made. The trouble is the gap between deciding and delivering: a crop takes a season, a hog a year or so, a containership or a chip factory three years. By the time the new supply arrives, the price that called for it is gone, and the supply itself is what drove it away. A thesis that reads today's freight rate, or today's memory price, as a level to extrapolate is making the farmer's mistake on a larger scale. This lesson builds the arithmetic of that mistake: why the market swings, how long each swing lasts, when the swings die away and when they grow, and what single number tells you where you are.

The idea in one paragraph

Think of an old hotel shower with a long pipe. You turn the hot tap, nothing happens, so you turn it further. Then scalding water arrives, all the heat you asked for twice over, and you wrench it toward cold, and a few seconds later you are freezing. The tap is not broken and you are not a fool; the delay in the pipe makes your sensible reactions arrive late, so they overshoot. A market whose supply takes years to build is the same shower. High prices call for capacity, the capacity arrives after the lag, the price falls, the falling price stops the building, and so on. Two numbers govern it. The lag sets the rhythm: a full cycle, peak to peak, takes twice the time it takes to build. The ratio of how strongly supply responds to price against how strongly demand does sets the fate: if supply is the calmer of the two, each swing is smaller than the last and the market settles; if supply is the more eager, each swing is larger. Nicholas Kaldor called it the cobweb theorem in 1934, after the shape the path draws, and Mordecai Ezekiel's survey of 1938, titled "The Cobweb Theorem", became the standard account.

The math, step by step

Step 1: two lines and the gap between them. Write p for the price and q for the quantity. Buyers take more when the price is lower:

demand:  q = A - (B x p)

and B is how many more units buyers take for each dollar the price falls. Sellers plant, or build, on the price they saw when they decided, which in the simplest story is last season's price:

supply:  q(t) = C + (D x p(t - 1))

and D is how many more units sellers bring for each dollar the price was higher. The (t - 1) is the whole model. Without it the two lines cross at one price and stay there. With it, this season's quantity is already fixed when this season's buyers arrive, and the price has to do all the adjusting: it becomes whatever makes buyers take exactly the crop that was planted.

Step 2: the teaching crop. All numbers here are round assumptions, not data. Demand is q = 120 - (2 x p), in million bushels and dollars. Supply is q(t) = 48 + (1.6 x p(t - 1)). The two lines cross where 120 - (2 x p) = 48 + (1.6 x p), that is 72 = 3.6 x p, so p* = 20 and q* = 80. That is the equilibrium: if last season's price was $20, farmers plant 80, and 80 sells for exactly $20.

Now the drought year: the price was $30. Next spring the farmers plant

q(1) = 48 + (1.6 x 30) = 48 + 48 = 96

and 96 million bushels sell only at the price where 120 - (2 x p) = 96, so p(1) = 24 / 2 = 12. At $12 they plant 48 + (1.6 x 12) = 67.2, which sells at (120 - 67.2) / 2 = 26.40. At $26.40 they plant 90.24, which sells at $14.88. The prices go 30, 12, 26.40, 14.88, 24.10, 16.72, closing in on 20 from alternate sides.

$0$10$20$30405060708090100110Quantity, million bushelsPrice, $ a busheldrought year: $30, so 96 plantedDemand: the price that sells this cropSupply: planted on last season's priceThe path, season by season
The cobweb, drawn the way Ezekiel drew it. Each season the farmers plant on last season's price (go across to the supply line), the crop sells at whatever clears it (go down or up to the demand line), and the next planting starts there. Here the spiral closes, because each swing is 0.8 of the last.

Step 3: the one equation behind the spiral. Solve demand for the price that clears this season's crop and put supply into it:

p(t) = (A - q(t)) / B = (A - C - (D x p(t - 1))) / B

At the equilibrium the same holds with p* on both sides: p* = (A - C - (D x p*)) / B. Subtract the second line from the first. A and C cancel, and what is left is

p(t) - p* = (-(D x p(t - 1)) + (D x p*)) / B = -(D / B) x (p(t - 1) - p*)

Call the gap from equilibrium g(t) = p(t) - p* (we use g for the gap so that the letter x can stay the multiplication sign) and the ratio k = D / B. Then

g(t) = -k x g(t - 1)

Every season the gap is multiplied by -k. The minus sign flips it to the other side (a high price makes a big crop makes a low price); k scales it. Apply the rule t times and

g(t) = (-k)^t x g(0)

In the crop, k = 1.6 / 2 = 0.8 and g(0) = 30 - 20 = 10, so the gaps are 10, -8, 6.4, -5.12, and the prices above are 20 plus these.

Step 4: the three fates. Everything turns on whether k is below, at or above 1.

  • k < 1, supply calmer than demand: the gaps shrink and the spiral closes. With k = 0.8 the size of the gap halves when 0.8^t = 0.5; take logarithms of both sides and t = ln 0.5 / ln 0.8 = 3.1 seasons. It falls to a tenth in ln 0.1 / ln 0.8 = 10.3.
  • k = 1: the same swing for ever. With D = 2, the drought price of $30 gives a $10 price, then $30, then $10.
  • k > 1, supply more eager than demand: the gaps grow. With D = 2.4 (so k = 1.2 and supply q = 32 + (2.4 x p)), the prices go 30, 8, 34.40, 2.72, 40.74, and the fifth season would need a price of minus $4.88. Real markets never get there, and the reason is in "Where the model breaks" below.

There is a cleaner way to say which side of 1 you are on. An elasticity is the percentage change in quantity for a one percent change in price. For a straight line it is the slope times p / q: the slope says how many units a dollar moves, and multiplying by p / q turns units and dollars into percentages. At the equilibrium, demand's is B x p* / q* = (2 x 20) / 80 = 0.5 (the minus sign is dropped by custom) and supply's is D x p* / q* = (1.6 x 20) / 80 = 0.4. Their ratio is 0.4 / 0.5 = 0.8, which is k again, because the p* / q* cancels. So the test is: the cycle dies out when supply is less elastic than demand.

Step 5: a longer lag sets the rhythm. A ship ordered today sails in about three years. Now count time in years and let supply respond to the price L years ago:

g(t) = -k x g(t - L)

The same algebra as Step 3 gives this, with t - L in place of t - 1. Take the teaching fleet: L = 3, k = 0.8, and a three-year boom with freight rates 10 above normal (in whatever unit you like; only the ratios matter). Each boom year orders ships that arrive three years later, so years 1 to 3 run -0.8 x 10 = -8. Those lean years order few ships, so years 4 to 6 run -0.8 x (-8) = 6.4, then -5.12, then 4.10. Apply the rule twice and the sign flips back:

g(t) = -k x g(t - L) = -k x (-k x g(t - 2L)) = k^2 x g(t - 2L)

So the pattern repeats every 2L years, shrunk each time by k^2 = 0.64. Three years to build makes a six-year cycle, peak to peak. This is the first practical use of the model: the rhythm of the cycle is set by the build time, not by anyone's mood.

-10-5+0+5+100369121518Year (the boom is years -2 to 0)Freight rate above or below normalships ordered in the boom start to arrivesix years from peak to peak
With a three-year lag the same rule makes a square wave: three good years, three bad, three good. The length of the cycle is set by the build time, twice over; how fast it dies is set by k.

Step 6: the order book is the forecast. Look again at g(t) = -k x g(t - L). The quantity that will arrive in each of the next L years has already been decided; it is on order. So the price over the next L years is mostly settled by a number anyone can look up: capacity under construction, against the demand it will meet. That is why the entry asks where in the cycle the decision sits, and counts ignoring the capacity already ordered as a failure. A rate at a ten-year high with an order book also at a ten-year high is not a level. It is a point near the top of a wave whose next three years are already being welded together in a shipyard.

Step 7: farmers who learn. The spiral needs sellers who plant on last season's price as if it would last. Marc Nerlove (1958) let them be more careful: each season their expected price moves only a fraction w of the way toward the price they just saw. Write e(t) for the gap between the price they expect and p*. Then e(t) = e(t - 1) + (w x (g(t - 1) - e(t - 1))), and since they plant on that expectation, g(t - 1) = -k x e(t - 1). Put the second into the first and collect terms:

e(t) = e(t - 1) + (w x ((-k x e(t - 1)) - e(t - 1)))
e(t) = (1 - w - (w x k)) x e(t - 1) = (1 - (w x (1 + k))) x e(t - 1)

The multiplier is no longer -k but 1 - (w x (1 + k)). With w = 1 (the naive farmer) it is -k, as before. With the explosive market, k = 1.2, and farmers who move halfway, w = 0.5, it is 1 - (0.5 x 2.2) = -0.1: the gap is cut to a tenth each season instead of growing by a fifth. Any w below 2 / (1 + k) = 0.91 tames it. John Muth (1961) took the last step: if sellers forecast the price the model itself predicts, the systematic cycle disappears, and only fresh surprises move the price. So a cycle that keeps recurring tells you something about how the industry forecasts: it orders on today's price and does not read its own order book.

A worked example

The entry's own example is shipping, and the years 2020 to 2024 played it out almost as the teaching fleet does. Every figure below is from the public source named beside it; the arithmetic is in the lesson's code.

The boom. When the pandemic sent households shopping for goods, there were not enough boxes or ships. Drewry's World Container Index, the average price of shipping one 40-foot container on eight main routes, reached $10,377 in September 2021 (Drewry, as reported by FreshPlaza, 7 July 2023). Against an average of $1,420 in 2019 (Drewry, as reported by AJOT), that is

10,377 / 1,420 = 7.3 times the 2019 rate

The orders. Owners did the farmer's sensible thing. In October 2020 the order book of new containerships bottomed out at 8.4% of the fleet (BIMCO, Hellenic Shipping News, 24 June 2022). By April 2023 it was 7.54 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units, the industry's count of box slots), 28.9% of the existing fleet (BIMCO, 13 April 2023):

28.9% / 8.4% = 3.44 times the order book of 2020, relative to the fleet
7.54 / 0.289 = 26.1 million TEU in the fleet it was measured against

The arrival. Ships ordered at the top take two to three years to build. They came: a record 2.3 million TEU delivered in 2023 (BIMCO, Maritime Executive, 8 May 2024) and a new record of 2.9 million TEU in 2024 (BIMCO, Hellenic Shipping News, 9 January 2025), 5.2 million TEU in two years, about a fifth of the April 2023 fleet (5.2 / 26.1 = 0.20). Demand did not keep pace. Between 2019 and 2023 BIMCO counts the fleet up 21% and container volumes up 4%, so there was

1.21 / 1.04 = 1.163

or about 16% more ship for every box than before the boom.

The bust. On 30 November 2023 the index stood at $1,382, 3% below the 2019 average (Drewry, as reported by AJOT):

1 - (1,382 / 10,377) = 0.867, a fall of 87% from the peak

Peak in September 2021, back below the 2019 level late in 2023, with the ships ordered at the peak arriving in between: the first half of a cycle about as long as the cobweb says, with the build time setting the clock.

Reading the order book as the model asks. In April 2023, with rates already falling, the question the entry poses was answerable from one public number. An order book of 28.9% of the fleet needs demand to grow by about that much before the extra ships are full (a little less, since some old ships will be scrapped meanwhile). If container volumes grow 3% a year (an assumption for illustration), that takes ln 1.289 / ln 1.03 = 8.6 years; at 4% a year, ln 1.289 / ln 1.04 = 6.5 years. Either way the ships arrive within three. The model did not say what happened next, and that is the honest lesson: from December 2023 attacks in the Red Sea sent ships the long way around Africa, each voyage took longer, the same fleet carried fewer boxes a year, and rates rose again. The demand line moved while the ships were on the water. That is the shock in "Where the model breaks", not a failure of the arithmetic: the order book still told you where the pressure was.

The usual mistakes
  1. Reading the price as a level. Symptom: a valuation that capitalizes this year's freight rate or memory price. Fix: ask where in the cycle the year sits and what the last peak and trough looked like; value the business on a whole cycle.
  2. Comparing slopes on the wrong axes. Symptom: concluding a market explodes when it settles. In the usual diagram price is on the vertical axis, so a line's steepness there is one over B or D. The test is D < B in quantity per dollar, which on the drawing means supply is steeper than demand. Fix: compare elasticities, which do not care which way the axes run.
  3. Taking the cycle to be as long as the lag. Symptom: expecting the recovery three years after the bust when ships take three years. Fix: peak to peak is twice the lag, and real cycles run longer still because orders and deliveries are spread out.
  4. Ignoring what is already on order. Symptom: a forecast built from demand alone. Fix: the next L years of supply are mostly committed; put the order book against the demand it will meet before forecasting anything.
  5. Assuming everyone is naive. Symptom: predicting a textbook cycle in an industry that plans on the order book. Fix: check how the industry actually orders; partial learning (Step 7) damps the cycle, and a market that has stopped cycling may simply have learned.
Where the model breaks

The entry's own warnings are that today's price is a point on a cycle and that capacity already ordered cannot be ignored; the model breaks when its own assumptions do. The straight lines are a convenience: real supply has a floor (nobody plants when the price will not cover the seed) and a ceiling (yards and fabs run full), so an explosive market does not explode; it tends to settle into a steady swing between those limits. The lag is not one fixed number: deliveries spread over years, ships can be scrapped early or slowed down, factories idled, which softens and lengthens the waves. Demand is not fixed either: a war, a canal closure or a new use can move the demand line while the ships are on the way, and then the price follows the shock, not the cobweb. And as Step 7 shows, the cycle depends on how sellers forecast; an industry that reads its order book can break the rhythm. The model tells you where the pressure comes from, not the date of the turn.

Check yourself
  1. Ships take three years to build. A thesis says "rates are high now, the cycle will turn in three years, so we have three good years." What is wrong? Answer: three years is when the ships ordered now start to arrive, which begins the lean phase; the next peak, if the rhythm held, would be about six years after this one. And the ships ordered last year and the year before arrive sooner. Read the order book by delivery year.
  2. Demand is q = 200 - (5 x p) and supply is q(t) = 20 + (4 x p(t - 1)). Find the equilibrium price and say whether the cycle dies out. Answer: 200 - (5 x p) = 20 + (4 x p) gives 180 = 9 x p, so p* = 20. k = 4 / 5 = 0.8, below 1, so it dies out.
  3. In that market, a shock leaves the price $8 above $20. After how many seasons is the gap below $2, a quarter of where it started? Answer: the gap is 8 x 0.8^t; we need 0.8^t < 0.25, so t > ln 0.25 / ln 0.8 = 6.21. After 6 seasons the gap is 8 x 0.262 = 2.10, still above $2; after 7 it is 8 x 0.210 = 1.68. Seven seasons, on alternating sides.
Teach me more
  • The Cobweb Model, Thomas J. Sargent and John Stachurski, QuantEcon's introductory lectures (a web lecture, about a quarter of an hour of reading plus code). Best for real data and play: it shows yearly US hog prices from 1924 to 1959, after Harlow (1960), and lets you simulate naive and adaptive expectations in Python. Its supply curve is S-shaped rather than straight and it states no slope condition, so read it after Steps 3 and 4 here.
  • Cobweb Models and Expectations, Andreas Thiemer, FH Kiel (1999, 11 pages, a printed Mathcad worksheet). Best for the expectations side: naive, "normal price", adaptive and extrapolative expectations, each with its stability condition and a simulated path. It writes quantity as a function of price, as this lesson does, so its condition (supply's slope over demand's, in absolute value, below 1) matches Step 4 directly; its letters differ from ours.
  • Cobweb Theory, Market Stability, and Price Expectations, Geoffrey Poitras, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 45(1), 2023, pages 137 to 161, free to read. Best for the story: who worked the theorem out in 1930, what Ezekiel added, Coase and Fowler's objection from the British pig cycle, and how Nerlove and Muth answered it. History, not a classroom derivation.

No video could be confirmed to state the convergence condition correctly, so none is linked.

Leontief input-output analysis

What breaks first in the supply chain

Every sector buys from others to make what it sells, so a shock to one sector travels through everyone downstream. We trace the shock through the purchase matrix to find where it lands hardest and first.

Born to answer
Leontief, 1936, mapping what every sector buys from every other.
What it does now
Tracing a tariff or an outage to where it lands hardest.
The mathematics
x = (I - A)^-1 d
The full entry
Where it began

Wassily Leontief built the first input-output table of the American economy in 1936, a matrix of what every sector buys from every other, and showed that a change in demand for one product could be traced through the purchases to its total effect on every sector. He won a Nobel for it, and the matrix models in the 1995 MMSS curriculum descend from it.

Why it works now

The Desk was asked, in a real conversation, what breaks first in a supply chain under a sustained tariff shock, and the honest answer is that the question has a structure. The purchase relationships can now be assembled for the relevant sectors and the shock traced through them, and procurement leads can say where substitutes exist and where they do not. The Desk asks which input comes through a sector that feeds many others and has no substitute.

When it applies

A tariff, sanction, outage, price spike, or bankruptcy in one part of a supply chain; a thesis about which industries a shock helps or hurts; a company whose inputs come through a sector under stress.

What we would ask

Which of your inputs comes through a sector that feeds many others and has few substitutes?
When the shock hits that sector, how many steps away are you, and how fast does it reach you?

What it needs

The purchase relationships among the relevant sectors, with substitution possibilities where they exist.

How we would get it

Operators and procurement leads on the actual sourcing chain; the record for input-output relationships; the analysis traced through the matrix.

Where it breaks

Fixed coefficients when firms substitute; national tables for a global chain; the second-order effects ignored.

For example

A tariff is imposed on one category of industrial input. Traced through the purchase matrix, the sectors hit hardest are not the direct importers but two steps down, in a small sector with no substitute that feeds four larger ones. That sector is the crux, and its operators are the panel.

The mathematics in fullOutput x solves x = A x + d, so x = (I - A)^-1 d; a shock to sector j propagates down column j of the inverse, and the sectors with large entries in that column absorb the shock first and hardest. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (matrix models); MATH 285

Sources

Leontief (1936). Quantitative Input and Output Relations in the Economic Systems of the United States. The Review of Economics and Statistics 18(3), 105. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927837

The Kelly criterion

How much of the bet to take

Given an edge, there is a size that maximizes long-run growth, and betting beyond it reduces growth while raising the chance of ruin. We work out which side of that line the proposed size sits on, and how sure the edge really is.

Born to answer
Kelly at Bell Labs, 1956; Thorp at the blackjack table.
What it does now
The bet size beyond which growth falls and ruin rises.
The mathematics
f* = p - (1 - p) / b
The full entry
Where it began

John Kelly at Bell Labs worked out in 1956 how a gambler with inside information on a noisy channel should size bets to maximize the growth of capital, and Edward Thorp used the result at the blackjack table and then on Wall Street; his 1969 paper is the practitioner's account. Robert Merton's 1969 continuous-time portfolio problem gives the same fraction, excess return over variance, for an investor.

Why it works now

Position sizing has been set by conviction, and conviction runs highest right after a winning year, which is when the edge is most overestimated. The arithmetic of a track record, its edge, variance, and correlation with the rest of the book, can now be assembled quickly, and the growth-optimal fraction compared with the proposed size. The Desk asks how the confidence in the edge was measured and how much of the capital is gone if it loses.

When it applies

Position sizing, allocation to a strategy, a capital commitment sized by conviction, a founder betting the company; any decision where the size of the bet is being set by enthusiasm.

What we would ask

How confident are you in the edge, and how was that confidence measured?
If this loses, how much of the capital is gone, and is that recoverable?

What it needs

An honest estimate of the edge and its uncertainty, the variance of the outcome, and the correlation with other bets.

How we would get it

The record and the Advisors on the true distribution of outcomes for bets of this kind; the client's own book at scoping for the correlations.

Where it breaks

The edge estimated on too few cases; correlated bets treated as independent; a horizon too short for the long-run argument.

For example

A fund with a documented edge in a strategy proposes to double its allocation after a strong year. Sized by the arithmetic of its own track record and variance, the current allocation is already near the growth-optimal fraction, and doubling it lowers expected growth while doubling the chance of a drawdown the fund cannot survive.

The mathematics in fullf* = p - (1 - p) / b for a bet at odds b, or (mu - r) / sigma^2 in the continuous case; growth g(f) is maximized at f* and turns negative beyond about twice it, and because the edge is estimated with error, fractional Kelly is the working rule. Taught in

MATH 385; MECN-451

Sources

Kelly (1956). A New Interpretation of Information Rate. Bell System Technical Journal 35(4), 917-926. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1956.tb03809.x
Thorp (1969). Optimal Gambling Systems for Favorable Games. Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique / Review of the International Statistical Institute 37(3), 273. https://doi.org/10.2307/1402118
Merton (1969). Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case. The Review of Economics and Statistics 51(3), 247. https://doi.org/10.2307/1926560

Learn the math
The question

In 2016 Victor Haghani and Richard Dewey sat 61 people down in front of screens and gave each of them $25 and a coin. The coin was rigged in the player's favor: it came up heads 60% of the time, and the players were told so. Each could bet any amount on either side, as often as they liked, for 30 minutes, at even money; winnings were capped at $250. Most of the players were finance and economics students or young finance professionals. A game where you know the odds are 60 to 40 in your favor is about the best offer a person will ever get.

28% of them finished with less than $2 of their $25. Only 21% maxed out, which the authors count as finishing with $200 or more against the $250 cap. The average payout was $91, and 18 of the 61 bet their entire bankroll on a single flip at some point. They knew the odds. What they did not know was how much to bet.

That is the question of this lesson. Having an edge and knowing which way to bet is half the problem. The other half is size, and size is where most of the damage is done.

The idea in one paragraph

Money compounds, so what matters over many bets is not the average result of one bet but the rate at which the bankroll multiplies. Losses hurt that rate more than equal gains help it: up 20% and then down 20% leaves you with 96% of what you started with, not 100%. So there is a tug of war. Bet more and the edge works harder; bet more and the losses bite harder. Somewhere between betting nothing and betting everything is the size that makes the bankroll grow fastest in the long run. John Kelly found it in 1956. Beyond it, every extra dollar wagered slows the growth, and at about twice that size the growth stops altogether, even though every single bet still has a positive expected value.

The math, step by step

The staircase. Start with what one bet does to the bankroll. Call the bankroll W and suppose you stake a fraction f of it on a bet that pays b for every 1 you stake (even money is b = 1) and wins with probability p. If it wins, the bankroll becomes W (1 + b f); if it loses, W (1 - f). After many bets, the bankroll is the starting amount multiplied by one of those two factors for every bet. Products are awkward; logarithms turn them into sums. Take the natural log of the final bankroll and you get the log of the start plus a sum: ln(1 + b f) for every win and ln(1 - f) for every loss.

That is the staircase. Each win is a step up of ln(1 + b f), each loss a step down of ln(1 - f), and the steps down are taller. At even money with f = 0.2, a win is a step of ln 1.2 = 0.1823 and a loss a step of ln 0.8 = -0.2231. That is why up 20% then down 20% leaves 96%: the two steps add to -0.0408, and e^(-0.0408) = 0.96.

The growth rate. Over n bets, about p n are wins and (1 - p) n are losses (the law of large numbers: the share of wins settles on p as n grows). So the log of the bankroll climbs, on average, by

g(f) = (p ln(1 + b f)) + ((1 - p) ln(1 - f))

per bet, and after n bets the bankroll is about W0 e^(n g(f)). This g(f) is the long-run growth rate per bet. It is the one number that decides where a long sequence of bets ends up: positive and the bankroll grows without limit, negative and it dwindles toward zero, whatever the average of each bet says.

Finding the best size. To find the f that makes g largest, take the derivative and set it to zero. The derivative of ln(1 + b f) with respect to f is b / (1 + b f), and of ln(1 - f) it is -1 / (1 - f). So

g'(f) = (p b / (1 + b f)) - ((1 - p) / (1 - f)) = 0

Multiply both sides by (1 + b f)(1 - f) to clear the fractions:

p b (1 - f) = (1 - p)(1 + b f)
(p b) - (p b f) = 1 - p + (b f) - (p b f)

The p b f terms on each side cancel, leaving p b = 1 - p + (b f), so

f* = p - ((1 - p) / b)

This is the Kelly fraction. Read it in words: your chance of winning, less your chance of losing divided by the odds. (It is a maximum, not a minimum: each of the two terms of g curves downward, since ln bends down, so g has one peak and this is it.) For the coin in the experiment, p = 0.6 and b = 1, so f* = 0.6 - 0.4 = 0.2: bet 20% of whatever you have, on heads, every flip. If f* comes out zero or negative, there is no edge and the right bet is nothing.

How fast, and what happens on either side. At 20%, g = (0.6 ln 1.2) + (0.4 ln 0.8) = 0.02014 a flip, a compounded gain of about 2.03% a flip. Now walk away from the peak.

-4%-3%-2%-1%0%1%2%0%10%20%30%40%50%Share of the bankroll bet on each flipGrowth per flip, % (log)Kelly, 20%: 2.01% a flipzero at 39%A 60% coinThe same bets if the coin is really 55%
The growth curve for the coin in the experiment: heads 60% of the time, even money. Bet 20% of the bankroll and it grows 2.01% a flip in the long run; bet 10% and it still grows 1.50%, about three quarters as fast; bet 39% and it goes nowhere. The dashed curve is the same coin if it really lands heads 55% of the time: then the 20% bet that looked optimal grows at about zero.
  • Bet half as much, 10%: g = 0.01504, which is 74.7% of the maximum growth, about three quarters, for half the size of bet. That is the most useful fact in the subject, and it has a reason. Near the peak, g is shaped like an upside-down parabola (for small bets, ln(1 + x) is close to x - (x^2 / 2), so g(f) is close to (f ((2p) - 1)) - (f^2 / 2) at even money), and a parabola falls off slowly near its top: halfway to zero from the peak, you have lost only a quarter of the height.
  • Bet twice as much, 40%: g = -0.00245. The same parabola that is gentle near the top is symmetric, so twice the peak sits about where zero sat. For the exact curve, growth is zero at 38.9% and slightly negative beyond. Every flip still has a positive average result: at 40% the expected gain is 8% of the bankroll per flip. The bankroll shrinks anyway.

That last point surprises everyone, so make it concrete. Bet 20% for 300 flips. The average final bankroll, over all possible sequences, is $25 x 1.04^300, about $3.2 million, because each flip adds 4% on average. The median, the result of the player in the middle, is $25 x e^(300 x 0.02014), about $10,504: 180 wins and 120 losses. The average is pulled up by a few astronomically lucky sequences that almost nobody lives through. Kelly's rule maximizes what the typical player ends with, not the average across a crowd of players, and when you only get to live one sequence, that is the number that matters.

The continuous version. An investor deciding how much of a portfolio to put in a stock rather than cash has the same problem with a smoother bet. Let the stock return mu a year with standard deviation sigma, cash return r, and put a fraction f in the stock. Expand the log to second order, exactly as above, with x now standing for f times the stock's return above cash: ln(1 + x) is about x - (x^2 / 2), the average of x is f (mu - r), and the average of x^2 is close to f^2 sigma^2, because a variance is the average squared distance from the mean. So the growth above cash is about

g(f) = (f (mu - r)) - (f^2 sigma^2 / 2)

Set the derivative (mu - r) - (f sigma^2) to zero and

f* = (mu - r) / sigma^2

the formula Robert Merton reached the same year Edward Thorp was taking Kelly's rule from the casino to Wall Street. At f* the growth above cash is (mu - r)^2 / (2 sigma^2); at 2 f* it is exactly zero; at f* / 2 it is exactly three quarters of the best. The parabola is no longer an approximation of the picture. It is the picture.

A worked example

Go back to the experiment and play it properly. The game has two features the plain formula ignores: it stops after about 300 flips (Haghani and Dewey assume one flip every six seconds over 30 minutes), and it stops early at $250. Neither changes the answer much, and the exact calculation shows why.

0%25%50%75%100%Chance of reaching $250 in 300 flips70%94%95%94%91%86%71%52%13%5%10%15%20%25%30%40%50%all in
The game Haghani and Dewey ran, computed exactly: $25, a 60% coin, about 300 flips, play stops at $250. Every stake from 10% to 20% reaches the cap about 94% of the time. Betting 40% a flip cuts the odds to 71% and 50% to 52%, and going all in needs four heads in a row, 13%. In the experiment 21% of the players finished with $200 or more and 28% with less than $2.

Follow every possible sequence of 300 flips, weighted by its probability, and you can compute exactly the chance of touching $250 for a player who stakes the same share of the bankroll each time. At 20% it is 93.8%; at 10%, 94.2%; at 15%, 95.2%. Any steady stake between 10% and 20% gets there about 19 times in 20. At 40%, twice Kelly, the chance falls to 70.8%, and at 50% to 52.4%. Going all in on every flip needs four heads in a row ($25 to $50 to $100 to $200 to $400), and the chance of that is 0.6^4, 13.0%.

Now set the players beside the arithmetic. A simple rule that any of them could have followed reached the cap about 94% of the time; 21% of them maxed out. Betting everything on one flip, which 18 of them did at least once, turns a 60% coin into a 40% chance of being finished on the spot. The players were not short of intelligence or of information. They were short of a rule, and the authors describe what betting by feel looked like: 41 of the 61, two thirds, bet on tails at some point, against a coin they had been told favored heads; a good number doubled up after losses to win them back; and an average stake of 15%, below Kelly, was undone by swinging between too small and too big.

Two cautions keep the example honest. The cap is generous to recklessness: it ends the game before a 40% bettor's negative growth can do its full work, which is why 40% still reaches $250 70.8% of the time here; in a longer game with no cap, that bettor's bankroll would shrink toward nothing. And Kelly's rule is not strictly optimal for this game: a player who cared only about reaching $250 could do slightly better near the cap by adjusting the stake. The point is not that 20% is perfect. It is that the range of sizes that work is wide, and the players mostly bet outside it.

The usual mistakes
  1. An edge measured on too few cases. Symptom: a size computed to two decimals from a p or a mu that is itself a guess. The formula is only as good as the edge you feed it, and edges are hard to measure. To tell a 60% coin from a 55% coin with any confidence, you want half the gap, 2.5 points, to be two standard errors of the observed share of heads, so a standard error of 1.25 points. The standard error of a share is sqrt(p (1 - p) / n), and sqrt(0.24 / n) = 0.0125 gives n of about 1,500 flips. In markets it is worse: with returns that swing 20% a year, five years of history measure the average return to within plus or minus 8.9 points (one standard error, 0.20 / sqrt 5), more than the premium you are trying to estimate; twenty years still leave 4.5 points. Fix: size for the edge you can defend, not the one you measured in a good year.
  2. Overestimating the edge is the expensive direction. Symptom: a strategy that should have grown and went sideways. If you think the coin is 60% and it is really 55%, you bet 20% when the right bet is 10%, which is twice the true Kelly fraction, and your growth is zero (g = -0.00014 a flip). Notice the coincidence that is not a coincidence: half of what you thought was Kelly is exactly the true Kelly. Hence the practitioner's rule, fractional Kelly: bet a half or a third of the computed fraction. You give up a quarter of the growth if you were right, and you are protected if you were wrong.
  3. Correlated bets treated as separate. Symptom: several positions each sized at Kelly, which together amount to one oversized bet. Two strategies that each earn 4% above cash with 20% volatility each deserve a fraction of 1.0 on their own (0.04 / 0.04), 2.0 together if they are unrelated. If their returns move together with a correlation rho of 0.8, the pair must be sized as one. Put f in each: the combined mean is 2 f (mu - r), and the combined variance is (f^2 sigma^2) + (f^2 sigma^2) + (2 rho f^2 sigma^2), the two own variances plus the cross term counted twice, so the growth is (2 f (mu - r)) - (f^2 sigma^2 (1 + rho)) and the best f is (mu - r) / (sigma^2 (1 + rho)): 0.56 each, 1.11 together, little more than one strategy's worth. (With many positions of different sizes the same step is written with the covariance matrix, f = Sigma^(-1) (mu - r).) Fix: size the book, not the bet.
  4. Forgetting the drawdowns. Symptom: a full Kelly plan abandoned in the first bad year. Full Kelly is a wild ride. A standard result for continuous trading says that betting c times the Kelly fraction, the chance of ever falling to a fraction x of your starting capital is x^((2/c) - 1). At full Kelly (c = 1) that is just x: a 50% chance of being cut in half at some point, an 80% chance of a 20% drawdown. At half Kelly it is x^3: 12.5% for a halving. At twice Kelly (c = 2) it is x^0 = 1: certain, eventually, whatever x. Fix: choose the fraction you can hold through the drawdowns it will bring.
  5. A horizon too short for the argument. Symptom: Kelly sizing applied to three bets. The case for Kelly is a long-run case; it rests on the law of large numbers, and over a handful of bets the luck of the draw swamps the growth rate. Paul Samuelson spent years pointing out that maximizing growth is a preference, not a law: an investor with a short horizon or a deep fear of loss can sensibly bet less. Kelly is a ceiling for the size, not a target.
Where the model breaks

The Library's entry names three failure conditions, and the mistakes above are each of them at work: the edge estimated on too few cases, correlated bets treated as independent, and a horizon too short for the long-run argument. Add two more limits. The formula assumes you can rebalance freely and that losses are bounded by the stake; a bet with a hidden tail, where you can lose more than you put up, breaks the arithmetic at its root, since ln(1 - f) has no meaning once the loss passes everything you have. And the continuous formula (mu - r) / sigma^2 often recommends leverage: a market assumed to earn 5% a year above cash with 20% volatility gives 0.05 / 0.04 = 1.25, a quarter more than everything you own. If the premium is really 3%, the right fraction is 0.75, and the 1.25 you chose is 1.67 times Kelly, with growth above cash of 0.63% a year instead of 1.13%. The formula is a disciplined upper bound on size, never a reason to borrow. This lesson describes a calculation, not advice about any position.

Check yourself

1. A bet pays 2 to 1 and wins 40% of the time. What fraction of the bankroll does Kelly bet?

Answer: f* = p - ((1 - p) / b) = 0.4 - (0.6 / 2) = 0.1, so 10%. The bet wins less than half the time and is still worth taking, because the payoff when it wins is twice the stake.

2. A fair coin at even money. What does Kelly say, and why does any bet at all make you poorer in the long run?

Answer: f* = 0.5 - 0.5 = 0. With no edge, the expected value of each bet is zero, but the growth rate is (0.5 ln(1 + f)) + (0.5 ln(1 - f)) = 0.5 ln(1 - f^2), which is negative for any f above zero: the staircase's steps down are taller than its steps up, and with nothing to tilt the odds, the difference wins.

3. A strategy is expected to earn 6% a year above cash with 30% volatility. What is the Kelly fraction, what is the growth above cash at Kelly, at a fraction of 1.0 and at half Kelly, and what is the chance of ever being cut in half at a fraction of 1.0?

Answer: f* = 0.06 / 0.09 = 0.667. At Kelly the growth above cash is 0.06^2 / (2 x 0.09) = 0.02, 2% a year. At 1.0 it is 0.06 - (0.09 / 2) = 0.015. At half Kelly, 0.333, it is (0.333 x 0.06) - (0.333^2 x 0.09 / 2) = 0.015, the same. So a fraction of 1.0 earns what half Kelly earns, with three times the stake. It is 1.5 times Kelly, so the chance of a halving is 0.5^((2 / 1.5) - 1) = 0.5^(1/3) = 0.794, against 12.5% at half Kelly.

Teach me more
  • Lessons from Betting on a Biased Coin: Cool heads and cautionary tales, Victor Haghani and Richard Dewey, Elm Wealth, 26 October 2016 (an essay, with a link to the full paper). The experiment this lesson opens with, told by the people who ran it: the setup, how the players actually bet, and why a steady 10% to 20% would have reached the cap about 95% of the time.
  • The Kelly Criterion in Blackjack, Sports Betting, and the Stock Market, Edward O. Thorp, 1997, revised 1998, hosted at Occidental College (a contents page; each chapter opens as a short PDF). The practitioner's own account from the man who took the rule to the blackjack table and then to Wall Street; its sections on coin tossing, formulas for practitioners and when the Kelly strategy dominates in the long run are the best next step after this lesson, and a late section gives his own experience using it.
  • Kelly Betting, Jean-Stanislas Denain and Jacob Steinhardt, chapter 18 of Forecasting: Lecture Notes (a short chapter). A careful derivation from the law of large numbers, with the clever detour of finding the best bet by maximizing the median bankroll, and a short treatment of several bets at once by the same second-order expansion used above.
  • The Kelly Criterion, Ben Lynn, Stanford (a short page, about ten minutes). The link Kelly himself made: the best growth rate equals the capacity of a noisy communication channel, the information-theory idea his 1956 paper was really about.

The papers behind the Library entry are Kelly, "A New Interpretation of Information Rate", Bell System Technical Journal, 1956; Thorp, "Optimal Gambling Systems for Favorable Games", Review of the International Statistical Institute, 1969; and Merton, "Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case", Review of Economics and Statistics, 1969.

The SIR epidemic model

Will it spread, or fizzle

Anything that spreads by contact spreads only if each carrier passes it to more than one other on average. We estimate that number and the size of the pool it can spread through, because below the threshold the early numbers mean nothing.

Born to answer
Kermack and McKendrick, 1927.
What it does now
Whether adoption or default actually spreads, or fizzles.
The mathematics
R0 = b / g; spread needs R0 x S above one
The full entry
Where it began

Ronald Ross, who received the 1902 Nobel Prize in medicine for showing that mosquitoes carry malaria, then asked how far the mosquitoes would have to be reduced for the disease to die out, and answered with equations: in The Prevention of Malaria (second edition, 1911) and his papers on a priori pathometry (1916 and 1917, the later ones with the mathematician Hilda Hudson) he showed that an infection dies out once each case produces fewer than one new case, so malaria need not be eradicated, only pushed below its threshold. Kermack and McKendrick's 1927 model divided a population into the susceptible, the infected, and the recovered and derived the threshold in its general form: an epidemic takes off only when each case produces more than one new case. The same equations describe the spread of products, practices, and defaults, and Frank Bass's 1969 diffusion model is a cousin with the imitation term made explicit.

Why it works now

The pass-along rate, the one number that decides whether a thing spreads, used to be a marketing department's hope. It can now be measured from a company's own data, outside the enthusiast cohort, and compared with the threshold; the susceptible pool can be sized from the record. The Desk asks how many others each adopter brings in, measured rather than hoped.

When it applies

A product, practice, default, or rumor spreading through a population; a viral growth thesis; a credit book where one default triggers others; an adoption that has stalled.

What we would ask

For each customer who adopts, how many others do they bring in, measured rather than hoped?
How much of the reachable population is still susceptible?

What it needs

The measured pass-along rate, the recovery or churn rate, and the size and structure of the susceptible pool.

How we would get it

The client's own data for the pass-along rate; operators on comparable spreads; the record for how comparable contagions ended.

Where it breaks

Uniform mixing assumed when the network has hubs; the susceptible pool overestimated; the pass-along rate measured in the enthusiast segment.

For example

A consumer app reports that each user invites two others, and a thesis extrapolates. Measured outside the launch cohort, each user brings in nought point eight others, below the threshold, and the growth is paid acquisition wearing a viral costume.

The mathematics in fulldI/dt = b S I - g I with R0 = b / g; spread takes off only when R0 times the susceptible share exceeds one, and the final size is a fixed point strictly less than everyone. Taught in

MS&E 221 (Stanford); MMSS 1995 (exponential growth); MECN-451

Sources

Ross (1916). An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori pathometry. Part I. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 92(638), 204-230. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1916.0007
Ross (1911). The Prevention of Malaria, 2nd ed. John Murray. (book)
Kermack, McKendrick (1927). A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 115(772), 700-721. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1927.0118
Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215

Threshold models and increasing returns

Critical mass and lock-in

When each person's choice depends on how many others have chosen, a market can sit still for years and then flip in months, and once flipped it may not flip back. We find the threshold and how close the market is to it.

Born to answer
Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 1978; Arthur, 1989.
What it does now
How close a platform market is to tipping, and whether it tips back.
The mathematics
Equilibrium is a fixed point of the threshold distribution
The full entry
Where it began

Thomas Schelling's 1971 model of segregation showed that mild individual preferences about neighbors can tip a whole neighborhood, and Mark Granovetter's 1978 threshold model generalized it: each person acts when enough others have, and the outcome depends on the whole distribution of thresholds. Brian Arthur's 1989 paper on competing technologies added increasing returns and showed that history, not merit, can decide which technology locks in.

Why it works now

For a long time, platform and standards wars were called the way a reviewer calls a product: by asking which one is better. The models say that is often the wrong question. What decides the contest is how close each side is to its tipping point, the share of the market at which the next customer joins because enough others already have. That point used to be a hunch. It can now be estimated: ask customers how many others would have to be using a product before they would switch, read their answers as a lineup of thresholds, and set today's adoption against them. The distance to the tip becomes a number with error bars instead of a mood. The Desk's question is the dancing guy's: how many people must already be on the hillside before the next one joins?

When it applies

A platform, standard, technology, or network good where value rises with adoption; a market that seems stuck; a thesis about a challenger displacing an entrenched incumbent.

What we would ask

How many others need to have adopted before the marginal customer will?
Once the market has tipped, what would it take to tip it back?

What it needs

The distribution of adoption thresholds across the population, the current adoption level, and the strength of the increasing returns.

How we would get it

Customers on the adoption level at which they would switch; operators on comparable tips; the record for the adoption curve and its inflection.

Where it breaks

Assuming a superior product wins when the incumbent has already locked in; assuming the tip is reversible.

For example

A challenger payment network has a better product and a fifth of the merchants. Merchants adopt when most of their customers use it and customers when most merchants take it. The threshold model says the market tips only if the challenger reaches about forty percent of one side, and the research is whether any path gets it there.

The mathematics in fullEach actor adopts when the adopting share exceeds its personal threshold; the equilibrium share is a fixed point of the cumulative threshold distribution, and with increasing returns two stable equilibria exist, so the outcome depends on history, not on which technology is better. Taught in

MMSS 311-2; MECN-451

Sources

Schelling (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1(2), 143-186. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1971.9989794
Granovetter (1978). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of Sociology 83(6), 1420-1443. https://doi.org/10.1086/226707
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208

Learn the math
The question

Picture a shirtless young man dancing alone on a grassy hillside at an outdoor music festival, in a home video that spread across YouTube and that Derek Sivers made famous in his 2010 TED talk, "How to start a movement". By Sivers's account the man "had been dancing for 20 minutes. Nothing happened until one person joined in." Then two more come, then three more, and over the next minute the rest of the hillside, until standing still is the odd thing to do. Nothing about the music changed. What changed was how many people were already dancing.

Markets for anything whose value depends on how many others use it behave the same way: payment networks, operating systems, messaging apps, technical standards. They can sit still for years and then flip in months, and once they flip they rarely flip back. The investor's question is never only "is the challenger's product better?" It is "how many others must already be using it before the next customer will, and how far is the challenger from that number?" Without the model, people answer the first question and lose money on the second.

The idea in one paragraph

Everyone has a personal threshold: the share of others who must already have joined before they will join. A few people have a threshold of zero and act alone; most need company. Whether a market tips depends on the whole lineup of thresholds, not on the average one, because each group that joins is what pushes the next group over its line. The market comes to rest where the share that has joined is exactly the share whose thresholds that level clears. Usually there are two such resting places, nearly nobody and nearly everybody, with a knife edge between them. That knife edge is the tip. Below it, a market slides back to nobody; above it, it races to everybody. And when two technologies compete, small accidents of who happened to arrive first can decide which one ends up on the winning side of the edge, whatever their merits.

The math, step by step

Thresholds and the curve that counts them. Let s be the share of the population that has adopted, a number from 0 to 1. Each person has a threshold θ (theta) on the same scale. Let F(s) be the share of people whose threshold is at or below s. In statistics this is the cumulative distribution of thresholds; in plain words, F(s) answers: "if a share s had adopted, what share would be willing to?"

Rounds. Suppose a share s_t has adopted in round t. Everyone whose threshold is at or below s_t is now willing, so next round

s_(t+1) = F(s_t)

That single line is the whole dynamic. It says: look up today's share on the curve, and the curve tells you tomorrow's.

Where it stops. The process stops changing when tomorrow equals today:

s* = F(s*)

A share that satisfies this is a fixed point. On a chart, draw the curve y = F(s) and the diagonal y = s. Every place the curve crosses the diagonal is a fixed point: the share that has joined is exactly the share willing to join.

Why the shape matters. If thresholds are spread around a middle value, as they usually are, F is shaped like a flattened S: low and flat at the left (few people act alone), steep in the middle (most thresholds sit there), flat again at the right. An S that is steep enough in the middle crosses the diagonal three times: once near 0, once in the middle, once near 1. (A flatter S can cross only once; the second question in Check yourself is that case.)

Which fixed points hold. Here is where the little calculus earns its place. Start a hair away from a fixed point, at s* + e, where e is a small error. One round later you are at F(s* + e). For small e, the curve is nearly its own tangent line at s*, a straight line with slope F'(s*) (that is what the derivative is), so

F(s* + e) ≈ F(s*) + (F'(s*) e) = s* + (F'(s*) e)

The error has been multiplied by F'(s*). If that slope is below 1, each round shrinks the error and the market returns to the fixed point: it is stable. If the slope is above 1, each round magnifies the error and the market runs away: it is unstable. The S crosses the diagonal from above at the two ends, where it is flat (slope below 1), and from below in the middle, where it is steep (slope above 1). So the two ends are where markets rest, and the middle crossing is the tip: the one fixed point no market ever stays at, and the line that decides which way it runs.

Two sides, one loop. A payment network has two populations. Merchants accept the card when enough customers carry it; customers carry it when enough merchants take it. Write F_C(m) for the share of customers who will carry the card when a share m of merchants accepts it, and F_M(c) for the share of merchants who will accept it when a share c of customers carries it. Go once round the loop, starting from merchants:

G(m) = F_M(F_C(m))

Now m_(t+1) = G(m_t) is exactly the one-sided problem again, and everything above applies to G. Its slope, by the chain rule, is the product of the two sides' slopes:

G'(m) = F_M'(F_C(m)) x F_C'(m)

which is why two-sided markets can be so explosive: two steep curves multiply.

History, not merit. Brian Arthur asked what happens when two technologies compete and every adopter makes the next adoption of the same technology more attractive. Two kinds of people arrive one at a time, at random, with equal chance. Type R prefers technology A by a margin of 3 (in whatever units of benefit); type S prefers B by a margin of 5. Each earlier adopter of a technology adds 1 to its benefit for the next person. Let d be A's lead: adopters of A minus adopters of B.

To an R type, A is worth 3 plus the number who already chose A (call that number n_A), and B is worth the number who already chose B (n_B), so A wins the comparison whenever 3 + n_A is at least n_B, that is, whenever d = n_A - n_B is at least -3 (a tie goes to the favorite). In words: an R type picks A unless B leads by more than 3. The same arithmetic for an S type: it picks B unless A leads by more than 5. So while d is between -3 and +5, each person picks their favorite and d moves up or down by one with equal chance, like a coin-flip walk. The moment B leads by 4 (d = -4), even R types pick B, every later arrival picks B, and A can never catch up: the market has locked in to B. The moment A leads by 6 (d = +6), the same happens for A.

What is the chance A wins? Let p_d be the chance that A locks in starting from lead d. From d, the next step goes to d - 1 or d + 1 with equal chance, so

p_d = (½ p_(d-1)) + (½ p_(d+1))

Each value is the average of its neighbors. Rearranged, that says p_(d+1) - p_d = p_d - p_(d-1): every step to the right adds the same amount, which is exactly what it means for points to lie on a straight line. With p = 0 at d = -4 and p = 1 at d = +6, the line is p_d = (d + 4) / 10, and from a standing start p_0 = 4/10. In general, with lock-in at -a and +b, A wins with chance a / (a + b).

How long does it take? Let T_d be the expected number of further adopters before lock-in. One person arrives, then you are at a neighbor:

T_d = 1 + (½ T_(d-1)) + (½ T_(d+1)),  with T = 0 at both lock-in points

The answer is T_d = (d + a)(b - d). To check it, write x = d + a and y = b - d; the neighbors give (x - 1)(y + 1) and (x + 1)(y - 1), whose average is (xy) - 1, and 1 + (xy) - 1 = xy. From a standing start, T_0 = a x b = 4 x 6 = 24.

So in Arthur's market, the technology whose fans care less about it still wins four times in ten, and the whole contest is usually over after a couple of dozen adopters, long before anyone could tell which technology was better.

A worked example
0%20%40%60%80%100%0%20%40%60%80%100%Merchants accepting the card nowOne round laterthe tip, 43.3%start 20%start 50%
The blue curve is one round of the loop: merchants now (across) to merchants after customers and then merchants have responded (up). Where it crosses the dashed diagonal, nothing changes. The staircases are the rounds: from 20% the market falls to 2.4% and then 0.78%; from 50% it rises to 68.9% and 97.3%. The tip is 43.3%.

The Library's example: a challenger payment network with a better product and a fifth of the merchants. The thresholds below are assumptions for teaching, stated so they can be argued with; in a real case they are what the customer and merchant research would estimate.

  • Merchants' thresholds (the share of customers who must carry the card) are spread around 50 percent, with a standard deviation of 20 points.
  • Customers' thresholds (the share of merchants who must accept it) are spread around 45 percent, also with a standard deviation of 20 points.

Computing G and finding where it crosses the diagonal (step m from 0 to 1 in small increments and watch where G(m) - m changes sign; there is no formula for it, and none is needed) gives three fixed points: 0.75 percent of merchants, 43.3 percent, and 99.35 percent. The slopes of G there are 0.018, 3.909 and 0.005. So the two ends are stable and the middle, 43.3 percent, is the tip: about forty percent, as the entry says. At the tip, a one-point nudge in either direction becomes a nudge of almost four points the next round.

Now the challenger at 20 percent of merchants. Round the loop once: with 20 percent of merchants, 10.6 percent of customers carry the card; with 10.6 percent of customers, only 2.43 percent of merchants will accept it. Next round 0.78 percent, and the market settles near 0.75 percent. Its 20 percent was being held up by something outside the model, and in real life that something is money: signing bonuses, lower fees, rewards. The model says what the money is buying. It is not buying growth; it is holding the share up against a current that runs backward.

Start instead at 50 percent, a little past the tip, and the same loop runs the other way: 68.9 percent, then 97.3 percent, then 99.3 percent. The research question is therefore not "is the product better?" but "is there a path from 20 to 43 percent, and what does it cost to walk it?"

The tip also moves. If the challenger can make merchants willing to accept the card with ten points fewer customers (through lower fees, say, so the mean merchant threshold falls from 50 to 40 percent), the tip falls from 43.3 to about 36 percent. Much of platform strategy is moving the tip rather than climbing toward it.

And the reverse question, which the entry also asks: once the market rests at 99.35 percent, the incumbent must fall below 43.3 percent of merchants, a drop of about 56 points, before the current runs against it. That is why tips are so rarely undone.

The smallest version of all of this is Mark Granovetter's own example. A hundred people stand in a square. One will throw a stone with nobody else acting, one will join once one other has, one once two have, and so on up to 99. The first person acts, which moves the second, which moves the third, and all 100 riot. Replace the person whose threshold is 1 with someone whose threshold is 2. Now the first person acts alone, nobody else's line is crossed, and the crowd stays quiet. Two crowds that differ by one person in a hundred, and one riots while the other goes home. A newspaper would describe the first as a violent crowd and the second as a peaceful one.

The usual mistakes
  1. Reading a share as momentum. Symptom: "they already have 20 percent, they are a fifth of the way there." Fix: find the tip. Below it, share decays unless something keeps paying for it; 20 percent below a 43 percent tip is not progress, it is a holding cost.
  2. Using the average threshold. Symptom: "most merchants would accept it once half of customers carry it, so it will get there." Fix: the outcome depends on the whole lineup. Granovetter's two crowds differ by one person and end in opposite places. Ask about the low-threshold people who will move first, and whether each group clears the next group's line.
  3. Treating quality as the decider. Symptom: "the better product wins in the end." Fix: in Arthur's walk the less-preferred technology wins 40 percent of the time. Quality changes the thresholds, which matters, but it does not override a lead that has already crossed the lock-in line.
  4. Assuming a tip can be undone cheaply. Symptom: "if the incumbent stumbles, customers will come back." Fix: measure how far the winner must fall to cross the tip again (56 points in the example). A stumble that costs ten points changes nothing.
  5. Forgetting that the tip is an estimate. Symptom: one number, quoted to the decimal, treated as fact. Fix: the thresholds are rarely observed; the tip is only as good as the research that estimated them. Report a range and show how it moves (43 percent falls to about 36 with one change in merchant economics).
Where the model breaks

The entry names two failures: assuming a superior product wins when the incumbent has already locked in, and assuming a tip is reversible. Both are the mistakes above, made in the field.

There are others to keep in view. The model assumes everyone sees everyone; in real networks people respond to their own contacts, and a local cluster can tip while the market as a whole does not (Nicky Case's interactive piece, below, shows this well). It assumes people choose one technology; when merchants can accept several cards at little cost, the either-or that drives lock-in weakens and two networks can coexist. And whether markets truly lock in to worse technologies is disputed: the famous keyboard story was challenged by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis in "The Fable of the Keys" (1990), who argued the evidence that a better layout lost was weak. The model shows lock-in can happen; whether it happened in a given case is a question for evidence.

Check yourself

1. A challenger has a clearly better product and 25 percent of a market whose tip you estimate at 40 percent. Its share has been flat for two years. What does the model say is keeping it flat, and what is the question to research?

Answer: below the tip the share should be sliding back, so something outside the threshold lineup is holding it up, most likely spending on incentives or a loyal niche with low thresholds. The question is whether any path (a subsidy, a partnership that brings a large block of adopters at once, a change that lowers the other side's thresholds) carries it past 40 percent, and at what cost.

2. Suppose the curve G crosses the diagonal only once, at 70 percent, and from above. What happens to a market that starts at 10 percent, and is there a tip?

Answer: crossing from above means slope below 1, so 70 percent is stable, and with no other crossing there is nowhere else to rest. The curve lies above the diagonal everywhere to its left, so from 10 percent each round raises the share until it settles at 70 percent. There is no tip: thresholds are low enough that adoption spreads on its own, and the contest is about how fast, not whether.

3. In Arthur's model, change the preferences so that R types switch to B once B leads by 2 or more, and S types switch to A once A leads by 8 or more. Starting level, what is the chance A locks in, and how many adopters does it take on average?

Answer: lock-in to B at d = -2 and to A at d = +8, so a = 2 and b = 8. A wins with chance a / (a + b) = 2/10 = 20 percent, and the expected number of adopters before lock-in is a x b = 2 x 8 = 16.

Teach me more
  • Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Chapter 17: Network Effects, David Easley and Jon Kleinberg (Cornell; free draft of the Cambridge University Press book, one chapter). The most careful textbook treatment of stable and unstable equilibria and tipping points in markets with network effects, with a section on the dynamics round by round. Best read after this lesson, for the version with prices.
  • The Wisdom and/or Madness of Crowds, Nicky Case (an interactive piece, about 30 minutes). You draw the network yourself and watch a threshold contagion spread or stall. It teaches better than any text why who is connected to whom changes whether a cluster tips, which is the first place this lesson's model breaks.
  • Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, W. Brian Arthur (1989), as presented in the Santa Fe Institute's Foundational Papers in Complexity Science with a commentary by Scott E. Page. A short introduction to why the paper mattered and where it led. The paper itself is in The Economic Journal 99(394), 1989, doi:10.2307/2234208, and its random walk between two lock-in lines is the one worked above.
  • Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, Mark Granovetter (American Journal of Sociology 83(6), 1978, pages 1420 to 1443). The original, and still very readable: the riot of a hundred people, the graphic method of finding equilibria, and many examples beyond riots.
  • Dynamic Models of Segregation, Thomas Schelling (The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1(2), 1971, pages 143 to 186). Where the entry's story begins: mild individual preferences about neighbors tip a whole neighborhood. The checkerboard model is the threshold idea before Granovetter gave it a curve.

System dynamics

Why inventories, hiring, and capacity oscillate

Decisions are made on a reading of the system that reflects decisions made a delay ago, and people running such systems overshoot in a predictable pattern. We measure the delay and ask whether the plan accounts for it.

Born to answer
Forrester, 1958; MIT's beer distribution game, early 1960s, analyzed by Sterman in 1989.
What it does now
Why inventories, hiring and capacity oscillate on their own.
The mathematics
d(Stock)/dt = inflow - outflow, set on a delayed reading
The full entry
Where it began

Jay Forrester's 1958 article founded system dynamics with an industrial supply chain in which a small change in retail demand produced wild swings in factory output, entirely because of delays in the ordering rules. The beer distribution game, developed by MIT Sloan's System Dynamics Group in the early 1960s as part of Forrester's research on industrial dynamics, showed that intelligent people playing that supply chain reproduce the oscillation every time, and John Sterman analyzed how they play it in 1989. In 1997 Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang analyzed the amplification, already termed the bullwhip effect, and traced it to four sources.

Why it works now

The delay between a decision and its visible effect is the number that explains most oscillation in inventories, hiring, and capacity, and it has rarely been measured because nobody thought of the rule of thumb as a model. Operators can now be asked for the delays and the rules they manage by, and the client's own order and inventory data reveal the cycle the rule produces. The Desk asks how long it takes for a decision's effect to show up in the numbers the client manages by.

When it applies

Inventory swings, hiring that alternates between freezes and sprees, capacity that arrives after demand has turned, a supply chain whose orders swing more than its sales.

What we would ask

How long between a decision here and the point when its effect is visible in the numbers you manage by?
When the numbers last turned, did the plan respond to the level or to the change?

What it needs

The structure of the decision rule, the delay, and the history of the stock and the flows.

How we would get it

Operators on the actual delays and the rules of thumb they manage by; the client's own data on orders, inventory, and demand.

Where it breaks

Treating a delayed system as immediate; blaming demand for oscillation the decision rule created.

For example

A distributor's orders to its suppliers swing three times as much as its sales, and the thesis blames volatile customers. The customers are steady. The distributor reorders on a delayed reading of stock, and the swing is the arithmetic of that rule. The fix is the rule, not the customers.

The mathematics in fulld(Stock)/dt = inflow(t) - outflow(t), with the inflow set on a reading of the stock that is D periods old; the delay turns a stabilizing rule into an oscillating one, and the variance of orders amplifies at each stage upstream. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (difference equations); MECN-451

Sources

Sterman (1989). Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment. Management Science 35(3), 321-339. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
Lee, Padmanabhan, Whang (1997). Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect. Management Science 43(4), 546-558. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
Forrester, Jay W. (1958). Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers. Harvard Business Review, 36(4), 37-66. (book)
Sterman, John D. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. McGraw-Hill. (book)

Queueing theory and Little's law

Capacity, waiting, and the cliff at ninety percent

Whatever is waiting obeys one identity, the number in the system equals the arrival rate times the time each spends there, and near full capacity waiting does not rise gently but explodes. We check the utilization the plan assumes.

Born to answer
Little, 1961: an identity true of any stable queue.
What it does now
The waiting-time cliff a high-utilization plan walks into.
The mathematics
L = lambda x W; wait grows like rho / (1 - rho)
The full entry
Where it began

John Little proved in 1961 that for any stable queue, whatever its internal rules, the average number waiting equals the arrival rate times the average time each spends in the system. The identity is exact and needs no assumptions about the process, which is why it is the one piece of queueing theory every operations course teaches, and why the cliff near full utilization surprises people who have not seen the curve.

Why it works now

Service operations have been praised for high utilization by analysts who never saw the wait-time curve. Arrival and service rates and their variability can now be pulled from a company's own systems, and operators can say how the arrivals actually cluster. The Desk asks at what utilization the operation runs and what happens to waiting when demand rises ten percent.

When it applies

A service business, a hospital, a call center, a fulfillment operation, a software team, or any plan that runs an operation near full capacity; a thesis that credits high utilization as efficiency.

What we would ask

At what utilization does this operation run, and what happens to waiting time when demand rises ten percent?
How variable are the arrivals?

What it needs

Arrival rates, service rates, their variability, and the utilization at which the operation runs.

How we would get it

Operators on the actual utilization and its variability; the client's own throughput and wait data.

Where it breaks

Steady arrivals assumed when they cluster; a plan that runs at a utilization where the mathematics guarantees queues.

For example

A thesis praises a clinic chain for running its rooms at ninety-five percent utilization. At that utilization the wait for a room is about twenty times the visit length whenever arrivals bunch, which they do every Monday. The utilization is not efficiency; it is the reason patients leave.

The mathematics in fullL = lambda x W for any stable system; with utilization rho = lambda / mu, the expected wait in the simplest queue grows like rho / (1 - rho), so from ninety to ninety-five percent utilization the wait roughly doubles. Taught in

MS&E 221 (Stanford); MECS 470

Sources

Little (1961). A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = lambda W. Operations Research 9(3), 383-387. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.3.383

Learn the math
The question

A coffee bar has one barista, and she is good: one drink a minute, sixty an hour, every hour. On a quiet morning fifty-four customers an hour come in, so she is busy 90% of the time and the line is a mild nuisance. A new office opens across the street and three more customers an hour arrive, fifty-seven in all. Demand is up a little over 5%. The owner, delighted, notices that the barista now stands idle only 5% of the time and calls it efficiency.

The customers notice something else. The average wait in line was 9 minutes. It is now 19. Five percent more customers have more than doubled the wait, and nothing about the barista changed. Some of the new customers look at the line, turn around and go back across the street.

Nobody in this story did anything wrong. The owner's mistake was in reading utilization, the share of the time a resource is busy, as a measure of efficiency, when near the top it is a measure of how little room is left to absorb bad luck. This lesson is about why that room matters so much more than it seems, and about one identity, Little's law, that ties the length of any line to the time spent in it.

The idea in one paragraph

Customers do not arrive like a metronome. Sometimes three come in a single minute, then nobody for four. Each bunch leaves a backlog, a debt of time owed to the customers in line, and the only currency that pays it down is spare capacity: the minutes when the server would otherwise stand idle. At 90% busy the barista has six spare minutes an hour to work off each bunch; at 95% she has three. Halve the spare time and every backlog takes twice as long to clear, while new bunches keep arriving, so the average wait roughly doubles. Close to 100% there is almost no spare time at all, and the wait rises without limit. Little's law adds the bookkeeping: the number of people in any line equals the rate at which they arrive times the time each one spends there, so a longer wait is the same thing as a longer line, and a longer line is inventory, money or patience held up in the system.

The math, step by step

Step 1: Little's law, from a picture. Watch any system for a long stretch of time T: a coffee bar, a warehouse, a court's docket, a hospital ward. Let N(t) be the number of people (or items) inside at time t. Draw N(t) as a graph: it steps up by one at every arrival and down by one at every departure, a jagged staircase.

Now measure the area under that staircase in two ways.

First, sideways. Each person contributes a strip of height one that lasts exactly as long as that person was inside. So the area is the sum of everyone's time in the system. If n people passed through and each spent on average W, the area is n x W.

Second, by the average height. The average number inside over the period, call it L, is the area divided by T. So the area is L x T.

The two are the same area, so L x T = n x W. Divide both sides by T:

L = (n / T) x W

and n / T is the arrival rate, written lambda (read "lambda"). That is Little's law:

L = lambda x W

The average number in the system equals the arrival rate times the average time each spends inside. Nothing was assumed about the order of service, the number of servers or how random anything is.

One thing was assumed, quietly: that every strip lies wholly inside the period. If the system is empty at the start and empty again at the end (a shop from opening to closing), that is true, and the law is exact for that period, whatever happened in between, rush hours included. If people are already inside at the start or still inside at the end, parts of their strips fall outside the period, and the two ways of measuring the area differ by those end pieces. Over a long stretch the end pieces become a negligible share of the whole area, provided the system is stable: the arrival rate and the average time inside settle down to finite long-run values, and the line does not grow without end. Then the law holds for the long-run averages. John Little gave the first general proof in 1961, which is why the identity carries his name.

It works in any of its three directions. A university that admits 1,000 students a year who stay four years has about 4,000 students. A warehouse that ships $726 million of goods a day and holds $18,720 million of stock holds each dollar of goods for about 26 days (the worked example below is exactly that, from a real 10-K). A bank with 2,400 loan applications in process that closes 600 a week takes about four weeks per application, whatever its staff say.

Step 2: utilization, and the wall at 100%. Let mu (read "mew") be the rate at which a server can work when busy: sixty drinks an hour. Utilization is

rho = lambda / mu

(read "rho"), the share of the time the server is busy. Fifty-four customers an hour against sixty gives rho = 0.9.

If lambda is larger than mu, no formula is needed. With 66 arrivals an hour against 60, the line grows by 66 - 60 = 6 people an hour for as long as the rush lasts; after a three-hour rush that began with no line, about 18 people are waiting, and the newest arrival has about 18 minutes of other people's drinks to wait through. Everything that follows is about the case people find surprising: lambda below mu, so the server can keep up on average, and yet the line is long.

Step 3: why there is a line at all. Suppose the customers arrived exactly every 60 / 57, about 1.05, minutes and each drink took exactly one minute. Then each customer would find the barista free, and nobody would ever wait, at 95% busy or at 99.9%. The line in the opening scene comes entirely from variability: arrivals that bunch and service times that vary. Utilization sets how fast a backlog clears; variability sets how often backlogs form. Waiting needs both.

Step 4: the simplest random queue, solved. The standard model, called M/M/1, has one server, arrivals at random (any short instant equally likely to bring someone, independently of the past) and service times that are random in the same way (a drink being made is equally likely to be finished in any short instant, however long it has been under way), with average 1 / mu. Its whole state is the number of people present, n. Let P(n) be the share of the time that exactly n people are present.

In the long run, the system must cross the line between n and n + 1 people as often upward as downward. It can go up from n only while it sits at n, which is a share P(n) of the time, and while it sits there arrivals come at the rate lambda: that makes lambda x P(n) upward crossings an hour. It can come down from n + 1 only while it sits at n + 1, where drinks are finished at the rate mu: mu x P(n + 1) downward crossings an hour. Each crossing up must be followed by a crossing down before the next one up, so over a long time the two counts never differ by more than one, and the two rates are equal:

lambda x P(n) = mu x P(n + 1)

which gives P(n + 1) = rho x P(n). Each step up multiplies by rho, so

P(n) = P(0) x rho^n

The shares must add to one. The sum 1 + rho + rho^2 + ... is a geometric series equal to 1 / (1 - rho) when rho is below one, so P(0) = 1 - rho and

P(n) = (1 - rho) x rho^n

Read it. P(0) = 1 - rho says the server is idle 1 - rho of the time, as it must be. The shares from n = 10 upward add to (1 - rho) x (rho^10 + rho^11 + ...) = rho^10, by the same geometric series. So at rho = 0.9 there are ten or more people in the shop, waiting or being served, 34.9% of the time; at 0.95, 59.9% of the time.

The average number present is the sum of n x P(n) over every n:

L = (1 - rho) x (rho + (2 x rho^2) + (3 x rho^3) + ...)

To add up the bracket, take the geometric series and differentiate both sides with respect to rho. A power series may be differentiated term by term inside the range where it converges, here rho below one. On the right, the derivative of 1 / (1 - rho) is 1 / (1 - rho)^2: the minus sign from the power rule and the minus sign from differentiating 1 - rho cancel.

1 + rho + rho^2 + rho^3 + ... = 1 / (1 - rho)
1 + (2 x rho) + (3 x rho^2) + ... = 1 / (1 - rho)^2

Multiply the second line by rho and its left side becomes the bracket. So the bracket is rho / (1 - rho)^2, and

L = (1 - rho) x (rho / (1 - rho)^2) = rho / (1 - rho)

At rho = 0.9, L = 0.9 / 0.1 = 9 people: on average 0.9 being served and 8.1 waiting.

Step 5: Little's law turns a count into a wait. Now use Step 1. Time in the system is W = L / lambda. Time waiting in line, before service starts, is that less one average service time, 1 / mu. Write it out, using lambda = rho x mu:

W = L / lambda = (rho / (1 - rho)) / (rho x mu) = 1 / (mu x (1 - rho))
W_q = W - (1 / mu) = (1 / mu) x ((1 / (1 - rho)) - 1) = (1 / mu) x (rho / (1 - rho))

The last step uses (1 / (1 - rho)) - 1 = (1 - (1 - rho)) / (1 - rho) = rho / (1 - rho). So:

W_q = (rho / (1 - rho)) x (1 / mu)

This is the formula behind the whole lesson. The wait in line, measured in service times, is rho / (1 - rho). For the barista, whose service time is one minute: 4 minutes at 80%, 9 at 90%, 19 at 95%. Check it against Step 1: at 90% the time in the system is 9 minutes in line plus 1 being served, 10 minutes, and L = 54 per hour x (10 / 60) hour = 9 people, the same 9 as Step 4.

0102030400%20%40%60%80%100%Utilization: share of the time the server is busyWait in line, in service times80%: 490%: 995%: 19random arrivals (the simplest queue)bunched arrivalsbooked and steady
The cliff. Waiting depends on the spare capacity left to absorb bad luck, so it grows as one over the slack: halve the slack and the wait doubles. Less variability lowers the whole curve; it never removes the wall at 100%.

Step 6: the cliff, with calculus. Why does the curve bend so sharply? Write the slack, the share of time the server is idle, as s = 1 - rho. Then

rho / (1 - rho) = (1 - s) / s = (1 / s) - 1

The wait, in service times, is one over the slack, less one. Near the top 1 / s dwarfs the one, so the wait is very nearly inversely proportional to the spare capacity: halve the slack and the wait roughly doubles. From 90% to 95% the slack falls from 10% to 5%, and the wait goes from (1 / 0.1) - 1 = 9 to (1 / 0.05) - 1 = 19.

The derivative says the same thing at a point. The quotient rule gives the derivative of u / v as ((v x u') - (u x v')) / v^2. Here u = rho and v = 1 - rho, so u' = 1 and v' = -1:

d/d rho (rho / (1 - rho)) = (((1 - rho) x 1) - (rho x (-1))) / (1 - rho)^2
= ((1 - rho) + rho) / (1 - rho)^2 = 1 / (1 - rho)^2

At 80% it is 1 / 0.2^2 = 25; at 90%, 1 / 0.1^2 = 100; at 95%, 1 / 0.05^2 = 400. So at 90%, one more point of utilization adds about 100 x 0.01 = 1 service time of waiting (exactly, 9 becomes 10.11). At 95% the slope says about four, and the true figure is five (19 becomes 0.96 / 0.04 = 24), because the curve goes on steepening across the step. The steepness goes as one over the square of the slack: halve the slack and the slope is four times as great.

The entry's first question, "what happens to waiting when demand rises ten percent?", has a sharp answer here. At 85% busy, 10% more demand means 0.85 x 1.1 = 0.935. The wait goes from 0.85 / 0.15 = 5.67 service times to 0.935 / 0.065 = 14.38, two and a half times as long, from 10% more customers.

Step 7: other kinds of variability (Kingman's formula). Real arrivals are rarely exactly as random as M/M/1 assumes. Booked appointments are steadier; Monday mornings, lunch rushes and end-of-quarter orders are bunchier. Measure variability by the coefficient of variation, the standard deviation divided by the mean: c_a for the gaps between arrivals and c_s for service times. Random gaps and random service both have a coefficient of one. John Kingman showed in 1961 that, for one server close to full,

W_q is about (rho / (1 - rho)) x ((c_a^2 + c_s^2) / 2) x (1 / mu)

Three factors: utilization, variability and the time per job. With c_a = c_s = 1, the middle factor is one and this is Step 5 exactly. Clockwork arrivals and service give zero, Step 3's no-line world. Steady booked arrivals with steady service, both coefficients 0.5, give a factor of (0.25 + 0.25) / 2 = 0.25: about 4.75 minutes at 95% instead of 19. Bunched arrivals with a coefficient of 1.5 and random service give (2.25 + 1) / 2 = 1.625: about 30.9 minutes at 95%.

Kingman's formula is an approximation, so we checked it by simulation, two million customers at a time, using the rule that each customer's wait is the previous customer's wait plus the previous service time less the gap between their arrivals, or zero if that is negative. The steady and the bunched gaps and service times were drawn from gamma distributions with the stated coefficients of variation. At 95%: random arrivals and service gave 19.24 minutes (the exact answer is 19); steady booked arrivals gave 4.54 (Kingman says 4.75); bunched arrivals gave 32.69 (Kingman says 30.9). At 90% with random arrivals, 9.05 against an exact 9. Close enough to steer by, and the shape is the point: variability raises or lowers the whole curve, but every curve hits the same wall at 100%.

Step 8: pooling, the one way to run hot safely. Ten rooms sharing one waiting list behave very differently from ten rooms that each keep their own list, even at the same utilization. With one shared line, a patient who would have waited behind a long visit in one room goes to whichever room frees up first. The Danish mathematician A. K. Erlang, who worked for the Copenhagen Telephone Company, published the answer for this queue, c servers sharing one line with random arrivals and service, in 1917. In the units of this lesson it reads

W_q = C / (c x (1 - rho))  service times

where rho is the utilization of each server and C, given by Erlang's formula, is the probability that an arrival finds every server busy and has to wait. With one server C = rho, and this is Step 5 again. With ten servers at 95%, C = 0.826: most arrivals still wait, but not for long, 0.826 / (10 x 0.05) = 1.65 service times. So at 95% busy the wait in line, in service times, is 19 with one server, 9.26 with two sharing one line, and 1.65 with ten.

0510152050%60%70%80%90%100%Utilization of each serverWait in line, in service timesone room: 19ten rooms: 1.65one servertwo sharing one lineten sharing one line
Pooling. Ten rooms sharing one list can run as hot as one room and keep the wait short, because a bad run in one room is absorbed by a free room next door. The same utilization means different things for one server and for ten.

The entry's clinic example, a wait of about twenty times the visit length at 95%, is the figure for a room that keeps its own list: with random arrivals and a 20-minute visit, 19 x 20 = 380 minutes. It is the right figure wherever each room, or each doctor, has its own patients, and arrivals that bunch make it worse: with Step 7's bunched factor it is about 30.9 x 20 = 618 minutes. Ten rooms at 95% drawing on one shared list, with random arrivals, give about 1.65 x 20 = 33 minutes. Same utilization; an order of magnitude apart. So the first question to put to any utilization figure is how many servers share the line. Pooling does not repeal the cliff, though: every curve on the chart still rises without limit toward 100%.

A worked example

Little's law in a 10-K. Costco Wholesale's annual report for the 52 weeks ended 30 August 2026 gives merchandise costs, the cost of the goods it sold, of $264,279 million. Merchandise inventories were $18,116 million at the start of the year and $19,324 million at the end; accounts payable, what it owed its suppliers, were $19,783 million and $22,591 million.

Treat the warehouses as one big queue of goods. The throughput, in dollars of goods leaving the shelves each day, is

lambda = $264,279 million / 364 days = $726.0 million a day

The average number in the system, in dollars, is the average inventory, taken here as the midpoint of the two year-end balances, ($18,116 million + $19,324 million) / 2 = $18,720 million. Little's law gives the average time a dollar of goods sits in a Costco before someone buys it:

W = L / lambda = $18,720 million / $726.0 million a day = 25.8 days

The same bookkeeping on the supplier side: average payables of $21,187 million at $726.0 million a day is 29.2 days. Costco, on average, sells a dollar of goods about three and a half days before it pays for it. Its suppliers finance its shelves. (These are rough readings: two year-end balances stand in for the average over the year, and the payables line may include bills for things other than merchandise.) That is not a ratio to memorize; it is Little's law read off a filing, and it says something about a business model: this retailer turns its queue of goods over faster than its suppliers' invoices come due.

It also prices a change. If goods sat ten days longer at the same throughput, Little's law says the stock would be 10 x $726.0 million = $7,260 million larger, cash the company would have to find. When an analyst says "inventory days rose", Little's law is what turns that into dollars.

The cliff in a hospital. In 1999 Adrian Bagust, Michael Place and John Posnett published in the BMJ a simulation of a hypothetical acute hospital in England: a pool of 200 beds, emergency admissions that fluctuate at random from day to day around weekly and seasonal patterns, and stays that average about a week. Their question is the one every bed manager asks: how full can the wards run before a patient who needs a bed finds none? A hospital is a close cousin of Step 8's system, many beds sharing one stream of patients, so it can run far hotter than one room. But it still has a cliff, and they found where it starts. In their words, risks "are discernible when average bed occupancy rates exceed about 85%", and a hospital "can expect regular bed shortages and periodic bed crises" at 90% or more. At 85%, the model's hospital was short of beds for admissions on four days a year.

Two of their findings are this lesson in a hospital's clothes. First, the bad days do not stay bad days: after a day with no bed to offer, the model's hospital needed about twice the average length of stay, some two weeks, to recover its balance, so at 85% occupancy four days of shortage can mean up to eight weeks of disruption in all (four recoveries of about 14 days each is 4 x 14 = 56 days). That is the debt of time from the top of this lesson, paid down only out of slack. Second, they turned the cliff into a calendar: with emergency admissions growing a few percent a year, they estimated that slowing that growth by one point a year would postpone reaching 85% occupancy by one year, and 90% by three. The average occupancy of acute hospitals in England, by the figure they cite for 1996-7, was 78.9%.

Their numbers come from a simulation of one notional hospital, not from a law of nature. In their experiments more variability raised the risk, seasonal swings most of all, as Step 7 would lead one to expect; the size of the bed pool mattered only below about 150 beds, and then modestly. The lasting lesson is the shape: a hospital stops being safe well before it is full.

The usual mistakes
  • Reading high utilization as efficiency. Symptom: a plan or a thesis praises an operation for running at 95% and projects growth on the same staff. Fix: ask what happens to waiting at the projected demand. At 50% busy, 10% more demand adds about a fifth of a service time to the wait (0.55 / 0.45 = 1.22 against 1); above 90% each point costs more than the one before, and growth pushed into a full system shows up as waiting, lost customers or overtime, not as revenue.
  • Using averages that hide the bunching. Symptom: "we get 57 customers an hour and can serve 60, so we are fine." Fix: an hourly average across the day says nothing about the Monday morning or the lunch rush, when the utilization is above 100% for an hour. Measure the busiest hours and the variability of arrivals, the c_a of Step 7.
  • Forgetting Little's law cuts both ways. Symptom: a company promises shorter delivery times while its backlog of orders grows at the same throughput. Fix: W = L / lambda. With throughput fixed, a longer backlog is a longer wait, whatever the promise says. Days of inventory, days of payables, the age of a court's docket and a lender's processing time are all this identity.
  • Comparing utilization across different sizes. Symptom: "the big hospital runs at 92%, so the small one can too." Fix: pooling (Step 8). Ten servers sharing a line can run far hotter than one or two for the same wait. The safe utilization depends on the number of servers and on whether they share one line.
  • Plugging a number above 1 into the formula. Symptom: a negative wait from rho / (1 - rho). Fix: above 100% there is no steady state at all; the line grows at lambda - mu per hour until demand falls or someone leaves.
Where the model breaks

The entry names two failures, and both are in the steps above. First, steady arrivals assumed when they cluster: the simplest formula assumes random arrivals with a coefficient of variation of one; real arrivals that bunch on Mondays or at quarter-ends sit on a higher curve (Step 7), and a plan sized on the daily average will meet the cliff in its busiest hour. Second, a plan that runs at a utilization where the mathematics guarantees queues: no amount of management will make a single server at 98% fast for its customers if arrivals are at all random (0.98 / 0.02 = 49 service times of waiting, on average).

Two more cautions. The formulas here are steady-state averages: they describe a system that has run at the same rates for a long time, not the first hour after opening or a one-day surge, when the line is still building. And real people leave lines that are too long and come back later, or not at all; the queue that the formulas predict at 98% may never form, because the customers have gone. That is not good news for the operation. It is the lost revenue the entry's clinic example warns about.

Little's law itself is an identity and fails only when the conditions of Step 1 do: over a period that starts or ends with people inside and is too short for those end pieces to wash out, or in a system that is still filling up, the averages do not line up.

Check yourself

1. A mortgage lender has 2,400 applications in process and closes 600 a week. Its website promises a decision in two weeks. Is the promise credible?

Answer: Little's law gives the average time in process: W = L / lambda = 2,400 / 600 = 4 weeks. The promise could hold for some applications, but the average is twice the promise. To make two weeks the average at 600 a week, the backlog would have to fall to 600 x 2 = 1,200.

2. A support team runs at 80% busy with random arrivals and random job times; each job takes 30 minutes on average. Demand rises 10%. By how much does the average wait in line rise, in percent and in minutes?

Answer: utilization goes to 0.8 x 1.1 = 0.88. The wait in line, in service times, goes from 0.8 / 0.2 = 4 to 0.88 / 0.12 = 7.33, up 83%. In minutes, 4 x 30 = 120 minutes becomes 7.33 x 30 = 220 minutes, from two hours to three hours and forty minutes, from 10% more work.

3. The barista at 95% busy gets a better machine, and each drink now takes 10% less time. The owner expects the wait to fall about 10%. What does the model say?

Answer: the same 57 customers an hour now need only 0.9 of a minute each, so utilization falls to 0.95 x 0.9 = 0.855. The wait in line, in the new service times, is 0.855 / 0.145, about 5.9, and each new service time is 0.9 of a minute, so the wait is about 5.9 x 0.9 = 5.3 minutes against 19 before: about 72% shorter, not 10%. The faster machine bought slack, and near the cliff slack is what waiting is made of.

Teach me more
  • M/M/1 Queue, MIT OpenCourseWare 2.854, Introduction to Manufacturing Systems, Fall 2016 (3 pages). The shortest clean chain from Little's law to the waiting-time formula, the same chain as Steps 4 and 5, and a useful correction: the average number at the server is rho, not one. It takes the count rho / (1 - rho) as given from its lecture; Step 4 derives it.
  • Little's Law as Viewed on Its 50th Anniversary, John D. C. Little, Operations Research 59(3), 2011, pp. 536 to 549, in the copy on the INFORMS website. The law's author on the area picture of Step 1, why the law holds even when arrival rates change through the day (over a period that starts and ends empty, it holds exactly), its history and its uses. He tells how a student in his queueing class asked him how hard a general proof would be, and he guessed it would not be too hard.
  • Dynamics of bed use in accommodating emergency admissions, Adrian Bagust, Michael Place and John W. Posnett, BMJ 319, 1999, pp. 155 to 158, free on PubMed Central. The hospital case above, with the simulation's design and its charts of shortage risk against occupancy.
  • The Kingman Law - Capacity Utilization vs Queue Time, Laurence Gartside, YouTube (about 3 minutes). A short video which, by its own description, covers Kingman's formula and the relation between queue time and capacity utilization, the subject of Step 7. Described from its page only (title, length and description); we have not watched it.

The original proof is Little, "A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = lambda W", Operations Research 9(3), 1961, pp. 383 to 387, which credits Philip Morse's book Queues, Inventories and Maintenance (1958) with the plausibility argument it made rigorous. The area picture of Step 1 is drawn, with many small examples, in Little and Graves, "Little's Law", a chapter of Building Intuition (Springer, 2008). Kingman's approximation is "The single server queue in heavy traffic", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 57(4), 1961, pp. 902 to 904.

Lotka-Volterra and Lanchester's square law

Share wars and the square law

When two rivals grind against each other, the outcome depends on relative strength in a way that is far from linear, and the dynamics can oscillate rather than settle. We work out which regime this contest is in before the client commits to a fight.

Born to answer
Volterra, 1926, on Adriatic fish; Lanchester, 1916, on force.
What it does now
Whether outspending a rival buys share in proportion, or its square.
The mathematics
Coupled dx/dt and dy/dt; strength counts as its square
The full entry
Where it began

Vito Volterra wrote the predator-prey equations in 1926 to explain why fish populations in the Adriatic oscillated, and Alfred Lotka had derived the same system a year earlier in a book on physical biology. Frederick Lanchester, an aeronautical engineer, published the square law of concentrated force in 1916: when both sides fire at each other, an advantage in numbers counts as its square. The law was later applied to market share contests.

Why it works now

Share wars have been fought on the belief that spend buys share linearly. The relative strengths of the rivals on the dimension that decides share, and the history of past contests in the market, can now be assembled quickly, and former executives of both sides can say how those contests actually resolved. The Desk asks whether the larger side gains proportionally more than its size when both spend, and whether the contest has oscillated before.

When it applies

A market-share contest between two large rivals, a price war, a platform fighting a challenger, or a plan to win by spending more; a competitive relationship that cycles.

What we would ask

When you and your rival both spend to take share, does the larger side gain proportionally more than its size, or only its share?
Has this contest oscillated before, and what set the period?

What it needs

The relative strength of the rivals on the dimension that decides share, and the history of past contests.

How we would get it

Former executives of both rivals on how past contests actually resolved; the record for share over time.

Where it breaks

Assuming a linear relationship between spend and share; ignoring that the losing side can withdraw rather than fight.

For example

A challenger with a third of the incumbent's marketing budget plans to win share by outspending in one region. Under the square law of concentrated force, the incumbent's advantage in a head-on contest is nine to one, not three to one; the challenger's only winning move is a region where the incumbent is not concentrated.

The mathematics in fullCoupled equations dx/dt = f(x, y), dy/dt = g(x, y): predator-prey systems produce cycles rather than a settled share, and under the square law losses are proportional to the opponent's total strength, so an advantage in numbers counts as its square. Taught in

MMSS 1995 (difference equations); MECN-441

Sources

Volterra (1926). Fluctuations in the Abundance of a Species considered Mathematically1. Nature 118(2972), 558-560. https://doi.org/10.1038/118558a0
Lanchester, F. W. (1916). Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. Constable. (book)
Lotka, Alfred J. (1925). Elements of Physical Biology. Williams and Wilkins. (book)

Learn the math
The question

On 19 February 1945, United States Marines began landing on Iwo Jima, an island of about eight square miles held by roughly 21,500 Japanese soldiers dug into caves, tunnels and concrete. By every account the defenders had the better position. Nine years later an operations researcher named J. H. Engel took the daily record of the battle and asked a cold question: could two lines of algebra, written by an aeronautical engineer in 1916, reproduce what happened? They could. His fit put the defenders' killing power at about five times the attackers', man for man, and the attackers still won, at a cost in casualties roughly equal to the whole garrison. The reason is the subject of this lesson: when every unit on each side can strike at any unit on the other, numbers do not count once. They count as their square.

Rivals in business fight the same way more often than they think: two networks bidding for the same advertisers, two retailers cutting price in the same towns, a challenger trying to buy share with marketing. The investor's question is not only "who has the better product, or the bigger budget?" It is "in this contest, does size count once or squared, and can the smaller side choose a battlefield where the larger one is not all there?" The same family of equations also explains a second surprise: contests between a predator and its prey, or between a business and the rivals it feeds, need not settle at all. They can go round in cycles.

The idea in one paragraph

Picture two forces wearing each other down. If each soldier can only fight the one in front of him, a three to one advantage means three to one: the big side wins and keeps the difference. But if every soldier on each side can aim at any soldier on the other, the big side wins faster and loses less, because while it destroys the small side, the small side's fire is spread over a crowd and shrinks as it fights. Run the arithmetic and a three to one edge in numbers becomes a nine to one edge in strength. The lesson cuts both ways: the smaller side should never fight the whole of the larger one at once, and the larger side should never arrive a piece at a time. Predator and prey are a different kind of contest, in which each side's growth depends on the other's size, and the result is a loop: prey multiply, predators feast and multiply, prey are eaten down, predators starve, prey recover. Over a full loop the averages sit at a fixed point set by the rates, which leads to Volterra's famous and counterintuitive result about fishing.

The math, step by step

The square law. Let A(t) and B(t) be the strengths of two forces at time t. Each unit of B removes β units of A per unit of time (beta), and each unit of A removes α units of B (alpha). With aimed fire, A's losses depend on how many shooters B has, not on how many targets A offers:

dA/dt = -β B
dB/dt = -α A

Getting rid of time. We do not need to solve for A(t) to know who wins. Multiply the first equation by α A and the second by β B:

α A dA/dt = -α β A B
β B dB/dt = -α β A B

The right sides are equal, so (α A dA/dt) - (β B dB/dt) = 0. The left side is the derivative of ((α A²) - (β B²)) / 2 (the chain rule: the derivative of A² is 2 A dA/dt). A quantity whose derivative is zero does not change, so throughout the battle

(α A²) - (β B²) = (α A0²) - (β B0²)

where A0 and B0 are the starting strengths. This is the whole law. Call α A² side A's fighting strength: effectiveness counts once, numbers count squared. The reason is that every extra unit does two jobs. It fires at the enemy, and it draws some of the enemy's fire away from the units already there. A better weapon does only the first job, which is why α enters once and A enters twice. If α A0² is bigger than β B0², A wins, and when B reaches zero A has left

A_end = sqrt(A0² - ((β/α) B0²))

Three against one. With equal effectiveness and 3 units against 1: strength 9 against 1, and the larger side ends with sqrt(9 - 1) = 2.83. It lost 0.17 of a unit destroying an entire unit of the enemy.

The linear law, for contrast. If fights are one on one (each unit can only engage one opponent at a time, as in a line of swordsmen or a store against the store across the road), each side loses at a fixed rate and (α A) - (β B) is what stays constant. Three against one then ends with 2 left. Same armies, two laws, and the answer to "how much does size help?" moves from 3 to 9.

Twice as good or twice as many? Under the square law, a unit twice as effective is worth sqrt(2) = 1.41 units, not 2. Pit 1 unit with α = 2 against 2 units with β = 1: strengths 2 x 1² = 2 against 1 x 2² = 4. The many win and keep sqrt(4 - 2) = 1.41. To break even against twice its numbers, the smaller side must be four times as effective.

Concentration. The square law punishes division. Suppose the incumbent spreads its 3 units evenly over four regions, 0.75 in each, and the challenger brings its single unit into one of them. Locally it is 1 against 0.75, strengths 1 against 0.5625, and the challenger wins, keeping sqrt(1 - 0.5625) = 0.66. But it cannot roll on: in the next region it is 0.66 against 0.75, and now the incumbent wins, keeping 0.35. The smaller side can win where the larger is not concentrated, and only there.

Predator and prey. Now a different contest. Let x be prey and y predators. Prey grow at rate a on their own and are eaten in proportion to meetings, b x y; predators die at rate c without food and grow from meetings at d x y:

dx/dt = (a x) - (b x y) = x (a - (b y))
dy/dt = (-c y) + (d x y) = y ((d x) - c)

Each side's growth rate depends on the other's size. Nothing changes when both brackets are zero, at the resting point

x* = c / d,   y* = a / b

What stays constant. Divide the second equation by the first: the dt cancels, leaving dy/dx, the slope of the path in the plane of prey and predators. Then move everything with y to the left and everything with x to the right:

(a - (b y)) / y dy = ((d x) - c) / x dx

Integrate both sides (the integral of 1/y is ln y):

(a ln y) - (b y) = (d x) - (c ln x) + constant

So V = (d x) - (c ln x) + (b y) - (a ln y) never changes along a path. V is smallest at the resting point and rises in every direction like a bowl, so a path of constant V is a ring around the bottom of the bowl: a closed loop. The populations cycle forever, neither settling nor exploding.

How long a cycle takes. Near the resting point, write x = x* + u and y = y* + v with u and v small, and drop the product u v, which is tiny when both are small: du/dt = -b x* v and dv/dt = d y* u. Differentiate the first once more and substitute the second:

d²u/dt² = -b x* d y* u = -a c u

This is the equation of a spring: u = cos(sqrt(a c) t) satisfies it, as differentiating twice confirms, so the solutions are waves with angular frequency sqrt(a c) and small cycles take 2Ï€ / sqrt(a c). Larger loops take a little longer.

The average over a cycle. Divide the second equation by y. The left side becomes (1/y) dy/dt, which is the derivative of ln y, so d(ln y)/dt = (d x) - c. Integrate over one full cycle of length T: the left side returns to where it started, so it gives 0, and

0 = (d ∫x dt) - (c T),   so the average of x is c / d

The same trick on the first equation gives the average of y as a / b. However wide the loop, the averages are exactly the resting point.

Volterra's principle. Now let fishing remove the same fraction E of each species per unit of time. Prey growth becomes a - E and predator death c + E, so the averages move to

average prey = (c + E) / d,   average predators = (a - E) / b

Moderate fishing raises the average of the prey and lowers the average of the predators. Stop fishing, and the predators' share rises. That is what Volterra's son-in-law, Umberto D'Ancona, had seen in the fish markets of the Adriatic.

A worked example
0k20k40k60k80k061218243036Day of the battleTroops in actionreportedU.S., as landedU.S., same men in ten wavesJapanese
Engel's equations with Washburn's coefficients: 0.0106 Japanese casualties per U.S. man day and 0.0544 U.S. casualties per Japanese man day, 21,500 defenders, and 54,000, 6,000 and 13,000 U.S. troops landed on days 1, 3 and 6. The model ends day 36 with 51,984 U.S. troops in action against 52,140 reported. The dashed line lands the same 73,000 in ten waves of 7,300, one every three days: on day 36 the garrison still holds 11,836, and when it is gone, on day 73, U.S. losses are 46,534 instead of 21,018.

Iwo Jima. Engel modeled the battle with the square law plus reinforcements: dUS/dt = landings - (β J) and dJ/dt = -α US, no Japanese reinforcements. As restated in Alan Washburn's Naval Postgraduate School notes, his best fit was β = 0.0544 U.S. casualties per Japanese man day and α = 0.0106 Japanese casualties per U.S. man day: each defender about 5.1 times as deadly as each attacker. With the landing record commonly used with his model (54,000 men on day 1, 6,000 on day 3, 13,000 on day 6) and 21,500 defenders, the equations give 51,984 U.S. troops still in action on day 36, against 52,140 in the record, and a garrison reduced to about 200 men on day 36 and gone about ten hours later. U.S. losses come to about 21,000, close to the defenders' entire number. One honest footnote: some restatements of Engel's paper give 0.0577 rather than 0.0544 for the Japanese coefficient. With that value the model ends day 36 with 50,443 U.S. troops in action, the garrison lasts into day 37, and U.S. losses are about 22,600. Nothing below turns on the choice.

Why did the side five times less deadly win? Fighting strength is effectiveness times numbers squared, and counting all 73,000 Americans as if ashore at once: 0.0106 x 73,000² = 56.5 million against 0.0544 x 21,500² = 25.1 million. Numbers of about 3.4 to 1, squared, are 11.5 to 1, which swamps 5.1 to 1.

Now the lesson about arriving all at once. Land the same 73,000 men in ten waves of 7,300, one every three days, and the model says the garrison still holds 11,836 men on day 36, the battle lasts until day 73, and U.S. losses are 46,534, 2.2 times as many. Nothing changed but the timing. A defender facing a piece at a time fights a string of small battles it can win, or at least make expensive.

The challenger in the Library entry. A challenger has a third of the incumbent's marketing budget and plans to outspend it in one region. If spend in this market can reach any customer the rival is courting (national media, search advertising), the square law is the right first guess: head on, the incumbent's edge is nine to one, not three to one, and the challenger loses. The only winning move is the one in the concentration example: a region or segment where the incumbent is spread thin, and the discipline not to roll on into the next one before rebuilding. If instead the contest is store by store, the linear law is closer, and size helps much less. Which law holds is a research question, answered by asking how past contests in this market actually ran.

020406080100020406080100120140PreyPredatorsaverage, no fishing (50, 50)average with fishing (75, 37.5)
Prey grow at 1 a unit of time, predators die at 0.5, and meetings cost the prey 0.02 and feed the predators 0.01 (teaching values). Starting at 80 prey and 50 predators, the loop takes 9.03 units of time and its averages are exactly the resting point (50, 50). Fishing at 0.25 moves the average to 75 prey and 37.5 predators.

The Adriatic fish. D'Ancona tabulated the share of sharks, skates and rays (predators) in the catch landed at Fiume. It was 11.9 percent in 1914, then 21.4, 22.1, 21.2 and 36.4 percent in the war years 1915 to 1918, when fishing nearly stopped, then 27.3 in 1919 and 16.0, 15.9, 14.8 and 10.7 percent from 1920 to 1923 as the boats went back out: an average of 25.3 percent in the war years against 14.4 percent after. Volterra's principle predicts exactly that direction. In the teaching values of the chart (prey grow at 1, predators die at 0.5, meetings cost the prey 0.02 and feed the predators 0.01), the resting point is 50 prey and 50 predators, a loop from 80 prey takes 9.03 units of time (the small-cycle formula gives 8.89), and its averages come out at 50 and 50, as the integral said. Fishing at 0.25 moves the averages to 75 prey and 37.5 predators: the predators' share of the population falls from one half to one third. These values illustrate the direction; they are not fitted to the Adriatic.

The usual mistakes
  1. Assuming spend buys share in proportion. Symptom: "we have a third of their budget, so we can win a third of the fights." Fix: ask which law governs. If each side's effort can reach all of the other's customers, a third of the budget is a ninth of the strength.
  2. Splitting the larger force. Symptom: an incumbent defending every region equally, or an attacker committing in waves. Fix: compute the local strengths. In the Iwo Jima model, landing in waves cost 2.2 times the men.
  3. Overrating quality. Symptom: "our product is twice as good, so half the spend is enough." Fix: quality counts once and numbers count squared; twice as good matches only sqrt(2) times the numbers.
  4. Reading a cycle as a trend. Symptom: a rising share or a falling margin extrapolated from one phase of a loop. Fix: ask whether the contest has turned before and what set the period; in the model, the turn comes from the other side's response, not from a change in the world.
  5. Forgetting that a common shock is not neutral. Symptom: "the downturn hurts everyone equally, so shares will not move." Fix: Volterra's principle. A pressure that takes the same fraction from both sides of a predator and prey contest moves the averages toward the prey.
Where the model breaks

The entry names two failures: assuming a linear relationship between spend and share, and ignoring that the losing side can withdraw rather than fight. The second matters most. Lanchester's equations run to the last unit; real armies and real companies usually stop well before that, at a break point set by morale, cash or the board. Iwo Jima fit so well partly because the garrison fought almost to the last man. In a market, the smaller rival may exit, merge or retreat to a niche long before the arithmetic says it is beaten, and the larger side's real prize is decided by that choice, not by the equations.

Two more limits. The coefficients are fitted after the event: Engel chose α and β to match the record, and a 1972 reexamination revised some of his data (the fit stayed good). Before a contest, the effectiveness of each side's spend is an estimate, and the law's verdict is only as good as that estimate; a third of the budget is a ninth of the strength only if the two sides' dollars are equally effective. And the Lotka-Volterra loop is fragile: add a small realistic touch, such as prey crowding each other when numbers are high, and the loop spirals in to the resting point instead of cycling forever. The MIT course page for Jeff Gore's lecture on it (below) calls the model bad, mathematically speaking, and profoundly important, which is right. Real cycles need a reason to keep going, and that reason should be found in the evidence, not assumed from the equations.

Check yourself

1. Two rivals cut prices. In one market the price war is fought town by town, each store against the store across the street. In another it is fought in national advertising that reaches every customer. Which law is closer in each, and where does size help more?

Answer: town by town, each unit engages one opponent, so the linear law is closer and size helps in proportion. In national advertising, each side's spend reaches all of the other's customers, so the square law is the first guess and the larger side's edge counts squared.

2. In a predator and prey contest, both populations are hit by the same disease, which kills the same small fraction of each per year. What happens to the average numbers of each, and why is that surprising?

Answer: it acts like fishing at rate E. The average prey rises to (c + E) / d and the average predators fall to (a - E) / b. It is surprising because a shock that hurts both sides equally ends up helping one of them on average: the prey gain because their main enemy lost more than they did.

3. Five units fight four. Each of the five is half as effective as each of the four (α = 0.5 for the five, β = 1 for the four). Who wins under the square law, with how many left? How effective would the five need to be to break even?

Answer: strengths are 0.5 x 5² = 12.5 against 1 x 4² = 16, so the four win, keeping sqrt((16 - 12.5) / 1) = 1.87. To break even the five need α x 25 = 16, that is α = 0.64.

Teach me more
  • Lanchester Systems, Alan Washburn (Naval Postgraduate School course notes, April 2000, 24 pages). The clearest working treatment: the biological roots in predator and prey, Engel's Iwo Jima fit, the square law for aimed fire against the linear law for unaimed fire, and exercises, several with answers. Its section on Iwo Jima is the source of this lesson's coefficients. Engel's original paper is "A Verification of Lanchester's Law", Operations Research 2(2), 1954, pages 163 to 171, doi:10.1287/opre.2.2.163.
  • Interspecies Interactions, Jeff Gore (MIT OpenCourseWare, Systems Biology 8.591J, Fall 2014, a full class lecture on video). Starts with the Lotka-Volterra model, explains why it is mathematically fragile and still essential, and shows laboratory experiments on predator and prey oscillations.
  • The Predator-Prey Model, Part 2, Duke University Connected Curriculum Project (a multi-part online module, based in part on Borrelli and Coleman's textbook). Walks through D'Ancona's Fiume data, Volterra's equations, the resting point and the direction field, with exercises to do yourself.
  • The paradox of Vito Volterra's predator-prey model, Jean-Marc Ginoux (Lettera Matematica 5(4), 2017, pages 305 to 311; free on arXiv). A short history of how D'Ancona's question reached Volterra, what the model assumed, and why it is better than its reputation.

Ornstein-Uhlenbeck and the random walk

Is this trend a trend

Some quantities wander with no memory and some are pulled back toward a level. We test which this one is, because a margin, a valuation, or a spread that reverts is an opportunity with a known half-life, and one that wanders is not.

Born to answer
Uhlenbeck and Ornstein, 1930; Black and Scholes, 1973.
What it does now
Whether a margin above its history comes back, and how fast.
The mathematics
dx = theta (mu - x) dt + sigma dW
The full entry
Where it began

Uhlenbeck and Ornstein's 1930 paper on Brownian motion gave the equation for a quantity that wanders but is pulled back toward a level, with a half-life for the return. The random walk with no pull is the model underneath Black and Scholes's 1973 option pricing, and the difference between the two is the question every claim of a trend has to answer first.

Why it works now

Whether a margin or a multiple is reverting or has moved for good has been decided by rhetoric, because estimating the pull needs a long history assembled carefully. The history can now be assembled and the half-life estimated, and operators can say whether the structural driver of the level has actually changed. The Desk asks how long it took to come back the last time the quantity moved this far, and whether it did.

When it applies

A margin, multiple, spread, or market share above or below its history; a thesis that extrapolates a run; a claim that something has permanently changed.

What we would ask

When this quantity has moved this far from its history before, how long did it take to come back, and did it?
What would have to be true for the old level to no longer be the level?

What it needs

A long enough history to estimate the pull toward the mean and its half-life, and a view on whether the regime has changed.

How we would get it

The record for the series; operators on whether the structural drivers of the level have changed; the estimate of the half-life.

Where it breaks

The pull estimated on a window too short to tell it from zero; a regime change that moved the level.

For example

A company's margins are five points above their twenty-year average and a thesis capitalizes them. Over that history, departures of this size reverted with a half-life of about two years, and every claim that this time was different accompanied one of them. The research is whether the driver has actually changed.

The mathematics in fullRandom walk: x(t + 1) = x(t) + e, no level is home; mean reversion: dx = theta (mu - x) dt + sigma dW with half-life ln 2 / theta; the question is whether theta is distinguishable from zero on the data available. Taught in

STATS 217 (Stanford); MATH 385; MATH 386-1

Sources

Uhlenbeck, Ornstein (1930). On the Theory of the Brownian Motion. Physical Review 36(5), 823-841. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.36.823
Black, Scholes (1973). The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 81(3), 637-654. https://doi.org/10.1086/260062

Sensitive dependence on initial conditions

How far ahead anyone can see

In a system where small differences grow, forecasts have a horizon beyond which they are worthless whatever the model, and the honest product is a spread of futures rather than one. We ask where the horizon is for this question.

Born to answer
Lorenz, 1963: a weather model diverging from a rounding error.
What it does now
How far ahead a forecast in this market is worth anything.
The mathematics
Separation grows like d x exp(lambda t)
The full entry
Where it began

Edward Lorenz found in 1963 that a simple model of the atmosphere run twice from starting points that differed in the third decimal place produced completely different weather within weeks. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions gave every forecast a horizon beyond which it is worthless, and weather forecasting responded by running ensembles of perturbed starts and reporting the spread.

Why it works now

Long-range business forecasts are still delivered as single paths to two decimal places, decades after meteorology stopped doing that. The track record of past forecasts by horizon in any market can now be assembled from the record, which shows where the horizon actually sits, and a model can be rerun from perturbed starts in minutes. The Desk asks how far ahead anyone in this market has ever forecast accurately.

When it applies

A long-range forecast presented with precision; a plan that depends on a point estimate five years out; an argument between two models about a distant future.

What we would ask

How far out has anyone in this market forecast accurately, ever?
If you ran the same model from slightly different starting assumptions, how quickly would the paths diverge?

What it needs

The track record of forecasts in this domain at each horizon, and the sensitivity of the outcome to initial conditions.

How we would get it

The record of past forecasts against outcomes by horizon; Advisors on what actually decided past outcomes; the report gives a spread, not a point, beyond the horizon.

Where it breaks

Precision beyond the horizon; a single path where an ensemble was honest.

For example

A ten-year demand forecast for a commodity is presented to two decimal places. Past ten-year forecasts in the same market were wrong by a factor of two in either direction, and the errors were not the forecasters' fault. The decision is redesigned to be robust across the spread rather than optimized for the point.

The mathematics in fullIn a chaotic system two trajectories that start a distance d apart separate like d x exp(lambda t); the forecast horizon is roughly the time for that separation to reach the size of the quantity itself, and an ensemble of runs from perturbed starts is the honest forecast. Taught in

MATH 285; MECN-451

Sources

Lorenz (1963). Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 20(2), 130-141. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0469(1963)020<0130:DNF>2.0.CO;2

Extreme value theory

The distribution of the worst case

The largest loss in a hundred periods has its own distribution, and it is not the one the average describes. We fit the tail from the few largest observations and report the level exceeded once in a horizon, with the honest width of that estimate.

Born to answer
Fisher and Tippett, 1928: the maximum has a law of its own.
What it does now
The drawdown to size limits against, not the worst one yet seen.
The mathematics
Maxima converge to Gumbel, Frechet, or Weibull
The full entry
Where it began

Fisher and Tippett proved in 1928 that the largest of many observations converges to one of only three distributions, whatever the observations came from, which is the theorem that lets the hundred-year flood be estimated from thirty years of data. The Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch textbook brought the theory to insurance and finance, and the 1987 paper on self-organized criticality showed why avalanche sizes in many systems follow power-law tails.

Why it works now

Risk limits have been set to the worst observed loss, which is not the worst possible loss and is not even an estimate of it. The tail can now be fitted from the extremes in the client's history and comparable series, and reported with the honest width of the estimate, and operators can say what preceded past extremes. The Desk asks what the worst has ever been and how many observations that rests on.

When it applies

Maximum drawdown, the hundred-year event, a covenant or margin call triggered by an extreme, a plan sized to survive a bad year but not the worst year.

What we would ask

What is the worst this has ever been, and how many observations is that based on?
Do the bad periods cluster?

What it needs

Enough history to observe several extremes, and a view on whether the process generating them has changed.

How we would get it

The record for the extremes in this and comparable series; operators on what preceded past extremes; the fitted tail with its interval.

Where it breaks

Extrapolating far beyond the data; treating clustered extremes as independent; a process that changed.

For example

A fund sizes leverage to survive the worst monthly loss in its fifteen-year history. Fitted to the tail, the once-in-fifty-years loss is nearly twice the worst observed, and the interval around it is wide. The leverage is set to the interval, not the history.

The mathematics in fullThe maximum of many draws converges to one of three families indexed by a tail parameter; the return level is the value exceeded once in T periods, read from the fitted tail, and its confidence interval is wide because it rests on the handful of largest observations. Taught in

MATH 385; MECN-451

Sources

Fisher, Tippett (1928). Limiting forms of the frequency distribution of the largest or smallest member of a sample. Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 24(2), 180-190. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100015681
Embrechts, Klüppelberg, Mikosch (1997). Modelling Extremal Events. Springer (book). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33483-2
Bak, Tang, Wiesenfeld (1987). Self-organized criticality: an explanation of the 1/f noise. Physical Review Letters 59(4), 381-384. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.59.381

Principal components

What really drives the portfolio

A portfolio, a product line, or a P&L that seems to have twenty moving parts often has two or three that explain most of the movement. We find them, because risk that looked diversified across twenty names is often concentrated in one factor.

Born to answer
Hotelling, 1933: the few directions carrying most of the variation.
What it does now
Forty positions that turn out to be one bet.
The mathematics
Sigma v = lambda v
In the inquiries: No. 14, What's in a Name
The full entry
Where it began

Harold Hotelling's 1933 paper on principal components found the few directions in which a set of measurements varies most, and showed how much of the total variation each explains. Harry Markowitz's portfolio theory made the same point from the other side: what an asset adds to a portfolio depends on how it moves with the rest. Between them, a portfolio of forty positions can be one bet.

Why it works now

Family offices and funds have believed themselves diversified because they held many names, and the decomposition that would have told them otherwise was a quant's job. It can now be run on any book in minutes, and Advisors can say in economic terms what the leading factor actually is. The Desk asks what moved together in the client's worst month.

When it applies

A portfolio or business with many exposures; a diversification claim; a P&L whose swings nobody can attribute; a set of regions or products that all move together.

What we would ask

When your worst month happened, what moved together?
If one factor explained most of your variance, what would you guess it is?

What it needs

A history of the components long enough to estimate their co-movement.

How we would get it

The client's own data decomposed; Advisors on what the leading factor actually is in economic terms.

Where it breaks

Reading components as causes; a decomposition that changes with rescaling; correlations estimated in calm periods.

For example

A family office holds forty positions across sectors and believes it is diversified. Two components explain most of the variance, and both load on the same interest-rate exposure. The forty positions are one bet, and the research is what that bet actually is.

The mathematics in fullSigma v = lambda v; the first component is the direction of greatest variance and lambda1 / sum of lambdas its share; loadings show what moves together, and a few components explaining most of the variance means the exposures are fewer than they look. Taught in

MATH 285; MMSS 1995 (multidimensional scaling)

Sources

Hotelling (1933). Analysis of a complex of statistical variables into principal components. Journal of Educational Psychology 24(6), 417-441. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0071325
Markowitz (1952). Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance 7(1), 77-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x

Benford's law

Numbers that were typed rather than measured

Quantities that arise from real processes have leading digits that follow a known distribution, with one appearing about thirty percent of the time. Numbers invented by people do not. We use the pattern as a screen for figures that deserve a closer look.

Born to answer
Newcomb, 1881, on worn logarithm tables; Benford, 1938.
What it does now
A screen for figures typed by a person rather than produced.
The mathematics
P(first digit = d) = log10(1 + 1/d)
The full entry
Where it began

Simon Newcomb noticed in 1881 that the early pages of logarithm tables were dirtier than the later ones, and Frank Benford documented the law of leading digits across twenty thousand numbers in 1938. Theodore Hill's 1995 paper gave it a proper derivation, and accountants adopted it as a screen because figures invented by people do not follow the pattern.

Why it works now

A data room now arrives with more figures than any team can check by hand. The digit screen can be run across all of them in seconds, and the categories that deviate become the place the Advisors are asked to look first. It is a screen, not a conclusion, and the Desk says so. The Desk asks which figures were produced by a process and which were entered by a person.

When it applies

A data room, a set of financial statements, expense reports, or operating figures whose provenance is uncertain; a diligence process with more numbers than time to check them.

What we would ask

Which of these figures were produced by a process and which were entered by a person?
Which categories, if any, deviate from the expected digit pattern?

What it needs

A large enough set of figures spanning several orders of magnitude, from a process that should produce the pattern.

How we would get it

The client's data screened for the pattern; the deviations, if any, handed to the Advisors as the place to start asking questions.

Where it breaks

Applying the screen to figures that have no reason to follow the pattern, such as assigned numbers or figures with a floor and a cap; treating a deviation as proof rather than as a place to look.

For example

A buyer receives five years of monthly operating figures from a target. The leading digits follow the expected pattern in every category but one, where the pattern breaks in the two years before the sale. That category is where the operators are asked to look first.

The mathematics in fullP(first digit = d) = log10(1 + 1/d), so one leads about thirty percent of the time and nine under five percent; the law holds for quantities that are scale-invariant or arise from multiplicative processes, and departures are a screen, not a conclusion. Taught in

MATH 385

Sources

Hill (1995). A Statistical Derivation of the Significant-Digit Law. Statistical Science 10(4). https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177009869

The financial accelerator and credit cycles (Bernanke and Gertler; Kiyotaki and Moore)

The financial accelerator: falling collateral cuts lending, which cuts collateral

We trace a loop. When lenders advance money against the value of collateral, a fall in asset prices cuts what can be borrowed, forcing sales that lower prices further and cut borrowing again; Kiyotaki and Moore showed that a small, temporary shock can produce large, persistent falls in output and prices this way, and Bernanke and Gertler showed the same amplification through borrowers' net worth and the premium they pay for outside funds. The loop has a strength, the product of leverage and the price impact of forced sales, and it converges only while that product is below one. We measure the leverage against collateral, the share of lending that depends on asset values, the price impact of sales and the length of the chain, and say how much of an initial fall the loop would add, and at what leverage there is no floor.

Born to answer
Agency costs and net worth, 1989; land as collateral, 1997.
What it does now
How much of a price fall the lending loop adds, and when there is no floor.
The mathematics
x = x_0 / (1 - k), k = lambda theta / (1 - theta)
The full entry
Where it began

Irving Fisher wrote in 1933 that the Depression was a debt-deflation: distress selling lowered prices, which raised the real weight of the remaining debt. Ben Bernanke's 1983 paper argued that the bank failures of 1930 to 1933 deepened the Depression by destroying the capacity to lend, not only the money supply, and with Mark Gertler (1989) he built the mechanism by which falling net worth raises the cost of outside finance; Bernanke, Gertler and Simon Gilchrist gave it the name financial accelerator in 1996 and a full model in 1999. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) wrote the credit cycle with land as both input and collateral, in which a small shock to borrowers' net worth sets off a fall in land prices that cuts borrowing and so land prices again. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1992) explained why assets sold under distress fetch less, because the natural buyers are in distress too; Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Pedersen (2009) traced the same loop through margins, and John Geanakoplos (2010) through the leverage cycle. Bernanke chaired the Federal Reserve through the crisis of 2008 and shared the 2022 Nobel Prize in economics with Diamond and Dybvig.

Why it works now

Loan-to-value limits, margin rules, covenants and holders' distance from them are in filings and loan data, past forced sales are on the record, and the loop's coefficient, the total fall it implies and the leverage at which there is no floor can be computed outside the conversation. How lenders will apply their limits when prices fall, and which buyers are ready, is still known to the credit officers and the distressed buyers of earlier episodes.

When it applies

Commercial or residential real estate funded with mortgages at loan-to-value limits, margin loans and prime brokerage, private credit against enterprise value, repo against securities, bank lending against borrowers' net worth, a sector or a country where asset prices and credit have risen together; a question whether a correction stays a correction; a lender whose borrowers' collateral is all the same asset class. Not to be confused with feedback-and-delay, which explains oscillation from delayed response; capacity-cycles, where capacity answers past demand; bank-runs, where short claims are presented against long assets; or distress-screen, which reads one borrower's solvency: this is the loop between asset prices and lending capacity across a market.

What we would ask

How much of the lending in this market depends on the value of collateral or on borrowers' net worth, and at what loan-to-value or coverage ratio must a borrower sell?
If 10 percent of the assets in this market were sold within a quarter, how far would prices fall, and who would buy?

What it needs

The leverage rules (loan-to-value limits, margin requirements, covenants on net worth or coverage), the share of holders near those limits, the price impact of sales in the market (from past forced sales, auction results, bid-ask spreads and depth), the natural buyers and their own leverage, the maturity of the funding, and the other sectors that hold the same collateral.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles leverage limits, holders' distance from them and the record of past forced sales from filings, loan data and market data, computes the loop's coefficient and the total fall and forced sales an initial shock implies, and locates the leverage at which there is no floor. What the record cannot show is how lenders will apply their limits when prices fall and which buyers have cash ready; credit officers, margin desks and the distressed buyers who bought in earlier episodes know that.

Where it breaks

Any price fall called an accelerator, when lending must depend on asset values for the loop to exist; lenders who forbear or extend rather than call, which weakens the loop; buyers outside the leveraged circle with cash, who set the floor the model has no term for; a price impact measured in calm markets applied to a forced sale; and the loop read as inevitable, when at a coefficient below one it converges and the arithmetic says to how much.

For example

A property investor holds $100 million of buildings against $70 million of debt, at the lenders' 70 percent loan-to-value limit. Prices fall 10 percent. To get back inside the limit the investor must sell $23.3 million of buildings and repay the proceeds, because selling and repaying one for one lowers the ratio only slowly. If every $10 million sold by investors in this position lowers prices another 1 percent, the sales push prices down further and force more sales: the loop's coefficient is 0.1 x 0.7 / 0.3 = 0.233, the 10 percent fall becomes 10 / (1 - 0.233) = 13.0 percent, and the forced sales reach $30.4 million. At an 80 percent limit the coefficient is 0.4, the fall 16.7 percent and the sales $66.7 million, two thirds of the portfolio. At a limit of 90.9 percent the coefficient reaches 1 and there is no floor: prices fall until buyers who do not borrow against the buildings arrive.

The mathematics in fullA holder with assets A at a price index of 1 and debt D = theta A, at the lender's limit theta, must after a price fall x sell S with (D - S) <= theta (A (1 - x) - S), so S = theta A x / (1 - theta). If sales of S depress prices by lambda S / A, the total fall solves x = x_0 + lambda theta x / (1 - theta), so x = x_0 / (1 - k) with k = lambda theta / (1 - theta), and the forced sales are S = theta A x / (1 - theta); the loop converges only for k < 1, that is theta < 1 / (1 + lambda). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): borrowing is limited to the discounted next-period value of the collateral, b_t <= q_(t+1) k_t / R, so a fall in q cuts k, which cuts q. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999): the premium on outside funds rises as net worth falls, s = s(N / (Q K)) with s' < 0, which amplifies and propagates shocks. Where it comes from

Fisher (1933), The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, Econometrica; Bernanke (1983), Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, American Economic Review (reprinted in Essays on the Great Depression, 2000); Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations, American Economic Review; Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Inside the Black Box, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, Review of Economics and Statistics, and (1999), the Handbook of Macroeconomics chapter; Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy; Shleifer and Vishny (1992) on liquidation values; Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) on margin spirals; Geanakoplos (2010), The Leverage Cycle; Mian and Sufi (2011) on borrowing against home equity; Bernanke's Nobel lecture (2023), Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations, American Economic Review

Sources

Fisher (1933). The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Econometrica 1(4), 337. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907327
Bernanke (2000). Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression. Essays on the Great Depression, 41-69. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691259666-004
Bernanke, Gertler (1995). Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4), 27-48. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.4.27
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1996). The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2109844
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1999). The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1341-1393. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0048(99)10034-x
Kiyotaki, Moore (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 211-248. https://doi.org/10.1086/262072
Bernanke (2023). Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations. American Economic Review 113(5), 1143-1169. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.113.5.1143
Shleifer, Vishny (1992). Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach. The Journal of Finance 47(4), 1343-1366. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04661.x
Brunnermeier, Pedersen (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 22(6), 2201-2238. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn098
Geanakoplos (2010). The Leverage Cycle. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 24(1), 1-66. https://doi.org/10.1086/648285
Mian, Sufi (2011). House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the US Household Leverage Crisis. American Economic Review 101(5), 2132-2156. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2132

Learn the math
The question

On Friday 23 September 2022 the British government announced a package of tax cuts, and the market for its long-dated bonds, the gilts, fell hard. Bond prices fall when yields rise, and within a few days the yield on the 30 year gilt had risen by 160 basis points (1.6 percentage points). The biggest daily rise in the Bank of England's data going back to 2000 had been 29 basis points. In those few days there were two rises of more than 35.

What turned a bad week into a near collapse was not the tax cuts. It was a loop. Many British pension schemes had bought gilts through funds that borrowed against the gilts they held. When gilt prices fell, the lenders asked for more collateral. To raise it, the funds sold gilts. The sales pushed prices down further, which brought more calls for collateral, which brought more sales. The Bank's market intelligence suggested that at least £50 billion of long-dated gilts might have to be sold in a short space of time, against normal trading of about £12 billion a day in those bonds. On Wednesday 28 September the Bank stepped in to buy, and the 30 year yield fell by more than 100 basis points in a day.

Economists call this loop the financial accelerator, or, in its market form, a fire sale spiral. Irving Fisher saw it in the Depression; Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist named it; Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore built it into a model of the whole economy. This lesson builds it from one balance sheet and one line of algebra, finds the point at which it has no floor, and shows why the Bank's purchases worked.

The idea in one paragraph

When lenders lend against the value of an asset, a fall in that asset's price does two things at once. It shrinks the owner's equity, and it shrinks what the lender will lend. Because the owner is borrowing, the equity falls by more than the price, so to get back inside the lender's limit the owner must sell much more than the fall itself. If many owners sell the same asset at once, their selling pushes the price down again, and the whole sequence repeats. Each round is smaller than the one before when leverage is modest and the market can absorb the selling, so the loop settles at a larger fall than the first, and the arithmetic says how much larger. But the strength of the loop grows faster than leverage, and past a certain limit each round is as large as the one before: the loop has no floor, and prices fall until buyers who are not borrowing against the asset arrive with cash.

Picture bailing out a boat with a bucket that leaks. Every bucketful thrown over the side lets a fraction of a bucket back in. If the fraction is small you still empty the boat, and the arithmetic says how many extra buckets it costs you; if every bucket lets a whole bucket back in, you bail for ever. The fraction is this lesson's k, and the leak is what forced selling does to the price.

The math, step by step

Step 1: why a small fall forces a large sale. Take the Library entry's investor. It holds A = $100 million of buildings against D = $70 million of debt. The lender allows at most theta (the Greek letter, pronounced "thay-ta") of the buildings' value as debt, here theta = 0.70, the loan to value limit, and the investor is right at it. The equity, the owner's own money, is A - D = $30 million.

Now prices fall by x = 10 percent. The buildings are worth $90 million, the debt is still $70 million, and the equity is $20 million. A 10 percent fall in prices has taken a third of the equity. The loan to value ratio is 70 / 90 = 77.8 percent, over the limit.

How much must be sold? The tempting answer is to sell $7 million, a tenth of the debt. It does not work. Selling $7 million of buildings and repaying $7 million of debt leaves (70 - 7) / (90 - 7) = 75.9 percent, still over the limit, because the sale lowers the debt and the assets by the same dollar amount and so moves the ratio only slowly. There are two ways to the right answer, and they agree.

The first way is from the equity. At a 70 percent limit, each dollar of equity can carry 1 / (1 - 0.70) = $3.33 of buildings. The $20 million of equity left can therefore carry 20 / 0.30 = $66.67 million of buildings. The investor holds $90 million, so it must sell 90 - 66.67 = $23.33 million and repay the debt with the proceeds.

The second way is algebra, which gives a formula we will use again. Write S for the dollars sold, with prices measured so that the buildings were worth A before the fall. (In the lines that follow, a lone x standing between two symbols is a multiplication sign; the price fall x is always the last factor in a product.) After the fall and the sale, the debt is D - S and the buildings are worth (A x (1 - x)) - S. The limit says

D - S = theta x ((A x (1 - x)) - S)

Put D = theta x A, multiply out the right side, and move every S to the left:

S - (theta x S) = (theta x A) - (theta x A x (1 - x))
S x (1 - theta) = theta x A x x

so

S = (theta x A x x) / (1 - theta)

With theta = 0.7, A = 100 and x = 0.1: (0.7 x 100 x 0.1) / 0.3 = $23.33 million, the same answer. The factor theta / (1 - theta) is the debt per dollar of equity, 2.33 here. A forced seller sells the price fall times the leverage.

Step 2: what selling does to the price. One investor selling $23 million of buildings changes nothing. A market full of investors in the same position, all selling at once, does. Measure the effect with one number, lambda (pronounced "lam-da"), the price impact: if forced sales equal to a share S / A of the assets in the market move prices down by lambda x (S / A), then lambda tells how badly the market absorbs selling. The entry assumes that sales of a tenth of the market lower prices by 1 percent, so lambda = 0.01 / 0.1 = 0.1. We treat the holders as one representative investor, so S / A is that investor's sale as a share of its holdings and also the market's.

Step 3: the loop, and its sum. Follow the rounds. The first 10 percent fall forces $23.33 million of sales. Those sales are 23.33 percent of the market, which lowers prices by 0.1 x 23.33 = 2.33 percent more. That second fall forces its own sales, by Step 1's formula (0.7 x 100 x 0.0233) / 0.3 = $5.44 million, which lower prices another 0.54 percent, and so on:

round 1: price fall 10.00%, sales $23.33 million, fall so far 10.00%
round 2: price fall  2.33%, sales  $5.44 million, fall so far 12.33%
round 3: price fall  0.54%, sales  $1.27 million, fall so far 12.88%
round 4: price fall  0.13%, sales  $0.30 million, fall so far 13.00%

Each round's fall is the previous round's fall times the same number. A fall x forces sales of (theta x A x x) / (1 - theta), which move prices by lambda times that over A, that is by

k x x, with k = (lambda x theta) / (1 - theta)

Here k = (0.1 x 0.7) / 0.3 = 0.233. The number k is the loop's coefficient: the strength of the spiral, the product of the price impact and the leverage. The total fall is the sum of a geometric series:

x = x_0 x (1 + k + k^2 + k^3 + ...) = x_0 / (1 - k)

where x_0 is the first fall. (The sum: call it T; then k x T is the same series without its first term, so T - (k x T) = 1 and T = 1 / (1 - k).) The same result comes in one line without the rounds: the final fall must equal the first fall plus the fall caused by all the selling, x = x_0 + (k x x), and solving for x gives x_0 / (1 - k).

With the entry's figures, 10 / (1 - 0.233) = 13.0 percent: the loop turns a 10 percent fall into 13.0 percent, a multiplier of 1.30. The forced sales in all are Step 1's formula at the total fall, (0.7 x 100 x 0.1304) / 0.3 = $30.4 million.

0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%123456Round of forced sellingPrice fall so far10.0%12.3%12.9%13.0%13.0%13.0%the sum, 10 / (1 - 0.233) = 13.0%
Each round of selling is 0.233 times the one before, so the falls shrink and add up to a finite total: a geometric series, and the reason a loop with a coefficient below one has a floor.

Step 4: the leverage at which there is no floor. The series converges only while k is below 1. If k = 1, every round is as large as the one before and the sum never stops growing. Setting (lambda x theta) / (1 - theta) = 1 and solving for theta:

theta* = 1 / (1 + lambda)

With lambda = 0.1, that limit is 1 / 1.1 = 90.9 percent. Below it the loop has a floor; at it there is none. Here is the same first 10 percent fall at different limits, with lambda = 0.1:

limit 50%: k = 0.100, total fall 11.1%, forced sales $11.1 million
limit 60%: k = 0.150, total fall 11.8%, forced sales $17.6 million
limit 70%: k = 0.233, total fall 13.0%, forced sales $30.4 million
limit 80%: k = 0.400, total fall 16.7%, forced sales $66.7 million

What the table shows, calculus says in general. Differentiate k = (lambda x theta) / (1 - theta) with respect to theta. By the quotient rule the derivative is ((lambda x (1 - theta)) + (lambda x theta)) / ((1 - theta)^2), and the numerator collapses to lambda:

dk / dtheta = lambda / ((1 - theta)^2)

At theta = 0.5 the slope is 0.40, at 0.7 it is 1.11, at 0.8 it is 2.50. Each extra point of leverage strengthens the loop more than the last, because it shrinks the denominator 1 - theta, the sliver of equity under the whole structure. That is why a market can run at rising leverage for years with nothing much happening, and then not.

There is a second cliff, and a holder usually meets it first. A total fall of 1 - theta wipes out the equity entirely: at a 70 percent limit, a 30 percent fall. When does the loop itself carry the fall that far? Set x_0 / (1 - k) = 1 - theta. Multiplying out, x_0 = (1 - theta) x (1 - k) = (1 - theta) - ((1 - theta) x k), and since (1 - theta) x k = lambda x theta, this is x_0 = (1 - theta) - (lambda x theta) = 1 - (theta x (1 + lambda)). Solving for theta:

theta = (1 - x_0) / (1 + lambda)

which is 0.9 / 1.1 = 81.8 percent here. At an 80 percent limit the 16.7 percent fall leaves the investor bruised but standing, selling $66.7 million of the $83.3 million it still holds. At 85 percent the loop would run to a 23.1 percent fall, past the 15 percent cushion: the holders are wiped out, and their lenders take the buildings and sell them, which is the loop by other hands. (The formula then asks for $130.8 million of sales from buildings worth $100 million before the fall and $76.9 million after it, a sign it has left its range.)

0%10%20%30%40%50%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Loan to value limit, thetaTotal price fallthe first 10% fallno floor, 90.9%13.0%16.7%10% sold moves prices 1%10% sold moves prices 2%
The same first fall, at different limits. The loop adds little at modest leverage and then, close to the limit where its coefficient reaches one, a great deal; dearer selling brings the cliff closer.

Step 5: whose price impact? Shleifer and Vishny. The number lambda is not a constant of nature. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1992) asked who buys an asset that a distressed owner must sell, and answered: mostly the people who know how to use it, the other owners of the same kind of asset, who are likely to be in trouble at the same moment. Outsiders buy only at a discount. So lambda is small in calm markets, measured when a few holders sell to many, and large in a crisis, when everyone who would normally buy is selling. Double it to lambda = 0.2 at the 70 percent limit and k becomes (0.2 x 0.7) / 0.3 = 0.467, the fall 10 / (1 - 0.467) = 18.75 percent and the forced sales $43.75 million; the no-floor limit drops from 90.9 to 1 / 1.2 = 83.3 percent. A price impact measured in good times flatters every calculation of this loop.

Step 6: the lender can move the limit too. Brunnermeier and Pedersen. So far theta stood still. In practice lenders cut it when prices become volatile: a margin requirement or a repo haircut (the share of the collateral's value the lender will not lend, 1 - theta) rises just when prices fall. Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Pedersen (2009) called this the margin spiral. Its arithmetic is Step 1 with no price move at all. Our investor, back at $100 million of buildings and $70 million of debt, is told the limit is now 60 percent, a haircut of 40 percent instead of 30. Its $30 million of equity can carry 30 / 0.4 = $75 million, so it must sell $25 million, more than the $23.33 million a 10 percent price fall required. A lender who cuts the limit is a price fall by another name, and the two come together.

Step 7: the whole economy. Kiyotaki and Moore. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) put the loop inside a model of an economy, with land that is both what farmers produce with and what they borrow against. Lenders cannot force a farmer to work, only seize the land, so a farmer can borrow at most what the land will be worth when the loan is due, discounted at the gross interest rate R:

R x b_t <= q_(t+1) x k_t

where b_t is the borrowing, k_t the land held and q_(t+1) next period's land price (their equation 3). A farmer with 100 acres, land expected at $1 an acre and R = 1.05 can borrow 100 / 1.05 = $95.24; if the expected price drops to $0.90, only 90 / 1.05 = $85.71, $9.52 less. Less borrowing means less land held by the farmers, who use it best; land passes to less productive hands, output falls, and so does what land is worth, which cuts borrowing again. Their contribution was to show that the loop runs through time as well as within a moment: the farmers' lost net worth carries into the next period, so a small, temporary shock leaves large and lasting falls in output and prices. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999) reach the same amplification by another road: the premium a firm pays for outside money rises as its net worth falls, so a fall in net worth makes every investment dearer just when the firm is weakest. They called it the financial accelerator.

A worked example: the gilt market, September 2022

The Bank of England explained the crisis to Parliament's Treasury Committee with a stylised fund (Jon Cunliffe's letter of 5 October 2022, Diagram 1): an LDI fund (liability driven investment, a fund that holds long gilts for a pension scheme) holding gilts "funded by repo borrowing at 2 times leverage", so half the gilts are financed by borrowing, theta = 0.5, and the cushion of equity is half the holdings. The gilts then fall in value "by around 30%".

Is 30 percent plausible from a 160 basis point rise? A bond's price falls, for a small rise in yield, by about its duration (roughly, the average time until its payments arrive, in years) times the rise. Duration is the calculus at work: it is minus the derivative of the log of the price with respect to the yield. A long gilt with a duration of about 20 (our assumption for illustration) loses about 20 x 0.016 = 0.32, or 32 percent. (The straight-line rule overstates a move this large a little, because the price curve bends upward as yields rise; the Bank's "around 30%" is the right order.) Long bonds are the most leveraged thing in a bond portfolio before anyone borrows a penny.

Now run Step 1 on the fund, starting from 100 of gilts and 50 of borrowing. After a 30 percent fall the gilts are worth 70, the borrowing is still 50, and the cushion is 20, down from 50. Borrowing is now 50 / 70 = 71.4 percent of the gilts. To get back to 2 times leverage there are two exits:

sell gilts: S = (0.5 x 100 x 0.3) / 0.5 = 30 of the 70 held
or raise new cash: the cushion must be half of 70, that is 35, so 35 - 20 = 15

Most of the major fund managers asked their pension scheme investors for the second, new capital, which would let them cut leverage without selling gilts. But pooled funds, with many smaller investors, were slow to raise it, and the managers told the Bank that where they could not raise enough they would have to do the first. And a further fall to 50 percent, 1 - theta, would have left nothing at all: the cushion gone and the lenders, the banks, holding gilts they would themselves sell. The Bank wrote that several funds were likely to fall into negative net asset value, and that the gilts the banks took could drive "a potentially self-reinforcing spiral".

Here is lambda. The Bank's figure of at least £50 billion of sales was 50 / 12 = 4.2 days of the whole market's usual trading, demanded at once, from buyers who were mostly the same kind of pension investors under the same pressure. That is Shleifer and Vishny's market. In the loop's terms, a fund at theta = 0.5 faces no floor when lambda reaches (1 - 0.5) / 0.5 = 1, a price fall of 1 percent for every 1 percent of the holdings sold. Calm markets are nowhere near it. A market where everyone sells is.

The cure follows from the formula. The total fall is x_0 / (1 - k), and k is lambda times the leverage. The Bank could not change anyone's leverage in a day, but it could change lambda: a buyer with no leverage and very deep pockets, standing ready to buy long gilts, means forced sales no longer move the price much. The Bank held auctions of up to £5 billion a day, later £10 billion, and in 13 days of operations bought £12.1 billion of conventional and £7.2 billion of index-linked gilts, £19.3 billion in all, far less than the £50 billion of selling its intelligence had feared. In the first six operations it bought £3.7 billion of the £10.4 billion offered to it, which the Bank put down partly to "the credibility of the backstop": a standing buyer meant the funds' sales no longer met a market with no buyer. In the image of the leaking bucket, the Bank could not make anyone's bucket bigger, but it could shrink the leak. The time it bought went to the second exit: the funds raised, the Bank reported, "tens of billion pounds in capital", and managers moved their capital buffer targets above their first ones. In the loop's terms, a lower theta.

The usual mistakes
  1. Selling the fall, not the fall times the leverage. Symptom: "prices are down 10 percent, so we sell 10 percent and repay." Fix: the equity falls by the price fall times A / equity. The required sale is (theta x A x x) / (1 - theta): at a 70 percent limit, 2.33 times the fall in value.
  2. Calling every price fall an accelerator. Symptom: a falling market described as a spiral when nobody's borrowing depends on the price. Fix: find the lending that depends on the value of the asset and the holders near their limits. No collateral constraint, no loop.
  3. Using a calm-market lambda. Symptom: a stress test that assumes forced sales move prices as much as ordinary sales do. Fix: ask who buys in a crisis. If the natural buyers are the other holders, the price impact can be several times the calm figure, and k scales with it.
  4. Holding the limit fixed. Symptom: a model in which lenders keep lending at 70 percent while prices fall. Fix: in a crisis, haircuts rise. A cut in theta is a forced sale with no price move, a fresh first fall fed into the loop; and if lenders keep cutting as prices fall, that is a second loop running on top of the first.
  5. Forgetting the second cliff. Symptom: comfort that k is well below 1. Fix: check whether the total fall x_0 / (1 - k) reaches the cushion 1 - theta; if it does, holders are wiped out and their lenders sell for them.
Where the model breaks

The entry names its limits. The loop exists only where lending depends on asset values; a market of owners with no debt, or with long fixed loans and no value tests, falls without spiraling. Lenders who forbear, extend or waive a covenant break the chain at its first link, and in many real episodes they do, because seizing collateral into a falling market hurts them too. Buyers outside the leveraged circle, holding cash, set a floor the simple model has no term for: the no-floor point is where such buyers become the only buyers, not where prices reach zero. A price impact measured in calm markets will understate the impact of a forced sale. And the model should never be read as saying a spiral is inevitable: below k = 1 it converges, and the arithmetic says to how much.

Two more cautions. The model here is linear, a constant lambda, which is a fair guide to the size of the effect and not a forecast of a path; real price impact grows with the size and speed of the selling. And it is a model of one asset; the same collateral held by several kinds of lenders, as in 2008, links several loops together.

Check yourself

1. An investor at a 70 percent limit sees prices fall 10 percent and sells $7 million to repay $7 million of debt. Why is that not enough, and how much is? Answer: the sale lowers debt and assets by the same amount, so the ratio moves slowly: (70 - 7) / (90 - 7) = 75.9 percent. The equity is down to $20 million, which can carry 20 / 0.3 = $66.67 million of buildings, so the investor must sell 90 - 66.67 = $23.33 million.

2. A market where holders borrow at a 75 percent limit, and forced sales of a tenth of the market lower prices by 1 percent, suffers a first fall of 10 percent. What is the loop's coefficient, the total fall, and the forced sales per $100 of assets? Answer: k = (0.1 x 0.75) / 0.25 = 0.3; the total fall is 10 / (1 - 0.3) = 14.3 percent; the forced sales are (0.75 x 100 x 0.143) / 0.25 = $42.9 per $100.

3. An LDI fund borrows half of its gilts' value (theta = 0.5). Its gilts have a duration of 20 and yields rise one percentage point. In a crisis, selling a tenth of the holdings moves prices 5 percent, so lambda = 0.5. What is the first fall, the total fall, and the forced sales per 100 of gilts? Is the fund still solvent? At what lambda would the loop have no floor, and at what limit would there be none with lambda = 0.5? Answer: the first fall is 20 x 0.01 = 20 percent. k = (0.5 x 0.5) / 0.5 = 0.5, so the total fall is 20 / (1 - 0.5) = 40 percent and the forced sales (0.5 x 100 x 0.4) / 0.5 = 40. The gilts are worth 60 against 50 of borrowing, so the fund is solvent but its cushion is down from 50 to 10. With theta = 0.5 the loop has no floor at lambda = 1; with lambda = 0.5 the no-floor limit is 1 / 1.5 = 66.7 percent. A buyer that lowers lambda, as the Bank did, cuts the total fall directly: at lambda = 0.25, k = 0.25 and the fall is 26.7 percent instead of 40.

Teach me more
  • Lecture 9: Financial Frictions and Amplification, Benjamin Moll, LSE (EC2B1, 2023), 13 pages of notes for undergraduates. The clearest written account of how a borrowing limit tied to asset prices amplifies a shock, and of why financial accelerator, debt deflation and Fisherian deflation are one idea. Its model is a two-period economy after Jeanne and Korinek rather than this lesson's balance sheet, and it asks for a little more economics (utility and the Euler equation).
  • The Leverage Cycle and Crashes, John Geanakoplos, Open Yale Courses (ECON 251, Financial Theory, lecture 26), a recorded lecture with a full transcript and audio, at least 48 minutes long (its last chapter begins at 48:01). Leverage, margins and why crashes come when lenders cut leverage and the optimists who borrowed are wiped out, told with numbers rather than equations. It is the last lecture of a course and leans on the earlier ones.
  • Letter from Jon Cunliffe on LDI, 5 October 2022, Bank of England, 11 pages. The primary account of the gilt crisis day by day, with Diagram 1, the stylised fund used above, and the Bank's own reasoning for stepping in.
  • The Leverage Cycle, John Geanakoplos, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1715 (2009), 55 pages. For the next step: why leverage itself, not only interest rates, is set in markets, with worked numbers for loan to value and haircuts.

ARCH and GARCH (Engle; Bollerslev)

Volatility comes in clusters

We forecast the size of a market's moves from its recent moves, never their direction. Engle showed that financial returns are close to unpredictable in sign but not in scale: a large move raises the odds that the next move is large, and calm persists too, so the variance of tomorrow's return can be forecast from today's surprise and yesterday's variance; Bollerslev's GARCH gives the compact form. We estimate the model, or take its standard parameters, and compute the variance forecast over the horizon of the decision, how fast it decays toward the long-run level and the half-life of the excess, then set the result beside the volatility that options imply and beside what the decision assumes.

Born to answer
Econometrica, 1982: the variance of United Kingdom inflation.
What it does now
The size of the next moves from the size of the last, never their sign.
The mathematics
sigma_t^2 = omega + alpha e_(t-1)^2 + beta sigma_(t-1)^2
The full entry
Where it began

Benoit Mandelbrot noticed in 1963 that in cotton prices large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small by small. Robert Engle gave the observation a model in 1982, studying the variance of inflation in the United Kingdom: autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, in which the variance of the next period's surprise depends on the size of the last ones while the mean stays unpredictable. His student Tim Bollerslev generalized it in 1986 to GARCH, which lets yesterday's variance carry forward too and fits most financial series with three parameters; Engle, David Lilien and Russell Robins (1987) let the variance enter the expected return, Daniel Nelson (1991) and Lawrence Glosten, Ravi Jagannathan and David Runkle (1993) let falls raise volatility more than rises, and Engle (2002) extended the idea to correlations. Engle shared the 2003 Nobel Prize in economics with Clive Granger. Torben Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Peter Hansen and Asger Lunde (2005) showed that the simple model forecasts volatility about as well as anything more elaborate.

Why it works now

Daily prices for any traded asset are free and long, the model can be estimated and its forecast over a decision's horizon computed outside the conversation, and options markets publish the implied volatility to set beside it. Why a shock happened and whether its cause persists is still a judgment for the traders and risk managers who priced the last one.

When it applies

An option position, a hedge or a collar priced after a shock; a risk limit, a margin requirement or a stop set from recent volatility; a question whether a turbulent week means a turbulent quarter; a strategy whose returns depend on the level of volatility; a model that assumes a constant volatility through a period that began with a jump. Not to be confused with trend-or-reversion, which tests whether the level of a price has memory; thin-or-fat-tails, which asks whether a single observation can outweigh the rest; or forecast-horizon, which asks when any forecast becomes worthless: this forecasts the scale of moves from their recent scale, with nothing to say about their sign.

What we would ask

What did the volatility of this asset do in the days after past shocks of this size, and how many days did it take to fall back halfway to normal?
What volatility does the position's price or the risk limit assume over its horizon, and what does the model forecast for the same horizon?

What it needs

A daily series of returns long enough to estimate the long-run variance and the persistence (a few years), the size of the recent shock, the horizon of the decision, and the volatility implied by options over the same horizon where they trade.

How we would get it

The Desk estimates or sets the GARCH parameters from the return series, computes the variance forecast at each horizon and its half-life, and compares the forecast with implied volatility and with the volatility the decision assumes. What the series cannot show is why the shock happened and whether its cause persists; the traders and risk managers who priced the last episode know that.

Where it breaks

The model read as a forecast of direction, which it never gives: a large move raises the expected size of the next move whatever its sign; one bad quarter called a cluster, when clustering is measured in days and weeks on daily data; the symmetric model applied where falls raise volatility more than rises, which the exponential and threshold versions capture (Nelson 1991; Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 1993); persistence estimated across a change of regime; and a forecast of the variance treated as a forecast of the loss, when the tails of the standardized returns remain fat.

For example

A stock's daily returns fit a GARCH(1,1) with weights of 0.08 on yesterday's squared surprise and 0.90 on yesterday's variance, so shocks persist at 0.98 a day, and a long-run daily volatility of 1 percent, about 15.9 percent a year. On a quiet day the stock falls 4 percent. The model's variance for the next day is 0.000002 + 0.08 x 0.0016 + 0.90 x 0.0001 = 0.00022, a daily volatility of 1.48 percent, up from 1. The excess over the long-run level decays by 2 percent a day, a half-life of 34 days. Over the next 21 trading days the forecast volatility is 6.46 percent against 4.58 percent at the long-run rate, 41 percent higher, or 22.4 percent a year against 15.9. An option priced at 16 percent implied volatility for the month after that day disagrees with the model by that margin, and the research question is which is right about the cause. A rise of 4 percent would have given exactly the same forecast.

The mathematics in fullReturns r_t = mu + e_t with e_t = sigma_t z_t, z_t of mean 0 and variance 1. ARCH(q) (Engle 1982): sigma_t^2 = omega + sum over i of alpha_i e_(t-i)^2. GARCH(1,1) (Bollerslev 1986): sigma_t^2 = omega + alpha e_(t-1)^2 + beta sigma_(t-1)^2, with long-run variance omega / (1 - alpha - beta) and persistence alpha + beta; the k-step forecast is sigma_bar^2 + (alpha + beta)^(k-1) (sigma_(t+1)^2 - sigma_bar^2), so the excess halves every ln 2 / -ln(alpha + beta) days and the variance over h days is h sigma_bar^2 plus the summed excess. E[e_t] = 0 at every step: the model forecasts sigma_t, never the sign of e_t. Asymmetry enters through a separate weight on negative shocks (Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 1993) or the log form (Nelson 1991). Where it comes from

Engle (1982), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation, Econometrica; Bollerslev (1986), Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, Journal of Econometrics; Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), ARCH modeling in finance, Journal of Econometrics, the survey; Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), the ARCH-M model, Econometrica; Nelson (1991), exponential ARCH, Econometrica; Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), Journal of Finance; Engle (2002), Dynamic Conditional Correlation, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics; Engle (2001), GARCH 101, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Engle and Patton (2001), What good is a volatility model?, Quantitative Finance; Engle's Nobel lecture (2004), Risk and Volatility, American Economic Review; Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), International Economic Review; Poon and Granger (2003), Journal of Economic Literature; Hansen and Lunde (2005), Journal of Applied Econometrics: the forecasting record; Mandelbrot (1963) on the clustering of large changes, the observation before the model

Sources

Engle (1982). Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation. Econometrica 50(4), 987. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912773
Engle, Lilien, Robins (1987). Estimating Time Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure: The Arch-M Model. Econometrica 55(2), 391. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913242
Nelson (1991). Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach. Econometrica 59(2), 347. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938260
Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993). On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks. The Journal of Finance 48(5), 1779-1801. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05128.x
Engle (2001). GARCH 101: The Use of ARCH/GARCH Models in Applied Econometrics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4), 157-168. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.4.157
Engle (2002). Dynamic Conditional Correlation. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 20(3), 339-350. https://doi.org/10.1198/073500102288618487
Engle (2004). Risk and Volatility: Econometric Models and Financial Practice. American Economic Review 94(3), 405-420. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464597
Poon, Granger (2003). Forecasting Volatility in Financial Markets: A Review. Journal of Economic Literature 41(2), 478-539. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.41.2.478
Hansen, Lunde (2005). A forecast comparison of volatility models: does anything beat a GARCH(1,1)? Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(7), 873-889. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.800
Engle, Patton (2001). What good is a volatility model? Quantitative Finance 1(2), 237-245. https://doi.org/10.1088/1469-7688/1/2/305
Mandelbrot (1963). The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices. The Journal of Business 36(4), 394. https://doi.org/10.1086/294632
Bollerslev, Tauchen, Zhou (2009). Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia. Review of Financial Studies 22(11), 4463-4492. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp008
Bollerslev, Todorov (2011). Tails, Fears, and Risk Premia. The Journal of Finance 66(6), 2165-2211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01695.x

Reading the financial statements

What the filed numbers say about how a business earns, what its earnings are made of, what it owes, and what its price already assumes.

Drawn from the financial statement analysis courses of leading business schools and the research they assign. These entries differ from the rest of the Library in one respect: on a publicly traded company the Desk works them from the filed numbers and shows its arithmetic. Most were first published with a trading result attached, and most of those results have shrunk since. They are here to understand a business and to test a thesis, not to promise a return.

Expectations investing

What the price already assumes

Before asking what a company is worth, we ask what its price requires. We start from the price, build the value of the whole enterprise, and solve for the growth in cash flow a buyer today is paying for. The thesis is then a comparison: what you expect against what is already in the price.

Born to answer
Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Rappaport and Mauboussin turned the valuation around.
What it does now
What a buyer at this price must believe.
The mathematics
EV = sum of CF0 (1 + g)^t / (1 + r)^t + terminal value, solved for g
The full entry
Where it began

Miller and Modigliani showed in 1961 that a share is worth the discounted cash the business will produce, however it is paid out. For decades analysts used that to forecast cash flows and arrive at a value, and argued about the value. Alfred Rappaport, at Northwestern's Kellogg School, turned the calculation around in the 1980s, and with Michael Mauboussin made a method of it: the price is the one number everyone agrees on, so start there and solve for the expectations inside it.

Why it works now

The reverse calculation used to mean an afternoon in a spreadsheet for each company. The Desk now pulls the filed statements and the price, builds the enterprise value, and solves for the required growth in seconds, at several discount rates, with every step shown. That moves the conversation from what the company is worth, which nobody can settle, to whether it can do what the price requires, which evidence can. The Desk asks what a buyer at this price must believe.

When it applies

Someone asks whether a stock is cheap or expensive, what is priced in, or what earnings would justify the price; a thesis whose good news may already be paid for; a valuation that produced one number and an argument about it.

What we would ask

At this price, how fast does cash flow have to grow, and for how long, before a buyer earns a normal return?
Has this company, or any company like it, grown that fast for that long?

What it needs

The share price and share count, debt and cash from the latest balance sheet, and the cash the business produced over the last twelve months, each with its date.

How we would get it

The Desk pulls the filed statements, builds enterprise value, and solves for the required growth at several discount rates, showing every step. Whether that growth is achievable is the part the statements cannot settle; that goes to the people who have run the business or sold against it.

Where it breaks

A base year that is unusually good or bad; cash flow before the cost of stock compensation or of capitalized software; a discount rate chosen to make the answer comfortable; forgetting that most of the value sits after the last year anyone can forecast.

For example

A fund believes a software company's new product will lift growth to twenty percent. At the current price, the reverse calculation shows a buyer already needs eighteen percent a year for ten years to earn nine percent. The thesis is right about the product and has almost nothing left to be paid for.

The mathematics in fullEV = P x shares + debt - cash; solve for g in EV = sum over t = 1..N of CF0 (1 + g)^t / (1 + r)^t + [CF0 (1 + g)^N (1 + gT) / (r - gT)] / (1 + r)^N, where r is the discount rate and gT the growth assumed for ever after; or hold g and solve for r, the return the price offers. Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Yale SOM MGMT 743 (doctoral)

Sources

Mauboussin (2006). Expectations Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns. CFA Institute Conference Proceedings Quarterly 23(3), 61-70. https://doi.org/10.2469/cp.v23.n3.4260
Miller, Modigliani (1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares. The Journal of Business 34(4), 411. https://doi.org/10.1086/294442
Gebhardt, Lee, Swaminathan (2001). Toward an Implied Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research 39(1), 135-176. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00007
Claus, Thomas (2001). Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence from Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock Markets. The Journal of Finance 56(5), 1629-1666. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00384
Easton, Taylor, Shroff, Sougiannis (2002). Using Forecasts of Earnings to Simultaneously Estimate Growth and the Rate of Return on Equity Investment. Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 657-676. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00066
Rappaport, Alfred and Mauboussin, Michael J. (2021). Expectations Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns, revised ed. Columbia Business School Publishing. (book)

Learn the math
The question

On 27 March 2000, Cisco Systems became the most valuable company in the world. Its own history page records the day: a high of $82 a share, a market value of $569 billion. Six months earlier, on the cover of its annual report, the company had put the market value of its shares held by outsiders at about $236 billion. In between it had filed two more quarters of the same fast growth, and the price had risen 2.4 times. The last full year on file, fiscal 1999, showed $4.4 billion of cash from operations and $0.6 billion spent on plant and equipment: $3.85 billion of free cash flow, from a wonderful business growing fast. The question that morning was not "is Cisco a great company?" Everyone agreed it was. The question was: what does a buyer at $569 billion need this company to do?

That is the question of this lesson. Most valuation starts at the other end: forecast the cash, discount it, arrive at a value, and argue with whoever arrived at a different one. Alfred Rappaport turned the calculation around: the price is the one number nobody disputes, so start there and solve for what it assumes. A stock price is not an opinion about what a business is worth. It is an order slip: it says what the kitchen must now deliver. The reverse valuation reads the slip.

The idea in one paragraph

A business is worth the cash it will hand its owners, each year's cash counted for less the further away it is, because a dollar you must wait for is worth less than a dollar in hand. Write that as a formula and you get a machine with a handful of dials: this year's cash flow, how fast it grows for the next ten years, how fast it grows after that, and the rate at which you discount the future. Turn the dials and the machine prints a value. The reverse valuation fixes every dial but one, sets the output to today's price, and turns the growth dial until the two agree. The reading on that dial is what the price assumes. It is not a forecast and not a verdict. It is a fact about the price, to be set beside two other facts: what this company has done, and what companies like it have ever done.

The math, step by step

One payment. Let r be the yearly rate you could earn elsewhere on money of similar risk, written as a fraction (9% is 0.09). A dollar invested today grows to (1 + r) in a year and (1 + r)^t in t years. Run that backward: a payment C due in t years is worth today

PV = C / (1 + r)^t

because that is the sum you would need to set aside now to have C then. At 9%, $100 due in five years is worth $64.99 today, and $100 due in ten years is worth $42.24. The waiting costs more than half.

A stream that grows. Let CF0 be the free cash flow of the year just ended, and suppose it grows at a fraction g a year. Year 1 pays CF0 (1 + g), year 2 pays CF0 (1 + g)^2, and so on. The value of the first n years is the sum of each year's payment discounted from its own date:

V_n = (CF0 (1 + g) / (1 + r)) + (CF0 (1 + g)^2 / (1 + r)^2) + ... + (CF0 (1 + g)^n / (1 + r)^n)

Every term is the one before it multiplied by the same ratio q = (1 + g) / (1 + r), so the sum is CF0 (q + q^2 + ... + q^n). There is a shortcut for adding such a list. Write S = q + q^2 + ... + q^n and multiply both sides by q:

qS = q^2 + q^3 + ... + q^(n+1)

Subtract the second line from the first. Every term appears in both except the first of S and the last of qS, so S - qS = q - q^(n+1), that is S (1 - q) = q - q^(n+1), and

V_n = CF0 x q (1 - q^n) / (1 - q),   with q = (1 + g) / (1 + r)

Ten years of a business whose cash grows 2.5% a year, discounted at 9%, come to 7.24 times this year's cash flow, which you can confirm by adding the ten terms one by one.

Everything after year n. No one can forecast year 37, so after year n the model assumes one modest growth rate gT for ever (Vista uses 2.5%, near long-run inflation: no real growth for ever). Carry the subtraction trick on without end. When q is below 1, q^(n+1) shrinks toward zero as n grows (0.94 to the hundredth power is 0.002), so S (1 - q) tends to q and the infinite sum is S = q / (1 - q). Apply it to the stream after year n, which starts at CF_n (1 + gT) in year n + 1 and grows at gT, so q = (1 + gT) / (1 + r). Its value as of year n is CF_n times q / (1 - q), and that fraction tidies up: multiply top and bottom by (1 + r) to get (1 + gT) / ((1 + r) - (1 + gT)), and the bottom is r - gT. So

TV_n = CF_n (1 + gT) / (r - gT)

This is the value, as of year n, of all the cash after year n. It exists only when gT is below r: a stream growing faster than you discount it is worth an infinite amount, a sign that one of the two numbers is wrong. Bring it back to today by dividing by (1 + r)^n.

The whole machine. Put the two parts together:

V = (CF0 x q (1 - q^n) / (1 - q))  +  (CF0 (1 + g)^n (1 + gT) / (r - gT) / (1 + r)^n)

Divide both sides by CF0 and the machine prints a multiple: how many times this year's cash flow a business is worth, for a given g, r, n and gT. Two readings are worth memorizing. A business that grows only at gT from the start is the perpetuity from day one, so it is worth (1 + gT) / (r - gT) times cash flow: at 9% and 2.5% that is 15.8, at 8% it is 18.6 and at 10% it is 13.7. And even for that steady business, more than half the value sits beyond year ten: the cash from year 11 on is the whole stream with every term multiplied by q^10, so its share of the value is q^10 = 0.54. That is not a flaw in the model. It is a fact about owning things that last.

Turning it around. Now hold r, n and gT fixed, set V equal to the price, and ask what g makes the equation true. The right side rises as g rises (every term grows with g and none shrinks), so there is exactly one answer. There is no formula for it: g sits inside powers up to n and cannot be isolated. You find it the way you find a word in a dictionary. Start with two growth rates, one that prints a value below the price and one above, so the answer lies between them. Try the midpoint. If it prints below the price, the answer is in the upper half; if above, the lower half. Keep the half that holds the answer and try its midpoint. Each step halves the gap, and forty steps pin g to more decimals than anyone needs. That procedure, called bisection, is what the Desk's calculator runs; the third question below walks through its first steps by hand.

The other way around. Hold the growth instead, at a rate you believe in, and solve for r. Now the reading is the return the price offers a buyer who turns out to be right about the growth. The two solves are the same equation read from different ends, and the second is what a finance textbook calls the implied cost of capital.

What is set against what. The cash flow and the value must belong to the same people. Free cash flow as usually measured, cash from operations less capital spending, is after interest, so it belongs to the shareholders and is set against the market value of the shares. Add the debt to make an enterprise value while keeping the after-interest flow and you have charged the debt twice: once in the interest already paid out of the flow, once in the net debt. A pile of cash is the mirror case: take it off the market value, and what remains is the price of the operating business.

A worked example
0x150x300x450x600x0%10%20%30%40%50%Growth of free cash flow, % a year for ten years (then 2.5%)Value as a multiple of today's free cash flowCisco, 27 March 2000: 145x32.5% a yearsteady 2.5% grower: 15.8xwhat Cisco did, 8.7%
The model at a 9% discount rate: free cash flow grows at the rate on the bottom axis for ten years, then 2.5% for ever. The dashed line is Cisco on 27 March 2000: $569 billion of market value less $9.0 billion of cash and investments, $560 billion, against $3.85 billion of free cash flow in the last fiscal year filed, 145 times. The curve meets it at 32.5% a year. At 8% the answer is 29.5%, at 10% it is 35.3%.

Cisco at the top. Take the day itself, 27 March 2000, and only what a buyer could have known. Market value at the high: $569 billion, which at $82 a share is about 6.9 billion shares. The company had no debt and held $9.0 billion of cash and investments at the end of fiscal 1999 ($827 million of cash, $1,189 million of short-term investments, $7,032 million of investments), so the operating business was being valued at $560 billion. Free cash flow in the last full year filed: $4,438 million from operations less $584 million of capital spending, $3,854 million. The business was priced at 145 times its free cash flow.

Start with the no-growth check, which needs no solver. For $560 billion to be the value of a business growing a steady 2.5% for ever at a 9% discount rate, its cash flow today would have to be 560 x (0.09 - 0.025) / 1.025 = $35.5 billion, nine times what Cisco had just reported. So the price was buying growth, and a lot of it. Now the solve. At 9%, ten years then 2.5%, the growth dial has to be turned to 32.5% a year: free cash flow of $64.3 billion by fiscal 2009, 16.7 times the starting figure, with 77% of the value still sitting beyond year ten even then. At 8% the dial reads 29.5%; at 10%, 35.3%. Pack the same requirement into five years instead of ten and it reads 64.9% a year. None of these is a prediction. Each is the same sentence: a buyer at this price needed this to happen.

$0B$20B$40B$60BFree cash flow, $ billions$3.9B$64.3B$8.9BFiscal 1999, as filedFiscal 2009, required by the priceFiscal 2009, as reported
What the price required against what happened. On the 32.5% path, fiscal 2009 free cash flow would have been $64.3 billion, 17 times fiscal 1999's. Cisco reported $8.9 billion, 8.7% a year of growth, a fine record for a large company and about one seventh of the requirement. Sources: Cisco's 10-K filings on sec.gov.

What happened. Cisco did grow. Fiscal 2000, reported six months after the peak, brought free cash flow of $5,055 million, up 31.2% in a single year, and a shareholder could be forgiven for feeling that the order slip was being filled. But the slip said 32.5% a year for ten years, compounding, and a decade of that is a different thing from one year of it. By fiscal 2009 Cisco's free cash flow was $8,892 million, 8.7% a year of growth from fiscal 1999: a fine record, better than most large companies ever manage, and about one seventh of what the price had required. Run the machine forward on that path, 8.7% for ten years and then 2.5%, and the business was worth about 25 times its fiscal 1999 cash flow at 9%, not 145. Hold the actual growth and solve for the return instead: a buyer at the high who had somehow known the next ten years exactly was being offered 3.7% a year. Even at a generous 25% a year for ten years, the offer was 6.7%. The shares took more than twenty-five years to get back: on 10 December 2025, Bloomberg reported them at a record $80.25, past the level of 27 March 2000 for the first time ($82 was that day's high; the close was lower).

Two honest cautions. First, this is written with the answer known, and the Library's entry on the narrative fallacy warns against counting a story told afterward as evidence. The point here is narrower: the arithmetic used nothing but the filed accounts and the price on the day, and anyone could have done it that morning. Second, the calculation never said Cisco was a bad company or that the price was wrong. It said what the price required, and left to the reader the judgment of whether any company had ever delivered it. That judgment, not the solve, is where money is made or lost.

The usual mistakes
  1. A base year that is not normal. Symptom: the required growth swings with which year you start from. Fix: the base is the thing the whole calculation multiplies, so choose it with care and say why. For Cisco, using the strong fiscal 2000 as the base instead of fiscal 1999 cuts the required growth from 32.5% to 28.7% a year; a bad year flatters the other way. For a cyclical business, use a mid-cycle figure or a five-year median, and label it an assumption.
  2. Cash flow that is not quite the owners'. Symptom: cash from operations swollen by something that is not the business. Cisco's fiscal 1999 operating cash flow included $837 million of tax benefits from employee stock plans, 18.9% of the total: real cash, but cash from issuing shares to employees, not from selling routers. Take it out and free cash flow is $3,017 million, the multiple 186, the required growth 36.0%. Stock compensation and capitalized software are the modern forms of the same trap. Fix: define the flow you are discounting, in writing, before you discount it.
  3. A discount rate chosen to make the answer comfortable. Symptom: the analysis works at 7% and not at 9%, and 7% is the rate in the spreadsheet. Fix: run several rates and show them all; the Desk prints the required growth at 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12%. The answer is a row, not a cell.
  4. Forgetting where the value sits. Symptom: ten careful years of forecast and a terminal value tossed off in one line. Fix: compute the share of value beyond year n and say it aloud. For a steady business at 9% it is 54%; on Cisco's required path it was 77%. The terminal growth rate deserves as much argument as the first year's.
  5. Reading the solve as a forecast. Symptom: "the model says it will grow 32% a year." Fix: the model says a buyer at this price needs it to grow 32% a year. Those are different sentences, and the second has an obvious next step: has this company, or any company like it, ever done that for that long?
Where the model breaks

The Library's entry lists four failure conditions, each met in the example above: a base year that is unusually good or bad, a cash flow counted before the cost of stock compensation or of capitalized software, a discount rate chosen to flatter, and forgetting that most of the value sits after the last year anyone can forecast.

Three more limits. The model assumes one stream of cash that grows smoothly; a big one-time receipt, a planned sale of a division, or a pile of cash earning interest must be valued separately and taken off before the solve. It assumes a fixed share count; a company issuing shares at speed, as Cisco was through its stock plans, divides its future among more owners each year, and the per-share question gives a harsher reading than the whole-company one. And it is only as good as the discount rate, which is a judgment, not a measurement: show the answer at several rates, never defend one. Finally, the solve says nothing about whether the required growth is achievable. The statements cannot settle that. The people who have run the business, sold against it or bought from it can, and that is the question the reverse valuation hands to them.

Check yourself

1. A business whose free cash flow will grow a steady 2.5% a year for ever trades at 25 times free cash flow. What return does that price offer? What multiple would it trade at if buyers required 8%?

Answer: for a steady grower, multiple = (1 + gT) / (r - gT). Multiply both sides by (r - gT) and divide by the multiple: r - gT = (1 + gT) / multiple, so r = 0.025 + (1.025 / 25) = 6.6%. At 8% the multiple would be 1.025 / 0.055 = 18.6.

2. Two analysts value the same company with the same base cash flow, the same 9% rate and the same ten-year growth. One assumes 2.5% growth after year ten, the other 3.5%. Why is the gap between their values so large, and which part of the formula is responsible?

Answer: the terminal value is CF_n (1 + gT) / (r - gT), and the denominator shrinks from 0.065 to 0.055, raising that whole term by about a fifth, on a piece that is usually more than half the value. A one-point change in the forever rate moves the answer more than a one-point change in any single year's growth, because it applies to every year after year ten at once.

3. A publicly traded company has a market value of $20 billion and free cash flow of $1 billion in the year just ended. At a 10% discount rate, ten years of growth and 2.5% after, what growth does the price require, and what share of the value sits beyond year ten? Check your answer against the no-growth multiple at 10%.

Answer: at 10% a steady 2.5% grower is worth 1.025 / 0.075 = 13.7 times cash flow, and the price is 20 times, so the required growth is above 2.5%. Now bisect by hand with the full formula, in multiples of the $1 billion. At 7% the machine prints 18.98, below 20; at 8% it prints 20.43, above; so the answer is between them. The midpoint, 7.5%, prints 19.69, still below, so the answer is in the upper half, 7.5% to 8%. Its midpoint, 7.75%, prints 20.06, above: the answer is between 7.5% and 7.75%. Next 7.625%, which prints 19.87, below. Four steps have put the answer between 7.625% and 7.75%; the solver carries on to 7.7% a year, with 55% of the value beyond year ten.

Teach me more
  • How Do You Perform a Price-Implied Expectations Analysis?, Michael J. Mauboussin and Alfred Rappaport, Online Tutorial 8 of 10 on the companion site to their book Expectations Investing (about a thousand words with tables, plus a free downloadable spreadsheet). The authors' own version of the solve, worked on Domino's Pizza in September 2020. Their variant holds the growth and solves for the forecast period, the number of years of projected cash flows the price already pays for: a second way to read the same order slip. Tutorial 1 on the same site, How Do You Calculate Present Value?, is the gentlest two-minute introduction to discounting there is.
  • Stock and Bond Valuation: Annuities and Perpetuities, chapter 3 of Ivo Welch's Corporate Finance (5th edition, 2022, free online). The cleanest derivation of the perpetuity and growing perpetuity formulas, with the convergence shown numerically (fifty terms, a hundred terms, then the limit) before the shortcut is stated. Read it if the subtraction trick above went by too fast.
  • Valuation Online Class, Aswath Damodaran, New York University (25 webcasts of 12 to 20 minutes each on YouTube, with slides and tests). Session 7 on estimating cash flows, session 8 on estimating growth and session 9 on terminal value are the forward model this lesson runs in reverse, and his separate "Terminal Value Check" tools webcast is the best short treatment of mistake 4 anywhere.

The paper behind the Library entry is Mauboussin, "Expectations Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns", CFA Institute Conference Proceedings Quarterly 23(3), 2006, pages 61 to 70, on the Library's reading list; the book is Rappaport and Mauboussin, Expectations Investing, revised edition, Columbia Business School Publishing, 2021.

DuPont analysis

A return is three numbers multiplied together

A return on equity can come from margin, from how hard the assets are worked, or from borrowing. We split it into those parts for each of the last several years, because two companies with the same return can be opposite businesses, and because the parts do not persist equally.

Born to answer
Donaldson Brown at DuPont in the 1910s, comparing unlike businesses.
What it does now
Whether a return rests on margin, turnover or debt.
The mathematics
ROE = (NI / S) x (S / A) x (A / E)
The full entry
Where it began

In the 1910s Donaldson Brown, an engineer by training working in finance at DuPont, wrote return on investment as margin multiplied by turnover, so that unlike operations could be compared on what drove each. He took the method with him to General Motors in 1921, and it became the way American managers were taught to read a business. Doron Nissim and Stephen Penman rebuilt it in 2001 to separate operating from financing activities.

Why it works now

The split is arithmetic, and for years it was done once, in a model, and never revisited. The Desk computes it from the filed statements for each of the last several years and shows which of the three terms moved. What it cannot see is why, and that is where the interviews go: the plant manager who knows why turnover fell is worth more than another decimal place. The Desk asks which of the three numbers the return rests on.

When it applies

A high or rising return on equity offered as evidence of quality; two companies compared on a single return figure; a return that rose while margin fell.

What we would ask

Of the return you are pointing to, how much is margin, how much is turnover, and how much is leverage?
Which of the three moved over the last three years?

What it needs

Income statement and balance sheet for at least three fiscal years, with average balances.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the split from the filed statements, year by year. Why turnover or margin moved (price, mix, a new plant, a customer lost) is a question for operators who were there.

Where it breaks

Year-end balances after a large acquisition; negative equity after buybacks, where the return on equity loses meaning; a margin flattered by a one-time gain; comparing a bank with an industrial company.

For example

Two distributors each report a return on equity near twenty percent. One earns it on a thin margin turned over four times with little debt. The other has half the turnover and three times the leverage. The first is an operating business; the second is a financing structure with a warehouse attached.

The mathematics in fullROE = (NI / S) x (S / A) x (A / E), with A and E as averages over the year; in the operating form, ROE = RNOA + FLEV x (RNOA - NBC), where RNOA is operating income after tax over net operating assets, FLEV is net debt over equity, and NBC is the after-tax cost of net debt. Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; Columbia B8110; NYU Stern ACCT-GB.2303; NYU Stern Advanced Financial Statement Analysis; Ohio State Fisher AMIS 7220; Texas McCombs ACC 327

Sources

Nissim, Penman (2001). Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation: From Research to Practice. Review of Accounting Studies 6(1), 109-154. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011338221623
Fairfield, Yohn (2001). Using Asset Turnover and Profit Margin to Forecast Changes in Profitability. Review of Accounting Studies 6(4), 371-385. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012430513430
Soliman (2008). The Use of DuPont Analysis by Market Participants. The Accounting Review 83(3), 823-853. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.823
Fairfield, Sweeney, Yohn (1996). Accounting Classification and the Predictive Content of Earnings. The Accounting Review 71(3), 337-355. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9608042311
Binz, Schipper, Standridge (2025). Estimating profitability decomposition frameworks via machine learning: Implications for earnings forecasting and financial statement analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 80(2-3), 101805. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101805
Penman, Zhang (2021). Connecting book rate of return to risk and return: the information conveyed by conservative accounting. Review of Accounting Studies 26(1), 391-423. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-020-09558-5
Penman, Stephen H. Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation, 5th ed. McGraw-Hill. (book)
Wahlen, James M., Baginski, Stephen P. and Bradshaw, Mark T. Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis, and Valuation: A Strategic Perspective. Cengage. (book)
Easton, Peter D., McAnally, Mary Lea and Sommers, Gregory A. Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation. Cambridge Business Publishers. (book)
Palepu, Krishna G. and Healy, Paul M. Business Analysis and Valuation: Using Financial Statements. Cengage. (book)

Return on invested capital

What the last dollar invested earned

Growth is worth paying for only when the capital it consumes earns more than it costs. We measure what the business has earned on the capital it added in the last few years, separately from what it earns on the capital it already had, and set both against the cost of that capital.

Born to answer
Marshall, 1890: profit only after the cost of capital.
What it does now
What the capital added lately has earned.
The mathematics
ROIC = NOPAT / (debt + equity - cash)
The full entry
Where it began

Alfred Marshall wrote in 1890 that a business earns a true profit only after paying for the capital it uses. General Electric measured its divisions that way in the 1950s and called the result residual income. The research that gives the idea teeth for investors came much later: Titman, Wei and Xie in 2004, and Cooper, Gulen and Schill in 2008, found that companies that grow their assets fastest tend to disappoint afterward. Capital is easiest to raise and to spend when returns are about to fall.

Why it works now

The return on the capital a company added recently is not reported anywhere; it has to be computed from two balance sheets and two income statements. The Desk does that from the filed statements and puts it beside the return on the capital already in place. For a build-out too young to judge, it says so, and names who would know when the capacity fills. The Desk asks what the last dollar invested has earned so far.

When it applies

A growth story financed by rising capital expenditure or acquisitions; a company whose assets are growing faster than its profits; an investment program management describes as the future of the business.

What we would ask

How much capital went in over the last three years, and how much more does the business earn now than before?
Is the return on the new capital above or below the return on the old?

What it needs

Operating income, tax rate, debt, equity and cash for at least three fiscal years.

How we would get it

The Desk computes return on invested capital by year and the return on the capital added. When a build-out is too young to judge, the question of when it turns goes to people who have run assets of that kind: at what utilization, after how many quarters.

Where it breaks

Judging a multi-year build-out in its first year; invested capital distorted by goodwill, by cash parked in long-term securities, or by intangible investment that was expensed; an operating income flattered or depressed by one-time items.

For example

A network operator has doubled capital spending to build a new line of business. Its return on the capital already in place is nine percent. On the capital added over two years, operating profit has fallen, so the measured return is negative. That is normal early in a build-out, and it is also exactly what a failed one looks like. The question for the operators is which.

The mathematics in fullROIC = NOPAT / average IC, with NOPAT = operating income x (1 - t) and IC = debt + equity - cash; incremental return = (NOPAT(t) - NOPAT(t - k)) / (IC(t) - IC(t - k)); value is created when ROIC exceeds the cost of capital, and growth adds value only at that spread. Taught in

UT Dallas ACCT 7323 (doctoral); Columbia B8110

Sources

Titman, Wei, Xie (2004). Capital Investments and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4), 677-700. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000003173
Cooper, Gulen, Schill (2008). Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1609-1651. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01370.x
Fama, French (2006). Profitability, investment and average returns. Journal of Financial Economics 82(3), 491-518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.09.009
Fairfield, Whisenant, Yohn (2003). Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future Profitability and Market Mispricing. The Accounting Review 78(1), 353-371. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.353
Babina, Fedyk, He, Hodson (2024). Artificial intelligence, firm growth, and product innovation. Journal of Financial Economics 151, 103745. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103745
Koller, Tim, Goedhart, Marc and Wessels, David. Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies. Wiley. (book)
Aldasoro, Inaki, Doerr, Sebastian and Rees, Daniel (2026). Financing the AI boom: from cash flows to debt. BIS Bulletin No. 120, Bank for International Settlements. (book)

Learn the math
The question

Two coffee chains report the same year. Each will earn $100 million after tax next year from running its shops. Each plans to grow that profit 4% a year for as long as anyone can see, by opening more shops. Each has investors who expect 8% a year for the risk of owning it. On a spreadsheet of growth rates they are twins.

They are not twins. The first chain's new shops earn 20 cents a year on every dollar it costs to build them. The second chain's new shops, opened in towns already full of coffee, earn 6 cents. Do the arithmetic this lesson builds and the first chain is worth $2,000 million. The second is worth $833 million, less than the $1,250 million it would be worth if it stopped growing altogether. Same profit, same growth, and one of them would make its owners richer by standing still.

The model in this lesson is the tool that tells the twins apart. It asks one question of every growth story: what has the last dollar invested earned?

The idea in one paragraph

A business is a machine that turns capital into profit. Its return on invested capital is how much profit each dollar in the machine produces. But the average over all the capital tells you about the past, because most of that capital was put in years ago, often when the opportunities were better. What decides whether growth is worth anything is what the newest capital earns, compared with what that capital costs. Growth is a multiplier: it multiplies whatever the new money earns above or below its cost. If the new money earns more than it costs, faster growth is worth more. If it earns exactly its cost, growth is worth nothing at all. If it earns less, every extra point of growth destroys value, and the business would be worth more if it handed the money back. So we measure the return on the capital added recently, separately from the return on the capital already in place, and set both against the cost of capital.

The math, step by step

Step 1: profit and the capital that produced it. Start with operating income, the profit from running the business before interest and taxes. Take the tax off at the rate t and you have NOPAT, net operating profit after tax:

NOPAT = operating income x (1 - t)

NOPAT is the profit the business would earn if it had no debt at all, which is what we want, because we are judging the business, not how it is financed. The capital that produced it is invested capital, IC: the money lenders and shareholders have put in, less the cash the business is just holding and not using.

IC = debt + equity - cash

Then the return on invested capital is the ratio of the two:

ROIC = NOPAT / IC

Because NOPAT is earned over a year and IC is measured on a single day, careful work divides by the average of the capital at the start and end of the year. If a business earns NOPAT of $100 million on $500 million of capital, its ROIC is 20%.

Step 2: the return on the newest dollars. Now look at two dates, k years apart. The capital went up by IC(t) - IC(t - k) and NOPAT went up by NOPAT(t) - NOPAT(t - k). The return on the new capital is the extra profit divided by the extra capital:

incremental return = (NOPAT(t) - NOPAT(t - k)) / (IC(t) - IC(t - k))

Suppose three years ago the business earned $100 million on $500 million (20%), and today it earns $112 million on $700 million. Its ROIC today is 112 / 700 = 16%. That sounds like a business that is still doing well. But the extra $200 million of capital produced only 112 - 100 = $12 million of extra profit, and 12 / 200 = 6%. The total fell from 20% to 16% because a 6% layer was laid on top of a 20% base. The 16% is an average of a good past and a poor present.

One caution travels with this ratio from the start. It credits every extra dollar of profit to the new capital, which is the same as assuming the old capital went on earning exactly what it earned before. If the old shops raised their prices, their gain lands in the numerator and flatters the new shops; if the old shops faded, the new ones are blamed for it. The incremental return is a reading on the new capital, not a clean measurement of it.

Step 3: what growth costs. Growth is not free. To grow, a business has to put money in. Call the return the new capital earns RONIC (return on new invested capital) and the money put back in next year I. Each dollar of I adds RONIC dollars of NOPAT the year after, so the extra NOPAT is RONIC x I. Growth is that extra divided by the NOPAT of the year the money went in:

g = (RONIC x I) / NOPAT

Solve for the share of NOPAT that has to go back in:

I / NOPAT = g / RONIC

This is the reinvestment rate. What is left, the cash an owner could actually take out of the business, is

cash to owners = NOPAT x (1 - (g / RONIC))

Read it slowly, because the whole lesson is in it. The faster you want to grow, the more you must reinvest. The less the new capital earns, the more you must reinvest for the same growth. For our chains, with g = 4%: the first chain, at 20%, reinvests 4 / 20 = 20% of its $100 million, $20 million, and its owners can take out $80 million. The second, at 6%, must reinvest 4 / 6, two thirds, about $66.67 million, and its owners can take out about $33.33 million. Same profit, same growth, and the owners of the second chain get less than half as much cash.

Step 4: what that cash is worth. A stream of cash that starts at C next year and grows at g a year, discounted at the cost of capital W, is worth the sum

(C / (1 + W)) + ((C x (1 + g)) / (1 + W)^2) + ((C x (1 + g)^2) / (1 + W)^3) + ...

Each term is the one before it multiplied by the same number, q = (1 + g) / (1 + W). A sum of that kind, a geometric series, starting at a and multiplied by q each time, adds up to a / (1 - q) whenever q is below 1, that is whenever g is below W. (Call the sum S. Everything after the first term is the whole sum over again multiplied by q, so S = a + (q x S), and solving for S gives a / (1 - q).) Here a = C / (1 + W), and

1 - q = ((1 + W) - (1 + g)) / (1 + W) = (W - g) / (1 + W)

so the sum is (C / (1 + W)) x ((1 + W) / (W - g)) = C / (W - g). That is the growing perpetuity. Put Step 3's cash in for C and you have the value driver formula, the center of the model:

Value = (NOPAT x (1 - (g / RONIC))) / (W - g)

where NOPAT is next year's. For the first chain: (100 x (1 - (0.04 / 0.20))) / (0.08 - 0.04) = 80 / 0.04 = $2,000 million. For the second: (100 x (1 - (0.04 / 0.06))) / 0.04 = (100 / 3) / 0.04, about $833.33 million. Most of that value lies far out: with cash growing at 4% and discounted at 8%, only about 68% of it is in the first thirty years (the share is 1 - q^30).

$0$1,000$2,000$3,0000%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%Growth a year (cost of capital 8%)$ millionsnew capital earns 20%: $2,000earns 8%: $1,250 at any growthearns 6%: $8336% growth: $0
Growth is a multiplier, not a gift. It multiplies whatever the new capital earns above or below its cost: above, faster growth is worth more; at the cost of capital, growth is worth nothing; below it, every extra point of growth destroys value.

Step 5: the value of growth, separated. Take away the value of the business if it never grew, NOPAT / W, and see what remains. Write 1 - (g / RONIC) as (RONIC - g) / RONIC and put both values over the common denominator RONIC x W x (W - g):

Value - (NOPAT / W) = (NOPAT x ((W x (RONIC - g)) - (RONIC x (W - g)))) / (RONIC x W x (W - g))

Multiply out the inner bracket: (W x RONIC) - (W x g) - (RONIC x W) + (RONIC x g). The two W x RONIC terms cancel and g x (RONIC - W) is left. So

Value = (NOPAT / W) + ((NOPAT x g x (RONIC - W)) / (RONIC x W x (W - g)))

The first part is the business standing still: 100 / 0.08 = $1,250 million for both chains. The second part is the value of growth, and look at its sign. It carries the factor RONIC - W. When the new capital earns more than its cost, growth adds value: +$750 million for the first chain. When it earns exactly its cost, the second part is zero, whatever g is. When it earns less, growth subtracts: about -$416.67 million for the second chain. Push the second chain to 6% growth and it must reinvest 6 / 6, all of its profit; its owners never receive a dollar, and the formula gives a value of zero. That is a treadmill: running harder to stay in place.

Step 6: the slope, with calculus. How much does one more point of growth add? Differentiate the value driver formula with respect to g. Write the top as NOPAT x (1 - (g / RONIC)), whose slope in g is -NOPAT / RONIC, and the bottom as W - g, whose slope is -1. The quotient rule (bottom times the slope of the top, less top times the slope of the bottom, all over the bottom squared) gives

dV/dg = (((-NOPAT / RONIC) x (W - g)) + (NOPAT x (1 - (g / RONIC)))) / (W - g)^2

Multiply out the top: -((NOPAT x W) / RONIC) + ((NOPAT x g) / RONIC) + NOPAT - ((NOPAT x g) / RONIC). The two g terms cancel, leaving NOPAT x (1 - (W / RONIC)), which is (NOPAT x (RONIC - W)) / RONIC, so

dV/dg = (NOPAT x (RONIC - W)) / (RONIC x (W - g)^2)

With g below W and a positive RONIC, everything here is positive except RONIC - W. So the sign of the slope is the sign of the spread: growth helps when the new capital earns more than its cost and hurts when it earns less, at every growth rate. And the (W - g)^2 at the bottom says the effect gets stronger the closer growth comes to the cost of capital. At 4% growth the slope for the first chain is (100 x 0.12) / (0.20 x 0.0016) = $37,500 million per unit of g (the 0.0016 is 0.04^2). A percentage point is a hundredth of a unit, so growth is worth about $375 million a point to the first chain there, and costs the second about $208 million a point. A slope describes small steps, and a whole point is not a small step here: going all the way from 4% to 5% adds $500 million to the first chain and takes about $278 million from the second, more than the slope says, because the curve steepens as g nears W.

Step 7: the old well and the new well. Why can't you just watch the ordinary ROIC? Because it moves slowly. A business with $500 million of old capital earning 20% that adds $50 million a year earning 6% has a total ROIC of

(100 + (0.06 x 50 x n)) / (500 + (50 x n))

after n years: 15.3% after five, 13% after ten, about 10.7% after twenty. It does not come down to an 8% cost of capital until year sixty, though every dollar added since the first year earned less than it cost. A town's oldest well can keep the town's average looking healthy long after the new wells have come up nearly dry. Only the return on the new capital shows it.

0%5%10%15%20%05101520Years of new investmentReturn on capitalcost of capital 8%total ROIC after 10 years: 13%return on every new dollar: 6%
The old well and the new well. The average return on all the capital stays above the cost of capital for decades while every dollar added since the first year earns less than it costs. Only the return on the new capital shows it.
A worked example

Few companies have put more new capital to work in a few years than Meta Platforms, and its annual reports to the SEC give everything the model needs. Its capital spending went from $18,567 million in 2021 to $69,691 million in 2025, about 3.75 times as much. Here is what the filed statements say, in millions of dollars: operating income for each fiscal year, and the balance sheet at its end (31 December).

  • 2021: operating income $46,753; shareholders' equity $124,879; long-term debt $0; finance leases $581; cash $16,601; marketable securities $31,397.
  • 2022: operating income $28,944; equity $125,713; debt $9,923; leases $687; cash $14,681; securities $26,057.
  • 2023: operating income $46,751; equity $153,168; debt $18,385; leases $690; cash $41,862; securities $23,541.
  • 2024: operating income $69,380; equity $182,637; debt $28,826; leases $709; cash $43,889; securities $33,926.
  • 2025: operating income $83,276; equity $217,243; debt $58,744; leases $1,184; cash $35,873; securities $45,719.

The tax rate first. Meta's tax expense was about 11.8% of its pretax income in 2024 and about 29.6% in 2025. A rate that jumps like that would move NOPAT by billions for reasons that have nothing to do with how well the new capital is working, so we use the 21% US statutory rate in every year and say so. That is mistake 4 in action: keep one-time effects out of the numerator.

Step 1, NOPAT and capital. For 2021, NOPAT is 46,753 x (1 - 0.21), about $36,935 million. Invested capital is 124,879 + 0 + 581 - 16,601 - 31,397 = $77,462 million: equity plus debt and leases, less the cash and marketable securities the business was holding rather than using. Following the entry, debt here means borrowed money and finance leases; Meta's operating leases, which some analysts add to capital, are left out, and the entry sends that rebuilding to a specialist. For 2025 the same steps give NOPAT of about $65,788 million on capital of $195,579 million. (We use year-end capital to keep the arithmetic visible. The entry's average of opening and closing capital gives a growing company a higher ROIC, because the opening balance is smaller: about 39.9% for 2025 in place of 33.6%. The incremental return, built on differences between year-end balances, is the same either way.)

Step 2, the total. ROIC was about 36,935 / 77,462 = 47.7% in 2021 and about 65,788 / 195,579 = 33.6% in 2025. Read alone, that is a falling return, and a careless reader stops there.

Step 3, the new capital. Over the four years NOPAT rose about $28,853 million and invested capital rose $118,117 million. The return on the new capital was about 28,853 / 118,117 = 24.4%. That is the old well and the new well in a real company: the new capital earns well below the old, which is why the total fell, but 24.4% is far above any plausible cost of capital for a company of this kind. On these measured numbers the total fell while the new capital still earned well above its cost. The model separates two things the total ROIC runs together.

Step 4, the window. Now watch how much the answer depends on where you start. Year by year, the incremental return was about -77.6% in 2022, 125% in 2023, 65% in 2024 and 17.9% in 2025. The 2022 figure is the entry's own example come to life: capital rose while operating income fell 38.1%, so the measured return was negative, which is exactly what a failed build-out looks like and exactly what a young one looks like. Start the window in 2022, at that depressed base, and the return on new capital from 2022 to 2025 comes out about 42.9%, not 24.4%. And because capital goes in before profit comes out, Mauboussin and Callahan (the first link below) lag the capital a year: the profit gained over three years, from 2022 to 2025, is set against the capital added over the three years ending a year earlier, from the end of 2021 to the end of 2024. That is about 42,922 / 56,895 = 75.4%, the highest of the multi-year figures, because it both starts from the depressed 2022 and leaves out the heavy spending of 2025. Each number is honest arithmetic; they answer different questions.

What the model says, and does not. On the filed numbers, the capital Meta added from 2021 to 2025 measured roughly a quarter on the dollar or better, depending on the window, against a total return that fell. Step 2's caution applies: whatever part of the added profit came from the business already in place flatters these figures. And what the model cannot say yet is what the 2025 capital will earn: much of the $69,691 million spent that year is in buildings and machines not yet fully at work, so its profit belongs to later years. That question goes, as the entry says, to people who have run assets of that kind. This is an illustration of the arithmetic on public filings, not a view of Meta's shares.

The usual mistakes
  1. Reading the total ROIC as the return on growth. Symptom: "the company earns 25% on capital, so its expansion will earn 25%." Fix: Step 7. The total is mostly old capital. Compute the incremental return over three to five years and set it beside the total; a gap between them is the most important number on the page.
  2. Judging a build-out in its first year. Symptom: a new plant, network or data center that shows a 0% or negative incremental return in year one, read as a failure. Fix: capital goes in before profits come out. A $200 million plant that earns nothing in its first year, $10 million in its second, $20 million in its third and $30 million a year after that measures 0%, 5% and 10% before it settles at 15%; at 8% it is worth about $322 million against its $200 million cost. Ask how long assets of this kind take to fill, and measure the return over that many years, or lag the profit behind the capital.
  3. Dividing by a number near zero. Symptom: an incremental return of 300%, or of -150%, from a year when capital barely moved or fell. Fix: the ratio means something only when the capital added is large relative to the base. Lengthen the window until it is, and when capital shrank, report the change in profit and the change in capital side by side instead of a ratio.
  4. Letting the accounting decide the answer. Symptom: a software company with a 60% ROIC, or an acquirer whose return halves the year it buys something. Fix: research and brand spending are investments that the accounts treat as expenses, so the capital they built is missing and the return is overstated; goodwill from an acquisition is capital the shareholders really paid. Compute the return with and without goodwill: without it you are judging the operations, with it you are judging management's purchases. Take cash parked in long-term securities out of capital, and take one-time gains and charges out of operating income.
  5. Comparing with the wrong hurdle. Symptom: "the new capital earns 7%, which is positive, so growth is good." Fix: Step 5. The test is the spread over the cost of capital, not over zero. A 7% return on money that costs 8% destroys value as surely as a loss does, only more slowly.
Where the model breaks

The entry names its failures, and each is a way the numbers lie. A multi-year build-out judged in its first year looks like a failure and may not be one; the entry's own example, a network operator whose profit fell while its capital doubled, is exactly what a failed build-out looks like and exactly what a normal young one looks like, and only people who have run such assets can say which. Invested capital is distorted by goodwill, by cash parked in long-term securities and by intangible investment that was expensed, so the same business can show very different returns depending on how it grew. And operating income flattered or depressed by one-time items moves the numerator in a single year, which the incremental return, built on differences, magnifies.

Three limits belong beside them. The incremental return assumes the capital already in place went on earning what it earned before, so a change in the old business is credited to, or blamed on, the new capital. The value driver formula assumes growth and the return on new capital last for ever, so it is a way to see what matters, not a valuation to trade on; the Library's residual income and expectations entries handle growth that fades. And the cost of capital is an estimate, not a fact: a spread of two points can disappear inside the uncertainty of the hurdle itself. The research that made this matter to investors, Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008), found that companies whose investment or assets grow fastest have tended to earn lower stock returns afterward; it describes averages across thousands of companies, not a forecast for any one. This lesson describes a way of thinking about growth, not advice about any investment.

Check yourself

1. A company with a 25% ROIC announces it will double its capital spending to grow faster. What number does the model ask for before cheering, and why is the 25% not it?

Answer: the return the new capital will earn, and the return the capital added in recent years has actually earned (Steps 2 and 7). The 25% is an average dominated by capital put in years ago; the decision turns on the next dollar. If the opportunities that earned 25% are used up, the new capital may earn far less, and Step 5 says growth then destroys value even while the reported ROIC stays high for years.

2. A business earns exactly its 8% cost of capital on new investment. Management says it can grow 6% a year instead of 2%. How much is the extra growth worth?

Answer: nothing. With RONIC = W the value of growth in Step 5 is zero, and the value driver formula gives NOPAT / W at any growth rate. The extra growth is real, but every dollar of it is paid for by a dollar of reinvestment that earns exactly what it costs, so the owners are no richer.

3. A company will earn NOPAT of $50 million next year. Its cost of capital is 9% and it expects to grow 3% a year. (a) What is it worth if new capital earns 12%? (b) How much must it reinvest next year? (c) What would it be worth if it did not grow, and if new capital earned only 6%?

Answer: (a) (50 x (1 - (0.03 / 0.12))) / (0.09 - 0.03) = (50 x 0.75) / 0.06 = $625 million. (b) The reinvestment rate is 0.03 / 0.12 = 25%, so $12.5 million, leaving $37.5 million for owners. (c) Without growth, 50 / 0.09, about $555.56 million, so growth at 12% adds about $69.44 million. At 6%, (50 x (1 - 0.5)) / 0.06, about $416.67 million: growing at a 6% return costs the owners about $138.89 million against standing still.

Teach me more
  • Return on Invested Capital: How to Calculate ROIC and Handle Common Issues, Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, Counterpoint Global, Morgan Stanley Investment Management, 6 October 2022 (about 44 pages). The best free practical guide to the measurement, including the incremental return with a one-year lag (the lag of Step 4 of the worked example), the advice to smooth it over three or five years, and the warning that it assumes the return on the existing capital holds steady. Its introduction also likens growth without a spread to the speed setting on a treadmill. Read the introduction and the section "Measuring Incremental ROIC" first; the long middle on leases, deferred taxes and intangibles is for when you are doing it for real.
  • How much is growth worth?, Aswath Damodaran, Musings on Markets, 29 May 2012. A short demonstration, first with one firm earning $10 million at a 10% cost of capital and then with three firms earning 8%, 10% and 12% on new investment, that growth adds value only when new investment earns more than it costs, does nothing at the cost of capital, and destroys value below it: Steps 3 to 5 in prose, with a spreadsheet to try.
  • Value enhancement, "Increase Expected Growth", Aswath Damodaran, the second part of chapter 31 of Investment Valuation, second edition, on his NYU site (PDF). The textbook version of Step 3: growth equals the reinvestment rate times the return on capital, and reinvesting more cuts the cash to owners. It then makes the point of Step 7 in one sentence that is worth the whole read: the return that matters is the marginal return on the new investment, not the average, and a firm earning 18% on its capital against a 12% cost may be earning only 11% on its newest projects.
  • Return on Invested Capital (ROIC): Dataset Support, Aswath Damodaran, YouTube, 1 December 2023 (about 9 minutes). Damodaran on computing the return itself: subtracting cash, what to do with goodwill, capitalizing research, treating leases as debt. Good companion to mistake 4; it does not cover the incremental return.

The papers behind the Library entry's history are Titman, Wei and Xie, "Capital Investments and Stock Returns", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4), 2004, and Cooper, Gulen and Schill, "Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns", Journal of Finance 63(4), 2008. The value driver formula of Steps 3 to 5 is set out in Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (McKinsey and Company, Wiley).

Mean reversion in profitability and growth

How long a high return lasts

Unusually high returns and unusually fast growth both tend to fade, and the record says how fast. Before accepting a forecast that holds either one, we put it beside the base rate: how often companies have actually sustained it.

Born to answer
Stigler, 1963; measured by Fama and French in 2000.
What it does now
The base rate for a forecast that holds a peak.
The mathematics
x(t + 1) - x(t) = a + b (mean - x(t))
The full entry
Where it began

George Stigler argued in 1963 that competition should pull every industry's return toward the same level. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French measured the pull in 2000: profitability closes a large part of its distance from the mean each year. Three years later Louis Chan, Jason Karceski and Josef Lakonishok asked how many companies sustain high growth in earnings for a decade and found almost none beyond what chance would give.

Why it works now

A base rate is only useful at the moment a forecast is made, and that is when it is least likely to be looked up. The Desk states the required growth, sets it beside the company's own record, and brings the published base rates to the same page. If the forecast is a claim to be an exception, the Desk says so and asks for the reason, which is usually something only customers and competitors can confirm. The Desk asks how often what the forecast assumes has actually happened.

When it applies

A forecast that extends a peak margin or a recent growth rate for many years; a price that requires growth few companies have achieved; a claim that this business is the exception.

What we would ask

How many companies have held a return or a growth rate like this for as long as the forecast assumes?
What is the specific reason this one will not fade, and can it be checked?

What it needs

The company's own history of returns and growth, and the published record on persistence for companies of its kind.

How we would get it

The Desk sets the required growth beside the company's record and the published base rates. Whether the advantage is the durable kind (a cost position, a switching cost, a license) is a question for customers, competitors and former insiders.

Where it breaks

Treating the average fade as a law for every company; a base rate drawn from the wrong class of business; ignoring that returns far below the mean revert as well, and faster.

For example

A model carries a thirty percent operating margin forward for ten years. The company reached that margin two years ago, in a shortage. The record on profitability says a gap that wide closes by more than a third each year, on average. The forecast is not impossible; it is a claim to be an exception, and it needs a reason.

The mathematics in fullx(t + 1) - x(t) = a + b (mean - x(t)) + e, with b the yearly rate of reversion; a departure from the mean shrinks by the factor (1 - b) each year, so its half-life is ln 2 / (-ln(1 - b)) years, about ln 2 / b only when b is small (b = 0.38 gives 1.45 years, where ln 2 / b would say 1.82); for growth, the share of companies above the median for k years running is compared with 0.5^k, what chance alone would give. Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research

Sources

Fama, French (2000). Forecasting Profitability and Earnings. The Journal of Business 73(2), 161-175. https://doi.org/10.1086/209638
Chan, Karceski, Lakonishok (2003). The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates. The Journal of Finance 58(2), 643-684. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00540
Nissim, Penman (2001). Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation: From Research to Practice. Review of Accounting Studies 6(1), 109-154. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011338221623
Dichev, Tang (2009). Earnings volatility and earnings predictability. Journal of Accounting and Economics 47(1-2), 160-181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.09.005
Penman, Zhang (2002). Accounting Conservatism, the Quality of Earnings, and Stock Returns. The Accounting Review 77(2), 237-264. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.2.237

Learn the math
The question

In the fiscal year that ended in August 2018, Micron Technology, the American maker of memory chips, sold $30,391 million of them and kept $14,994 million as operating income. That is 49.3 cents of every dollar of revenue. Memory was scarce that year, and buyers paid what they had to.

Now imagine the forecaster's spreadsheet that autumn. The easiest thing in the world is to copy the last column to the right: 49.3%, 49.3%, 49.3%. Each copy feels like no assumption at all. In fact it is the boldest assumption on the page. It says that the competitors who watched Micron earn 49 cents on the dollar will do nothing about it, and that the customers who paid those prices will not find another way.

Over the next five fiscal years Micron's margin was 31.5%, 14.0%, 22.7%, 31.5% and then minus 37.0%. This lesson is about the arithmetic that would have told the forecaster, before any of that happened, what to expect on average, and how to say plainly when a forecast is claiming to be the exception.

The idea in one paragraph

Think of a cup of hot coffee in a cool room. It does not stay hot, and it does not drop to room temperature at once. Each minute it loses a share of the difference between itself and the room: fast when it is very hot, slowly as it gets close. Profits behave like that coffee. A return far above what businesses normally earn draws rivals, copies and tougher customers, and the pull is strongest when the gap is widest. So the useful question about a high return is never "will it fall?" but "what share of its lead does it lose each year, and toward what level?" Researchers have measured that share across many companies and many years. That measurement is a base rate: what has usually happened to businesses in this position. A forecast that keeps the coffee hot for ten years is not wrong by definition. It is a claim to be an exception, and it owes us a reason.

The math, step by step

The symbols. Let x_t be the measure we care about in year t: a return on capital, or an operating margin, written as a fraction (49.3% is 0.493). Let m be the level it is pulled toward, the "room temperature". The gap is d_t = x_t - m, positive when the business earns more than the norm, negative when it earns less. Let b be the share of the gap that closes in a year, a number between 0 and 1.

Step 1: the rule. The entry writes the model as

x(t + 1) - x(t) = a + (b (m - x(t))) + e

Read it left to right: the change this year equals a constant a, plus a pull of b times the distance to m, plus a surprise e that averages zero. When m is the true long-run level, a is zero, and we will set it there for now. Since m - x_t = -d_t, the rule says x(t + 1) = x(t) - (b d(t)) + e. Subtract m from both sides, and because x(t) - m is d(t),

d(t + 1) = d(t) - (b d(t)) + e = ((1 - b) d(t)) + e

Each year the gap keeps the fraction 1 - b of itself, plus some luck. Call that fraction rho = 1 - b.

Step 2: run it forward. Take expectations (the average over all the luck, so e drops out). After one year the expected gap is rho d_0; after two, rho times that, rho^2 d_0; after k years,

E[d_k] = rho^k d_0

This is the coffee's rule: the same share is lost every year, so the gap shrinks geometrically, never quite to zero.

Step 3: the half-life. How long until half the gap is gone? Set rho^h = 1/2 and take logarithms of both sides: h ln(rho) = ln(1/2), so

h = ln(0.5) / ln(1 - b)

Both logarithms are negative, so h is positive. Fama and French, fitting this rule to company profitability year by year, put b at about 0.38 a year. Then rho = 0.62, and the half-life is ln 0.5 / ln 0.62 = 1.45 years. After two years 38.4% of the gap is left, after three 23.8%, after five 9.2%, after ten 0.8%.

Step 4: where the entry's ln 2 / b comes from. The Library entry gives the half-life as ln 2 / b, which at 0.38 is 1.82 years, not 1.45. Neither is a mistake; they answer slightly different questions. Suppose the pull acts continuously instead of once a year:

dd/dt = -b d

The rate of change of the gap is proportional to the gap. The function whose derivative is -b times itself is d(t) = d_0 e^(-bt) (differentiate it and check). Setting e^(-bh) = 1/2 gives h = ln 2 / b. In this version b is an instantaneous rate, and closing 38% in a whole year corresponds to a continuous rate of -ln 0.62 = 0.478, whose half-life is ln 2 / 0.478 = 1.45 years again. When b is small the two agree closely (at 0.05: 13.5 years against 13.9), because -ln(1 - b) is almost exactly b for small b. When b is large, use the yearly formula with a yearly rate.

Step 5: how much of the edge is left to earn. Add up the expected gap over every year from now on: d_0 (1 + rho + rho^2 + ...). A list in which each term is the last times rho sums to 1 / (1 - rho) (call the sum S; rho S is the same list missing its first term, so S - (rho S) = 1). Since 1 - rho = b, the whole future edge adds up to d_0 / b: the equivalent of 1 / b years of the present gap, undiscounted. At 38% that is 2.63 years of today's lead, not ten.

Step 6: measuring the rate. Where does 0.38 come from? From the rule in Step 1, read as a regression: put this year's change on the vertical axis and last year's level on the horizontal, for many companies and years, and fit a straight line. Its slope is -b, and its intercept divided by b is the level the line pulls toward. The constant a in the entry's formula is what lets the data choose that level instead of our assuming it.

Step 7: the same idea for growth. For growth rates the record is starker, and the test is simpler. If a company's growth in each year were a coin toss, above or below the median, the chance of beating the median k years running would be 0.5^k: 3.1% for five years, 0.1% for ten. Count how many companies actually did it. If the count matches the coin, the past streak told us nothing about the future one. To measure how far a count departs from chance, suppose a company above the median stays above next year with probability p. Then the share above k years running is 0.5 p^(k - 1), and an observed share s implies p = (s / 0.5)^(1 / (k - 1)). A coin gives p = 0.5.

A worked example: the peak and the fade

Here is Micron's operating margin from its 10-K filings, as the forecaster in late 2018 could have seen the decade behind it.

-40%-20%0%20%40%60%20092011201320152017201920212023Fiscal yearOperating marginMedian FY2009 to FY2018: 13.6%the peak held flat38% of the gap closes a year49.3%
Micron Technology's operating income as a share of revenue, fiscal 2009 to 2023, from its 10-K filings as tagged in SEC EDGAR. From the fiscal 2018 peak, two forecasts: the peak held flat, and the gap to the ten-year median closing 38% a year, the average rate Fama and French measured for profitability. The rate is borrowed from all firms and applied to one; it is an illustration, not a model of the memory cycle.

The ten fiscal years from 2009 through 2018 ran from minus 34.9% to plus 49.3%. Their median is 13.6% (the mean, 10.5%, is dragged down by the 2009 loss, which is why we use the median as the room temperature). The gap at the peak was about 36 points.

Two forecasts, then. The flat one holds 49.3%. The fade borrows Fama and French's 38% and lets the gap close at that rate: 35.8% for 2019, 27.3% for 2020, 22.1%, 18.9% and 16.9% after. Applied to the revenue Micron actually booked in fiscal 2019 to 2023, $118,844 million in all, the flat forecast implies $58,634 million of operating income. The fade implies $28,776 million. Micron earned $20,619 million. The fade was too generous as well, about 40% too high, where the flat line was almost three times too high. The average margin over those five years was 12.6%, close to the median the forecaster already had.

Two lessons sit inside this example, and both matter more than the fit. First, the path was nothing like smooth: the coffee was reheated in 2022 and thrown out in 2023. The model forecasts the average of many possible paths, not the one that happens. Second, the 38% is an average across all kinds of companies, borrowed here for one. Fit the line of Step 6 to Micron's own nine changes from 2009 to 2018 and the slope says Micron closes about 84% of its gap in a typical year, toward about 17%. Memory is a commodity business with a cycle; its peaks in this record were brief. The base rate for "companies" is the wrong class for a memory maker, and the right class is harsher. (Nine points make a rough line; it is a reading of the record, not a law of the company.)

Growth tells the same story more bluntly. Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok took every domestic company in the Compustat database from 1951 to 1998 and counted how many of those that lasted the span grew faster than the median every year for five years running.

0%2%4%6%8%Chance alone3.1%Sales6.3%Operating income3.6%Operating income3.0%Firms above the median growth rate five years running
Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003), Table III: of all domestic firms in the Compustat database from 1951 to 1998 that lasted the span, the percent whose growth per share exceeded the median every year for five years running, against the 3.1% a coin would give. Ten years running: sales 0.9%, operating income 0.3%, income 0.2%, against 0.1% by chance.

For income before extraordinary items, 3.0% did it, against 3.1% for a coin: the implied p is 0.495, indistinguishable from chance. For sales, 6.3% did, about twice the coin, an implied p of 0.596; over ten years 0.9% against 0.1%, a p of 0.640. Sales growth has some memory. Earnings growth, over these spans, has almost none. A forecast of ten straight years of above-median earnings growth is a bet on something the record says almost never happens beyond luck.

The usual mistakes
  • Fading the level instead of the gap. "Margins fall 38% a year" takes a 49% margin to 31% to 19% and on toward zero. The rule shrinks the distance to the norm, not the margin. Symptom: a forecast that drifts below any plausible floor. Fix: write m down first, then fade x - m.
  • Using the continuous half-life with a large yearly rate. It overstates the half-life (1.82 years against 1.45 at 38%). Fix: use ln 0.5 / ln(1 - b) for a share closed per year.
  • Borrowing the wrong class. The all-company rate understated Micron's fade by more than half. Fix: ask which businesses are really like this one (a commodity maker, a software platform, a regulated utility) and look for their record.
  • Reading one hot year as a lead. Some of any "fade" is plain regression to the mean: a measured high year includes good luck that would not repeat even if nothing competed it away. Fix: look at several years, and be wary of building a forecast from the single best one.
  • Forgetting the losers. Fama and French found reversion faster below the mean than above it. A business earning far less than the norm is also likely to move toward it, faster, through cuts, exits and takeovers. Fix: apply the base rate to depressed returns as readily as to peaks.
Where the model breaks

The entry names three failures. The average fade is not a law for every company: a business with a real defense (a cost position, a switching cost, a license) can hold its lead for decades, and the averages include such firms beside the ones that collapsed. A base rate drawn from the wrong class misleads in both directions, as Micron showed. And reversion is not symmetric: Fama and French report it is faster below the mean, and faster the further a company is from the mean in either direction, so a single b is a simplification of a curved relation. Two more cautions follow from the math itself. The "room temperature" m can move, when an industry's economics change, and then the coffee cools toward a new room. And the rule describes averages: it can say a lasting lead is rare, never which company has one. That last question is the one the entry hands to primary research: customers, competitors and former insiders know whether a defense is real.

Check yourself

1. A company earns 25% on its capital where the norm is 10%. If 30% of the gap closes each year, what return should we expect two years from now, and what is the half-life of the gap?

Answer: the gap is 15 points; two years keep 0.7^2 = 0.49 of it, 7.35 points, so 10% + 7.35% = 17.35%. Half-life: ln 0.5 / ln 0.7 = 1.94 years.

2. An analyst says, "Margins mean-revert, so I've cut this company's 40% margin by a third each year for ten years." What is wrong, and how would you fix it?

Answer: the analyst faded the level, so the margin heads toward zero (40%, 26.7%, 17.8%, and so on). Mean reversion shrinks the gap to the norm. Name the norm, say 15%, and fade the 25-point gap: 15% plus 25 points times (2/3)^k.

3. Of firms in some industry, 2% beat the median growth rate seven years running. What does chance alone give, and what stay-above probability does 2% imply?

Answer: chance gives 0.5^7 = 0.78%. With 0.5 p^6 = 0.02, p^6 = 0.04, so p = 0.04^(1/6) = 0.585. Better than a coin, but a company above the median this year is still almost as likely as not to fall below it next year.

Teach me more
  • Assessing the Magnitude and Sustainability of Value Creation, Michael Mauboussin with Kristen Bartholdson, Credit Suisse First Boston, 16 December 2002 (52 pages; the original "Measuring the Moat", hosted by a reader's site). A clear practitioner's account of why excess returns fade: competition, the competitive advantage period, and what lets a few companies resist. It says little about the arithmetic of the fade, which is what this lesson adds.
  • The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates, Louis Chan, Jason Karceski and Josef Lakonishok, The Journal of Finance, 2003 (43 pages, hosted by LSV Asset Management; the NBER working paper is w8282). Table III is the chart above in full; the paper also shows how optimistic analysts' long-term growth forecasts have been.
  • January 2019 Data Update 3: Playing the Numbers Game!, Aswath Damodaran, Musings on Markets (a blog post). A valuation teacher's warning that mean reversion is strong but not automatic, and breaks when an economy or a sector changes structure: the moving "room temperature" of this lesson.

The papers behind the Library entry are Fama and French, "Forecasting Profitability and Earnings", The Journal of Business, 2000 (whose abstract gives the 38% and the faster reversion below the mean), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok above, and Nissim and Penman's "Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation", all on the Library's reading list.

The accrual anomaly

Earnings that ran ahead of the cash

Every dollar of earnings is either cash or an estimate that cash will arrive. The estimated part is less reliable and reverses more often. We split reported earnings into the two and look at where the estimates are piling up: receivables, inventory, capitalized costs.

Born to answer
Sloan, 1996: accruals persist less than cash.
What it does now
How much of the profit arrived as cash.
The mathematics
Earnings = cash flow + accruals
The full entry
Where it began

Accountants have always known that profit and cash are different things; the accrual is the difference. In 1996 Richard Sloan, then at Wharton, sorted companies by how much of their earnings was accrual and how much was cash. The accrual part was less likely to persist, and investors priced the two as if they were the same. It became one of the most cited papers in accounting, and for a decade a strategy built on it earned a return.

Why it works now

The return to trading on accruals has largely gone, because everyone read the paper. The fact underneath has not: earnings backed by cash last longer than earnings backed by estimates. The Desk splits the two from the filed statements and shows which balance sheet account absorbed the difference. Whether receivables grew because customers are slow or because sales were pulled forward is not in the filing; a former controller or a distributor knows. The Desk asks how much of the profit arrived as cash.

When it applies

Earnings growing faster than operating cash flow; receivables or inventory growing faster than sales; a company that meets its numbers every quarter while its balance sheet swells.

What we would ask

How much of this year's earnings arrived as cash, and how much is an estimate on the balance sheet?
Which asset grew faster than sales, and what would have to happen for it to turn into cash?

What it needs

Income statement, cash flow statement and balance sheet for at least two years; the cash flow statement, not balance sheet differences, where there have been acquisitions.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the accrual and cash parts of earnings and the growth of each operating asset against sales. Why customers are paying later or stock is building is a question for a former controller, a channel partner or a customer.

Where it breaks

Reading a growing business's working capital as manipulation; ignoring acquisitions and currency, which contaminate balance sheet changes; forgetting that the trading result attached to this measure has largely disappeared since it was published.

For example

A hardware company reports earnings up fifteen percent. Operating cash flow is flat, and the difference sits in receivables, which grew twice as fast as sales. Either customers were given longer to pay to make the quarter, or the sales are real and the cash is coming. The statements say where to look, not which.

The mathematics in fullEarnings = CFO + accruals; accrual ratio = (NI - CFO) / average A; in the persistence regression E(t + 1) = a + b1 CFO(t) + b2 ACC(t), b2 is below b1; net operating assets NOA = (A - cash) - (A - debt - equity), the running total of earnings not yet received as free cash flow. Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern B10.4311 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Texas McCombs ACC 386K.3 (doctoral); USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); Yale SOM MGMT 743 (doctoral)

Sources

Sloan (1996). Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings? The Accounting Review 71(3), 289-315. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9608042309
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, Tuna (2005). Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(3), 437-485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.04.005
Dechow, Dichev (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review 77(s-1), 35-59. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35
Hribar, Collins (2002). Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical Research. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 105-134. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00041
Hirshleifer, Kewei Hou, Teoh, Yinglei Zhang (2004). Do investors overvalue firms with bloated balance sheets? Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 297-331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.10.002
Thomas, Zhang (2002). Inventory Changes and Future Returns. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 163-187. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020221918065
Allen, Larson, Sloan (2013). Accrual reversals, earnings and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(1), 113-129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.002
Lewellen, Resutek (2019). Why do accruals predict earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 67(2-3), 336-356. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.12.003
Bushman, Lerman, Zhang (2016). The Changing Landscape of Accrual Accounting. Journal of Accounting Research 54(1), 41-78. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12100
Green, Louis, Sani (2022). Intangible Investments, Scaling, and the Trend in the Accrual-Cash Flow Association. Journal of Accounting Research 60(4), 1551-1582. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12414
Ball, Nikolaev (2022). On earnings and cash flows as predictors of future cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 73(1), 101430. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101430
Dechow (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18(1), 3-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)90016-7
Green, Hand, Soliman (2011). Going, Going, Gone? The Apparent Demise of the Accruals Anomaly. Management Science 57(5), 797-816. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1320

Learn the math
The question

In March 1998 Sunbeam, the maker of blenders, grills and electric blankets, filed its annual report for 1997. It was meant to be the year of the turnaround. A restructuring plan begun in 1996 had closed 18 factories and 43 warehouses, by the filing's own count, and now the numbers had come back: net sales up 18.7% to $1,168 million, and net earnings of $109 million after a loss of $228 million the year before.

A reader who turned a few pages further, to the statement of cash flows, saw a different year. Net cash from operating activities was negative: the business had used $8 million of cash in the year it earned $109 million. And a sentence in the discussion of results said that this figure already included $59 million received in December from selling trade receivables to a financing program. The earnings were real on paper. The cash had not come.

Where had $118 million of profit gone? The balance sheet answered that too: receivables up 38.5% and inventories up 57.9%, in a year when sales grew 18.7%. The Securities and Exchange Commission later alleged that "at least $60 million" of the $189 million of 1997 pre-tax earnings from continuing operations "came from accounting fraud", including revenue booked on "bill and hold" sales that did not meet the accounting rules.

You do not need to suspect fraud to use this lesson; most companies whose earnings outrun their cash are honest, and many are simply growing. But Sunbeam shows the question the Library entry asks of every set of accounts: how much of this year's profit arrived as cash, and how much is an estimate waiting on the balance sheet? By the end you should be able to split earnings into the two parts, find the account that absorbed the difference, say why the estimated part is worth less, and read Richard Sloan's famous result for what it still says and what it no longer does.

The idea in one paragraph

A company keeps two kinds of score. One counts money: what came into the bank and what went out. The other, the earnings the accountants report, counts what the company has earned whether or not the money has moved yet: a sale made on credit counts today, though the customer pays next quarter; a machine bought for cash is charged a little each year it is used, not all at once. The gap between the two is the accrual, and it is not a trick; it is what makes earnings a better measure of a year than a bank statement. But every accrual is an estimate that cash will move later, and estimates can be wrong. An accrual must, in the end, either turn into cash or be reversed out of earnings. So earnings that rest mostly on cash tend to repeat next year, while earnings that rest on a swelling pile of estimates tend to fade. Picture a shopkeeper's till at closing time: banknotes, and slips of paper that say "owed to us". Both count toward the day's takings, and most slips are good. The work is to count the slips, notice when the drawer fills with them faster than the shop is growing, and ask what has to happen for them to turn into money.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the split. Write NI for net income (the earnings), CFO for cash flow from operations (the money), and ACC for the accrual. The definition is one line:

NI = CFO + ACC,   so   ACC = NI - CFO

The cash flow statement builds CFO from NI by undoing the accruals one account at a time (the "indirect method"). For a simple company:

CFO = NI + depreciation - (increase in receivables) - (increase in inventory) + (increase in payables)

Read each term in words. Depreciation was charged against earnings but no cash left this year, so it is added back. A rise in receivables is revenue booked but not yet collected, so it is taken out. A rise in inventory is cash spent on goods not yet sold and charged, so it is taken out. A rise in payables is costs charged but not yet paid, so it is added back. Rearranging gives the accrual account by account:

ACC = (increase in receivables + increase in inventory) - (increase in payables + depreciation)

Now the entry's own example, with round numbers chosen as assumptions. A hardware company had sales of $1,000 million last year, earnings of $100 million, and operating cash flow of $100 million: every dollar of profit arrived as cash. This year sales rise 10% to $1,100 million and earnings rise 15% to $115 million. On the balance sheet, receivables go from $150 million to $180 million, inventory from $120 million to $126 million and payables from $80 million to $81 million; depreciation is $20 million. Then

CFO = 115 + 20 - 30 - 6 + 1 = 100
ACC = 115 - 100 = 15,   and account by account   (30 + 6) - (1 + 20) = 15

Earnings up 15%, cash flat, and the difference is $15 million of accrual. Which account absorbed it? Receivables grew 20%, twice as fast as sales. Had they grown in step with sales they would be 150 x 1.10 = 165; they are 180, so $15 million of the year's revenue sits uncollected beyond what the sales growth explains. Another way to see the same thing is days of sales outstanding, receivables divided by a day's sales: (150 / 1,000) x 365 = 54.75 days last year, (180 / 1,100) x 365 = 59.7 days this year. Customers are taking five more days to pay.

To compare companies of different sizes, scale the accrual by the average of the year's opening and closing total assets. With total assets of $800 million and $860 million, the average is $830 million and the accrual ratio is 15 / 830 = 1.8%. Sloan scaled every one of his variables this way.

Step 2: the running total, and why an accrual must come back. Earnings are not cash, but they are not free of it either. Put the operating balance sheet into one number, the net operating assets: receivables plus inventory plus net plant, less payables (for this simple company, with no debt and no spare cash). Free cash flow is CFO less capital spending. Then one identity ties them together:

change in NOA = NI - free cash flow

In words: whatever was earned and not taken out as free cash stayed in the business as operating assets. For our company this year, capital spending equals depreciation at $20 million, so free cash flow is 100 - 20 = 80, and the identity reads 115 - 80 = 35, exactly the change in the operating accounts, 30 + 6 - 1 + (20 - 20) = 35. The entry calls NOA the running total of earnings not yet received as free cash flow, and this is why.

Now follow the identity over a whole life. A business starts with no operating assets and, wound up, ends with none. Summed over its life, the left side is zero, so the earnings it ever reported equal the free cash it ever produced. Every accrual is a loan from the future to the present, and the future collects. Here is the extra $15 million of receivables in year 3, with sales flat at $1,100 million (so receivables in step with sales are $165 million), the business earning $110 million before anything else, and nothing else moving:

(a) the customers pay:    NI = 110,             CFO = 110 + 20 + 15 = 145,   free cash flow 125
(b) they never will:      NI = 110 - 15 = 95,   CFO = 95 + 20 + 15 = 130,    free cash flow 110

(Read the two + 15 terms side by side. In (a) it is receivables falling because customers paid. In (b) it is the write-off, a charge that moves no cash, added back like depreciation; receivables fall by $15 million there too, but that fall is the write-off itself, not a collection, so it is counted once, not twice.) Over years 2 and 3 together, case (a) reports $225 million of earnings and $205 million of free cash flow; case (b) reports $210 million and $190 million. In both, the $20 million left over is exactly the growth that kept pace with sales: receivables up $15 million to 165, inventory up $6 million, payables up $1 million. The excess is gone either way: in (a) the cash caught up with the earnings, in (b) the earnings came down to the cash. The accounts cannot tell you in year 2 which is coming. That is the entry's point: the statements say where to look, not which.

Step 3: persistence, and Sloan's measurement. If accruals must come back, earnings built on them should repeat less. Sloan (1996) tested it on 40,679 company years from 1962 to 1991. First he regressed next year's earnings on this year's, each scaled by average assets:

E(t + 1) = a + (b x E(t))

and found b = 0.841: a dollar of earnings this year is followed, on average, by 84 cents next year. Then he split this year's earnings into its two parts and let each have its own coefficient (his earnings were operating income, and his accrual was built from balance sheet changes, because for most of his years no cash flow statement existed):

E(t + 1) = a + (b1 x CFO(t)) + (b2 x ACC(t))

The cash part came out at b1 = 0.855 and the accrual part at b2 = 0.765. The difference is statistically overwhelming (his F statistic is 614), and when he ran the regression industry by industry the accrual part persisted less in 86% of them. Per dollar, it is nine cents a year: 0.855 - 0.765 = 0.09. For our company that is small. Two firms each earn $115 million; one is all cash, the other is $100 million of cash and $15 million of accrual. Leaving out the intercept,

all cash:     0.855 x 115 = 98.3
the mix:      (0.855 x 100) + (0.765 x 15) = 85.5 + 11.5 = 97.0

a gap of 0.09 x 15 = 1.35, about $1.4 million of next year's profit. The gap grows with the accrual. For a company whose earnings are mostly accrual, it is most of the story.

Step 4: why the accrual part persists less: a little noise goes a long way. Why should the coefficient fall? The simplest model, and the idea behind Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005), is that part of each accrual is an estimation error that reverses. Write the accrual as a true part T plus an error e, so ACC = T + e. Suppose the true part and the cash part both persist at the rate p, while the error reverses fully next year (a receivable that was never good is written off; inventory that will not sell is written down):

E(t + 1) = (p x (CFO + T)) - e + u

where u is next year's fresh news. Assume, for the arithmetic, that CFO, T, e and u are independent of one another. That assumption buys a shortcut: when the two regressors are independent, each slope in the two-variable regression is the same as the slope of a simple regression on that variable alone, the covariance of the regressor with next year's earnings divided by the regressor's own variance. The cash part moves next year's earnings only through p x CFO, so its coefficient is simply p. For the accrual, work out the two pieces. The covariance of T + e with (p x T) - e is (p x var T) - var e (the cross terms vanish because the pieces are independent), and the variance of T + e is var T + var e. Divide top and bottom by var T and write v for the error's share, var e / var T:

b2 = ((p x var T) - var e) / (var T + var e) = (p - v) / (1 + v)

With no error, v = 0 and b2 = p: the accrual is as good as cash. As the error grows, b2 falls twice over, once because the error does not persist and once because it dilutes the good part. What error share reproduces Sloan's numbers? Set p = 0.855 and b2 = 0.765 and solve:

0.765 x (1 + v) = 0.855 - v
v = (0.855 - 0.765) / (1 + 0.765) = 0.09 / 1.765 = 0.051

About 5%. If one part in twenty of the variation in accruals is estimation error that later reverses, the accrual part of earnings persists exactly as much less as Sloan found. At 10% the coefficient would be 0.686; at 25%, 0.484. The lesson's code checks the formula by simulating 200,000 company years with v = 0.051 and recovering slopes of 0.854 and 0.761.

0.40.50.60.70.80.90%5%10%15%20%25%30%Estimation error as a share of the true accrual variancePersistence of the accrualcash: 0.855 (Sloan)Sloan's accruals: 0.765 at about 5%
A little noise goes a long way: if about a twentieth of the variation in accruals is estimation error that reverses, the accrual part of earnings persists about as much less as Sloan measured.

The model also tells you where to look. Richardson and his coauthors sorted accruals by how reliably they can be measured, from changes in cash-like items to changes in receivables, inventory and capitalized costs that rest on judgment. The less reliable the accrual, the less it persisted. That is why the entry asks which asset grew, not only how large the total is.

Step 5: the market, then and now. Sloan's second finding made the paper famous. He asked what persistence stock prices were assuming for each part, and the answer was the wrong way round: prices moved as if the accrual part would persist at 0.911 and the cash part at 0.826, against the measured 0.765 and 0.855. Investors were paying for the slips as if they were banknotes. So a portfolio that each year held the tenth of companies with the lowest accruals and was short the tenth with the highest earned 10.4% in the following year after adjusting for size (4.9% on the low side, minus 5.5% on the high side), and 4.8% more in the second year. Then everyone read the paper. Green, Hand and Soliman (2011) found that the hedge returns had decayed until they were on average no longer reliably positive, in part because hedge funds put capital behind the strategy. The entry says it plainly: the trading result has largely gone; the fact underneath has not. Cash-backed earnings still last longer than estimate-backed ones, a fact about the company, useful whatever the price.

A worked example

Back to Sunbeam, with every figure from its 10-K for 1997 (the 1996 column as that filing shows it, with the furniture business already set aside as a discontinued operation; dollars in thousands):

net sales             984,236 (1996)    1,168,182 (1997)    up 18.7%
net earnings (loss)  (228,262)            109,415
cash from operations   14,163              (8,249)
receivables, net      213,438             295,550            up 38.5%
inventories           162,252             256,180            up 57.9%
total assets        1,072,709           1,120,284

The split, Step 1:

ACC = 109,415 - (-8,249) = 117,664
accrual ratio = 117,664 / ((1,072,709 + 1,120,284) / 2) = 117,664 / 1,096,497 = 10.7% of assets

Compare the teaching company's 1.8%. Which accounts absorbed it? Had receivables grown with sales they would be 213,438 x (1,168,182 / 984,236) = 253,327; they were 295,550, about $42 million more. Had inventories grown with sales they would be 162,252 x (1,168,182 / 984,236) = 192,575; they were 256,180, about $64 million more. Together, about $106 million of the $118 million accrual sits in two accounts that grew far faster than the business. Days of sales in receivables went from (213,438 / 984,236) x 365 = 79.2 to (295,550 / 1,168,182) x 365 = 92.3, and that is after the $59 million of receivables sold in December. Put them back and the figure is 110.8 days; take the sale out of the cash flow and operations used about $67 million of cash, not $8 million.

0%20%40%60%Net sales+18.7%Receivables, net+38.5%Inventories+57.9%Growth in fiscal 1997, percent
Where the earnings went: Sunbeam's receivables grew about twice as fast as its sales, and its inventories about three times as fast, in the year it reported $109 million of net earnings and used $8 million of cash in operations.

Now the entry's question: what would have to happen for those accounts to turn into cash? The filing gives its own answer. Receivables were higher, it says, because of "increased sales in 1997 and certain seasonal dating terms", the trade's phrase for letting customers pay later; inventories were built for anticipated sales growth. A reader in March 1998 could not tell from the statements whether the dating terms were a courtesy to good customers or the price of pulling next year's sales into this one. The entry says exactly this of its hardware company: the statements say where to look, not which. The SEC's complaint later alleged the second reading, discounts and inducements to take merchandise early, which it called "channel stuffing". The person who could have said so in 1998 was not in the filing: a Sunbeam credit manager, or the buyer at a retail chain who had been offered the terms.

What would Step 3's coefficients have said? Nine cents a dollar on $117.7 million is 0.09 x 117.7 = 10.6, about $10.6 million less of next year's profit than if the same earnings had been cash. That understates what happened, and it is worth seeing why: Sloan's coefficients describe the average company, whose accruals are mostly honest estimates of growth. Sunbeam's sat at the far tail, and by the SEC's account at least $60 million of the year's pre-tax profit was never going to become cash at all. The model is a screen; it said where to look, and what was there was far worse than average.

One more lesson hides in the cash flow statement. Its own line for the rise in receivables is $84,576 thousand and for inventories $100,810 thousand, against balance sheet changes of $82,112 thousand and $93,928 thousand. The filing suggests why: product lines were sold during 1997 (time and temperature products, scales, a textile plant), and their receivables and inventories left the balance sheet by sale, not by collection, so part of the balance sheet change was never an operating accrual. Hribar and Collins (2002) showed that accruals measured from balance sheet differences are contaminated in exactly this way, by mergers and acquisitions and by discontinued operations; where the cash flow statement is available, measure from it. (The total here, NI - CFO, comes straight from the cash flow statement, so it is clean.)

Every figure in this section and the steps above comes from the lesson's code, which asserts each one. The teaching company is invented; Sloan's coefficients and returns are his Tables 2, 3, 5 and 6; Sunbeam's figures are its 10-K405 for fiscal 1997, filed 6 March 1998; the SEC's words are from its Litigation Release No. 17710.

The usual mistakes

Reading a growing company's working capital as manipulation. Symptom: every company with rising receivables is "suspicious". Fix: grow each account with sales first and look only at the excess. Our teaching company's honest growth left $20 million on the balance sheet over two years, and that was fine. The entry names this as the first way the model fails.

Measuring from the balance sheet across an acquisition. Symptom: an accrual that jumps the year a company buys another, because the target's receivables arrived with it. Fix: use the cash flow statement's own working capital lines, the direct measure Hribar and Collins used as their benchmark; in Sunbeam's year of divestitures the two measures sat about $9 million apart.

Forgetting the sign of depreciation. Symptom: an accrual that looks enormous for a heavy-asset business. Fix: depreciation is a negative accrual (a charge with no cash), so a capital-heavy company can have earnings below its cash flow year after year. The question is the working capital, not the total alone.

Confusing operating cash with free cash. Symptom: "cash flow covers earnings" while the company spends more on plant than it depreciates. Fix: the running total of Step 2 uses free cash flow. A company can hit its earnings with cash from operations and still never hand any cash to its owners.

Trading the anomaly from the 1996 paper. Symptom: a backtest ending in 1991. Fix: the hedge return decayed after publication (Green, Hand and Soliman, 2011). Use the split to understand the company, not to expect the old return.

Where the model breaks

The split is an identity and never fails; what can fail is the reading of it. A fast-growing business honestly carries rising receivables and inventory, and reading those as warnings punishes growth. Acquisitions, divestitures and currency moves contaminate balance sheet changes, so measure from the cash flow statement. The cash side can be managed too: a company that sells its receivables, as Sunbeam did in December 1997, or stretches its payables, makes cash from operations look better than the business is; read the notes. And the trading result attached to this measure has largely disappeared since it was published. What remains is a question, and the entry says whose knowledge answers it: whether receivables grew because customers are slow or because sales were pulled forward is not in the filing; a former controller or a distributor knows.

Check yourself

1. A retailer reports earnings up 20% and operating cash flow up 25%. Is its accrual rising or falling, and should that worry you?

Answer: falling relative to earnings, since cash grew faster than profit, so more of the earnings arrived as money, the reassuring direction. Still look at which accounts moved: a fall in inventory can mean good discipline or a clearance sale.

2. A company earns $50 million with operating cash flow of $20 million; its total assets were $280 million at the start of the year and $320 million at the end. What is its accrual ratio?

Answer: (50 - 20) / ((280 + 320) / 2) = 30 / 300 = 10%. That is large, comparable to Sunbeam's 10.7% in 1997. Your next step is to find the account that absorbed the $30 million and grow it with sales.

3. Using Sloan's coefficients, compare two companies that each earn $200 million: one entirely in cash, the other with $120 million of operating cash flow. How much less of next year's profit should you expect from the second, leaving out the intercept?

Answer: all cash: 0.855 x 200 = 171.0. The mix: (0.855 x 120) + (0.765 x 80) = 102.6 + 61.2 = 163.8. The difference is 171.0 - 163.8 = 7.2, which is 0.09 x 80: nine cents for each of the $80 million of accrual. That is the average company; one whose accruals sit in the far tail, as Sunbeam's did, can fall much further.

Teach me more
  • Accruals, chapter 15 of Ian D. Gow and Tongqing Ding, Empirical Research in Accounting: Tools and Methods (free online; about 9,000 words, plus R code). The best free walk through Sloan (1996): it simulates why accruals reverse and reproduces versions of his Tables 2, 3 and 6 on later data (its own pooled coefficients come out at 0.706 for accruals and 0.757 for cash, the same ordering as Sloan's). Written for researchers, with no company example; skip the code on a first reading, the prose stands alone.
  • Understanding Earnings Quality, Patricia M. Dechow, slides for an AFAANZ talk (99 slides). The lemonade stand on slides 5 to 22 is the clearest picture anywhere of two sellers with the same 70 cents of earnings and different cash, and of what can go wrong with each accrual (the customer who promises to pay tomorrow, the lemonade nobody wants). Read it beside Step 1.
  • What is the Accruals Anomaly (Sloan, 1996)?, DrMarket, YouTube (about ten minutes). A spoken introduction to the paper and its result, for anyone who wants to hear Steps 3 and 5 said aloud before reading them. No company example; come back to Sunbeam afterwards.
  • Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings?, Richard G. Sloan, The Accounting Review, 1996 (publisher's page). The source of Steps 3 and 5; pages 293 to 300 (the definition and Table 3) are readable with this lesson in hand.

The entry's sources also include Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005; Step 4's idea, less reliable accruals persist less), Hribar and Collins (Journal of Accounting Research, 2002; why to measure from the cash flow statement) and Green, Hand and Soliman (Management Science, 2011; the fade of the trading result).

The Piotroski F-score

Nine questions about direction

A handful of yes-or-no questions about the latest statements (is it profitable, is cash flow above earnings, did leverage fall, did margin and turnover rise) say whether a business is getting stronger or weaker. We ask them all, and we say which ones changed.

Born to answer
Piotroski, 2000, sorting cheap stocks into survivors and casualties.
What it does now
A checklist of which way the business is moving.
The mathematics
F = sum of nine yes-or-no signals
The full entry
Where it began

Benjamin Graham's analysts kept checklists. Jane Ou and Stephen Penman showed in 1989 that a statistical summary of many ratios predicted earnings; Baruch Lev and Ramu Thiagarajan asked analysts which signals they actually watched; and in 2000 Joseph Piotroski, at Chicago, reduced the idea to nine yes-or-no questions and showed that among cheap, neglected stocks they separated the recoveries from the casualties.

Why it works now

The nine questions take a few seconds to compute and were once a day's work for each company. The Desk answers all nine from the filed statements and shows the pair of numbers behind each answer, so the count can be checked and the signals that turned can be seen. It reports the score as a checklist of direction, not a grade. The Desk asks which signals changed in the last year, and why.

When it applies

A cheap stock that might be cheap for a reason; a turnaround claim; a first look at an unfamiliar company where the direction of travel matters more than the level.

What we would ask

Which of the nine signals turned in the last year, and which way?
Is the improvement in the operations, or only in the financing?

What it needs

Two consecutive fiscal years of statements, three year-end balance sheets.

How we would get it

The Desk scores each signal from the filed statements and shows the two numbers behind every yes or no. The reason a signal turned is a question for the people closest to it.

Where it breaks

Reading the count as a grade of the business; applying a screen built for cheap, neglected stocks to large, well-followed ones; ignoring a single signal that matters more than the other eight.

For example

A retailer trading below book value scores seven of nine. The two it fails are the two that matter: gross margin fell and inventory turnover slowed. The score says improving; the two failures say the improvement was bought with markdowns.

The mathematics in fullF = sum of nine indicators: ROA > 0; CFO > 0; change in ROA > 0; CFO > NI; change in long-term debt to assets < 0; change in current ratio > 0; no new shares issued; change in gross margin > 0; change in asset turnover > 0. Taught in

Ohio State Fisher AMIS 7220; Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); Texas McCombs ACC 327; Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7

Sources

Piotroski (2000). Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2672906
Ou, Penman (1989). Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(4), 295-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(89)90017-7
Lev, Thiagarajan (1993). Fundamental Information Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 31(2), 190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491270
Abarbanell, Bushee (1997). Fundamental Analysis, Future Earnings, and Stock Prices. Journal of Accounting Research 35(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491464
Abarbanell, Bushee (1998). Abnormal returns to a fundamental analysis strategy. The Accounting Review 73(1), 19-45. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-274315
Mohanram (2005). Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis. Review of Accounting Studies 10(2-3), 133-170. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-005-1526-4
Piotroski, So (2012). Identifying Expectation Errors in Value/Glamour Strategies: A Fundamental Analysis Approach. Review of Financial Studies 25(9), 2841-2875. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs061
Shao, Stoumbos, Zhang (2021). The power of firm fundamental information in explaining stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 26(4), 1249-1289. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-020-09572-7
Hou, Mo, Xue, Zhang (2024). The Economics of Security Analysis. Management Science 70(1), 164-186. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4640
Lundholm, Russell and Sloan, Richard. Equity Valuation and Analysis. McGraw-Hill. (book)

The Beneish M-score and the misstatement F-score

The statements of companies that were later caught

Companies later found to have misstated their results had statements with a recognizable shape beforehand: receivables outrunning sales, margins slipping, soft assets swelling, accruals high, new securities being sold. We measure how closely a set of statements resembles that shape. It is a reason to read the footnotes, never an accusation.

Born to answer
Beneish, 1999; Dechow and colleagues, 2011.
What it does now
Which accounts moved the way they move before trouble.
The mathematics
M = w0 + sum of w(i) x index(i)
The full entry
Where it began

In 1999 Messod Beneish, at Indiana, compared the statements of companies caught manipulating earnings with everyone else's and found eight ratios that set them apart. A year earlier, business students at Cornell had run his model on Enron for a class project: it flagged the company, and after a closer look they set the flag aside. In 2011 Patricia Dechow and colleagues built a second score from every company the securities regulator had charged with misstatement since 1982.

Why it works now

Both scores can be computed from two years of filed statements, and the Desk does so, showing every input. Their real use is to direct attention: a score says which accounts moved in the way they move before trouble. It cannot say whether there is trouble. That takes people who saw the shipping docks, the reserve meetings or the channel inventory, and who are free to talk about it. The Desk asks which warning ratios moved and whether there is an ordinary reason.

When it applies

Results that look too smooth or too good against the industry; a short thesis built on accounting; diligence on a target whose numbers nobody has yet challenged.

What we would ask

Which of the warning ratios moved, and is there an ordinary business reason for each?
Who inside the company or its channel would know whether that reason is true?

What it needs

Two consecutive years of statements in enough detail to compute each ratio, and the definitions used by the original models.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the published scores from the filed statements and shows every input. A high score names the accounts to ask about; the asking is done with former finance staff, auditors, distributors and customers, who are free to discuss what they saw.

Where it breaks

Treating a screen as a finding: most companies above the line have done nothing wrong, and a good share of the frauds score below it. Even the best of these models raises more than a hundred false alarms for each true case. Applying models fitted to the 1980s and 1990s to businesses that did not exist then. Using it on banks and insurers, which the models excluded.

For example

A device maker's score sits well above the screening line. The inputs show why: days of sales in receivables up forty percent in a year and gross margin down. Both are consistent with shipping product to distributors ahead of demand, and both are consistent with a new product ramp. Two former regional sales managers can tell you which.

The mathematics in fullM = w0 + w1 DSRI + w2 GMI + w3 AQI + w4 SGI + w5 DEPI + w6 SGAI + w7 TATA + w8 LVGI, each index the ratio of this year's measure to last year's; for the misstatement score, v = b0 + b1 accruals + b2 change in receivables + b3 change in inventory + b4 soft assets + b5 change in cash sales + b6 change in ROA + b7 issuance, p = e^v / (1 + e^v), and F = p / (the unconditional rate). Taught in

NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; UT Dallas ACCT 7313 (doctoral)

Sources

Beneish (1999). The Detection of Earnings Manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal 55(5), 24-36. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v55.n5.2296
Dechow, Ge, Larson, Sloan (2011). Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 28(1), 17-82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01041.x
Beneish, Vorst (2022). The Cost of Fraud Prediction Errors. The Accounting Review 97(6), 91-121. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2020-0068
Beneish, Lee, Nichols (2013). Earnings Manipulation and Expected Returns. Financial Analysts Journal 69(2), 57-82. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v69.n2.1
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney (1996). Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13(1), 1-36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney (1995). Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70(2), 193-225. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9505096112
Amiram, Bozanic, Rouen (2015). Financial statement errors: evidence from the distributional properties of financial statement numbers. Review of Accounting Studies 20(4), 1540-1593. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-015-9333-z
Chakrabarty, Moulton, Pugachev, Wang (2025). Catch me if you can: In search of accuracy, scope, and ease of fraud prediction. Review of Accounting Studies 30(2), 1268-1308. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-024-09854-4
Bao, Ke, Li, Yu, Zhang (2020). Detecting Accounting Fraud in Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach. Journal of Accounting Research 58(1), 199-235. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12292
Yang, Zhu (2026). Misstatement Detection Lag and Prediction Evaluation. The Accounting Review 101(2), 395-417. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2023-0073
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2010). Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? The Journal of Finance 65(6), 2213-2253. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2024). How pervasive is corporate fraud? Review of Accounting Studies 29(1), 736-769. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-022-09738-5

Earnings management around thresholds

The profit that just cleared the bar

Reported earnings land just above zero, just above last year, and just above the forecast far more often than chance allows. When a company clears a bar by a hair, quarter after quarter, we look at what moved to get it there: an accrual, a tax rate, a cut to spending that will be missed later.

Born to answer
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997: the missing small losses.
What it does now
What moved to make the number.
The mathematics
count just above the bar > count just below
The full entry
Where it began

In 1997 David Burgstahler and Ilia Dichev plotted the earnings of thousands of companies and found a gap in the curve: too few small losses, too many small profits. Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser found the same kink at last year's earnings and at the analysts' forecast. In 2005 John Graham, Campbell Harvey and Shiva Rajgopal asked four hundred executives, and most said they would give up real value to hit the number.

Why it works now

Reading eleven quarters of results for the one item that closed each gap is slow work for a person and quick for a machine. The Desk reads the quarterly statements and releases and lists what made the difference each time: a tax rate, a reserve, a spending cut. What that practice costs the business later is in the heads of the managers who were told to find the cent. The Desk asks what moved to clear the bar.

When it applies

A long unbroken record of meeting or narrowly beating expectations; a quarter saved by a low tax rate or a reserve release; discretionary spending cut late in a period.

What we would ask

By how much did they clear the bar, and what single item made the difference?
What was given up to do it, and when does that show?

What it needs

Quarterly results against the relevant bar for several years, with the reconciling items.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the quarterly statements and the company's own releases for the items that closed the gap. Whether spending was cut or sales were pulled forward to make a number is a question for the people who were told to do it.

Where it breaks

Seeing management of earnings in ordinary good execution; forgetting that guidance itself is managed, so the bar moved too; assuming the practice is illegal, when most of it is within the rules.

For example

A company has beaten the forecast by one cent for eleven straight quarters. In the latest, the cent came from a tax rate three points below guidance. In the one before, from a cut in advertising. The record is not evidence of strength; it is evidence of a target, and the question is what it is costing.

The mathematics in fullThe distribution of reported earnings (level, change, and surprise) is compared with a smooth density around the threshold: the count just above exceeds, and the count just below falls short of, what the neighbors imply; discretionary accruals are the residual from TA / A = a (1 / A) + b (change in sales) / A + c PPE / A + e. Taught in

NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Texas McCombs ACC 386K.3 (doctoral); USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); NYU Stern B10.4311 (doctoral); Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; UT Dallas ACCT 7323 (doctoral)

Sources

Burgstahler, Dichev (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 99-126. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00017-7
Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser (1999). Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds. The Journal of Business 72(1), 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1086/209601
Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1-3), 3-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002
Roychowdhury (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(3), 335-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002
Bird, Karolyi, Ruchti (2019). Understanding the "numbers game". Journal of Accounting and Economics 68(2-3), 101242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101242
Srivastava (2019). Improving the measures of real earnings management. Review of Accounting Studies 24(4), 1277-1316. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-019-09505-z
Healy, Wahlen (1999). A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4), 365-383. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365
Jones (1991). Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29(2), 193. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491047
Healy (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3), 85-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1
Bartov (1993). The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation. The Accounting Review 68(4), 840-855. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9403090159
DeFond, Jiambalvo (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1-2), 145-176. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)90008-6
Dichev, Skinner (2002). Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 40(4), 1091-1123. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00083
Bartov, Givoly, Hayn (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33(2), 173-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00045-9
Skinner, Sloan (2002). Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020294523516
Dechow, Skinner (2000). Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators. Accounting Horizons 14(2), 235-250. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2000.14.2.235
Kothari, Leone, Wasley (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1), 163-197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002
Matsumoto (2002). Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises. The Accounting Review 77(3), 483-514. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.3.483

The Altman Z-score

Whether it can carry what it owes

Before any story about growth, we check whether the business can service its debt: how many years of cash flow the debt represents, how many times operating profit covers interest, what falls due soon against the cash on hand. The published failure scores compress those into one number, and we report it with its limits.

Born to answer
Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968, on sixty-six manufacturers.
What it does now
A screen for strain, read with its limits.
The mathematics
Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4 + 1.0 X5
The full entry
Where it began

William Beaver showed in 1966 that a single ratio, cash flow to debt, separated companies that failed from those that did not, years ahead. Two years later Edward Altman, at New York University, combined five ratios into one score for a sample of sixty-six manufacturers, half of them bankrupt. James Ohlson replaced the score with a probability in 1980, and Robert Merton had by then shown that equity is an option on the assets, which gives a distance to default.

Why it works now

The scores are simple and were fitted to companies that no longer resemble much of the market, so they need reading, not just reporting. The Desk computes leverage, coverage, liquidity and both versions of the score from the filed statements, says which version fits the company, and states what the screen cannot see. Covenants and lender intentions are not in the ratios; people who have restructured such companies know how they behave. The Desk asks what falls due and what pays for it.

When it applies

A leveraged company, a cyclical one near the top, a turnaround that needs time; any thesis that takes several years to play out in a company that may not have them.

What we would ask

What falls due in the next two years, and what pays for it?
How far can operating profit fall before interest is no longer covered?

What it needs

The latest balance sheet, twelve months of income and cash flow, the market value of the equity, and from the notes, the schedule of maturities and the covenants.

How we would get it

The Desk computes leverage, coverage, liquidity and the failure scores from the filed statements. Covenants, lender behavior and the real flexibility of the maturities are in the credit agreement and in the heads of people who have sat across from the borrower.

Where it breaks

Scores fitted to manufacturers of the 1960s applied to software companies; a cash balance that is not available (trapped abroad, pledged, or owed to customers); debt held off the balance sheet; reading a screen as a probability.

For example

A services company scores in the distress zone on the original measure and in the middle on the version built for non-manufacturers. The difference is the weight on revenue per dollar of assets, which means little for its kind of business. Coverage of interest by operating profit is fourteen times. The screen flagged it; the coverage answers it.

The mathematics in fullZ = 1.2 (WC / A) + 1.4 (RE / A) + 3.3 (EBIT / A) + 0.6 (MVE / L) + 1.0 (S / A); for non-manufacturers Z'' = 6.56 (WC / A) + 3.26 (RE / A) + 6.72 (EBIT / A) + 1.05 (BE / L); in the option view, equity is a call on the assets and the distance to default is [ln(V / D) + (mu - sigma^2 / 2) T] / (sigma sqrt T). Taught in

NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; UT Dallas ACCT 7313 (doctoral)

Sources

Altman (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance 23(4), 589-609. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x
Beaver (1966). Financial Ratios As Predictors of Failure. Journal of Accounting Research 4, 71. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490171
Ohlson (1980). Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 18(1), 109. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490395
Shumway (2001). Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model. The Journal of Business 74(1), 101-124. https://doi.org/10.1086/209665
Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2008). In Search of Distress Risk. The Journal of Finance 63(6), 2899-2939. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01416.x
Merton (1974). On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates. The Journal of Finance 29(2), 449. https://doi.org/10.2307/2978814
Bharath, Shumway (2008). Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model. Review of Financial Studies 21(3), 1339-1369. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn044
Beaver, McNichols, Rhie (2005). Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy. Review of Accounting Studies 10(1), 93-122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-004-6341-9
Kraft (2015). Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads. The Accounting Review 90(2), 641-674. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50858
Heese, Shin, Wang (2025). Variable leases under ASC 842: first evidence on properties and consequences. Review of Accounting Studies 30(3), 2218-2263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-025-09899-z
Dichev (1998). Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk? The Journal of Finance 53(3), 1131-1147. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00046

Residual income valuation

What the book value earns above its cost

A company is worth its book value plus whatever it will earn above a normal return on that book value. Put that way, a price above book is a forecast: of how far the return will exceed its cost, and for how long. We state that forecast, and for a bank or an insurer, where cash flow means little, it is the main tool.

Born to answer
Preinreich, 1938; Ohlson, 1995.
What it does now
The return a multiple of book requires.
The mathematics
P / B = (ROE - g) / (r - g)
The full entry
Where it began

The idea that value is book value plus the profits earned above a normal return appears in Gabriel Preinreich's work in 1938 and in Edwards and Bell in 1961. It lay unused until James Ohlson's 1995 paper tied it to the accounting identities, and Gerald Feltham and Ohlson separated operating from financial assets. Columbia's Stephen Penman built a generation of teaching on it.

Why it works now

For a bank or an insurer, cash flow valuation does not work and book value is the natural anchor. The Desk computes the multiple of book, the return on equity, and the return or growth that the multiple requires at several costs of equity, so a price to book becomes a statement that can be tested. Whether the return survives a credit cycle is a question for people who have managed the book through one. The Desk asks what return the multiple requires.

When it applies

A bank, an insurer, or any business valued on its book; a price-to-book multiple offered as cheap or dear without reference to the return earned; a valuation where free cash flow is negative because the company is investing.

What we would ask

What return on equity does this multiple of book require, and for how long?
Has the business earned that return through a full cycle?

What it needs

Book equity, the return on it over several years, and a view of the cost of equity.

How we would get it

The Desk computes price to book, the return on equity, and the return or the growth the multiple requires at several costs of equity. Whether the return survives a credit cycle or a change in the capital rules is a question for people who have managed the book through one.

Where it breaks

Book values distorted by buybacks, write-downs, or assets carried far from their worth; accounting that does not pass every gain and loss through earnings; a return held constant for ever.

For example

A bank trades at more than twice book value. At a ten percent cost of equity, that multiple requires a return on equity near eighteen percent with book growing four percent a year, for good. The bank earned that in its best year of the last decade and not in the other nine.

The mathematics in fullV = B0 + sum over t of (E(t) - r B(t - 1)) / (1 + r)^t; with a constant return and growth, P / B = (ROE - g) / (r - g), so the growth a multiple requires is g = (P / B x r - ROE) / (P / B - 1) and the return it requires is ROE = g + P / B x (r - g). Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern B10.4311 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; UT Dallas ACCT 7323 (doctoral); USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); UT Dallas ACCT 7313 (doctoral)

Sources

Ohlson (1995). Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 661-687. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1995.tb00461.x
Feltham, Ohlson (1995). Valuation and Clean Surplus Accounting for Operating and Financial Activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 689-731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1995.tb00462.x
Frankel, Lee (1998). Accounting valuation, market expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(3), 283-319. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00026-3
Dechow, Hutton, Sloan (1999). An empirical assessment of the residual income valuation model. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26(1-3), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00049-4
Penman, Sougiannis (1998). A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15(3), 343-383. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00564.x
Francis, Olsson, Oswald (2000). Comparing the Accuracy and Explainability of Dividend, Free Cash Flow, and Abnormal Earnings Equity Value Estimates. Journal of Accounting Research 38(1), 45. https://doi.org/10.2307/2672922
Lee, Myers, Swaminathan (1999). What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow? The Journal of Finance 54(5), 1693-1741. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00164
Lundholm, O'Keefe (2001). Reconciling Value Estimates from the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Residual Income Model. Contemporary Accounting Research 18(2), 311-335. https://doi.org/10.1506/w13b-k4bt-455n-ttr2
Burgstahler, Dichev (1997). Earnings, adaptation and equity value. The Accounting Review 72(2), 187-215. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9706165831
Easton, Harris, Ohlson (1992). Aggregate accounting earnings can explain most of security returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(2-3), 119-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(92)90015-t
Penman, Reggiani (2013). Returns to buying earnings and book value: accounting for growth and risk. Review of Accounting Studies 18(4), 1021-1049. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9226-y
Penman, Stephen (2011). Accounting for Value. Columbia Business School Publishing. (book)
Penman, Stephen H. Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation, 5th ed. McGraw-Hill. (book)

Learn the math
The question

At the end of 2024 two of the largest banks in America closed the year a world apart in the market. JPMorgan Chase's shares finished the year at $239.71. Its own accounts said each share carried $97.30 of tangible book value: the shareholders' money in the business, less goodwill and other intangibles. The market was paying $2.46 for every $1 of it. Citigroup's shares finished at $70.39, against $89.34 of tangible book. The market was paying 79 cents for every $1.

A newcomer's first thought is that one of these prices must be a mistake: surely book value is what a bank is worth, and the gap is greed in one case and fear in the other.

It is not. Book value is what the owners have put in and left in. What a business is worth depends on what that money earns. The residual income model is the arithmetic that connects the two, and once you can do it, a price to book ratio stops being a mood and becomes a sentence you can read aloud: this is the return on its capital the bank must earn, and for this long.

The idea in one paragraph

Imagine a savings account that pays exactly what investors demand for a business of this risk. A dollar in it is worth a dollar, no more. A business that earns exactly that rate on the money left in it is the same savings account in a different coat, and it is worth exactly its book value, however fast it grows. Everything a business is worth above its book is the present value of what it earns above that rate, the profit left over after the shareholders' capital has been paid its rent. That leftover is the residual income. A price above book is a bet that there will be leftovers, and the size of the premium says how big and how long-lived the price thinks they will be. A price below book is a bet that the leftovers will be negative: that the bank will earn less on its capital than the capital could earn elsewhere.

The math, step by step

The symbols. Let B_t be book value (shareholders' equity) at the end of year t, so B_0 is book today. Let E_t be the earnings of year t, D_t the dividends paid in year t (buybacks count as dividends, net of new shares sold), and r the cost of equity: the yearly return investors demand for owning a business of this risk, written as a fraction (10% is 0.10). The return on equity in year t is earnings over opening book, ROE_t = E_t / B_(t-1).

Step 1: the bookkeeping identity. Book value changes for exactly two reasons: earnings are added to it, and dividends are taken out.

B_t = B_(t-1) + E_t - D_t

Accountants call this clean surplus: every gain and loss passes through earnings on its way into book. It is the one assumption the whole model rests on, and we will come back to where it fails. Rearranged, it tells us what the owners received in year t:

D_t = E_t - (B_t - B_(t-1))

The owners got the earnings, less whatever part of them was kept in the business and added to book.

Step 2: value is the dividends, discounted. Whatever a share is worth, it is worth the cash its owners will receive, each payment counted for less the further away it is (a payment due in t years is worth D_t / (1 + r)^t today, because that is what you would have to set aside now at rate r to have it then):

V_0 = (D_1 / (1 + r)) + (D_2 / (1 + r)^2) + (D_3 / (1 + r)^3) + ...

Step 3: substitute and watch it collapse. Put Step 1 into Step 2. The first year's term becomes (E_1 - B_1 + B_0) / (1 + r). Now a small trick: add and subtract r B_0 in the numerator, which changes nothing:

D_1 / (1 + r) = ((E_1 - (r B_0)) / (1 + r)) + (B_0 (1 + r) / (1 + r)) - (B_1 / (1 + r))

= B_0 + ((E_1 - (r B_0)) / (1 + r)) - (B_1 / (1 + r))

Do the same for year 2, and its term contains + B_1 / (1 + r) (from B_1 (1 + r) / (1 + r)^2) and - B_2 / (1 + r)^2. The - B_1 / (1 + r) left over from year 1 and the + B_1 / (1 + r) from year 2 cancel. Each year's closing book cancels against the next year's opening book, like the links of a folding telescope sliding into one another. Stop after T years and what survives is the first book, the leftovers, and one distant book value with a minus sign:

(D_1 / (1 + r)) + ... + (D_T / (1 + r)^T) = B_0 + ((E_1 - (r B_0)) / (1 + r)) + ... + ((E_T - (r B_(T-1))) / (1 + r)^T) - (B_T / (1 + r)^T)

This is exact for any T, and it reads plainly: T years of dividends are worth the book you start with, plus the leftovers of those years, less the book still held at the end. (Wind the business up in year T, paying that book out with the last dividend, and the last term is paid back; the worked example below does exactly that.) Now let T grow. The last term is a book value T years away, discounted T times; for any business whose book grows more slowly than r, it shrinks toward zero. In the limit the value, the sum of all the dividends, is the model:

V_0 = B_0 + sum over t of (E_t - (r B_(t-1))) / (1 + r)^t

Each numerator, E_t - (r B_(t-1)), is the residual income of year t: the earnings less the rent on the capital that produced them. Since E_t = ROE_t x B_(t-1), it is also (ROE_t - r) x B_(t-1): the spread between the return and its cost, times the capital it is earned on. Nothing has been assumed except clean surplus. This is not a different theory of value from discounting dividends. It is the same sum, rearranged so that the part you can see today, book value, comes first.

Step 4: the steady case. Now suppose the return on equity holds at one level, ROE, and book grows at a steady g a year (the business keeps the fraction g / ROE of its earnings and pays out the rest). Then book in year t - 1 is B_0 (1 + g)^(t-1), and the leftovers are

(ROE - r) B_0 (1 + g)^(t-1) / (1 + r)^t

a list in which every term is the one before it times q = (1 + g) / (1 + r). A list like that, running for ever with q below 1, adds up to its first term divided by 1 - q (call the sum S; then q S is the same list missing its first term, so S - (q S) is the first term alone). The first term is (ROE - r) B_0 / (1 + r), and 1 - q = (r - g) / (1 + r), so the (1 + r) cancels and

V_0 = B_0 + ((ROE - r) B_0 / (r - g))

Divide by B_0, put the two terms over the common bottom r - g, and the price to book ratio the model allows is

P / B = 1 + ((ROE - r) / (r - g)) = (ROE - g) / (r - g)

Read the first form, not the second: one for the book itself, plus the spread over the cost of equity, capitalized at r - g. Three things follow at once, and they are the heart of the lesson. If ROE = r, the ratio is exactly 1, whatever g is. If ROE > r, the ratio is above 1 and growth raises it, because growth means more capital earning the spread. If ROE < r, the ratio is below 1 and growth lowers it, because growth means more capital earning less than its cost. Growth is not good or bad in itself. It is a multiplier on whatever the spread is.

0x1x2x3x4x0%5%10%15%20%25%Return on (tangible) book, % a year, for everPrice to bookreturn = cost of equity: worth bookJPMorgan 2.46x: 18.8%Citigroup 0.79x: 8.5%book grows 4%book grows 3%no growth
The model with the return and the growth held for ever: price to book = (return - growth) / (cost - growth), at a 10% cost of equity. Every line passes through 1 times book at a 10% return. Prices and tangible book per share at 31 Dec 2024: closing prices as publicly reported, tangible book from JPMorgan's fourth-quarter 2024 earnings release and Citigroup's 2024 annual report on sec.gov; the cost of equity and the growth rates are assumptions, not the banks' figures.

Step 5: turn it around. The price is known; the future is not. So hold the price and solve for what it assumes. Multiply both sides of P / B = (ROE - g) / (r - g) by (r - g) and add g:

ROE required = g + (P / B x (r - g))

Or hold the return and solve for the growth: P / B x (r - g) = ROE - g, so (P / B x r) - ROE = g (P / B - 1) and

g required = ((P / B x r) - ROE) / (P / B - 1)

Step 6: for how long. "For ever" is a strong word. Suppose instead the bank earns ROE for T years and exactly r afterward, so the leftovers stop. The list now has T terms, and the same subtraction gives S - (q S) = first term x (1 - q^T). So

P / B = 1 + ((ROE - r) / (r - g) x (1 - q^T))

The forever premium is multiplied by 1 - q^T, the share of it that the first T years supply. Given a price, solve for T: 1 - q^T = (P / B - 1)(r - g) / (ROE - r), then take logarithms, T = ln(1 - ((P / B - 1)(r - g) / (ROE - r))) / ln q. A second way to say "for how long" is a fade: the spread keeps a fraction phi of itself every year, so year t's spread is (ROE - r) phi^(t-1). The ratio of the list becomes phi q, and the same shortcut gives

P / B = 1 + ((ROE - r) / (1 + r - (phi (1 + g))))

With phi = 1 nothing fades and this is the forever formula again. The spread halves every ln 0.5 / ln phi years.

A worked example

The shop first, with round numbers. A shop has $100 of book. It earns 15% on its opening book, keeps a third of its earnings and pays out two thirds, so book grows 5% a year, and its owners want 10%. Year 1: earnings $15; book rises $5 to $105; the dividend is the other $10. Discount the dividends, a stream of $10 growing 5% a year: 10 / (0.10 - 0.05) = $200. Now residual income: the first year's leftover is 15 - (0.10 x 100) = $5, also growing 5% a year, so the value is 100 + 5 / 0.05 = $200. Two roads, one answer, as Step 3 promised. Had the shop earned 10%, it would be worth exactly $100 whether it kept a penny or all of its earnings. Had it earned 8%, it would be worth $80 paying everything out and $60 if it kept enough to grow 5%: growth at a return below cost is a machine for turning a dollar of the owners' money into less than a dollar.

The telescoping holds for any path, not only a steady one. Give the same shop earnings of $15, $4 and $22 over three years, dividends of $5 and $20 and nothing in the third year, and wind it up at the end paying out its closing book. Book runs $100, $110, $94, $116. Discounting the three dividends, the last one including the $116, and adding up the book plus three years of leftovers (one of them negative) both give $108.23. Leave the wind-up out and the dividends alone are worth that less the $116 discounted three years: Step 3's identity to the cent.

How long matters as much as how much. If the shop's 15% lasts only ten years and then falls to 10%, q = 1.05 / 1.10 and q^10 = 0.628, so the shop is worth 1 + (1 x (1 - 0.628)) = 1.37 times book, not 2. Twenty years of the edge gives 1.61. If instead the spread fades, keeping nine tenths of itself each year (a half-life of 6.6 years), the shop is worth 1.32 times book. The forever assumption was carrying most of the premium.

The two banks. Return to 31 December 2024. A bank's tangible book is the right base here, and each bank reports a return on tangible common equity to match it. JPMorgan: 239.71 / 97.30 = 2.46 times tangible book. Citigroup: 70.39 / 89.34 = 0.79. Take a 10% cost of equity, an assumption and a common one for large banks, and let tangible book grow 4% a year at JPMorgan.

What return does JPMorgan's multiple require for ever? 0.04 + (2.464 x (0.10 - 0.04)) = 18.8%. At a 9% cost of equity it is 16.3%; at 11%, 21.2%: the answer is a row, not a cell. With book growing 3% instead of 4% it is 20.2%: less capital compounding, so each dollar of it must earn more. JPMorgan reported 22% for 2024, above every number in the row. So the question is not whether it earns enough today. It is how long. Hold the 22% for T years and then 10%, and the price pays for about 23 years of it. Or let the spread fade: the price allows it to keep 97.9% of itself each year, a half-life of 32 years. Either way the price is a forecast that the bank will stay that profitable, measured against its cost, for about a generation.

Two of the bank's own numbers sharpen the reading. The 22% included one-time gains, the largest from selling Visa shares; without them JPMorgan put its 2024 return at 20%, and at 20% the price pays for about 37 years, not 23. And the bank's stated target is 17%. Held for ever, 17% gives (0.17 - 0.04) / (0.10 - 0.04) = 2.17 times tangible book, less than the 2.46 the market paid: at a 10% cost of equity and 4% growth, the price asked for more than the bank's own target, for ever. That is not a verdict. It may say that investors used a lower cost of equity (at 9% the required return is 16.3%, under the target), or that they expected the bank to beat its target, as it had. It says exactly which of those beliefs the price rests on.

0x1x2x3x0102030405060Years the 22% return lasts, then 10%Price to tangible bookfor ever: 3.0xJPMorgan, 31 Dec 2024: 2.46x23 years
How long the price asks the edge to last. A 22% return on tangible equity, JPMorgan's for 2024, held for T years and then exactly 10%, with tangible book growing 4% a year meanwhile. The price at 31 Dec 2024, 2.46 times tangible book, pays for about 23 years. The 10% and the 4% are assumptions.

Citigroup is the mirror. Under book, the price says the return will fall short of the cost of equity: with book growing 3% a year, a multiple of 0.79 requires 0.03 + (0.788 x 0.07) = 8.5% for ever, and 7.9% with no growth. Citigroup reported 7.0% for 2024 and had told investors it was aiming for 10% to 11% in 2026. Held for ever at 7.0% with 3% growth, the model gives 0.57 times book; at 10.5%, 1.07. The price sat between the two: it gave the target some credit, not full credit. Whether the target is met is a question about the bank's businesses, its costs and its regulators, which the model does not answer. What it does is turn "Citi is cheap at 0.79 times book", an opinion, into a claim a date can test: that the return will climb above about 8.5% and stay there.

Neither calculation says either share was a good or a bad buy. Each says what the price required, and hands the reader the real question: has this bank, or any bank like it, earned that return through a full credit cycle?

The usual mistakes
  1. Calling a low multiple cheap. Symptom: "it trades below book, so it is undervalued." Fix: a price below book is the model's correct answer for a business that earns less than its cost of equity. Compute the return the multiple requires and set it beside the return earned; only the gap between those two is an opinion.
  2. Mixing the bases. Symptom: a return on total equity set against tangible book, or the other way round. Fix: pair them, tangible with tangible. For JPMorgan in 2024 the two returns differ by four points (22% and 18%), two very different required paths.
  3. One cost of equity, defended. Symptom: the answer works at 9% and the analysis uses 9%. Fix: show 9, 10 and 11%. JPMorgan's required return runs from 16.3% to 21.2% across those three rates.
  4. Growth assumed to help. Symptom: a faster growth rate added to make the value larger. Fix: growth multiplies the spread. Below the cost of equity it subtracts, which is why the 8% shop is worth $60 growing and $80 standing still.
  5. For ever, by default. Symptom: the steady formula used without asking how long. Fix: solve for the years or the fade the price requires and say them aloud. A premium that needs 23 years of a 22% return is a different claim from one that needs ten.
Where the model breaks

The Library's entry names three failure conditions. Book values distorted by buybacks, write-downs or assets carried far from their worth: a company that has bought back most of its shares can have a tiny or even negative book and an enormous return on it, and the ratio means nothing; a bank whose loans or bonds are carried above what they would fetch has a book that overstates the base. Accounting that does not pass every gain and loss through earnings: clean surplus fails whenever a gain or loss goes straight into equity (unrealized losses on some securities, currency translation) or never reaches book at all (a bond held to maturity is carried at cost, however far its market value has fallen), and then Step 3's cancellation is no longer exact. And a return held constant for ever: returns above the cost of capital attract competitors and regulators and tend to fade, which is why the Library keeps the entry profitability fade beside this one.

Two more limits. The model needs a book value that means something: for a software company whose main assets are people and code, expensed as they were built, book understates the capital and the "return on book" overstates the edge. And the model says what the price requires, never whether it will happen. For a bank, whether a return survives a credit cycle or a change in the capital rules is a question for people who have managed a loan book through one.

Check yourself

1. An insurer trades at 1.5 times book. Its cost of equity is 9% and its book grows 3% a year. What return on equity does the price require for ever?

Answer: ROE = g + (P / B x (r - g)) = 0.03 + (1.5 x 0.06) = 12%.

2. A business earns 8% on its book against a 10% cost of equity. Its managers propose to keep more of the earnings so book grows 5% a year instead of not at all. What does the model say happens to its price to book, and why?

Answer: with no growth, P / B = (0.08 - 0) / (0.10 - 0) = 0.8. With 5% growth, (0.08 - 0.05) / (0.10 - 0.05) = 0.6. The ratio falls, because each dollar kept earns 8% when its owners could earn 10% elsewhere: growth multiplies a negative spread. The better plan, if the return cannot be raised, is to pay the money out.

3. A bank trades at 2 times tangible book. Its cost of equity is 10%, tangible book grows 4% a year, and it earns 20% on tangible equity. What return would the price require for ever, and if the 20% lasts T years and then falls to 10%, how long must it last?

Answer: for ever, 0.04 + (2 x 0.06) = 16%, below the 20% earned, so the price does not need for ever. For T years: 1 - q^T = (P / B - 1)(r - g) / (ROE - r) = 1 x 0.06 / 0.10 = 0.6, so q^T = 0.4 with q = 1.04 / 1.10 = 0.9455. Then T = ln 0.4 / ln 0.9455 = 16.3 years. Check: 1 + ((0.10 / 0.06) x 0.6) = 2.0.

Teach me more
  • Determinants of Price to Book Ratios, Aswath Damodaran, New York University (a short web page), with the full chapter behind it, Book Value Multiples, chapter 19 of his Investment Valuation, second edition (42 pages). The best existing treatment of the steady formula: he reaches (ROE - g) / (r - g) from the dividend model through the payout ratio and works it on real companies, including what happens when a return on equity is cut. The chapter never builds the value up as book plus leftovers, which is why this lesson does.
  • Class 4: Using Accounting Earnings for Valuation, MIT OpenCourseWare 15.535 (26 slides, no narration). The clearest statement of the three parts, invested capital, a normal return on it and an abnormal return, with a Dell example to finish yourself. Read it after Step 3 above.
  • The Valuation of Financial Service Firms, Aswath Damodaran (53 lecture slides). Why banks and insurers are valued from their equity and book rather than their cash flow, and an excess return valuation of a bank laid out line by line.
  • A Tutorial on Residual Income Valuation and Value Added Valuation, Kenth Skogsvik, Stockholm School of Economics working paper 1999:10 (25 pages, free from that page). The proofs in full: clean surplus, the equivalence with dividends, and what happens when the accounting is not clean.

The papers behind the Library entry are Ohlson, "Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation", Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 1995, and Feltham and Ohlson's companion paper in the same issue; Stephen Penman's Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation is the textbook built on them. All are on the Library's reading list.

Valuation multiples and comparable companies

A multiple is a compressed forecast

A multiple packs growth, margin, risk and accounting into one number. When two companies trade at different multiples, we unpack the difference before anyone calls one cheap: the same measures, the same definitions, side by side, and then the growth each price requires.

Born to answer
Tested by Liu, Nissim and Thomas, 2002.
What it does now
What the gap between two multiples is paying for.
The mathematics
P / E = payout x (1 + g) / (r - g)
The full entry
Where it began

Comparing a company with its neighbors is the oldest method in the business and the least examined. In 2002 Jing Liu, Doron Nissim and Jacob Thomas tested which multiples actually explain prices and found forward earnings far ahead of cash flow and sales. The same year Sanjeev Bhojraj and Charles Lee showed that peers chosen by what drives the multiple do better than peers chosen by industry.

Why it works now

A fair comparison needs the same definitions applied to every company, which is tedious by hand and exact by machine. The Desk computes identical measures for each company from the filed statements and converts each multiple into the growth it requires. The remaining question, whether the difference in expected growth is deserved, belongs to people who buy from and compete with both. The Desk asks what the gap between two multiples is paying for.

When it applies

A stock called cheap because it trades below its peers; a peer group chosen by industry label; a valuation that rests on a multiple of something other than what the owners receive.

What we would ask

What would have to be true of growth, margin and risk for these two multiples to be equally fair?
Are these companies peers in what drives the multiple, or only in what they sell?

What it needs

For each company: price, enterprise value, and twelve months of revenue, operating profit, cash flow and returns on capital, on identical definitions.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the same measures for each company from the filed statements and turns each multiple into the growth it requires. Whether the cheaper one deserves to be is a question for customers and competitors of both.

Where it breaks

Peers that share a label and not an economic model; mixing adjusted figures for one company with reported figures for another; different fiscal year ends; multiples of a figure that is negative or near zero.

For example

One network company trades at five times revenue and its rival at fifty. The first grows six percent with a ten percent operating margin; the second grows thirty-four percent and loses money. The gap is not a mispricing to be harvested; it is a bet on which growth rate lasts, and it should be argued as that.

The mathematics in fullP / E = payout x (1 + g) / (r - g) in the steady state; EV / S = margin x (1 - reinvestment rate) x (1 + g) / (r - g); a peer's warranted multiple is the fitted value from a regression of multiples on profitability, growth and risk. Taught in

Yale SOM MGMT 743 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research

Sources

Liu, Nissim, Thomas (2002). Equity Valuation Using Multiples. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 135-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00042
Bhojraj, Lee (2002). Who Is My Peer? A Valuation-Based Approach to the Selection of Comparable Firms. Journal of Accounting Research 40(2), 407-439. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00054
Easton (2004). PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital. The Accounting Review 79(1), 73-95. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.79.1.73
Ohlson, Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value. Review of Accounting Studies 10(2-3), 349-365. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-005-1535-3
Penman, Reggiani (2018). Fundamentals of Value versus Growth Investing and an Explanation for the Value Trap. Financial Analysts Journal 74(4), 103-119. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v74.n4.6
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny (1994). Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. The Journal of Finance 49(5), 1541-1578. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x

Post-earnings-announcement drift

The market is slow on earnings news

Prices keep moving in the direction of an earnings surprise for weeks after it is announced, and a surprise in one quarter predicts another in the next. When a thesis turns on a recent report, we separate the move that was the market from the move that was the company, and ask whether the news has finished arriving.

Born to answer
Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989.
What it does now
How much of the move was the company's own.
The mathematics
AR(t) = R(t) - (a + b Rm(t))
The full entry
Where it began

In 1968 Ray Ball and Philip Brown, at Chicago, tested the view then common among academics that accounting earnings meant little to investors. They found the opposite, and one thing more: after an earnings announcement, prices kept drifting the same way. Victor Bernard and Jacob Thomas showed twenty years later that the drift lasts about sixty trading days and that investors act as if this quarter's surprise says nothing about the next.

Why it works now

An event study once needed a database and a programmer. The Desk runs one from daily prices in a moment: how much of the day's move was the market, how much was the company, and how large that is against the stock's ordinary noise. Whether the surprise is the first of several is not in the price; it is in the order books of customers and suppliers. The Desk asks how much of the move was the company's own.

When it applies

A decision to act just after an earnings report; a stock that fell on results and looks oversold, or rose and looks stretched; a claim that the market overreacted.

What we would ask

How much of the move on the day was the company and how much was the market?
Was the surprise in revenue, in margin, or in an item that will not repeat?

What it needs

Daily prices for the stock and a benchmark around the date, and the reported figures against what was expected.

How we would get it

The Desk runs the event study from daily prices and reads the release for what drove the surprise. Whether the surprise is the first of several is a question for people who see the order book: customers, distributors, suppliers.

Where it breaks

Other news on the same day; an industry-wide move the benchmark does not capture; treating a statistical tendency in thousands of stocks as a forecast for one; the drift itself, which has weakened in large, heavily traded stocks.

For example

A stock falls seven percent on results while the market rises. Against its normal relation to the market, the abnormal move is under two standard deviations of its ordinary daily noise: large for the holder, unremarkable for the stock. The next day it recovers most of it. The event study says there was less news in the report than the headline suggested.

The mathematics in fullAR(t) = R(t) - (a + b Rm(t)), with a and b estimated before the event; CAR = sum of AR over the window; standardized surprise SUE = (E - expected E) / sigma; in the drift, CAR over the following sixty days rises with SUE, and the surprise is positively autocorrelated for three quarters and negatively at the fourth. Taught in

Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern B10.4311 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); UT Dallas ACCT 7313 (doctoral); Yale SOM MGMT 743 (doctoral)

Sources

Ball, Brown (1968). An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6(2), 159. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490232
Beaver (1968). The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 67. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490070
Bernard, Thomas (1989). Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response or Risk Premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491062
Bernard, Thomas (1990). Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13(4), 305-340. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(90)90008-r
Kormendi, Lipe (1987). Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns. The Journal of Business 60(3), 323. https://doi.org/10.1086/296400
Freeman, Tse (1992). A Nonlinear Model of Security Price Responses to Unexpected Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 30(2), 185. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491123
Ball, Bartov (1996). How naive is the stock market's use of earnings information? Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(3), 319-337. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(96)00420-x
Brown, Warner (1985). Using daily stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 14(1), 3-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(85)90042-x
Jegadeesh, Livnat (2006). Revenue surprises and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41(1-2), 147-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.10.003
Beaver, McNichols, Wang (2020). Increased market response to earnings announcements in the 21st century: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 69(1), 101244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101244
Skinner, Sloan (2002). Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020294523516

Non-GAAP earnings

What the adjusted number leaves out

Companies report the earnings the accounting rules require and the earnings they would like to be judged on. We put the two side by side, list what was removed to get from one to the other, and ask of each item whether it will be back next year.

Born to answer
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002: the Street's number against the rules'.
What it does now
What was removed, and whether it will be back.
The mathematics
adjusted E = reported E + exclusions
The full entry
Where it began

Through the 1990s companies began leading their results with figures of their own design. In 2002 Mark Bradshaw and Richard Sloan showed that the gap between reported and adjusted earnings had widened sharply and that prices had come to follow the adjusted number. A year later Jeffrey Doyle, Russell Lundholm and Mark Soliman showed that the excluded expenses predict lower cash flow: they come back.

Why it works now

Every release now carries a reconciliation from adjusted to reported figures, and almost nobody adds them up across years. The Desk opens the releases, totals each excluded item by year, and keeps the two sets of figures apart in every ratio it reports. Whether a charge that recurs for six years is a cost of doing business is a judgment the operators can make and the reconciliation cannot. The Desk asks what was removed and whether it will be back.

When it applies

A valuation built on adjusted earnings or adjusted cash flow; restructuring charges every year; stock compensation excluded from the figure the multiple is applied to.

What we would ask

What is the gap between reported and adjusted earnings, and how many years in a row has each excluded item appeared?
Would the business run without the cost that is being excluded?

What it needs

The company's own reconciliation of adjusted to reported figures for several years.

How we would get it

The Desk opens the releases, reads the reconciliations, and totals each excluded item by year, keeping reported and adjusted figures apart in every ratio. Whether a recurring charge is a cost of doing business is a question for people who ran the operations being restructured.

Where it breaks

Assuming every exclusion is cosmetic, when some really are one-time; assuming none is; comparing one company's adjusted figure with another's reported one.

For example

A company trades at fourteen times adjusted earnings. The adjustment removes stock compensation and an annual restructuring charge that has appeared for six straight years. On reported earnings the multiple is twenty-five. The right number depends on whether employees would stay without the stock and whether the restructuring ever ends.

The mathematics in fullAdjusted E = reported E + sum of exclusions; the test is the regression of future operating cash flow on the exclusions: a coefficient of zero means they were transitory, and a negative one means they recur. Taught in

NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; USC Marshall ACCT 624 (doctoral); Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research

Sources

Bradshaw, Sloan (2002). GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 41-66. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00038
Doyle, Lundholm, Soliman (2003). The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings. Review of Accounting Studies 8(2-3), 145-174. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024472210359
Rouen, So, Wang (2021). Core earnings: New data and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 142(3), 1068-1091. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.04.025
Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, Whipple (2018). Non-GAAP reporting: Evidence from academia and current practice. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 45(3-4), 259-294. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12298
Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, Whipple (2021). Non-GAAP Earnings: A Consistency and Comparability Crisis? Contemporary Accounting Research 38(3), 1712-1747. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12671
Mohanram, White, Zhao (2020). Stock-based compensation, financial analysts, and equity overvaluation. Review of Accounting Studies 25(3), 1040-1077. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-020-09541-0
Allen, Lewis-Western, Valentine (2026). Intangible-intensive firms and performance reporting. Review of Accounting Studies 31(3), 1877-1923. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-026-09966-z
Aboody, Barth, Kasznik (2004). SFAS No. 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Values. The Accounting Review 79(2), 251-275. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.251
Bradshaw (2004). How Do Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock Recommendations? The Accounting Review 79(1), 25-50. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2004.79.1.25
Mauboussin, Michael J. and Callahan, Dan (2023). Stock-Based Compensation: Unpacking the Issues. Counterpoint Global Insights, Morgan Stanley Investment Management. (book)

Capitalizing intangible investment

The investment the income statement calls an expense

Spending on research, software, brands and people is charged against profit in the year it is made, although it is meant to pay off for years. For a business built on such spending, we rebuild the statements as if it were capital: profit rises, the capital base rises, and the return on capital usually falls toward something more ordinary.

Born to answer
Lev and Sougiannis, 1996, on research capital.
What it does now
Returns on capital that can be compared.
The mathematics
K = sum of R(t - j) x (1 - j / n)
The full entry
Where it began

Accounting rules written for factories require research to be expensed as it is spent. In 1996 Baruch Lev and Theodore Sougiannis estimated the research capital that rule leaves off the balance sheet and showed that investors value it. As the economy moved toward software, brands and data, Lev argued that reported earnings and book value were losing their meaning, and Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor showed in 2017 that adding intangible capital back makes the standard theory of investment fit again.

Why it works now

Rebuilding a company's statements with research treated as capital takes several years of data and a stated assumption about how long the spending lasts. The Desk does the arithmetic from the filed statements and shows both versions, so the assumption can be argued. How long a dollar of research or customer acquisition really keeps working is known to the people who manage those assets. The Desk asks how many years the spending lasts.

When it applies

A company with heavy research or selling expense that looks unprofitable or wildly profitable on reported figures; a comparison between an asset-light business and a factory; a book value that seems to have nothing to do with the price.

What we would ask

How many years does a dollar of this spending keep working?
What does the return on capital look like once that spending is treated as an asset?

What it needs

Research and selling expense for as many years as the assumed life of the asset, and a defensible view of that life.

How we would get it

The Desk capitalizes the reported research spending over a stated life and recomputes operating profit, capital and return, showing both versions. How long the spending really lasts (a drug's patent life, the half-life of acquired customers) is a question for people who have managed that kind of asset.

Where it breaks

A life chosen to produce the desired return; one rate applied to every industry; treating all selling and administrative cost as investment; forgetting that capitalizing does not change cash flow, only when the cost is recognized. There is also a serious dissent: that the income statement already tells a careful reader what the spending is earning, so that moving it to the balance sheet adds an assumption and no information.

For example

A software company reports a return on capital of sixty percent and a competitor in equipment reports twelve. Capitalizing five years of research spending, the software company's capital base roughly quadruples and its return falls to about twenty percent: still better, and now comparable.

The mathematics in fullResearch asset K = sum over j = 0..n-1 of R(t - j) x (1 - j / n) for a life of n years; amortization = sum over j = 1..n of R(t - j) / n; adjusted operating income = operating income + R(t) - amortization; adjusted invested capital = IC + K. Taught in

NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; UT Dallas ACCT 7323 (doctoral)

Sources

Lev, Sougiannis (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(1), 107-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00410-6
Chan, Lakonishok, Sougiannis (2001). The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures. The Journal of Finance 56(6), 2431-2456. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00411
Peters, Taylor (2017). Intangible capital and the investment-q relation. Journal of Financial Economics 123(2), 251-272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.011
Iqbal, Rajgopal, Srivastava, Zhao (2024). A Better Estimate of Internally Generated Intangible Capital. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01703
Ewens, Peters, Wang (2024). Measuring Intangible Capital with Market Prices. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02058
Eisfeldt, Papanikolaou (2013). Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. The Journal of Finance 68(4), 1365-1406. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12034
Enache, Srivastava (2018). Should Intangible Investments Be Reported Separately or Commingled with Operating Expenses? New Evidence. Management Science 64(7), 3446-3468. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2769
Lev, Srivastava (2022). Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing. Critical Finance Review 11(2), 333-360. https://doi.org/10.1561/104.00000115
Eisfeldt, Kim, Papanikolaou (2022). Intangible Value. Critical Finance Review 11(2), 299-332. https://doi.org/10.1561/104.00000113
Barth, Li, McClure (2023). Evolution in Value Relevance of Accounting Information. The Accounting Review 98(1), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0521
Penman (2026). Empirical Research on Capitalizing Intangible Assets Is Logically Incoherent. Accounting Horizons 40(2), 17-22. https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-2024-143
Srivastava (2014). Why have measures of earnings quality changed over time? Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(2-3), 196-217. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.001
Lev, Zarowin (1999). The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them. Journal of Accounting Research 37(2), 353. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491413
Lev, Baruch and Gu, Feng (2016). The End of Accounting and the Path Forward for Investors and Managers. Wiley. (book)
Mauboussin, Michael J. and Callahan, Dan (2022). ROIC and Intangible Assets: A Look at How Adjustments for Intangibles Affect ROIC. Counterpoint Global Insights, Morgan Stanley Investment Management. (book)

External financing and share issuance

Who is raising money, and from whom

A company that keeps selling shares or borrowing is telling you its operations do not pay for its plans, and its managers, who know the most, are choosing this moment to sell. One that buys shares back is saying the reverse. We add up the net flow between the company and its capital providers and read it beside the story.

Born to answer
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Loughran and Ritter, 1995.
What it does now
Which way cash flows between company and owners.
The mathematics
XFIN = (net equity + net debt raised) / A
The full entry
Where it began

Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf showed in 1984 why selling shares is bad news: managers know more than buyers and sell when the price is high. In 1995 Tim Loughran and Jay Ritter found that companies issuing stock earned poor returns for five years, and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen found the mirror image for buybacks. Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan combined debt and equity into one measure of net financing in 2006.

Why it works now

Net financing is a sum of lines scattered across the cash flow statement, and the share count that matters is the diluted one after stock compensation. The Desk adds them up from the filed statements across several years. What the company told the buyers of the offering, and what terms it accepted, is known to people who were on the other side. The Desk asks which way the cash has flowed.

When it applies

Rapid growth funded by repeated share or debt offerings; a buyback announced with fanfare; a share count that rises every year despite repurchases.

What we would ask

Over the last three years, has cash flowed from the company to its owners and lenders, or the other way?
Is the share count rising or falling once stock compensation is counted?

What it needs

The financing section of the cash flow statement and the share count for several years.

How we would get it

The Desk totals net financing against assets and tracks the diluted share count from the filed statements. Why the company chose to raise capital now, and on what terms, is a question for people on the other side of the offering.

Where it breaks

Reading every offering as a warning, when a young business with good projects should raise capital; a buyback that only offsets stock issued to employees; ignoring the terms, which carry most of the signal.

For example

A company has announced three buyback programs in four years and its share count is up six percent. Cash spent on repurchases was smaller than the value of stock granted to staff. The buybacks were real; the return of capital was not.

The mathematics in fullNet external financing = (equity issued - equity repurchased - dividends + debt issued - debt repaid) / average A; net issuance = ln(shares(t) / shares(t - 1)), adjusted for splits. Taught in

Graduate courses in financial statement analysis

Sources

Bradshaw, Richardson, Sloan (2006). The relation between corporate financing activities, analysts' forecasts and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1-2), 53-85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.03.004
Loughran, Ritter (1995). The New Issues Puzzle. The Journal of Finance 50(1), 23-51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05166.x
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1995). Market underreaction to open market share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39(2-3), 181-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00826-z
Daniel, Titman (2006). Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information. The Journal of Finance 61(4), 1605-1643. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00884.x
Pontiff, Woodgate (2008). Share Issuance and Cross-sectional Returns. The Journal of Finance 63(2), 921-945. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01335.x
Brav, Graham, Harvey, Michaely (2005). Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77(3), 483-527. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.07.004
Fama, French (2001). Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60(1), 3-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00038-1
Chuk, Lourie, Yoo (2021). The determinants and consequences of reverse factoring: Early evidence from the UK. Working paper, SSRN 3890547. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3890547
Berger, Li, Liu (2025). The Effects of Mandatory Supplier Finance Program Disclosure on Credit Markets. Working paper, SSRN 5372816. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5372816

Textual analysis of filings

What changed in the filing since last year

Most of an annual report is copied from the year before. The sentences that were added, removed or reworded are where the company's lawyers and accountants decided something had changed. We compare this year's filing with last year's and read the differences first.

Born to answer
Li, 2008; Cohen, Malloy and Nguyen, 2020.
What it does now
The sentences that changed since last year.
The mathematics
sim = (D1 . D2) / (|D1| |D2|)
The full entry
Where it began

Feng Li showed in 2008 that companies with poor results write annual reports that are harder to read. Tim Loughran and Bill McDonald built a dictionary of financial language in 2011 because ordinary word lists misread it. In 2020 Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy and Quoc Nguyen found that when a company changes the wording of its report, bad news tends to follow, and that investors do not notice at the time.

Why it works now

Comparing two filings of two hundred pages each, sentence by sentence, is the kind of work no analyst has time for and a machine does in seconds. The Desk opens this year's filing and last year's and reports what was added, removed and reworded, section by section. What the new sentences are preparing the reader for is a question for people who know the business from the inside. The Desk asks what changed in the words.

When it applies

A new filing nobody has read closely; a company whose numbers look steady while its business is changing; a risk factor that appeared quietly.

What we would ask

Which passages are new or reworded in this year's report, and in which sections?
Does the change in the words match anything in the numbers yet?

What it needs

Two consecutive filings of the same form, as filed.

How we would get it

The Desk opens both filings and reports what was added, dropped and reworded in the risk factors, the management discussion and the notes. What the new language is preparing the reader for is a question for people who know the business from inside.

Where it breaks

Changes forced by a new accounting standard or a new disclosure rule, which every company makes at once; treating longer or denser language as proof of concealment; reading tone into boilerplate.

For example

A company's results are unchanged, and its new annual report adds two sentences to the risk factors about reliance on a single distributor and rewrites the revenue recognition note. Neither is in the press release. Both are where a careful reader would start asking questions.

The mathematics in fullSimilarity between consecutive filings is measured on their word vectors, sim = (D1 . D2) / (|D1| |D2|), or by the edits needed to turn one into the other; a low similarity marks a changer; tone is the share of words from a list built for financial text. Taught in

Texas McCombs ACC 386K.3 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research

Sources

Cohen, Malloy, Nguyen (2020). Lazy Prices. The Journal of Finance 75(3), 1371-1415. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12885
Li (2008). Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(2-3), 221-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.003
Loughran, Mcdonald (2011). When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks. The Journal of Finance 66(1), 35-65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01625.x
Loughran, Mcdonald (2016). Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance: A Survey. Journal of Accounting Research 54(4), 1187-1230. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12123
Brown, Tucker (2011). Large-Sample Evidence on Firms' Year-over-Year MD&A Modifications. Journal of Accounting Research 49(2), 309-346. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00396.x
Huang, Teoh, Zhang (2014). Tone Management. The Accounting Review 89(3), 1083-1113. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50684
Siano (2025). The News in Earnings Announcement Disclosures: Capturing Word Context Using LLM Methods. Management Science 71(11), 9831-9855. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05417

Machine learning in financial statement analysis

The statements without the story

Learning models fed the full detail of the filed statements, with the story left out, forecast the direction of earnings better than the older statistical models and, in the published tests, better than the analysts. We use that as a second opinion: what do the numbers alone say, and where does that differ from what everyone believes? The arithmetic stays in code, because language models are poor at it.

Born to answer
Ou and Penman, 1989; learning models on full statement detail since 2020.
What it does now
What the numbers say with the story removed.
The mathematics
y(t + 1) = f(x(t)) + e
The full entry
Where it began

Ou and Penman's 1989 forecast from sixty-eight ratios was an early machine reading of the statements. Thirty years later Xi Chen, Yang Ha Cho, Yiwei Dou and Baruch Lev fed the full detail of filed statements to learning models and beat the analysts at forecasting the direction of earnings. In 2024 a working paper claimed that a general language model could do the same from anonymized statements; its authors withdrew it the following year when a co-author could not reproduce the analysis, and in 2026 Bradford Levy showed that such models reason poorly with numbers and have often already read the period they are tested on.

Why it works now

This entry describes what the Desk is, and why it is built the way it is. The Desk does not ask a language model to compute: every measurement is run in code on the filed numbers, and the model's part is to read what they show against the story the market is telling. The limits are stated with it: a model may have seen the period it is asked about, and the statements leave out what the business has not yet reported. The gap between the cold reading and the consensus is a list of questions, and people answer them. The Desk asks what the numbers alone would predict.

When it applies

A consensus built on a narrative; a company whose story is so well known that nobody reads its statements; a need for a view that is not anchored on guidance.

What we would ask

If you knew only the numbers, what would you expect next year's earnings to do?
Where does that differ from the consensus, and who is likely to be right about that difference?

What it needs

Standardized statements for several years, read without the name attached, and the consensus they will be compared with.

How we would get it

The Desk runs the measurements in code on the standardized statements, reads what the trends and ratios imply on their own, and sets that beside the stated expectations. The difference between the two is the list of things the narrative is adding, and each is a question for someone who can check it.

Where it breaks

A model that has seen the answers, because it was trained after the period it is tested on; a language model trusted to do the arithmetic; statements that leave out what matters for the business; confusing a forecast of direction with a forecast of size. The best-known claim that a general language model could match the analysts from the numbers alone was withdrawn by its authors in 2025, after a co-author could not reproduce it.

For example

The statements of a consumer company show four years of slowing turnover and a margin held up by cuts to advertising. Read cold, they point to lower earnings. The consensus expects growth, on the strength of a relaunch. The gap is one question: whether the relaunch is working, which the statements cannot answer and three large retailers can.

The mathematics in fullA learner f maps the vector of statement items x(t) to a forecast of the sign or the size of the change in earnings, y(t + 1) = f(x(t)) + e, and is judged only on data it has not seen; the benchmark is the analysts' forecast and the random walk. Taught in

UT Dallas ACCT 7313 (doctoral); Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research; NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting

Sources

Chen, Cho, Dou, Lev (2022). Predicting Future Earnings Changes Using Machine Learning and Detailed Financial Data. Journal of Accounting Research 60(2), 467-515. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12429
Cao, You (2024). Fundamental Analysis via Machine Learning. Financial Analysts Journal 80(2), 74-98. https://doi.org/10.1080/0015198x.2024.2313692
Binz, Schipper, Standridge (2025). Estimating profitability decomposition frameworks via machine learning: Implications for earnings forecasting and financial statement analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 80(2-3), 101805. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101805
Campbell, Ham, Lu, Wood (2026). Expectations Matter: When (Not) to Use Machine Learning Earnings Forecasts. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05808
Levy (2026). Caution Ahead: Numerical Reasoning and Look-Ahead Bias in AI Models. Journal of Accounting Research 64(3), 1139-1188. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.70058
Zhang, Zhu, Linnainmaa (2025). Man versus Machine Learning Revisited. The Review of Financial Studies 38(12), 3768-3790. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaf066
Sarkar, Vafa (2024). Lookahead Bias in Pretrained Language Models. Working paper, SSRN 4754678. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4754678
Gu, Kelly, Xiu (2020). Empirical Asset Pricing via Machine Learning. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2223-2273. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa009
Bartram, Grinblatt (2018). Agnostic fundamental analysis works. Journal of Financial Economics 128(1), 125-147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.11.008
Ou, Penman (1989). Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(4), 295-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(89)90017-7
Bradshaw, Drake, Myers, Myers (2012). A re-examination of analysts' superiority over time-series forecasts of annual earnings. Review of Accounting Studies 17(4), 944-968. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-012-9185-8
So (2013). A new approach to predicting analyst forecast errors: Do investors overweight analyst forecasts? Journal of Financial Economics 108(3), 615-640. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.002

Publication decay and replication

An edge everyone has read about

Most of the patterns in this family were published with a trading profit attached, and most of those profits shrank once they were published. We use the patterns for what still holds, which is what they say about the business, and we do not treat a thirty-year-old result as a return anyone can still collect.

Born to answer
McLean and Pontiff, 2016; argued over ever since.
What it does now
Why an old result is a description, not a return.
The mathematics
decay = 1 - (return after / return before)
The full entry
Where it began

By the 2010s the academic journals had published several hundred variables said to predict stock returns. In 2016 David McLean and Jeffrey Pontiff showed that the returns fell by more than half after publication, and Campbell Harvey, Yan Liu and Heqing Zhu argued that with so many tests most of the findings were probably false. Kewei Hou, Chen Xue and Lu Zhang tried to replicate 452 of them and most failed; Theis Jensen, Bryan Kelly and Lasse Pedersen answered in 2023 that, tested together, most hold. How many are real is still argued. That their returns shrink once they are published is not.

Why it works now

A desk that quotes old studies as if they were live strategies would be selling something it cannot deliver. The Desk states when each finding was published and what happened to it afterward, and uses the finding for what survives: its account of how a business works. Where someone wants to trade on a pattern, the question of whether it still pays belongs to people who run that trade with real money. The Desk asks when the pattern was published and how it has done since.

When it applies

A strategy justified by a published study; a screen sold as a source of return; a backtest that looks too good.

What we would ask

When was this pattern published, and how has it done in the years since?
Does it survive in large, liquid companies, or only in the smallest?

What it needs

The date and sample of the original finding, and its record out of sample.

How we would get it

The Desk states when each result was published and what later work found. Whether a pattern is still exploitable in a particular market is a question for people who trade it.

Where it breaks

Concluding that a pattern which no longer earns a return no longer describes anything; ignoring trading costs; dismissing every finding because many failed.

For example

A manager proposes to buy companies with low accruals and sell those with high ones, citing the original study. The return to that trade in large US companies fell toward zero within a decade of publication. What survives is the reason the trade once worked: earnings backed by cash last longer than earnings backed by estimates. That is still worth knowing about any single company.

The mathematics in fullDecay = 1 - (return after publication / return in the original sample); with many hypotheses tested, the threshold for significance rises from a t-ratio near 2 toward 3 or more; a predictor's return is re-estimated with large companies given their full weight. Taught in

Texas McCombs ACC 386K.3 (doctoral); NYU Stern doctoral seminar in empirical financial accounting; Bocconi doctoral seminar in financial accounting research

Sources

Mclean, Pontiff (2016). Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability? The Journal of Finance 71(1), 5-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12365
Harvey, Liu, Zhu (2016). ... and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. Review of Financial Studies 29(1), 5-68. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv059
Hou, Xue, Zhang (2020). Replicating Anomalies. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2019-2133. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy131
Jensen, Kelly, Pedersen (2023). Is There a Replication Crisis in Finance? The Journal of Finance 78(5), 2465-2518. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13249
Green, Hand, Zhang (2017). The Characteristics that Provide Independent Information about Average U.S. Monthly Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 30(12), 4389-4436. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx019
Linnainmaa, Roberts (2018). The History of the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 31(7), 2606-2649. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy030
Bowles, Reed, Ringgenberg, Thornock (2024). Anomaly Time. The Journal of Finance 79(5), 3543-3579. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13372
Green, Hand, Soliman (2011). Going, Going, Gone? The Apparent Demise of the Accruals Anomaly. Management Science 57(5), 797-816. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1320
Penman, Zhu (2014). Accounting Anomalies, Risk, and Return. The Accounting Review 89(5), 1835-1866. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50799
Hou, Mo, Xue, Zhang (2024). The Economics of Security Analysis. Management Science 70(1), 164-186. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4640
Engelberg, McLean, Pontiff (2020). Analysts and anomalies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 69(1), 101249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101249
Richardson, Tuna, Wysocki (2010). Accounting anomalies and fundamental analysis: A review of recent research advances. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 410-454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.008
Lewellen (2010). Accounting anomalies and fundamental analysis: An alternative view. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 455-466. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.007
Sloan (2019). Fundamental Analysis Redux. The Accounting Review 94(2), 363-377. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10652

How a business makes money

The designs that capture profit, from installed bases and standards to brands, product pyramids and local leadership, and how each shows up in the filed numbers.

Drawn from Adrian Slywotzky's The Profit Zone (1997) and The Art of Profitability (2002), checked page by page against the first editions. The examples are the books' own; how each model shows up in the statements, and the mathematics underneath, are Vista's reading.

Customer solution profit (Slywotzky)

Customer solution profit: invest in the account first, earn from it for years

We follow accounts from the day they are won: what each cost to win and fit, how many years of margin repaid it, and how long it stayed. The company is winning while accounts stay longer than they take to pay back and newer cohorts pay back no slower than older ones; it is losing when setup costs rise or customers leave before they have paid for themselves.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997; Factset's small team in The Art of Profitability, 2002.
What it does now
Whether accounts stay longer than they take to pay back.
The mathematics
Winning while account life 1 / churn > payback C / (m x R)
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997) calls it customer solutions profit and sets it out at pp. 37 to 38: the supplier invests first in understanding how a customer makes money and building its offer into the way that customer works day to day, then earns for years from a relationship that is hard to replace; Exhibit 3.3 (p. 47) names GE, HP, ABB, Nalco, Nordstrom and USAA among its practitioners. The Art of Profitability (2002) opens with it in Lesson 1 (p. 9), where the book reports that Factset, with 36 people, handled about $24 million of business while a competitor needed 400 people for $40 million, because Factset spent heavily on each account at the start. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 201 to 207) describes the wider shift from selling products to selling what they achieve for the customer, with Tetra Pak and Ryder among its cases.

Why it works now

Subscription software and outsourced services often run on this model, and their filings show it: cohorts that start at a loss and turn profitable, retention far above peers, and selling cost per account falling as the base grows. The Desk asks whether accounts now stay longer than they take to pay back, and whether that is improving or slipping from one cohort to the next.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from customer relationships that are costly to start and long to run: accounts lose money for a year or more while the company fits itself into the customer's operations, then earn for years because customers rarely leave; not to be confused with a discounted bundle sold as a solution, or a firm billing hours, whose revenue is won again every year.

What we would ask

What does it cost to win and set up a new account, and how many years of that account's margin does it take to repay?
What share of accounts leaves each year, and is that share rising or falling from one cohort to the next?

What it needs

Sales and marketing expense and the number of new accounts each year (or capitalized costs to obtain and fulfill contracts, where disclosed); implementation cost where reported; gross margin; revenue per account; gross and net revenue retention, by cohort where reported; customer counts over at least three years.

How we would get it

Former account managers, implementation leads and heads of customer success on what an account costs to set up and keep; operations heads at customer firms on what switching would cost them; the record of renewals and contract terms, including public-sector contracts, which are often published.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: loyal customers taken as proof of the model when the numbers show no early loss and no payback to measure; retention that is contractual and ends at a renewal date; accounts that need fresh custom work every year, so payback never comes; a few large accounts carrying the averages.

For example

A growth investor is weighing a vertical software company that calls itself a customer solutions business, and the model fits: new accounts lose money for about eighteen months, then earn high margins. The test says it is losing. An account now costs three years of its own margin to win and set up, double the old figure, and two in five new accounts leave each year, so the average one lasts two and a half years and never pays back.

The mathematics in fullPayback T = C / (m x R), where C is the cost to win and set up one account (sales and marketing plus implementation, over the number of new accounts), R the yearly revenue per account and m the gross margin; expected life L = 1 / c, where c is the share of accounts lost each year; the company is winning while L > T, T does not rise from one cohort to the next, and net revenue retention (revenue this year from last year's customers / their revenue last year) is at least 1. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 37 to 38; The Profit Zone (1997), Exhibit 3.3, p. 47; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 1, p. 9; Profit Patterns (1999), Product to Solution, pp. 201 to 207

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Kaplan, Meier (1958). Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations. Journal of the American Statistical Association 53(282), 457-481. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1958.10501452

Pyramid profit (Slywotzky)

Pyramid profit: a cheap base that guards a profitable top

We read the product line as one structure and measure two things over the same years: the company's share of units sold at the entry price, and the share of its gross profit that comes from the upper tiers. The company is winning while both hold or rise; when the entry share slips to a cheaper rival, the upper tiers are next.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Swatch and Mattel; Barbie's price ladder in 2002.
What it does now
Whether the cheap line still holds the bottom.
The mathematics
Entry-band unit share and upper-tier profit share both holding
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997) calls it product pyramid profit and illustrates it with SMH, the maker of Swatch, and with Mattel (pp. 38 to 39, 58). The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 2, p. 20) shortens the name to pyramid profit and walks through Barbie: the book reports a doll at about $10 serving as the 'firewall', a core range priced from $20 to $30 and collector dolls near $200, and it points to Nokia phones, Sloan's ladder at General Motors from Chevrolet to Cadillac, and American Express cards. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 197 to 199) describes the move from a single product to a pyramid, with Swatch as the base beneath Rado, Longines and Blancpain.

Why it works now

Many product companies report sales by tier or price band, and a working pyramid shows there as a mix moving upward while the bottom keeps its share. The Desk asks whether the cheapest line still holds the bottom, because when it stops doing so the upper tiers are exposed.

When it applies

A company that sells one kind of product at several price levels and keeps the cheapest level on purpose, at a thin margin, to keep rivals away from the upper levels where its profit is; not to be confused with a broad line whose cheap products are a separate market that protects nothing above them.

What we would ask

What share of the units sold at the entry price does the company hold, and how has that share moved over three years?
What share of gross profit comes from the upper tiers, and is it holding?

What it needs

Unit sales and average price by tier or price band (company disclosures, or industry panel data where the filing is silent); gross margin by tier where reported, or mix and average selling price; the company's share of units in the entry price band over several years; launch dates of rivals' low-end products.

How we would get it

Former product-line and pricing managers on what each tier earns and how the ladder is managed; retail buyers and distributors on who trades up and where rivals attack; the record of low-end entrants in the category and of what happened to the upper tiers after each.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a price range called a pyramid because it has a cheap end, when the cheap line protects nothing above it; a base priced below cost, a subsidy rather than a wall; tiers that take sales from each other; mix moving up because of inflation or one popular model rather than the ladder.

For example

A consumer brand calls the basic model at the bottom of its range a firewall, and the model fits: that model earns almost nothing and the upper tiers carry the profit. The test says the wall is failing. In three years the brand's share of units at the entry price fell from about half to under a third as a store-brand rival grew, and the premium margin has begun to slip; the question is what retaking the bottom would cost.

The mathematics in fullEntry share s = the company's units in the entry price band / all units sold in that band, and upper share g = gross profit from the upper tiers / total gross profit; the company is winning while the change in s >= 0 and the change in g >= 0 over the same years, with the base still priced above its cost, and a fall in s is the first sign of losing. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 38 to 39, 58; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 2, p. 20; Profit Patterns (1999), Product to Pyramid, pp. 197 to 199

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6

Multi-component profit (Slywotzky)

Multi-component profit: one product, priced differently in each setting

We measure the realized price per unit in each setting and the mix of units across settings, year by year. The company is winning while the rich settings hold their price and their share of units; when a powerful buyer or a rival squeezes them, the blended price falls even as volume grows. The thin setting is worth keeping only if cutting it would cost the rich ones more than it earns.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Coca-Cola's price per ounce in grocery, fountain and vending.
What it does now
Whether the rich settings keep their price.
The mathematics
Blended price = sum of unit share x price by setting, holding
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997) calls it multicomponent profit, or multicomponent system profit in its chapter heading, and explains it with Coca-Cola: the book reports that an ounce of the same drink brought in about 2 cents through grocery stores, 4 cents through fountains and 6 cents through vending machines, so the profit sat in the last two while grocery volume kept the brand in front of buyers (p. 39). The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 3, p. 31) writes it as multi-component profit and adds hotels, whose rooms and conventions earn on different terms, and bookstores; the practitioners the books name are Coca-Cola and Mirage Resorts.

Why it works now

Segment and channel reporting often shows one product earning very different prices in different settings, and the thin setting is the first target of any cost program. The Desk asks whether the rich settings are holding their price and share, and what the thin one does for them, before anyone cuts it.

When it applies

A company that sells the same product in several settings or channels at very different realized prices, earns its profit in the rich settings, and keeps the thin one because it builds the volume or familiarity that wins them; not to be confused with a profit multiplier, where one asset feeds different products.

What we would ask

What does the same unit bring in, after the cost to serve, in each setting where it is sold?
Are the rich settings holding their price and their share of units, and what happened to them when a thin setting was last cut?

What it needs

Revenue and units, or revenue per unit, in each channel or setting (segment notes, management discussion, investor presentations); margin by channel where reported; the mix of units across settings over at least three years; any period when a setting was lost, cut or repriced.

How we would get it

Former channel and revenue managers on the price realized in each setting and the cost to serve it; buyers in each channel on what they would do if the product were missing from another; the record of periods when a setting was lost, cut or repriced and what followed in the others.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: the label applied because a product is sold through several channels, when the realized prices are close and nothing links the settings; costs allocated so that a setting looks thin or rich; per-unit figures that mix sizes, packs or service levels; a link between settings asserted rather than shown.

For example

A buyer of a regional beverage maker is told the profit is in restaurants and vending while supermarkets keep the brand familiar, and the model fits: a unit fetches nearly three times as much in vending as in supermarkets. The test shows it losing: two restaurant chains have renegotiated, the restaurant price per unit is down a fifth in two years, and the blended price is falling while volume grows. The growth is all in the thin setting.

The mathematics in fullRealized price p(k) = revenue in setting k / units in setting k, and blended price P = sum over k of w(k) x p(k), where w(k) is the share of units sold in setting k; the company is winning while P and the rich settings' share of units hold or rise together, and a thin setting earns its place only if cutting it would lower profit in the rich settings by more than its own profit. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 39; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 3, p. 31; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Besanko, David and Braeutigam, Ronald. Microeconomics, 5th ed. Wiley. (book)

Switchboard profit (Slywotzky)

Switchboard profit: a fee for connecting many buyers with many sellers

We compute the hub's fee as a share of the volume it routes, and its share of the market's transactions, over the same years. The company is winning while its share rises without cutting the fee and its largest users keep routing through it; share bought with fee cuts, or volume leaving with the largest users, means it is losing, whatever the growth rate.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Schwab's OneSource; Ovitz at CAA in 2002.
What it does now
Whether the hub gains share without cutting its fee.
The mathematics
Fee rate = net revenue / gross volume, steady while share rises
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997) tells it through Charles Schwab, whose OneSource linked investors with many mutual fund companies (ch. 8, pp. 153 to 174). The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 4, pp. 45 to 47) uses Michael Ovitz at CAA, who put writers, stars and directors together for the studios and drew on Mort Janklow's literary agency for stories; the practitioners the books name include CAA, Schwab, USAA and Auto-by-Tel. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 167 to 172) treats the switchboard as one form of reintermediation and notes that Auto-by-Tel later faced Microsoft's CarPoint.

Why it works now

Marketplaces, brokers and booking platforms are switchboards, and their filings often report gross volume, net revenue and the count on each side, so the fee rate can be computed. The Desk asks whether the hub is gaining share without cutting that fee, and whether its largest users are learning to go around it.

When it applies

A company whose profit is a fee for routing many buyers and many sellers through one hub, where each side would otherwise spend heavily to search for and transact with the other, and the hub is worth more to each side as the other grows; not to be confused with a distributor that buys and resells stock, or a one-sided service that only looks like a marketplace.

What we would ask

What fee does the hub keep as a share of the volume it routes, and has that fee held while its share of the market grew?
Are the largest participants routing more or less through the hub than three years ago?

What it needs

Gross volume and net revenue each year, so the fee rate can be computed; counts of active buyers and sellers; total market volume from industry data; the share of volume from the largest participants where disclosed; fee changes and incentives paid to either side.

How we would get it

Former heads of supplier and partner relations at the hub on what keeps each side from dealing directly; large participants on both sides on their costs with and without the hub; the record of the fee over time and of participants who left or went around it.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: any marketplace called a switchboard, when one side has few alternatives and the hub is in effect a reseller; gross volume reported while net revenue is what the hub keeps; one side subsidized, so its count overstates its loyalty; the largest participants learning to deal directly.

For example

A private equity firm is looking at a staffing intermediary that connects hospitals with traveling clinicians, and the model fits: both sides would pay heavily to find each other without it. The test is mixed. Volume grew a fifth last year, but the fee rate fell three points after the three largest hospital systems won rebates, and their share of volume is falling as they build their own pools. The company is winning with small hospitals and losing at the top.

The mathematics in fullFee rate f = net revenue / gross volume, and hub share h = gross volume through the hub / total market volume; the company is winning while the change in h > 0 with the change in f >= 0 and the volume share of its largest participants holding, and losing when h rises only as f is cut or when the largest participants' volume falls. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), ch. 8, pp. 153 to 174; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 4, pp. 45 to 47; Profit Patterns (1999), Reintermediation, pp. 167 to 172

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208

Time profit (Slywotzky)

Time profit: the premium lasts until the copy arrives

We compare how long a capable rival takes to match each new product with how often the company launches the next one, and watch the share of revenue from recent products. The company is winning while it launches faster than it is copied and that share holds with the margin; once copies arrive before the next launch, each premium ends early and the margin follows.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Intel under Andrew Grove, organized around speed.
What it does now
Whether the next launch beats the copy.
The mathematics
Lead ratio = time to copy / launch interval, above 1
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 41, 59) describes time profit through Intel under Andrew Grove, a company it portrays as organized around speed, and puts the lead that matters at about two years; the practitioners the books name include Intel, Bankers Trust and Sony. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 5, p. 58) teaches it with a small investment bank that kept seeing its new financial products imitated by bigger rivals; that bank is a disguised teaching case, not a real firm.

Why it works now

In many industries a copy can now arrive sooner than it once did, because designs, suppliers and code travel quickly, so the window that pays for innovation has to be measured rather than assumed. The Desk asks whether the next launch still arrives before the copy.

When it applies

A company whose margin comes from charging more for what is new, and which stays profitable only by launching the next product before rivals copy the last; not to be confused with new product profit, one product's margin rising and falling once, or a specialty product whose premium is protected by a patent or a niche.

What we would ask

How long does a capable rival now take to match a new product, and how often does the company launch the next one?
What share of this year's revenue comes from products launched in the last two years, and is it holding with the margin?

What it needs

Revenue from products under one, two and three years old as a share of the total, where disclosed; gross margin and unit price over each product's life; launch dates of the company's products and of rivals' matching products, from releases and filings; research spending as a share of revenue.

How we would get it

Former product managers and engineers at the company and at its fastest follower on how long copying takes now and what slows it; customers and channel partners on when they move to the copy; the record of launch dates and price cuts across rivals.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: an innovative company called a time-profit business when its premium rests on a patent or a niche that lasts without renewal; one product's head start read as a process; minor refreshes counted as launches, which inflates the new-product share; a time to copy taken from the old record rather than the current one.

For example

A growth fund is underwriting a maker of industrial sensors that earns a premium on each new model, and the model fits: most revenue comes from models less than two years old. The test shows it slipping. Former engineers at its main rival say they now match a new model in about nine months, while the company launches every eighteen; the lead ratio is one half, so each premium ends well before the next launch.

The mathematics in fullLead ratio = T / L, where T is the time a rival needs to match a new product and L the interval between the company's own launches; new-product share v = revenue from products introduced in the last two years / total revenue; the company is winning while T / L > 1 and v holds with gross margin, and losing once T / L < 1, when each premium ends before the next begins. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 41, 59; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 5, p. 58; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)

Blockbuster profit (Slywotzky)

Blockbuster profit: a few hits pay for everything

We set the revenue from products introduced in the last five years against the revenue that loses protection in the next five, and the new-product revenue against the research spent to find it. The company is winning while new products more than replace what is expiring at a steady research cost; when they fall short, the current hit is carrying a pipeline that cannot follow it.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: drugs costing about $300 million each to bring to market.
What it does now
Whether new products replace what is losing protection.
The mathematics
Replacement = new-product revenue / revenue expiring, at least 1
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 41 to 42) shows the logic in pharmaceuticals: the book reports that developing and launching a drug had come to cost about $300 million, so a second-ranked drug with $1.6 billion of sales outweighed several category leaders selling $200 million each, and the industry's model moved from category share to 'product scale'; the practitioners named include Merck, Disney and NBC. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 187 to 189) follows NBC's schedule built around a few hit shows and Merck's run of blockbusters, which the book reports started from Vasotec in 1981 and reached fifteen over the next ten years. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 6, p. 72) teaches it through a disguised teaching case, an agricultural chemicals unit rebuilding its research pipeline.

Why it works now

Drug development, film, games and parts of software run on this model, and their filings disclose revenue by product, expiry dates and pipelines. The Desk asks whether the products launched lately are replacing the revenue about to lose protection, and at what research cost.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from a few large hits that cost heavily to develop, cost little to make and are protected for a limited time (drugs, films, games, some software), so the pipeline must keep producing them; not to be confused with transaction scale profit, where larger deals simply cost little more than small ones, or with one lucky product.

What we would ask

How much revenue do the products introduced in the last five years bring in, against the revenue that loses protection in the next five?
When did the pipeline last stop a project, and at what stage?

What it needs

Revenue by product with launch dates; the patent or rights expiry date of each major product; research or content spending by year; pipeline disclosures by stage; impairments taken when projects fail; the share of revenue from the top three products.

How we would get it

Former heads of development and portfolio review on how projects are kept or stopped and the real odds at each stage; specialists in the category on the likely size of the next hit; the pipeline's past success at each stage against industry rates, from filings and public registries.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: one big product called a blockbuster model when the record shows no second hit; stage odds taken from the company's plan rather than from the record; the expiry of the current hit underweighted; costs per project rising faster than the size of hits, so the yield falls even as revenue grows.

For example

A healthcare fund is weighing a mid-sized drug developer whose oldest product earns most of its profit and loses its patent in four years. The model fits, and the test says it is losing: the two products launched in the last five years bring in about a fifth of the revenue that loses protection in the next five, and at the success rates in the public trial record the nine programs in trials are unlikely to close the gap. The thesis narrows to the one late-stage program.

The mathematics in fullReplacement ratio Q = latest-year revenue from products introduced in the last five years / latest-year revenue of products losing protection in the next five, and research yield Y = that same new-product revenue / research spending over the five years before; the company is winning while Q >= 1 and Y holds or rises, and a company with Q < 1 is living on its current hits. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 41 to 42; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 6, p. 72; Profit Patterns (1999), Product to Blockbuster, pp. 187 to 189; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. https://doi.org/10.1137/070710111
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. (book)

Profit-multiplier model (Slywotzky)

Profit-multiplier model: one asset, paid for once, earning in many forms

We trace each line of revenue to the asset it draws on and measure how much the asset earns beyond its first use, and at what margin, while watching its results in its home format. The company is winning while reuse revenue and margin grow and the home results hold; when extensions grow as the home results fall, the asset is being spent.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Disney's characters across film, books and parks.
What it does now
Whether reuse grows without wearing out the asset.
The mathematics
Reuse profit = first-use revenue x (M - 1) x reuse margin
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 43, 60) calls it the profit multiplier model and uses Disney, whose characters earn again in theme parks, merchandise, books and videos as well as films; the practitioners the books name include Disney, Virgin and Honda. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 7, p. 89) turns to Honda, whose skill with engines is put to work in motorcycles, cars, outboard motors and lawnmowers. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 191 to 194) adds Bloomberg L.P. running one reporter's story on television, radio and the web.

Why it works now

Content, brands and know-how can be reused across formats more quickly and cheaply than when the books were written, so a multiplier can form fast and wear out fast. The Desk asks whether reuse revenue is growing while the asset still performs in its home format.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from reusing one expensive asset (a character, a brand, a story, a body of data or a technical skill) in many products or formats, each new use earning without paying again for the asset; not to be confused with multi-component profit, one product sold in different settings, or a set of separate assets each developed at full cost.

What we would ask

How much does the asset earn beyond its first use, and at what margin?
Are the asset's results in its home format holding while the extensions grow?

What it needs

Revenue and operating profit of licensing, consumer products and other reuse lines (segment notes); revenue of the original format for the same assets where disclosed; production and development spending and content amortization; the home-format results of each new release over time.

How we would get it

Former licensing and brand extension executives on what each format earns and what the asset's owners turned down; licensees and retailers on how the asset sells outside its home format; the record of the asset's home-format results and of extensions that worked or diluted it.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: licensing of a name called a profit multiplier when each product needed its own development and the margins show it; the asset stretched until it loses its pull; an asset that is a person or a team who can leave; reuse revenue growing on one hit that is fading.

For example

An investor is looking at a company that owns a long-running game character and licenses it into toys, films and clothing; the character was paid for once, in the games, so the model fits. The test says it is winning: revenue from the other formats grew from half of the game revenue to more than all of it in five years, at higher margins, while each new game in the series outsold the last. The open question is how many more formats the character can carry.

The mathematics in fullMultiplier M = revenue from all uses of an asset / R1, the revenue from its first use, and reuse margin r = operating profit of the reuse lines / their revenue, so reuse profit = R1 x (M - 1) x r; the company is winning while M and r hold or rise and the asset's results in its home format hold, and losing when M rises only as those home results fall. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 43, 60; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 7, p. 89; Profit Patterns (1999), Product to Profit Multiplier, pp. 191 to 194; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Entrepreneurial profit (Slywotzky)

Entrepreneurial profit: small units, close to customers, careful with money

We measure the cost of the center as a share of revenue against peers, and whether it stays flat as the company grows, alongside revenue per employee and operating margin. The company is winning while its overhead stays below its peers' and does not creep up with size; when it rises with every new unit or acquisition, the large company the model was meant to avoid is forming.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: ABB's profit centers and the units Thermo Electron spun off.
What it does now
Whether overhead stays low as the company grows.
The mathematics
Overhead / revenue below peers and not rising with size
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 43 to 44, 61) points to ABB, which the book reports ran 5,000 profit centers, to Softbank units of as few as ten people held to a five-day measure of cash flow, and to the units Thermo Electron spun off, in which managers held shares. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 239 to 244) describes the move from pyramid to network, with Virgin Group, as the book tells it, splitting off a fresh company once a record label unit grew to roughly fifty staff, and it concedes that Thermo Electron's model later ran into trouble. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 8, p. 97) teaches it through an invented frugal entrepreneur and holds up Sam Walton and Soichiro Honda as the real examples.

Why it works now

Cost and revenue can now be tracked by team almost as they happen, which makes small accountable units easier to run, and a company's overhead is visible in its filings. The Desk asks whether overhead is staying below peers as the company grows.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from being organized as many small units, each close to its customers and answerable for its own profit, or from an owner's frugality, so that its overhead stays below that of larger rivals; not to be confused with a company that is small because it is young, or one decentralized only on its organization chart.

What we would ask

What does the center cost as a share of revenue, and how has that share moved as the company grew?
How much of a unit manager's pay rides on that unit's profit?

What it needs

Corporate and unallocated expense, and selling, general and administrative expense, as a share of revenue over several years and against peers; headcount and revenue per employee; operating margin by segment; the number of reporting units; how unit managers are paid, where disclosed.

How we would get it

Former unit managers and unit finance heads on how much of their pay rode on unit profit and what the center charged them; former headquarters staff on what the center decides; the record of spin-offs and of their margins after separation.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a founder-led company, or one with many subsidiaries, called entrepreneurial when its overhead ratio is no lower than its peers'; small units that duplicate costs and lose the advantages of scale; transfer prices and allocations that distort unit profit, so pay rewards the accounting; a spin-out model that later runs into trouble, as Profit Patterns concedes of Thermo Electron.

For example

A private equity firm is buying a group of regional service businesses that describes itself as a federation of owner-run branches. The model fits: branch managers set prices and staffing and are paid on branch profit. The test says it is losing: as the group grew from twenty branches to sixty, the cost of the center rose from four to nine percent of revenue and revenue per employee fell. The diligence turns to what the center now does that the branches used to do.

The mathematics in fullOverhead ratio o = corporate and unallocated expense / revenue where segments are reported, or selling, general and administrative expense / revenue otherwise; the company is winning while o stays below the peer median and does not rise as the company grows (change in o <= 0 while change in revenue > 0), with revenue per employee at or above its peers'. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 43 to 44, 61; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 8, p. 97; Profit Patterns (1999), Pyramid to Network, pp. 239 to 244

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320

Specialist profit (Slywotzky)

Specialist profit: knowing one segment better than anyone

We compare the company's margin in its home segment with what generalists earn serving the same segment, and track how quickly each segment entered later approaches the home margin. The company is winning while the gap holds or widens and new segments close on it; if the gap narrows, or the newest segment stalls far below, the knowledge is not unique or does not travel.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: EDS taking one industry at a time.
What it does now
Whether the segment edge holds, and travels.
The mathematics
Segment margin minus generalists' margin, held and repeated
In the inquiries: No. 2, Moving Day
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 44 to 45) calls it specialization profit and builds it on EDS, which took on one industry at a time (banking, health care, insurance and manufacturing among them); the book reports a 13 percent margin for EDS in computer services in 1994, a year in which IBM only broke even. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 9, p. 108) renames it specialist profit and adds Wallace, a business forms company that concentrated on telecommunications customers, specialized engineering units at ABB, whose margins the book reports rose from 2 percent to at least 10, and the way HP managed its global accounts.

Why it works now

Vertical software and services firms often report revenue by industry, so a specialist's edge can be checked against the generalists it meets in the same segment. The Desk asks whether the margin gap holds at home and whether the segments entered later are closing on it.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from knowing one industry or customer segment better than anyone, shown in higher margins, better prices or faster sales than the generalists it meets there; not to be confused with experience curve profit, a cost edge from total volume, or with dependence on one large customer.

What we would ask

In its home segment, how does the company's margin compare with what generalists earn serving the same customers?
How long did the last segment it entered take to approach the home margin, and has it got there?

What it needs

Revenue and operating margin by industry or customer segment where disclosed; the same for generalist peers serving that segment; the year the company entered each segment; pricing, win rates and sales cycle length where management reports them.

How we would get it

Former sales and delivery leaders on win rates, time to close and pricing in the home segment and the newest one; customers in the segment on why they chose the specialist over a larger generalist; the record of the company's past entries into new segments and how long each took to earn.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company concentrated in one industry called a specialist when its margins there are no better than a generalist's; a margin that comes from a few large customers rather than from know-how; a segment reshaped by regulation, taking the knowledge with it; segments reported too broadly to show the gap.

For example

A buyer is weighing a software services firm whose margin with regional banks is about eight points above the large generalists', and which entered insurance four years ago. At home the test says it is winning; in insurance it is not. That margin is still under half the bank margin and has not risen in two years, and former delivery leads say the bank work rests on regulatory reporting that insurers do not need, so the insurance plan is costed as a new start.

The mathematics in fullSpecialist gap G = the company's operating margin in segment s - the margin of generalists serving s; for a segment entered k years ago, convergence C(k) = that segment's margin / the home segment's margin; the company is winning while G holds or rises at home and C(k) moves toward 1 as k grows, and losing when G shrinks or C(k) stalls well below 1. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 44 to 45; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 9, p. 108; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Installed base profit (Slywotzky)

Installed base profit: thin on the machine, rich on what follows

We measure follow-on revenue per unit in use, and the margin on it, year by year against growth in the base. The company is winning while the base grows and revenue per unit holds or rises; when the base grows but revenue per unit falls, users are buying elsewhere or using less, and the base is leaking.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Microsoft's upgrades; razors, blades and Polaroid film in 2002.
What it does now
Whether revenue per unit holds as the base grows.
The mathematics
Follow-on revenue = units in use x revenue per unit
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 45 to 46) explains it through Microsoft, which priced low, set the standard and then earned on upgrades; the practitioners the books name include Microsoft, Otis Elevator, Gillette and GE. The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 10, p. 118) uses razors and blades, Polaroid's cameras with their film, and personal copiers, where the hardware carried a low margin and the consumables a high one.

Why it works now

Makers of instruments, machines and devices that need supplies or service still earn this way, and their filings often separate equipment from supplies and service. The Desk asks whether follow-on revenue per unit in use is holding as the base grows.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from what an installed base of its devices or systems keeps buying (supplies, service, upgrades, follow-on products) while the original sale earns little; not to be confused with after-sale profit, financing or service any seller could offer, or with a de facto standard that outside firms build on.

What we would ask

What does each unit in use bring in each year from supplies, service and upgrades, and is that rising or falling as the base grows?
What share of the units in use buy from the company rather than from outside suppliers?

What it needs

Installed base or units in use where reported; revenue and margin of supplies, service and upgrades against equipment; recurring revenue as a share of the total; attach or renewal rates where disclosed; follow-on revenue through past downturns.

How we would get it

Former service and aftermarket managers on attach rates, pricing and leakage to outside suppliers; dealers and independent service firms on what users buy elsewhere and why; the record of supply and service pricing and of any legal or regulatory fight over compatible parts.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company that sells some service called an installed base business when follow-on revenue per unit is small or falling; the base counted in units sold rather than units in use; compatible parts, outside suppliers or repair rules breaking the link; follow-on revenue that looked steady but was a replacement cycle.

For example

An investor sees a maker of laboratory instruments that sells machines near cost and earns on reagents. The model fits: reagents bring in most of the profit. The test shows it losing: the installed base grew a tenth in two years while reagent revenue per machine fell by a fifth, and service managers at large labs say older machines now run on cheaper outside reagents since a key patent expired. The forecast is rebuilt on the units still buying.

The mathematics in fullFollow-on revenue F = N x a, where N is the average number of units in use and a the follow-on revenue per unit, so growth in F splits into growth in the base and the change in a; the company is winning while the change in a >= 0 as N grows and the follow-on margin stays above the equipment margin, and losing when F grows only because N does while a falls. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 45 to 46; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 10, p. 118; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)

De facto standard profit (Slywotzky)

De facto standard profit: the industry builds around the product

We test for pricing power that comes from the standard: whether the company has raised price without losing share or customers, while the number of outside firms building for it keeps growing and its selling cost per dollar of new revenue falls. The company is winning while all three hold; when a price rise costs share, or partners start building for a rival, the standard is weakening.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Windows, Oracle's databases and SABRE.
What it does now
Whether price can rise without losing share.
The mathematics
Price up, share held, partners still arriving
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone (1997, pp. 46 to 47) ties this model to increasing returns to scale and gives as examples Microsoft's Windows, Oracle in relational databases and the SABRE system of American Airlines; its index of strategic control puts owning the standard at the top (Exhibit 3.4, p. 53). The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 11, p. 124) reaches back to IBM's 360 mainframe, which set the standard from 1964. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 85 to 89) treats the arrival of a standard as a pattern and reports that Nellcor Puritan Bennett opened its pulse oximetry methods to dozens of competitors under license, turning them into the standard, and still kept more than half of the market for the devices.

Why it works now

Operating systems, cloud platforms, data formats and payment networks play this role today, and their filings show the marks: high and steady margins, low churn, and partners building on them. The Desk asks whether the company can still raise price without losing share, and whether partners are still arriving.

When it applies

A company whose product has become the format, interface or system its industry builds around, so that its share, margins and pricing power rise with the number of users and partners; not to be confused with a large installed base that outside firms do not build on, or a standard the company only complies with or shares.

What we would ask

When the company last raised price, what happened to its share and to its churn?
How many outside firms build products that work only with this standard, and is that number growing?

What it needs

Price changes and their dates (price lists, releases, filings); market share over several years from industry data; customer churn or renewal rates; counts of developers, partners or compatible products where reported; sales and marketing expense and the change in revenue each year; gross margin over a decade.

How we would get it

Former partner and developer relations leaders on why outside firms build for the standard and what would move them to a rival; technology heads at large customers on the real cost of moving; the record of past challengers, of the standard's price increases and the share they cost, and of any antitrust or regulatory action.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a popular product called a standard when users could move at little cost and partners build for rivals too; complying with a standard mistaken for owning it; a consortium or regulator opening the standard, so share stays and pricing power goes; a new layer of technology making the standard matter less rather than defeating it.

For example

A fund is weighing an industrial software vendor whose file format is used across its industry and which calls itself the standard. The test says it is losing that position: since a consortium opened the format, each of the last two price rises cost several points of share, and the count of outside tools built for it has fallen. Customers stay for the training their staff already have, which is a switching cost rather than a standard, and the case is resized to that.

The mathematics in fullPricing power holds while %change in price > 0 with %change in share >= 0 and churn not rising; selling cost of growth e = sales and marketing expense / (revenue this year - revenue last year); the company is winning while pricing power holds, e stays flat or falls as revenue grows, and the count of outside firms building for the standard keeps rising, and losing when a price rise costs share. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 46 to 47; The Profit Zone (1997), Exhibit 3.4, p. 53; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 11, p. 124; Profit Patterns (1999), De Facto Standard, pp. 85 to 89; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, the 'first cousins'

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208

Brand profit (Slywotzky)

Brand profit: the same product, at a higher price

We measure the premium over the closest equivalent product and what happens to volume when the brand raises its price. The company is winning while it can raise price and keep or grow volume with marketing held steady; a margin that rose when marketing was cut, or a premium kept only by promotions, is the brand being spent.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997; NUMMI's twin nameplates in the later books.
What it does now
Whether volume holds when price rises.
The mathematics
Premium = (p_brand - p_store) / p_store; volume holds as price rises
In the inquiries: No. 1, The Chocolate Truce
The full entry
Where it began

The Art of Profitability (2002, Lesson 12, p. 132) makes the case with NUMMI, the General Motors and Toyota plant in Fremont, where the same workers and process built two nameplates and, the book reports citing The Economist in 1994, the Toyota version fetched roughly $300 a car more. Profit Patterns (1999, pp. 177 to 185) uses the same plant in its account of the move from product to brand, beside Frank Perdue's branded chicken and LVMH's portfolio of luxury names. The Profit Zone (1997, p. 63) lists Intel, Coca-Cola and Nike among its practitioners.

Why it works now

Marketing spending is easy to cut and the damage shows late, so a margin gained that way can pass for skill for several years. The Desk asks whether volume holds when the brand raises price, and whether the premium has held with marketing kept steady.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes from a price premium over products buyers otherwise see as equivalent, built by years of steady marketing; not to be confused with specialty product profit, a premium for a measurably better product, or a premium that comes from shelf position or distribution.

What we would ask

How much more does the brand sell for than the closest store brand, and has that premium held?
When the brand last raised price, did volume hold, and what was marketing spending doing at the time?

What it needs

Price and volume for the brand and for the closest store brand or unbranded equivalent, from retail data or from the company's split of sales growth into price, mix and volume; advertising and marketing spending as a share of sales over a full cycle; gross margin through downturns.

How we would get it

Former brand and marketing heads on how the premium is defended and what spending cuts did to it; retail buyers on the gap to the store brand and how it has moved; retail scanner data on price and volume for the brand and its closest equivalents.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a well-known product called a brand when its price is no higher than the store brand's or its volume falls whenever price rises; a premium that comes from shelf position or distribution rather than trust; cuts in marketing that lift margins for years before the premium erodes; acquired brand intangibles, which measure the price paid, not what the brand earns now.

For example

A consumer investor sees a packaged food brand whose margins rose for three years after its new owner cut advertising by a third. The model fits: the brand still sells at about a fifth over the store brand. The test shows it losing: each of the last two price rises cost more volume than the one before, and retail data show the premium narrowing every quarter. The higher margin is the brand being spent down, and the forecast is rebuilt around a shrinking premium.

The mathematics in fullPremium q = (p_brand - p_store) / p_store, where p_brand is the brand's price and p_store the price of the closest store brand; the company is winning while %change in volume >= 0 when %change in price > 0, with q holding and advertising as a share of sales, A / S, held steady, and losing when volume falls after a price rise; goodwill is a stock that A builds and time wears down, so a cut in A / S lifts margin at once and narrows q only later. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 63; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 12, p. 132; Profit Patterns (1999), Product to Brand, pp. 177 to 185

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Akerlof (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431

Specialty product profit (Slywotzky)

Specialty product profit: a premium that lasts only until the copies arrive

We first check that the margin really comes from products rivals cannot yet copy, by setting gross margin by product age against the patent and launch record. If it does, the company is winning when new specialty sales replace those lost to copying and expiry at least as fast as they are lost, and the premium over its commodity lines is not narrowing.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Merck, Hercules, 3M and Great Lakes Chemical.
What it does now
Whether launches replace the specialty sales that copies and expiries take.
The mathematics
Winning while L / (S / T) is at least one
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone lists it among its twenty-two models and names Merck, Hercules, 3M and Great Lakes Chemical as practitioners, with product cycles the book reports at eight to fifteen years (p. 63). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 13 tells it through the mentor's story of an unnamed North Carolina dye maker in 1978, whose newest dyes, the book reports, earned gross margins near sixty percent against twenty-five percent for the company as a whole, until the discoveries stopped and dyes became a commodity (p. 144).

Why it works now

Product disclosures, patent schedules and launch histories now show how fast a specialty share is being renewed, so the model can be tested rather than assumed. The Desk asks what share of sales rivals cannot yet copy, and whether new launches replace, year by year, the sales that expiries take away.

When it applies

A company that earns a clearly higher gross margin on patented or hard-to-copy products than on the rest of its range, and whose margin depends on launching new ones as old ones lose protection; not time profit, where an unprotected lead lasts only as long as rivals take to catch up, and not new product profit, where the premium comes from a growing category rather than from protection.

What we would ask

What share of this year's sales comes from products rivals cannot yet copy, and how much of it was launched in the last five years?
Over the last five years, did new specialty sales replace the specialty sales lost to copies and expiring patents?

What it needs

Revenue and gross margin split between specialty and commodity lines; sales from products launched in each recent year; the patent expiry schedule with the sales attached to each expiring product; the specialty sales lost after past expiries; and research spending by year, set against the specialty sales it later produced.

How we would get it

Former research and portfolio heads on how projects are chosen and how many reach the market; former product managers and customers' purchasing leads on when each specialty began to face substitutes; the record of past expiries and what happened to price and volume after each.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called a specialty producer because its products sound technical, when margin by product age shows no premium. Also research spending that defends old products, or whose payoff in later profit has been shrinking; one protected product read as a renewing portfolio; and a product life assumed from the past when copies now arrive sooner.

For example

A fund is studying a specialty materials maker with a gross margin steady for five years. The fit is real: its protected products earn about twice the margin of its commodity grades. But new launches have replaced only about half of what expiries took each year, and the margin was kept steady by price increases on two products whose patents lapse within three years. It fits the model and is losing at it; former research leaders can say whether the pipeline can close the gap in time.

The mathematics in fullSpecialty sales S change by dS/dt = L - S / T, where L is the specialty sales added by new launches in a year and T the average years before a specialty is copied or loses its patent; the company is winning while the renewal ratio L / (S / T) is at least one and the premium m(S) - m(C), the specialty gross margin less the commodity margin, is not shrinking. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 63; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 13, p. 144

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Lev, Sougiannis (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(1), 107-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00410-6
Curtis, McVay, Toynbee (2020). The changing implications of research and development expenditures for future profitability. Review of Accounting Studies 25(2), 405-437. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-019-09528-6

Local leadership profit (Slywotzky)

Local leadership profit: be the biggest name in each town

We first check that profit really follows local density, by setting the margin of each region, store group or route against the company's share there. If it does, the company is winning when most of its revenue comes from places where its share is highest and its delivery and service cost per outlet lowest, and when new outlets go next to markets it already leads.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Starbucks city by city, with A&P as the warning.
What it does now
Whether new outlets raise or dilute share where the company already leads.
The mathematics
Winning: revenue-weighted local share high and rising
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone shows it with Starbucks, which took Seattle before moving on to Chicago and then Vancouver, and warns with A&P, which pursued national share and closed its least profitable stores city by city, weakening the local share its economics rested on, before its sale to Tengelmann (pp. 64 to 65). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 14 uses Wal-Mart's county-by-county saturation, which the book reports gave it a margin edge of about six percentage points (p. 153).

Why it works now

Outlet counts, regional disclosures and local market data can now be assembled quickly enough to test the claim locality by locality. The Desk asks where the company is the largest player, whether that is where it earns most, and whether its new outlets are raising or diluting its share where it already leads.

When it applies

A chain of stores, branches, clinics or service routes whose margins are highest where its local share is highest, because delivery, advertising and hiring cost less where it is dense; not a company that is merely large nationally, which is relative market share profit, and not one whose sales come through national contracts or online, where local share lowers no cost.

What we would ask

In which towns or regions is the company the largest player, and are those the places where it earns the most?
Are new outlets going next to markets the company already leads, or into markets where it is one of many?

What it needs

Margin or operating profit by region, store group or route; the company's share in each locality, from outlet counts, local market data or industry surveys; delivery and service cost per outlet by region; revenue by locality, to weight the result; and the location of recent openings and closings.

How we would get it

Former regional and district managers and logistics heads on how cost and sales differ between dense and thin markets; former managers of local rivals on what happened when the company arrived; the record of openings and closings market by market.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a chain called a local leader because it has many outlets, when its margins do not rise with local share. Also a national average that hides a few dominant regions carrying the rest; a local lead that exists only because rivals have not yet arrived; and closing weak outlets town by town, which thins local share and raises the cost of those that remain.

For example

A private equity firm is underwriting a regional chain of physical therapy clinics that plans to enter four new states. The fit is clear: in its home metro areas, margin rises steadily with local share. But two-thirds of the clinics it opened in the last three years sit in markets where it is one of many, so its revenue-weighted local share and its margin have fallen every year. It fits the model and is losing at it, and the diligence question becomes whether filling in around its home markets beats entering new states.

The mathematics in fullAcross localities i, margin m(i) = a + b x s(i) - c x k(i), where s(i) is the company's share in locality i and k(i) its delivery and service cost per outlet there; it fits when b is positive, and it is winning when the revenue-weighted local share, the sum over i of w(i) x s(i) with w(i) locality i's share of company revenue, is high and rising, and new outlets open where s(i) is already high and k(i) low. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 64 to 65; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 14, p. 153

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Hotelling (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214

Transaction scale profit (Slywotzky)

Transaction scale profit: a large deal takes little more work than a small one

We first check that profit per transaction really climbs with transaction size, by setting revenue and cost per transaction against size band. If it does, the company is winning when it takes a larger share of the largest transactions than of the market overall, and when profit per hour of its team's time is highest in that band and not falling.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Morgan Stanley's lead in the largest financings.
What it does now
Whether the company wins more than its share of the largest transactions.
The mathematics
Winning: share of the top size band above share overall
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone's case is Morgan Stanley in the early 1970s, whose lead in financings for the Fortune 100 counted for more than its share overall, since, the book reports, a $100 million financing cost little more to carry out than a $5 million one; British Airways' shift toward long-haul routes is the second case (pp. 65 to 66). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 15 extends the model to brokerage-like and transportation-like businesses in general (p. 163).

Why it works now

Revenue by transaction size used to live only in internal systems; much of it can now be rebuilt from filings, league tables and fee disclosures, and the rest comes from the people who priced the deals. The Desk asks how much more work a large transaction takes than a small one, and whether the company wins more than its share of the largest.

When it applies

A business paid by the deal, the shipment or the trade, such as banking, brokerage, advisory, freight or payments, whose cost per transaction is largely fixed, so a deal many times larger earns many times more for little more work; not a company that merely depends on a few large clients whose deals are no more profitable, and not blockbuster profit, where a few large products rather than large transactions carry the business.

What we would ask

How much more work does a transaction ten times larger take, and how much more does it pay?
What share of the largest transactions in this market does the company win, compared with its share of all transactions?

What it needs

Revenue and number of transactions by size band, as disclosed or rebuilt from league tables and deal records; fee rate by size band; staff cost or hours per transaction by size band where it can be inferred; the company's share of the largest band and of the whole market; and the concentration of revenue among its largest clients.

How we would get it

Former deal leaders, pricing heads and operations managers on what a large transaction really costs compared with a small one; clients' former treasury or procurement staff on how they choose providers for their largest deals; league tables and deal records for the share of large transactions won over time.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a deal business called a scale player because its average deal is large, when its share of the largest deals is no higher than its share overall. Also large deals that carry risk or capital the fee does not cover; fee rates the biggest clients push down until size stops paying; and large clients taking the work in-house.

For example

An investor is looking at a freight broker whose revenue grew fast by adding thousands of small shippers. The fit is real: a large contract route earns several times the profit of a small account for about the same staff time. But its share of the largest routes fell from about a fifth to about a tenth in three years, now below its share of the market overall, so revenue rose while profit per staff hour fell. It fits the model and is losing at it; former account managers can say why the large routes left.

The mathematics in fullProfit on a transaction of size D is pi(D) = f(D) x D - F - v x D, where f(D) is the fee rate, F the fixed cost of doing any transaction and v the cost that grows with size; the company is winning when its share of the largest size band, w(top), exceeds its share of all transactions, w, and its profit per hour, pi(D) / h(D) with h(D) the team hours a transaction takes, is highest in that band and not falling. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), pp. 65 to 66; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 15, p. 163

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Value chain position profit (Slywotzky)

Value chain position profit: stand where the industry's profit collects

We first check that the company sits at the stage of its industry's chain that earns the most, by setting its return on capital beside those of its publicly traded suppliers and customers over a full cycle. If it does, the company is winning when that return stays above the adjacent stages through downturns and its share of the chain's total operating profit is stable or rising.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Intel; retold in 2002 with Intel and Microsoft against the PC makers.
What it does now
Whether the company's share of the chain's profit is rising or slipping.
The mathematics
Winning: positive return spread every year, pool share z rising
The full entry
Where it began

The Art of Profitability's Lesson 16 builds it from cases where one link takes most of an industry's profit: Intel and Microsoft against the makers of the personal computers themselves, Nike as designer and marketer, Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Toys R Us against their suppliers, and best-selling authors such as Tom Clancy against their publishers (p. 172). The Profit Zone had listed Intel, Blockbuster Video and Republic Industries as its practitioners (Exhibit 3.3, p. 47).

Why it works now

Returns for every listed stage of a chain, and the dependence disclosures that suppliers and customers must file, can now be set side by side quickly. The Desk asks where in the chain the profit collects across a full cycle, and whether the company's share of it is rising or slipping.

When it applies

A company whose return on capital has stayed well above that of its suppliers and its customers in the same chain through at least one downturn, typically one that those suppliers or customers name as a dependence in their own filings; not a stage earning from a temporary shortage, which is cycle profit, and not simply the largest firm at its stage, which is relative market share profit.

What we would ask

Which stage of this industry's chain earns the highest return on capital across a full cycle, and is the company in it?
If the company raised its price, where else could its suppliers or its customers go?

What it needs

Operating profit and invested capital for the company and for the publicly traded suppliers and customers in its chain, for every year of at least one full cycle; the concentration disclosures in their filings that name the company; and the company's realized prices through downturns compared with the adjacent stages'.

How we would get it

Former procurement and sales leaders on both sides of the company's key relationships on who gives way in a negotiation and why; former executives of suppliers and customers on what switching away would cost them; the record of price changes and contract renewals across the chain.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company said to own the key position because it is visible or well known, when its return over the cycle is no higher than its neighbors'. Also profit read from one good year in a cyclical chain; dominance resting on a single relationship that can be renegotiated; and a position that lasts only while the technology or the regulation stays as it is.

For example

A fund is comparing two suppliers to the same assembly industry, both with strong margins this year. The first is winning at the model: most customers name it as a sole source, its return stayed above theirs through the last downturn, and its share of the chain's operating profit has risen for five years. The second earned as much at the peak, but its return fell below its customers' in the slump and its share of the chain's profit is drifting down; it was earning from the cycle, not from its position.

The mathematics in fullThe company's share of the chain's profit pool is z = pi(k) / (sum over stages j of pi(j)), with pi each listed stage's operating profit, and its return spread is ROIC(k) less the adjacent stages' average ROIC; it is winning when the spread is positive in every year of the cycle and z is stable or rising. In the bargaining split u(k) = d(k) + (S - d(k) - d(j)) / 2, with S the joint surplus and d what each side gets without a deal, that requires its own d(k) high and its counterparties' d(j) low. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), Exhibit 3.3, p. 47; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 16, p. 172

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Cycle profit (Slywotzky)

Cycle profit: break even lower than rivals, and price with the cycle

We first check that the company's profit really swings with the industry's use of capacity, by fitting its margin against utilization over at least one full cycle. If it does, the company is winning when it breaks even at a lower utilization than its rivals, its margin stays positive at the trough, and its prices rise before the industry's and fall after them.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Dow Chemical leading price rises and lagging cuts.
What it does now
What a cyclical producer earns at the bottom of the cycle, not the top.
The mathematics
Winning: breakeven U* = -a / b below every rival's
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone's example is Dow Chemical, which led price increases as capacity tightened and was slow to follow cuts as it loosened (p. 67). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 17 draws profit against capacity utilization and points to Toyota's work to lower its breakeven point, noting a cash reserve that the book reports at more than sixteen billion dollars by late 2001 (p. 177).

Why it works now

Industry utilization, price indexes and a company's margins over several cycles can now be lined up quickly, which makes breakeven a measured number rather than a claim. The Desk asks where the company breaks even compared with its rivals, and whether it led or followed the last price moves.

When it applies

A capacity-heavy producer, in chemicals, steel, paper, memory chips, shipping or autos, whose margins rise and fall with the industry's utilization of capacity; not a business whose earnings swing for other reasons, such as passing through input costs or one customer's orders, and not an industry in lasting decline, where no recovery follows the trough.

What we would ask

At what level of industry capacity use does the company stop making money, and where is that level for its rivals?
In the last upturn and downturn, did the company move its prices before or after the rest of the industry?

What it needs

Quarterly or annual margins for the company and its publicly traded rivals over at least one full cycle; industry capacity utilization for the same periods; the company's realized prices against an industry price index; fixed costs, to check the fitted breakeven; and cash built up at peaks and spent at troughs.

How we would get it

Former plant managers and controllers on fixed costs and the real breakeven; former pricing and commercial leaders on who led each price move and who followed; industry histories of capacity added, delayed and closed.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company said to manage the cycle because it is profitable today, when its margin has never been tested at a trough. Also a breakeven measured after a temporary cost cut; costs that rose with sales in the upturn and do not fall back, which lifts breakeven just when it matters; a through-cycle margin averaged over good years only; and rivals' capacity already on order.

For example

An investor is comparing two producers in a cyclical chemical market after a strong year for both. Fitted over two cycles, the first breaks even when the industry runs at about two-thirds of capacity and the second only above four-fifths; the first also raised prices a quarter ahead of the index and cut them a quarter behind it. Both fit the model and only the first is winning at it; the second's peak earnings say nothing about how it fares when utilization falls back.

The mathematics in fullFitting margin m(t) = a + b x U(t) over the cycle, where U(t) is industry capacity utilization, gives the utilization at which the company breaks even, U* = -a / b; it is winning when its U* is below each rival's, its margin at the lowest U of the cycle is positive, and its realized price leads the industry index up and lags it down. Structurally its own breakeven is u* = F / ((P - v) x K), with F fixed cost, P price, v variable cost per unit and K capacity. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 67; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 17, p. 177

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Ezekiel (1938). The Cobweb Theorem. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(2), 255. https://doi.org/10.2307/1881734
Anderson, Banker, Janakiraman (2003). Are Selling, General, and Administrative Costs "Sticky"? Journal of Accounting Research 41(1), 47-63. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00095

After-sale profit (Slywotzky)

After-sale profit: the margin is in what the owner needs after the big purchase

We first check that the follow-on lines, financing, insurance, service, parts and add-ons, carry more of a unit's lifetime margin than the original purchase does. If they do, the company is winning when it captures a high and steady share of what owners of its units spend after the purchase, and that share does not fade as the units age.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: GE financing and servicing its engines and locomotives.
What it does now
Whether the company keeps owners' later spending as its units age.
The mathematics
Winning: capture rate a(t) stays high as units age
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone's examples are GE, which built financing and service around its aircraft engines and locomotives, and Softbank's Kingston, which earned from add-on memory without ever having made the computers it went into (p. 68). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 18 makes the same point with cars, computers, copiers and elevators: the first purchase is fought over on price, and what follows meets far less resistance (p. 188).

Why it works now

Service, parts, financing and insurance are often reported together with the product, and can now be pulled apart from segment notes, dealer data and finance-arm disclosures. The Desk asks what an owner spends after the purchase over a unit's life, and what share of it the company keeps as the unit ages.

When it applies

A maker or dealer of equipment, vehicles, machinery or systems whose margin on the original purchase is thin and whose service, parts, financing or insurance earn most of the profit over a unit's life, in a follow-on market any competent provider may serve; not installed base profit, where consumables or upgrades that only the company's own base can use carry the margin, and not a finance arm whose income is really credit risk.

What we would ask

Over the life of one unit, how much does an owner spend after the purchase, and what share of it does the company capture?
Does that share last as units age, or do independent providers take over after the first few years?

What it needs

Revenue and margin split between the original product and each follow-on line; the number of units in service, by age where disclosed; follow-on revenue per unit in service, by age; an estimate of total follow-on spending per unit from dealers or industry data, to compute the capture rate; and captive finance income set beside its credit losses.

How we would get it

Former service and parts managers and dealer principals on capture rates and price resistance; independent service providers on how much of the follow-on business they take; owners' maintenance and procurement heads on how they choose suppliers after the purchase.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company credited with after-sale profit because it reports a service line, when its share of owners' later spending is small or falling. Also follow-on margins that draw in independent providers and regulators once they are visible; capture rates measured on new units that fall as the fleet ages; and bundles of equipment, service and financing that hide where the margin sits.

For example

A strategic acquirer is weighing an equipment maker with thin product margins and a profitable service business. The fit is real: over a unit's life, service and parts earn about three times the original margin. But the maker captures most owner spending only for the first three years; by year seven independent shops take most of it. It fits the model and is losing at it, and the deal turns on whether a service contract offered with the equipment could keep owners past year three.

The mathematics in fullLifetime value of one unit V = (P0 - c0) + sum over t of S(t) x a(t) x (p(t) - c(t)) / (1 + r)^t, where P0 - c0 is the margin on the original purchase, S(t) the chance the unit is still in service in year t, a(t) the company's capture rate, its share of the owner's follow-on spending in year t, p(t) - c(t) the follow-on margin and r the discount rate; it fits when the sum exceeds P0 - c0, and the company is winning when a(t) stays high as t rises. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 68; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 18, p. 188

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Adams, Yellen (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(3), 475. https://doi.org/10.2307/1886045

New product profit (Slywotzky)

New product profit: a category earns most while it grows fastest

We first check that the company's profit really comes from categories in their growth phase, by setting each product line's margin beside its growth. If it does, the company is winning when the share of its gross profit from categories still before their peak growth stays high, which means it moves money into the next category before the current one peaks.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: PC desktops, laptops and servers, with Compaq.
What it does now
Whether profit from still-growing categories is replaced in time.
The mathematics
Winning: g, the profit share before the peak, stays high
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone illustrates it with personal computers: desktops had matured and earned little, laptops still made money, and servers, the book reports, earned the most and gave Compaq most of its profit (p. 68). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 19 follows the same arc through radios, televisions, VCRs and Walkmans, and through sedans, minivans and SUVs, and draws category profit as a parabola, the rate of change of the S-shaped curve of volume (p. 197).

Why it works now

Product-line growth, prices and margins can now be followed from segment notes, channel data and the histories of comparable categories, so a line's position on its curve need not be guessed. The Desk asks what share of profit comes from categories still growing fastest, and where the money for the next one is going.

When it applies

A company whose profit comes mostly from product categories in fast growth, with margins that fall as each category matures, so its results depend on reaching the next category in time; not specialty product profit, where the premium comes from protection rather than growth, and not a single surge in orders mistaken for a growing category.

What we would ask

What share of the company's gross profit comes from categories whose growth is still accelerating?
Where is the next category, and did the company start investing in it before the present one peaked?

What it needs

Revenue, units and gross margin by product line or segment for each year; average selling prices and inventory write-downs by line; capital and research spending by line where disclosed; and the pattern of operating, investing and financing cash flows, which marks where each business sits in its life cycle.

How we would get it

Former category and product line managers on where each line sits on its curve and when price competition began; channel buyers on which categories they are expanding and which they are cutting back; the histories of comparable categories and when their margins turned.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called a new-product earner because it launches often, when most of its gross profit comes from categories that have stopped growing. Also a growth spike from one order or a subsidy read as category growth; a category that keeps being redefined and so never seems to mature; and entering the next category too early to earn from it.

For example

A fund is studying a consumer electronics maker with record margins in its main product line. The fit is clear: each of its past categories earned most while growing fastest. But the share of gross profit from categories still before their peak has fallen from most of the total to about a tenth in four years, because its next line launched after the main category had already peaked. The record margin is the top of the curve; it fits the model and is losing at it.

The mathematics in fullUnits per period in a category follow M x dF/dt = M x (p + q x F(t)) x (1 - F(t)), where F(t) is the share of eventual adopters reached by time t, M the eventual market and p and q the rates of innovation and imitation; growth peaks where F = (q - p) / (2 x q), and the company is winning while g, its gross profit from categories with F still below that point divided by its total gross profit, stays high, which requires the next category to start before the current one passes its peak. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 68; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 19, p. 197

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215
Dickinson (2011). Cash Flow Patterns as a Proxy for Firm Life Cycle. The Accounting Review 86(6), 1969-1994. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10130

Relative market share profit (Slywotzky)

Relative market share profit: what pays is being well ahead of the nearest rival

We first check that size lowers cost in this market, by setting margin against the company's share divided by its largest rival's across the segments it serves. If it does, the company is winning when that ratio is above one in the segments that carry most of its revenue, its overhead, advertising and research cost less per dollar of sales than the rival's, and the ratio is not falling.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris; traced in 2002 to Bruce Henderson.
What it does now
Whether a lead over the nearest rival lowers cost per dollar of sales.
The mathematics
Winning: weighted RS above one, cost ratio below the rival's
The full entry
Where it began

The Art of Profitability's Lesson 20 traces the model to Bruce Henderson, founder of the Boston Consulting Group, with Michael Porter completing the picture, and names Jack Welch's GE as its most thorough practitioner (p. 211). The Profit Zone lists Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris (Exhibit 3.3, p. 47). The rule that traveled with it was blunt: lead the market, or leave it.

Why it works now

Shares by segment and the cost ratios of a leader and its nearest rival can now be assembled from filings and trade data, so the claim that size pays can be checked segment by segment. The Desk asks how large the company is against its nearest rival in each market, and whether that lead shows up as lower cost per dollar of sales.

When it applies

A company that leads its nearest rival by a wide margin in markets where scale lowers cost per unit, through purchasing, overhead, advertising or research, and whose margins are higher where its lead is larger; not local leadership profit, where the share that matters is the one in each town, and not a large share in a market where scale no longer lowers cost.

What we would ask

In each market the company serves, how large is it compared with its largest rival, rather than with the market as a whole?
Does the company spend less per dollar of sales on overhead, advertising and research than that rival, and does the difference reach its margins?

What it needs

Market shares for the company and its largest rival in each segment, from trade data or the companies' own statements; operating margin by segment; selling, general and administrative cost and research as a share of revenue for both companies; revenue by segment, to weight the result; and input costs against peers where purchasing scale is claimed.

How we would get it

Former segment heads and purchasing leaders on where size actually lowers cost and where it does not; former executives of the second- and third-ranked rivals on what the leader's scale cost them; trade and industry association data on share by segment over time.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called the scale leader because it is the biggest name, when its cost ratios are no lower than its nearest rival's. Also a market defined so broadly that share means nothing, or so narrowly that any company leads one; a lead where production is outsourced or distribution is digital, so size no longer lowers cost; and a leader whose size slows it when the market shifts.

For example

A conglomerate's board is deciding which divisions to fund. One is winning at the model: twice the size of its nearest rival, it spends far less on overhead and advertising per dollar of sales, and its margin is higher by about the same amount. Another also leads its market, but its cost ratios match the second player's and its lead has narrowed for three years. It wears the label and is losing at it; the board's question is what that lead actually earns.

The mathematics in fullIn segment j, relative share RS(j) = s(j) / s(r, j), the company's share over its largest rival's; it fits when b is positive in m(j) = a + b x log(RS(j)), fitted across segments with m the operating margin, and it is winning when the revenue-weighted sum over j of w(j) x RS(j), with w(j) segment j's share of revenue, is above one and not falling, and its (overhead + advertising + research) / sales is below the rival's. In a head-on contest the square law makes a size advantage count as its square. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), Exhibit 3.3, p. 47; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 20, p. 211

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Lanchester, F. W. (1916). Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. Constable. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Experience curve profit (Slywotzky)

Experience curve profit: the producer furthest down the cost curve earns the most

We first check that unit cost really falls with cumulative output, line by line for labor, materials and overhead, rather than with time or input prices. If it does, the company is winning when its rate of decline per doubling and its cumulative output both exceed its rivals', so its unit cost is lowest, and when no cost line, overhead included, is rising.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Milliken and Emerson Electric.
What it does now
Whether a volume lead is a cost lead in every line, overhead included.
The mathematics
c = c(1) x Q^(-b); winning when b and Q both beat rivals'
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone lists Milliken and Emerson Electric as practitioners (Exhibit 3.3, p. 47). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 21 uses a teaching case, an unnamed plant whose labor cost fell along a seventy-five percent curve and materials along an eighty-five percent curve while overhead rose along a one hundred forty percent curve; once every line was managed down, the book reports, two rivals left the business, the client acquired their plants cheaply and all three plants earned twelve percent margins (p. 222).

Why it works now

Unit costs by line and cumulative output can now be rebuilt from years of filings and set against rivals', so a claimed cost lead can be checked line by line. The Desk asks how much cost falls with each doubling of output compared with the nearest rival, and whether overhead is following the factory floor down.

When it applies

A producer whose unit cost has fallen at a steady rate with each doubling of its cumulative output, in a product where buyers compare on price and the lowest-cost producer sets the terms; not low-cost business design profit, where the advantage is a different and cheaper way of operating, and not specialist profit, where the edge comes from knowing one customer segment better than anyone.

What we would ask

Each time the company's total output has doubled, by how much has its cost per unit fallen, line by line?
How do its cumulative output and its rate of cost decline compare with those of its nearest rival?

What it needs

Unit cost, or cost of goods sold per unit, over many years; cumulative units produced, from reported volumes; cost broken into labor, materials and overhead where the notes allow; the same figures for the main rivals where they report them; and selling prices over the same years, to see whether savings were passed on.

How we would get it

Former plant managers, manufacturing engineers and cost accountants on what drove each cost line down and what did not move; former executives of smaller rivals on how far behind on cost they were; the record of prices and capacity exits in the industry.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called the experience leader because it is the oldest or largest producer, when its cost per unit is not falling faster than its rivals'. Also savings from cheaper inputs, purchased equipment or outsourcing that any rival can match; learning that spills across the industry; a curve fitted to years when cost and output simply trended together; and overhead that grows with complexity while the factory floor improves.

For example

A fund is studying a battery pack assembler that claims a lasting cost lead because it has built the most units. The fit is real: its labor and materials costs fall steadily with output. But its total unit cost falls about ten percent per doubling against a younger rival's twenty, because its overhead per unit rises with every new variant. It has the larger output and the slower curve, so at this pace the rival's unit cost crosses below its own within a few doublings; it fits the model and is losing at it.

The mathematics in fullUnit cost after cumulative output Q is c(Q) = c(1) x Q^(-b), so each doubling multiplies cost by 2^(-b); b is estimated from changes, log c(t) - log c(t - 1) against log Q(t) - log Q(t - 1), because both series trend with time, and separately for each cost line j as b(j); the company is winning when its b and its cumulative Q both exceed its rivals', so that from similar starting costs c(1) its c(Q) is lowest, and every b(j), overhead included, is above zero. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), Exhibit 3.3, p. 47; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 21, p. 222

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)
Granger, Newbold (1974). Spurious regressions in econometrics. Journal of Econometrics 2(2), 111-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(74)90034-7

Low-cost business design profit (Slywotzky)

Low-cost business design profit: win on a cheaper design, not on size

We first check that the company's cost gap with the incumbents comes from how the business is designed, its network, plant or channel, rather than from size, newer assets or cheaper inputs. If it does, the company is winning when its cost per unit of output stays well below theirs as it grows, and its return on capital is higher at a smaller share.

Born to answer
The Profit Zone, 1997: Nucor's minimills, Southwest, and Dell's direct model.
What it does now
Whether a cost gap comes from the design, and whether it survives growth.
The mathematics
Winning: gap G = 1 - c(N) / c(I) stays large as volume grows
The full entry
Where it began

The Profit Zone's cases are Nucor's minimills against integrated mills, Southwest's point-to-point flying against hub-and-spoke carriers, and Dell's direct model against field sales forces and dealers: designs that, the book reports, can run twenty to thirty percent below incumbents' costs, which makes the incumbents' long experience beside the point (p. 70). The Art of Profitability's Lesson 22 repeats them and adds Formosa Plastics, Wal-Mart, Geico and Home Depot (p. 231).

Why it works now

Operating statistics such as cost per ton or per seat mile, with margin and asset turnover from the filings, make the size of a design gap measurable rather than asserted. The Desk asks which design choice produces the gap, and whether the gap stays open as the company grows.

When it applies

A company whose cost per unit of output, per ton, per seat mile or per order, is well below larger incumbents' because it runs on a different design, and which earns more than they do at lower prices and a smaller share; not experience curve profit, where the lead comes from more output on the same design, and not a gap from young assets, cheaper labor or a temporary input contract.

What we would ask

What is the company's cost per unit of output compared with the incumbents', and which design choice explains the gap?
Has the gap stayed as wide as the company has grown, or is it closing?

What it needs

Cost per unit of output for the company and its peers over several years, from operating statistics where the industry reports them; margin and asset turnover for each; return on invested capital set beside market share; and the cost lines that carry the gap, to see whether they come from the design or from inputs.

How we would get it

Former operations and network planning executives of the company and of incumbents on where the cost gap comes from and why it has not been copied; former incumbent executives on attempts to launch a low-cost unit of their own; industry operating statistics over time.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called a low-cost design because its prices are low, when its unit cost is not, or when the gap comes from young assets, cheaper labor or an input contract. Also an incumbent that copies the design or starts a separate unit built on it; growth that adds the complexity the design was built to avoid; and earnings-management screens that read an unusual cost structure as manipulation.

For example

A lender is assessing a regional carrier that grew fast on a simpler network than the incumbents'. The fit is clear: five years ago its cost per seat mile was about a quarter below theirs, from the design rather than from wages. Since it added connecting routes and a second aircraft type, the gap has narrowed to under a tenth and its return on capital has fallen to theirs. It fits the model and is losing at it; former network planners can say which additions brought the incumbents' costs with them.

The mathematics in fullThe cost gap is G = 1 - c(N) / c(I), where c(N) and c(I) are the company's and the incumbents' cost per unit of output, and returns compare as margin x asset turnover; the company is winning while G stays large as its volume grows and its return exceeds the incumbents' at a smaller share. On cost curves the design is a lower curve, c(N) = theta x c(1) x Q^(-b) with theta below one, not a further point on the old one, and its share of industry output grows while its return beats the industry average. Where it is in the books

The Profit Zone (1997), p. 70; The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 22, p. 231

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Soliman (2008). The Use of DuPont Analysis by Market Participants. The Accounting Review 83(3), 823-853. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.823
Srivastava (2019). Improving the measures of real earnings management. Review of Accounting Studies 24(4), 1277-1316. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-019-09505-z

Digital profit (Slywotzky)

Digital profit: move the information side online and let customers pull

We first check that moving information work online has changed the operating numbers it should change: inventory turns, the cash cycle, and cost per order and per customer contact. If it has, the company is winning when those measures improve by multiples rather than percentages, beat its rivals', and sit on a business that already earned more than its cost of capital.

Born to answer
The Art of Profitability, 2002, Lesson 23: Dell, Cemex and Oracle.
What it does now
Whether automation multiplies a sound design or decorates a weak one.
The mathematics
Winning: turns and cash cycle better by multiples than rivals'
The full entry
Where it began

Digital profit is the one model found only in The Art of Profitability, where it is Lesson 23, added to the twenty-two from The Profit Zone. The book reports that Dell's inventory turns rose from six to sixty a year, that Cemex cut its response to an order from 180 minutes to twenty, and that Oracle brought the cost of a customer interaction down from $350 to $20 (pp. 239 to 242), and it insists that going digital multiplies a sound design rather than rescuing a weak one. Profit Patterns had described the same shift as the pattern Conventional to Digital Business Design (pp. 253 to 259).

Why it works now

The same test now applies to automation and AI programs: the gain should appear as faster turns, a shorter cash cycle and a lower cost per transaction, on a design that already earned its keep. The Desk asks what in the work has changed since the program began, by how much against rivals, and whether the business earned its return before it.

When it applies

A company whose customers configure and place their own orders online, whose inventory turns and cash cycle have improved by multiples since its information work moved online, and whose design earned a good return before; not a company that has simply installed the same software as its rivals, and not one presenting a technology program as the source of margins it has yet to show.

What we would ask

Since the program began, how have inventory turns, the cash cycle and the cost of handling an order or a customer contact changed, against the company's own past and its rivals'?
Was the business earning more than its cost of capital before the program, or is the program expected to create that return?

What it needs

Days of inventory, receivables and payables, and so the cash conversion cycle, for several years before and after the program, for the company and its rivals; revenue, to turn days into dollars; revenue per employee; selling and administrative cost per order or as a share of sales; the share of orders taken online where disclosed; and return on invested capital before the program began.

How we would get it

Former operations, supply chain and customer service leaders on what changed in the work itself and what stayed manual; customers' purchasing staff on whether they now configure and order for themselves; the company's disclosures on order channels and headcount.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a company called digital because it talks about its platform, when its turns, cash cycle and cost per transaction have not moved. Also working capital improved by stretching suppliers or financing receivables rather than by building to customers' orders; gains every rival gets from the same software; and, as the book warns, a weak design that digital tools only make faster.

For example

A fund is studying two distributors that both credit new ordering platforms for higher margins. The first is winning at the model: it earned well before the platform, inventory now turns several times faster, its cash cycle has gone from more than two months to below zero, and customers place most orders themselves. The second fits only the label: its turns and cash cycle are unchanged, and its margin gain coincides with a price increase. The interviews with former warehouse and customer service managers test whether the second's work has changed at all.

The mathematics in fullBy Little's law average inventory I = C x D, where C is the cost of goods sold per day and D the days a unit waits, so turns = 365 / D; the cash conversion cycle CCC = days of inventory + days of receivables - days of payables, and the working capital freed is (CCC before - CCC after) x revenue per day. The company is winning when D, CCC and cost per transaction have fallen by multiples against its own baseline and its rivals', on a return on invested capital that exceeded its cost of capital before the program. Where it is in the books

The Art of Profitability (2002), Lesson 23, pp. 239 to 242; Profit Patterns (1999), Conventional to Digital Business Design, pp. 253 to 259

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Little (1961). A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = lambda W. Operations Research 9(3), 383-387. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.3.383
Dechow, Kothari, Watts (1998). The relation between earnings and cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(2), 133-168. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00020-2
Lee, Padmanabhan, Whang (1997). Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect. Management Science 43(4), 546-558. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546

Where the profit is moving

The recurring patterns by which profit migrates between companies, links of a value chain, channels and customers, and how to tell which one an industry is in.

Drawn from Profit Patterns (1999) by Slywotzky and his colleagues, checked page by page against the first edition, in the book's seven groups of patterns. The examples are the book's own; the signatures and the mathematics are Vista's reading.

No profit (Slywotzky)

No profit: a whole cycle that earns nothing

We total each competitor's profit over a full cycle after a charge for its capital; if even the leader's total is below zero, the industry is in the pattern. The winners are then any firm with a positive total and, if real prices fell faster than unit costs, the customers.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: airlines, and Intel in memory chips.
What it does now
Whether anyone earns its cost of capital over the cycle.
The mathematics
Sum over the cycle of (NOPAT - r x C) at or below zero
The full entry
Where it began

Profit Patterns opens its group of six mega patterns with no profit. Its earliest examples are farming and passenger railroads. The modern ones are airlines in the United States, which the book reports lost more from 1990 to 1993 than the industry had earned in the forty years before, and Intel, which the book reports lost $200 million in memory chips in 1985 before leaving that business (pp. 57 to 61).

Why it works now

The pattern is likeliest wherever rivals have copied one another's model and capacity is cheap to add, and restructuring charges that make each bad year look exceptional often hide it. The Desk asks whether anyone, the leader included, earned its cost of capital over the last full cycle, and who collected the value instead.

When it applies

Look-alike competitors fighting on price where, summed over a full cycle, even the share leader earned less than its cost of capital; not a trough in an industry that covers its cost of capital across the cycle, nor one weak firm in a healthy field.

What we would ask

Summed over the last full cycle, did any company in this industry, the leader included, earn more than its cost of capital?
What used to keep prices disciplined here (few rivals, regulation, weak players leaving), and is any of it still at work?

What it needs

For every peer across a full peak-to-peak cycle: after-tax operating profit, capital employed (write-downs added back) and cost of capital, year by year; real price per unit and unit cost; capacity against demand; restructuring charges.

How we would get it

Former pricing and capacity planners at the rivals and procurement leads at large customers, on how price is really set and what capacity is coming; the record of past exits and mergers, and what price did after each.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: an industry is called profitless because a few bad years make the story sound right, with no full-cycle totals behind it; a firm that escaped with a different design is lumped in with the rest; or write-downs shrank the capital base and flatter later returns.

For example

A fund expects the share leader of a look-alike industry to win as weaker rivals fail. Over two cycles, with write-downs added back, the leader's profit after a capital charge is below zero, only less so than its rivals', and real prices fell faster than unit costs. Customers are collecting; the thesis must name what would change that.

The mathematics in fullCEP(i) = sum over the cycle of [NOPAT(i,t) - r x C(i,t)], after-tax operating profit less a charge at cost of capital r on capital C, write-downs added back; the pattern is present when the leader's CEP and the industry's total are at or below zero, a firm wins only if its CEP > 0, and customers collect when real price over unit cost, p / c, falls. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 57 to 61

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Ezekiel (1938). The Cobweb Theorem. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(2), 255. https://doi.org/10.2307/1881734
Green, Porter (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica 52(1), 87. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Back to profit (Slywotzky)

Back to profit: a new design in a commodity business

We look for the company in a profitless industry that rebuilt its offer around needs incumbents neglect. It is winning if its return on capital beats its cost and flat peers through a downturn, and its average price rises from customers moving to new formats, not from list prices.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Swatch and the Swiss watch industry.
What it does now
Whether a commodity redesign earns above its cost, and from what.
The mathematics
Spread over peers > 0 through a downturn, carried by mix
The full entry
Where it began

Profit Patterns sets back to profit beside no profit among its mega patterns, as its mirror image. The lead case is Swiss watchmaking after the industry collapsed in the early 1980s: Nicolas Hayek's SMH made Swatch its volume brand and 'firewall', earned its profit on the costlier brands above it, and, the book reports, grew profit at double-digit rates for more than ten years. The book adds Starbucks making coffee an experience, Coca-Cola's resealable 20-ounce plastic bottle in money-losing grocery cola, and Cemex in cement (pp. 63 to 65).

Why it works now

Commodity businesses that earn again usually do it through a format, package or tier that changes what customers pay for, rather than through cost alone, and segment disclosures now make the mix shift visible. The Desk asks whether the leader's gain survived the last downturn, and whether it came from mix or from list price.

When it applies

A profitless industry in which one company's returns have climbed above its cost of capital while peers stayed flat, through a format, tier or service customers pay more for; not an upturn lifting every peer, nor a price rise any rival could match.

What we would ask

What do customers in this business care about that none of the incumbents is designing for?
Did the margin gain survive the last downturn, and did it come from customers moving to new formats or from higher list prices?

What it needs

Return on capital and cost of capital for the company and each peer, through at least one downturn; units and price per unit by format or tier, to split the change in average price into the shift between formats and the change within each; margin by format.

How we would get it

Customers who moved to the new format and those who did not, on what they pay for; former product and channel heads at the innovator and the incumbents, on how hard the design is to copy; the format's price and share history.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a rising margin is hailed as a new design because the story appeals, when peers show the same upturn; the format is copied within a few seasons; or the profitable top tier depends on a low-priced line that guards it, and that line is failing.

For example

A sponsor is weighing a maker of a commodity cleaning product whose margins rose three years running. The gain passes the test: returns stayed above the cost of capital through the last downturn while peers fell below, and the price split traces it to customers moving to a refill format, which two rivals' former engineers say neither will retool to copy.

The mathematics in fullSpread(t) = [ROIC(t) - r] minus the peers' median of the same; Delta P = sum over formats f of [w1(f) - w0(f)] x p0(f) + sum over f of w1(f) x [p1(f) - p0(f)], with w(f) the share of units and p(f) the price in format f in years 0 and 1; the company wins when ROIC > r, the spread stays positive through a downturn, and the first sum, the format shift, carries most of Delta P. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 63 to 65

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Hotelling (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214
Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6

Convergence (Slywotzky)

Convergence: rivals arriving from other industries

We sort rivals arriving from outside the industry by kind: neighbors bundling a one-stop offer, a substitute technology doing the same job, or premium and economy partners combining. The winner is the side whose share rises use by use, or whose products per customer rise.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: steel losing uses to plastic and aluminum.
What it does now
Which outside rival is gaining, and in which uses.
The mathematics
Substitute's share of each use, s(u, t), rising over time
The full entry
Where it began

Convergence is the third mega pattern, in three kinds: neighbors merging their offers into one-stop service, often once the rules allow it; rival technologies becoming able to meet the same need; and premium and economy partners joining forces. Its cases are banks, brokers, fund companies and insurers reaching for one-stop financial offers; steel, whose integrated mill model the book reports was worth $60 billion in 1960, losing uses in cars and beverages to plastic and aluminum; and biotech merging into pharmaceuticals (pp. 67 to 75).

Why it works now

Boundaries blur fastest where software lets a company in one industry reach another's customers at little added cost, and where a new technology does an old product's job in some uses but not yet in others. The Desk asks which rival in the lost deals did not exist five years ago, and whose share is rising use by use.

When it applies

Companies from another industry now take a measurable share of the same customers' spending, by a one-stop offer, a substitute technology or a premium and economy combination; not entry by a firm of the familiar kind, nor an alliance that changes no customer's choice.

What we would ask

Which competitor in recent lost deals did not exist in this market five years ago, and which industry did it come from?
Is the threat a broader offer that bundles this product with others, or a different technology that does the same job?

What it needs

Share of each use by technology, year by year, with each side's margin where known; products and cost to serve per customer for one-stop offers; the rivals named in each year's filings, and how closely the company's product descriptions match those of firms in other industries.

How we would get it

Customers who now shop across the old boundary, on what they compare and why; former strategy and product heads at the entrants and the incumbents; the record of share lost use by use, and of the rule changes that opened the boundary.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: an announcement from another industry is called convergence because it sounds like the future, while use-by-use shares have not moved; or a substitute that wins one use is assumed to win all, though its performance overlaps in only some.

For example

A lender to a maker of metal containers is told the business is safe because the other metal makers are disciplined. Use by use, a different material's share has risen in three of five applications and is flat in two. The convergence is real but partial: the maker's volume in the three uses is the risk, and the loan is sized to the two that remain.

The mathematics in fullFor each use u, the substitute's share s(u,t) = Q(sub,u,t) / [Q(sub,u,t) + Q(inc,u,t)], Q being the volume served by each technology; convergence is under way in u when s(u,t) rises year after year, the winner there is the side whose share and margin rise together, and in a one-stop contest it is the firm whose products per customer rise as its cost to serve per product falls. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 67 to 75

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Hoberg, Phillips (2016). Text-Based Network Industries and Endogenous Product Differentiation. Journal of Political Economy 124(5), 1423-1465. https://doi.org/10.1086/688176
Adams, Yellen (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(3), 475. https://doi.org/10.2307/1886045

Collapse of the middle (Slywotzky)

Collapse of the middle: value draining to both ends

We place each competitor on a line from cheapest to most complete and plot margin against position over time. The middle is collapsing when the plot becomes a U: the ends win, and a middle player loses as its gross margin falls and its sales and administrative cost per dollar of revenue rises.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: department stores between discounters and specialists.
What it does now
Whether peer margins form a U, and where the company sits on it.
The mathematics
m = a + b x z + c x z^2, with c > 0 and rising
The full entry
Where it began

Collapse of the middle is the fourth mega pattern, which the book extends to the conventional sales force, the costly middle between cheap customizing channels and complete solutions. Its cases are retailing, where the book reports discounters, superstores and upscale specialists created $163 billion of shareholder value in ten years as department stores fell behind; computers, where value went to Dell and to solution providers such as IBM, HP, EDS and Andersen; and business forms, where Moore gave ground to Wallace and JetForm (pp. 77 to 83).

Why it works now

The middle is under pressure wherever online shopping makes the cheapest option easy to find and specialists can reach customers directly, removing the middle's old reason to exist. The Desk asks where lost customers go, down to a cheaper option or up to a more complete one, and where the company sits on the margin curve.

When it applies

Peers' margins have split into a low-price group and a premium or full-solution group, while the firms in between lose share and spend more on sales per dollar of revenue; not a downturn that compresses every margin, nor one discounter taking share from everyone.

What we would ask

When this company loses a customer, does the customer go to a cheaper option or to a more complete or specialized one?
What does the sales force now spend to win a dollar of revenue, compared with five years ago?

What it needs

For each peer over five or more years: price relative to the market median, gross and operating margin, sales and administrative cost as a share of revenue, and market share; revenue moving to low-cost direct channels or to services; where lost customers went.

How we would get it

Customers who left the middle player, on where they went and why; former sales leaders on the cost to win and keep an account; channel executives at the discount and specialist ends; the record of peer margins over a decade.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a struggling mid-market firm is said to be caught in the middle because the phrase fits the mood, though peer margins show no U and its losses go to one rival; a passing low-end price war is read as permanent sorting; or the collapse is confined to one region.

For example

A family office is offered a stake in a regional distributor pitched as the full-line choice. Peer margins plotted against price position form a deepening U with the distributor at its bottom: gross margin down four years, sales cost per order up, small accounts lost to an online discounter and large ones to a specialist. The pattern is real; the target is losing it.

The mathematics in fullWith z(i) = p(i) / p(median), each firm's price relative to the market median, fit m(i,t) = a(t) + b(t) x z(i) + c(t) x z(i)^2 to peers' margins each year; the middle is collapsing when c(t) > 0 and rising, so margins bottom out near z = 1 and sink there, and a middle firm is losing when its gross margin falls as sales and administrative cost over revenue, SGA / R, rises. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 77 to 83

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Hotelling (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214
Anderson, Banker, Janakiraman (2003). Are Selling, General, and Administrative Costs "Sticky"? Journal of Accounting Research 41(1), 47-63. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00095

De facto standard (Slywotzky)

De facto standard: owning the rule everyone follows

We establish whether a market is settling on one format or interface, and which companies own part of it rather than merely building to it. The winners are those who collect: license and royalty income, and margins above the compliers' that persist from one product generation to the next.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Windows over Apple; Nellcor's pulse oximetry.
What it does now
Whether the company owns the standard or only complies with it.
The mathematics
Owner's take = license income plus margin above compliers
The full entry
Where it began

De facto standard is the fifth mega pattern; The Profit Zone's De Facto Standard Profit (pp. 46 to 47) covers the same ground and names increasing returns to scale as its defining trait. The cases are Nellcor Puritan Bennett, whose pulse oximetry algorithms, licensed to dozens of rivals, became the monitoring standard while it kept most of the device market; Apple keeping its better interface to itself as Microsoft made Windows the standard, a shift the book reports at over $100 billion of shareholder value; and Intel Inside, a standard built by branding (pp. 85 to 89).

Why it works now

Standards are now contested in data formats, software interfaces and communication protocols, and the owner is often whoever governs the next version rather than whoever wrote the first. The Desk asks whether the company collects on the standard or only complies with it, and whether its take survives a change of product generation.

When it applies

A market settled or visibly settling on one format, interface or protocol that rivals license or build to; not a merely popular product or installed base that rivals do not build to, nor an open standard nobody owns.

What we would ask

If this standard wins, does the company collect through licenses, royalties or control of the next version, or does it only comply?
How many backers does this format need to prevail, and at what size would each one's share become too small to matter?

What it needs

License and royalty revenue; total revenue of the products built on the standard; the company's gross margin against the compliers'; its share of the installed base by product generation; counts of licensees, developers and compatible devices.

How we would get it

Former licensing executives and standards-body delegates on how the coalition was built and who governs the next version; developers and device makers on what switching would cost them; licensee counts and share by product generation.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a popular product is called a standard because the word flatters it, though nobody licenses it and customers could switch at little cost; complying is mistaken for owning; or the coalition grows so large that decisions stall and no member earns much.

For example

A growth fund is asked to back a sensor maker whose data format three rivals have adopted. The format is becoming the standard, but the maker collects little: small license income, a gross margin equal to the compliers', and a next version governed by a consortium it does not control. The pattern is real; the target only complies, and the case is rebuilt as hardware.

The mathematics in fullThe owner's take, tau = [L + (m(own) - m(comp)) x R(own)] / R(std): license and royalty income L plus the company's margin above the compliers' margin on its own revenue R(own), over all revenue built on the standard, R(std); the company is winning when tau is positive and stable across product generations, and only complying when L is near zero and m(own) equals m(comp). Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 85 to 89

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208

Technology shifts the board (Slywotzky)

Technology shifts the board: profit moves along the chain

We map each link's share of the chain's profit before a new technology arrives and track it as adoption grows. The links whose share rises with adoption are collecting the shift, and a company is winning only if it sits in one of them and its own share within that link is rising too.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: the VCR moving power from networks to Hollywood.
What it does now
Which link of the chain gains profit share as a technology spreads.
The mathematics
Each link's profit share S(k) tracked against adoption A(t)
The full entry
Where it began

Technology shifts the board closes the six mega patterns. Its lead case is the VCR, which loosened the networks' control of prime-time viewing, shifted influence from New York back to Hollywood, and brought rental and video revenue to a film business that had been barely profitable. Earlier, the book says, the car made fortunes for Rockefeller, for Ford and then Sloan, and for Sears under General Wood, the personal computer did the same for Grove, Jobs, Gates and Dell, and the Internet was the case to come (pp. 91 to 95).

Why it works now

The book expected its pattern of conventional to digital business design to be counted among the mega patterns in time (p. 259), and every broad technology since, artificial intelligence included, poses the same question of which link gains. The Desk asks which link's share of the chain's profit is rising with adoption, and whether the company stands there.

When it applies

A new technology is changing how a product is made, delivered or consumed, and profit or market value shares across the chain's links are moving as it spreads; not a technology that lowers every link's cost alike and leaves the shares unchanged.

What we would ask

As the new technology spreads, which link of this chain is gaining share of the chain's profit, and which is losing it?
What would it cost the company now to stand at the link that is gaining, and what would waiting cost?

What it needs

Operating profit by link of the chain, from the main companies' filings at each link, year by year; the adoption rate of the new technology; new revenue lines or channels and their growth; legacy write-downs; research and capital spending moved to the new technology.

How we would get it

Early adopters and those who have not adopted, on how their spending shifts; former strategy heads at incumbents and entrants on where margin moved in early deployments; comparable technologies' adoption curves and profit shares before and after.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a new technology is said to shift the board because the phrase sounds strategic, while link-by-link profit shares have not moved; adoption is projected from its steepest early stretch; or the incumbent's assets prove to be the scarce input the technology needs.

For example

A fund that owns physical clinics fears remote consultation. In comparable regions where remote use grew, the clinics' share of the chain's profit stayed level, the referral intermediaries' share fell and the specialists' share rose. The shift is real but runs through the specialists, so the question becomes how securely the clinics retain theirs.

The mathematics in fullWith adoption A(t) following dA/dt = (p + q x A / M) x (M - A), for innovation rate p, imitation rate q and ceiling M, track each link's profit share S(k,t) = pi(k,t) / sum over j of pi(j,t); link k is collecting the shift when the change in S(k) per unit of A is positive, and a firm in link k is winning when its own share of pi(k) rises as well. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 91 to 95

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. (book)

Deintegration (Slywotzky)

Deintegration: specialists overtake the integrated firm

We check whether integrated incumbents are handing steps to outside specialists that earn more on less capital. The test is step by step: specialists' return on capital against the integrated firms' at the same step, and which step's share of the chain's profit rises as it separates.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: IBM's integrated model against Microsoft and Intel.
What it does now
Which step a specialist can take, and whether its profit share rises.
The mathematics
VA / R falling while specialists' ROIC exceeds the incumbent's
The full entry
Where it began

Deintegration opens the book's four value chain patterns. Its lead case is computing, where value drained from IBM's do-everything model to Microsoft and Intel, each concentrated on a single step; the book adds deregulation ending AT&T's control of telephone service from end to end, Nucor's minimills leaving out the coke and iron stages, Qwest offering its fiber capacity to other carriers, and chip production itself breaking into specialist stages, which the book treats as a second phase (pp. 99 to 105).

Why it works now

Chains keep coming apart wherever software and common interfaces lower the cost of passing work across company lines, and the second phase, steps splitting again, is where the newest specialists often appear. The Desk asks which step a focused company could now do better than the integrated firm, and whether that step's share of the chain's profit is rising.

When it applies

Integrated incumbents now source from outside steps they once performed, and focused firms owning one step earn higher returns on capital than they do; not downturn outsourcing that returns in-house in the upturn, nor a spin-off that leaves how the steps work unchanged.

What we would ask

Which step in this chain could a focused company now do better or cheaper than the integrated incumbents?
What stopped the steps from being separated before, and has that changed?

What it needs

At each incumbent, purchased inputs and value added per dollar of revenue, year by year; returns on capital of single-step specialists and of integrated firms, by step where segments allow; capital per dollar of revenue for each; each step's share of chain profit.

How we would get it

Former operations and procurement heads at the incumbents on what was outsourced and why; specialists' executives on their cost edge; customers who now assemble the chain themselves; the step-by-step margin history.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: outsourcing is called deintegration because the trend sounds structural, though specialists earn no more than integrated firms and value added has not fallen; a step looks separable but relies on a handoff only an integrated firm manages; or specialists crowd in and compete the margin away.

For example

A sponsor is asked to fund an integrated manufacturer's plan to bring machining back in-house. Machining specialists earn twice its return on half the capital per dollar of revenue, and their share of chain profit has risen six years running. Former plant heads say the old reason to own the step no longer applies, and the plan is dropped.

The mathematics in fullTrack value added per dollar of revenue at the incumbents, VA / R = (R - purchased inputs) / R, the return gap at step k, ROIC(spec,k) - ROIC(int,k), and step k's share of chain profit, pi(k) / sum over j of pi(j); deintegration is under way when VA / R falls while the gap is positive, and the winning step is the one whose share rises as it separates. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 99 to 105

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Value chain squeeze (Slywotzky)

Value chain squeeze: caught between stronger neighbors

We put each link's share of the chain's total profit side by side over time. A link is squeezed when its share falls while both its suppliers' and its customers' shares rise; when an input cost later falls, the winner is whichever link's share rises, which is often not the link that was squeezed.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: PC makers between Microsoft and Intel.
What it does now
Which link's share of chain profit is falling, and who keeps a release.
The mathematics
S(k) = pi(k) / sum of pi(j), falling as both neighbors' rise
In the inquiries: No. 1, The Chocolate Truce
The full entry
Where it began

Value chain squeeze is the second of the four value chain patterns. The book's cases are American television networks pressed by strong local stations on one side and the producers of their programs on the other, carmakers caught between powerful parts suppliers and giant dealer groups, sports franchise owners between their players and the stadiums, and PC makers between Microsoft and Intel, which the book reports accounted for about 70 percent of the roughly $400 billion of market value in the PC business in 1997 (pp. 107 to 109).

Why it works now

The squeeze recurs wherever a business sits between a handful of dominant suppliers and a handful of dominant customers, a position that consolidation on either side can create quickly. The Desk asks how each link's share of the chain's profit has moved, and who kept the saving the last time an input cost fell.

When it applies

A link whose share of its chain's total profit has fallen for years while both suppliers' and customers' shares rose, with input costs and customer concessions climbing together; not a company-specific margin fall, nor pressure from one side only, which is a power shift.

What we would ask

Over the last three years, how much margin went to suppliers in higher prices and how much to customers in concessions?
When input costs last fell, which link of the chain kept the saving?

What it needs

Operating profit for each link of the chain, from the main companies' filings, year by year; this company's gross margin against input costs and customer price concessions; top suppliers' share of its costs and top customers' share of its revenue; return on capital against its cost.

How we would get it

Former procurement heads on the suppliers' terms; former key-account managers on what large customers demand; executives at both neighbors on whether they could do without this link; the margin record of each link in the chain.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a falling margin is blamed on stronger neighbors because the story is familiar, though the link's share of chain profit is stable and the loss is its own doing; the neighbors' strength is cyclical; or the link has a hidden lever, such as a scarce certification, that averages miss.

For example

A lender is asked to refinance a contract assembler whose margin fell four years running. Its share of chain profit fell from about a sixth to under a tenth as both its merged suppliers' and its large customers' shares rose; when a key input cost dropped last year, the customers' share rose, not the assembler's. The loan is sized to a squeezed link with no release.

The mathematics in fullEach link's share of total chain profit, S(k,t) = pi(k,t) / sum over j of pi(j,t), tracked over time; link k is squeezed when S(k) falls while the shares of both its supplier link k - 1 and its customer link k + 1 rise, and when an input cost falls, the release goes to whichever link's share rises in that period. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 107 to 109

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Reintegration (Slywotzky)

Reintegration: taking back the step next to the customer

We check whether profit and access to customers have moved to a neighboring step and whether a company is taking it back. It is winning when the step earns more than a capital charge on the price paid and capital added, and its share of chain profit rises; a contract may pass the same test with less capital.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Merck and Medco; Tosco in convenience retailing.
What it does now
Whether reaching the customer earns more than the capital it takes.
The mathematics
EP = NOPAT + Delta pi(core) - r x (P + K) > 0
The full entry
Where it began

Reintegration closes the four value chain patterns. Its cases are Merck, under Roy Vagelos, acquiring the pharmacy benefit manager Medco; Fresenius going beyond distribution into dialysis clinics and services; The Gap creating its own lines; LVMH running its own boutiques; and Coca-Cola, under Roberto Goizueta, reorganizing its bottlers. Tosco moved into convenience-store retailing, taking over Unocal's retail assets along the way, and the book reports it grew shareholder value 58 percent a year from 1993 to 1997 (pp. 117 to 123).

Why it works now

Forward moves now often aim at the customer relationship and its data as much as at the margin, and control by contract or platform terms often stands in for ownership. The Desk asks what the next step toward the customer earns against the capital it takes, and whether a contract would deliver the same control.

When it applies

A company moving into the adjacent step, usually toward the customer, by acquisition, stakes or long-term control contracts, because profit and customer access have moved there; not a diversifying deal, nor an outsider consolidating the channel, which is channel concentration.

What we would ask

What does the downstream step earn today that the company cannot reach from where it sits?
Does the company need to own that step, or would a long-term contract give it the same control with less capital?

What it needs

For the step taken back: after-tax operating profit, the price paid, capital added since, any lift to the core business's margin, and the cost of capital; the company's share of chain profit before and after; long-term channel contracts and stakes; revenue booked gross rather than net.

How we would get it

Former channel and corporate development heads on what the acquired step earns and what integration cost; customers on whether the combined offer changed their choices; rivals who chose contracts instead; returns on the acquired capital.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: an acquisition is called reintegration because moving toward the customer sounds strategic, though the step earns less than the charge on its price; the downstream profit was cyclical; or ownership drives the remaining independent partners to a rival.

For example

An equipment maker asks whether to acquire its largest service partner. Service margins are real, but at the asking price the step earns less than its capital charge, and two of the other three independent service firms say they would defect to a rival. An exclusive service contract captures most of the margin with no purchase price, and the plan changes.

The mathematics in fullEP = NOPAT(step) + Delta pi(core) - r x (P + K): the step's after-tax operating profit plus any gain it brings the core business, less a charge at cost of capital r on price paid P and capital added K; the integrator is winning when EP > 0 and its share of chain profit rises, and a contract earning most of the same profit with far less P + K beats ownership. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 117 to 123

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Profit shift (Slywotzky)

Profit shift: a few customers carry the profit

We rank customers by profit after the cost to serve each one; the cumulative curve usually climbs above total profit on the best customers and falls back on the rest. The winner is the supplier gaining the most profitable tenth's spending as profit moves between groups from year to year.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Kanthal's customer-by-customer profit.
What it does now
Which customers earn the profit, and where their spending is moving.
The mathematics
Whale curve W(k) peaking above 1; decile shares over time
The full entry
Where it began

Profit shift opens the book's four customer patterns. Its lead case is Kanthal, a Swedish maker of electrical equipment, which the book reports found 40 percent of its customers generating 150 percent of its profit, 20 percent breaking even and the other 40 percent losing the equivalent of 50 percent of profit. The book adds banks that started measuring the profit of each account and, it reports, a printer that found 60 percent of its customers unprofitable (pp. 127 to 131).

Why it works now

Customer-level profit is easier to measure than ever, since most businesses record every order, return and service call, yet many still manage and report profit by product. The Desk asks what share of customers earns all the profit, and whether that group's spending is moving toward the company or away from it.

When it applies

Customer-level profit after the cost to serve runs from far above to well below zero, the best group earns more than the total, and customers move between groups over time; not a business whose profit simply tracks revenue across customers.

What we would ask

Ranked by profit after the cost to serve, what share of customers earns all of this company's profit?
Is the most profitable tenth of customers growing its spending with this company, or moving it to a rival?

What it needs

Profit by customer decile after the cost to serve, for at least two years, with movement between deciles; the company's share of its top customers' spending where known; customer counts against revenue and margin; small-account or minimum-balance fees; disclosed customer tiers.

How we would get it

Former finance and sales operations leads on how cost is traced to accounts; account managers on which customers consume service out of proportion to what they pay; account data, where the client has it, to build the curve.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a few big accounts are said to carry the business because the story is common, though nobody has traced cost to customers; fixed costs spread by revenue make small accounts look worse than they are; or an unprofitable customer is a beachhead or feeds a profitable one.

For example

A business services owner plans an across-the-board price rise. The rebuilt curve shows a third of customers earning more than total profit and another third losing money on custom requests, while the top decile has moved spending to a rival two years running. The price rise gives way to charging for custom work and a fight for the top decile.

The mathematics in fullRank customers by pi(i) = revenue(i) - cost to serve(i); the whale curve W(k), the sum of pi over the k most profitable divided by total profit, shows the pattern when it peaks above 1; profit is shifting when deciles' shares of total profit change between years, and the company is winning when its share of the top decile's spending rises while loss-making deciles shrink or are repriced. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 127 to 131

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. https://doi.org/10.1137/070710111

Microsegmentation (Slywotzky)

Microsegmentation: offers priced for very small groups

We check whether customers differ enough, and reaching a small group costs little enough, for a supplier to design and price for groups of a few hundred or fewer. The winner shows lower losses or churn than peers at similar prices; the losers see losses rise among the customers they keep.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: USAA; Levi's Personal Pair custom jeans.
What it does now
Who is winning the best customers, read from losses at the same price.
The mathematics
m = y - l - c; a lower l at matched y marks the winner
The full entry
Where it began

Microsegmentation is the second customer pattern. The book's cases are USAA, which served only selected small segments with insurance designed for each, and Levi Strauss's Personal Pair, custom-fitted women's jeans introduced in 1994, which the book reports made up 25 percent of women's jeans sales at Original Levi's stores by 1997. Its case studies return to the idea with Capital One in credit cards and Amazon's personalization (pp. 133 to 135, 281 to 284, 313).

Why it works now

Data and testing have become cheap enough that groups of a few hundred customers, or a single one, can be priced and served separately in insurance, lending, retail and software. The Desk asks whether, at similar prices, the company's losses or churn are better or worse than those of the rival that tailors most finely.

When it applies

At least one supplier tailors offers and prices to very small customer groups, shown by many variants and price points, disclosed testing programs, and better loss, churn or margin results than peers at similar prices; not segmentation into a few broad tiers.

What we would ask

At similar prices, are this company's losses, churn or margins better or worse than those of the rival that tailors most finely?
How cheaply can the company identify, test and price for a group of a few hundred customers?

What it needs

Yield and loss rate by year for the company and each peer, such as premiums and claims or interest and credit losses per unit; cost to serve per account; market share; churn and revenue per customer by cohort; counts of variants and price points; disclosed testing programs.

How we would get it

Former analytics and pricing leads on how groups are found and tested; customers in the best groups on what rivals have offered them; loss or churn rates by group where the client has them.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a rival is said to microsegment because it talks about data, though its losses at similar prices are no better; segments are cut finer than the data support, so tailored prices chase noise; or the tailoring rests on data that rules or customers will withdraw.

For example

An insurer asks why a newer rival's loss ratio is better at similar premiums. At matched premium levels the rival's losses run well below the client's, and the client's losses have risen each year among the policies it renewed. The rival is picking off the lowest risks; the client is losing, and the question is whether it can find those groups first.

The mathematics in fullFor firm i in year t, margin m(i,t) = y(i,t) - l(i,t) - c(i,t), with yield y (premium or interest per unit), loss rate l (claims or credit losses per unit) and cost to serve c; at matched y a lower l marks better selection, so the winner shows l below its peers' with stable or rising share, and the loser shows its own l rising as its best customers leave. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 133 to 135; Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 281 to 284 and 313 (case studies)

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), 629. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326
Athey, Imbens (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(27), 7353-7360. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1510489113
Kohavi, Longbotham, Sommerfield (2009). Controlled experiments on the web: survey and practical guide. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 18(1), 140-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10618-008-0114-1

Power shift (Slywotzky)

Power shift: the balance tips toward one side

We track the balance of leverage between a company and its customers or suppliers as one side merges, professionalizes its purchasing, learns the other's costs or faces look-alike rivals. The winner is the side whose share of the combined margin rises, and a supplier's first number is how much of list price it realizes.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: drug makers facing managed care.
What it does now
Whose share of the combined margin is rising, read from realized price.
The mathematics
theta = pi(s) / (pi(s) + pi(c)), with realization rho
The full entry
Where it began

Power shift is the third customer pattern. Its cases are drug companies in the 1990s confronting managed-care organizations that had consolidated their purchasing, and responding with faster innovation, mergers and Merck's acquisition of Medco; makers of consumer goods ceding leverage to Wal-Mart, Toys R Us and Home Depot; and plastic bottle makers turning cost data against their own plastics suppliers (pp. 137 to 141).

Why it works now

Purchasing has grown more professional and data-driven almost everywhere, and large customers can often estimate a supplier's costs from public information. The Desk asks how much of list price the company actually realized over five years, and whose share of the combined margin rose.

When it applies

One side of a supplier and customer relationship has gained share of the combined profit for years, with realized price, rebates and payment terms moving its way after consolidation or cost transparency; not one hard negotiation, nor pressure from both neighbors, which is a value chain squeeze.

What we would ask

Over the last five years, how much of the list price did this company actually realize, and where did the difference go?
If its largest customer walked away, how quickly could each side replace the other?

What it needs

Net over gross revenue, with rebates, chargebacks and trade spending broken out, year by year; top customers' share of revenue from the large-customer disclosures; receivable days; the operating margins of the company and its main customers or suppliers on the same product.

How we would get it

Former key-account and pricing heads on how terms have moved; former procurement leads at the large customers on what alternatives they use as leverage; the record of price realization and of consolidation on both sides.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: customer concentration is read as lost power because it sounds like weakness, though research on filed statements finds suppliers to concentrated customers often earn more through lower operating costs and better use of assets; or one hard negotiation is mistaken for a lasting shift.

For example

A fund looks at a branded food maker with growing revenue. Its realized price, net of rebates and trade spending, fell well below list in five years while the two largest retailers' margin on the category rose, and former category managers say the retailers now see the maker's costs. Power has shifted against it; the forecast is rebuilt on realized price.

The mathematics in fullRealization rho(t) = net revenue / gross revenue, and the supplier's share of the combined margin, theta(t) = pi(s,t) / [pi(s,t) + pi(c,t)], pi(s) and pi(c) being the supplier's and customer's profit on the product; power is moving to the customer when rho and theta fall together as the customer's share of the supplier's revenue rises, and to the supplier when both rise. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 137 to 141

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Patatoukas (2012). Customer-Base Concentration: Implications for Firm Performance and Capital Markets. The Accounting Review 87(2), 363-392. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10198

Redefinition (Slywotzky)

Redefinition: finding the customer who really decides

We look for whoever actually makes the choice when a supplier's growth with its paying customers stalls, and whether the supplier is redirecting its offer there. It is winning when the decider names it in a rising share of purchases and the premium earned exceeds the cost of reaching the decider.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Intel Inside; Texas Instruments and teachers.
What it does now
Who really decides the purchase, and how often they name the company.
The mathematics
G = P x Q(n) + g x Delta Q - m - L > 0
The full entry
Where it began

Redefinition closes the four customer patterns. The book's lead case is Bang & Olufsen, which changed whom it designed for and, the book reports, saw its market value rise from 0.2 times sales in 1989 to 1.5 times in 1997; it adds Intel going over the heads of PC makers to the people who used the machines with Intel Inside, Texas Instruments treating teachers as the customer who mattered for its calculators, and IBM's PC, aimed at end users rather than the computing chiefs who chose mainframes (pp. 143 to 148).

Why it works now

Many products are chosen by one party and paid for by another, from software picked by engineers and paid for by finance to treatments chosen by doctors and paid for by insurers. The Desk asks who actually decides, whether that party is the one the company invoices, and in what share of choices the decider names the company.

When it applies

A supplier blocked with its direct customers is redirecting its offer to the party who actually drives the choice, such as end users, specifiers or advisers, with a premium or share gain to show; not a brand campaign aimed at the same customers, which is product to brand.

What we would ask

Who actually decides that this product is chosen, and is that the same party that pays for it?
In what share of purchases does the decider now name this company's product, and is that share rising?

What it needs

The share of purchases in which end users or specifiers name the brand, over time; the premium over an equivalent product and the unit margin; spending aimed at deciders, such as cooperative advertising or consumer branding by a component maker; revenue lost from direct customers who retaliate.

How we would get it

End users, specifiers and other influencers on who shaped their last choice; former marketing and channel heads on how direct customers reacted to a supplier reaching past them; the record of premiums after past redefinitions in the industry.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: a campaign is called a redefinition because reaching the end user sounds bold, though no premium or gain in named share follows; the supposed decider is only a voice and the payer overrides; or weaker rivals could copy the message cheaply, so it signals nothing.

For example

A component maker's board wants a consumer campaign like those of component makers that built brands with end users. The test finds nothing to redefine: equipment makers here choose components on cost, end users never see the part, and a rival's campaign three years ago won no premium and no named share. The money stays with the direct customers.

The mathematics in fullGain G = P x Q(n) + g x Delta Q - m - L: the premium P on the volume Q(n) in which the decider names the product, plus margin g on added volume Delta Q, less spending m aimed at the decider and margin L lost from direct customers who retaliate; the company is winning when G > 0 and the named share, Q(n) / Q, rises. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 143 to 148

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Spence (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010

Multiplication (Slywotzky)

Multiplication: buyers split up, and the routes to them multiply

We confirm that buyers have split into groups that prefer different channels, then tell who is winning by comparing each maker's share in the fastest-growing channels with its share of the whole category, and the margin it keeps in each channel after the cost of serving it. A maker whose share in the new channels is below its overall share is losing position even while its total sales rise.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: books reaching readers through clubs, airports, mail and the Internet.
What it does now
Is the company's share in the growing channels as large as its share overall?
The mathematics
Change in share = shift between channels + change within them
The full entry
Where it began

Multiplication is the first of the book's four channel patterns (Profit Patterns, pp. 153 to 155): as customers grow more varied and the established outlets suit fewer of them, the routes to the buyer increase, and makers that get into the new routes first secure a place there, at the cost of friction with their existing partners. Its picture is the book trade: a purchase once made almost only in bookstores came to happen in airports and supermarkets, at newsstands and card shops, through book clubs, by mail and telephone, and on the Internet. Dell, Amazon and CarMax are its cases of businesses organized around one kind of customer's way of purchasing.

Why it works now

Most consumer categories, and many business ones, now reach buyers through the maker's own site, marketplaces, subscriptions, specialist stores and mass merchants at once, each with its own margin and its own conflict. The Desk asks which buyers moved to which channels, and whether the company's share there is as large as its share of the category.

When it applies

The buyers of one product have split into groups that buy it in different ways, and channels that were negligible a few years ago now carry a large and growing share of the category's sales. Not a maker adding outlets for reach while the category's channel shares stay put, and not a shorter route displacing the old one, which is compression.

What we would ask

What share of the category's sales went through each channel five years ago, and what share goes through each today?
In the channels that grew, is the company's share larger or smaller than its share of the category as a whole?

What it needs

Category sales by channel over at least five years, from trade associations, panels or the companies' channel disclosures; the company's sales and share within each channel; gross margin and cost to serve by channel; and the same split for the main rivals where it can be built. Channel conflict named in the risk factors is a sign; the shares are the evidence.

How we would get it

Former channel and sales heads at the makers on what each channel costs to serve and which customers buy there; buyers at the newer outlets on which makers they stock and why; dealers and distributors on how they respond when a maker reaches their customers another way; and the category's channel shares, year by year.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling it multiplication because a company opened an online store, when the category's channel shares have barely moved. Also: a new channel that mostly moves existing customers to a lower margin, so total sales do not grow; and product pushed into new outlets that buyers did not ask for, read as customer pull.

For example

A private equity firm is looking at a maker of premium kitchen tools. Category data show direct online sales and specialty chains rising from a sixth to two fifths of the category in five years, so the pattern is real. The company's share in those channels is four percent against twelve percent overall: its sales are carried by the department stores that are shrinking. The test says the company is losing at the pattern, and the deal model is rebuilt around catching up in channels its rivals already lead.

The mathematics in fullS = sum over channels j of w(j) x s(j), where w(j) is channel j's share of category sales and s(j) the company's share within it; from a first year 0 to a last year 1 the change splits exactly into sum over j of s0(j) x (w1(j) - w0(j)), the gain or loss from where buyers moved, plus sum over j of w1(j) x (s1(j) - s0(j)), the gain or loss inside each channel. The company is winning while the first term is positive and its margin after cost to serve, sum over j of q(j) x (p(j) - c(j)), rises with it; a new channel's w(j) tends to follow an S-shaped adoption curve, so its early growth says little about its ceiling. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 153 to 155

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215

Channel concentration (Slywotzky)

Channel concentration: many small outlets give way to a few large ones

We confirm that a few operators are taking a rising share of a fragmented trade, then tell who is winning by whether the outlets a consolidator takes over sell more and cost less afterward, and whether its return on all the capital it paid, goodwill included, stays above what that capital costs. A consolidator growing only by acquisition while that return falls is buying share, not winning it.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Carrefour's hypermarkets and AutoNation's megastores.
What it does now
Does the consolidator run each outlet better, or only own more of them?
The mathematics
Same-outlet growth, and NOPAT / (capital + goodwill) above r
The full entry
Where it began

The second channel pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 157 to 160) describes an entrant gathering a trade spread across many small, costly outlets into a few large ones, by acquisition or by building at a larger scale, and passing part of the savings to customers as lower prices and a wider range. The cases start with Carrefour, which opened its first hypermarket near Paris in 1963 and had, the book reports, about $29 billion in annual sales some thirty years on; they add Republic Industries, which by the book's count acquired 268 dealerships while launching its AutoNation megastores, USA Waste Services gathering up local haulers, Blockbuster Video, and Barnes & Noble.

Why it works now

Owner-run trades such as dental and veterinary practices, home services, insurance brokerage and specialty distribution are being assembled into chains, much of it with private capital. The Desk asks whether the consolidator runs each outlet better than the owner it bought it from, or has only bought more of them.

When it applies

A trade once served by many small, independently owned outlets in which one or a few operators gain share year after year, by acquiring outlets or by opening much larger ones, and offer lower prices or wider choice than the independents. Not a financial roll-up whose outlets keep their old costs and prices under a new name.

What we would ask

What share of the market did the five largest operators have five years ago, and what do they have today?
In the outlets the consolidator bought, how have sales, gross margin and running costs changed since it took them over?

What it needs

The combined share of the largest operators over at least five years; outlet counts and acquisitions by year, with the price paid and the goodwill recorded; sales growth split into outlets owned a full year, new outlets and acquired outlets; gross margin and selling and administrative cost per outlet; operating profit after tax against operating capital plus goodwill; and impairments.

How we would get it

Former development and integration leads at the consolidator on what each acquisition actually changed; owners of independents who sold, and some who refused, on the terms and what followed; supplier sales heads on the consolidator's buying terms against the independents'; and the record of acquisitions, same-outlet sales and impairments over several years.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a sector consolidating because deals are announced, when the largest operators' combined share has barely moved. Also: growth that is all purchased, with outlets owned a full year flat; goodwill that grows faster than profit and is written down late; and the assumption that suppliers must lose, when on average suppliers selling to a few large customers have earned higher returns through lower operating costs.

For example

A lender is asked to finance a veterinary roll-up that has bought forty clinics in three years. The trade is concentrating, so the pattern is real. But sales at clinics owned a full year are flat, the margin gain came from a distributor rebate since cut for every chain, and the return on capital with goodwill included sits below the interest rate on the loan. The test says the borrower is losing at the pattern, and the loan is sized on the clinics as they are, not on the case for combining them.

The mathematics in fullGrowth splits as g = g(owned a full year) + g(new outlets) + g(acquired), and the return that decides it is NOPAT / (operating capital + goodwill), with NOPAT the operating profit after tax; the consolidator is winning while g(owned a full year) and the gross margin of acquired outlets rise after purchase and that return stays above the cost of capital r, and is buying share when growth comes from g(acquired) while the return falls toward r. Concentration itself is CR5, the sum of the five largest operators' shares, tracked year by year. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 157 to 160

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Patatoukas (2012). Customer-Base Concentration: Implications for Firm Performance and Capital Markets. The Accounting Review 87(2), 363-392. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10198
Li, Sloan (2017). Has goodwill accounting gone bad? Review of Accounting Studies 22(2), 964-1003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-017-9401-7

Compression/disintermediation (Slywotzky)

Compression/disintermediation: fewer steps between maker and buyer

We confirm that volume is moving to shorter routes and the skipped steps are losing margin, then tell who is winning by following the margin each removed step used to take: into the maker's gross margin, into a lower price for the buyer, or into a new direct seller's margin. The maker wins only if what it earns selling direct, after paying for what the step used to do, beats what it earned selling through the step.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Calyx & Corolla taking flower delivery down to three steps from seven.
What it does now
Where the removed step's margin went, and whether the maker kept it.
The mathematics
Direct wins if p(d) - c - s(d) > p(k) - c
The full entry
Where it began

The third channel pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 163 to 165) treats a channel as a series of hand-offs, each lasting only while someone will pay for what it contributes; when buyers and makers stop paying, the series collapses into fewer hand-offs or none. Its cases are Calyx & Corolla, which, the book reports, worked with FedEx to take four of the seven hand-offs out of the flower trade, so a bouquet could reach a home two days after leaving the grower; and Cisco, which by the book's figures was doing close to half its business directly over the Internet.

Why it works now

Brands selling on their own sites, insurers and airlines selling direct, and business software sold without resellers all follow it, wherever a buyer can find and pay the maker as easily as the middleman. The Desk asks where the margin of each removed step went, and whether the maker kept it.

When it applies

A product that reached buyers through two or more intermediaries, where a shorter or direct route now takes a growing share of volume and the skipped steps are losing margin or volume. Not a maker opening a direct channel beside the old ones, which is multiplication, and not intermediaries coming back in a new role, which is reintermediation.

What we would ask

What share of volume now reaches buyers directly or through one fewer step than five years ago, and what has happened to the skipped intermediaries' margins?
Selling direct, what does the maker earn per unit after paying for the credit, stock, delivery and service the intermediary used to provide?

What it needs

Direct and indirect sales as shares of revenue over several years; the price realized and gross margin on each route; the cost of serving buyers directly (fulfillment, credit, returns, support); days of inventory, receivables and payables; and the intermediaries' own volumes and margins in the category.

How we would get it

Former heads of distribution and channel sales at the maker on what each intermediary actually does and costs; wholesaler and distributor executives on which services buyers still pay for; purchasing leads at large customers on what made them go direct; and the record of distributor margins, contract terms and inventory across the chain.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a chain compressed because a maker launched a website, when the share of volume going direct is small and flat. Also: a step that looks like pure margin but carried credit, returns, local stock or service the maker must now pay for itself; and a direct channel whose gross margin rises while the cost of serving buyers rises faster.

For example

An investor is underwriting a distributor of laboratory supplies. The largest labs now order direct from the two biggest makers, so the chain is compressing at the top. But former channel heads at those makers put the cost of serving a small lab directly above the distributor's margin, and small labs keep ordering through it. The test splits the market: the distributor is losing large accounts and winning small ones, and the thesis is rebuilt on the small-lab segment.

The mathematics in fullThe end price is P = c x (1 + m1) x (1 + m2) x ... x (1 + mn), the maker's unit cost c marked up at each of n steps; when step k is cut, the maker is winning only if p(d) - c - s(d) > p(k) - c, where p(d) is its direct price, s(d) its cost per unit of doing what the step did, and p(k) the price it used to receive from the step. Whatever part of the step's markup the maker does not keep goes to the buyer as a lower P or to whoever now stands in the step's place, and the maker's cash cycle, days of inventory plus days of receivables minus days of payables, should fall. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 163 to 165

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Reintermediation (Slywotzky)

Reintermediation: the middleman returns with a new job

We confirm that an intermediary is gaining volume from both sides by saving them the cost of finding, judging or paying each other, then tell who is winning by its take rate, what it keeps of each transaction, set against the growth of buyers and sellers and the share of the largest sellers' volume that still runs through it. A hub that has to cut its take rate to keep its biggest sellers is losing its place in the middle.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Schwab's OneSource between fund companies and investors.
What it does now
Whether the take rate survives the largest sellers' alternatives.
The mathematics
t = net revenue / gross volume, capped by the saving
The full entry
Where it began

The last channel pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 167 to 172) follows intermediaries back into chains that had cut them out, some returning with services the direct link could not give, others placing themselves as a 'switchboard' among buyers and sellers too scattered to find each other. Among its cases: Rosenbluth managing corporate travel; Priceline; W.W. Grainger offering services to its largest customers; Charles Schwab's OneSource, one door through which millions of investors reached hundreds of fund companies; MLP, a German financial services firm built around students and young professionals; and Auto-by-Tel, which soon had Microsoft's CarPoint to contend with. The Profit Zone treats the hub as a profit model of its own, Switchboard Profit (ch. 8, pp. 153 to 174).

Why it works now

Marketplaces, app stores, booking sites, freight brokers and comparison services are switchboards in this sense, and the argument about each is how far the take rate can rise before the largest participants go around it. The Desk asks what the hub saves each side, and whether its biggest sellers are staying.

When it applies

Many fragmented buyers and many fragmented sellers who bear real costs to find, judge and pay each other, and an intermediary gaining volume from both sides by lowering those costs; or a direct channel whose buyers now pay a third party for advice or service it lacks. Not a reseller that adds nothing and survives on habit, and not a large seller's own storefront.

What we would ask

What would a buyer spend, in time and money, to deal with these sellers directly, and what does the intermediary charge for saving it?
What share of the largest sellers' volume runs through the intermediary now, against three years ago?

What it needs

Gross transaction value and net revenue by year, which give the take rate; counts of active buyers and sellers; the share of volume from the largest sellers; sellers leaving to deal direct; incremental operating margin; and spending on incentives to either side.

How we would get it

Former heads of partnerships and pricing at the intermediary on how the take rate has moved and who pushed back; large sellers on what share of their volume runs through it and what going around it would cost; heavy buyers on why they use it; and the record of fee changes, participant counts and rival hubs entering.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling any marketplace a switchboard because it has two sides, when one side can reach the other directly at little cost and volume depends on subsidies. Also: a take rate raised past what the largest sellers will bear, so they leave and take their buyers; and a bigger hub on one side that drains a smaller one on both.

For example

A growth fund is weighing a marketplace that matches contractors with homeowners. Homeowners pay it for screening and payment protection, so the pattern is real on that side. But the best contractors route under a fifth of their jobs through it, and the take rate has fallen three years running while gross volume grew. The test says the hub is losing its best sellers, and the fund models it as a service to homeowners, not as a toll every contractor must pay.

The mathematics in fullTake rate t = net revenue / gross transaction value; the hub is winning while t is level or rising as the number of buyers n and of sellers m both grow and the largest sellers' share routed through it does not fall. A hub replaces n x m separate dealings with n + m links to itself, and t is capped by what it saves the side that pays: t <= (cost of finding, judging and paying directly) / (transaction value). Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 167 to 172

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208

Product to brand (Slywotzky)

Product to brand: when products look alike, the margin goes to the name

We confirm that buyers in the category choose by name because the products have multiplied and look alike, then tell who is winning by the price premium each name earns over a physically equivalent product, through good years and bad, against what it spends each year to keep the name strong. A brand whose premium survives a downturn without heavier promotion is winning; one that buys its premium back with discounts is not.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: the same NUMMI car fetching more with a Toyota badge.
What it does now
What the name earns with the product kept equal, through a downturn.
The mathematics
(p(b) - p(u)) x q - A
The full entry
Where it began

Product to brand opens the book's five product patterns (Profit Patterns, pp. 177 to 185): when products multiply and blur together, buyers rely on names to tell them what to expect, and profit gathers around the name rather than the product. Its sharpest case is NUMMI, the GM and Toyota plant in Fremont, where the same car fetched more wearing the Toyota badge; the others are Frank Perdue making a name out of chicken, LVMH assembling luxury names, and Amazon, whose associates program, by the book's account, made it as familiar as much bigger rivals for far less money, the book's case of 'brand acceleration'.

Why it works now

Names are now built in a fraction of the old time through reviews, creators and search, and can lose their premium as quickly once private labels match them on quality and shelf position. The Desk asks what the name earns with the product kept equal, and whether that premium survived the last downturn without heavier promotion.

When it applies

A category where products have multiplied and become hard to tell apart, buyers cannot judge quality before buying, and named products earn a lasting price premium over physically equivalent unnamed ones. Not a premium that rests on a real difference in quality or service, and not awareness that does not change what buyers pay.

What we would ask

Where the branded and unbranded versions are physically the same, how much more does the branded one fetch, and what happened to that gap in the last downturn?
What does the company spend each year on advertising and promotion to keep that gap, as a share of sales, and has that share risen?

What it needs

Shelf prices of the brand, after promotions, against store brands or products that cost the same to make, over several years and through at least one downturn; gross margin on the same basis; advertising and promotion as a share of sales in those years; market share; and any licensing income from the name.

How we would get it

Category buyers at retailers on the price gap to private label and what happened when shoppers traded down; contract manufacturers who make both branded and unbranded versions, on how much the products really differ; former brand and marketing heads on what keeping the name strong costs; and the record of price gaps, promotion depth and share across past downturns.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a brand because it is well known or advertises heavily, when its premium over an equivalent product is small or bought with promotions. Also: a premium that is really a quality or service difference, so the name gets credit for the product; and a premium measured on list prices, when the shelf price after promotions is what buyers pay.

For example

A consumer fund is underwriting a premium pet food maker. A contract manufacturer that makes both the brand and two store labels confirms the recipes differ little, so the premium is the name's and the pattern is real. But retailer data show the price gap narrowing from about a third to a sixth in the last downturn while promotion spending doubled. The test says the brand is losing at the pattern, and the diligence turns to whether the gap can be rebuilt at a cost the margin can carry.

The mathematics in fullBrand profit = (p(b) - p(u)) x q - A, where p(b) is the brand's shelf price, p(u) the price of a physically equivalent unbranded product, q the brand's volume and A its yearly advertising and promotion; the brand is winning while that stays positive and the premium (p(b) - p(u)) / p(u) survives downturns without A / sales rising. The name is a stock B that grows with spending and fades without it, B(t + 1) = (1 - d) x B(t) + A(t), with d the yearly fade. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 177 to 185

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Akerlof (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
Kreps, Wilson (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

Product to blockbuster (Slywotzky)

Product to blockbuster: a few hits pay for everything else

We confirm that each product costs more and more to develop and a few releases bring in the bulk of the profit, then tell who is winning by the return on all development spending, failures included, over many years, and by whether hits keep coming from the same company. A company with one hit and no repeat has had a good draw, not a system.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: NBC's schedule, and Merck's run of blockbusters after Vasotec.
What it does now
Return on all development spending, failures included, over a decade.
The mathematics
Sum of hit profits / sum of all development costs
The full entry
Where it began

The second product pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 187 to 189) is for project businesses whose development costs keep climbing while results spread wide, so profit settles in a few hits that carry the rest, and the winners are built to produce hits again and again. Its cases are NBC, whose schedule was anchored first by Cosby, Cheers and Seinfeld and then by ER and Friends; films, where by the book's figures budgets rose 150 percent in ten years and marketing costs by more than 300 percent; and Merck, whose run of hits it traces to Vasotec in 1981, with fifteen blockbusters over the next ten years. The Profit Zone tells the same shift in drugs, from leading a therapeutic category to the scale of the single product, as the cost of developing a drug climbed (pp. 41 to 42).

Why it works now

Drugs, films, games, streaming series and music still work this way, and so does any business whose launches are large, rare bets. The Desk asks what the company's development spending has returned over a decade, failures included, and whether its hits repeat.

When it applies

A project business in which each product needs a large and rising development cost, results vary enormously, and a handful of releases account for most of the profit year after year. Not profit concentrated in a few large customers or deals, which is transaction scale, and not a single hit with no record of repeating it.

What we would ask

Over the last ten years, what share of profit came from the top three products each year, and how many different products made that list?
What has the company spent on development in total, failures included, and what have its hits earned against it?

What it needs

Revenue and profit by product, especially the top three's share each year; development or content spending each year; projects started, stopped and launched; the cost of projects written off; and the dates when the main products lose patent or rights protection.

How we would get it

Former heads of development and portfolio management on how projects are chosen, funded in stages and stopped; executives who ran launches on what separated hits from misses; partners and licensors on how they rank the company's pipeline against rivals'; and the record of past pipelines against what each produced.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a hit maker after one success, when the record shows no repeat. Also: a pipeline counted by the number of projects rather than by how many could be large; and a hit whose profit falls away when its protection ends, with nothing behind it.

For example

A fund is weighing a game studio after a release that earned more than its five previous ones together. Over ten years the hit accounts for nine tenths of the studio's profit, and without it the return on the studio's development spending is below one. The pattern is real in games; the test says this studio has not yet shown it can win at it, and the diligence moves to the two projects in development and who decides on them.

The mathematics in fullDevelopment return = sum over hits h of the present value of profit(h) / sum over all projects k of D(k), the development cost including the failures; the company is winning while that ratio stays above one over many years and hits per project started do not fall, not in the year of a single hit. Payoffs are heavy-tailed, P(X > x) = (x_min / x)^alpha with alpha small, so totals are set by a few releases and the average of a short record misleads. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 187 to 189

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. https://doi.org/10.1137/070710111
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. (book)

Product to profit multiplier (Slywotzky)

Product to profit multiplier: one asset, paid for once, earns in many forms

We confirm that one asset, a character, a name, a body of content or a skill, already earns in several formats at a fraction of its original cost, then tell who is winning by the revenue each asset earns across all its uses, the margin on each added use, and whether the original format keeps growing as uses are added. An asset whose extensions earn little, or whose core shrinks as it spreads, is being spent, not multiplied.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Disney taking The Lion King into toys, clothing and books.
What it does now
Whether each added use earns, and the core keeps growing.
The mathematics
Sum over uses of (r - c), less one creation cost F
The full entry
Where it began

The third product pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 191 to 194) makes the unit of profit the system that puts a single powerful asset to work in market after market and form after form, rather than any one product, much as a platform spreads one cost over many uses. Its cases are Disney taking The Lion King into books, clothing, toys and more; Bloomberg L.P. putting a single reporter's story out again on television, radio and the web; and three names built as multipliers, Michael Jordan, Martha Stewart and Richard Branson's Virgin Group. The Profit Zone lists the same logic as a profit model, with Disney's characters again the case (pp. 43, 60).

Why it works now

Entertainment franchises, creator-led brands, sports leagues and data businesses that sell one dataset in many products run on this pattern. The Desk asks how many uses the asset earns from, and whether the newest ones add to it or draw it down.

When it applies

A company that owns a single expensive asset, such as a character, a name, a body of content or a skill, which already earns in several formats or markets, each added at a fraction of what the asset cost to create. Not one product sold in several parts or occasions at different prices, which is a different model, and not a name stretched onto products that sell no better for it.

What we would ask

How many separate formats and markets earn money from this one asset, and what did the newest one cost to launch against what it earns?
Since the extensions began, has the asset's original format grown, stayed level or shrunk?

What it needs

Revenue by format or segment traced to the same asset; income from licensing and from consumer products; the margin on each added use; what each franchise earns in total, where it is disclosed; the original format's revenue before and after each extension; and content costs spread across release windows.

How we would get it

Former licensing and franchise heads on how each extension was chosen and what it earned; licensees on royalty terms and how the asset performs in their categories; retail buyers on whether the franchise still moves product; and the record of extensions launched and dropped.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a profit multiplier because its name is on many products, when the extensions earn little and the core is not growing. Also: one product priced several ways, which the books call multi-component; and extensions that dilute the asset, each new use borrowing from the original's strength.

For example

A family office is looking at the owner of a popular children's book series. The books and a streaming adaptation both earn, but two of four licensed toy lines were dropped at a loss, and book sales did not rise with the toys. The test says the multiplier works where the story travels and stops at the toy shelf, so the case is built on the proven formats and further licensing is treated as an option, not a forecast.

The mathematics in fullProfit = sum over uses u of (r(u) - c(u)) - F, where F is the one-time cost of creating the asset and r(u) and c(u) the revenue and direct cost of each use; the owner is winning while revenue per asset, sum over u of r(u), rises, each added use's margin (r(u) - c(u)) / r(u) beats what a stand-alone product of that kind earns, and the first format's revenue does not fall as uses are added. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 191 to 194

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley. (book)

Product to pyramid (Slywotzky)

Product to pyramid: a ladder of offers run as one system

We confirm that the company sells the same kind of product at several price tiers, managed together, then tell who is winning by the upper tiers' share of total profit and by whether the entry tier keeps its share of the low end without heavy losses. A company whose upper tiers still earn the bulk of the profit while its base keeps cheaper rivals out is winning; one losing the base is being attacked from below.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Swatch as the firewall under Rado, Longines and Blancpain.
What it does now
The upper tiers' share of profit, and who is winning the bottom rung.
The mathematics
U = upper tiers' profit / total profit, with the base kept
The full entry
Where it began

The fourth product pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 197 to 199) trades the search for one perfect product for a tiered family managed together: an inexpensive but well-made base that keeps entrants out, the 'firewall', and higher tiers where most of the margin is earned. Its cases, at the prices the book gives, are Mattel's Barbie, from low-priced dolls up to collector editions at $200 or more; American Express's Gold card at $100 and Platinum at $300; SMH under Nicolas Hayek, where Swatch guarded the bottom while Rado, Longines and Blancpain sat higher up; Gillette building more expensive razors on top of the Trac II; and Intel, challenged by AMD with new tiers beneath it. The Profit Zone describes the same structure as Product Pyramid Profit (pp. 38 to 39, 58).

Why it works now

Software plans, car lineups, airline cabins and phone ranges are pyramids, and the usual attack still comes from below, from a rival that enters where the incumbent priced itself out. The Desk asks what share of profit the upper tiers earn, and who is winning the bottom rung.

When it applies

A company sells the same kind of product at several price tiers to buyers who differ in income or need, with a low-priced entry product and upper tiers that bring in most of the profit, managed as one line. Not a range that grew piece by piece with tiers that compete with each other, and not a low-price challenger's single product, which is a different design.

What we would ask

What share of total profit do the upper tiers earn now, against three years ago?
At the lowest price point, who has been gaining share, and what does the company's entry product earn there?

What it needs

Price, volume and gross margin by tier or price band over several years; the entry product's share of the low end against entrants; the trend in average price and in the mix of tiers sold; and launches of entry or flanker products.

How we would get it

Former product line and pricing heads on what each tier earns and how the tiers are kept apart; retail and channel buyers on where low-priced entrants are winning; customers who moved up or down the ladder; and the record of entry products launched in answer to cheap rivals, and what happened to the tiers above.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a range a pyramid because it has good, better and best labels, when the upper tiers earn no more per unit and buyers trade down. Also: a base priced so low it loses money on every unit and pulls the company's own customers down the ladder; and a low-end rival ignored because the bottom looked unprofitable, which is how ladders are attacked.

For example

A fund's thesis on a premium power tool maker rests on its professional lines, whose share of profit has not changed in three years. But an importer has taken the hardware-store price point the company left empty, and the company's share of that end has fallen from about a third to under a fifth in two years. The test says the pyramid has lost its base: the company is winning at the top and losing the bottom, and the question for the thesis becomes whether an entry line can be built before the importer moves up.

The mathematics in fullUpper-tier profit share U = sum over upper tiers k of (p(k) - c(k)) x q(k) / sum over all tiers k of (p(k) - c(k)) x q(k), where p, c and q are each tier's price, unit cost and volume; the company is winning while U is level or rising and the entry tier keeps its share of the low end at a margin p(1) - c(1) at or a little above zero. The tiers sort buyers only if each type prefers its own, theta(i) x s(i) - p(i) >= theta(i) x s(j) - p(j) for every other tier j, with s the quality of a tier and theta(i) how much a buyer of type i values quality. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 197 to 199

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
Dixit (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal 90(357), 95. https://doi.org/10.2307/2231658

Product to solution (Slywotzky)

Product to solution: paid for the buyer's saving, not for the parts

We confirm that buyers can measure a supplier's effect on their total cost and that rival products look alike, then tell who is winning by solutions revenue against product revenue, the margin and renewal rate of the solution contracts against the product business, and whether prices are tied to the buyer's saving. A supplier whose solution contracts renew at product-like prices has a bundle, not a solution.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Ryder moving from truck leasing to running logistics.
What it does now
Whether the buyer can see the saving, and the contracts renew on it.
The mathematics
Price = s x (TC0 - TC1); account value with renewal R
The full entry
Where it began

The last of the five product patterns (Profit Patterns, pp. 201 to 207) begins when buyers can count a product's effect on their whole cost of operating and can no longer tell competing products apart; the margin then goes to the supplier that takes on that whole cost, combining equipment, service and finance and charging against the saving. Its cases are Tetra Laval sizing its Tetra Pak block package to the euro pallet; the solutions that GE and Honeywell built around jet engines and hospital equipment; and Ryder, which turned from leasing trucks to running logistics, its logistics revenue rising by 30 percent annually between 1993 and 1997 by the book's figures. The Profit Zone's Customer Solutions Profit describes the same business design seen in a single year rather than over time (pp. 37 to 38).

Why it works now

Equipment sold with monitoring and service, software sold as a managed outcome, and suppliers paid per hour of uptime or per unit of output all follow this pattern. The Desk asks whether the buyer can see the saving in its own numbers, because a solution the buyer cannot measure is repriced like a product at renewal.

When it applies

Business buyers who can measure a supplier's effect on their total cost of operation, rival products that have become hard to tell apart, and suppliers paid at least partly on the savings or outcomes they deliver under multi-year contracts. Not a discounted bundle of products and services, and not services revenue that grows only because product sales are shrinking.

What we would ask

Can the buyer see, in its own accounts, what the supplier's offer saves it, and who at the buyer signs off on that number?
When solution contracts come up for renewal, how many renew, and at what margin against the product business?

What it needs

Revenue from solutions or services against products over several years; gross margin of each; renewal rates and contract length; contracted revenue not yet earned, which the filings call backlog or remaining performance obligations; and the share of contracts priced on outcomes or shared savings.

How we would get it

Operations and procurement heads at the buyers on how they measure the supplier's effect on their costs and what they compare it with at renewal; former solutions and services leaders at the supplier on which contracts made money; field engineers on what the service work involves; and the record of renewals, losses and repricings.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a solutions provider because it sells service with its products, when buyers cannot measure the saving and renewals are priced like products. Also: outcome contracts that move the buyer's risk to the supplier without a price for it; and services growing as a share only because product revenue is falling.

For example

An industrial investor is looking at a maker of commercial refrigeration that now offers monitoring and maintenance priced on energy saved. Facility managers at three grocery chains say they see the saving in their utility bills, and the contracts renew at more than nine in ten at a gross margin above the equipment's. The test says the company is winning at the pattern, so the diligence shifts from the equipment's market share to the contract book.

The mathematics in fullAccount value = sum over t of m(t) x R^t / (1 + r)^t, with m(t) the margin on the account in year t, R the yearly renewal rate and r the discount rate; the supplier is winning while solutions revenue grows as a share of the total, m and R for solution contracts are at or above the product business's, and the price is a share s of the buyer's saving, s x (TC0 - TC1), where TC0 and TC1 are the buyer's total cost of operation before and after, rather than a markup on the parts. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 201 to 207

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Adams, Yellen (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(3), 475. https://doi.org/10.2307/1886045

Product to customer knowledge (Slywotzky)

Product to customer knowledge: the record of what customers buy becomes the asset

We confirm that the company records what customers buy, at what price and how, and uses the record to change decisions, then tell who is winning by whether those decisions beat peers': forecast error, inventory turns, stockouts, the survival of new products and revenue per customer. A company whose numbers are no better than its rivals' owns data, not knowledge.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: grocery category management and Wal-Mart's regional forecasts.
What it does now
Whether the data changes decisions that beat rivals' results.
The mathematics
Worth = profit of the decisions the data changes
The full entry
Where it began

The first of three knowledge patterns (Profit Patterns, pp. 211 to 213) treats the record of sales, long a side effect of doing business, as the thing of value: a supplier that studies every purchase learns its customers' wants, price limits and habits, and can make money from what it learns. The book points to grocery category management, where a supplier is valuable to the grocer for knowing how to make each foot of shelf earn more; to Wal-Mart forecasting demand from regional transaction data; to GE and a maker of specialty chemicals building models of how their customers make money and decide what to buy; and to Capital One in its case studies (pp. 280 to 286).

Why it works now

Retail media networks, loyalty programs and data-sharing agreements between suppliers and retailers are the present form, and the argument has moved to who owns the record. The Desk asks which decisions the data changes, and whether the results beat rivals who lack it.

When it applies

A supplier or retailer that records many customers' purchases in detail and uses the record to change assortments, prices, forecasts or launches, or sells the insight to its own customers. Not data that is collected and reported but changes no decision, and not insight any rival can buy from the same panel or retailer feed.

What we would ask

Which decisions does the company make differently because of its customer data, and what did those decisions earn last year?
Are the company's forecast error, stockouts and new product survival better than its rivals', and by how much?

What it needs

Inventory turns, stockout rates and forecast error against peers; the share of new products still on sale after two years; revenue per customer; how much orders to suppliers swing against sales, before and after data is shared; and what the filings claim for the company's data and its advice to retailers, set against those operating numbers.

How we would get it

Former category and analytics heads on which decisions the data changed; retail buyers who receive the supplier's category advice on whether it moves their numbers; former merchandising and supply chain leaders on forecast accuracy before and after; and the record of launches and how long they lasted.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company data-driven because it describes a data asset, when its turns, stockouts and launch success are no better than peers'. Also: insight any rival can buy from the same source; and the retailer, which owns the transactions, taking the analysis back from the supplier.

For example

A consumer investor is looking at a snack maker whose shelf analytics are said to win it space at grocers. Category buyers at two chains say the advice is useful, but they now get advice as good from the largest rival and from their own data teams, and the company's new products survive two years no more often than the category's. The test says the pattern is real in the category and the company's lead in it is gone.

The mathematics in fullOn each measure the data should move, lead = company - peer median for inventory turns, two-year survival of new products and revenue per customer, and lead = peer median - company for forecast error and stockouts, where lower is better; the company is winning while the leads are positive and widening against rivals without the record. In decision terms the data is worth VOI = E[max over actions a of profit(a) given the data] - max over a of E[profit(a)], which is zero wherever the data changes no action. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 211 to 213 and 280 to 286

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Howard (1966). Information Value Theory. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 2(1), 22-26. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSSC.1966.300074
Lee, Padmanabhan, Whang (1997). Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect. Management Science 43(4), 546-558. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546

Operations to knowledge (Slywotzky)

Operations to knowledge: the know-how earns more than the assets

We confirm that an asset-heavy operator earns fees, licenses or system revenue from what it learned running its operations, then tell who is winning by the share of operating income that comes from outside clients and by the return on capital with lease and guarantee obligations kept in the base. A return that rises only on reported assets is financing, not knowledge.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: SABRE, the American Airlines reservation system opened to travel agents in 1976.
What it does now
Outside clients' share of income, and the return with leases left in.
The mathematics
I / (A + L), and outside fees / operating income
The full entry
Where it began

The second knowledge pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 215 to 217) concerns operators whose plants, fleets or buildings have stopped paying: the expertise built up running them becomes the product, sold as management services, software or licenses, and the assets themselves are often sold. The case the book treats as classic is SABRE, the reservation system American Airlines began making available to travel agents in 1976. The others: two guides, the Official Airline Guide and TV Guide, that earned more than the industries they covered; Marriott managing hotels that had passed out of its ownership; Disney setting up Euro Disney so the assets belonged to others; and Japanese steelmakers earning from what they knew about steelmaking processes and about building plants.

Why it works now

It shows up in asset-light hotel and restaurant companies, in manufacturers licensing their process technology, and in operators selling internal software to rivals. The Desk asks what share of operating income outside clients pay for the know-how, and what the return looks like with the leases left in.

When it applies

An operator in an asset-heavy business with thin operating returns that earns fees, licenses or system revenue from outside clients for know-how gained running its operations, often while selling or leasing out the assets. Not a sale-leaseback that only moves assets off the balance sheet, and not a services arm whose main customer is its own parent.

What we would ask

Who outside the company pays for its systems or its management, and what share of operating income do they provide?
With the leases and guarantees from its asset sales put back, has the company's return on capital risen?

What it needs

Fee, licensing or system revenue split between outside clients and the parent; operating income by segment; property and equipment against sales; lease and guarantee obligations, including those from sale-leasebacks; and management contract renewals and terminations.

How we would get it

Former heads of the services or systems arm on who the outside clients are and why they stay; owners of assets the company manages on the contract terms and how often they switch; former operations leaders on what the know-how consists of and how easily it could be copied; and the record of contract renewals, fees and terminations.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a knowledge business because it calls itself asset-light, when its return improves only on reported assets. Also: know-how rivals can hire away or buy from a vendor; and a services arm that earns only because its parent is its biggest client.

For example

An investor is studying a restaurant operator that sold its properties and now describes itself as asset-light. Return on reported assets has doubled, but with the leases from the sale-leasebacks put back, return on capital is unchanged, and fees from outside franchisees are under a tenth of operating income. The test says the pattern is named but not under way: the company is the same operator with a new landlord.

The mathematics in fullReturn on capital = I / (A + L), where I is operating income, A the operating assets and L the capitalized lease and guarantee obligations, which splits into margin x turnover, (I / revenue) x (revenue / (A + L)); the company is winning while fees from outside clients grow as a share of I and this return rises with L kept in the base, not only I / A, the return on reported assets. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 215 to 217

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Nissim, Penman (2001). Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation: From Research to Practice. Review of Accounting Studies 6(1), 109-154. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011338221623
Imhoff, Lipe, Wright (1991). Operating Leases: Impact of Constructive Capitalization. Accounting Horizons 5(1), 51-63. https://doi.org/10.2308/ah-9604010111

Knowledge to product (Slywotzky)

Knowledge to product: expertise packaged so it grows without headcount

We confirm that a firm that sold expertise by the hour, or kept it in scattered data, now earns a growing share from offerings that need few added people, then tell who is winning by the revenue each added employee brings in, the product share of revenue and the gross margin. A product whose sales still rise in step with headcount is a service under another name.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Incyte selling genomic databases by subscription.
What it does now
Revenue per added employee, before and after the product.
The mathematics
(R1 - R0) / (N1 - N0) against R0 / N0
The full entry
Where it began

The third knowledge pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 219 to 222) concerns know-how that lives in people's hours or in data spread across files: once captured in software, a database or a fixed-price offer, each further sale needs few extra people, and the achievable growth rate rises. The book's cases are Incyte, whose genomic databases major drug companies subscribed to at about $5 million a year, by the book's figures; Cambridge Technology Partners selling projects at a fixed time and price; SAP, SDRC and PeopleSoft turning process expertise into software; and Reuters packaging information as products.

Why it works now

Professional services firms building software, research firms selling subscriptions, and firms turning their expertise into AI tools all face the same test. The Desk asks how much revenue each added employee brings in, and whether it has risen since the product launched.

When it applies

A firm that sold expertise by the hour, or kept it in scattered data, now earns a growing share of revenue from software, databases or fixed-price offerings that do not need more people to deliver more. Not a product that still needs heavy services to install and run, and not fixed-price work delivered by the same people at the same pace.

What we would ask

What share of revenue comes from offerings that need no added people to deliver more, and how fast is it growing?
Over the last three years, how much revenue did each added employee bring in, against the firm's revenue per employee before?

What it needs

Revenue split between products (licenses, subscriptions, data) and services; headcount by year; revenue per employee and per added employee; gross margin of each; software or database development costs carried on the balance sheet; and deferred revenue.

How we would get it

Former product and delivery leaders on how much of each sale still needs the firm's people; customers on whether they buy the product for itself or for the experts behind it; former engineers on what codifying the expertise cost and how fast it ages; and the record of revenue per employee and services attached to each sale over several years.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a services firm a product company because it launched software, when revenue per employee has not moved. Also: codified knowledge that ages quickly and must be rebuilt at a cost hidden in capitalized development; and a fixed price that moves overrun risk to the firm without the efficiency to cover it.

For example

A growth investor is considering a compliance consultancy that has launched a software product. Each software customer still needs about three months of consultants to set up, and revenue per added employee over three years equals the firm's revenue per employee before the launch. The test says the firm has not made the shift: it is a services business with a product attached, and the growth case is rebuilt on hiring, not on software margins.

The mathematics in fullRevenue = N x y, with N the people delivering and y the revenue per person, so a services firm grows no faster than the growth of N plus that of y; the deciding figure is revenue per added employee, (R1 - R0) / (N1 - N0), against revenue per employee before, R0 / N0, with 0 and 1 the first and last years; the firm is winning while the first runs well above the second, product revenue rises as a share and gross margin widens. A product with fixed cost F and unit cost c near zero earns (p - c) x q - F, so once q passes F / (p - c), profit grows faster than revenue. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 219 to 222

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Lev, Sougiannis (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(1), 107-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00410-6

Skill shift (Slywotzky)

Skill shift: what customers pay for changes, and the skills must follow

We confirm that what customers pay for in the industry has changed and that companies are moving people toward the new skill, then tell who is winning by each company's share of headcount and pay in the new skill against its rivals', and by the operating measure tied to that skill. The company whose mix moved first and whose measure improves is collecting the profit; announcements without a change in mix are not a shift.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Continental moving from cost to service under Gordon Bethune.
What it does now
Whose people mix moved first, and whose results show it.
The mathematics
Share of people in the new skill, against rivals'
The full entry
Where it began

The first of four organizational patterns (Profit Patterns, pp. 231 to 237) argues that when customers start valuing different things, a company needs different capabilities to serve them, technical, managerial or rooted in values, and that companies that rebuild their talent early take the profit. Its cases are Incyte, which by 1998, the book reports, employed 175 programmers to 125 biologists as its central skill moved from biology to programming; Continental Airlines, where Gordon Bethune, from 1994, moved the emphasis from cost to service and market value rose nearly five times over in four years by the book's figures; GE's move to managing by values; and Compaq's purchase of Digital Equipment to gain the services capability it lacked.

Why it works now

Many industries absorbing software, data and AI are in a skill shift, and it appears in the filings as restructuring charges in one function and hiring in another. The Desk asks where the company's hiring and leadership are actually going, and whether the measure the new skill should move has moved.

When it applies

An industry in which what customers pay for has changed, from hardware to software, from cost to service, from product to data, and companies are visibly moving people, hiring and leadership toward the new skill. Not a cost-cutting restructuring renamed as a transformation, and not a hiring announcement with no change in where budget and leadership sit.

What we would ask

What share of the company's people and pay sits in the skills customers now pay for, against three years ago and against its two closest rivals?
Which operating measure should the new skill improve, and has it?

What it needs

Headcount or pay by function over several years; restructuring charges and where the hiring went; acquisitions made for their people, and how many stayed; and the operating measure the new skill should move, such as on-time performance or software revenue per head, against rivals'.

How we would get it

Former heads of people and of the growing and shrinking functions on where hiring and departures have gone; recruiters who place people in the industry on whether the company can attract the new skill; customers on whether they notice the change; and the record of job postings, departures and leadership changes over several years.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling it a skill shift because management says so, when the headcount mix and the operating measure have not moved. Also: a skill bought by acquisition whose people leave once their retention terms end; and a restructuring that cuts costs while the new skill never arrives.

For example

A fund is underwriting an industrial controls maker that says it is becoming a software company. Software engineers are about one in sixteen of its staff against roughly one in four at the two rivals leading the change, software revenue per head is flat, and recruiters report losing most candidates to pure software firms. The test says the shift is real in the industry and the company is behind it, so the plan's software margins are pushed out until the mix moves.

The mathematics in fullMix gap = s(leaders) - s(company), where s = h(new) / h(total) is the share of headcount or pay in the new skill and the leaders are the rivals furthest along; the company is winning while its gap is at or below zero, or closing year by year, and the operating measure tied to the skill improves with it. The skill stock moves with a lag, S(t + 1) = (1 - a) x S(t) + hires(t), with a the yearly attrition, so a late start costs years, not quarters. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 231 to 237

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Eisfeldt, Papanikolaou (2013). Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. The Journal of Finance 68(4), 1365-1406. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12034
Babina, Fedyk, He, Hodson (2024). Artificial intelligence, firm growth, and product innovation. Journal of Financial Economics 151, 103745. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103745

Pyramid to network (Slywotzky)

Pyramid to network: many small, accountable units in place of one hierarchy

We confirm that the company is run, or being rebuilt, as small units that face customers and answer for their own profit, then tell whether the design is winning by the cost of headquarters against revenue, the share of people in customer-facing roles, and whether the typical unit's return, not only the best units', is rising. A company with many subsidiaries whose decisions still go to headquarters is a pyramid with more names.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Virgin forming a fresh company each time a label unit neared fifty people.
What it does now
Whether the typical unit improves, with headquarters kept thin.
The mathematics
Overhead / revenue down; median unit return up
The full entry
Where it began

The second organizational pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 239 to 244) starts from the observation that a growing hierarchy spends more of its attention on itself and answers customers more slowly, and proposes breaking it into small units that each serve customers directly and answer for their own profit. Its cases are Virgin Group, about 200 companies by the book's count, which started a new company each time a unit of its record label grew to around fifty people; ABB, divided into thousands of profit centers; and Thermo Electron, which spun out companies from 1982 onward and whose later difficulties the book itself notes. The Profit Zone treats the same idea as Entrepreneurial Profit (pp. 43 to 44, 61).

Why it works now

It shows up in companies run as federations of small businesses, in serial acquirers that leave each purchase to run itself, and in product teams that answer for their own results. The Desk asks what a unit can decide alone, and whether the typical unit, not only the best, is improving.

When it applies

A large company run, or being rebuilt, as many small units that face customers directly, keep their own profit and loss, and pay their heads on unit results under a thin headquarters. Not a hierarchy that renamed its divisions, not a holding company of unrelated businesses run for financing, and not product to pyramid, where the pyramid is a ladder of products.

What we would ask

What can a unit head decide without asking headquarters, and how is that person paid?
Over the last five years, what has happened to the cost of headquarters against revenue, and to the median unit's return?

What it needs

The number of reporting units and their results where disclosed; the cost of headquarters, year by year, against revenue; headcount in customer-facing roles; how unit heads are paid; and the record of spin-offs, carve-outs and units closed.

How we would get it

Former unit heads on what they could decide alone and how they were paid; former corporate staff on the size and role of headquarters; customers on how quickly the company responds; and the record of reorganizations, spin-offs and what happened to the units afterward.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company a network because it has many subsidiaries, when decisions still go up and unit pay ignores unit results. Also: units competing for the same customers or duplicating costs no one sees; unit incentives that reward each unit at the expense of the whole; and spin-outs that serve financing more than customers.

For example

A family office is looking at a building products group of thirty small companies, each run by its former owner and paid on its own profit. Headquarters costs about two percent of revenue and the median unit's return has risen five years running, so the design is winning locally. But three units bid against each other for the same national customers, and the diligence turns to whether the group can coordinate national accounts without adding the layers it was built to avoid.

The mathematics in fullOverhead ratio = corporate cost / revenue and front-line share = customer-facing staff / total staff; the design is winning while the first stays low or falls, the second rises, and the median unit's return on capital rises, not only the mean, which a few stars can carry. If each of L management layers passes up a fraction a of what the layer below knows, the top sees a^L of it, the loss small units are meant to remove, and unit pay of the form w = b + c x (unit profit) ties each head to what the unit controls. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 239 to 244

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business. (book)
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320

Cornerstoning (Slywotzky)

Cornerstoning: from a secure base into the next market, then the next

We confirm that a company with real control of its first market is entering neighboring markets one at a time, then tell whether it is winning by whether each step is larger than the last, pays back no slower, wins its customers more cheaply because many come from the core, and is funded from the company's own cash. A step that shares little with the core and needs outside money is a new venture, not the next cornerstone.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Microsoft's path from BASIC to DOS, then Windows and office software.
What it does now
What the next step shares with the core, and whether the last paid back.
The mathematics
Payback per step, and the share of customers drawn from the core
The full entry
Where it began

The third organizational pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 247 to 251) is the planned expansion of a company that already controls its first market: it enters the neighboring market that makes the most economic sense, then the next, each bigger than the one before and paid for by its predecessor's profit. Its cases are Microsoft, whose business was BASIC from 1975 to 1980 before it went on to DOS, then Windows and its office applications; Rentokil, which grew outward from pest control; Charles Schwab, which went from discount brokerage to working with investment advisers; and Amazon, which the book expected to follow books with music, video and software.

Why it works now

Software companies growing from one product into a suite, platforms adding payments or lending, and specialist manufacturers adding services follow it, and the steps not yet taken are often already in the plan's numbers. The Desk asks what the next step shares with the core, and whether the last one paid for itself.

When it applies

A company with a dominant, defensible core that has entered, or plans to enter, neighboring markets one at a time, each sharing customers, channel or technology with the core and funded from its cash. Not diversification by acquisition into markets that share little with the core, and not a single expansion described as the first of many.

What we would ask

What does the next market share with the first: the same customers, channel, technology or name?
For each earlier step, how long did it take to pay back, and what share of its first customers came from the core?

What it needs

Revenue and operating profit by segment from the start of each step; investment in each step; products per customer; the cost of winning a customer in each line; the core's return on capital; and any outside financing raised for the expansions.

How we would get it

Former strategy and business development heads on how each step was chosen and what it shared with the core; customers in the core on whether they would take the next offer; former leaders of expansions that failed or were closed; and the record of segment results over the life of each step.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling an expansion cornerstoning because it sits next door on an industry map, when it shares no customers, channel or skill with the core. Also: a step chosen because the market is large rather than near; and a core weaker than it looks, so the cash stops before the sequence is done.

For example

A growth fund is weighing a software company that dominates scheduling for dental practices and plans to enter veterinary clinics, then hospitals. In the veterinary step most early customers came through the same billing partners and payback matched the dental business; hospitals buy through committees the company has never sold to and share no customers with the core. The test backs the first step and treats the hospital plan as an option to revisit, not part of the base case.

The mathematics in fullFor each step k, payback T(k) = cumulative investment in k / yearly operating profit of k, and core draw d(k) = customers of k who came from the core / all customers of k; the company is winning while each step's revenue exceeds the last's, T(k) does not lengthen, the cost to win a customer in k falls as d(k) rises, and the steps are paid from internal cash. Each step is also an option on the next, V(k) = NPV(k) + C(k + 1), worth more the more step k teaches about step k + 1. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 247 to 251

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press. (book)

Conventional to digital business design (Slywotzky)

Conventional to digital business design: the information side goes digital, and the economics change by a multiple

We confirm that the company's ordering, configuration, scheduling or design now runs digitally and lets customers say what they want before anything is made or shipped, then tell who is winning by the cash cycle, inventory turns, cost per order and revenue per employee against rivals', before and after. The design is winning when those move by a multiple; a program that moves them by a few percent is an upgrade, not a new design.

Born to answer
Profit Patterns, 1999: Dell's customers configuring their own computers, and Cemex's twenty-minute promise.
What it does now
Whether going digital moved the cash cycle and turns by a multiple.
The mathematics
Cash cycle = inventory + receivable - payable days; I = lambda x W
The full entry
Where it began

The last organizational pattern (Profit Patterns, pp. 253 to 259) is the conversion of a company's information flows, its 'bits' rather than its physical 'atoms', into digital form, in whatever order its most pressing business problems suggest, aimed at gains of ten times rather than a few percent and at a continuous connection with customers. Its cases are Dell, whose customers configured their own computers online and whose working capital ran below zero; Schwab and Cisco; Microsoft, whose asset intensity the book shows as negative; Cemex, which, the book reports, committed to arrive no more than twenty minutes from the agreed time where the norm had been a three-hour window; and Boeing, which designed the 777 entirely on computers. The book expects the pattern to be counted later among the mega patterns (p. 259), and The Art of Profitability later made it a twenty-third model, Digital Profit (Lesson 23).

Why it works now

Nearly every company now describes a digital program; the pattern is the narrower case where customers ordering, configuring and scheduling for themselves change inventory, working capital and cost per order by a multiple. The Desk asks which business problem went digital first, and what it did to the cash cycle against rivals'.

When it applies

A company that has moved ordering, configuration, scheduling or design into digital form so that customers say what they want before it is made or shipped, and whose inventory, working capital and cost per order have changed by a multiple. Not a technology budget that digitizes the old process without moving those numbers, and not a website that works as a catalog.

What we would ask

Which business problem went digital first, and what happened to inventory, the cash cycle and cost per order as a result?
Do customers now say what they want before the company builds or ships, or does it still forecast and push?

What it needs

Days of inventory, receivables and payables over several years against rivals'; inventory turns; revenue per employee; the share of orders placed or configured by customers online; selling and administrative cost as a share of sales; and deferred revenue against assets.

How we would get it

Former operations and technology leaders on what was digitized, in what order, and what changed; customers on how they order and what they would lose if they had to call; suppliers on how the company's schedules reach them; and the record of turns, cash cycle and cost per order before and after.

Where it breaks

The forced fit: calling a company digital because it spends heavily on technology, when its cash cycle and inventory turns are where they were. Also: gains of a few percent presented as a transformation; and a weak design moved online, which going digital speeds up rather than repairs.

For example

A private equity firm is looking at an industrial distributor whose online ordering portal is said to cut costs. Two years in, inventory turns and the cash cycle are unchanged, and former sales staff say customers check stock on the portal and then phone their usual rep. The test says the design has not changed, and the savings in the plan are taken out until orders actually move online.

The mathematics in fullCash cycle = days of inventory + days of receivables - days of payables, and inventory follows I = lambda x W, daily throughput times the days each unit waits; the company is winning while its cash cycle and W fall to a fraction of rivals', not a few percent below them. With a negative cycle, a rise in yearly revenue of delta R releases cash of delta R x (-cash cycle) / 365 before any of it is spent, so customers finance the growth. Where it is in the books

Profit Patterns (1999), pp. 253 to 259

Sources

Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business. (book)
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books. (book)
Little (1961). A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = lambda W. Operations Research 9(3), 383-387. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.3.383

Fat tails, fragility and ruin

Whether one observation can outweigh all the rest, whether harm grows faster than the shock, what cannot be recovered from, and who bears the downside.

Drawn from the books of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, from Fooled by Randomness (2001) and The Black Swan (2007) to Antifragile (2012), Skin in the Game (2018) and his technical volume Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails (2020), and from his papers on the reading list, with chapters checked against publishers' and libraries' tables of contents. The tests, what each needs from the filings, and the worked examples are Vista's reading.

Thin and fat tails: Mediocristan and Extremistan (Taleb)

Mediocristan or Extremistan: whether one observation can move the total

We test whether the quantity a thesis averages comes from a world where no single observation matters much or from one where a single observation can outweigh the rest. We measure the largest observation's share of the total, how that share behaves as observations accumulate, and how far the average moves when the top one or two are set aside. If the share does not fall, the average and the standard deviation are not properties of the business, and the work moves from estimating them to sizing the exposure to one large observation.

Born to answer
Mandelbrot on cotton prices, 1963; The Black Swan's two countries, 2007.
What it does now
Whether the average of a loss or deal history means anything.
The mathematics
R(n) = max |x_i| / sum |x_i| falls toward zero only if the mean exists
The full entry
Where it began

Benoit Mandelbrot's 1963 study of cotton prices found price changes far wilder than a bell curve allows. In The Black Swan (2007, chapter 3) Taleb named the two kinds of randomness Mediocristan, where no single observation can change the total much, and Extremistan, where one can outweigh all the rest. Mandelbrot and Taleb's 2010 chapter makes the point with a crowd of a thousand people: add the heaviest person alive and the total weight barely moves, add the richest and that one person holds nearly all of the crowd's wealth. Taleb's 2007 reply to his statistician reviewers confines the critique to the second kind of world when decisions turn on sizes rather than probabilities, and his 2019 paper turns how fat into how much more data: a one-tailed Pareto variable with tail exponent 3 needs about 543 observations to say what 30 say for a Gaussian.

Why it works now

The test was rarely run because it needs the raw observations, every claim, deal or loss, and those sat in systems nobody had time to extract. A loss register or a deal history can now be read into a table quickly, and the share of the largest observation and the maximum-to-sum ratio computed outside the conversation in minutes. What still takes people is knowing whether the largest event on record was the largest possible, which former risk officers and operators can say.

When it applies

A thesis, price, reserve or risk limit rests on the average or the standard deviation of a quantity that can take very large values (loss per claim, cost overrun per project, revenue per title or per deal, size of a drawdown), and the record holds tens or hundreds of observations, not thousands. Not to be confused with tail-story-or-average-story, which asks whether a market is really a handful of customers, or worst-case-distribution, which fits the extremes once they are known to matter: this is the earlier test of whether an average means anything at all.

What we would ask

What is the largest single observation in the record, and what share of the total does it account for?
With the largest one or two observations set aside, how far does the average move?

What it needs

The raw observations rather than summaries (every claim, loss, deal size or return in the period, with dates) and their count; the same series for peers where it exists, so the test runs on more data than one company holds; any cap that bounds the quantity (a policy limit, a contract maximum).

How we would get it

The Desk computes the largest observation's share, the maximum-to-sum ratio as the record accumulates, and the change in the average without the top observations. Former risk officers, underwriters and operators say whether the largest event on record was the largest possible, and what, if anything, caps the next one.

Where it breaks

Too short a record to have met the tail, so a calm look is only a short history; a genuine cap that makes the tail thin above some size; a mixture of two calm regimes mistaken for a fat tail; reading the test as a forecast of when the large observation arrives, which it is not.

For example

A specialty insurer prices a new line from the average of its first 400 claims, 58 thousand dollars. The largest claim is 31 percent of everything paid, and setting it aside moves the average to about 40 thousand. The average is not a property of the line: the price has to come from what one claim of that size does to the insurer's capital, and the reinsurance attachment becomes the research question.

The mathematics in fullMaximum-to-sum ratio for the p-th moment: R(n, p) = max |x_i|^p / sum |x_i|^p over the first n observations; if the p-th moment exists, R falls toward zero as n grows, and if R stays high or jumps, the average (p = 1) or the variance (p = 2) is not a usable summary. Data needed: with M(n) = E|S(n) - E S(n)| the mean absolute deviation of a sum of n observations, kappa(n0, n) = 2 - log(n / n0) / log(M(n) / M(n0)) runs from 0 (Gaussian) to 1, and with kappa_1 = kappa(1, 2) a sample needs about n_g^(1 / (1 - kappa_1)) observations to tell as much as n_g Gaussian ones. Where it is in the books

The Black Swan (2nd ed., 2010; first published 2007), Part One, Chapter 3, The Speculator and the Prostitute; The Black Swan, Part Three, Chapter 15, The Bell Curve, That Great Intellectual Fraud; Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails (2020), section 2.2.20, MS Plot; Chapter 3, section 3.1, On the Difference Between Thin and Thick Tails; Chapter 8, How Much Data Do You Need? An Operational Metric for Fat-tailedness; Taleb (2007), Black Swans and the Domains of Statistics, The American Statistician; Mandelbrot and Taleb (2010), Mild vs. Wild Randomness, Chapter 3 of The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Risk Management; Taleb (2019), How much data do you need?, International Journal of Forecasting

Sources

Taleb (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., with the postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility (first published by Random House, 2007). Random House Trade Paperbacks. (book)
Taleb (2020). Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails: Real World Preasymptotics, Epistemology, and Applications, The Technical Incerto, vol. 1 (free electronic version, arXiv 2001.10488). STEM Academic Press. (book)
Taleb (2007). Black Swans and the Domains of Statistics. The American Statistician 61(3), 198-200. https://doi.org/10.1198/000313007x219996
Mandelbrot, Taleb (2010). Mild vs. Wild Randomness: Focusing on Those Risks That Matter. The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Risk Management, 47-58. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835287-004
Taleb (2019). How much data do you need? An operational, pre-asymptotic metric for fat-tailedness. International Journal of Forecasting 35(2), 677-686. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2018.10.003
Taleb (2009). Finiteness of variance is irrelevant in the practice of quantitative finance. Complexity 14(3), 66-76. https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.20263
Mandelbrot (1963). The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices. The Journal of Business 36(4), 394. https://doi.org/10.1086/294632

Learn the math
The question

An actuary at a specialty insurer is pricing a new line of cover. She has the first 400 claims in a spreadsheet, and the average is $58 thousand. Add a margin, multiply by the claims expected next year, and the price is done before lunch.

Then she sorts the column. One claim, a single row out of 400, is 31 percent of everything the line has ever paid. She deletes it to see what happens, and the average drops from $58 thousand to about $40 thousand. So which is the average claim: $58 thousand or $40 thousand? If one row can move the answer by a third, the honest reply is that this record does not yet have an average, and a price built on one is built on a single claimant's bad day.

This lesson is about the test she just ran by accident. Before trusting any average or any standard deviation, of claims, deal sizes, cost overruns, revenue per title, ask what kind of world the numbers come from. In one kind, no single observation matters much and averages mean what they say. In the other, one observation can outweigh all the rest, and the average is a rumor. Nassim Taleb named the two worlds Mediocristan and Extremistan. The test that tells them apart takes a column of raw numbers and a few lines of arithmetic.

The idea in one paragraph

Picture a stadium holding a thousand people, and ask what one more person walking in can do to the total. If the total is weight, nothing: even the heaviest human alive barely moves it. If the total is wealth, everything: one billionaire through the turnstile and the newcomer holds nearly all the money in the building. (The picture is Benoit Mandelbrot and Nassim Taleb's.) Every quantity you might average lives in one stadium or the other, and you can find out which by measuring three things: the largest observation's share of the total, whether that share shrinks as observations pile up, and how far the average moves when you set the top one or two aside. Where the share shrinks steadily toward nothing, the average and the standard deviation are real properties of the thing you are studying. Where the share stays large or leaps up again each time a new giant arrives, they are properties of whoever happened to walk in so far, and the useful question changes from "what is the average?" to "what would one very large observation do to me?"

The math, step by step

Step 1: the largest observation's share. Take the first n observations, x_1, x_2, ..., x_n, all positive (claims, deal sizes, losses). Define

R(n, 1) = (the largest of the n) / (the sum of the n)

R is the share of the total owed to one observation. For the insurer it is 0.31. Put round numbers on the stadium. A thousand people averaging 170 pounds weigh 1,000 x 170 = 170,000 pounds; a newcomer of 1,400 pounds, heavier than almost anyone who has ever lived, takes a share of 1,400 / (170,000 + 1,400) = 0.8%. A thousand people with $100,000 each hold 1,000 x $100,000 = $100 million; a newcomer with $100 billion takes, in $ millions, a share of 100,000 / (100 + 100,000) = 99.9%, and the average wealth in the building goes from $100,000 to about $100 million. Nobody inside got richer.

The actuary's second experiment, deleting the top row, is the same number seen from the other side. The average without the largest observation is

(sum - largest) / (n - 1) = average x (1 - R) x (n / (n - 1))

because sum - largest = sum x (1 - R) and sum = average x n. For her: 400 x 58 = 23,200 paid in all (in $ thousands); the largest claim is (0.31 x 23,200) = 7,192; and (23,200 - 7,192) / 399 = 40.1. Read the formula: when n is large, setting aside the top observation cuts the average by the fraction R, almost exactly. The Library's two questions, what share is the largest and how far does the average move without it, are one question.

Step 2: why the share dies away in Mediocristan. One number at one moment proves little; any record of ten has a largest that looks big. What separates the two worlds is what R does as n grows. Divide top and bottom by n:

R(n, 1) = (largest / n) / (sum / n)

The bottom is the sample average, and the law of large numbers says that if the quantity has a finite true mean m, the average of n independent draws settles at m. So the bottom goes to m. Now the top. For the largest of n to be as big as some fixed fraction f of n, at least one observation must exceed f x n, and the chance that any of n does is at most n x P(X > f x n) (add up the n separate chances), where P(X > x) is the chance a single observation exceeds x. Here is the key fact: a finite mean forces x x P(X > x) toward zero as x grows. Why: observations above x contribute at least x x P(X > x) to the mean (each is at least x, and that is how often they come), and the contribution of the ever more distant tail to a finite mean must fade to nothing. Set x = f x n:

n x P(X > f x n) = (1 / f) x (x x P(X > x)), which goes to zero

So largest / n goes to zero, the bottom goes to m, and R(n, 1) goes to zero. In words: when a true mean exists, the sum grows in step with n, the largest observation cannot keep up, and each newcomer to the stadium matters less than the last. Turn it around and you have the test. If R refuses to fall, the mean that the argument assumed is not there to be estimated.

Step 3: how fast, in each world. The size that the largest of n observations typically reaches is the size that about one in n exceeds: solve n x P(X > x) = 1.

A thin tail first. Suppose the chance of exceeding x falls off exponentially, P(X > x) = exp(-x / m), with mean m. Then n x exp(-x / m) = 1 gives x = m x ln(n). The largest of n grows like the logarithm of n, which is to say hardly at all, and

R(n, 1) is about (m x ln(n)) / (n x m) = ln(n) / n

At n = 1,000 that is 6.9 / 1,000 = 0.7%; at a million, about 0.001%. (A bell curve's largest grows more slowly still.)

Now a fat tail. The standard one is the Pareto: P(X > x) = (L / x)^a for x above a minimum L. The number a is the tail exponent, and smaller means fatter. Its signature: double x and the chance falls by the same factor 2^a at every scale, from thousands to billions. There is no size at which "large" turns into "impossible". Solve n x (L / x)^a = 1 and the typical largest is

x = L x n^(1 / a)

a power of n, not a logarithm. When a is above 1 the mean exists and equals (a x L) / (a - 1), so

R(n, 1) is about (L x n^(1 / a)) / (n x (a x L) / (a - 1)) = ((a - 1) / a) x n^((1 / a) - 1)

With a = 1.5 and L = 1 the mean is 3 and the typical largest of 1,000 is 1,000^(2/3) = 100, so R is about 100 / (1,000 x 3) = 3.3%. At a million observations it is still 0.33%, some 240 times the thin tail's share. It falls, but so slowly that a record of hundreds has barely begun. And when a is below 1, the largest grows like n^(1 / a), faster than n itself: with a = 0.75, the largest of a million observations is typically around 10^8, a hundred times the count. There is no mean for the total to settle on, the total is driven by its few largest terms, and R does not go to zero however long you wait: in simulated samples with a = 0.75 the largest observation is typically about a third of the total, at 100 observations and at 1,000 alike. That is the wealth stadium. (At a = 1 exactly, the knife edge, the share does fall, but only like 1 / ln(n), too slowly to show in any real record.)

Step 4: the same test on squares. A standard deviation is built from squared observations, so run the test on the squares. In general, for a power p,

R(n, p) = (the largest x_i^p) / (the sum of all x_i^p)

p = 1 tests the mean and p = 2 tests the variance. Nothing new is needed, because raising a Pareto variable to the power p gives another Pareto variable: P(X^p > y) = P(X > y^(1 / p)) = L^a x y^(-a / p), a tail exponent of a / p. So Steps 2 and 3 apply with a / p in place of a: R(n, p) falls to zero when a is above p, and stays high when a is below p.

That gives the reading its teeth. A tail exponent of 1.5 means the mean exists (1.5 is above 1) and the variance does not (the squares have exponent 0.75). Such a quantity has an average you can estimate, slowly, and no standard deviation at all, whatever the spreadsheet prints.

0%25%50%75%100%101001,00010,000Number of observations so far (each step is ten times more)Largest observation as a share of the totalfat sample, squares (p = 2)fat sample, sizes (p = 1)thin sample, squares (p = 2)thin sample, sizes (p = 1)
Two stadiums with the same average. In the thin one, each newcomer matters less and less. In the fat one, the dashed line is the warning: a single arrival can take over the sum of squares, so a standard deviation computed from this sample describes its largest observation more than the crowd. Seeded simulation: exponential and Pareto (tail exponent 1.5) samples, both with mean 3.

The chart shows two simulated stadiums of 10,000 observations with the same mean of 3, one exponential and one Pareto with a = 1.5. In the thin one the largest share of sizes is 0.8% after 1,000 observations and 0.1% after 10,000, and the share of squares follows it down. In the fat one, look at observation 260: a single arrival lifts the share of sizes from 3.2% to 15.7% and the share of squares from 13% to 81%. After 10,000 observations the largest square is still 19% of the sum. Anyone who had computed a standard deviation at observation 259 was describing a different sample by observation 260.

Step 5: how much more data a fat tail demands. Between the two stadiums lies a wide middle, and Taleb's kappa measures where a quantity sits in it. Let S(n) be the sum of n observations and

M(n) = the average distance of S(n) from its own mean

For a bell curve, M(n) = M(1) x n^(1/2): the sum of twice as many observations wanders 2^(1/2) = 1.414 times as far, so their average is 2 / 1.414 = 1.414 times steadier. That is the square root rule behind every margin of error. At the other extreme M(2) = 2 x M(1): two observations average out no better than one. Kappa is defined by writing the growth as a power,

M(n) / M(n0) = (n / n0)^(1 / (2 - kappa))

and solving. Take logs of both sides, log(M(n) / M(n0)) = log(n / n0) / (2 - kappa), so

kappa(n0, n) = 2 - (log(n / n0) / log(M(n) / M(n0)))

Kappa of 0 is the bell curve's square root; kappa of 1 means averaging buys nothing. Taleb's benchmark is kappa_1 = kappa(1, 2), from one observation to two.

Try it on a Pareto with a = 3, a tail so mild it has a finite variance. In units of its minimum, M(1) = 0.4444 and M(2) = 0.6981 (two integrals, done in the code). The ratio is 1.5707, between the bell curve's 1.414 and the useless 2, and

kappa_1 = 2 - (ln 2 / ln 1.5707) = 2 - (0.6931 / 0.4515) = 0.465

Now the question a decision turns on: how many observations n of this kind are as informative as n_g from a bell curve? Scale both to the same M(1). The noise in an average is M(n) / n, which is M(1) x n^(-(1 - kappa) / (2 - kappa)) for the fat variable and M(1) x n_g^(-1/2) for the bell curve. Set them equal and solve:

n = n_g^((2 - kappa) / (2 x (1 - kappa)))

Taleb's 2019 paper prints a different and simpler formula, the one the Library's entry quotes, n = n_g^(1 / (1 - kappa_1)). The paper calls it an approximation, and reports from it a much quoted figure: a Pareto with a = 3 needs 543 observations to say what 30 say for a bell curve. It is worth checking, and the check is a lesson in itself. For n_g = 30:

  • The shortcut with kappa_1 = 0.465 gives 576. (Cut kappa to 0.46 and it gives 543, the paper's figure; the exponent is that touchy.)
  • The paper's fuller form of the shortcut uses kappa measured from one observation to n_g in place of kappa_1. Its own table prints that value as 0.3246, and with it the formula gives 154.
  • The algebra above, with kappa_1 = 0.465, gives 131.
  • A direct count, simulating 200,000 samples with a fixed seed and finding the smallest n whose average is as steady as 30 bell curve draws, gives about 62.

Two things separate these numbers. First, the shortcut and the algebra raise n_g to different powers, 1 / (1 - kappa) against (2 - kappa) / (2 x (1 - kappa)), and the two agree only when kappa is 0. The algebra is the one you can rebuild from kappa's definition in the three lines above. Second, kappa is not one number. It is 0.465 from one observation to two, but about 0.33 from one to thirty (the table's 0.3246) and about 0.30 by sixty: as observations pile up, a variable with finite variance slowly starts to behave. Feed the kappa measured at 62 into the algebra and it returns 62. So treat the shortcut as a smoke alarm, not a ruler. What survives every version is the ranking and the direction: even this tame tail, with a variance any textbook would accept, needs about twice the data of a bell curve with the same M(1); and as the tail exponent falls toward 1, kappa approaches 1 and every version of the formula explodes together. In Extremistan the data you would need is more than you will ever have.

A worked example: 403 billion-dollar disasters

Simulations behave because we wrote their rules. Here is a real loss register. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration kept a public table of every weather and climate disaster in the United States from 1980 through 2024 that cost at least $1 billion, adjusted for inflation: 403 events, close to the insurer's 400 claims. (The table leaves out everything under $1 billion, so its average is the average of large events only.) Run the actuary's test.

The total is $2,917.6 billion and the average event cost $7.24 billion. The median, the event in the middle, cost $2.46 billion: the average is three times the typical event, which is already a hint. The largest is Hurricane Katrina at $201.3 billion, and

R(403, 1) = 201.3 / 2,917.6 = 6.9%

Set Katrina aside and the average is (2,917.6 - 201.3) / 402 = $6.76 billion; set aside Hurricane Harvey ($160.0 billion) as well and it is (2,917.6 - 201.3 - 160.0) / 401 = $6.37 billion. Two rows out of 403 move the average by 12%. A thin tail's benchmark for 403 observations is ln(403) / 403 = 1.5%; the real share is 4.6 times that. The top four events, 1% of the record, are 20% of the cost.

Now the squares. Katrina alone is 26.5% of the sum of squared costs, and Katrina and Harvey together are 43%. The standard deviation of the 403 costs is $18.1 billion; without Katrina it is $15.3 billion; without the top two, $13.2 billion. A measure of spread that falls by more than a quarter when two rows are removed is not measuring the spread of the other 401.

0%25%50%75%100%1100200300403Events so far, in date order, 1980 to 2024Largest event as a share of the totalKatrina, event 121share of squared costs (p = 2)share of costs (p = 1)
A real record. For twenty five years the test looked calmer each year, and then one event more than three times the previous record walked in. Source: NOAA NCEI, U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, 1980 to 2024, costs adjusted for inflation by NOAA.

The chart tells the part that matters most. Stand at event 120, in the summer of 2005. The record is twenty five years long. The largest event so far is Hurricane Andrew at $60.5 billion, 8.0% of the total and falling; the share of squares is 23% and falling; the average is $6.32 billion and the standard deviation $9.8 billion. A careful analyst would have said the record was settling down. Event 121 is Katrina, 3.3 times the previous record. In one row the share of costs jumps from 8.0% to 21.0%, the share of squares from 23% to 71%, and the average from $6.32 billion to $7.93 billion.

The reading: the share of costs does fall over time, so an average exists in some loose sense, though one event can still move it by a quarter. The share of squares does not settle at all, so the standard deviation is not a usable summary of this record. And nothing in 120 events of calm said that event 121 was coming. For an insurer of such risks the work is therefore not to refine the $7.24 billion; it is to ask what one event of $200 billion, or $400 billion, does to its capital, and where its reinsurance begins. That is the turn the Library's insurer makes when one claim is 31% of the book.

The usual mistakes
  1. Calling the big one an outlier. The symptom is a footnote: "excluding one exceptional claim". In Mediocristan an outlier is a measurement error and trimming it helps. In Extremistan the outlier is most of the story, and trimming it deletes the thing you needed to price. The fix: report the average with and without the top one and two, and if they differ much, stop quoting either as "the" average.
  1. Quoting a standard deviation nobody tested. The symptom is "mean plus or minus two standard deviations" on a quantity like deal size. The fix is to compute R(n, 2). If one squared observation is a fifth or more of the sum of squares, or the share has jumped lately, the standard deviation is a fact about one row.
  1. Running the test on summaries. Annual totals, averages by region and "top ten customers" have already been added up, and adding hides the single large item. The test needs the raw rows: every claim, every deal.
  1. Taking a calm record for a thin tail. The disaster register looked calm for 120 events. A falling share shows only that the giant has not arrived yet in this sample. The fix is to borrow observations, from peers and from longer histories, and to ask people who know the business whether the largest event on record was the largest possible.
  1. Reading a finite variance as safety. The Pareto with tail exponent 3 has a perfectly finite variance and still needs about twice a bell curve's data. "The variance exists" is a statement about infinity; your sample lives well short of it.
Where the model breaks

The record may be too short to have met its tail. Then the test passes and means little: a calm look is only a short history, as the first 120 disasters show. A pass on a few hundred observations is weak evidence; a failure is strong evidence.

There may be a genuine cap. A policy limit, a contract maximum, the physical size of a plant: above the cap the tail is not fat but absent, and a share that looks alarming cannot grow. Find the cap before sounding the alarm, and check that it truly binds.

The data may be a mixture of two calm regimes, say small routine claims and occasional total losses of a fixed size. The share jumps when the first total loss arrives, which looks like Extremistan, but then it falls and keeps falling, because nothing larger than a total loss exists. Split the record by regime and test each.

And the test is not a forecast. It says whether one observation can dominate, never when the next large one arrives. A high share is no signal that a catastrophe is due, and a low one is no all-clear.

Check yourself
  1. Two columns of 1,000 numbers each: the calories each of 1,000 adults ate yesterday, and the lifetime sales of each of 1,000 published novels. Which stadium is each in, and what would you expect the largest share to be, roughly?

Answer: calories are Mediocristan. Nobody eats a hundred times the average, so the largest share is a fraction of one percent, near the weight stadium's 0.8%. Novel sales are Extremistan: a single bestseller can outsell the other 999 together, so the largest share could be anything from a tenth to most of the total, and it would change completely with one more title.

  1. A register of 2,000 claims shows the largest share of costs falling steadily to 0.4%, while the largest share of squared costs sits at 35% and has jumped twice in the last 500 claims. Which summaries can you use?

Answer: the average, with care, since R(n, 1) is falling the way Step 2 says it should when a mean exists. The standard deviation, no: R(n, 2) is not settling, which is what a tail exponent between 1 and 2 produces (Step 4). Report the average with and without the top claims, drop anything built on the variance, and size the exposure to one very large claim directly.

  1. A firm's record shows 250 deals averaging $1.2 million. The largest was $45 million and the second largest $30 million. Find the largest deal's share, the average without it, the average without the top two, and compare the share with a thin tail's benchmark.

Answer: the total is 250 x 1.2 = $300 million. The share is 45 / 300 = 15%. Without the largest, the average is (300 - 45) / 249 = $1.024 million; without the top two, (300 - 45 - 30) / 248 = $0.907 million, a quarter below the headline. The thin benchmark is ln(250) / 250 = 2.2%, so the share is about 6.8 times what a thin tail would give. "Average deal size $1.2 million" describes two deals and 248 bystanders; the forecast should treat large deals as a separate question of whether and how big, not as part of an average.

Teach me more
  • Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails, Nassim Nicholas Taleb (free on arXiv; third revised edition, 2025). Read chapter 3, "A Non-Technical Overview: the Darwin College Lecture", about 44 pages. Best for the intuition this lesson only sketches: pick two people whose heights add to 4.1 meters and they are probably both about 2.05; pick two whose wealth adds to $36 million and one of them probably has nearly all of it. The maximum-to-sum plot is a single page in chapter 2 (section 2.2.21 in this edition), stated without derivation, and chapter 8 holds kappa and the 543.
  • Heavy-Tailed Distributions, Thomas J. Sargent and John Stachurski, a lecture in A First Course in Quantitative Economics with Python; long, with runnable code. Best for real data: city sizes, firm values, wealth and daily returns plotted so that a fat tail shows as a straight line, and a sample average that never settles. It does not cover the largest share test, so it pairs well with this lesson.
  • The single big jump principle, John D. Cook (2011), about 450 words. The shortest correct statement of why, with fat tails, a large total is nearly always one large term and not many middling ones: the chance that a sum is huge comes to match the chance that its largest term alone is huge. It uses the Cauchy distribution and one chart. Five minutes.
  • How Much Data Do You Need? An Operational, Pre-Asymptotic Metric for Fat-tailedness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, International Journal of Forecasting (2019), 11 pages. The source of kappa. Read sections I to III and Table III, which lists kappa for Pareto and Student tails at 2, 30 and 100 observations; the shortcut is its equation 7. Graduate level in places, but the tables can be read without the proofs.

The fragility heuristic (Taleb)

Fragility: harm that accelerates with the size of the shock

We find out whether the harm grows faster than the shock. Given the loss reported for one stress (revenue down, rates up, load up), we obtain the same measure at a smaller and a larger shock and compare: if twice the shock does more than twice the harm, the exposure is fragile, and a single stress number understates the tail however carefully it was modeled. A company is handling its fragility when the acceleration is small beside its cushion and the trigger points (covenants, margin calls, capacity limits) sit well beyond the shocks it can expect.

Born to answer
Antifragile, 2012: one large stone against a thousand pebbles; the IMF test, 2012.
What it does now
Whether losses accelerate past the reported stress scenario.
The mathematics
Fragile when L(2d) > 2 L(d)
The full entry
Where it began

Taleb's test for fragility comes from option trading, where a book's hidden exposure to large moves shows up as losses that accelerate. Antifragile (2012, chapter 18) states it as the difference between a large stone and a thousand pebbles: the fragile is hurt more by one large shock than by many small ones adding up to the same size. With four IMF economists he turned it into a second-order stress test (2012): rerun a bank's or a government's stress scenario with the shock a little larger and a little smaller, and read the acceleration. Their illustration of size as a source of fragility was Societe Generale's forced sale of about 70 billion dollars of index futures over three days in January 2008, far costlier than ten sales of 7 billion spread over weeks would have been; Taleb and Douady (2013) proved the theorem behind the test.

Why it works now

A company's response to shocks used to be visible only inside its own model, and a single stress result was all an outsider saw. Filings now carry sensitivity tables, covenant terms and stress disclosures that can be read in bulk, and the loss at two or three shock sizes can often be rebuilt from them; the acceleration is then arithmetic done in code. What the documents miss is the mechanics past the reported scenario, the margin call or the capacity limit, and that is what former treasurers and operators are asked.

When it applies

A company, balance sheet, operation or plan is called safe because it passed one stress scenario, or its sensitivity is quoted as one number per unit of shock, while leverage, fixed costs, capacity limits, covenants or forced sales of assets could make losses grow faster than the shock. Not to be confused with worst-case-distribution, which asks how large the shock can be, or flaw-of-averages, which runs uncertain inputs through a model: this asks about the shape of the response to the shock itself.

What we would ask

What did the stress test or the model show at the scenario reported, and what does the same model show at a shock half again as large?
What happens mechanically past that point: a covenant, a margin call, a capacity limit, a forced sale?

What it needs

The loss (or earnings, capital, cash, waiting time) at three or more shock sizes on the same basis, from sensitivity disclosures, stress tests or a rebuilt model; the capital or cash cushion it is measured against; the trigger points that change the slope.

How we would get it

The Desk reads sensitivity tables, covenant terms and stress disclosures in filings and supervisory releases and computes the acceleration. Former treasurers, risk officers and plant managers say what happens past the reported scenario, which is where the trigger points live.

Where it breaks

Points too far apart, so a cliff between them is missed; a model that is linear by construction, which the test cannot see past and which has to be checked against the mechanics; losses measured on different bases at different shocks; gains that merely diminish read as fragility.

For example

A distributor tells its lenders that a 10 percent fall in volume costs 12 million of EBITDA. Rebuilt from its cost base, a 20 percent fall costs 31 million, because a fixed-cost warehouse network and a leverage covenant bite beyond 15 percent. Twice the shock does about 2.6 times the harm; the lenders' single scenario understated the second half of the tail, and the covenant headroom is the research question.

The mathematics in fullWith L(d) the loss from a shock of size d and L(0) = 0, the exposure is fragile over the range when L(2d) > 2 L(d). The ratio A = L(2d) / (2 L(d)) is Vista's shorthand, not the IMF paper's, and holds only when L(0) = 0: adding a constant to L moves it, and it fails near zero or for gains; without that condition use the difference C = L(2d) - 2 L(d) + L(0). The IMF paper's own test (2012) is a difference, not a ratio: around a stress level s, D = [L(s + d) + L(s - d)] / 2 - L(s), positive when losses accelerate, divided by capital or cash so that institutions of a similar type can be ranked; it reads one scenario interval, not global convexity, and does not rank across unlike domains. For a convex loss, E[L(X)] > L(E[X]): more volatile shocks raise the expected loss even when the average shock is unchanged. Where it is in the books

Antifragile (2012), Book V, Chapter 18, On the Difference Between a Large Stone and a Thousand Pebbles (A Simple Rule to Detect the Fragile; Why Is Fragility Nonlinear?); Antifragile (2012), Book V, Chapter 19, The Philosopher's Stone and Its Inverse (How to Detect Who Will Go Bust); Taleb, Canetti, Kinda, Loukoianova and Schmieder (2012), IMF Working Paper 12/216, section II.B, A Simple Heuristic to Detect Fragility; Taleb and Douady (2013), Quantitative Finance

Sources

Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Taleb, Canetti, Kinda, Loukoianova, Schmieder (2012). A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing. IMF Working Papers 2012(216), 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475505665.001
Taleb, Douady (2013). Mathematical definition, mapping, and detection of (anti)fragility. Quantitative Finance 13(11), 1677-1689. https://doi.org/10.1080/14697688.2013.800219
Taleb, Tapiero (2010). Risk externalities and too big to fail. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389(17), 3503-3507. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2010.03.014
Jensen (1906). Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes. Acta Mathematica 30(0), 175-193. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02418571

Learn the math
The question

A distributor sits across the table from its lenders. The chief financial officer has one slide: "A 10% fall in volume costs us $12 million of EBITDA. We have $150 million. We are fine." (EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization: roughly, the cash profit the business throws off before paying its lenders.) The lenders nod. It is a careful number; someone spent a week on it.

Nobody asks the second question: what does a 20% fall cost? If the answer is $24 million, the slide told the truth about the tail, because harm that grows in a straight line can be scaled from one point. If the answer is $31 million, the slide hid something. Somewhere between 10% and 20% the warehouses stop being able to shrink, the covenant starts to bite, and every extra point of lost volume hurts more than the one before. One stress number cannot show that. It is a single dot, and a single dot has no shape.

This lesson is about reading the shape. Nassim Taleb's test is almost embarrassingly simple, and that is its power: run the stress twice, at two sizes, and see whether twice the shock does more than twice the harm.

The idea in one paragraph

Some things are hurt more by one big blow than by many small ones that add up to the same size. A porcelain cup survives a thousand taps of one gram and does not survive one tap of a thousand grams. Taleb's image is a large stone and a thousand pebbles: the stone does more damage than the pebbles, though they weigh the same. Anything built like that, with fixed costs, borrowed money, hard limits, or a promise to buy when others sell, is fragile, and the way to find out is not to estimate how likely the big blow is (that is often unknowable) but to look at how the harm bends as the blow grows. If it bends upward, the single stress result understates the tail however carefully it was modeled, and the place to look is the trigger that makes it bend.

The math, step by step

The loss curve. Write L(d) for the loss (lost EBITDA, lost capital, lost cash) from a shock of size d: a fall in volume of d percent, a rise in rates of d basis points (a basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point, so 200 basis points is 2 percentage points). Measure L on one basis at every size. Assume no shock means no loss, L(0) = 0.

What "fragile" means here. Compare the loss from a shock of 2d with twice the loss from a shock of d:

fragile over the range 0 to 2d  when  L(2d) > 2 L(d)

If L is a straight line through zero, L(d) = k x d, then L(2d) = 2k x d = 2 L(d) exactly. So the test asks one thing: does the curve bend upward between d and 2d?

Two ways to read the bend. Vista's shorthand is a ratio:

A = L(2d) / (2 L(d))

A = 1 is a straight line; A above 1 is fragile; A below 1 means losses grow more slowly than the shock. The ratio is only honest when L(0) = 0. Add a fixed $10 million to every loss and A moves, though the shape has not changed at all. The difference that does not care about such a constant is

C = L(2d) - 2 L(d) + L(0)

which is zero for any straight line, with or without a constant, and positive when the curve bends upward.

A curve that bends. Take L(d) = (a x d) + (b x d^2), a straight part plus a small square part. Then

L(2d) = (2a x d) + (4b x d^2)
2 L(d) = (2a x d) + (2b x d^2)
C = 2b x d^2

So C is positive exactly when b is positive: the square term is the bend. With a = 1, b = 0.05 and d = 10: L(10) = 10 + 5 = 15, L(20) = 20 + 20 = 40, and A = 40 / 30 = 4/3, a third more harm than a straight line would give.

The IMF version. Taleb and four economists at the International Monetary Fund (2012) wanted to apply this to bank and government stress tests, which already have a central scenario s (say, rates up 200 basis points). Their heuristic perturbs the scenario a little each way:

D = [L(s + d) + L(s - d)] / 2 - L(s)

In words: average the losses at a slightly worse and a slightly milder scenario, and see how far that average sits above the loss at the scenario itself. (The paper calls it H and writes it for the outcome as a stress test reports it, a bank's capital, where a fall is the harm; there a negative H means fragile, and the paper notes that for a measure where a rise is the harm, such as a government's debt, the sign flips. Written for a loss, as here, positive means fragile. It sets the step d as a multiple of the variable's mean deviation, so that "a little worse" is sized by how much the variable usually moves.) For a straight line the average of the two ends is exactly the middle, so D = 0. For our quadratic, D = b x d^2 at every s (try it: expand L(s + d) and L(s - d); the a x d terms cancel each other, so do the 2 x b x s x d terms, the average that is left is (a x s) + (b x s^2) + (b x d^2), and taking away L(s) leaves b x d^2): with b = 0.05 and d = 5, D = 1.25. If you know a little calculus you will recognize D: for small d it is about (1/2) x L''(s) x d^2, half the second derivative times the step squared. The second derivative is the curvature; the heuristic measures it without needing a formula for L, just three runs of the model you already have.

The paper divides D by capital (or cash, or the budget), so that a bank with a thin cushion and a moderate bend ranks above a bank with a thick cushion and the same bend. It reads one interval around one scenario. It does not prove the curve bends everywhere, and it does not let you compare a bank with a utility.

Why the bend matters even if the average shock does not change. If L bends upward, then for any uncertain shock X,

E[L(X)] > L(E[X])

the average loss is larger than the loss at the average shock (Jensen's inequality, 1906). Picture the curve: the straight chord between two points on an upward-bending curve lies above the curve between them, and the average of two losses is the midpoint of that chord. So more volatility raises the expected loss of a fragile exposure even with the average shock held fixed. A stress test run only at the expected shock understates what the exposure costs on average, not just in the tail.

The stone and the pebbles, in symbols. One shock of size n x d against n shocks of size d: the stone costs L(n x d), the pebbles n x L(d). For a straight line through zero they are equal; for an upward bend the stone costs more. That is Taleb's definition and the ratio test in one line.

A worked example

The distributor, rebuilt. Here is the Library entry's example with its cost base laid out (round numbers, assumed). Each point of volume lost costs $1.2 million of EBITDA in lost contribution. Past a 15% fall the warehouse network cannot shrink any further and the leverage covenant reprices the debt (a covenant is a promise written into the loan, here to keep debt below some multiple of EBITDA; break it and the lenders may raise the rate), so each point beyond 15 costs another $1.4 million. In millions:

L(d) = (1.2 x d) + (1.4 x the points beyond 15)
$0$10$20$3005101520Fall in volume, percentEBITDA lost, $ millionscovenant and fixed network bite$31mtwice the 10% loss: $24m$12m
The distributor's loss is straight until a trigger, then it bends. Two points below the trigger (5 and 10) would show a straight line and pass any fragility test; only a point beyond it shows the bend.

The four runs:

L(5) = 6      L(10) = 12      L(15) = 18      L(20) = (1.2 x 20) + (1.4 x 5) = 31

At d = 10: A = 31 / (2 x 12) = 31 / 24 = 1.29. Twice the shock does 31 / 12 = 2.58 times the harm. The lenders' single scenario understated the second half of the tail by $7 million.

Now the trap. Suppose the analyst had tested at 5 and 10 instead: A = 12 / (2 x 6) = 1. Perfectly straight. The IMF heuristic around s = 10 with d = 5 says the same: D = [(18 + 6) / 2] - 12 = 0. Move the center to s = 15: D = [(31 + 12) / 2] - 18 = 3.5, which is 2.33% of the $150 million of EBITDA. The bend lives at the trigger, and a test that never reaches the trigger cannot see it. This is why the entry asks what happens mechanically past the scenario reported: the covenant, the margin call, the capacity limit.

The stone and the pebbles, with the distributor's numbers. One 20% fall costs $31 million. Ten separate 2% falls cost 10 x $2.4 million = $24 million. Same total volume lost, $7 million apart.

Jensen, with the distributor's numbers. Suppose next year the fall is either 0% or 20%, equal odds. The average fall is 10%, and the loss at the average fall is $12 million. But the average loss is (0 + 31) / 2 = $15.5 million. Uncertainty itself costs this company $3.5 million a year in expectation, and a plan built on the average shock never sees it.

The sold put, where Taleb learned it. Taleb spent about two decades as an options trader, and the test comes from there. Sell a one-month put on a $100 stock, struck at $90: you collect a premium today and promise to buy the stock at $90 a share at any time in the next 30 days if the put's holder asks. (Assumptions: 30 days, 30% volatility, a 4% interest rate, and the put priced by the Black-Scholes formula.) You collect $0.40 a share. If the stock falls at once, the put you sold is worth more, and your loss is what it would now cost you to buy it back, less the $0.40 you were paid. With volatility held at 30%, you lose:

a 5% fall:  $0.80     a 10% fall:  $2.54     a 15% fall:  $5.52     a 20% fall:  $9.61
$0$2$4$6$8$1005101520Sudden fall in the stock, percentLoss per share, $$9.61$2.54twice the 10% losspremium collected $0.40
The trade where Taleb learned the test. The seller keeps the small premium on most days; the loss from a large fall is not twice the loss from half that fall but 3.8 times it.

A at 10% is 9.61 / (2 x 2.54) = 1.89 (1.90 from the unrounded prices); the 20% fall costs 3.8 times the 10% fall and 24 times the premium. And volatility rarely stays put in a crash: at 60% volatility the 20% fall costs $11.51. The seller is paid in pebbles and pays in stones, which is why a trader can make money for years and lose it in a week.

A real bank, read with both tests. SVB Financial Group's annual report for 2021 printed how its economic value of equity (EVE: the value of its assets less its liabilities, rates applied to every cash flow) would change if rates jumped at once and stayed there. As printed, in millions, at 31 December 2021, from a base of $20,672: up 100 basis points, -$2,873; up 200, -$5,722; down 100, +$1,232; down 200, +$636.

Run the ratio up the curve: A = 5,722 / (2 x 2,873) = 5,722 / 5,746 = 0.996. Straight as a ruler. A year earlier the same table had bent (losses of $666 and $1,724 at 100 and 200, so A = 1.29), but by the end of 2021 a lender reading the chord test would have called the exposure linear.

Now run the IMF version around today's rates, s = 0, with steps of 100 and 200, writing gains as negative losses:

d = 100:  D = ([2,873 + (-1,232)] / 2) - 0 = 820.5, which is 4.0% of EVE
d = 200:  D = ([5,722 + (-636)] / 2) - 0 = 2,543, which is 12.3% of EVE

A strong bend. The two tests disagree because they look at different stretches: the chord looks only up the curve, where the model drew a nearly straight line, while the centered test sees that a rise of 200 costs about nine times what a fall of 200 gains. Part of that asymmetry is mechanical, and the filing says so: short rates were near zero at the end of 2021, and the down scenarios were "not complete rate shocks in this rate environment, since rates are assumed to be floored at zero." But the floor was a fact about the bank's position, not a quirk of the model. It had almost nothing left to gain from falling rates and everything to lose from rising ones, and that is exactly what the centered test reports. The bank was paid in pebbles when rates fell and stood to pay in stones when they rose.

And neither test could see the trigger the model left out. The table priced the deposits from their past behavior (the filing assumed interest-bearing deposits would reprice at about 60 percent of any move in short rates) and took it that they stayed while rates moved. In March 2023, after rates had risen far more than 200 basis points, SVB announced that it had sold $21 billion of securities at a $1.8 billion after-tax loss to raise cash; the next day, 9 March, its depositors withdrew more than $40 billion, management expected $100 billion more the day after, and the bank was closed on 10 March (the Federal Reserve's own review, April 2023). The run was the cliff past the last row of the table: mistake 2 below, in its most expensive form.

The IMF paper's own bank. The paper ran its heuristic on the 2012 stress test of twelve large US banks. For its Bank 1, a GDP shock one mean deviation worse cut Tier 1 capitalization (a bank's core capital as a share of its risk-weighted assets) by 1.27 percentage points and two deviations worse by 2.62, 2.06 times as much for twice the shock; the matching gains were 1.20 and 2.34. Its H, as printed, is -0.035 at one deviation and -0.141 at two: (-1.27 + 1.20) / 2 = -0.035 and (-2.62 + 2.34) / 2 = -0.14, the paper's third decimal coming from inputs it printed rounded. Small beside its capital, which is the point of dividing by capital: the paper ranks the twelve banks by H beside the standard ranking and the two orders differ. The bank the standard test ranks second worst comes out among the less fragile by H, and four banks that look more resilient under the standard test come out more fragile.

The usual mistakes
  1. Points too far apart. Symptom: two runs, 10% and 30%, a modest A, and a covenant cliff at 12% that neither run sees as a cliff. Our distributor with a $25 million penalty switching on at 12% gives A = 1 from runs at 5 and 10, and A = 2.04 from runs at 10 and 20, and still says nothing about where the cliff is. Fix: find the triggers first (covenants, margin thresholds, capacity limits) and put a run on each side of every one.
  2. A model that is linear by construction. Symptom: A comes out exactly 1.00 at every size. Many sensitivity tables are a slope times a shock; the test cannot see past a model that has no bend built into it. Fix: check the mechanics, not the spreadsheet; ask a former treasurer what actually happens at the trigger.
  3. Different bases at different sizes. Symptom: the small shock is measured before tax and over one quarter, the large one after tax and over a year, and A looks dramatic or tame for no real reason. Fix: one basis, one horizon, one starting balance sheet, every run.
  4. Reading the ratio with a constant in it. Symptom: A swings when someone adds a fixed cost to every scenario. Fix: use the difference C, or D, which ignore constants; use A only when L(0) = 0.
  5. Calling diminishing gains fragile. Symptom: an upside that grows less than proportionally (a price rise that wins fewer and fewer new customers) is flagged as fragile. That curve bends the other way for a gain; it is concavity of a benefit, not acceleration of a harm. Fix: always state L as a loss, positive when bad, and read the sign of the bend from that.
Where the model breaks

The test reads the shape of a curve over the range you ran; it says nothing about how likely the shock is, and nothing about shocks beyond your largest run. Points too far apart can step over a cliff. A model that is linear by construction will always pass, so the result is only as good as the mechanics the model contains. Losses measured on different bases at different sizes give a meaningless ratio. A gain that merely diminishes is not fragility. The IMF number reads one interval around one scenario, not the whole curve, and it ranks institutions of a similar kind by their cushion; it does not rank a bank against a factory. This lesson describes a way of reading a stress test, not advice about any security.

Check yourself

1. A company's model says a 1% rise in costs cuts profit by $3 million, a 2% rise by $6 million, and a 4% rise by $12 million. Fragile? Answer: Not over that range: A = 6 / 6 = 1 and 12 / 12 = 1, a straight line. But before you relax, ask whether the model could bend at all, and where the company's triggers are. A straight line from a model with no triggers in it is mistake 2.

2. Why does Taleb say you can detect fragility without knowing the odds of the big shock? Answer: Because the test is about the shape of the response, which you can measure from a few runs of a model or a few observed shocks, while the odds of a rare shock are exactly what history is worst at telling you. If the harm bends upward, the exposure loses more from volatility whatever the odds turn out to be (Jensen), so you can act on the shape alone: add cushion, move the trigger, cut the size.

3. A bank's losses are $4 million, $9 million and $20 million at shocks of 1, 2 and 3 points, and nothing at zero. Compute A at d = 1 and the IMF D around s = 2 with a step of 1. What do they tell you? Answer: A = 9 / (2 x 4) = 1.125, a mild bend between 1 and 2. D = [(20 + 4) / 2] - 9 = 12 - 9 = 3: the bend is sharper between 2 and 3 than between 1 and 2 (the loss rose $5 million over the first step and $11 million over the second). The acceleration is growing, so the next question is what sits near a 3-point shock: a covenant, a margin call, a forced sale.

Teach me more
  • MINI LECTURE 14: A First Course on Fragility, Convexity, and Antifragility (Nontechnical), Nassim Nicholas Taleb, on his YouTube channel N N Taleb's Probability Questions, premiered 21 January 2022, 24 minutes 46 seconds. By his own description a first, very introductory presentation of fragility as linked to nonlinearity and to a dislike of variation: why everything fragile must be concave, the S curve of dose and response in medicine, why harm to the climate must be nonlinear in the dose, and how hospitals overflow without redundancy. Marked nontechnical by its author; watch it first, then come back for the arithmetic.
  • A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing, Taleb, Canetti, Kinda, Loukoianova and Schmieder, IMF Working Paper 12/216, 24 pages. The heuristic as a tool: section II.B states it, footnote 20 works one bank through by hand, Tables 1 and 3 apply it to banks and to sovereign debt, and section IV gives a five-step procedure. Readable without advanced math.
  • Mathematical Definition, Mapping, and Detection of (Anti)Fragility, Taleb and Douady, arXiv 1208.1189 (2012; published in Quantitative Finance, 2013). The theory behind the test, from the coffee cup in the introduction to the theorem that links the heuristic to the tail. The introduction is accessible; the later sections need probability beyond this lesson.

Antifragility and optionality (Taleb)

Antifragility: more to gain from a swing up than to lose from a swing down

We look for exposures whose cost is small and known and whose gain is open, so that variability helps: a cheap right to capacity, a portfolio of small trials, a business that earns more in turmoil. We test it by checking that a swing up adds more than an equal swing down takes away, and by comparing results in turbulent periods with calm ones. A company is winning at it while the cost of each trial stays capped and small and the occasional large success keeps paying for all the trials.

Born to answer
Antifragile, 2012: the Hydra, and Thales renting the olive presses.
What it does now
Whether a business gains from disorder at a capped cost.
The mathematics
[f(x + d) + f(x - d)] / 2 - f(x) > 0
The full entry
Where it began

Antifragile (2012) opens with the Hydra, which grows two heads for each one cut off, as the image of things that gain from stress. Its chapter 12 retells Aristotle's story of Thales of Miletus, who paid a small sum in advance for the right to use the olive presses and profited when the harvest came in large: in Taleb's reading the gain came not from forecasting the harvest but from holding a right without an obligation, with a small known cost and a large possible gain. Taleb and Douady (2013) define antifragility as a gain from wider dispersion, what a trader calls being long volatility, and the IMF paper of 2012 notes that the same second-order test reads antifragility when the curvature of profits is positive.

Why it works now

Optionality was hard to see from outside because the cost of each trial and the payoff of each winner were buried in aggregate results. Licensing terms, milestone schedules and segment results by year can now be read and lined up quickly, and the convexity gap computed from calm and turbulent years. Whether the cap on losses is real, and whether the options are getting dearer as rivals crowd in, is a question for the people who negotiated them.

When it applies

A business, project portfolio or position whose losses are capped by design (a fee, a premium, a small trial budget, a right without an obligation) while its gains are not, and whose value is said to come from volatility, experimentation or dislocation: a pipeline of small licensed bets, a broker or distressed buyer whose volumes rise in turmoil, an option on land or capacity. Not to be confused with option-to-wait, which values delaying one irreversible commitment, or with fragility-heuristic, its mirror image: here the curvature works for the client.

What we would ask

What is the most a single trial, position or bet can lose, and is that cap written into the contract or only expected?
In the last turbulent years, did results improve or deteriorate against calm years, and why?

What it needs

The cost of each trial or the premium paid, and whether it is capped; the payoffs of past trials (how many paid and how much the winners returned); results by year beside a measure of turbulence in each year.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the convexity gap and the payoff of the trials from deal terms and segment results across calm and turbulent years. Former business development heads, portfolio managers and operators say what the trials cost, what share paid, and whether the cap on losses held when it was tested.

Where it breaks

Options bought too dearly, so premiums paid year after year bleed more than the rare payoffs return; a cap on losses that is not real (a guarantee, a recourse clause, a reputation at stake); a payoff that looked convex when small and turns concave at scale; survivorship, when only the trials that paid are visible.

For example

A specialty pharmaceutical company licenses early compounds for small upfront fees and pays large milestones only on success. Over ten years it took 46 licenses at an average of 3 million each, 138 million in all; four reached the market and returned 610 million. A swing up in any one compound adds far more than the most a failure can cost. The company is winning at the design for as long as upfront fees stay small while more bidders pursue the same compounds, and that is what the interviews test.

The mathematics in fullFor an exposure f(x) to a variable x, the convexity gap C = [f(x + d) + f(x - d)] / 2 - f(x) is positive when a swing up adds more than an equal swing down takes away; for n trials each costing c with payoffs V_i, the net result, the sum of max(V_i, 0) less n c, rises with the dispersion of the V_i because each loss stops at c. For convex f, E[f(X)] > f(E[X]): more volatility raises the expected value. Where it is in the books

Antifragile (2012), Book I, Chapter 1, Between Damocles and Hydra; Antifragile (2012), Book IV, Chapter 12, Thales' Sweet Grapes (Option and Asymmetry; Things That Like Dispersion); Antifragile (2012), Book V, Chapter 19, The Philosopher's Stone and Its Inverse (Now the Philosopher's Stone); Taleb and Douady (2013), Quantitative Finance

Sources

Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Taleb, Douady (2013). Mathematical definition, mapping, and detection of (anti)fragility. Quantitative Finance 13(11), 1677-1689. https://doi.org/10.1080/14697688.2013.800219
Taleb, Canetti, Kinda, Loukoianova, Schmieder (2012). A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing. IMF Working Papers 2012(216), 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475505665.001
Taleb (2004). Bleed or Blowup? Why Do We Prefer Asymmetric Payoffs? Journal of Behavioral Finance 5(1), 2-7. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15427579jpfm0501_1
Jensen (1906). Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes. Acta Mathematica 30(0), 175-193. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02418571

Ergodicity and ruin: time probability versus ensemble probability

Ruin: the one path the client lives, not the average of many

We find the point of no return in the plan (a covenant breach, a margin call, redemptions, a lost license, a bankruptcy) and compute the chance of touching it along the single path the client will actually travel, counting every repetition of the exposure. When that chance is material over the horizon, the average return across many imagined clients does not describe this one, and the plan is judged first by whether it survives: it passes when the chance of reaching the barrier over the whole horizon is small, not merely the chance in any one year.

Born to answer
Fooled by Randomness, 2001: Russian roulette; Skin in the Game, 2018: the casino.
What it does now
The chance of touching the point of no return along one path.
The mathematics
P(ruin within n) = 1 - (1 - p)^n; path growth g = E[ln(1 + r)]
The full entry
Where it began

Fooled by Randomness (2001) uses Russian roulette played for money as its central story: five players in six collect, and the average payoff means nothing to the sixth. Skin in the Game (2018, chapter 19) makes the distinction formal with a casino: a hundred people gambling once reveal the house's edge, but one person gambling a hundred days in a row will go bust eventually, and once bust there is no next day. Taleb credits the physicists Ole Peters and Murray Gell-Mann with the general statement, that the average across people and the average along one life differ when ruin is possible, and says that Kelly, Thorp and Shannon, and the insurance mathematician Harald Cramer, had already worked that way.

Why it works now

The calculation was always simple; what was missing was the barrier, because the level that ends a strategy is written in credit agreements, prime brokerage terms and fund documents nobody read together. Those documents can now be read side by side and the barrier located, and the chance of touching it over the horizon computed outside the conversation. Former lenders and finance chiefs say whether the barrier on paper is the one that binds.

When it applies

A strategy, financing or operating plan is defended by its expected return or by what happens on average across many cases, while the same client will take the exposure again and again, and some outcome along the way ends the game: leverage with margin calls, a fund that can be redeemed, a company facing a maturity wall, a founder who cannot raise again. Not to be confused with kelly-sizing, which sets the size of a bet given a measured edge, or worst-case-distribution, which estimates how bad the worst period could be: this asks whether any path crosses a barrier that cannot be uncrossed, and how likely that is over the horizon.

What we would ask

What, specifically, would end the strategy or the company, and at what loss is that line crossed?
How many times over the horizon will this exposure be taken, and does each time carry the same small chance of crossing the line?

What it needs

The barrier (the loss, drawdown, covenant level or cash floor that ends the game) and the horizon; the chance of reaching it in one period, or the distribution of period returns; how often the exposure repeats and whether the repetitions are independent.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the chance of touching the barrier over the horizon and the gap between the average return and the growth of a single path. Former lenders, prime brokers and finance chiefs say where the barrier really sits, which is usually before formal bankruptcy.

Where it breaks

A barrier softer than modeled (a lender that will amend, a parent that will fund) or harder (a cross-default that brings it closer); repetitions that are not independent, so the chance per period is wrong; a chance per period estimated from calm years; the client's ruin computed when the unit really at risk is the wider system, which is precaution-under-compounding-harm.

For example

A family office runs a leveraged strategy whose manager shows a 9 percent average annual return. The strategy carries about a 1 percent chance each month of a loss large enough to trigger the lender's margin call and a forced liquidation. Over ten years, 120 monthly exposures, the chance of meeting that call at least once is 1 - 0.99^120, about 70 percent. The average describes a crowd of offices; this office lives one path, and on most paths it does not reach year ten intact.

The mathematics in fullWith a chance p per period of reaching the barrier and n independent exposures, the chance of ruin over the horizon is 1 - (1 - p)^n, which tends to one as n grows however small p is. For multiplicative returns r, a single path grows at the time average g = E[ln(1 + r)], not at the ensemble average E[r]: a bet returning +50 percent or -40 percent with equal odds has E[r] = +5 percent a round, but g = (ln 1.5 + ln 0.6) / 2, about -0.053, a loss of about 5 percent a round on almost every path. Where it is in the books

Skin in the Game (2018), Book 8, Chapter 19, The Logic of Risk Taking (Ergodicity; Repetition of Exposures); Fooled by Randomness (2nd ed., 2004; first published 2001), Chapter 2, A Bizarre Accounting Method (Russian Roulette); Taleb (2019), Probability, Risk, and Extremes, in Extremes (Darwin College Lectures), section Ruin and Path Dependence; Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails (2020), Chapter 3, section 3.11, Ruin and Path Dependence

Sources

Taleb (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House. (book)
Taleb (2019). Probability, Risk, and Extremes. Extremes, 46-66. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108654722.004
Taleb (2004). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets, 2nd ed. (first published 2001; reissued by Random House, 2005). Thomson/Texere. (book)
Taleb (2020). Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails: Real World Preasymptotics, Epistemology, and Applications, The Technical Incerto, vol. 1 (free electronic version, arXiv 2001.10488). STEM Academic Press. (book)
Kelly (1956). A New Interpretation of Information Rate. Bell System Technical Journal 35(4), 917-926. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1956.tb03809.x

Skin in the game (Taleb)

Skin in the game: who bears the downside of the decision

We set what the decision maker gains when the decision works beside what the decision maker loses when it fails, and compare both with what the client gains and loses in the same states. When the person choosing is paid in good years and keeps the pay in the bad one, the strategy that person prefers will be the one that earns steadily and hides its losses in the tail; the arrangement passes when the decision maker's loss in the bad state is a real fraction of the gain in the good one.

Born to answer
Hammurabi's builder; the Bob Rubin trade in Skin in the Game, 2018.
What it does now
Whether the person recommending bears any of the tail.
The mathematics
Client (1 - p) g - p L against agent (1 - p) b g
The full entry
Where it began

Taleb and Sandis (2014) trace the rule to the code of Hammurabi, about 3,800 years old, under which a builder whose house collapsed and killed its owner was put to death: the builder knows more than the client about where risk can be hidden, and the foundation is the best place to hide it. Skin in the Game (2018) opens with what Taleb calls the Bob Rubin trade, his name for a banker who collects large pay in the good years and bears none of the losses when the bank has to be rescued. Antifragile (2012, chapter 23) had already named the pattern optionality at the expense of others.

Why it works now

Who bears the downside used to be read from a proxy statement once a year, if at all. Compensation terms, deferral and clawback clauses, co-investment and insider holdings can now be pulled for every decision maker in a deal and set beside the payoff profile of the strategy each one favors. How a person behaved after a loss is still known only to the people who were in the room.

When it applies

A decision is made or recommended by someone whose pay or standing rises with gains but who does not share the losses in the bad state: a manager paid yearly on a strategy with rare large losses, an adviser paid on volume, an executive whose options pay only on the upside, a consultant recommending a project the consultant will not run. Not to be confused with incentive-contracts, which asks what a pay plan measures and how it can be gamed: this asks whether the decision maker bears any of the tail, and whether the payoff being steered toward keeps its losses there.

What we would ask

If this goes badly, what does the person recommending it lose, in money or position, and when?
Does the strategy earn small amounts most of the time and carry a rare large loss, and who holds that loss?

What it needs

The decision maker's payoff in good and bad states (bonus terms, deferral and clawback, co-investment, personal liability, time left in the seat); the strategy's payoff distribution, above all how often and how large its losses are; the client's share of each.

How we would get it

The Desk reads compensation disclosures, clawback and deferral terms, co-investment and insider holdings in proxy statements and fund documents. Former colleagues and counterparties say how the person behaved after a loss, which no document records.

Where it breaks

Skin that is real but small beside the gain (a token co-investment); deferral that ends before the tail can arrive; an agent who bears ruin of reputation treated as one who bears nothing; every asymmetry read as abuse, when some advisers are simply paid for advice whose consequences they cannot control.

For example

A pension committee is offered a strategy that has returned 7 percent a year for six years, run by a manager paid 20 percent of each year's gains with no clawback. The strategy earns premiums by insuring others against crashes, and in a crash year, about one in twelve, it loses 60 percent. Expected for the fund after the fee: 11/12 x 5.6 - 1/12 x 60, about 0.1 percent a year; expected for the manager: 11/12 x 1.4, about 1.3 percent of assets a year, with nothing to repay. The asymmetry, not the six-year record, is what the committee is choosing.

The mathematics in fullFor a strategy that gains g with probability 1 - p and loses L with probability p each period, the client's expected result is (1 - p) g - p L, while an agent paid a share b of gains and none of the losses expects (1 - p) b g, positive however large L is. The skin-in-the-game ratio s = (agent's loss in the bad state) / (agent's gain in the good state) is near zero when the agent holds a free option on the client's capital. Where it is in the books

Skin in the Game (2018), Book 1, Prologue, Part 1, Antaeus Whacked (The Bob Rubin Trade); Skin in the Game (2018), Book 1, Prologue, Part 2, A Brief Tour of Symmetry (From Hammurabi to Kant); Antifragile (2012), Book VII, Chapter 23, Skin in the Game: Antifragility and Optionality at the Expense of Others (Hammurabi; The Robert Rubin Free Option); Taleb and Sandis (2014), Review of Behavioral Economics

Sources

Taleb (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House. (book)
Taleb, Sandis (2014). The Skin In The Game Heuristic for Protection Against Tail Events. Review of Behavioral Economics 1(1-2), 115-135. https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000006
Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Taleb (2004). Bleed or Blowup? Why Do We Prefer Asymmetric Payoffs? Journal of Behavioral Finance 5(1), 2-7. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15427579jpfm0501_1
Taleb, Tapiero (2010). Risk externalities and too big to fail. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389(17), 3503-3507. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2010.03.014
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320

The barbell strategy (Taleb)

The barbell: very safe on one side, small capped bets on the other, nothing in the middle

We make the worst case known by construction when the risk of the middle cannot be measured: most of the capital where it cannot be lost, a small share in bets whose loss stops at what was put in and whose gain is open. We check that the safe side is truly safe and that no risky position can lose more than its stake; then the most the client can lose is a number written down in advance rather than an estimate of a tail, and the split passes when that number sits inside the client's limit.

Born to answer
The Black Swan, 2007: most in Treasury bills, the rest in capped bets.
What it does now
Making the worst case a number written down in advance.
The mathematics
Worst case W = w M_r + (1 - w) M_s, kept at or below L
The full entry
Where it began

In The Black Swan (2007, chapter 13) Taleb describes the barbell he used as a trader: put most of the money, he suggests 85 to 90 percent, in instruments as safe as can be found, such as Treasury bills, and the rest in highly speculative bets with limited losses, such as options, so that no rare event can take the portfolio below its floor. Antifragile (2012, chapter 11) carries it beyond money, as extreme caution in some things paired with many small risks in others, and nothing in the middle. Geman, Geman and Taleb (2015) showed that a portfolio built only to respect a limit on its left tail, and otherwise as uncertain as possible, takes the barbell shape on its own.

Why it works now

The barbell was easy to state and hard to check, because the safety of the safe side and the cap on the risky side both live in the fine print. Issuer terms, fund documents and option contracts can now be read for hidden leverage, capital calls and concentration, and the worst case of the split computed from them. Whether a safe instrument has a failure mode nobody priced is a question for specialists in it.

When it applies

Capital, a budget or a career must be allocated under uncertainty that cannot be priced (a new technology, a regime change, a market with no reliable history), and the choice is between holdings of moderate risk whose worst case depends on a tail estimate and a split between near-certain safety and capped speculation. Not to be confused with kelly-sizing, which sizes a bet whose edge can be measured, or portfolio-fit, which asks how a position moves with the rest: the barbell is for when neither the edge nor the behavior in the bad state can be trusted.

What we would ask

What is the most that can be lost without changing how the client operates, as a share of the capital?
On the risky side, can any position lose more than what is put into it, through leverage, calls for more capital or guarantees?

What it needs

The client's maximum tolerable loss L as a share of capital; the true worst case of the safe holdings (issuer, liquidity, inflation); for each risky position, its maximum loss (premium or stake) and its range of payoffs.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the worst case and the range of payoffs of the split against the limit. Specialists in the safe instrument and in the risky positions say whether the safe side has a failure mode nobody priced and whether any risky position carries obligations beyond its stake.

Where it breaks

A safe side that is not safe (credit, liquidity or inflation risk, or all of it with one issuer); hidden leverage or capital calls on the risky side; premiums that bleed year after year until the speculative share is abandoned just before a payoff; a middle the client could in fact measure, where the barbell gives up return for nothing.

For example

A family office wants exposure to an emerging technology it cannot value and refuses to lose more than 12 percent of a 200 million portfolio. A 40 percent allocation to a concentrated technology fund has a worst case that depends on how far the fund can fall: at a fall of 70 percent the loss is 28 percent of the portfolio, more than twice the limit, and nobody can show that 70 percent is the floor. Split as 90 percent in short Treasury bills and 10 percent in positions that can lose at most their stake, the worst case is about 10 percent, 20 million, inside the limit whatever the tail turns out to be.

The mathematics in fullWorst-case loss W = w x M_r + (1 - w) x M_s, where w is the share in risky positions, M_r their maximum loss per unit (at most 1 when no position can lose more than its stake) and M_s the maximum loss per unit of the safe side; with M_s near 0, choosing w at or below L / M_r keeps W within the limit L by construction, and the upside is w times the payoff multiple of the risky side. A middle allocation h has worst case h x D, where the drawdown D has to be estimated from the tail. Where it is in the books

The Black Swan (2nd ed., 2010; first published 2007), Part Two, Chapter 13, Appelles the Painter, or What Do You Do If You Cannot Predict? (Barbell Strategy); Antifragile (2012), Book III, Chapter 11, Never Marry the Rock Star (Seneca's Barbell; Away from the Golden Middle); Geman, Geman and Taleb (2015), Tail Risk Constraints and Maximum Entropy, Entropy; Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails (2020), Chapter 25, Tail Risk Constraints and Maximum Entropy

Sources

Taleb (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., with the postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility (first published by Random House, 2007). Random House Trade Paperbacks. (book)
Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Geman, Geman, Taleb (2015). Tail Risk Constraints and Maximum Entropy. Entropy 17(6), 3724-3737. https://doi.org/10.3390/e17063724
Taleb (2020). Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails: Real World Preasymptotics, Epistemology, and Applications, The Technical Incerto, vol. 1 (free electronic version, arXiv 2001.10488). STEM Academic Press. (book)

The Lindy effect

The Lindy effect: for what does not perish, the longer it has lasted, the longer it should last

We read age as evidence for things that do not wear out (a technology, a standard, a format, an idea, a practice): where survival times in the comparable class follow a power law, the expected remaining life grows in proportion to the age already reached. We check the two conditions the rule needs, no physical aging and no steady drift toward abandonment, before letting age speak, and then say how much longer the thing can be expected to last.

Born to answer
Lindy's delicatessen, 1964; Antifragile, 2012: books in print for forty years.
What it does now
How long a standard or technology can be expected to last.
The mathematics
E[T - t | T > t] = t / (alpha - 1)
The full entry
Where it began

The name comes from Lindy's, a New York delicatessen whose show-business regulars, Albert Goldman reported in The New Republic in 1964, held that a television comedian would last in proportion to how sparingly he spent his material. Antifragile (2012, chapter 20) builds on Benoit Mandelbrot's later version and separates the perishable from the non-perishable: a person's remaining life shrinks with each year, while a book that has been in print for forty years can be expected to stay in print about forty more, and about fifty more if it survives another decade. Skin in the Game (2018, chapter 8) makes time the judge of experts, and Taleb's 2026 paper shows the rule holds only when nothing pushes the thing steadily toward extinction.

Why it works now

Age is free to observe; what was costly was the reference class, the survival records of comparable standards, formats or institutions, and the usage data that shows whether something is drifting toward abandonment. Both can now be assembled from public records and filings, and the survival curve fitted outside the conversation. Practitioners say whether use is quietly declining, which is the one fact that switches the rule off.

When it applies

A long commitment depends on how long something non-perishable will stay in use (building on a standard, a programming language, a payment network, a distribution format, an established practice), and an old incumbent is being weighed against a young challenger. Not to be confused with time-to-event, which estimates any hazard from data, or profitability-fade, which asks how long a high return lasts: Lindy is the special case of a hazard that falls with age, and it applies only to the non-perishable and only without decline.

What we would ask

How long has it been in use, and is its use steady or growing rather than shrinking?
Among comparable technologies or standards that reached this age, what share were still in use a decade later?

What it needs

The age of the thing; its use over time (volumes, users, installations) to detect a drift toward abandonment; survival records for a comparable class, enough to estimate the tail exponent alpha of their lifetimes.

How we would get it

The Desk fits the survival curve of the reference class and computes the expected remaining life at the current age. Practitioners who build on the technology say whether its use is drifting down, which is the condition that voids the rule.

Where it breaks

The thing perishes (a machine, a patent with an expiry date, a person, a contract with an end), so its hazard rises with age; use is drifting down, which takes it out of the Lindy class; a reference class drawn from survivors only; a young challenger with a structural advantage dismissed because it is young.

For example

A bank choosing a core platform for fifteen years weighs a messaging standard in use for 40 years against a protocol launched 3 years ago. Among comparable standards, lifetimes fit a power law with alpha near 2, so expected remaining life is about equal to age: roughly 40 more years for the old standard and 3 for the new, provided neither is losing users. The interviews go to the one fact that can void the rule: whether the old standard's message volumes are falling.

The mathematics in fullIf lifetimes T in the reference class satisfy P(T > t) = (t0 / t)^alpha for t at or above t0, with alpha > 1, the expected remaining life at age t is E[T - t | T > t] = t / (alpha - 1), proportional to age and equal to it when alpha = 2, and the hazard alpha / t falls with age. For a perishable item the hazard rises with age instead, and in Taleb's 2026 model the property holds only when the process carries no drift toward the absorbing barrier. Where it is in the books

Antifragile (2012), Book VI, Chapter 20, Time and Fragility (To Age in Reverse: The Lindy Effect); Skin in the Game (2018), Book 5, Chapter 8, An Expert Called Lindy; Taleb (2026), Lindy as Distance From an Absorbing Barrier, Wilmott

Sources

Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Taleb (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House. (book)
Taleb (2026). Lindy as Distance From an Absorbing Barrier. Wilmott 2026(144). https://doi.org/10.54946/wilm.12251

Iatrogenics and via negativa (Taleb)

Via negativa: the harm done by the intervention itself

We price the harm a fix itself can do before crediting the fix. The benefit of an intervention usually grows with how bad the problem is, while its side effects arrive whatever the severity, so we find the severity below which acting does more harm than good, and we ask whether removing something (a layer, a product, a dose, a rule) would achieve what adding was meant to. The plan passes when the measured severity sits well above that break-even.

Born to answer
Antifragile, 2012; the hypertension odds in Taleb, 2018.
What it does now
The severity below which the fix does more harm than good.
The mathematics
Act only when B(s) > H; break-even where B(s*) = H
The full entry
Where it began

Antifragile (2012, chapter 7) borrows the medical word iatrogenics, harm caused by the healer, and applies it to economic and political intervention; its Book VI, Via Negativa, argues for knowledge by subtraction, and chapter 21 names a second principle of iatrogenics, nonlinearity in response, which Taleb's 2018 paper makes explicit: when a condition is mild the benefit of treatment is small while its harm is not. The paper illustrates it with a simplified case drawn from blood pressure studies, a drug that helps about one patient in twenty when hypertension is mild and 26 and 72 percent in the high and severe ranges, against a harm of treatment taken as constant. Taleb and West (2023) carry the same mathematics into cancer dosing.

Why it works now

The benefit of an intervention by severity was rarely available, because case studies report the dramatic turnarounds and not the mild cases that were treated anyway. Deal histories, clinical summaries and the record of comparable reorganizations can now be read in bulk and sorted by how severe the problem was at the start, so the break-even can be estimated. The cost of an intervention that went wrong is still best told by the people who ran it.

When it applies

A client or a management team proposes to act on a problem that is mild or ambiguous (a reorganization after one weak year, a new system for a process that mostly works, a treatment for a borderline condition, a rule against a rare abuse), and the action carries disruption, side effects or tail risks of its own. Not to be confused with counterfactual-first, which asks what would have happened without the action, or regression-to-the-mean, which explains recoveries that follow bad years: this asks whether, at this severity, the action's own harm outweighs its benefit.

What we would ask

How severe is the problem today, measured, and how much of the fix's reputation comes from cases far more severe than this one?
What are the fix's own costs and failure modes, and do they arrive whether the problem is mild or severe?

What it needs

A measure of severity; the benefit of the intervention at different severities, from the client's history or comparable cases; the frequency and size of the intervention's own harms (disruption, attrition, side effects, failures), including the rare large ones.

How we would get it

The Desk sets the benefit by severity beside the harm and finds the break-even. People who have run or undergone the same intervention (former operators, implementation leads, clinicians) say what it cost when it went wrong, which the case studies leave out.

Where it breaks

Harm that also grows with severity, which moves the break-even; benefits measured on the severe cases that justified the intervention, then applied to mild ones; inaction with a compounding harm of its own, where waiting is the risky choice (precaution-under-compounding-harm); a removal that is itself an intervention with side effects.

For example

A private equity owner wants to replace the management of a portfolio company whose margin slipped from 18 to 16 percent in a soft year. In its own records and those of comparable deals, a management change recovers about a fifth of a margin gap, so a 2 point gap is worth about 0.4 points, against a one-time cost of disruption and departures near 1 point and a one in ten chance of losing key accounts. At this severity the change does more harm than good; it pays only for a gap well above 5 points, and the research question becomes whether the slip is the soft year or the start of a structural decline.

The mathematics in fullWith severity s, expected benefit B(s) rising with s (often convexly: little when mild, much when severe) and expected harm H roughly independent of s, act only when B(s) > H; the break-even severity s* solves B(s*) = H, and below s* doing nothing is the better treatment. In the simplified blood pressure case of Taleb's 2018 paper, drawn from clinical studies, the chance of benefiting from a drug is about 5 percent when the condition is mild and 26 and 72 percent in the high and severe ranges, against a harm of treatment taken as constant. Where it is in the books

Antifragile (2012), Book II, Chapter 7, Naive Intervention (Intervention and Iatrogenics; Non-Naive Interventionism); Antifragile (2012), Book VI, Via Negativa (Subtractive Knowledge; Less Is More); Antifragile (2012), Book VI, Chapter 21, Medicine, Convexity, and Opacity (Second Principle of Iatrogenics (Nonlinearity in Response)); Taleb (2018), (Anti)Fragility and Convex Responses in Medicine, Springer Proceedings in Complexity; Taleb and West (2023), Working with Convex Responses, Entropy

Sources

Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House. (book)
Taleb (2018). (Anti)Fragility and Convex Responses in Medicine. Springer Proceedings in Complexity, 299-325. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96661-8_32
Taleb, West (2023). Working with Convex Responses: Antifragility from Finance to Oncology. Entropy 25(2), 343. https://doi.org/10.3390/e25020343

The fourth quadrant (Taleb)

The fourth quadrant: forecast the payoff, not the probability

We separate what the client is paid on. If the payoff is fixed when an event happens, the probability is the whole question; if the payoff grows with the size of the outcome and outcomes are fat tailed, a well-calibrated probability can come with a losing position, so we forecast the size of the outcomes and limit the exposure instead. A forecaster's hit rate is evidence in the first case only; in the second, the record is judged by profit and loss.

Born to answer
Fooled by Randomness, 2001: likelier up, yet short; the 2009 map.
What it does now
Judging forecasts by profit and loss, not by hit rate.
The mathematics
Binary p x K against open E[X]; Pareto E[X | X > K] = K alpha / (alpha - 1)
The full entry
Where it began

Fooled by Randomness (2001; chapter 6 in the 2004 edition) tells of a trader who says the market will more likely rise while holding a large bet that it will fall, because a fall, if it comes, will be much larger; Taleb retells it as the first example in his 2020 paper. His 2009 paper sorted decisions by payoff, simple (true or false) or complex (depending on size), and by randomness, thin or fat tailed, and named the fourth quadrant, complex payoffs under fat tails, as the place where statistical estimates of rare events break down; the second edition of The Black Swan (2010) adds the map and what to do there. Forecasting researchers dispute the conflict: Tetlock, Lu and Mellers (2023) call the two programs complementary, and Taleb and three coauthors replied the same year.

Why it works now

Track records used to be kept as hit rates because hit rates were easy to count. Every call can now be set beside the position it would have justified and its profit or loss computed, and outcome sizes collected from market and operating data, so the payoff can be forecast instead of the probability. Where the large misses came from, and whether they will recur, is a question for practitioners who lived through them.

When it applies

A decision rests on a probability call (will the drug pass, will the deal close, will the price rise, will the borrower default) while what the client holds pays in proportion to how large the outcome is, and outcomes can be very large: a position sized on a 70 percent view, a reserve set from a probability of loss, an analyst judged by the share of calls that came true. Not to be confused with calibration-track-record, which scores probability calls, or eliciting-a-probability, which extracts one: this asks whether a probability is the right object at all.

What we would ask

Is the payoff a fixed amount if the event happens, or an amount that depends on how large the outcome turns out to be?
When the call was wrong, how large were the losses compared with the gains when it was right?

What it needs

The payoff as a function of the outcome (fixed or proportional, capped or open); the sizes of outcomes on both sides, above all the large ones; for a forecaster, both the hit rate and the profit or loss of each call.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the expected payoff from sizes as well as probabilities, and rescores a track record by profit and loss rather than by the share of correct calls. Practitioners in the market say how large the misses were when the consensus was wrong.

Where it breaks

A payoff that really is binary (a fixed fee on closing, a contract paying a set amount), where probability is the right object and calibration the right test; outcome sizes that are bounded and thin tailed, where probability and payoff tell the same story; discarding an informative probability when it should be combined with the sizes. The point is contested: Tetlock, Lu and Mellers (2023) answer that probability tournaments and tail-risk work are complementary, and Taleb and coauthors replied the same year.

For example

An analyst calls the direction of a commodity price correctly 70 percent of the time, and a fund wants to size positions on her calls. In her record the right calls gained 1 percent on average and the wrong ones lost 10 percent, so each call is worth 0.7 x 1 - 0.3 x 10 = -2.3 percent: a fine forecaster of direction and a losing guide to positions. The question for the fund is the size of her misses and whether they cluster in the large moves.

The mathematics in fullA binary payoff pays K if the event occurs, so its value p x K turns on the probability p; an open payoff is worth E[X], the sum over outcomes of x times its probability, which turns on sizes: probabilities 0.7 and 0.3 with outcomes +1 and -10 give 0.7 - 3 = -2.3 although the likelier call is up. Under a Pareto tail with exponent alpha, E[X | X > K] = K x alpha / (alpha - 1), so the expected size beyond any threshold depends on alpha, which no probability forecast reveals; the fourth quadrant is open payoffs under fat tails. Where it is in the books

Fooled by Randomness (2nd ed., 2004; first published 2001), Chapter 6, Skewness and Asymmetry (The Median Is Not the Message; Bull and Bear Zoology); The Black Swan (2nd ed., 2010), postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility, sections VI, The Fourth Quadrant, the Solution to That Most Useful of Problems, and VII, What to Do with the Fourth Quadrant; Taleb (2009), Errors, robustness, and the fourth quadrant, International Journal of Forecasting; Taleb (2020), On the statistical differences between binary forecasts and real-world payoffs, International Journal of Forecasting, section II; Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails (2020), Chapter 11, Probability Calibration Under Fat Tails

Sources

Taleb (2009). Errors, robustness, and the fourth quadrant. International Journal of Forecasting 25(4), 744-759. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2009.05.027
Taleb (2020). On the statistical differences between binary forecasts and real-world payoffs. International Journal of Forecasting 36(4), 1228-1240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2019.12.004
Taleb (2004). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets, 2nd ed. (first published 2001; reissued by Random House, 2005). Thomson/Texere. (book)
Taleb (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., with the postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility (first published by Random House, 2007). Random House Trade Paperbacks. (book)
Taleb, Richman, Carreira, Sharpe (2023). The probability conflation: A reply to Tetlock et al. International Journal of Forecasting 39(2), 1026-1029. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2023.01.005
Tetlock, Lu, Mellers (2023). False dichotomy alert: Improving subjective-probability estimates vs. raising awareness of systemic risk. International Journal of Forecasting 39(2), 1021-1025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2022.02.008
Brier (1950). Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability. Monthly Weather Review 78(1), 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0493(1950)078<0001:VOFEIT>2.0.CO;2

The precautionary principle under fat tails (Taleb)

Precaution: when harm compounds and spreads, waiting for proof is the risky act

We ask whether the harm stops at the unit that takes the risk or can multiply through the system, and whether its size is fat tailed. When it compounds and can spread, each period of delay multiplies what must later be contained, an average cost-benefit figure does not exist, and the burden shifts: continuing the exposure needs evidence of no harm, and the bounded cost of acting early is set against an open-ended cost of acting late.

Born to answer
Pandemics over 2,500 years, 2020; COVID-19 point forecasts, 2022.
What it does now
What one more week of waiting multiplies.
The mathematics
Delay multiplier exp(r k) = 2^(k / T2)
The full entry
Where it began

Taleb's case for precaution rests on scale and spread: Skin in the Game (2018, chapter 19) observes that one person's ruin is survivable for the group while the group's is not, so risks that can reach the whole system belong in a category of their own. Cirillo and Taleb (2020) found deaths from pandemics over 2,500 years so fat tailed that the average is not usable, and Taleb, Bar-Yam and Cirillo (2022) argued from COVID-19 that for multiplicative, systemic risks waiting for more evidence is itself a decision, and that the burden belongs on showing no harm. Siegenfeld, Taleb and Bar-Yam (2020) added that because outcomes depend exponentially on an uncertain growth rate, precise forecasts are out of reach while the interventions that reverse the growth are not.

Why it works now

Acting early against a spreading harm was hard to justify because evidence of the spread arrived late and in pieces. Incident logs, shipment and network maps and case counts can now be read as they arrive, the doubling time estimated and the multiplier of delay computed outside the conversation. How far the harm can travel through shared suppliers, networks or counterparties is what the operators of those systems know.

When it applies

A harm can travel beyond the unit that takes it and grows multiplicatively while it does (a contamination moving through a supply chain, a breach spreading across a network, a run moving from one funding source to the next, a defect shipped across a fleet), and the client is waiting for more data before acting. Not to be confused with contagion-threshold, which estimates whether something will spread, or option-to-wait, where waiting has value because nothing compounds meanwhile: this applies only when harm multiplies with time and can reach the whole system.

What we would ask

If this spreads, does it stop at one plant, product or counterparty, or can it reach everything that shares the same network, supplier or funding?
How fast has it grown since it was first seen, and what would one more week of waiting multiply?

What it needs

The growth rate of the harm per period, or its doubling time, and how uncertain it is; the reach of the system it can spread through (shared suppliers, networks, counterparties, customers); the cost of acting early, and whether it is bounded and reversible.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the multiplier of delay and the spread of outcomes implied by an uncertain growth rate. Operators of the shared system (supply chain, security, treasury, public health) say how far the harm can travel and how fast it moved in comparable incidents.

Where it breaks

Harm that is local and bounded, where precaution is waste and ordinary cost-benefit applies; growth that is not multiplicative, each case causing no further cases; an early action that is itself irreversible or systemic, trading one ruin for another; precaution claimed for every remote risk, which Taleb, Bar-Yam and Cirillo confine to fat-tailed, multiplicative, systemic cases.

For example

A food company finds contamination at one plant that ships an ingredient to eleven others. Confirmed cases at the first plant have doubled every four days, and management wants two more weeks of testing before a recall. Two weeks is three and a half doublings, a factor of about 11 on what must be contained if growth holds, and the reach is twelve plants, not one. The cost of the recall is bounded and known, the cost of waiting is neither, and the research question is the ingredient's distribution list, not the next test.

The mathematics in fullIf harm grows as X(t) = X(0) x exp(r t), waiting k periods multiplies what must be contained by exp(r k), or 2^(k / T2) with doubling time T2. When the growth rate r is itself uncertain the outcome is fat tailed: if r is exponentially distributed with mean m, then, taking X(0) = 1, P(X(t) > x) = x^(-1 / (m t)) for x at or above 1, a power law whose exponent falls below one, leaving no finite mean, once t exceeds 1 / m. Precaution sets the bounded cost C of acting now against a harm that has no stable average. Where it is in the books

Skin in the Game (2018), Book 8, Chapter 19, The Logic of Risk Taking (Who Is "You"?; Courage and Precaution Aren't Opposites); Taleb, Bar-Yam and Cirillo (2022), On single point forecasts for fat-tailed variables, International Journal of Forecasting; Cirillo and Taleb (2020), Tail risk of contagious diseases, Nature Physics; Siegenfeld, Taleb and Bar-Yam (2020), What models can and cannot tell us about COVID-19, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; Taleb (2019), Probability, Risk, and Extremes, in Extremes (Darwin College Lectures)

Sources

Taleb, Bar-Yam, Cirillo (2022). On single point forecasts for fat-tailed variables. International Journal of Forecasting 38(2), 413-422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2020.08.008
Cirillo, Taleb (2020). Tail risk of contagious diseases. Nature Physics 16(6), 606-613. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41567-020-0921-x
Siegenfeld, Taleb, Bar-Yam (2020). What models can and cannot tell us about COVID-19. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117(28), 16092-16095. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2011542117
Taleb (2019). Probability, Risk, and Extremes. Extremes, 46-66. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108654722.004
Taleb (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House. (book)

How people really decide

Where the people in a decision, the client's own team included, depart from the textbook in ways that can be predicted and measured: the frame, the reference point, the mental account, the default, the plan, the score so far, the noise between judges, and the limits that keep markets from correcting them.

Drawn from the work of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Richard Thaler and Robert Shiller, from prospect theory (1979), framing (1981) and excess volatility (1981) to mental accounting (1985), Nudge (2008), Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Misbehaving (2015) and Noise (2021), and from the papers on the reading list, with chapters checked against publishers' and libraries' tables of contents. The tests, what each needs from the evidence, and the worked examples are Vista's reading.

Framing and the invariance test (Tversky and Kahneman)

Framing: the same facts, stated as gains or as losses, should not flip the decision

We restate the decision in the opposite frame and in final positions, with every option written as what the client ends up holding and every concurrent decision combined into one, and check whether the preferred option changes. If it changes, the choice rests on the description rather than the facts, and the description is what has to be fixed or researched. When the question is how other people will choose (buyers, patients, voters, a committee), we test both descriptions on the people who will actually decide. A recommendation passes when it holds in both frames and in the combined statement.

Born to answer
Science, 1981: 200 saved against 400 dead.
What it does now
Whether a recommendation survives being restated.
The mathematics
v(x) = x^0.88 for gains, -2.25 (-x)^0.88 for losses
The full entry
Where it began

Tversky and Kahneman's 1981 paper in Science gave two groups the same choice about an epidemic expected to kill 600 people. Told that one program would save 200 for certain, 72 percent of 152 respondents chose it over a one-in-three chance of saving all 600; told that under the same program 400 would die, 78 percent of 155 chose the gamble. In the same paper, 73 percent of respondents facing two decisions at once picked a pair of choices that, once combined, every one of 86 respondents in another group rejected as worse in every outcome. McNeil, Pauker, Sox and Tversky (1982) found physicians, like patients and students, favoring surgery for lung cancer more when results were given as survival than as mortality.

Why it works now

Framing was hard to test outside a laboratory because the descriptions decision makers and customers actually saw were scattered across decks, labels and scripts. Board materials, offer letters, product pages and trial summaries can now be collected and rewritten in the opposite frame quickly, and prospect theory's prediction for each version computed outside the conversation. Whether the frame moves the people who will really decide is still a question for them, in a test or an interview.

When it applies

A recommendation, an investment case or an offer is presented in one description only (lives or jobs saved or lost, survival or mortality, a discount or a surcharge, the share of a plan achieved or missed, the chance of success or of failure), or several concurrent decisions are being taken one at a time, and the client must either make the choice or predict how buyers, patients, voters or a committee will make it. Not to be confused with behavioral-pricing, which reads how customers react to a price against a reference price, or eliciting-a-probability, which designs how an expert is asked for a number: this tests whether the decision itself survives being restated.

What we would ask

If the same outcomes were described by what is lost rather than what is kept, would the recommendation change?
Which other decisions are being made at the same time, and what do they add up to when combined into one position?

What it needs

Every option's outcomes in absolute terms, as final positions rather than changes from a chosen starting point; the description the decision makers or customers will actually see; for a market question, choice shares under each description from a test or from comparable launches.

How we would get it

The Desk rewrites the case in both frames and in final positions, combines the concurrent choices, and computes what prospect theory predicts in each frame with the published parameters. Former product, pricing and clinical trial leads say which description buyers, physicians or committees really see, and a test on the real deciders shows whether the frame moves them.

Where it breaks

Frames that carry information, as when the choice of words signals what the adviser recommends, so a shift is not an error; effects measured on hypothetical questions and students that shrink in the field; treating the effect as all or nothing, when the 1981 framing result replicated across 36 samples at about half its original size (Klein and coauthors, 2014); restating a decision until it flips and calling that a bias.

For example

A lender's workout committee must choose how to handle a 600 million dollar exposure. Plan A recovers 200 million for certain; Plan B recovers all 600 million with probability one third and nothing otherwise, the same expected recovery. Written as recoveries, the published parameters favor A, valued at 200^0.88, about 105.9, against 0.336 x 278.5, about 93.6. Written as write-offs, a certain loss of 400 million against a two-thirds chance of losing 600 million, they favor B, valued at 0.564 x (-626.5), about -353.1, against about -438.5 for A. Same plans, opposite choice; the committee sees both statements before voting, and the tie between equal expected recoveries is broken by the lender's capital and liquidity, not by the wording.

The mathematics in fullValue of an outcome x measured from the reference point: v(x) = x^a for gains and v(x) = -lambda (-x)^b for losses, with decision weights w(p) = p^g / (p^g + (1 - p)^g)^(1/g); Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated medians a = b = 0.88, lambda = 2.25, g = 0.61 for gains and 0.69 for losses. Invariance holds when the option with the highest V = sum of w(p_i) v(x_i) stays the same after the outcomes are recoded from a different reference point; for two concurrent choices it holds only if their combination is also preferred, which a dominated pair fails in every state. Where it is in the books

Tversky and Kahneman (1981), The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science (problems 1 to 4); Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Choices, Values, and Frames, American Psychologist; Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Advances in Prospect Theory, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (the parameter estimates); Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 34, Frames and Reality; McNeil, Pauker, Sox and Tversky (1982), On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, New England Journal of Medicine; Klein and coauthors (2014), Investigating Variation in Replicability, Social Psychology

Sources

Tversky, Kahneman (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211(4481), 453-458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
Kahneman, Tversky (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist 39(4), 341-350. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.39.4.341
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
McNeil, Pauker, Sox, Tversky (1982). On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies. New England Journal of Medicine 306(21), 1259-1262. https://doi.org/10.1056/nejm198205273062103
Klein, Ratliff, Vianello and others (2014). Investigating Variation in Replicability. Social Psychology 45(3), 142-152. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000178
Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, Kunreuther (1993). Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7(1), 35-51. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01065313
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)
Kahneman and Tversky (editors) (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Russell Sage Foundation and Cambridge University Press. (book)

Mental accounting (Thaler)

Mental accounting: money in labeled jars is not spent as one pool

We measure the response to a dollar by where it came from and which account it lands in, and compare it with the response to a dollar of ordinary income. If money were interchangeable the two responses would match; their ratio is the size of the mental account, and the forecast is rebuilt account by account. For a price design we also apply the editing rules: separate gains are valued more than one combined gain, and one combined loss hurts less than several separate ones. A forecast passes when it treats each account the way the people deciding do.

Born to answer
Thaler, 1985: acquisition and transaction utility; beer on the beach.
What it does now
Whether a dollar from one source is spent like any other.
The mathematics
R = response per dollar in the account / response per dollar of income
The full entry
Where it began

Thaler's 1980 paper listed the underweighting of opportunity costs and the failure to ignore sunk costs among the ways consumers depart from the textbook, and his 1985 paper built mental accounting on the prospect theory value function, with two parts to every purchase: what the good is worth against its price, and the pleasure or pain of the deal itself. Asked what they would pay for the same cold beer on the same beach, executive program participants gave a median of 2.65 dollars when it came from an upscale resort hotel and 1.50 dollars when it came from a rundown grocery. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found 88 percent would still buy a 10 dollar theater ticket after losing a 10 dollar bill, but only 46 percent after losing the ticket itself.

Why it works now

Mental accounts are invisible in aggregate statistics, which show only total spending. Card and scanner panels, budget files and capital allocation records can now be split by source and category and the response per dollar compared account by account outside the conversation. How a company's budgets and windfalls were really handled is still told best by the planners and treasurers who handled them.

When it applies

A forecast of spending, demand or capital allocation assumes that a dollar is a dollar wherever it comes from, while the people deciding keep separate accounts: households facing a price shock in one budget category such as fuel, food or rent, or a windfall from a refund or rebate; customers shown a price split into a base and fees, or bundled into one; a company spending asset-sale proceeds, a tax refund or a settlement by different rules than operating cash, or a budget set per category that blocks moving money to a better use. Not to be confused with behavioral-pricing, which reads reactions to a price level against a reference price, or house-money-and-break-even, which concerns the risk taken after gains and losses: this tests whether money from different sources or categories is treated as interchangeable.

What we would ask

When this money arrived (a windfall, a refund, a fall in a price), where did it go, and would it have gone there had it come as ordinary income?
Is spending managed against category budgets, and what happens to a good opportunity when its category's budget is already spent?

What it needs

Spending or allocation data split by the source and category of the money (card or scanner panels, budget records, capital allocation by funding source); a comparable change in ordinary income for the benchmark; the price structure customers see (one price, fees, bundles).

How we would get it

The Desk computes the marginal response in each account and its ratio to the income response from purchase or budget data. Former category managers, financial planning leads and treasury staff say how budgets and windfalls were actually handled, which no filing records.

Where it breaks

Responses that differ for good reasons (a fuel price rise that also signals a recession, a windfall that is temporary while income is permanent); accounts that serve as a sensible self-control device, which Thaler and Shefrin model as a farsighted planner restraining a myopic doer, rather than an error; category budgets that save more in discipline than they cost in blocked decisions; data too aggregated to separate the accounts.

For example

A fuel retailer is forecasting premium grade sales after a 60 cent fall in pump prices. Hastings and Shapiro (2013) estimated that a 1 dollar change in the gasoline price, worth about 1,200 dollars a year to a typical household, moves the share buying regular by 1.4 percentage points, while ordinary income moves it by 0.08 points per 1,000 dollars: a ratio of 1.2 to 0.08, or 15. Treating gas money as fungible, the 720 dollars a household saves predicts a shift of 0.72 x 0.08, about 0.06 points away from regular; treating it as its own account predicts 0.6 x 1.4 = 0.84 points. With the higher grades at 10 percent of gallons, that is a rise in their volume of about 8.4 percent rather than 0.6 percent.

The mathematics in fullFungibility test: R = (response per dollar arriving in account A) / (response per dollar of ordinary income); R = 1 when money is fungible, and Hastings and Shapiro's gasoline estimates give R of about 15. Thaler (1985): the value of a purchase is acquisition utility v(p_bar - p) plus transaction utility v(-p : -p*), where p is the price paid, p_bar the good's worth to the buyer and p* the reference price. With v concave for gains and convex for losses, v(x) + v(y) > v(x + y) for gains (keep gains separate) and v(-(x + y)) > v(-x) + v(-y) for losses (combine losses). Where it is in the books

Thaler (1985), Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, Marketing Science (acquisition and transaction utility; the four editing rules); Thaler (1999), Mental Accounting Matters, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Misbehaving (2015), Part II, Chapter 7, Bargains and Rip-Offs, and Chapter 9, Buckets and Budgets; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 32, Keeping Score; Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Science (the lost ticket and the calculator problems); Hastings and Shapiro (2013), Fungibility and Consumer Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics

Sources

Thaler (1985). Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science 4(3), 199-214. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.3.199
Thaler (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12(3), 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::aid-bdm318>3.0.co;2-f
Thaler (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1(1), 39-60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7
Thaler (1990). Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4(1), 193-205. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.1.193
Hastings, Shapiro (2013). Fungibility and Consumer Choice: Evidence from Commodity Price Shocks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1449-1498. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt018
Heath, Soll (1996). Mental Budgeting and Consumer Decisions. Journal of Consumer Research 23(1), 40. https://doi.org/10.1086/209465
Tversky, Kahneman (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211(4481), 453-458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
Thaler, Shefrin (1981). An Economic Theory of Self-Control. Journal of Political Economy 89(2), 392-406. https://doi.org/10.1086/260971
Shefrin, Thaler (1988). The Behavioral Life-cycle Hypothesis. Economic Inquiry 26(4), 609-643. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01520.x
Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, Thaler (1997). Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 407-441. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555244
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

The planning fallacy and the uplift (Kahneman and Tversky; Flyvbjerg)

The planning fallacy: the plan is a best case, the record is the forecast

We put the plan's dates and budget beside two records: the team's own past forecasts against outcomes, and the overruns of comparable projects. We then set the budget at the level that gives the chance of no overrun the client is willing to accept (the uplift), and count the milestones that must each land for the date to hold. A plan passes when its contingency covers the uplift at the chosen chance and the team's own history does not show the same misses.

Born to answer
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; theses planned for 33.9 days took 55.5, 1994.
What it does now
How much contingency the record says a plan needs.
The mathematics
U(q) = F^-1(1 - q) - 1; P(on time) = product of p_i
In the inquiries: No. 19, Late, or Gone
The full entry
Where it began

Kahneman and Tversky named the planning fallacy in their 1979 paper on intuitive prediction, which traced forecasting errors to neglect of distributional information, the outcomes of similar cases, in favor of the case at hand. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) told how a curriculum team Kahneman sat on in 1976 estimated 18 to 30 months to a draft, while its curriculum expert, asked about comparable teams, recalled that about 40 percent never finished and the rest took seven to ten years; the project took about eight. Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994) found honors students predicting their theses in 33.9 days on average and taking 55.5, with only 29.7 percent finishing by their own best guess and fewer than half by their worst case. Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) found costs underestimated in 86 percent of 258 transport projects, with rail averaging 44.7 percent over.

Why it works now

Overrun records used to sit in project files nobody pooled, so each plan was judged on its own. Project histories, capital expenditure disclosures and published overrun studies can now be gathered into a reference class quickly, and the uplift and a team's own slip ratios computed outside the conversation. Why the overruns happened, and whether this project shares the cause, is what former project directors and cost engineers know.

When it applies

A capital project, build, integration or launch is defended with a schedule and budget built from its own plan (milestones, a fixed contingency, the team's confidence), while the planners' own past projects and comparable projects elsewhere ran late or over budget. Not to be confused with reference-class-forecast, which chooses the class of comparable cases and starts any forecast from its distribution: this sets the contingency for a specific budget and schedule from the record of overruns, tests a team's guidance against its own history, and counts the milestones that must all go right.

What we would ask

On the last three projects of this kind, what were the planned and actual cost and duration, and who made those plans?
How many milestones must all land on time for this date to hold, and how likely is each one?

What it needs

Planned and actual cost and duration for the team's past projects and for a reference class of comparable projects; the plan's critical milestones with a judged chance for each; the contingency already in the budget; the chance of no overrun the client wants to buy.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the team's slip ratios, the overrun distribution of the reference class, the uplift at the chosen level and the chance that every milestone lands. Former project directors, cost engineers and lenders' technical advisers on comparable builds say where the overruns came from, which the plan never lists.

Where it breaks

A reference class that is not comparable, such as a first-of-a-kind technology; estimates that are low by design to win approval, which Flyvbjerg and coauthors read as strategic misrepresentation rather than error, so the fix is accountability as much as arithmetic; fat-tailed overruns, as in information technology projects (Flyvbjerg and coauthors, 2022), where a percentile uplift understates the worst cases; milestones that are not independent, so multiplying their chances misstates the joint chance.

For example

A company guides investors to a new plant at 1.20 billion dollars in 30 months with a 10 percent contingency. Its last three plants came in at 1.25, 1.40 and 1.15 times budget and 1.3, 1.6 and 1.2 times schedule: an average of 1.27 and 1.37, or about 1.52 billion and 41 months if history repeats. Suppose its reference class needs an uplift of 35 percent for an even chance of no overrun and 60 percent for four chances in five: 1.62 and 1.92 billion, against the 1.32 billion the plan carries. Its eight critical milestones, each judged 90 percent likely, all land on time with probability 0.9^8, about 43 percent. The guidance is a best case, and the research question is what, if anything, makes this plant different from the last three.

The mathematics in fullUplift for an acceptable chance q of overrun: U(q) = F^-1(1 - q) - 1, where F is the distribution of actual to estimated cost in the reference class; Flyvbjerg (2006) reports for the UK guidance an uplift of 40 percent for rail at q = 50 percent and 68 percent at q = 10 percent, and 15 and 45 percent for roads. The team's own slip ratios s_i = actual_i / planned_i give a bias b = average(s_i) - 1. With n milestones that must all land, each with chance p_i, P(on time) = product of the p_i, which is p^n when they are alike and independent. Where it is in the books

Kahneman and Tversky (1979; reprinted 1982), Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in Judgment under Uncertainty; Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts, Management Science (the inside and outside views); Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part III, Chapter 23, The Outside View; Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994), Exploring the Planning Fallacy, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Study 1); Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002), Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects, Journal of the American Planning Association; Flyvbjerg (2006), From Nobel Prize to Project Management, Project Management Journal (the UK uplifts); Flyvbjerg (2008), European Planning Studies; Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Science (conjunctive events)

Sources

Kahneman, Tversky (1982). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. Judgment under Uncertainty, 414-421. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511809477.031
Kahneman, Lovallo (1993). Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking. Management Science 39(1), 17-31. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.1.17
Buehler, Griffin, Ross (1994). Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people underestimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(3), 366-381. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.366
Flyvbjerg, Holm, Buhl (2002). Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie? Journal of the American Planning Association 68(3), 279-295. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360208976273
Flyvbjerg (2006). From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right. Project Management Journal 37(3), 5-15. https://doi.org/10.1177/875697280603700302
Flyvbjerg (2008). Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice. European Planning Studies 16(1), 3-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654310701747936
Flyvbjerg, Budzier, Lee, Keil, Lunn, Bester (2022). The Empirical Reality of IT Project Cost Overruns: Discovering A Power-Law Distribution. Journal of Management Information Systems 39(3), 607-639. https://doi.org/10.1080/07421222.2022.2096544
Lovallo, Clarke, Camerer (2012). Robust analogizing and the outside view: two empirical tests of case-based decision making. Strategic Management Journal 33(5), 496-512. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.962
Tversky, Kahneman (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185(4157), 1124-1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (editors) (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. (book)

Learn the math
The question

A company's chief executive stands at an investor day beside a rendering of a new plant. It will cost $1.20 billion and open in 30 months, she says, and the budget carries a 10 percent contingency, so the board has room for surprises. The slide behind her is careful. Every milestone has a date, every date has an owner, and the owners are good.

A shareholder in the third row has the company's last three annual reports open on her lap. The last three plants came in at 1.25, 1.40 and 1.15 times their budgets, and took 1.3, 1.6 and 1.2 times as long as planned. Not one came in within a 10 percent contingency. Nobody on the stage is lying. Each of those earlier plans was made by capable people who knew the work, and each was a sincere best guess. That is the trouble.

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky named this in 1979: the planning fallacy. A plan is built from the inside, out of the steps of this project as its makers imagine them going. The record of how similar projects actually went sits outside the plan, and the plan rarely asks it. This lesson is about putting the two side by side: reading the team's own past as a measuring stick, turning the overruns of comparable projects into a budget with a stated chance of being enough, and counting what it takes for every milestone on the slide to land.

The idea in one paragraph

A plan is a story of how this project will go if nothing unusual happens. But something unusual nearly always happens; it is just a different unusual thing each time, so no single one is worth planning for, and the plan leaves them all out. The record of past projects has them all in, mixed together in their true proportions. So the record, not the plan, is the forecast. Two numbers come out of it. The first is the team's own bias: how much, on average, its past plans fell short. The second is an uplift: how much to add to an estimate so that the chance of overrunning it is no more than a level you choose, an even chance or one in five or one in ten. A third number comes from the plan itself: if a date needs eight milestones to each go right, the chances multiply, and steps that each look nearly certain make a date closer to a coin toss.

The math, step by step

Step 1: the slip ratio and the team's bias. For any finished project, divide what it actually took by what was planned:

s = actual / planned

and call s the slip ratio. A ratio of 1 means the plan was right; 1.25 means a quarter over. Ratios make projects of different sizes comparable: a $400 million plant that ran $100 million over and a $2 billion plant that ran $500 million over both have s = 1.25.

For a team with n past projects, the average slip ratio is

s-bar = (s_1 + s_2 + ... + s_n) / n

and the team's bias is b = s-bar - 1, the share by which its plans have fallen short on average. For the company on stage, cost and time:

cost: (1.25 + 1.40 + 1.15) / 3 = 3.80 / 3 = 1.267, so b = 26.7%
time: (1.3 + 1.6 + 1.2) / 3 = 4.1 / 3 = 1.367, so b = 36.7%

If history repeats on average, the plant costs $1.20 billion x 1.267 = $1.52 billion and takes 30 x 1.367 = 41 months. The plan with its contingency carries $1.20 billion x 1.10 = $1.32 billion. Notice also the smallest of the three cost ratios, 1.15: the contingency would not have covered even the company's best plant of the three.

Three projects are a thin record, and that is why the bias is only the first look. It says whether this team's plans have run short, and by how much. It does not say how wide the misses spread, and the spread is what decides how much room a budget needs.

Step 2: the reference class and its distribution. Widen the record to comparable projects built by anyone: plants of the same kind, size and technology. That set is the reference class. Line up its slip ratios from smallest to largest, and for any number x let

F(x) = share of the class with a slip ratio at or below x

F is the distribution of overruns. It starts near 0 for small x, rises, and approaches 1. Read it as a forecast: if this plant is like the class, then F(x) is the chance that it comes in at or under x times its estimate, and 1 - F(x) is the chance it goes over.

To keep the arithmetic in view, suppose the class is shaped like this. The slip ratio X of a project drawn at random is lognormal: its natural logarithm, ln X, follows a bell curve with mean mu and standard deviation sigma. This is a common shape for overruns, because it cannot fall below zero, it bunches near its middle and it has a long right tail; it is an assumption here, made to fit the two figures in the Library's example, not a law. The Library's example says the class needs a 35 percent uplift for an even chance of no overrun and 60 percent for four chances in five. So half the class sits at or below 1.35, which makes 1.35 its median, and 80 percent of it sits at or below 1.60, its 80th percentile. Two facts about the bell curve turn those into mu and sigma. Half of a bell curve lies below its mean, so ln X is below mu half the time; and ln X <= mu says the same thing as X <= e^mu, so the median of X is e^mu. And 80 percent of a bell curve lies below the point 0.8416 standard deviations above its mean (a figure read from a normal table, or from NORM.S.INV(0.8) in a spreadsheet), so by the same step the 80th percentile of X is e^(mu + (0.8416 x sigma)). So

mu = ln 1.35 = 0.3001
mu + (0.8416 x sigma) = ln 1.60 = 0.4700
sigma = (0.4700 - 0.3001) / 0.8416 = 0.2019

Two numbers now describe the whole class.

Step 3: the uplift. You choose q, the chance of an overrun you are willing to accept: one half for an even bet, one in five for a cautious board, one in ten for a lender. The budget must then sit at the point of F that leaves q of the class above it, which is the (1 - q) quantile, written F^-1(1 - q) and read "the inverse of F at 1 - q": the ratio below which a share 1 - q of the class falls. The uplift is how far that point sits above the estimate:

U(q) = F^-1(1 - q) - 1

For the lognormal class the quantile is e^(mu + (z x sigma)), where z is the bell-curve number for the share 1 - q, found the same way as the 0.8416 of Step 2: 0 for one half, 0.8416 for 80 percent, 1.2816 for 90 percent. So

U(50%) = e^0.3001 - 1 = 1.35 - 1 = 35%
U(20%) = e^0.4700 - 1 = 1.60 - 1 = 60%
U(10%) = e^(0.3001 + (1.2816 x 0.2019)) - 1 = e^0.5588 - 1 = 1.749 - 1 = 75%

On the $1.20 billion estimate: $1.62 billion for an even chance, $1.92 billion for four chances in five, about $2.10 billion for nine in ten. Each step of certainty costs more than the one before it: from even odds to four in five adds 25 points of uplift, and the next ten points of certainty, to nine in ten, add another 15. That is the long right tail at work. The few projects that go badly wrong go very wrong, and a budget that means to cover them has to reach a long way out.

Now run the plan backward. What chance of overrun does its own 10 percent contingency buy? Put 1.10 into the bell curve:

z = (ln 1.10 - mu) / sigma = (0.0953 - 0.3001) / 0.2019 = -1.014
chance of overrun = 1 - F(1.10) = 1 - Phi(-1.014) = 1 - 0.155 = 84.5%

where Phi is the bell curve's distribution function, the share of a standard bell curve below a given z, read from the same normal table or from NORM.S.DIST(-1.014, TRUE). A contingency presented as room for surprises leaves, against this class, about a five in six chance of overrunning the budget anyway. Even the team's own average, 1.267, is overrun by the class 62 percent of the time.

0%20%40%60%80%100%0.8x1.0x1.2x1.4x1.6x1.8x2.0x2.2x2.4xBudget as a multiple of the estimateChance the project overruns itplan, 1.10x: 84%1.35x: 50%1.60x: 20%1.75x: 10%
The record as a forecast. Read across from any budget to the chance the reference class says it will be overrun. The plan sits high on the curve; each step down the curve costs more uplift than the one before.

One more feature of a skewed class is worth seeing. The average of a lognormal is e^(mu + (sigma^2 / 2)) (a standard result, quoted here without its proof, which takes an integral), here e^(0.3001 + 0.0204) = 1.378, a little above the median 1.35. The long tail pulls the average up. So the two natural budgets differ. One set at the median, 1.35, is overrun exactly half the time, and over many such projects it falls short of what they cost on average. One set at the average, 1.378, covers the cost on average and is still overrun 46 percent of the time. Which point to use is a decision about risk, not a fact about the project, and that is why the uplift is quoted with its q.

Step 4: milestones that must all land. The slide shows eight critical milestones: site permit, foundations, long-lead equipment, the main building, power, commissioning, a regulator's inspection, first output. Suppose each has a 90 percent chance of landing on its date and the eight are independent, meaning one landing tells you nothing about the others. The date holds only if all eight land. The chance of two independent events both happening is the product of their chances, and the rule extends to any number:

P(all on time) = p_1 x p_2 x ... x p_n = p^n when they are all alike
0.9^8 = 0.430

Eight steps, each nine chances in ten, make a date with less than an even chance. Taking logarithms turns the product into a sum, which shows why: ln(0.9^8) = 8 x ln 0.9 = 8 x (-0.1054) = -0.843, and each milestone subtracts the same amount. There is no cancelling; every added step can only lower the total.

How many steps at 90 percent before the date drops below an even chance? Solve 0.9^n = 0.5 by taking logarithms of both sides: n x ln 0.9 = ln 0.5, so n = ln 0.5 / ln 0.9 = (-0.6931) / (-0.1054) = 6.58. Six milestones still give 53.1 percent; the seventh brings it to 47.8.

The calculus gives the payoff from making each step surer. The slope of p^n with respect to p is n x p^(n - 1) by the power rule. At p = 0.9 and n = 8 it is 8 x 0.9^7 = 3.83: one point of reliability on every milestone (90 to 91 percent) raises the chance of the date by about 3.8 points, and in fact 0.91^8 = 0.470, up from 0.430. Run it in reverse: for the eight together to reach four chances in five, each must land with chance 0.8^(1/8) = 0.9725. A board that wants an 80 percent date has to believe every owner on the slide is about 97 percent sure.

0%20%40%60%80%100%148121620Milestones that must all landChance every one landsan even chanceeight at 90%: 43%each 99% likelyeach 95% likelyeach 90% likely
The chain. Every milestone a date depends on multiplies its chance by a number below one. Steps that each look nearly certain make a date that is closer to a coin toss.

Step 5: the test a plan must pass. Put Steps 1 to 4 together and the entry's test reads plainly. A plan passes when (1) its contingency covers the uplift at the chance of overrun the decision-maker has chosen, (2) the team's own record does not show the same misses, and (3) its date survives the count of milestones. The plan on stage fails all three: its $1.32 billion against $1.62 billion for even odds; three past plants, none inside the contingency; eight milestones that all land 43 percent of the time. That does not prove this plant will overrun. It shifts the burden: the research question becomes what, if anything, makes this plant different from the last three and from the class.

A worked example

The students who were sure. In 1994 Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin and Michael Ross asked psychology honors students at the University of Waterloo, near the end of their theses, when they expected to finish. On average they predicted 33.9 days. They took 55.5. The slip ratio of those averages is 55.5 / 33.9 = 1.64: the work took about 64 percent longer than predicted, three weeks more. Only 29.7 percent finished by the date they gave as their best guess. (Thirty-seven were asked; the averages cover the 33 who had finished two semesters later, so 55.5 days, if anything, flatters the record.) The researchers also asked for a worst case, the time it would take if everything went as poorly as it possibly could. Those averaged 48.6 days, still a week short of what happened, and only 48.7 percent of the students finished even by their worst case.

Read it as Step 1 and Step 3 read it. The students' best guesses were not estimates of the middle of anything; they sat at about the 30th percentile of what happened. Their worst cases sat just below the median. A plan built from the inside, even with a deliberate effort to imagine disaster, does not reach the record. Nor was the record unknown to people like them: in a classroom survey the same researchers ran, students said they had finished about two thirds of their past projects later than they expected. People can know their own record and still forecast the next project as if it would be the exception.

Rail, roads and an official uplift. Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm and Soren Buhl gathered 258 transport projects from twenty countries across seventy years and found costs underestimated in 86 percent of them. Rail ran over by 44.7 percent on average. Flyvbjerg later turned records like these into the uplifts in the guidance he wrote with the consultancy COWI for Britain's Department for Transport in 2004, Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning. Its table is the function U(q) of Step 3, read off real projects instead of a fitted curve:

chance of staying in budget:   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%
roads                          15%   24%   27%   32%   45%
rail                           40%   45%   51%   57%   68%

Each column is 1 - q, the chance of no overrun. Notice the same shape as Step 3: the last ten points of certainty are the most expensive, 13 points of uplift for roads and 11 for rail. On a hypothetical $2.0 billion rail scheme, that is a budget of $2.0 billion x 1.40 = $2.80 billion for even odds and $2.0 billion x 1.68 = $3.36 billion for nine chances in ten. The difference, $2.0 billion x (0.68 - 0.40) = $560 million, is the price of the extra certainty, and it is a decision, not a calculation: a government chooses q, and the record supplies the rest.

The usual mistakes
  • Adding a fixed contingency and calling it risk. Symptom: "the budget includes 10 percent for contingencies." Fix: ask what chance of overrun that contingency buys against the reference class (Step 3). A contingency with no stated q is a number chosen to look prudent, not a forecast.
  • Asking the team for a worse case instead of asking the record. Symptom: the plan shows a "pessimistic scenario" built by the same people from the same steps. Fix: Buehler's students show the inside view's worst case still falls short of the median of what happens. Take the bad case from the record of comparable projects.
  • Choosing a flattering reference class. Symptom: the comparison set is the company's three best projects, or projects "like ours" defined after looking at their results. Fix: define the class before looking at outcomes, by what the projects are (kind, size, technology, region), and keep the misses in.
  • Multiplying milestone chances that are not independent, or forgetting to multiply at all. Symptom: "each milestone is 90 percent likely, so the date is 90 percent likely." Fix: Step 4. Eight independent steps at 90 percent give 43 percent. If they share a cause, read "Where the model breaks" below before multiplying.
  • Treating the average overrun as the budget. Symptom: the budget is raised by the class average and called safe. Fix: in a skewed class the average sits only a little above the median and well below the tail (1.378 against 1.60 at four in five here), so a budget at the average is still overrun 46 percent of the time. Say which q the budget is for.
Where the model breaks

The entry names four ways, and each is a real limit, not a footnote.

First, a reference class that is not comparable. A first-of-a-kind technology has no true class, and borrowing one from a different technology can mislead in either direction. The honest answer is a wider uplift and a stated reason, not a confident number.

Second, estimates that are low by design. Flyvbjerg and his coauthors argue that many large projects are underestimated on purpose, to win approval, and call it strategic misrepresentation rather than error. Then the fix is accountability, who signs the forecast and who pays when it misses, as much as arithmetic. The uplift corrects the number; it does not change the incentive that produced it.

Third, fat tails. The lognormal in Step 2 has a long tail, but some classes have far longer ones. Flyvbjerg and coauthors (2022) found information technology overruns following a power law, where a small share of projects run over by many times their budgets. In such a class a percentile uplift still gives a correct chance of overrun, but it says nothing about how large the overruns beyond it are, and those are the ones that sink a company.

Fourth, milestones that are not independent. Suppose one year in five is a bad year, when permits stall and a supplier slips, and each milestone then lands with chance 0.70; in the other years, 0.95. Each milestone on its own is still (0.2 x 0.70) + (0.8 x 0.95) = 0.90, exactly as before. But the chance all eight land is now (0.2 x 0.70^8) + (0.8 x 0.95^8) = 0.0115 + 0.5307 = 54%, not 43 percent. The shared cause raises the chance that everything goes right, and it fattens the other end too: four or more misses out of eight happen 3.9 percent of the time, against 0.5 percent if the milestones were independent, nearly eight times as often. Multiplying chances is right only when the steps truly do not lean on each other, and in a real plant several of them lean on the same permit, the same supplier or the same crew.

Check yourself

1. A team's plan carries a 15 percent contingency. Its reference class needs a 15 percent uplift for an even chance of no overrun. Is the budget safe?

Answer: it is a coin toss. A 15 percent contingency that equals the class's 50 percent uplift means the budget sits at the median of the class: half of comparable projects overrun it. Whether that is acceptable depends on the q the decision-maker chose; "safe" is not a word the budget earns by itself.

2. A contractor's last four projects took 1.10, 1.30, 1.20 and 1.40 times their planned schedules. It now promises 24 months. What does its own record suggest, and what does that number leave out?

Answer: the average slip ratio is (1.10 + 1.30 + 1.20 + 1.40) / 4 = 5.00 / 4 = 1.25, so its own history suggests 24 x 1.25 = 30 months. That is the record's average, not a budget for a chosen chance of overrun: four projects say little about the spread, so the reference class of comparable projects is still needed before setting how much room to allow.

3. A launch needs twelve independent milestones, each judged 95 percent likely. What is the chance the date holds, and how likely must each milestone be for the date to hold three times in four?

Answer: 0.95^12 = 0.540, a 54 percent chance. For 75 percent, each must land with chance p where p^12 = 0.75, so p = 0.75^(1/12) = 0.9763: every one of the twelve owners must be about 97.6 percent sure. If they cannot honestly say so, the date should move, or the chain should get shorter.

Teach me more
  • Exploring the "Planning Fallacy": Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin and Michael Ross, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(3), 1994, pp. 366 to 381 (16 pages, in a copy hosted at MIT). A scanned copy, so its text cannot be searched. Study 1 is the thesis study above, with its figures in Table 1; the later studies show that people thinking aloud about a forecast rarely mention their own past projects, and that the bias went away when they were told to connect that past to the task at hand.
  • From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right, Bent Flyvbjerg, Project Management Journal 37(3), 2006 (the author's copy on arXiv). The clearest account by its inventor of how an overrun record becomes an uplift, with the British guidance and the Edinburgh tram as worked cases. Its uplifts are for cost, not schedule, it reads them off charts without showing the quantile arithmetic, and it does not treat milestones; Steps 1, 3 and 4 fill those in.
  • Why Your Projects Are Always Late, and What to Do About It, Freakonomics Radio, episode 323 (replayed 2023), with a free transcript of roughly 7,000 words. The story told by people who study it: Buehler on the theses, Flyvbjerg on megaprojects and strategic misrepresentation, Yael Grushka-Cockayne on reference classes and uplifts. No arithmetic beyond an average uplift; this lesson supplies it.
  • Risks don't add up, Mosaic Project Services (4 pages). A short practitioner's note on why the chances of activities that must all finish multiply, the arithmetic of Step 4: three activities at 90, 90 and 80 percent start the next one on time with chance 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.8 = 64.8%. Its footnote warns, as this lesson does, that the product needs independence. It does not discuss the planning fallacy itself.

The 1979 paper that named the fallacy is Kahneman and Tversky, "Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures", reprinted in Judgment under Uncertainty (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 414 to 421. The reference class and the uplift are the subject of the Library's companion entry, reference-class-forecast, which chooses the class; this entry uses it to set a budget and a date.

The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman; Odean)

The disposition effect: selling winners, keeping losers, and what it does to prices

We count, for the trader or manager in question, the share of gains realized and the share of losses realized on the days a sale was made, as Odean defined them, and read the gap. For a stock, we estimate holders' average purchase price and the unrealized gain it implies, because news that lands on a stock whose holders sit on gains is sold into and absorbed slowly. A manager passes when the gap is near zero or explained by taxes and rebalancing; a thesis that relies on the drift passes only if the holders' gain or loss and the news point the same way.

Born to answer
Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean's 10,000 accounts, 1998.
What it does now
Whether a manager sells winners and keeps losers, and what holders' gains do to prices.
The mathematics
PGR - PLR; overhang g = (P - R) / P
The full entry
Where it began

Shefrin and Statman (1985) named the disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long, and traced it to prospect theory, mental accounting, regret and self-control. Odean (1998) measured it in the trades of 10,000 accounts at a discount broker from 1987 to 1993: on days they sold, investors realized 14.8 percent of their paper gains and 9.8 percent of their paper losses, and the winners they sold went on to beat the losers they kept. Weber and Camerer (1998) reproduced it in the laboratory and found it largely vanished when shares were sold automatically each period. Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) found employees' option exercise roughly doubling when the stock passed its high of the previous year.

Why it works now

The test needs trade-level records, which used to be locked in broker systems and were rarely given to the investor paying for the trades. Account statements, fund holdings filings and volume data can now be read in bulk, and the proportions of gains and losses realized, or a stock's overhang, computed outside the conversation. Why a manager kept a particular loser is still a question for the people who sat in the meetings.

When it applies

A question turns on how holders will trade from where they bought: a fund manager's or adviser's record of sales, a stock whose holders sit mostly on gains or mostly on losses before news, employees holding options near a past high, a lockup expiry, or a price returning to many holders' cost. Not to be confused with earnings-surprise-drift, which measures the drift after news, or trend-or-reversion, which tests a price series statistically: this measures whether gains are realized more readily than losses and uses holders' unrealized gains to explain how prices respond.

What we would ask

Over the last two years, what share of the positions showing a gain were sold on sale days, and what share of those showing a loss?
Where did most current holders buy, and how far is the price from that level?

What it needs

Trade-level records (dates, quantities, purchase prices) for the account or manager; for a stock, holders' cost basis estimated from fund holdings, or from past prices weighted by turnover; the dates of news and tax deadlines; the later returns of what was sold and what was kept.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the proportions of gains and losses realized, their gap and its seasonal pattern, and the capital gains overhang from holdings and volume data. Former portfolio managers, risk officers and brokers say how selling decisions were really made, and plan administrators say when employees exercise.

Where it breaks

Gains realized for rebalancing or losses for taxes (in December the pattern reverses, as Odean found); a reference point other than the purchase price; a preference story that does not hold, since Barberis and Xiong (2009) show prospect theory over annual gains often fails to predict the effect and Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) find selling V-shaped in profit, pointing to belief revision; a cost basis estimated badly, which voids the overhang.

For example

A family office reviews a manager before adding capital. On the manager's sale days over two years, 120 of 600 positions showing a gain were sold and 40 of 500 showing a loss: PGR = 120 / 600 = 0.20 and PLR = 40 / 500 = 0.08, a gap of 0.12. In Odean's 10,000 accounts the gap was 0.148 - 0.098, about 0.05, and the winners sold went on to beat the losers kept by 3.4 percentage points over the next year. A gap more than twice the retail benchmark is the finding; whether the manager's losers were kept on evidence or on reluctance is what former analysts on the team can say.

The mathematics in fullPGR = realized gains / (realized gains + paper gains) and PLR = realized losses / (realized losses + paper losses), counted on days a sale occurs; the disposition effect is PGR - PLR > 0. Odean (1998) found PGR = 0.148 and PLR = 0.098 for the whole year, and in December PLR = 0.128 above PGR = 0.108. For a stock, the capital gains overhang is g = (P - R) / P, where R is holders' reference price: Grinblatt and Han (2005) estimate it as the sum over n of V(t - n) x [product for j = 1 to n - 1 of (1 - V(t - n + j))] x P(t - n), past prices weighted by turnover V; drift after news is strongest when g and the news share a sign (Frazzini, 2006). Where it is in the books

Shefrin and Statman (1985), The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long, Journal of Finance; Odean (1998), Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, Journal of Finance (Table I); Weber and Camerer (1998), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Grinblatt and Han (2005), Journal of Financial Economics; Frazzini (2006), Journal of Finance; Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999), Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 32, Keeping Score

Sources

Shefrin, Statman (1985). The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Finance 40(3), 777-790. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x
Odean (1998). Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? The Journal of Finance 53(5), 1775-1798. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00072
Weber, Camerer (1998). The disposition effect in securities trading: an experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 33(2), 167-184. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00089-9
Frazzini (2006). The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News. The Journal of Finance 61(4), 2017-2046. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00896.x
Grinblatt, Han (2005). Prospect theory, mental accounting, and momentum. Journal of Financial Economics 78(2), 311-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.006
Barberis, Xiong (2009). What Drives the Disposition Effect? An Analysis of a Long-Standing Preference-Based Explanation. The Journal of Finance 64(2), 751-784. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01448.x
Ben-David, Hirshleifer (2012). Are Investors Really Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? Trading Responses to Past Returns and the Disposition Effect. Review of Financial Studies 25(8), 2485-2532. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs077
Heath, Huddart, Lang (1999). Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 601-627. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556089
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

Noise and the noise audit (Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein)

Noise: how far apart two experts land on the same case

We run a noise audit: the same realistic cases go to several judges independently, and we measure how far apart their answers are relative to their average, then split the spread into level differences (some judges are harsher across the board) and pattern differences (judges react differently to particular cases). The organization passes when the typical difference is inside what its own executives say they would tolerate; when it fails, the remedy is structure, by averaging independent judgments, using a simple rule or a model of the judges, and writing guidelines.

Born to answer
Goldberg's model of the judge, 1970; the insurer's 55 percent, 2021.
What it does now
How far apart two experts land on the same case.
The mathematics
MSE = bias^2 + noise^2; system noise^2 = level^2 + pattern^2
The full entry
Where it began

Goldberg (1970) found that a linear model of each of 29 clinical psychologists' own diagnoses was usually more accurate than the psychologist, and Dawes (1979) that even equal weights beat clinical intuition. Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein's Noise (2021) turned the point into an audit: at a large insurer, in a study the authors ran in 2015, two underwriters pricing the same case differed by a median of 55 percent of their average premium, where the company's executives had expected about 10. The book also reports a 1981 study in which 208 federal judges sentencing the same 16 hypothetical cases averaged seven years, with a standard deviation of 3.4 years.

Why it works now

A noise audit was rarely run because it needs the same cases judged independently by many people, which takes time nobody budgets. Case files can now be anonymized and replicated quickly, judgments collected online, and the spread and its components computed outside the conversation, as can a simple model of the judges. Which cues the judges actually weigh, and why, is still a question for the senior people who trained them.

When it applies

Decisions are made case by case by professionals using judgment (underwriters, credit officers, appraisers, analysts scoring deals, interviewers, an investment committee rating opportunities, claims adjusters, forecasters), no one has measured how differently two of them would decide the same case, and outcomes arrive too late or too seldom to score them. Not to be confused with calibration-track-record, which scores forecasts against outcomes, committee-aggregation, which asks how votes combine, or eliciting-a-probability, which designs how one expert is asked: this measures disagreement on identical cases, which needs no outcome at all.

What we would ask

If two of the most experienced people priced or scored the same case without conferring, how far apart would they be?
Has anyone ever given the same case to several of them, or to the same person twice?

What it needs

A set of realistic cases, each judged independently by several professionals or by the same professional twice; the judgments in a common unit (a price, a score, a probability); where they exist, outcomes or a simple model of the judges for comparison.

How we would get it

The Desk designs the audit, computes the noise index, the spread and its split into level and pattern noise, and compares an equal-weight rule with the judges. Former senior underwriters, credit heads and investment committee members say which cues the judges really use and how cases are assigned.

Where it breaks

Cases that differ in ways the audit misses, so disagreement is real information; judges meant to differ, as a second opinion is; a rule fitted to biased past decisions, which removes noise but keeps the bias (Kleinberg and coauthors, 2018, address that data problem directly); written cases that overstate disagreement compared with live ones where colleagues confer; reading low noise as accuracy, when everyone may share the same bias.

For example

A lender has three senior credit officers price the same twelve loan files independently. The median difference between two officers' spreads, divided by their average, is 30 percent, against an executive expectation of 10 percent. The spread splits into level noise of 0.6 points and pattern noise of 0.8 points, for system noise of the square root of 0.6^2 + 0.8^2, or 1.0 point. Because overall error is bias squared plus noise squared, removing this noise would cut error as much as removing a bias of the same size, and averaging the three officers' independent prices divides the noise by the square root of 3, about 1.7, before anyone builds a model.

The mathematics in fullFor one case judged many times, overall error (mean squared error) = bias^2 + noise^2, where noise is the standard deviation of the judgments; across cases, system noise^2 = level noise^2 + pattern noise^2 (Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein, 2021). The audit's noise index for a pair of judgments is |J1 - J2| / ((J1 + J2) / 2), summarized by its median over pairs: at the insurer in the book it was 55 percent against the 10 percent executives expected. Averaging k independent judgments divides noise by the square root of k; a linear model of a judge gives the same answer to the same case every time, and Goldberg (1970) found such models more valid than the judges they were built from. Where it is in the books

Noise (2021), Part I, Finding Noise (the insurance company audit); Noise (2021), Part II, Chapter 5, Measuring Error; Chapter 6, The Analysis of Noise; Chapter 7, Occasion Noise; Noise (2021), Appendix A, How to Conduct a Noise Audit; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part III, Chapter 21, Intuitions vs. Formulas; Goldberg (1970), Man Versus Model of Man, Psychological Bulletin; Dawes (1979), The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models, American Psychologist; Grove and coauthors (2000), Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction, Psychological Assessment; Kahneman and Klein (2009), Conditions for Intuitive Expertise, American Psychologist

Sources

Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein (2021). Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment. Little, Brown Spark. (book)
Goldberg (1970). Man versus model of man: A rationale, plus some evidence, for a method of improving on clinical inferences. Psychological Bulletin 73(6), 422-432. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0029230
Dawes (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making. American Psychologist 34(7), 571-582. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.34.7.571
Dawes, Faust, Meehl (1989). Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment. Science 243(4899), 1668-1674. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.2648573
Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, Nelson (2000). Clinical versus mechanical prediction: A meta-analysis. Psychological Assessment 12(1), 19-30. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.12.1.19
Ashton (2000). A review and analysis of research on the test-retest reliability of professional judgment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13(3), 277-294. https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0771(200007/09)13:3<277::aid-bdm350>3.0.co;2-b
Kahneman, Klein (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist 64(6), 515-526. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016755
Kleinberg, Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig, Mullainathan (2018). Human Decisions and Machine Predictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133(1), 237-293. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx032
Galton (1907). Vox Populi. Nature 75(1949), 450-451. https://doi.org/10.1038/075450a0
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

Defaults and choice architecture (Thaler and Sunstein)

Defaults: what people get when they do nothing

We compare the outcome under the default with the outcome under active choice or the opposite default, from a natural experiment, a staggered rollout or a test, and treat the difference as the share held by inertia. We then stress the revenue or participation to a change of default, and check how the default is presented, since defaults that read as a recommendation or as the status quo work harder. A business or a policy passes when what remains under active choice still pays.

Born to answer
Madrian and Shea, 2001: 37 to 86 percent; Save More Tomorrow, 2004.
What it does now
How much of a revenue line is choice and how much inertia.
The mathematics
D = P(on | default on) - P(on | default off); at risk = D x N x revenue
The full entry
Where it began

Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found people sticking disproportionately with the status quo, in faculty choices of health plans and retirement funds among other decisions. Madrian and Shea (2001) studied a company that began enrolling new hires automatically in its 401(k) plan at a 3 percent contribution invested in a money market fund: participation among employees with 3 to 15 months of service rose from 37 to 86 percent, and most new participants stayed at exactly the default. Thaler and Benartzi's Save More Tomorrow (2004) asked employees to commit future raises to saving; 78 percent of those offered it joined and their average saving rate rose from 3.5 to 13.6 percent in 40 months. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) found effective consent to organ donation separated by nearly 60 percentage points between opt-in and opt-out countries in Europe.

Why it works now

Defaults were hard to price from outside because the share of customers sitting at the default settings was internal data. Plan disclosures, regulatory filings, app settings and usage panels can now be read for the share at the default and for markets where the default differs, and the revenue at risk computed outside the conversation. How a default is presented, and what happened when it was switched, is what former product managers and plan administrators know.

When it applies

A revenue line, a participation rate or a policy outcome rests on what happens when people do not act (automatic enrollment, automatic renewal, opt-out consent, a preselected plan or fund, automatic escalation), and the question is how much of it is choice and how much inertia, or what happens if a rule, a competitor or the client changes the default. Not to be confused with tipping-and-lock-in, which concerns network effects, or adoption-curve, which models diffusion: this separates the people who would choose the outcome from those who merely did not opt out.

What we would ask

What share of these customers or participants made an active choice, and what share simply never changed the setting?
Where has the opposite default been tried, by a competitor, a rule or a pilot, and what happened to take-up?

What it needs

Take-up, retention or participation under each default, ideally in the same population; the share sitting exactly at the default settings; revenue or outcome per participant; any pending rule on consent, renewal or enrollment.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the default effect and the revenue or participation at risk under a change of default, from plan, subscription or registry data and published comparisons. Former product managers, plan administrators and regulators say how the default is presented and what changed when it was switched.

Where it breaks

Defaults chosen because they are good, so inertia is overstated; effects that fade when the default is costly to keep or easy to reverse; published effects inflated by selective publication (DellaVigna and Linos, 2022, find 8.7 percentage points in journal studies against 1.4 in two government nudge units, and Maier and coauthors, 2022, find no overall nudge effect left after correcting for publication bias, with the evidence on changes to the structure of choice, defaults among them, undecided); a default that raises take-up but shifts behavior elsewhere.

For example

A software company has 2 million subscribers renewing automatically at 120 dollars a year, 240 million dollars of revenue, and a rule requiring renewal to be confirmed each year is under consultation. Where customers must confirm, renewal has run at 65 percent against 90 percent under automatic renewal. The revenue at risk is 2,000,000 x (0.90 - 0.65) x 120 = 60 million dollars a year, a quarter of the base. The research question is how many automatic renewers actually use the product, which usage logs and former customer success managers can answer.

The mathematics in fullDefault effect D = P(outcome | default on) - P(outcome | default off), measured in the same population; revenue at risk = D x N x revenue per participant. Madrian and Shea (2001): participation of 86 percent under automatic enrollment against 37 percent for comparable employees hired before it, D = 49 points. Johnson and Goldstein (2003), online: 82 percent consent to organ donation under opt-out, 42 percent under opt-in, 79 percent with no default. Meta-analyses: d = 0.68 for defaults (Jachimowicz and coauthors, 2019) and d = 0.62 for defaults within all choice architecture (Mertens and coauthors, as corrected in 2022). Where it is in the books

Nudge (2008), Part I, Chapter 5, Choice Architecture; Part II, Chapter 6, Save More Tomorrow; Part III, Chapter 11, How to Increase Organ Donations; Misbehaving (2015), Part VIII, Chapter 31, Save More Tomorrow; Madrian and Shea (2001), The Power of Suggestion, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Save More Tomorrow, Journal of Political Economy; Johnson and Goldstein (2003), Do Defaults Save Lives?, Science; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 34, Frames and Reality (the organ donation default)

Sources

Madrian, Shea (2001). The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4), 1149-1187. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265543
Thaler, Benartzi (2004). Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving. Journal of Political Economy 112(S1), S164-S187. https://doi.org/10.1086/380085
Johnson, Goldstein (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives? Science 302(5649), 1338-1339. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091721
Samuelson, Zeckhauser (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1(1), 7-59. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00055564
Benartzi, Thaler (2007). Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), 81-104. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.81
Jachimowicz, Duncan, Weber, Johnson (2019). When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects. Behavioural Public Policy 3(02), 159-186. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.43
DellaVigna, Linos (2022). RCTs to Scale: Comprehensive Evidence From Two Nudge Units. Econometrica 90(1), 81-116. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta18709
Mertens, Herberz, Hahnel, Brosch (2022). The effectiveness of nudging: A meta-analysis of choice architecture interventions across behavioral domains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(1). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2107346118
Maier, Bartoš, Stanley, Shanks, Harris, Wagenmakers (2022). No evidence for nudging after adjusting for publication bias. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(31). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2200300119
Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press. (book)
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)

Limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny; Lamont and Thaler)

Limits to arbitrage: a visible mispricing that cannot be traded away

We price the trade that would close the gap: the borrowing cost and availability of the expensive leg, the date and certainty of the event that forces the prices together, and the capital needed if the gap widens before it narrows. The gap is evidence of mispricing only after those costs, and an opportunity only if it survives them. A case passes when the gap exceeds the cost of carry to the forcing date with margin left for a widening the holder can fund.

Born to answer
3Com and Palm, 2 March 2000: a stub of minus 63 dollars.
What it does now
Whether a mispricing survives the cost of trading it.
The mathematics
S = P_parent - x P_sub; net = -S - x P_sub f T
The full entry
Where it began

On 2 March 2000, 3Com sold about 5 percent of Palm to the public and said it would distribute the rest, about 1.5 Palm shares for each 3Com share, within the year. Palm closed its first day at 95.06 dollars; 3Com, which had closed at 104.13 the day before, fell to 81.81, valuing everything 3Com owned besides Palm at about minus 63 dollars a share, minus 22 billion dollars in all. Lamont and Thaler (2003) showed the gap lasted for months because Palm could hardly be borrowed: short interest reached 147.6 percent of the shares available, and on 16 March options priced a synthetic short at 39.12 dollars when the stock traded at 55.25, 29 percent less. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) had explained why: arbitrage takes capital, carries risk and runs on other people's money, which leaves when the gap widens.

Why it works now

The gap was always visible; what it cost to trade was not, because borrow fees and availability sat with lending desks. Securities lending data, short interest, option prices and the terms of the forcing event can now be gathered and the gap net of carry computed outside the conversation. Whether stock could really be borrowed in size, and who was forced out when the gap widened, is what former arbitrage traders and prime brokers know.

When it applies

Two claims on the same cash flows trade at prices that do not add up (a parent below its stake in a listed subsidiary, dual-listed twins, a closed-end fund or holding company away from its assets, share classes with the same rights), and the gap is offered as proof the market is wrong or as an easy profit. Not to be confused with published-edge-decay, which asks whether a published return survives, or price-implied-expectations, which reads what one price assumes: this asks what it would cost and risk to hold the offsetting trade until the prices must meet, and who could be forced out first.

What we would ask

What forces the two prices together, on what date, and how certain is that event?
Can the expensive leg be borrowed, at what fee, and what happens to the position if the gap doubles before it closes?

What it needs

Both prices, the exchange ratio and any cash or debt adjustments; the borrow fee, availability and short interest of the expensive leg, or option prices from which the implied cost of shorting can be read; the date and conditions of the forcing event; the history of the gap.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the stub or discount, the annualized cost of carry, the gap net of borrowing and the capital at risk if the gap widens, from prices, options and filings. Former arbitrage traders, prime brokers and securities lending desks say whether stock could really be borrowed, and at what fee.

Where it breaks

A forcing event that is not certain (in Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford's 82 cases of companies worth less than their stake in a subsidiary, the link was severed before the gap closed 30 percent of the time); borrow fees that absorb the gap; a gap that is not mispricing at all once lending fees and timing uncertainty are priced, as Cherkes, Jones and Spatt (2026) argue for 3Com and Palm; arbitrage capital withdrawn just when the gap is widest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).

For example

A holding company trades at 40 dollars a share while its stake in a listed subsidiary is worth 52 dollars a share net of debt: a stub of minus 12 dollars. The subsidiary costs 25 percent a year to borrow, and the distribution that forces the prices together is nine months away. Carrying a short of 52 dollars of subsidiary stock for 0.75 years at 25 percent costs 52 x 0.25 x 0.75 = 9.75 dollars, leaving 2.25 dollars of the 12 dollar gap, and a widening to minus 20 dollars before the distribution would call for 8 dollars a share of fresh margin. The gap is real; the free money is mostly not, and the research question is whether the distribution date can slip.

The mathematics in fullStub per parent share S = P_parent - x P_sub + adjustments for cash and debt, where x is subsidiary shares per parent share; for 3Com and Palm on 2 March 2000, 81.81 - 1.525 x 95.06 is about -63. Net gain to convergence per parent share = -S - x P_sub f T, for a borrow fee f a year and time T to the forcing event; a lending fee d shows in options through put-call parity, C - P = S0 e^(-d T) - K e^(-r T). Capital at risk if the stub widens to S_w before convergence: S - S_w per parent share. Where it is in the books

Lamont and Thaler (2003), Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-outs, Journal of Political Economy (3Com and Palm); Lamont and Thaler (2003), Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Misbehaving (2015), Part VI, Chapter 25, The Battle of Closed-End Funds, and Chapter 26, Fruit Flies, Icebergs, and Negative Stock Prices; Shleifer and Vishny (1997), The Limits of Arbitrage, Journal of Finance; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, Journal of Finance; Cherkes, Jones and Spatt (2026), A Solution to the Palm-3Com Spinoff Puzzles, Critical Finance Review

Sources

Lamont, Thaler (2003). Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-outs. Journal of Political Economy 111(2), 227-268. https://doi.org/10.1086/367683
Lamont, Thaler (2003). Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4), 191-202. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034952
Shleifer, Vishny (1997). The Limits of Arbitrage. The Journal of Finance 52(1), 35-55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x
Mitchell, Pulvino, Stafford (2002). Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets. The Journal of Finance 57(2), 551-584. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00434
Lee, Shleifer, Thaler (1991). Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle. The Journal of Finance 46(1), 75-109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03746.x
Cherkes, Jones, Spatt (2026). A solution to the Palm-3Com spinoff puzzles. Critical Finance Review 15(3), 249-270. https://doi.org/10.1108/cfr-03-2024-2515
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldmann (1990). Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets. Journal of Political Economy 98(4), 703-738. https://doi.org/10.1086/261703
Gromb, Vayanos (2010). Limits of Arbitrage. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2(1), 251-275. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104107
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)

Myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler)

Myopic loss aversion: how often the result is looked at decides what can be held

We compute how often the owner will see a loss at each evaluation interval, and a loss-averse value of the holding at each interval, then find the interval at which the risky holding stops looking worse than the safe one. If the owner's reporting is more frequent than that, the allocation is likely to be abandoned at the first bad stretch whatever its long-run merit, so the remedy is to change what is reported and when, or to choose an allocation that survives the reporting actually in place.

Born to answer
The equity premium explained by yearly evaluation, 1995.
What it does now
Whether the reporting calendar, not the allocation, will decide.
The mathematics
P(loss at h) = N(-(mu / sigma) sqrt(h)); V(h) = E[R_h] - (lambda - 1) E[max(-R_h, 0)]
The full entry
Where it began

Benartzi and Thaler (1995) asked how often investors with prospect theory preferences would have to look at their portfolios to be indifferent between stocks and bonds, found about once a year, and called the combination of loss aversion and frequent evaluation myopic loss aversion; in their working paper the 6.5 percent equity premium of 1926 to 1990 fit annual evaluation and would fall to about 2 percent at ten-year evaluation. Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) found that subjects who saw their results most often took the least risk and earned the least, and Gneezy and Potters (1997) found the same with evaluation periods. Haigh and List (2005) ran the experiment on traders from the Chicago Board of Trade and found the effect stronger than in students.

Why it works now

The interval at which owners look used to be fixed by paper statements; it is now set by dashboards that report daily. Reporting calendars, committee minutes and return histories can be assembled and the chance of a reported loss and the break-even interval computed outside the conversation. What a committee actually did after its last losing quarters is still a question for the people in the room.

When it applies

An allocation, a mandate or a pay scheme will be judged at a fixed interval (monthly reports, quarterly reviews, annual bonuses, a board that sees every drawdown) while the holding's horizon is long, and the question is how much risky exposure the owner can live with, or why a committee keeps cutting risk after bad quarters. Not to be confused with kelly-sizing, which sizes a bet from its edge, or expected-value-and-risk, which compares the average with the downside: this asks how the frequency of evaluation, combined with a heavier weight on losses, changes what the same owner is willing to hold.

What we would ask

How often will the owner, the board or the investment committee see the result, and what did it do after past losing quarters?
Over the holding's real horizon, how often would it have shown a loss at that reporting interval?

What it needs

The return distribution of the risky and the safe holding (mean, volatility, ideally the historical record); the reporting and review calendar; the owner's past behavior after losses; any contractual triggers tied to periodic results.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the probability of a reported loss at each interval and the loss-averse value with the published coefficient, and finds the break-even interval. Former trustees, consultants and investment committee members say what was really done after bad quarters, which minutes rarely record.

Where it breaks

Owners whose loss aversion is low or whose capital is truly long term, for whom the evaluation period does not bind; returns that are not independent from period to period, which changes the loss probabilities; assuming experience cures it, when professional traders showed more of it than students (Haigh and List, 2005); using it to argue for risk a client cannot in fact bear.

For example

A foundation's equity sleeve has an expected excess return of 6 percent a year with volatility of 18 percent, and the board reviews it monthly. The chance of seeing a loss is about 46 percent in a month and 37 percent in a year, but about 15 percent over ten years. With losses weighted 2.25 times gains and a linear value function, the sleeve's value at a monthly review is negative, about -1.8 percent of the sleeve, and turns positive only at intervals longer than about 11 months. Reviewed monthly, it will look like a loss in nearly half the reports; the research question is what the board did after its last losing quarters, and the remedy may be the reporting calendar rather than the allocation.

The mathematics in fullWith returns over an interval h normally distributed with mean m = mu h and standard deviation s = sigma sqrt(h), P(loss at h) = N(-(mu / sigma) sqrt(h)). A loss-averse value with a linear value function is V(h) = E[R_h] - (lambda - 1) E[max(-R_h, 0)], with E[max(-R_h, 0)] = s phi(m / s) - m N(-m / s); the break-even interval h* solves V(h*) = V(safe). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) found an evaluation period of about one year makes stocks and bonds equally attractive under prospect theory with lambda of 2.25. Where it is in the books

Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997), The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Gneezy and Potters (1997), An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Misbehaving (2015), Part V, Chapter 20, Narrow Framing on the Upper East Side; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 31, Risk Policies; Haigh and List (2005), Journal of Finance

Sources

Benartzi, Thaler (1995). Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1), 73-92. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118511
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, Schwartz (1997). The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 647-661. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555226
Gneezy, Potters (1997). An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 631-645. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555217
Haigh, List (2005). Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis. The Journal of Finance 60(1), 523-534. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00737.x
Benartzi, Thaler (1999). Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments. Management Science 45(3), 364-381. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.3.364
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Barberis, Huang, Santos (2001). Prospect Theory and Asset Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 1-53. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556310
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

The house money and break-even effects (Thaler and Johnson)

House money and break-even: the risk taken depends on the score so far

We locate the reference point the decision maker keeps score against (start of the day or year, a benchmark, a purchase price, a budget), measure where the decision maker stands against it, and compare the risk taken in the following period after gains and after losses. Risk that rises after gains (house money) or concentrates in bets that could restore the starting point (break-even) is driven by the score, not the opportunity. A manager or team passes when risk is flat across prior outcomes once the opportunity set is controlled for.

Born to answer
A Cornell poker game, then real-money experiments, 1990.
What it does now
Whether the next bet is sized by the score so far.
The mathematics
0.5 [v(G) + v(x)] + 0.5 v(G - x) against v(G); P(catch up) = 1 - N(g / (s sqrt(T)))
The full entry
Where it began

Thaler noticed in a low-stakes poker game among Cornell economists that players who were ahead played loosely with what gamblers call house money, while those behind chased long shots to get back to even. With Eric Johnson he tested it with real money (1990): in Thaler's account, 70 percent of students told they had just won 30 dollars took a coin flip for 9 dollars, while students told they had just lost 30 dollars shied away from the same flip yet chose a one-in-three chance of winning 30 back over a sure 10. Coval and Shumway (2005) found Chicago Board of Trade traders with morning losses taking above-average risk in the afternoon, and Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008) found risk aversion falling after both bad and good luck among contestants on Deal or No Deal.

Why it works now

Prior outcomes were hard to see in a manager's behavior because positions arrived quarterly and in aggregate. Daily positions, fund holdings filings and risk reports can now be lined up against each reference point and the risk taken after gains and after losses compared outside the conversation. How limits were enforced when someone was behind is what former risk managers and heads of desks know.

When it applies

A decision maker's next bet follows a gain or a loss measured from a salient starting point (a trader up or down on the day, a fund ahead of or behind its benchmark late in the year, a company after a windfall or a missed target, an investor flush with a recent gain), and the question is whether the next risk will be sized by the opportunity or by the score so far. Not to be confused with skin-in-the-game, which asks who bears the downside, or incentive-contracts, which reads what pay rewards: this predicts how prior outcomes alone shift the appetite for risk, toward bigger bets after gains and toward long shots that offer a way back after losses.

What we would ask

Where does the decision maker stand against the point that matters most right now: the start of the year, the benchmark, or the cost?
In periods that followed losses, did the size or riskiness of the bets go up, and were they bets that could restore the starting point?

What it needs

A history of positions or decisions with their dates and risk (volatility, size, odds); the reference points (period start, benchmark, high-water mark, budget); results by period, so risk after gains and after losses can be compared.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the change in risk after gains and after losses against each reference point, from position, fund and filing data. Former risk managers, heads of trading and fund directors say how limits were enforced when someone was behind, which is where break-even bets happen.

Where it breaks

Prior outcomes that change real constraints (capital lost does reduce capacity), so risk should change; career incentives such as fund flows and bonuses that explain the pattern better (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997); house money effects found with small stakes in experiments that may not carry over to the stakes and settings of the client's case; a break-even bet that was also a good bet.

For example

A fund is 5 percent behind its benchmark at the end of September, with tracking error of 6 percent a year. Kept at that tracking error, the quarter's spread is 6 x sqrt(0.25) = 3 percent and the chance of catching up by December is about 4.8 percent; tripled to 18 percent, the spread is 9 percent and the chance rises to about 28.9 percent, at the cost of three times the range of shortfall. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) found funds trailing at mid-year raising their volatility in the rest of the year. The research question is whether the October trades were sized by the opportunity or by the gap.

The mathematics in fullIn a simple form of Thaler and Johnson's editing rule, a prior gain G cushions a later loss, so a 50-50 bet of plus or minus x after G is valued at 0.5 [v(G) + v(x)] + 0.5 v(G - x) rather than 0.5 v(x) + 0.5 v(-x); with v(x) = x^0.88 and lambda = 2.25, a coin flip for 9 after a gain of 30 is worth 20.7 against 19.9 for stopping (accept), but -4.3 on its own (reject). Break-even: after a loss, outcomes that can reach zero are favored. For a manager behind by g with time T left and tracking error s, P(catch up) = 1 - N(g / (s sqrt(T))), which rises with s. Where it is in the books

Thaler and Johnson (1990), Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even, Management Science; Misbehaving (2015), Part II, Chapter 10, At the Poker Table; Coval and Shumway (2005), Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?, Journal of Finance; Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008), Deal or No Deal?, American Economic Review; Misbehaving (2015), Part VII, Chapter 30, Game Shows; Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), Of Tournaments and Temptations, Journal of Finance

Sources

Thaler, Johnson (1990). Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice. Management Science 36(6), 643-660. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.6.643
Coval, Shumway (2005). Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? The Journal of Finance 60(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00723.x
Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, Thaler (2008). Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show. American Economic Review 98(1), 38-71. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.38
Brown, Harlow, Starks (1996). Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry. The Journal of Finance 51(1), 85-110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x
Chevalier, Ellison (1997). Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 105(6), 1167-1200. https://doi.org/10.1086/516389
Barberis, Huang, Santos (2001). Prospect Theory and Asset Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 1-53. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556310
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)

Sunk costs and escalation of commitment (Thaler; Arkes and Blumer; Staw)

Sunk costs and escalation: money already spent is not a reason to spend more

We rebuild the continuation case from today forward with every dollar already spent set to zero, and compare continuing with stopping, selling or redeploying. Then we look for the signature of escalation: commitment that rises with the amount spent, or with the decision maker's personal responsibility for the original choice. The project passes when its forward value beats the alternatives with sunk costs ignored, and a reviewer with no stake in the original decision reaches the same answer.

Born to answer
Thaler, 1980; Ohio theater tickets and the radar-blank plane, 1985.
What it does now
Whether a project would be approved today at its remaining cost.
The mathematics
Continue iff PV(future benefits) - PV(remaining cost) > value of stopping
The full entry
Where it began

Thaler's 1980 paper counted the failure to ignore sunk costs among consumers' departures from economic theory, and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explained it as a decision referred to an account already in the red. Arkes and Blumer (1985) sold season tickets for an Ohio University theater season at full price or at discounts of 2 or 7 dollars: full-price buyers used more tickets in the first half of the season, 4.11 against 3.32 and 3.29. Staw (1976) found business students putting more money into a failing division when they had chosen it themselves, and Staw and Hoang (1995) found NBA teams giving more playing time to higher draft picks after allowing for performance, an effect Camerer and Weber (1999) confirmed at a smaller size. Ho, Png and Reza (2018) found Singapore drivers driving more when the sunk cost of buying their car was higher.

Why it works now

The continuation case is usually written by the people who started the project, and the spending history and the forward case sit in different documents. Board papers, capital expenditure disclosures and project reviews can now be read side by side and the forward value with sunk costs removed computed outside the conversation. Whether the project still makes sense to someone with no stake in it is what independent reviewers and the team that would take it over can say.

When it applies

A project, acquisition integration, product line, plant or position is being continued or given more money, and the case leans on what has already been spent, on the people who championed it, or on finishing what was started, while its forward economics have worsened. Not to be confused with option-to-wait or decision-tree-staging, which value flexibility in a decision still to be made, or behavioral-pricing, which covers sunk costs built into prices: this tests whether the continuation decision would survive if the money already spent were zero and someone new were deciding.

What we would ask

If this project had not been started and someone proposed it today at the remaining cost, with what is now known, would it be approved?
Who made the original decision, and are they the people deciding whether to continue?

What it needs

The remaining cost to complete and its range; the forward cash flows if completed and the value of stopping (salvage, redeployment, sale); the spending to date and who approved it; the history of revisions to the case.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the forward value of continuing and of each alternative with sunk costs excluded, and the change in the case at each revision. Former project sponsors, board members and the team that would take over say what the original champions cannot, including whether a rival has made the project moot.

Where it breaks

Costs that look sunk but buy something real, such as a nearly finished asset whose remaining cost is small against its value; reputational and contractual costs of stopping that are real and forward looking; escalation evidence that weakens on closer analysis (Camerer and Weber, 1999, found the NBA effect persists but is smaller and shorter than first reported); learning that justifies a revised but positive forward case.

For example

An industrial company has spent 900 million dollars of a 1.2 billion plant when a rival's cheaper process cuts the plant's expected value on completion to 250 million. Finishing costs 300 million more, a forward value of 250 - 300 = -50 million, against a sale of the site and equipment for 120 million today: stopping is worth 170 million more than finishing, whatever was spent. In Arkes and Blumer's 1985 version of the choice, 41 of 48 respondents chose to finish a project after a rival had leapfrogged it, against 10 of 60 when nothing had yet been spent; the research question is who is making this decision, and what they told the board when they began.

The mathematics in fullContinue if and only if E[PV(future benefits)] - PV(remaining cost) > value of stopping (salvage, sale or redeployment); the spending to date S carries no weight in the rule. Escalation shows as commitment rising with S, or as a jump when the decider made the original choice: in Staw (1976), business students personally responsible for a failing first choice put an average of 13.07 of a possible 20 million dollars back into it, the most of any condition. Where it is in the books

Arkes and Blumer (1985), The Psychology of Sunk Cost, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (the season tickets; the radar-blank plane); Thaler (1980), Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Science (a sunk cost as a decision referred to an account with a negative balance); Misbehaving (2015), Part II, Chapter 8, Sunk Costs; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 32, Keeping Score; Staw (1976), Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance; Staw and Hoang (1995), Administrative Science Quarterly; Camerer and Weber (1999), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Sources

Arkes, Blumer (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1), 124-140. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4
Thaler (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1(1), 39-60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7
Tversky, Kahneman (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211(4481), 453-458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
Staw (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: a study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16(1), 27-44. https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90005-2
Staw, Hoang (1995). Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly 40(3), 474. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393794
Camerer, Weber (1999). The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: a re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39(1), 59-82. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00026-8
Ho, Png, Reza (2018). Sunk Cost Fallacy in Driving the World's Costliest Cars. Management Science 64(4), 1761-1778. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2651
Klein, Ratliff, Vianello and others (2014). Investigating Variation in Replicability. Social Psychology 45(3), 142-152. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000178
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

Reference points and loss aversion in deals (Kahneman and Tversky)

The other side's reference point: why offers bunch at the old high

We identify the number the other side keeps score against and restate each possible offer as a gain or a loss from it, valued with the prospect theory value function. Offers just below the reference point are felt as losses weighted about twice as heavily as gains, so acceptance jumps once an offer crosses it, and sellers below their reference wait longer and ask more. The test passes when the predicted bunching and delay show up in the comparable record: offer histograms, time on market, accepted against rejected bids.

Born to answer
Prospect theory, 1979; mugs, 1990; offers at the 52-week high, 2012.
What it does now
How an offer reads against the number the other side keeps score by.
The mathematics
v(x) = x^0.88, -2.25 (-x)^0.88; x = offer - reference point
The full entry
Where it began

Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979) measured outcomes as gains and losses from a reference point rather than as final wealth, with losses weighing more, and their 1992 estimates put the weight at about 2.25. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) showed it in markets for coffee mugs: owners would not sell for less than about twice what buyers would pay, and far fewer mugs traded than theory predicted; in one version sellers asked a median of 7.12 dollars, buyers offered 2.87, and choosers, in the sellers' position without owning a mug, 3.12. Genesove and Mayer (2001) found Boston condominium owners facing a nominal loss asking more and selling more slowly, and Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012) found merger offers bunching at targets' past peak prices, with acceptance jumping once an offer passed the 52-week high.

Why it works now

Reference points were private: what a seller paid, or what a founder was told the company was worth. Purchase dates and prices, past highs, round terms and prior offers can now be assembled from filings, deeds and transaction records, and each candidate offer valued against them outside the conversation. Which number the board or the owner is actually anchored on is what former bankers, directors and founders can say.

When it applies

A sale, merger, financing round or negotiation in which the counterparty has a salient number it measures outcomes from (its purchase price, a 52-week or all-time high, the last round's valuation, an earlier offer, a peer's deal multiple), and the question is whether an offer will be accepted, at what price, and how long the counterparty will wait. Not to be confused with negotiation-and-outside-options, which sets the split from each side's fallback, or behavioral-pricing, which reads customers' reactions to a price: this predicts how the same offer is felt as a gain or a loss against the counterparty's own reference point.

What we would ask

What number is the other side measuring this offer against: what it paid, the old high, the last round, a peer's price?
In comparable deals, did offers cluster at that number, and what happened to bids just below it?

What it needs

The counterparty's reference points (purchase price and date, past highs, last round terms, prior offers); the comparable record of offers and outcomes around such points; the client's own value and walk-away price.

How we would get it

The Desk computes how each candidate offer reads against each reference point with the published parameters, and the bunching and acceptance pattern in comparable deals from filings and transaction records. Former bankers, board members and founders say which number the board or the owner really used, which is rarely written down.

Where it breaks

A reference point that is not the one in use, since an investor's cost is not a founder's; loss aversion weaker than the published median (a 2024 meta-analysis by Brown and coauthors puts the mean coefficient at 1.955, and Gal and Rucker, 2018, dispute that losses generally loom larger at all); rational reasons to wait, such as better information or liquidity; a bidder who pays up to the old high and overpays, the risk the winners-curse entry addresses and that bidders' shareholders punish (Baker, Pan and Wurgler, 2012).

For example

A target trades at 40 dollars after peaking at 52 within the year, and a bidder values it at 50. On the published parameters, a bid of 48, a 20 percent premium, reads to the target's board as a loss of 4 against the high, v(-4) = -2.25 x 4^0.88, about -7.6, while 52 is break-even and 54 a gain of 2, v(2) = 2^0.88, about 1.8. Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012) found the probability of success jumping by 4.4 to 6.4 percent once an offer edged past the 52-week high, and bidders' announcement returns 2.45 percent worse for each 10 percent of premium the high explained. The research question is whether the board is anchored on 52, and whether anything besides the old high would justify paying it.

The mathematics in fullv(x) = x^0.88 for gains and -2.25 (-x)^0.88 for losses, with x = offer - reference point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; mean coefficient 1.955 across 607 estimates in Brown and coauthors, 2024). Genesove and Mayer (2001): condominium owners facing a nominal loss set asking prices higher by 25 to 35 percent of the gap between expected price and purchase price, and sold for 3 to 18 percent of it more, more slowly. Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012): the offer premium rises about 3.3 percent for each 10 percent rise in the 52-week high, and the probability of success jumps by 4.4 to 6.4 percent just above it. Where it is in the books

Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prospect Theory, Econometrica; Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), Journal of Political Economy; (1991), Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part IV, Chapter 27, The Endowment Effect; Misbehaving (2015), Part IV, Chapter 16, Mugs; Genesove and Mayer (2001), Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012), The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics

Sources

Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Tversky, Kahneman (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), 1039-1061. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937956
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98(6), 1325-1348. https://doi.org/10.1086/261737
Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 193-206. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Genesove, Mayer (2001). Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4), 1233-1260. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265561
Baker, Pan, Wurgler (2012). The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 106(1), 49-71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.010
Heath, Huddart, Lang (1999). Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 601-627. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556089
Brown, Imai, Vieider, Camerer (2024). Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion. Journal of Economic Literature 62(2), 485-516. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221698
Gal, Rucker (2018). The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? Journal of Consumer Psychology 28(3), 497-516. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1047
Roll (1986). The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business 59(2), 197. https://doi.org/10.1086/296325
Malmendier, Tate (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89(1), 20-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)

Investor overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler)

Overreaction: extreme losers and winners, priced as if the past would continue

We split the run into what happened to the business and what happened to the price it commands: the change in earnings or cash flow against the change in the multiple, and the growth the price required before and after. We then set today's price-implied growth beside the record of how often companies in that position sustained such growth or such decline. The case passes when the price-implied path sits inside the record; a price that assumes the extreme will continue is the overreaction the test looks for, and the record of extreme portfolios is the base rate for what followed.

Born to answer
Three-year losers beat winners by 24.6 percent, 1985.
What it does now
Whether a price extrapolates an extreme run beyond the record.
The mathematics
P1 / P0 = (E1 / E0)(M1 / M0); g = (r P/E - b) / (P/E + b)
The full entry
Where it began

De Bondt and Thaler (1985) took the psychological finding that people overreact to unexpected and dramatic news, in violation of Bayes' rule, and asked whether it moved prices. Ranking stocks by their returns over three years, with monthly data from 1926 to 1982, they found the 35 worst performers beating the market by 19.6 percent over the next 36 months and the 35 best trailing it by 5.0 percent, a spread of 24.6 percent, larger for losers than winners and earned mostly in January and in the second and third years. Their 1987 paper found the pattern held after allowing for size and market risk; critics answered that much of it came from small, low-priced stocks and from how returns were measured.

Why it works now

The test needs the price, the results and the multiple over the whole run, and base rates of recovery, which once took a database and a programmer. Price and statement histories can now be pulled, the run decomposed, the implied growth solved and base rates computed outside the conversation. Whether the business has changed for good is what former operators and long-time sector analysts can say.

When it applies

A stock, sector or fund has had an extreme multi-year run, among the worst or best performers over three to five years, and the case for or against it assumes the run will continue or must reverse. Not to be confused with earnings-surprise-drift, which concerns the weeks after one report, regression-to-the-mean, which concerns measured performance of managers or units, or profitability-fade, which tracks the fundamentals: this tests whether the price has extrapolated the past further than the fundamentals' own record of persistence justifies.

What we would ask

Over the run, how much of the price change came from the business's results and how much from the multiple?
What growth or decline does today's price require, and how often have companies in this position delivered it?

What it needs

Price, earnings or cash flow and multiples over the run; the growth the current price implies (from price-implied-expectations); base rates of persistence for growth and margins (from profitability-fade); the company's size and liquidity, since the effect is concentrated in small, low-priced stocks.

How we would get it

The Desk decomposes the run, solves for the price-implied growth and sets it beside base rates and the record of extreme portfolios. Former operators and long-time sector analysts say whether the business has changed for good, which is the question the price and the record disagree about.

Where it breaks

A business that has changed for good, so the extreme is the new normal; returns concentrated in January and in small, low-priced stocks, where trading costs and the measurement of returns inflate the result (Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995); risk that rises after losses, and apparent overreaction about as common as underreaction (Fama, 1998); a base rate drawn from decades whose market structure no longer holds.

For example

A specialty retailer's stock has fallen 85 percent in three years while its earnings fell 40 percent: the price ratio 0.15 is the earnings ratio 0.6 times a multiple that went from 20 to 5. With a 10 percent discount rate and a payout of 60 percent, a multiple of 20 implied perpetual growth of (0.1 x 20 - 0.6) / (20 + 0.6), about 6.8 percent, and a multiple of 5 implies (0.1 x 5 - 0.6) / (5 + 0.6), about -1.8 percent: the price now requires earnings to keep shrinking forever after already losing 40 percent. Whether retailers in that position usually keep shrinking is the base rate the research measures; in De Bondt and Thaler's data, three-year losers went on to beat three-year winners by 24.6 percent over the next three years.

The mathematics in fullDecompose the run: P1 / P0 = (E1 / E0) x (M1 / M0), with M the earnings multiple. In the steady state P / E = b (1 + g) / (r - g), so the implied growth is g = (r x P/E - b) / (P/E + b) for payout b and discount rate r. De Bondt and Thaler (1985): for portfolios of the 35 most extreme stocks ranked on three-year returns, ACAR(losers, 36 months) - ACAR(winners, 36 months) = 19.6 - (-5.0) = 24.6 percent (t = 2.20), from monthly data for 1926 to 1982. Where it is in the books

De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Does the Stock Market Overreact?, Journal of Finance; De Bondt and Thaler (1987), Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, Journal of Finance; Misbehaving (2015), Part VI, Chapter 22, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, and Chapter 23, The Reaction to Overreaction; Kahneman and Tversky (1973), On the Psychology of Prediction, Psychological Review; Conrad and Kaul (1993), Journal of Finance; Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995), Journal of Financial Economics; Fama (1998), Journal of Financial Economics

Sources

De Bondt, Thaler (1985). Does the Stock Market Overreact? The Journal of Finance 40(3), 793-805. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x
De Bondt, Thaler (1987). Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality. The Journal of Finance 42(3), 557-581. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04569.x
Kahneman, Tversky (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review 80(4), 237-251. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747
Conrad, Kaul (1993). Long-Term Market Overreaction or Biases in Computed Returns? The Journal of Finance 48(1), 39-63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04701.x
Ball, Kothari, Shanken (1995). Problems in measuring portfolio performance An application to contrarian investment strategies. Journal of Financial Economics 38(1), 79-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00806-c
Fama (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics 49(3), 283-306. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00026-9
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny (1994). Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. The Journal of Finance 49(5), 1541-1578. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x
Fama, French (1996). Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies. The Journal of Finance 51(1), 55-84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05202.x
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton. (book)

Excess volatility and narrative economics (Shiller)

Prices that move more than their fundamentals, and the stories that move them

We ask whether a price has moved more than the thing it is supposed to forecast. If a price is the present value of future cash flows, it is a forecast of them, and a forecast must move less than what it forecasts: that is Shiller's variance bound, and he found that stock prices broke it several times over. A price that has moved far relative to its fundamentals is then being moved by something else, a changing required return or a story, and Shiller's later work gives both a measure, the cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, which has forecast ten-year returns, and a mechanism, the narrative that spreads through a population like a contagion. We compute what the price now requires of growth or of the discount rate, compare the swing in the price with the swing in the fundamentals, and ask which story is carrying the difference and how far it has spread.

Born to answer
American Economic Review, 1981: prices moved more than the dividends they forecast.
What it does now
Whether a price has outrun its fundamentals, and the story carrying the gap.
The mathematics
Var(P) <= Var(P*); P / D = 1 / (r - g)
The full entry
Where it began

Robert Shiller showed in 1979 that long-term interest rates moved more than the expectations theory of the term structure allowed, and in 1981 that stock prices since 1871 had moved several times more than the present value of the dividends they were supposed to forecast; Stephen LeRoy and Richard Porter reached the same result in Econometrica the same year. Allan Kleidon (1986) and Terry Marsh and Robert Merton (1986) disputed the statistics, and John Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988) answered with cointegration and the dividend-price ratio. Shiller's 1984 Brookings paper proposed that fashions move prices; Irrational Exuberance appeared in March 2000, at the peak of the market it described, and introduced a wide public to the cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio, whose forecast of ten-year returns Campbell and Shiller had published in 1998. Shiller shared the 2013 Nobel Prize in economics with Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen; his 2017 presidential address to the American Economic Association and the 2019 book Narrative Economics gave the mechanism, stories that spread like epidemics.

Why it works now

Long series of prices, dividends and earnings are public, the valuation ratio and the growth or discount rate a price requires can be computed outside the conversation, and the spread of a story can be measured in search data, mentions and surveys as it could not be in 1981. What holders believe, and how many have heard the story, is still known best to the people surveying them and to the strategists carrying the thesis.

When it applies

A market or a sector trading at a multiple far from its history on a story (a new technology, a new monetary regime, a scarcity), a thesis that prices will follow fundamentals, a question whether a boom is a bubble, a valuation ratio at an extreme; a fund deciding whether a move is in the cash flows or in the discount rate. Not to be confused with price-implied-expectations, which reverses one company's valuation into the growth it requires; trend-or-reversion, which tests one price series for a pull toward a level; overreaction-to-extremes, which prices a run of extreme news; or contagion-threshold, which gives the spread of anything by contact: this compares the movement of prices with the movement of the fundamentals they forecast, and reads the story that carries the gap.

What we would ask

Over the period in question, how much did the price move, and how much did the dividends, earnings or cash flows it is supposed to forecast move?
What is the story that explains the price, who is telling it, and what would the fundamentals have to do over the next decade for the story to be right?

What it needs

A long series of the price and of the fundamental it forecasts (dividends, earnings, rents), real and per share; the valuation ratio against its own history and the subsequent returns at comparable levels; the required return implied at the current price under a stated growth rate; and for the narrative, its text, its carriers and some measure of its spread (search interest, mentions, surveys of expectations).

How we would get it

The Desk computes the valuation ratio, the growth or discount rate the price requires and the ratio of the price's variation to the fundamental's, and reads the story in the record (letters, calls, press) and its spread. What the record cannot show is what holders believe and how many have heard the story; investor surveys and the people selling the thesis know that.

Where it breaks

Excess volatility declared from a short window, when the bound is a statement about long averages; the fundamental mismeasured (dividends when buybacks carry the payout, earnings at a cyclical peak); a swing in the required return read as a story when real rates moved; the bound's statistics disputed, since Kleidon (1986) showed that nonstationary prices and the smoothed perfect-foresight series can produce apparent violations and Barsky and De Long (1993) that a slowly varying growth rate can make prices respond more than proportionately to dividends; and a valuation ratio used as a timing signal, when its forecasting power is for a decade, not a quarter.

For example

An index pays $100 of dividends a year and investors require 10 percent. Suppose each year's dividend is $90 or $110 with equal odds, independently. The rational price, the present value of expected dividends, is $1,000 and never moves. The ex post rational price, what the index would have been worth had the dividends been known in advance, moves with the dividends, with a standard deviation of $21.82, about 2.2 percent of the price. A price that is a forecast of those dividends cannot swing more than that. A price that swung with a standard deviation of $200, a fifth of its level, would be moving 9.2 times more than the bound allows, and the surplus would have to come from a changing discount rate or from a story. The same test in words: an index at 25 times dividends that goes to 50 times while dividends grow 4 percent requires the gap between the required return and expected growth to fall from 4 percentage points to 2, either expected growth of 4 percent forever or a required return of 4 percent. The narrative side is a contagion: a story each carrier passes to 0.3 new people a month, and stops telling after about five months, has a reproduction number of 1.5, grows about 10 percent a month at first, and peaks when the share who have not yet heard it falls to two thirds.

The mathematics in fullIf P_t = E_t[P*_t], where P*_t = sum over k of D_(t+k) / (1 + r)^k is the ex post rational price, then P*_t = P_t + e_t with e_t uncorrelated with P_t, so Var(P*) = Var(P) + Var(e) >= Var(P): the forecast varies less than the thing forecast (Shiller 1981; LeRoy and Porter 1981). With independent dividends of variance s^2 and gross rate R, Var(P*) = s^2 / (R^2 - 1). The Gordon identity P / D = 1 / (r - g) reads a multiple as the gap between the required return and expected growth. The cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio is price over the ten-year average of real earnings, and its logarithm forecast ten-year real returns in Campbell and Shiller (1998). A narrative spreads as in contagion-threshold, dI/dt = b S I - g I with R_0 = b / g (Shiller 2017). Where it comes from

Shiller (1981), Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, American Economic Review; LeRoy and Porter (1981), The Present-Value Relation, Econometrica; Shiller (1979) on long-term interest rates, Journal of Political Economy; Kleidon (1986), Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models, Journal of Political Economy, the critique; Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988) on cointegration and the dividend-price ratio; Barsky and De Long (1993), Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate?, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Shiller (1984), Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; Campbell and Shiller (1998), Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock Market Outlook, Journal of Portfolio Management; Siegel (2016) on the CAPE ratio; Irrational Exuberance (2000; third edition 2015), the historical record of prices and the chapters on psychological anchors and herd behavior; Narrative Economics (2019), the epidemiology of stories and the nine perennial narratives; Shiller (2003), From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Shiller's Nobel lecture (2014), Speculative Asset Prices; Shiller (2017), Narrative Economics, American Economic Review

Sources

Shiller (1979). The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure. Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1190-1219. https://doi.org/10.1086/260832
Shiller (1984). Stock Prices and Social Dynamics. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1984(2), 457. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534436
Campbell, Shiller (1987). Cointegration and Tests of Present Value Models. Journal of Political Economy 95(5), 1062-1088. https://doi.org/10.1086/261502
Campbell, Shiller (1988). The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount Factors. Review of Financial Studies 1(3), 195-228. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/1.3.195
Campbell, Shiller (1998). Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock Market Outlook. The Journal of Portfolio Management 24(2), 11-26. https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.24.2.11
Shiller (2003). From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1), 83-104. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003321164967
Shiller (2017). Narrative Economics. American Economic Review 107(4), 967-1004. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.4.967
Kleidon (1986). Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models. Journal of Political Economy 94(5), 953-1001. https://doi.org/10.1086/261419
Barsky, De Long (1993). Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 291-311. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118333
Siegel (2016). The Shiller CAPE Ratio: A New Look. Financial Analysts Journal 72(3), 41-50. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v72.n3.1
Kermack, McKendrick (1927). A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 115(772), 700-721. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1927.0118
Shiller (2015). Irrational Exuberance, Revised and expanded 3rd ed. (first published 2000). Princeton University Press. (book)
Shiller (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton University Press. (book)

Rising expectations and the J-curve (Tocqueville, Davies, Gurr)

The expectations gap: why discontent peaks after the victory

We measure what people feel as the distance between what they get and what they had come to expect, not as what they get. Tocqueville saw it in France before 1789, where discontent ran highest in the districts that had improved most; James C. Davies drew it as a J-curve, a long rise followed by a short, sharp reversal while expectations are still climbing; Ted Gurr called the gap relative deprivation. We set out the path of the thing the people in question care about (revenue, pay, a share price, a country's income), state how their expectation is formed, read from a forecast, a survey or a demand where one exists and otherwise from the recent trend, and value the gap with the prospect theory value function, in which a shortfall counts more than twice as heavily as an equal surplus. The gap is deepest at the turn after a long rise, when people are objectively better off than before the rise began.

Born to answer
The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1856; American Sociological Review, 1962.
What it does now
Why a turn after a long rise is felt as worse than the hardship before it.
The mathematics
F_t = v(A_t - E_t); E_t = A_(t-1) + g (A_(t-1) - A_(t-2))
The full entry
Where it began

The oldest record of the pattern is the Exodus. Three days after the song at the sea (Exodus 15:1 to 21), the people found the water at Marah bitter: 'So the people grumbled against Moses, saying, "What are we to drink?"' (Exodus 15:24, BSB); in the wilderness they remembered Egypt as plenty, 'We remember the fish, which we ate in Egypt for nothing' (Numbers 11:5, WEB); and at the edge of the promised land 'they said to one another, "Let us appoint a leader and return to Egypt"' (Numbers 14:4, BSB). On a scale of 0 to 10, slavery lived at 2 against an expectation of 2 is felt as nothing; deliverance lifts the lived level to 6, and if expectations carry half of that rise forward they stand at 8, so a desert lived at 4 is felt as -2.25 x 4^0.88, about -7.62: objectively better off, felt far worse. Alexis de Tocqueville found the same in France. The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) shows the kingdom growing more prosperous under Louis XVI, the districts that progressed most becoming the chief theater of the Revolution, and concludes that 'the most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually that when it enters upon the work of reform' (Henry Reeve's translation). Samuel Stouffer's surveys of American soldiers (1949) found the branch with the fastest promotions the least satisfied with its chances and coined the term relative deprivation. James C. Davies (1962) drew the J-curve from Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Egyptian revolution of 1952, and in 1969 added the French Revolution, the American Civil War and the Nazi revolution of 1933; Ted Gurr built Why Men Rebel (1970) on the gap. Elections carry the shape. Winston Churchill, whose approval as prime minister had run between 78 and 93 percent in the British Institute of Public Opinion's polls from 1940 to 1942, saw victory in Europe on 8 May 1945 and lost the general election held on 5 July; when the votes were counted on 26 July, Labour had 393 seats and a majority of 146. George H. W. Bush had 89 percent approval in Gallup's poll of 28 February to 3 March 1991, after the Gulf War, 29 percent by early August 1992, after a recession, and 37.4 percent of the popular vote that November. Both defeats have other explanations, and the model claims only the shape.

Why it works now

Expectations used to be inferred after the fact from the outcome they were meant to explain. Today they can usually be read before it, published and dated: analysts' consensus and guidance for companies, surveys of expected income and business conditions for households and firms, polls for governments, wage demands for workforces, and futures and option prices for markets. The gap, its history and its value in the value function can be computed outside the conversation as the series arrive. What a particular group expected, and why, is still known best to the people who live and work beside it.

When it applies

A long run of rising results, pay, prices or national income slows or turns while the expectation built during the rise is still in place, and the question is how customers, employees, investors or citizens will react: a company whose growth slows after years of acceleration and reports a record that falls short of the extrapolated path, a beat that disappoints; a workforce after a series of large raises followed by a freeze; consumer or investor sentiment after a windfall; political and sovereign risk in a country whose wages and schooling rose for a decade and then stalled; a leader or a management team at peak approval after a victory, before the next shortfall. Not to be confused with reference-points-in-deals, which measures an offer against a fixed number such as an old high; hedonic-adaptation, which follows a reference point catching up with a level that has stopped moving; earnings-surprise-drift, which follows prices in the weeks after one report; or price-implied-expectations, which reverses a valuation into the growth it requires and can supply the expectation this entry needs: this asks how far what people expect has run ahead of what they get, and how the gap will be felt.

What we would ask

What have these people come to expect, and where can that expectation be read: a consensus forecast, guidance, a survey, a wage demand, or only the recent trend?
Is what they are getting still rising but more slowly than the path they had extrapolated, or has it turned down, and how did the same people react the last time it turned?

What it needs

A series of the achieved quantity (revenue, earnings, pay, real income, approval) long enough to show the rise; a measure of expectations, read directly where possible (analysts' consensus, management guidance, surveys of expected income or business conditions, a union's demand, polls) and modeled from the trend only where none exists; the record of how the same people reacted to past shortfalls; and evidence on the competing explanations, from the size of the actual loss to who is organized to act on a grievance.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles the achieved series and the best available measure of expectations, computes the gap period by period, values it with the published parameters, and sets the result beside reactions to past shortfalls in the record (share price moves on misses, attrition after pay freezes, protests or votes after reversals). What the record cannot show is what these particular people expected and why; investor relations staff and the analysts who cover a company, compensation and labor relations managers, and pollsters and local journalists who have followed a population through the rise know that.

Where it breaks

A grievance explained away by naming the gap: a real loss, an injustice or a broken promise is not made smaller by showing that expectations had risen, and the entry must never be used that way, nor to take sides in an actual conflict between peoples or parties; expectations inferred from the trend when they could have been measured, which is how the theory has been fitted after the fact; a J-curve read into the history of a revolution that happened while the many reversals that produced none are left out, the selection Davies's cases invite; the empirical record treated as settled, when Snyder and Tilly (1972) found no effect of short-term hardship on collective violence in France from 1830 to 1960, Grofman and Muller (1973) found a V-curve rather than a J, Miller, Bolce and Halligan (1977) rejected the J-curve for the urban riots of the 1960s on individual survey data (Crosby, 1979, challenged their measures), Gurr and other advocates abandoned the original theory after mostly negative tests (Brush, 1996), and a meta-analysis of 210 studies found relative deprivation a weak predictor unless angry resentment about injustice is measured (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz, 2012); and organization, resources and opportunity ignored, which Tilly (1978) argued decide whether a grievance becomes action at all.

For example

A company's quarterly revenue has risen by $50 million a quarter for eight quarters, to $1,400 million, and the market's expectation carries forward 80 percent of the last increase. Each quarter of the rise beat that expectation by $10 million, felt as a gain of 10^0.88, about 7.59 in the value function's units. Then the company reports a record, $1,420 million, above its own guidance; the extrapolated expectation was $1,440 million, so the record is a shortfall of $20 million, felt as -2.25 x 20^0.88, about -31.41: a loss 4.14 times the size of each earlier quarter's gain, a ratio that does not depend on the units. The same $1,420 million from a company whose revenue had been flat at $1,400 million would be felt as a gain of about 13.96. Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that growth stocks fall far more on a small miss than they rise on a beat of the same size. The research question is what the market actually expected, read from the consensus, the guidance and the questions on the last call rather than assumed, and whether the slowdown is a pause or a turn.

The mathematics in fullFelt value F_t = v(A_t - E_t), where A_t is what is achieved, E_t what was expected, and v(x) = x^0.88 for gains and -2.25 (-x)^0.88 for losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Brown and coauthors 2024 put the mean loss coefficient across 607 estimates at 1.955). Where expectations are not measured they are taken to extrapolate the last change: E_t = A_(t-1) + g (A_(t-1) - A_(t-2)), with 0 <= g <= 1, so the gap is A_t - E_t = dA_t - g dA_(t-1), this period's change less g times the last one. Along a steady rise of s a period the gap is (1 - g) s, never negative; at a reversal to a change r < 0 it is r - g s, deepest when a long, steep rise (large s and g) meets a fall: Davies's J-curve. With s = 0.5 and r = -1 the felt value at the turn is -2.25 when g = 0 and -3.03 when g = 0.8. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) take the reference point to be recent rational expectations; in Card and Dahl (2011) an upset loss by a favored home football team raised reports of at-home violence by men by 10 percent while a loss in a game expected to be close had little effect, evidence that the gap, not the outcome, does the work. Where it comes from

Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856), Book III, chapter 4 (chapter 16 in the English translations of 1856); Davies (1962), Toward a Theory of Revolution, American Sociological Review; Davies (1969), The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion, in Graham and Gurr, editors, Violence in America; Gurr (1968), A Causal Model of Civil Strife, American Political Science Review; Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970); Stouffer and coauthors, The American Soldier (1949), and Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (1966), on relative deprivation; Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development, Quarterly Journal of Economics, the tunnel effect; Graham and Pettinato (2002) on frustrated achievers; Campante and Chor (2012) on schooling, jobs and the Arab Spring; The tests: Snyder and Tilly (1972), Grofman and Muller (1973), Miller, Bolce and Halligan (1977), Sigelman and Simpson (1977), Crosby (1979), Brush (1996), Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz (2012); Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (1978); Expectations as the reference point: Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) on disappointment; Koszegi and Rabin (2006); Mas (2006); Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman (2011); Card and Dahl (2011); the value function from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992); The extrapolation rule and the worked figures are Vista's formalization of the verbal theory

Sources

Davies (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review 27(1), 5. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714
Gurr (1968). A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. American Political Science Review 62(4), 1104-1124. https://doi.org/10.2307/1953907
Snyder, Tilly (1972). Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960. American Sociological Review 37(5), 520. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093448
Grofman, Muller (1973). The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis. American Political Science Review 67(2), 514-539. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958781
Miller, Bolce, Halligan (1977). The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory. American Political Science Review 71(3), 964-982. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960101
Sigelman, Simpson (1977). A Cross-National Test of the Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 21(1), 105-128. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277702100106
Crosby (1979). Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan. American Political Science Review 73(1), 103-112. https://doi.org/10.2307/1954733
Brush (1996). Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(4), 523-545. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040004001
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, Bialosiewicz (2012). Relative Deprivation. Personality and Social Psychology Review 16(3), 203-232. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868311430825
Hirschman, Rothschild (1973). The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(4), 544. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882024
Graham, Pettinato (2002). Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers and Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies. Journal of Development Studies 38(4), 100-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380412331322431
Campante, Chor (2012). Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(2), 167-188. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.26.2.167
Bell (1985). Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Operations Research 33(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.1.1
Loomes, Sugden (1986). Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies 53(2), 271. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297651
Koszegi, Rabin (2006). A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4), 1133-1165. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/121.4.1133
Mas (2006). Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(3), 783-821. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
Abeler, Falk, Goette, Huffman (2011). Reference Points and Effort Provision. American Economic Review 101(2), 470-492. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.470
Card, Dahl (2011). Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 103-143. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr001
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Brown, Imai, Vieider, Camerer (2024). Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion. Journal of Economic Literature 62(2), 485-516. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221698
Skinner, Sloan (2002). Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 289-312. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020294523516
Bartov, Givoly, Hayn (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33(2), 173-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00045-9
Tocqueville (1856). The Old Regime and the Revolution. Michel Levy Freres, Paris; English translation by John Bonner, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1856. (book)
Gurr (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press. (book)
Tilly (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley. (book)
Runciman (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Routledge and Kegan Paul. (book)
Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949). The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Volume 1. Princeton University Press. (book)

Adaptation level and the hedonic treadmill (Helson; Brickman and Campbell)

Hedonic adaptation: the gain is felt once, the shortfalls keep counting

We follow the reference point after a change, not only the change. Harry Helson showed that people judge each new stimulus against an adaptation level, a pooled average of what they have recently experienced, and Philip Brickman and Donald Campbell drew the consequence they called the hedonic treadmill: a permanent gain lifts the adaptation level until the gain is no longer felt. We state how fast the reference point catches up with a new level, read from how a comparable group adapted before, compute how long a change keeps being felt and how much is felt in all, and ask whether it is a change people adapt to fully, as they largely do to income, or only in part, as the panels show for unemployment and serious disability. A gain is felt mostly at once and fades; a loss is felt about twice as hard, and some losses never fully fade.

Born to answer
Psychological Review, 1948; Brickman and Campbell, 1971; lottery winners and accident victims, 1978.
What it does now
How long a change keeps being felt, and which losses never fade.
The mathematics
r_(t+1) = r_t + k (x_t - r_t); F_t = v(x_t - r_t)
The full entry
Where it began

Harry Helson, who began with the perception of color, proposed that every stimulus is judged against an adaptation level, a pooled average of what has recently been experienced, and in Psychological Review (1948) and Adaptation-Level Theory (1964) extended the idea to judgment in general. Philip Brickman and Donald Campbell (1971) asked what it meant for a society that tries to make its people happier, and answered with what they called the hedonic treadmill: each gain raises the adaptation level, and satisfaction drifts back toward neutral. Brickman, Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (1978) tested it on 22 major lottery winners, 22 controls and 29 people paralyzed in accidents: the winners were no happier than the controls and took less pleasure in ordinary things. Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein (1999) gathered the evidence on what people adapt to; Richard Easterlin (1974) found that average happiness in the United States had not risen as the country grew richer, the paradox Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers (2008) challenged; and the German and British panels of Richard Lucas, Andrew Clark, Ed Diener and their coauthors showed in the 2000s that adaptation is real but incomplete for unemployment and disability, while Erik Lindqvist, Robert Östling and David Cesarini (2020) found Swedish lottery winners more satisfied with their lives a decade and more later. The same arithmetic runs through public life. In Northern Ireland, where the police count 3,234 deaths due to the security situation from 1969 to 1997, the report in January 2024 that 2023 had been the first calendar year since records began in 1969 without such a death was headline news; the report in May 2025 that 2024/25 had been 'the first financial year since records began in 1969 that there were no security related deaths' appeared in a statistics bulletin and, in a search of the news that followed, drew little or no coverage. The gain of the peace had become the reference point.

Why it works now

Adaptation could once be measured only in small samples interviewed once. Household panels in Germany, Britain and elsewhere now follow the same people for decades, and firms record churn, attrition and spending month by month, so the pace at which a group's reference point catches up after a change can be fitted from the record and the felt path computed outside the conversation. Whether the people now living with a change treat it as normal is still known best to those who serve and manage them.

When it applies

A permanent change in something people live with every day, and the question is how long its effect on their feelings and behavior will last: a subscription or utility price increase and the churn that follows; a product upgrade or a new feature whose novelty wears off; a raise, a bonus, a pay cut or a benefit withdrawn; a household's sense of wealth after house or share prices rise; customer satisfaction after an improvement; a population living with a gain it has come to take for granted. Not to be confused with expectations-gap, in which expectations extrapolate a trend and the damage peaks when a rise turns; reference-points-in-deals, in which the reference is a fixed number such as an old high; behavioral-pricing, which reads customers' reaction to a price when it is set; or house-money-and-break-even, which reads the risk taken after a gain or loss within a period: this follows a reference point that moves toward a new level, and asks how much of a change is felt, and for how long.

What we would ask

After a comparable change in the past (an earlier price rise, raise or upgrade), how long did the effect on churn, effort, satisfaction or spending last, and did it return all the way?
Is this a change people have been shown to adapt to fully, such as income, or one where adaptation stops partway, such as job loss, and is it a gain or a loss for the people living with it?

What it needs

The size and date of the change and whether it is permanent; a series of the behavior or reported satisfaction before and after comparable past changes, to estimate the pace of adaptation; whether the change is a gain or a loss for the people living with it, and what they measure it against (the price they paid before, a peer's pay, an earlier level); and the evidence on whether adaptation to this kind of change is complete.

How we would get it

The Desk fits the pace of adaptation to past episodes in the record (churn after earlier price rises, attrition after pay changes, spending after wealth gains, satisfaction surveys), computes the felt path and its total with the published loss weight, and tests whether the record shows a full or a partial return. What the record cannot show is what the people living with the change now treat as normal; pricing and customer research managers, compensation specialists and the people themselves know that.

Where it breaks

Adaptation assumed complete for every change, when the panels show it is not: life satisfaction did not fully recover after unemployment even after reemployment (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis and Diener, 2004; Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas, 2008), disability brought large drops with little or partial adaptation (Lucas, 2007; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), and Swedish lottery winners' life satisfaction stayed higher for more than a decade (Lindqvist, Östling and Cesarini, 2020), against the small early sample of Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman (1978); averages hiding wide differences between people (Lucas and coauthors, 2003; Diener, Lucas and Scollon, 2006); life evaluations and daily feelings treated as one, when they respond differently (Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid and Lucas, 2012; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010); the treadmill read as proof that gains do not matter, which the debate over the Easterlin paradox leaves open (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008, against Easterlin and coauthors, 2010); and a felt gain that has faded read as a gain that no longer exists: adaptation changes what is noticed, not what was achieved.

For example

A company gives its staff a permanent raise of 5 percent. If the reference wage closes a quarter of the remaining gap each quarter, the gap halves about every 2.4 quarters: the raise is felt as 5^0.88, about 4.12 in the value function's units, in its first quarter and about 0.54 after two years, 13 percent of the first, and about 18.43 in all, the sum of a series that shrinks by the factor 0.75^0.88 each quarter. A cut of 5 percent adapted to at the same pace is felt 2.25 times as hard, about -41.47 in all. If only half of the cut is ever absorbed, as the panels found for job loss, the felt loss settles at -2.25 x 2.5^0.88, about -5.04 a quarter for good, and its running total passes the raise's whole lifetime gain in the third quarter. Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2013) found in a field experiment that a wage cut lowered output by more than 20 percent and the damage persisted, while an equal raise added nothing. The research question is the pace of adaptation for this workforce, read from the attrition and effort that followed its past pay changes.

The mathematics in fullThe reference point r_t, the adaptation level, moves toward what is lived: r_(t+1) = r_t + k (x_t - r_t), with 0 < k <= 1 the share of the remaining gap closed each period (Helson's pooled average in its simplest recursive form). What is felt is v(x_t - r_t), with v(x) = x^0.88 for gains and -2.25 (-x)^0.88 for losses. After a permanent step of D the gap is D (1 - k)^t, so a step gain is felt as v(D) (1 - k)^(0.88 t), a transient whose gap halves every ln 2 / -ln(1 - k) periods, and is felt in total as v(D) / (1 - (1 - k)^0.88); a loss of the same size is felt 2.25 times as hard. Incomplete adaptation stops the reference point short: if only a share a of a loss D is ever absorbed, the felt loss settles at -2.25 ((1 - a) D)^0.88 each period for good. On the Exodus scale of the expectations gap, an expectation falling a quarter of the remaining gap each month from 8 toward a lived 4 gives a felt loss of -7.62 in the first month and less than one point once nine months have passed (t > 8.02, from 4 x 0.75^t < (1/2.25)^(1/0.88)). The same law of motion is the habit stock of Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999); read as a geometric decay, the finding of Di Tella, Haisken-De New and MacCulloch (2010) that 65 percent of a year's income effect is lost over the next four years implies k of about 0.23 a year. Where it comes from

Helson (1948), Adaptation-level as a basis for a quantitative theory of frames of reference, Psychological Review; Helson, Adaptation-Level Theory (1964); Brickman and Campbell (1971), Hedonic relativism and planning the good society, in Appley, editor, Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium, where the hedonic treadmill was named; Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman (1978), Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative?, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), Hedonic Adaptation, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, editors, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology; Easterlin (1974), Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?, in David and Reder, editors, Nations and Households in Economic Growth, and (1995), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; Easterlin and coauthors (2010), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; The revisions: Lucas, Clark, Georgellis and Diener (2003, 2004); Diener, Lucas and Scollon (2006), Beyond the hedonic treadmill, American Psychologist; Lucas (2007); Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas (2008); Oswald and Powdthavee (2008); Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid and Lucas (2012); Lindqvist, Östling and Cesarini (2020); The recursive reference point and the worked figures are Vista's formalization; the same law of motion is the habit stock of Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)

Sources

Brickman, Coates, Janoff-Bulman (1978). Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36(8), 917-927. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.36.8.917
Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, Diener (2003). Reexamining adaptation and the set point model of happiness: Reactions to changes in marital status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84(3), 527-539. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.3.527
Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, Diener (2004). Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction. Psychological Science 15(1), 8-13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01501002.x
Diener, Lucas, Scollon (2006). Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation theory of well-being. American Psychologist 61(4), 305-314. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.61.4.305
Lucas (2007). Long-term disability is associated with lasting changes in subjective well-being: Evidence from two nationally representative longitudinal studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92(4), 717-730. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.717
Oswald, Powdthavee (2008). Does happiness adapt? A longitudinal study of disability with implications for economists and judges. Journal of Public Economics 92(5-6), 1061-1077. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.01.002
Clark, Diener, Georgellis, Lucas (2008). Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis. The Economic Journal 118(529), F222-F243. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02150.x
Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid, Lucas (2012). Subjective well-being and adaptation to life events: A meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102(3), 592-615. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025948
Gardner, Oswald (2007). Money and mental wellbeing: A longitudinal study of medium-sized lottery wins. Journal of Health Economics 26(1), 49-60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.08.004
Lindqvist, Östling, Cesarini (2020). Long-Run Effects of Lottery Wealth on Psychological Well-Being. The Review of Economic Studies 87(6), 2703-2726. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa006
Di Tella, Haisken-De New, MacCulloch (2010). Happiness adaptation to income and to status in an individual panel. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 76(3), 834-852. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.09.016
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, Wheatley (1998). Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(3), 617-638. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.617
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, Rabin (2003). Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1209-1248. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552784
Kahneman, Thaler (2006). Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1), 221-234. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533006776526076
Nelson, Meyvis (2008). Interrupted Consumption: Disrupting Adaptation to Hedonic Experiences. Journal of Marketing Research 45(6), 654-664. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.654
Stevenson, Wolfers (2008). Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008(1), 1-87. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.0.0001
Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa, Zweig (2010). The happiness-income paradox revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(52), 22463-22468. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1015962107
Kahneman, Deaton (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(38), 16489-16493. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1011492107
Killingsworth (2021). Experienced well-being rises with income, even above $75,000 per year. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118(4). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2016976118
Killingsworth, Kahneman, Mellers (2023). Income and emotional well-being: A conflict resolved. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120(10). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2208661120
Kalyanaram, Winer (1995). Empirical Generalizations from Reference Price Research. Marketing Science 14(3_supplement), G161-G169. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.14.3.g161
Mazumdar, Raj, Sinha (2005). Reference Price Research: Review and Propositions. Journal of Marketing 69(4), 84-102. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.2005.69.4.84
Kube, Maréchal, Puppe (2013). Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(4), 853-870. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12022
Constantinides (1990). Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle. Journal of Political Economy 98(3), 519-543. https://doi.org/10.1086/261693
Campbell, Cochrane (1999). By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107(2), 205-251. https://doi.org/10.1086/250059
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574
Helson (1964). Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach to Behavior. Harper and Row. (book)
Appley, editor (1971). Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium. Academic Press. (book)
Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, editors (1999). Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. Russell Sage Foundation. (book)
David and Reder, editors (1974). Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz. Academic Press. (book)

Remembered utility and the peak-end rule (Kahneman, Fredrickson and Redelmeier)

We remember the fish: memory scores the peak and the end

We separate what an experience was like moment by moment from how it is remembered, because the next choice is made from the memory. Daniel Kahneman, Barbara Fredrickson, Donald Redelmeier and their coauthors found that a finished episode is scored in memory largely by its most intense moment and its last one, while its length barely counts (duration neglect), and Terence Mitchell and coauthors that memory turns rosier than the experience within days. We rebuild the episode as the people in it lived it, from the record of complaints, usage, prices or reports through time, compute the moment-by-moment total beside the peak-and-end score, and ask which of the two the coming decision (a renewal, a repurchase, a vote, a return to a supplier) will be made from. When the two disagree, the ending is often the cheapest thing to change, and the worst moment the most expensive to leave unrepaired.

Born to answer
Psychological Science and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993; Pain, 1996.
What it does now
Why the memory of an episode, not the episode, decides the next choice.
The mathematics
R = (u_peak + u_end) / 2; weight on duration near 0
The full entry
Where it began

The Exodus holds the memory as well as the gap: in the wilderness the people remembered Egypt not as slavery but as plenty, 'We remember the fish, which we ate in Egypt for nothing' (Numbers 11:5, WEB), and in the Desert of Sin, 'There we sat by pots of meat and ate our fill of bread' (Exodus 16:3, BSB). Daniel Kahneman and his coauthors gave the distortion a measure in 1993. Barbara Fredrickson and Kahneman showed that the length of film clips barely moved how they were judged afterward; Kahneman, Fredrickson, Charles Schreiber and Donald Redelmeier had subjects hold one hand in water at 14 degrees Celsius for 60 seconds and the other for 90 seconds, the last 30 slightly warmer, and a significant majority chose to repeat the longer one. Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996) found that patients' memories of colonoscopy tracked the worst moment and the last three minutes, and a randomized study of 682 patients (2003) showed that a gentler ending changed what was remembered. Kahneman, Peter Wakker and Rakesh Sarin (1997) separated the utility that is experienced from the utility that is remembered and chosen from, and Terence Mitchell and coauthors (1997) found trips recalled more warmly than they were lived. The rule reaches public life. The peace in Northern Ireland came in installments: the IRA ceasefire of August 1994, broken in February 1996 and restored in July 1997, the agreement of April 1998, the Omagh bomb that August, devolution in December 1999 with four suspensions, and power sharing restored on 8 May 2007. It has no single ending for memory to keep, so each setback was remembered as the latest end.

Why it works now

Experiences now leave a dense record as they happen, in usage logs, complaints, ratings and prices, so the moment-by-moment path and the peak-and-end score of an episode can both be computed outside the conversation and set beside the choices that followed. What people actually carry away is still learned best by asking them afterward.

When it applies

A customer, client, employee, voter or investor will decide whether to repeat, renew or recommend an experience with a clear beginning and end (a contract term, a product launch, a hospital stay, a fund's year, a restructuring, a negotiation), and the question is how it will be remembered and what that memory will lead them to do; a long effort whose final stage, not its average, will decide how it is judged; or a gain delivered in installments over years, which has no single ending for memory to keep, so each setback is remembered as the latest end. Not to be confused with expectations-gap, which compares an outcome with what was expected beforehand; hedonic-adaptation, which follows the reference point while an experience continues; or house-money-and-break-even, which reads the risk taken after a gain or loss: this asks how a finished episode will be scored afterward, and what the score will decide.

What we would ask

What was the worst moment of the episode for the people who will make the next decision, and how did it end for them?
Will the next choice (a renewal, a repurchase, a vote, a return) be made from their memory of the episode, and what does the record of their own words afterward say they remember?

What it needs

A record of the episode through time as the people in it lived it (complaints, satisfaction surveys, usage, prices, incidents), its worst moments and how it ended; the decision that will follow and when; and evidence of what is actually remembered, from later surveys, reviews or what people say when they are asked.

How we would get it

The Desk rebuilds the episode's path from the record, computes the moment-by-moment total and the peak-and-end score, and sets both beside the choices that followed comparable episodes (renewals and churn after contracts that ended badly or well, returns after stays, votes after the last year of a term). What the record cannot show is what people actually carry away; account managers, patient and customer experience researchers, and the people themselves, asked afterward, know that.

Where it breaks

Episodes without the shape the rule was found in: memories of meals showed duration neglect but no peak or end effect (Rode, Rozin and Durlach, 2007), a vacation's remembered happiness was not well predicted by its peak and end (Kemp, Burt and Furneaux, 2008), and a whole day was judged more by its time-weighted average than by its peak and end (Miron-Shatz, 2009), though a meta-analysis of 174 effect sizes found the peak-end effect large, a correlation of about 0.58, and about as strong as the overall average (Alaybek, Dalal, Fyffe and coauthors, 2022); the rule used to excuse a bad experience by polishing its ending, when the moment-by-moment total is still what people lived; the remembered score confused with the decision, when price, habit or a contract may decide the renewal; and a peak chosen by the analyst rather than the one the people themselves would name.

For example

Two versions of an unpleasant procedure, scored for illustration on a discomfort scale of 0 to 10: 60 seconds at 8, or the same 60 seconds followed by 30 seconds at 5. Second by second the longer one is worse, 630 against 480, yet by its peak and end it is remembered as better, 6.5 against 8, which is the choice most subjects made in the cold-water experiment of Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber and Redelmeier (1993); in a randomized study of 682 colonoscopy patients, a short, milder extension made the procedure remembered as less unpleasant, 4.4 against 4.9 on a 10 centimeter scale, and a repeat procedure slightly more likely (Redelmeier, Katz and Kahneman, 2003). The same arithmetic applies to a service contract whose last month was its worst: the renewal is decided by that month and the worst incident, whatever the year's average. For a gain delivered in installments, steps felt as +6, -7, +5, +8, -9 and +3, a memory that keeps the worst moment and the latest step scores -3 after the last step though the steps average +1, and the score swings with every new step: there is no single ending for memory to keep.

The mathematics in fullLet u(t) be the moment-by-moment experience of an episode of length T. Total experienced utility is the sum of its moments, the integral of u over the episode (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997). Remembered utility is approximated by the peak-end rule, R = (u_peak + u_end) / 2, where u_peak is the most intense moment and u_end the last, with almost no weight on T (duration neglect; Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993). A choice to repeat is made from R, not from the total: in the cold-water experiment, adding 30 milder seconds raised the total and improved R. Across 174 effect sizes the peak-end score correlated about 0.58 with retrospective evaluations, and the duration of the experience essentially not at all (Alaybek and coauthors, 2022). Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson and Cronk (1997) add a drift: within days the memory turns more positive than the experience was, and Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon and Diener (2003) found that the remembered experience, not the one lived or the one predicted, decided whether students wanted to repeat it. Where it comes from

Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber and Redelmeier (1993), When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End, Psychological Science; Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993), Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996), Patients' memories of painful medical treatments, Pain; Redelmeier, Katz and Kahneman (2003), Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial, Pain; Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997), Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson and Cronk (1997), the rosy view, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon and Diener (2003), Psychological Science; Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), Part V, Two Selves, chapters 35 and 36; The tests: Rode, Rozin and Durlach (2007); Kemp, Burt and Furneaux (2008); Miron-Shatz (2009); Alaybek, Dalal, Fyffe and coauthors (2022)

Sources

Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, Redelmeier (1993). When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End. Psychological Science 4(6), 401-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00589.x
Fredrickson, Kahneman (1993). Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(1), 45-55. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.1.45
Redelmeier, Kahneman (1996). Patients' memories of painful medical treatments: real-time and retrospective evaluations of two minimally invasive procedures. Pain 66(1), 3-8. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3959(96)02994-6
Redelmeier, Katz, Kahneman (2003). Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial. Pain 104(1), 187-194. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3959(03)00003-4
Kahneman, Wakker, Sarin (1997). Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 375-406. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555235
Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, Cronk (1997). Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The "Rosy View". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33(4), 421-448. https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1997.1333
Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, Diener (2003). What to Do on Spring Break? Psychological Science 14(5), 520-524. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.03455
Rode, Rozin, Durlach (2007). Experienced and remembered pleasure for meals: Duration neglect but minimal peak, end (recency) or primacy effects. Appetite 49(1), 18-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2006.09.006
Kemp, Burt, Furneaux (2008). A test of the peak-end rule with extended autobiographical events. Memory & Cognition 36(1), 132-138. https://doi.org/10.3758/mc.36.1.132
Miron-Shatz (2009). Evaluating multiepisode events: Boundary conditions for the peak-end rule. Emotion 9(2), 206-213. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015295
Alaybek, Dalal, Fyffe, Aitken, Zhou, Qu, Roman, Baines (2022). All's well that ends (and peaks) well? A meta-analysis of the peak-end rule and duration neglect. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 170, 104149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2022.104149
Kahneman, Thaler (2006). Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1), 221-234. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533006776526076
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (book)

Identified and statistical lives (Bastiat; Schelling; Jenni and Loewenstein)

The life saved has no name: the seen and the unseen

We count the unseen side of a decision. Frederic Bastiat wrote in 1850 that every act has effects that are seen and effects that are not; Thomas Schelling (1968) separated an identified life, a named person in danger whom everyone will spend to save, from a statistical life, a small reduction in risk spread over many people, none of whom will ever know they were spared. The identified victim draws money and attention, and the statistical ones, often far more numerous, draw little (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). We state the counterfactual explicitly, a baseline rate of harm and the period it would have run, compute the harms prevented across two or three baselines, value them where a value is needed with the value of a statistical life, and set them beside the visible costs and the named cases that dominate the discussion.

Born to answer
Bastiat's essay, 1850; Schelling for the Brookings Institution, 1968.
What it does now
What a measure prevented, against a stated baseline, and why it goes uncounted.
The mathematics
H = b T - O; VSL = WTP / dRisk
The full entry
Where it began

Frederic Bastiat's essay of 1850 opens with a broken window: the glazier's fee is seen, and the shoes the owner would have bought with the money are not. Thomas Schelling, writing for the Brookings Institution in 1968, turned the point to lives: a named child in danger draws whatever it takes, while a program that lowers everyone's risk slightly saves people who will never be known, and he proposed valuing such a reduction by what people would pay for it, the idea behind the value of a statistical life that W. Kip Viscusi and others later measured from the extra pay workers receive for risky jobs. Karen Jenni and George Loewenstein (1997) took the identified victim effect into the laboratory, Deborah Small and Loewenstein (2003) found that merely knowing a victim had already been chosen raised giving, and Small, Loewenstein and Paul Slovic (2007) that teaching people about the bias lowered their giving to the named victim without raising it for the rest. Nelson Repenning and John Sterman (2001) found the same pattern inside firms: nobody gets credit for fixing problems that never happened. The modern case is Northern Ireland, where the deaths that did not happen after 1998 have no names.

Why it works now

Long series of incidents, injuries, failures and deaths are now published and can be modeled, so a baseline, its range and the harms a measure prevented can be computed outside the conversation and set beside the named cases that dominate the discussion. How much of a change a measure caused is still judged best with the people who ran it.

When it applies

A decision whose benefits are harms that do not happen, spread across many unnamed people, while its costs or its rare failures are concrete and named: safety spending, preventive maintenance, a vaccine or screening program, a compliance or quality function, a security or peace arrangement, a regulation; a company whose prevention work is cut because nothing has gone wrong lately; a donation or a budget pulled toward one visible case; a public measure judged by its one visible failure. Not to be confused with counterfactual-first, which asks what stands in for the world that did not happen when a cause is claimed; how-big-is-what-we-cannot-see, which estimates a hidden total from the part that leaks into view; or tail-risk-and-near-misses, which reads the incidents that almost happened: this asks what a decision prevented, against a stated baseline, and why that number carries so little weight beside a single named case.

What we would ask

What would the rate of harm have been without the measure, over what period, and on what evidence: the record before it, a comparable place without it, or an engineering estimate?
Who are the named cases in the discussion, and how do they compare in number with the people the measure protects without anyone knowing?

What it needs

A baseline rate of harm before the measure or in comparable places without it, the period over which it would have continued, the observed rate since, the cost of the measure, and, where money must be set against lives or injuries, a value of a statistical life from the wage and risk studies of the relevant country, with its range.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles the before-and-after record and comparable cases, states the counterfactual as an assumption, computes the harms prevented under two or three baselines, and values them where needed with a published value of a statistical life. What the record cannot show is how much of the change the measure caused rather than other changes at the same time; the engineers, clinicians, officers or negotiators who ran the program know that, and their judgment is evidence to be weighed, not a substitute for the counterfactual.

Where it breaks

A baseline chosen to flatter the measure (a peak year, or a trend that was already falling); every decline credited to one cause when several changed at once; the counterfactual reported as a finding rather than an assumption; the named victim treated as irrelevant, when a named case may carry real information about the risk; the identified victim effect taken as large and settled, when a meta-analysis of 41 studies found it modest, a correlation of 0.05, and reliable mainly for a single victim (Lee and Feeley, 2016), and a preregistered replication found none with hypothetical donations (Maier, Wong and Feldman, 2024); and the value of a statistical life read as the worth of a person, when it is the rate at which people trade money for small changes in risk (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).

For example

Northern Ireland, stated as an assumption, not a finding. Police records count 1,427 deaths due to the security situation in the seventeen years from 1977 to 1993, about 83.9 a year. Had that rate run on for the 27.5 years from January 1999 to June 2026, it would have meant about 2,308 deaths; the police recorded 114 to 117. On that baseline about 2,190 lives were not lost, people no one can name. Malcolm Sutton's index, which also counts the conflict's deaths outside Northern Ireland, gives 89.5 a year and about 2,345 on the same assumption; a round 90 a year gives 2,475 expected and about 2,360. The research question is how much of the difference the peace itself made, against everything else that changed, and the honest answer is a range, not a number. The same arithmetic applies to a safety or maintenance budget judged by a year in which nothing went wrong.

The mathematics in fullHarms prevented H = sum over t of (b_t - o_t), where b_t is the counterfactual baseline and o_t the observed count; with a constant baseline b over T periods, H = b T - O, where O is the observed total. The baseline is an assumption, so H is reported across two or three baselines with the evidence for each. A value of a statistical life is VSL = WTP / dRisk, what people will pay for a small reduction in the risk of death divided by the reduction, so a measure that lowers the yearly risk of death by 1 in 10,000 for 1,000,000 people saves 100 statistical lives a year (Schelling 1968; Viscusi and Aldy 2003). The identified victim effect is the gap between what people give to one named victim and to many statistical ones: Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) traced much of it to the share of those at risk who can be saved, Kogut and Ritov (2005) found it confined largely to a single victim, and Small, Loewenstein and Slovic (2007) found that pointing it out lowered giving to the named victim without raising giving to the others. Where it comes from

Bastiat (1850), That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen; Schelling (1968), The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in Chase, editor, Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, Brookings Institution; Jenni and Loewenstein (1997), Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, and Small and Loewenstein (2003), Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim, both Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic (2007), Sympathy and callousness, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; Kogut and Ritov (2005); Slovic (2007) on psychic numbing; The tests: Lee and Feeley (2016); Maier, Wong and Feldman (2024); Viscusi and Aldy (2003), The Value of a Statistical Life, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; Repenning and Sterman (2001), Nobody Ever Gets Credit for Fixing Problems That Never Happened, California Management Review; The Northern Ireland figures are the police series of deaths due to the security situation (published by the Police Service of Northern Ireland and tabulated by CAIN at Ulster University) and Malcolm Sutton's index of deaths at CAIN; the baseline is Vista's assumption

Sources

Jenni, Loewenstein (1997). Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 14(3), 235-257. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007740225484
Small, Loewenstein (2003). Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(1), 5-16. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022299422219
Small, Loewenstein, Slovic (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102(2), 143-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.005
Kogut, Ritov (2005). The "identified victim" effect: an identified group, or just a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 18(3), 157-167. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.492
Slovic (2007). "If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making 2(2), 79-95. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500000061
Lee, Feeley (2016). The identifiable victim effect: a meta-analytic review. Social Influence 11(3), 199-215. https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2016.1216891
Maier, Wong, Feldman (2024). Revisiting and Rethinking the Identifiable Victim Effect: Replication and Extension of Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007). Collabra: Psychology 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.90203
Viscusi, Aldy (2003). The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1), 5-76. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1025598106257
Repenning, Sterman (2001). Nobody Ever Gets Credit for Fixing Problems That Never Happened: Creating and Sustaining Process Improvement. California Management Review 43(4), 64-88. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166101
Bastiat (1850). That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen. Guillaumin, Paris; English translation in Selected Essays on Political Economy, Foundation for Economic Education, 1964. (book)
Chase, editor (1968). Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis. Brookings Institution. (book)

The scapegoat (Girard; Bacchetta and van Wincoop)

The scapegoat: when everyone blames one thing

We test whether the cause everyone names for a fall can carry the weight put on it, and whether the blame stays put. René Girard described the scapegoat mechanism: a community in crisis resolves it by turning, all together, on one victim, and the unanimity of the blame, not the victim's guilt, restores the peace. Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop (2004) found the same in currency markets, and rationally: when prices move for reasons traders cannot see, they attribute the move to whichever visible fundamental is out of line, and the scapegoat changes as the imbalances do. We separate the part of a fall the named cause could explain, by comparing with peers or the market that did not share the cause, from the part it is asked to carry, and we watch whether the market moves on to a new culprit while the decline continues. A scapegoat is named only when the blame demonstrably moves.

Born to answer
Girard, 1972: the victim whose blame ends a crisis; Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004.
What it does now
Whether one named cause can carry a broad decline, and whether the blame moves on.
The mathematics
e = r_i - b r_m; the cause explains at most e / r_i
The full entry
Where it began

The word comes from William Tyndale's rendering, in 1530, of the goat sent into the wilderness bearing the people's sins on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 16). René Girard made it a theory of society in Violence and the Sacred (1972) and The Scapegoat (1982): rivalry spreads by imitation until a community turns, all together, on one victim, and the peace that follows seems to confirm the victim's guilt. William Gamson and Norman Scotch (1964) asked whether firing a baseball manager improves the team and called much of it ritual scapegoating; Barry Staw, Pamela McKechnie and Sheila Puffer (1983) found letters to shareholders taking credit for success and blaming the environment for failure; Warren Boeker (1992) found powerful chief executives surviving downturns by moving the blame onto their subordinates; Naveen Khanna and Annette Poulsen (1995) found that managers of firms headed into Chapter 11 decided much as healthier firms' managers did, and that the market did not cheer their replacement; and R. Kent Weaver (1986) found politicians more concerned to avoid blame than to claim credit. Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop (2004) gave the scapegoat a place in finance, starting from the dollar's weakness blamed almost entirely on the current account deficit after its strength had been credited to growth differentials.

Why it works now

Explanations used to be collected by hand after the fact. Analysts' notes, news, filings and surveys of what traders blame are now recorded as they appear, and a return can be split into the part peers explain and the part left over in minutes, so whether the blame fits the cause, and whether it has moved, can be computed outside the conversation. Why a board or a market settled on one culprit is still known best to the people in the room.

When it applies

A broad decline is pinned on one cause (a chief executive, a policy, a product, a tariff, one bad quarter), and the question is whether removing or reversing that cause will reverse the decline: a board pressed to replace a chief executive after a fall that peers shared; a stock that has fallen on news attributed to one product while its industry fell nearly as far; a currency move explained each month by a different fundamental; a policy blamed for a slowdown whose timing does not match it. Not to be confused with excess-volatility-and-narratives, which asks whether prices move more than their fundamentals and which stories move them; fingerprinting-a-cause, which tests a claimed cause against its expected pattern in noisy data; or regression-to-the-mean, which explains why the worst performers improve on their own: this asks whether the blame fits the cause, and what happens when it moves.

What we would ask

How much did comparable companies, or the market, fall over the same period without the named cause, and what part of the decline is left for the cause to explain?
Has the cause named for this decline changed while the decline went on, and what happened the last time a culprit was removed?

What it needs

The decline and its dates; the same measure for peers, an industry index or the market, with the company's usual sensitivity to it; the named cause and when it arose; the history of the explanations offered (analysts' notes, news, letters to shareholders, survey data on what traders blame); and the record of what happened after earlier culprits were removed (a chief executive replaced, a product withdrawn, a policy reversed).

How we would get it

The Desk computes the move expected from peers or the market, the part left over, and the share of the decline the named cause could explain; it tracks the explanations given over time and tests whether the decline followed the cause's timing. What the record cannot show is why the people deciding settled on this explanation; board members, investor relations staff, the analysts who covered the decline and the people who took the blame know that.

Where it breaks

Every named cause dismissed as a scapegoat, when blame is often deserved: the test is that the blame demonstrably moves, or that peers without the cause fell as far, not that a cause was named; a benchmark chosen to make the cause look small or large; one quarter's comparison taken as proof; Girard's reading imposed on a market as if trading were persecution, when Bacchetta and van Wincoop's investors are rational and uncertain, not cruel; and the mirror error, credit given for luck, since chief executives are paid for lucky dollars as well as earned ones (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and letters to shareholders take credit for good results while blaming the environment for bad ones (Staw, McKechnie and Puffer, 1983).

For example

A retailer's shares fall 20 percent in a quarter, and the market blames a product recall. Its peers fell 15 percent over the same quarter with no recall. If the retailer usually moves one for one with its peers, 15 points of the fall were expected anyway and the recall can explain at most 5, a quarter of the decline; if its shares usually move 1.2 times as much as its peers', 18 points were expected and the recall can explain at most 2, a tenth. Replacing the chief executive over the recall would remove the scapegoat and leave most of the decline. Boards do this: chief executives are more likely to be fired after bad industry performance they could not control, and a fall in industry performance from the 90th to the 10th percentile doubles the chance of a forced turnover (Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). The research question is what the other 75 to 90 percent of the fall was, and whether the next explanation offered is only the next scapegoat.

The mathematics in fullThe move expected from a benchmark is E[r_i] = b r_m, with b the stock's usual sensitivity to its peers or the market; the part left for a company-specific cause is the abnormal move e = r_i - b r_m, and the share of the decline that cause can explain is at most e / r_i. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004, 2013): with an exchange rate s_t = sum over k of b_k f_kt + u_t, where u is unobserved and the weights b are uncertain, traders' estimate of b_k rises when f_k is large and u moves, so the weight the market gives a fundamental, the scapegoat, shifts over time though the true weight barely changes; Fratzscher, Rime, Sarno and Zinna (2015) found that measured scapegoats explain much of exchange rate movement in sample. Girard's mechanism has no equation; its test is unanimity and transfer: a crisis attributed by everyone to one cause, the cause removed, and the crisis either ending or finding its next cause. Where it comes from

Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1972) and The Scapegoat (1982); Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004), A Scapegoat Model of Exchange-Rate Fluctuations, American Economic Review, and (2013), Journal of International Economics; Fratzscher, Rime, Sarno and Zinna (2015), the first tests, Journal of Monetary Economics; Blame in organizations: Gamson and Scotch (1964), Scapegoating in Baseball, American Journal of Sociology; Staw, McKechnie and Puffer (1983); Boeker (1992); Khanna and Poulsen (1995); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001); Jenter and Kanaan (2015); Blame in politics: Weaver (1986), The Politics of Blame Avoidance, Journal of Public Policy; Hood, The Blame Game (2011); The worked figures are Vista's illustration

Sources

Bacchetta, van Wincoop (2004). A Scapegoat Model of Exchange-Rate Fluctuations. American Economic Review 94(2), 114-118. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041301849
Bacchetta, van Wincoop (2013). On the unstable relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals. Journal of International Economics 91(1), 18-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.06.001
Fratzscher, Rime, Sarno, Zinna (2015). The scapegoat theory of exchange rates: the first tests. Journal of Monetary Economics 70, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.09.001
Khanna, Poulsen (1995). Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains or Scapegoats? The Journal of Finance 50(3), 919-940. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04042.x
Boeker (1992). Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top. Administrative Science Quarterly 37(3), 400. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393450
Jenter, Kanaan (2015). CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation. The Journal of Finance 70(5), 2155-2184. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12282
Bertrand, Mullainathan (2001). Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3), 901-932. https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269
Staw, McKechnie, Puffer (1983). The Justification of Organizational Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 28(4), 582. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393010
Weaver (1986). The Politics of Blame Avoidance. Journal of Public Policy 6(4), 371-398. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00004219
Girard (1972). Violence and the Sacred. Grasset, Paris; English translation by Patrick Gregory, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. (book)
Girard (1982). The Scapegoat. Grasset, Paris; English translation by Yvonne Freccero, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. (book)
Hood (2011). The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government. Princeton University Press. (book)

Innovation, productivity and displacement

Where technological progress comes from, why it takes years to show in productivity, who keeps the profit it creates, how fast a lead is chased, and whom it displaces: incumbent firms, tasks and workers.

Drawn from the work of Joel Mokyr; of Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, who shared the 2025 Nobel Prize in economics with him; and of Erik Brynjolfsson; and of David Teece on who profits from innovation and on dynamic capabilities, with the supporting classics: Schumpeter on creative destruction, the R&D race models of Loury, Reinganum, Fudenberg and his co-authors, and Harris and Vickers, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg on general purpose technologies, David on the dynamo, and the task-based studies of automation. Chapters were checked against tables of contents and papers against Crossref. The tests, what each needs from the records, and the worked examples are Vista's reading.

Useful knowledge and its epistemic base (Mokyr)

Useful knowledge: whether the understanding behind a technology can keep it improving

We separate the technique from the understanding beneath it. Mokyr distinguishes knowledge of how to do something from knowledge of why it works, and argues that techniques resting on a wide, growing and cheaply reached base of understanding keep improving, while those that work without anyone knowing why tend to stall. We test it two ways: by how much research effort each step of improvement now costs, research productivity in the sense of Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb, and by how closely the field's inventions draw on published science and how many independent groups contribute. A rate of improvement is credible for as long as research productivity holds up, or the research budget can grow faster than research productivity falls.

Born to answer
The Gifts of Athena, 2002: knowing what and knowing how.
What it does now
Whether a technology's rate of improvement can last.
The mathematics
g = alpha x S; holding g needs S to grow by (1 + s)^T
The full entry
Where it began

Mokyr's The Gifts of Athena (2002) splits useful knowledge into two kinds, knowledge of what (about natural phenomena and regularities) and knowledge of how (the techniques themselves), and argues that every technique rests on an epistemic base, the part of the first kind that explains why it works. His 2005 paper in the Journal of Economic History traced the Industrial Revolution to the seventeenth-century Baconian program of enlarging useful knowledge and applying it, and credited the Enlightenment's institutions with making that knowledge more plentiful and easier to reach, which is why a burst of invention became sustained growth. Later evidence fits the mechanism: Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015) found that French cities with more subscribers to the Encyclopédie grew faster once industrialization began, and Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb (2020) found that doubling chip density now takes more than 18 times the researchers it took in the early 1970s, research productivity in chips falling about 6.8 percent a year. In 2025 Mokyr received half of the Nobel Prize in economics for identifying the prerequisites for sustained growth through technological progress. The 2024 Nobel Prize in chemistry supplies a case: AlphaFold (Jumper and others, 2021) predicted the three-dimensional structure of a protein from its sequence to near experimental accuracy only because five decades of structures determined by experiment had accumulated in the Protein Data Bank, knowledge of what proteins look like on which a new technique could be trained; the predicted structures were then released for nearly every catalogued protein, widening the base for the next step.

Why it works now

Research productivity was rarely measured because it needs a long series of a technology's performance and of the research effort behind it, scattered across patents, papers, company reports and trade data. Those records can now be read and assembled quickly, the citation links between patents and papers traced, and the rate of decline computed outside the conversation. Whether the mechanism is understood, and where the next step will come from, is still a judgment for the scientists who work on it.

When it applies

A thesis, budget or valuation extrapolates a technology's rate of improvement (cost per unit of performance, efficiency, yield, capability per dollar) for many years, and the question is whether the rate can last: a battery chemistry, a drug platform, a chip process, a family of AI models, a materials process. Not to be confused with experience-curve-profit, which asks whether one producer's unit cost falls with its own cumulative output, or adoption-curve, which forecasts how fast buyers take up a product: this asks whether the knowledge behind the improvements is deep and open enough for them to continue, and what each further step costs in research.

What we would ask

Is the improvement explained by a mechanism that is understood and that many groups can work on, or by a recipe that works without a clear reason, held by a few?
Over the last decade, has the research effort behind each step of improvement risen, and how fast?

What it needs

A series of the technology's performance or cost per unit of performance; research effort in the field over the same years (researchers, or research spending divided by researchers' wages), for the firm and for the field; the share of the field's patents linked by citation to scientific papers; and the number of independent groups (firms, universities, countries) contributing improvements.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the rate of improvement, research productivity and its trend from performance, spending and patent records, and the field's reliance on science from citation links. Scientists and engineers who work on the technology say whether the mechanism is understood, where the next steps are expected to come from and how many groups can take them, which no series shows.

Where it breaks

A technology near a hard physical limit mistaken for one with a narrow base of understanding, or the reverse; research effort measured as spending without dividing by researchers' wages; citations to science read as depth, when some are ornamental; a recipe that keeps improving by cheap, fast trial and error, as in some software, where understanding follows practice; one verdict for the whole economy carried to one technology, when the economy-wide question is itself disputed: Gordon (2016) argues the great inventions are behind us, while Mokyr (2018) sees no technological reason for growth in welfare to slow.

For example

A battery start-up's plan assumes energy density rises 7 percent a year for a decade, as it has across the field for eight years. Over those eight years the researchers working on the chemistry grew 15 percent a year, about threefold, so improvement per researcher fell to about a third, roughly 13 percent a year. If that decline continues, holding 7 percent needs research effort to grow about fourfold in ten years (1.15^10 = 4.0); with effort flat, improvement slows toward 1.7 percent a year (7 x 0.87^10). The research question becomes whether a new mechanism, a wider base of understanding, is in sight.

The mathematics in fullFollowing Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb (2020), the growth rate of a technology's measure is g(t) = alpha(t) x S(t), with S the effective research effort (research spending divided by researchers' wages) and alpha research productivity; when g holds steady while S grows at rate s, alpha falls by the factor 1 / (1 + s) a year, and holding g for T more years at that decline needs S to grow by (1 + s)^T, while with S flat g falls by the same factor each year. The field's reliance on science is the share of its patents linked by citation to research papers; Ahmadpoor and Jones (2017) find 61 percent of US patents linked back to prior research, typically two to four citation steps away. Where it is in the books

The Gifts of Athena (2002), Chapter 1, Technology and the Problem of Human Knowledge (propositional and prescriptive knowledge, the epistemic base, access costs), and Chapter 2, The Industrial Enlightenment: The Taproot of Economic Progress; Mokyr (2005), The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth, Journal of Economic History; Mokyr (2005), Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology, Handbook of Economic Growth; Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb (2020), Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?, American Economic Review; Jones (2009), The Burden of Knowledge and the Death of the Renaissance Man, Review of Economic Studies; Ahmadpoor and Jones (2017), The dual frontier, Science; The Rise and Fall of American Growth (2016), Chapter 17, Innovation: Can the Future Match the Great Inventions of the Past? (the opposing view)

Sources

Mokyr (2002). The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy. Princeton University Press. (book)
Mokyr (2005). The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth. The Journal of Economic History 65(2), 285-351. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050705000112
Mokyr (2005). Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1113-1180. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01017-8
Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, Webb (2020). Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? American Economic Review 110(4), 1104-1144. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180338
Jones (2009). The Burden of Knowledge and the "Death of the Renaissance Man": Is Innovation Getting Harder? Review of Economic Studies 76(1), 283-317. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00531.x
Ahmadpoor, Jones (2017). The dual frontier: Patented inventions and prior scientific advance. Science 357(6351), 583-587. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aam9527
Mokyr (2018). The past and the future of innovation: Some lessons from economic history. Explorations in Economic History 69, 13-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2018.03.003
Gordon (2016). The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton University Press. (book)
Nagy, Farmer, Bui, Trancik (2013). Statistical Basis for Predicting Technological Progress. PLoS ONE 8(2), e52669. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0052669
Squicciarini, Voigtländer (2015). Human Capital and Industrialization: Evidence from the Age of Enlightenment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4), 1825-1883. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv025
Jumper, Evans, Pritzel and others (2021). Highly accurate protein structure prediction with AlphaFold. Nature 596(7873), 583-589. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03819-2

Cardwell's Law (Mokyr)

Cardwell's law: a technological lead fades where no rival can adopt what the leader resists

We count the independent places where a technique the leader resists can still be adopted: rival firms, other jurisdictions, other funders and channels, and whether the people with the idea can move to them. Mokyr's model has a single economy drift into technological stagnation as those who stand to lose from innovation capture the rules, while a set of competing economies escapes, because stagnation would have to win in all of them at once. So we judge a leader's future by whether challengers can take the next technique elsewhere, and by whether the leader's own decision makers are the ones the technique would hurt.

Born to answer
Cardwell, 1972; named in The Lever of Riches, 1990; modeled in 1994.
What it does now
Whether a leader's world still admits the innovation that hurts it.
The mathematics
P(adopted somewhere) = 1 - (1 - q)^N
The full entry
Where it began

In The Lever of Riches (1990) Mokyr named the regularity after the historian of technology Donald Cardwell, who had observed in Turning Points in Western Technology (1972) that no nation stays technologically creative for more than a short span of history, and in 1994 he modeled it in Research Policy: the groups that expect to lose from innovation work the political system to suppress it, and a single economy drifts toward an absorbing state of stagnation, while a world of competing economies does not, even when each would on its own. His 1992 paper had traced such resistance, by vested interests whose assets new techniques threatened and by intellectuals opposed to technology on principle, in Britain and France during the Industrial Revolution. A Culture of Growth (2016) gives the European version, a continent of rival states across which ideas, and the people who held them, could move when one ruler suppressed them. A firm-level echo is Cunningham, Ederer and Ma's (2021) finding that some pharmaceutical incumbents buy rivals' projects in order to shut them down.

Why it works now

The gates a new technique must pass (regulators, standards bodies, platforms, licensing pools, acquirers) are recorded in dockets, membership lists, deal records and patent assignments that were rarely read together. They can now be assembled into one map, the independent adopters counted, and the waiting time computed outside the conversation. Which proposals were quietly blocked, and by whom, is still known only to the engineers, standards participants and regulators who were there.

When it applies

A firm, cluster, country or platform has led a technology for years and the thesis assumes the lead will last, while the people who decide what gets adopted (an incumbent business unit, a regulator, a standards body, a dominant platform, a licensing pool) stand to lose from the next technique and challengers have few other places to take it. Not to be confused with entry-and-deterrence, which asks whether an incumbent can credibly fight a given entrant, or creative-destruction, which prices the rate at which outside innovations displace an incumbent: this asks whether the leader's environment still lets innovation that hurts the leader reach the market at all.

What we would ask

If a better technique threatened the leader's main business, who could block it, and where else could it be adopted?
Can the engineers and founders with the next idea take it to a rival, a start-up, another funder or another country, or are they held by contracts, licenses or law?

What it needs

The decision points that admit a new technique (regulators, standard setters, platforms, large buyers, internal capital committees) and who sits on them; the number of rivals and jurisdictions that could adopt it independently; noncompete, licensing and acquisition records, including acquired projects that were then dropped; and the history of techniques the leader resisted and where they were adopted instead.

How we would get it

The Desk maps the gates, counts the independent adopters and reads acquisition records, standards body memberships and regulatory dockets. Former engineers, standards participants and regulators say which proposals were blocked and by whom, which no filing records.

Where it breaks

Rivals that look independent but share a gate (one regulator, one standard, one supplier, one acquirer); resistance that is prudence, as when a safety rule blocks a dangerous technique; counting jurisdictions without asking whether innovators can actually move; reading every acquisition of a start-up as suppression, when Cunningham, Ederer and Ma (2021) estimate that 5.3 to 7.4 percent of the pharmaceutical acquisitions in their sample fit that pattern.

For example

A maker of railway signaling equipment has led its home market for twenty years, and the thesis assumes the lead will last. A cheaper radio-based technique threatens its installed base. At home a single ministry decides adoption on the advice of a standards committee the incumbent chairs; abroad, five national rail operators decide independently. If each independent gate admits the technique with a 10 percent chance a year, the home market waits 1 / 0.10 = 10 years on average, while across the five operators the expected wait for a first adoption is 1 / (1 - 0.9^5), about 2.4 years, and the chance of adoption somewhere within three years is 1 - 0.9^15, about 79 percent. The lead is sheltered at home and short abroad; whether the incumbent is adopting the technique or resisting it is the research question.

The mathematics in fullIf each of N independent gates admits a resisted technique with probability q a period, the chance it is adopted somewhere in a period is 1 - (1 - q)^N, the expected wait for a first adoption is 1 / [1 - (1 - q)^N] periods, and the chance it is still blocked everywhere after T periods is (1 - q)^(N T). In Mokyr's (1994) urn model a single economy reaches an absorbing barrier of stagnation; if each of N independent economies has stagnated by time t with probability p(t), all of them have with probability p(t)^N, which is why competition among economies keeps progress going. Where it is in the books

Mokyr (1994), Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress, Research Policy; The Lever of Riches (1990), Chapter 8, Classical and Medieval Technology, where Cardwell's Law is introduced, with Chapter 10, The Industrial Revolution: Britain and Europe, and Chapter 12, Epilogue; Cardwell, Turning Points in Western Technology (1972), Chapter 6, The Twentieth Century, the observation Mokyr named; The Gifts of Athena (2002), Chapter 6, The Political Economy of Knowledge: Innovation and Resistance in Economic History (section Cardwell's Law Revisited); A Culture of Growth (2016), Chapter 11, Fragmentation, Competition, and Cultural Change, and Chapter 12, Competition and the Republic of Letters; Mokyr (1992), Technological Inertia in Economic History, Journal of Economic History; Cunningham, Ederer and Ma (2021), Killer Acquisitions, Journal of Political Economy

Sources

Mokyr (1994). Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress. Research Policy 23(5), 561-574. https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(94)01006-4
Mokyr (1992). Technological Inertia in Economic History. The Journal of Economic History 52(2), 325-338. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700010767
Mokyr (1990). The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. Oxford University Press. (book)
Cardwell (1972). Turning Points in Western Technology: A Study of Technology, Science and History. Science History Publications. (book)
Mokyr (2002). The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy. Princeton University Press. (book)
Mokyr (2016). A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton University Press. (book)
Cunningham, Ederer, Ma (2021). Killer Acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy 129(3), 649-702. https://doi.org/10.1086/712506
Akcigit, Ates (2021). Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(1), 257-298. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180449

Growth through creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt)

Creative destruction: an incumbent's rents last until the next innovation in its line arrives

We value an incumbent's position as a stream of profit that ends when a better product or process in its line arrives, and we estimate how fast such innovations are arriving from the research aimed at the line: challengers' funding, rivals' patents and launches, and how often past generations were replaced. In Aghion and Howitt's model replacements arrive at a Poisson rate, so the position is worth its profit discounted at the interest rate plus that rate, and it survives t years with probability exp(-rate x t). Then we ask whether the incumbent can make the next innovation itself, which, as Arrow showed, it will pursue less eagerly than a newcomer when the innovation would replace what it earns today.

Born to answer
Schumpeter, 1942; Aghion and Howitt's Econometrica model, 1992.
What it does now
How long an incumbent's rents last against funded challengers.
The mathematics
V = pi / (r + lambda n); S(t) = exp(-lambda n t)
The full entry
Where it began

In the seventh chapter of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), The Process of Creative Destruction, Joseph Schumpeter described how new products, methods and forms of organization displace old ones from within, and put the process at the center of how capitalism works. Aghion and Howitt's 1992 Econometrica paper made it a model of growth in which each innovation makes the last obsolete: an innovator's rents last until the next innovation in its line, so the prospect of more research tomorrow lowers the value of research today, and laissez-faire can even produce too many innovations because each steals business from its predecessor. Klette and Kortum (2004) carried the logic to firms that win and lose product lines. In 2025 Aghion and Howitt shared half of the Nobel Prize in economics for the theory of sustained growth through creative destruction. Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019) add the caution: in US data most growth comes from incumbents improving their own products.

Why it works now

The rate at which replacements arrive was hard to estimate because the evidence sits in clinical registries, patent filings, venture rounds, product launches and the trade press, none of it in the incumbent's statements. These can now be read and dated quickly, the history of replacements in a line reconstructed, and the value and survival computed at several rates outside the conversation. How close a challenger really is to approval or adoption is still a question for scientists, engineers and former executives in the line.

When it applies

An incumbent's value rests on a product, process or design whose rents are assumed to continue, in a line where outsiders are spending to replace it (venture funding, rival patents, products in trials or pilots) and where a replacement takes most of the market when it arrives: a diagnostic platform with funded challengers, a component a new design makes obsolete, a drug class with successors in late trials, a software category with well-funded entrants. Not to be confused with profitability-fade, which measures how fast high returns revert across companies on average, or time-to-event, the general hazard model: here the hazard is set by the research aimed at the line, so it moves when challengers' funding moves.

What we would ask

Who is spending to replace this product or process, how much, and how close are they to the market?
When a replacement arrives, does it take the market from the incumbent, or can the incumbent make or buy it first, and would doing so cannibalize what it earns today?

What it needs

The incumbent's profit from the line and its cost of capital; the research aimed at replacing it (challengers' funding, rivals' R&D, patents and pipeline by stage); the history of how often past generations in the line were replaced and how much of the market each replacement took; the incumbent's own pipeline and acquisition record.

How we would get it

The Desk estimates the arrival rate from the line's history of replacements and from the current pipeline, and computes the value and survival of the position at that rate and at the rates implied by more or less outside funding. Engineers, scientists and former executives in the line say how close the challengers are and whether the incumbent's pipeline would replace its product or protect it.

Where it breaks

Arrivals that are not independent of the incumbent, because it buys or licenses the challengers; growth that comes mostly from incumbents improving their own products, which Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019) find accounts for most US productivity growth, with creative destruction around a quarter of it, so the hazard is often lower than the story suggests; a replacement that takes only part of the market, adding variety rather than displacing; research spending read as progress when its productivity is falling (useful-knowledge).

For example

A diagnostics company earns 120 million a year of operating profit from one test platform; at a 9 percent cost of capital, with no displacement, the stream would be worth about 1.33 billion. Three funded challengers are in validation, and the line's history shows a new generation about every eight years, an arrival rate of 0.125, which values the stream at 120 / (0.09 + 0.125), about 558 million, with a 54 percent chance of surviving five years. If challenger funding doubles and the rate rises to 0.25, the value falls to about 353 million and the five-year survival to 29 percent. The research question is how close the challengers are to approval, not the platform's margin.

The mathematics in fullWith profit pi while the position lasts, interest rate r and replacements in the line arriving at Poisson rate lambda x n, where n is the research effort aimed at the line and lambda its productivity, the position is worth V = pi / (r + lambda n) and survives t years with probability S(t) = exp(-lambda n t), an expected tenure of 1 / (lambda n). This is the value of an innovation in the linear case of Aghion and Howitt's (1992) model, where creative destruction is the lambda n in the denominator; research expands until its wage cost equals lambda x V, so more research expected tomorrow lowers the value of innovating today. An incumbent already earning pi_0 gains only pi_1 - pi_0 from an innovation that a newcomer values at pi_1 (Arrow 1962), which is why, in their model, incumbents leave the research to outsiders. Where it is in the books

Aghion and Howitt (1992), A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction, Econometrica, section 2: the value of an innovation and the research arbitrage condition; Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: the monopolist's smaller incentive to invent; Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Part II, Can Capitalism Survive?, Chapter VII, The Process of Creative Destruction; The Economics of Growth (2009), Chapter 4, The Schumpeterian Model; The Power of Creative Destruction (2021), Chapter 4, Is Competition a Good Thing? (firm dynamics and the cost of subsidizing incumbent firms); Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014), What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory?, Handbook of Economic Growth; Klette and Kortum (2004), Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation, Journal of Political Economy; Garcia-Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2019), How Destructive Is Innovation?, Econometrica

Sources

Aghion, Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Econometrica 60(2), 323. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951599
Arrow (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, 609-626. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400879762-024
Schumpeter (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper and Brothers. (book)
Aghion and Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. MIT Press. (book)
Aghion, Antonin and Bunel (2021). The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations, translated by Jodie Cohen-Tanugi from the French (Odile Jacob, 2020). Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (book)
Aghion, Akcigit, Howitt (2014). What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory? Handbook of Economic Growth, 515-563. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53540-5.00001-x
Klette, Kortum (2004). Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation. Journal of Political Economy 112(5), 986-1018. https://doi.org/10.1086/422563
Garcia-Macia, Hsieh, Klenow (2019). How Destructive Is Innovation? Econometrica 87(5), 1507-1541. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14930
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, Stoffman (2017). Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), 665-712. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw040
Cunningham, Ederer, Ma (2021). Killer Acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy 129(3), 649-702. https://doi.org/10.1086/712506
Christensen, Bower (1996). Customer Power, Strategic Investment, and the Failure of Leading Firms. Strategic Management Journal 17(3), 197-218. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199603)17:3<197::aid-smj804>3.0.co;2-u
Tushman, Anderson (1986). Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 31(3), 439. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392832

Competition and innovation: the inverted U (Aghion and coauthors)

Competition and innovation: the inverted U, and whom an entrant spurs

Before predicting what more competition will do to innovation (an entrant, a deregulation, a trade shock, a merger that removes a rival), we find out how close the firms are to one another technologically. Where leaders run neck and neck, competition spurs innovation because innovating is the way to escape it; where one firm leads and the rest lag far behind, more competition discourages the laggards, because catching up no longer pays. Across industries the two effects trace an inverted U, and the threat of advanced entry spurs incumbents near the technology frontier while discouraging those far from it, so we place the industry, and each firm in it, before reading the shock.

Born to answer
Step-by-step innovation, 2001; the inverted U in panel data, 2005.
What it does now
Whether an entrant will spur or discourage incumbents' research.
The mathematics
I = exp(a + b c + d c^2), peaking at c* = -b / (2 d)
The full entry
Where it began

Schumpeter held that large firms with market power do most of the innovating; Arrow (1962) answered that a monopolist has less incentive to invent than a competitive firm, because it would displace its own profits. Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) reconciled the two with step-by-step innovation: firms running neck and neck innovate to escape competition, while laggards facing a dominant leader are discouraged by it. Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) found the resulting inverted U in panel data on 311 firms listed in London, in 17 industries from 1973 to 1994, with the peak near the median of their competition index, 0.95, and Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2009) found in UK firms that the threat of technologically advanced entry spurred incumbents near the frontier and discouraged those far behind. Evidence on low-wage import competition points both ways: Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2016) found it raised innovation in European firms, while Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano and Shu (2020) found it lowered patenting by US firms.

Why it works now

Placing an industry on the curve needs margins and technology gaps firm by firm, which sit in filings, patent records and trade data that were slow to assemble. These can now be pulled for an industry and for its past shocks, and the competition index and the gaps computed outside the conversation. How each firm actually answered the last entrant is still a question for former research heads and strategy officers.

When it applies

A decision turns on how a change in competition will move innovation: whether an incumbent will answer an entrant by innovating or retreating, whether a merger, a deregulation or import competition will raise or lower an industry's research, whether a near-monopoly will keep investing. Not to be confused with concentrated-industry-strategy, which asks how rivals answer a move in prices or capacity, or entry-and-deterrence, which asks whether entry can be stopped: this asks what competition does to the incentive to innovate, which depends on how far apart the firms are technologically.

What we would ask

How close are the leading firms technologically: do they trade the lead, or has one led for years while the rest fell further behind?
When competition rose in this industry before (an entrant, a tariff change, a patent expiry), did the leaders' research rise or fall, and the laggards'?

What it needs

Price-cost margins (Lerner indexes) for the industry's firms over time; each firm's distance from the technological leader (productivity or unit cost gap, patent position); innovation output by firm (citation-weighted patents, R&D, the share of revenue from new products); and past shocks to competition and what followed them.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the competition index and the leader-follower gaps from filings and patent records and places the industry on the curve using the history of past shocks. Former R&D heads and strategy officers at leaders and laggards say how they answered the last entrant, which is the evidence the curve needs.

Where it breaks

Margins that measure accounting choices rather than competition; a gap measured by size rather than technology; the inverted U read as a law for one firm, when it is a pattern across industries; low-wage import competition treated as one case, when Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2016) find it raised innovation in exposed European firms and Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano and Shu (2020) find it cut patenting in exposed US firms.

For example

A components maker asks whether its industry's research will rise after a large importer enters. Three domestic firms run neck and neck; in index units each earns 4 a year when level with the others, 10 as the leader and nothing as a laggard. The importer cuts the profit of running level to 1: a neck-and-neck firm's gain from pulling ahead rises from 10 - 4 = 6 to 10 - 1 = 9, so its research should rise, while a firm already a step behind sees its gain from catching up fall from 4 to 1, so its research should fall. The research question is which of the three is already a step behind.

The mathematics in fullIn the step-by-step model a neck-and-neck firm gains Delta_N = pi_L - pi_N from innovating and a laggard gains Delta_B = pi_N - pi_B from catching up, where pi_L, pi_N and pi_B are profits as leader, level and laggard; competition lowers pi_N, raising Delta_N (escaping competition) and lowering Delta_B (the Schumpeterian effect). Across industries, innovation I = exp(a + b c + d c^2) with c = 1 - (average Lerner index) and d < 0 peaks at c* = -b / (2 d), and the curve is steeper where more industries are neck and neck. Where it is in the books

Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005), Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation, Review of Economic Studies; Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2009), The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity, Review of Economics and Statistics; The Power of Creative Destruction (2021), Chapter 4, Is Competition a Good Thing? (the escape competition effect and the inverted U); The Economics of Growth (2009), Chapter 12, Fostering Competition and Entry (sections 12.2.4 and 12.2.5, the Schumpeterian and escape-competition effects and the inverted U); Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014), Handbook of Economic Growth, on competition and market structure

Sources

Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2005). Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), 701-728. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.2.701
Aghion, Harris, Howitt, Vickers (2001). Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation. Review of Economic Studies 68(3), 467-492. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00177
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, Prantl (2009). The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity. Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1), 20-32. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.20
Aghion, Antonin and Bunel (2021). The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations, translated by Jodie Cohen-Tanugi from the French (Odile Jacob, 2020). Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (book)
Aghion and Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. MIT Press. (book)
Aghion, Akcigit, Howitt (2014). What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory? Handbook of Economic Growth, 515-563. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53540-5.00001-x
Arrow (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, 609-626. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400879762-024
Bloom, Draca, Van Reenen (2016). Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity. The Review of Economic Studies 83(1), 87-117. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv039
Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, Shu (2020). Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from US Patents. American Economic Review: Insights 2(3), 357-374. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20180481

General purpose technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg)

General purpose technologies: pervasive, improving, and paid for by the users' co-invention

We test whether a technology is general purpose in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg's sense: used across many industries, improving steadily, and spawning innovation in the industries that use it. If it is, most of its value is created by co-invention in the using industries and is captured there or by customers unless its producer holds a bottleneck, and each side's improvements raise the other's returns, so progress waits on both. We measure the breadth of use, the rate of improvement and the generality of the inventions that build on it, then ask where in the chain the company in question sits.

Born to answer
Steam, the electric motor and semiconductors as engines of growth, 1995.
What it does now
Where the value of a pervasive technology will land.
The mathematics
Generality G = 1 - sum of s_j^2
The full entry
Where it began

Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) gave the idea its name and its three marks, pervasiveness, room for improvement and innovational complementarities with the industries that use it, taking the steam engine, the electric motor and semiconductors as examples, and showed that arm's-length markets coordinate a technology's producers and users poorly. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) compared the two great American cases, electricity from 1894 to 1930 and information technology from 1971: productivity growth was slow at the start of both, electricity spread faster and IT's price fell faster. Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017) called machine learning a general purpose technology like the steam engine and electricity, and Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rock (2024) built the title of their study of language models on the pun, GPTs are GPTs.

Why it works now

The tests were rarely run because breadth of use, price-performance and patent citations had to be assembled by hand across many industries. Adoption surveys, patent citation records and price series can now be gathered and the generality index computed outside the conversation in minutes. How much co-invention a using industry needed, and whether it could switch suppliers, is still known to the practitioners who did the work.

When it applies

A thesis calls a technology transformative across the economy (electricity, the semiconductor, the internet, machine learning, large language models) and must decide where the value will land: with the companies that make the technology, those that apply it, or customers; or a company's growth depends on using industries investing to adopt it. Not to be confused with pattern-technology-shifts-the-board, which tracks profit moving among the links of one value chain, or adoption-curve, which forecasts how fast one product is taken up: this asks whether the technology is general purpose at all, and what its producer can capture of value created mostly downstream.

What we would ask

How many different industries use the technology today, and does each have to invent its own applications to get value from it?
Is the producer a bottleneck the users cannot route around, or one of several suppliers of an improving input?

What it needs

Adoption by industry (the share of firms, workers or capital using it); the technology's price-performance over time; patents or products that build on it, with the technology classes or industries that cite them; the producer's share of the chain's revenue and margins; and the users' spending on complementary investment.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the breadth of adoption, the rate of improvement and the generality index of the patents citing the technology, and sets the producer's margins beside the users' complementary spending. Practitioners in two or three using industries say how much co-invention it took to make the technology pay and whether they could switch suppliers.

Where it breaks

Breadth of attention mistaken for breadth of use; a technology general in principle whose improvement has stalled; a generality index computed on too few citations, which pushes it toward zero or one by chance; assuming the producer captures nothing when it controls a standard or a scarce input (de-facto-standard-profit); calling every large technology general purpose, when Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) reserve the term for technologies whose effect on the whole economy is large and lasting.

For example

A growth fund is told that a company's machine-vision platform is a general purpose technology that will earn rents across industries. Patents citing the platform's patents come from eight technology classes, the largest with 20 percent, so generality is 1 - (0.2^2 + 2 x 0.15^2 + 5 x 0.1^2), about 0.87; a rival's battery-separator patents draw 85 percent of their citations from their own class and 10 and 5 percent from two others, generality 1 - (0.85^2 + 0.1^2 + 0.05^2), about 0.27. The platform behaves like a general purpose technology and the separator like a component. That settles less than it seems: with value created mainly by co-invention among the users, the platform's maker earns rents only if users cannot switch suppliers, so the interviews go to the customers' switching costs.

The mathematics in fullGenerality of the inventions that build on a technology, G = 1 - (sum over technology classes j of s_j^2), where s_j is the share of citations to its patents that come from class j (Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe 1997): near 1 when use spreads across many fields, near 0 when it stays in one. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg's innovational complementarity: the return to a using sector's innovation T rises with the technology's quality z, d^2 pi / (dz dT) > 0, so each side's investment raises the other's return and arm's-length markets underinvest in both. Where it is in the books

Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), General purpose technologies, Journal of Econometrics; Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005), General Purpose Technologies, Handbook of Economic Growth; Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1997), University Versus Corporate Patents, Economics of Innovation and New Technology; Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017), What can machine learning do?, Science; Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rock (2024), GPTs are GPTs, Science; The Economics of Growth (2009), Chapter 9, General-Purpose Technologies

Sources

Bresnahan, Trajtenberg (1995). General purpose technologies 'Engines of growth'? Journal of Econometrics 65(1), 83-108. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01598-t
Jovanovic, Rousseau (2005). General Purpose Technologies. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1181-1224. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01018-x
Trajtenberg, Henderson, Jaffe (1997). University Versus Corporate Patents: A Window On The Basicness Of Invention. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 5(1), 19-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599700000006
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell (2017). What can machine learning do? Workforce implications. Science 358(6370), 1530-1534. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap8062
Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, Rock (2024). GPTs are GPTs: Labor market impact potential of LLMs. Science 384(6702), 1306-1308. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adj0998
David, Wright (2006). General Purpose Technologies and Surges in Productivity: Historical Reflections on the Future of the ICT Revolution. The Economic Future in Historical Perspective. https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263471.003.0005
Aghion and Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. MIT Press. (book)

The productivity J-curve (Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson)

The productivity J-curve: why a new technology looks unproductive before it pays

We rebuild measured productivity with the unmeasured investment put back. A general purpose technology needs large complementary investments (new processes, data, training, reorganized work) that are mostly intangible and charged as costs, so in the build years measured output understates true output and measured productivity dips; later, when the stock those investments built yields returns that are counted while new investment slows, measured productivity overstates. We estimate the size and growth of the complementary investment and the returns on the stock it builds, and so tell a dip that is investment from a dip that is failure.

Born to answer
Solow's remark on the computer age, 1987; the J-curve model, 2021.
What it does now
Telling an investment dip from a failing program.
The mathematics
Measured minus true TFP growth = eta (g_A - g_I) + (1 - eta) s_U g_U
The full entry
Where it began

Robert Solow's 1957 accounting attributed about seven-eighths of the doubling of US private nonfarm output per hour of work from 1909 to 1949 to technical change, and thirty years later he remarked that the computer age could be seen everywhere except in the productivity statistics. Brynjolfsson's 1993 survey of that productivity paradox sorted its explanations into four: mismeasurement, lags from learning and adjustment, redistribution of profits, and mismanagement. Brynjolfsson and Hitt then found in firm data that the gross marginal product of computer capital averaged 81 percent in 1987 to 1991 (1996), and that computers' contribution to productivity was normal over one year but up to five times greater over five to seven, as slow complementary investments matured (2003). Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2021) formalized the pattern as a J-curve: intangible investment depresses measured productivity early and inflates it later, and adjusting US data for intangibles tied to computer hardware and software puts the level of TFP 15.9 percent above the official figure by 2017. The economy-wide version is disputed: Syverson (2017) and Byrne, Fernald and Reinsdorf (2016) find mismeasurement too small to explain the US slowdown after 2004.

Why it works now

The adjustment needs the complementary spending by year, which companies bury in operating expense and rarely report separately, and the operating results of early and late sites. Cost disclosures, implementation records and site data can now be read, the intangible stock rebuilt, and the gap between measured and adjusted productivity computed outside the conversation. Whether the spending is building anything is still a judgment for the operators and customers of the first sites.

When it applies

A company, industry or economy is in the early years of adopting a general purpose technology (AI, cloud software, automation, electrification) and its measured productivity, margins or return on capital have fallen or stalled while spending on implementation, training, data and process redesign is high; or a later surge in measured productivity is being credited to current management. Not to be confused with intangible-capital, which rebuilds a company's statements so that research and selling expense counts as investment, or dynamo-and-redesign, which asks how long the real gain waits on capital turnover: this is about the time path of measured productivity through an adoption, the dip and the later overshoot, and how much of each is mismeasurement.

What we would ask

How much is being spent each year on implementation, training, data and redesign that the accounts charge as cost, and how fast is that spending growing?
Which operating measures should improve once the work is done, and are they improving at the first sites that finished?

What it needs

The complementary intangible investment by year (implementation, data preparation, training, process redesign), whether expensed or capitalized; output and inputs (labor and capital) for productivity; a depreciation rate for the intangible stock; and operating measures at early and late adopting units.

How we would get it

The Desk rebuilds the intangible investment and stock from cost disclosures and computes the gap between measured and adjusted productivity year by year. Implementation leads, operations managers and the customers of early sites say what the program actually changed and when, which tells investment from waste.

Where it breaks

Every dip treated as a J-curve when the program is failing; an intangible stock with no evidence that it yields anything; a depreciation rate chosen to make the curve turn; the economy-wide version stretched too far, since Syverson (2017) and Byrne, Fernald and Reinsdorf (2016) find that mismeasurement explains little of the US productivity slowdown after 2004.

For example

A logistics company's measured total factor productivity has fallen about 1 percent a year since it began rebuilding its network around machine learning. It spends 180 million a year on data, retraining and redesign, all expensed: 6 percent of its 3 billion of value added, so eta = 0.06 / 1.06, about 0.057, and the spending grows 30 percent a year; the intangible stock built so far earns about 1.5 percent of value added and grows 40 percent a year. The gap between measured and true growth is 0.057 x (-0.01 - 0.30) + 0.943 x 0.015 x 0.40, about -1.2 points, so adjusted productivity rose about 0.2 percent a year: an investment dip, not yet a failure, if the first redesigned sites show the operating gains. As the spending levels off and the stock earns more, the gap turns positive and measured productivity will flatter the program.

The mathematics in fullBrynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2021), equation (6): measured minus true TFP growth = eta x (g_A - g_I) + (1 - eta) x s_U x g_U, where eta = I / (Y + I) is the unmeasured intangible investment I as a share of true output, g_I its growth rate, g_A measured TFP growth (the Solow residual), s_U = r_U U / Y the income share of the intangible stock U and g_U its growth rate. The first term is negative while the investment grows faster than measured productivity (the dip of the J); the second is positive, and wins once investment slows and the stock earns returns that the accounts credit to productivity (the overshoot). Where it is in the books

Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2021), The Productivity J-Curve, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, equation (6); Brynjolfsson (1993), The productivity paradox of information technology, Communications of the ACM; Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2019), Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox, in The Economics of Artificial Intelligence; Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence, Review of Economics and Statistics; Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2003), The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth, NBER Macroeconomics Annual; Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009), Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth, Review of Income and Wealth; The Second Machine Age (2014), Chapter 7, Computing Bounty (why the complements of a general purpose technology delay its productivity benefits)

Sources

Brynjolfsson, Rock, Syverson (2021). The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(1), 333-372. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180386
Brynjolfsson, Rock, Syverson (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox: A Clash of Expectations and Statistics. The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, 23-60. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226613475.003.0001
Brynjolfsson (1993). The productivity paradox of information technology. Communications of the ACM 36(12), 66-77. https://doi.org/10.1145/163298.163309
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2003). Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4), 793-808. https://doi.org/10.1162/003465303772815736
Solow (1957). Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. The Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3), 312. https://doi.org/10.2307/1926047
Basu, Fernald, Oulton, Srinivasan (2003). The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth, or Does Information Technology Explain Why Productivity Accelerated in the United States but Not in the United Kingdom? NBER Macroeconomics Annual 18, 9-63. https://doi.org/10.1086/ma.18.3585244
Corrado, Hulten, Sichel (2009). Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth. Review of Income and Wealth 55(3), 661-685. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4991.2009.00343.x
Syverson (2017). Challenges to Mismeasurement Explanations for the US Productivity Slowdown. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(2), 165-186. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.165
Byrne, Fernald, Reinsdorf (2016). Does the United States Have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement Problem? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2016(1), 109-182. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2016.0014
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton. (book)

Complementarity and organizational capital (Milgrom and Roberts; Brynjolfsson and Hitt)

Complements: a technology pays only with the reorganization around it

We test whether a technology's return depends on changes made around it: decisions pushed down to those with the information, new incentives, retrained or different people, redesigned processes. When it does, the technology alone earns little, the reorganization alone earns little, and the two together earn more than the sum, so the evidence is a comparison of four groups (neither, technology only, practices only, both) or an interaction term, never the average return to technology spending. A company is winning at it when its units that adopted both outperform those that adopted one, and the gap persists.

Born to answer
Lincoln Electric and supermodularity, 1995; computers and organizational capital, 2002.
What it does now
Whether a technology pays only together with reorganization.
The mathematics
delta = [y(1,1) - y(0,1)] - [y(1,0) - y(0,0)]
The full entry
Where it began

Milgrom and Roberts (1995) gave complementarity its mathematics, supermodularity, and used it to explain the shift to modern manufacturing and the tightly fitted strategy and structure of the Lincoln Electric Company. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) found in firm data that information technology, workplace reorganization and new products were complements, and that firms adopting them used more skilled labor; Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) found each dollar invested in computers associated with over 10 dollars of market value, against just over 1 for other tangible assets, and traced the excess to a cluster of organizational practices. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) found that US multinationals operating in Europe got more productivity from IT than other multinationals, and traced the gap mainly to tougher people management.

Why it works now

The comparison needs adoption and practices unit by unit, which lived in site reports, personnel systems and consultants' files that were rarely combined. Those records, and industry surveys of management practice, can now be joined, the four groups compared and the interaction computed outside the conversation. Which practices really changed at which sites is still a question for the people who ran the programs.

When it applies

A company or investor is judging a technology program (an ERP or data platform, AI tools, robotics, analytics) by its average return, or comparing adopters, while the return plausibly depends on organizational changes that vary across units or firms: incentives, decision rights, skills, management practices. Not to be confused with digital-profit or pattern-digital-business-design, which judge whether a digital design has changed the operating numbers by a multiple, or productivity-j-curve, which is about the timing and measurement of the payoff: this asks whether the payoff exists only in combination, and finds out by comparing the combinations.

What we would ask

Which units or sites adopted the technology together with changes in decision rights, incentives and skills, and which adopted the technology alone?
What did each group's productivity do afterward, compared with units that changed nothing?

What it needs

Unit or firm level data on technology adoption and spending; organizational practices (decision rights, incentive pay, training, management practice scores); productivity or output before and after; and enough units in each of the four groups to compare.

How we would get it

The Desk computes the four-way comparison or the interaction from unit-level records, or from industry surveys when the company's own are not available. Operations leaders and the consultants who ran the programs say which practices changed at which sites, which the records often do not show.

Where it breaks

Firms that adopt both because they were better managed to begin with, so the interaction measures management quality rather than complementarity; too few units in the both and neither groups; practices measured by what a firm says rather than what it does; a technology that substitutes for the practice, where the interaction is negative.

For example

A retailer rolled out a forecasting system to 200 stores. Against stores that changed nothing, productivity rose 2 percent where stores took the system alone, 1 percent where managers gained pricing authority without it, and 9 percent where both arrived. The interaction, (9 - 1) - (2 - 0) = 6 points, is most of the gain: the system pays where store managers can act on its forecasts, and the research question is whether the remaining stores can be given that authority.

The mathematics in fullWith productivity y(T, O) for technology T and practice O, each 0 or 1, complementarity is the interaction delta = [y(1,1) - y(0,1)] - [y(1,0) - y(0,0)], positive when each raises the other's return (supermodularity; Milgrom and Roberts 1995), estimated as b3 in y = a + b1 T + b2 O + b3 (T x O) + controls. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) find each dollar invested in computers associated with over 10 dollars of market value, against just over 1 dollar for other tangible assets, a market price for the unmeasured organizational complements. Where it is in the books

Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Beyond Computation, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002), Intangible Assets: Computers and Organizational Capital, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; Milgrom and Roberts (1995), Complementarities and fit, Journal of Accounting and Economics; Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013), Complementarity in Organizations, in The Handbook of Organizational Economics; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), Americans Do IT Better, American Economic Review

Sources

Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2000). Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4), 23-48. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.4.23
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2002). Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 339-376. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399526
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, Yang (2002). Intangible Assets: Computers and Organizational Capital. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2002(1), 137-198. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2002.0003
Brynjolfsson, Milgrom (2013). Complementarity in Organizations. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, 11-55. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-003
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (1996). Paradox Lost? Firm-Level Evidence on the Returns to Information Systems Spending. Management Science 42(4), 541-558. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.4.541
Milgrom, Roberts (1995). Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(2-3), 179-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)00382-f
Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen (2012). Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle. American Economic Review 102(1), 167-201. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.167
Bartel, Ichniowski, Shaw (2007). How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4), 1721-1758. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1721
Brynjolfsson, McElheran (2016). The Rapid Adoption of Data-Driven Decision-Making. American Economic Review 106(5), 133-139. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161016

The dynamo and the computer (David)

The dynamo's lesson: the gain waits for redesign and for old capital to retire

We separate adoption of the device from redesign around it. Factories ran electric motors inside layouts built for steam and line shafts for decades; the large gains came as plants were rebuilt around motors driving individual machines. So we estimate what share of the client's, or the industry's, capacity has been redesigned around the technology, how fast the old capital retires, and how much a redesigned unit gains over a retrofitted one, and we forecast the productivity effect from the redesigned share, not from the count of adopters.

Born to answer
From shafts to wires: American factories electrified, 1880 to 1930.
What it does now
When a technology's gain will show, given how long capital lasts.
The mathematics
R(t) = 1 - (1 - delta)^t; gain = R G + (1 - R) g
The full entry
Where it began

Paul David's 1990 article The Dynamo and the Computer, in the American Economic Review's papers and proceedings, set the slow payoff of computers beside electrification: no effect on manufacturing productivity appeared until the early 1920s, when just over half of factory drive capacity was electric, four decades after Edison's first central power stations of 1881. Through the early decades owners added motors to the old shafting, group by group, and kept the old plant in place; the large gains came with unit drive, a motor at each machine, which allowed lighter single-story buildings and layouts arranged around the flow of work. Devine (1983) traced the shift: electric motors supplied under 5 percent of the mechanical drive in American factories in 1899, about 25 percent in 1909, over 53 percent in 1919 and about 78 percent in 1929. David and Wright date the surge: manufacturing TFP grew 0.2 percent a year from 1909 to 1919 and 5.3 percent a year from 1919 to 1929.

Why it works now

Forecasting the redesigned share needs the age and layout of each site, which sat in permits, filings and engineering records nobody compiled. These can now be assembled into a profile of the capital stock by vintage and the redesigned share projected outside the conversation. What a redesigned site gains over a retrofitted one is still known best to the engineers who have built both.

When it applies

A forecast of when a technology's productivity effect will appear in an industry or company that runs on long-lived capital or entrenched processes (plants, hospitals, networks, fleets, buildings, legacy software), where the device can be adopted quickly but the full gain needs a different layout, workflow or organization. Not to be confused with adoption-curve, which forecasts how fast buyers take up a product, or productivity-j-curve, which corrects measured productivity for unmeasured investment: this asks how long the real gain waits on capital turnover and redesign.

What we would ask

What share of sites have been rebuilt or redesigned around the technology, as opposed to running it inside the old layout?
How long do the old plants, systems or buildings last, and what makes a site redesign rather than retrofit?

What it needs

Adoption of the device by site and the share of sites redesigned around it; the age and expected life of the old capital; productivity at redesigned sites against retrofitted and untouched ones; and the cost of redesign against retrofit.

How we would get it

The Desk builds the vintage profile of the capital stock from filings, permits and industry data and projects the redesigned share. Plant engineers, facility planners and operators who have done both retrofits and new builds say what each gains, which is what the forecast turns on.

Where it breaks

A technology that needs no redesign, where the gain arrives with the device; redesign that can be done without replacing capital (software, process), so the capital life overstates the lag; greenfield sites that look better for reasons besides the technology (newer equipment, better locations); assuming every replacement takes the new design when repeating the old one is cheaper.

For example

A hospital group plans on the efficiency of AI-assisted scheduling, which cut staff hours and patient waits by 15 percent in the two hospitals rebuilt around it and by 3 percent where it was added to existing workflows. Its forty hospitals are remodeled on a 25-year cycle, about 4 percent of capacity a year, so after five years 1 - 0.96^5, about 18 percent of capacity, runs the redesigned workflow, and the group-wide gain is about 0.18 x 15 + 0.82 x 3 = 5.2 percent, not 15. The research question is whether workflow redesign can run ahead of the building cycle.

The mathematics in fullWith old capital retiring at rate delta a year and every replacement built to the new design, the redesigned share after t years is R(t) = 1 - (1 - delta)^t; if a redesigned unit gains G and a retrofitted one g, the aggregate gain is R(t) x G + (1 - R(t)) x g, so the gain arrives at the pace of capital turnover, not of adoption. Where it is in the books

David and Wright (2006), General Purpose Technologies and Surges in Productivity, in The Economic Future in Historical Perspective; Devine (1983), From Shafts to Wires: Historical Perspective on Electrification, Journal of Economic History; Atkeson and Kehoe (2007), Modeling the Transition to a New Economy, American Economic Review; Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005), General Purpose Technologies, Handbook of Economic Growth; Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2019), Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox, on implementation lags; Comin and Hobijn (2010), An Exploration of Technology Diffusion, American Economic Review; The Second Machine Age (2014), Chapter 7, Computing Bounty

Sources

David, Wright (2006). General Purpose Technologies and Surges in Productivity: Historical Reflections on the Future of the ICT Revolution. The Economic Future in Historical Perspective. https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197263471.003.0005
Devine (1983). From Shafts to Wires: Historical Perspective on Electrification. The Journal of Economic History 43(2), 347-372. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700029673
Atkeson, Kehoe (2007). Modeling the Transition to a New Economy: Lessons from Two Technological Revolutions. American Economic Review 97(1), 64-88. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.64
Jovanovic, Rousseau (2005). General Purpose Technologies. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1181-1224. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01018-x
Brynjolfsson, Rock, Syverson (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox: A Clash of Expectations and Statistics. The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, 23-60. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226613475.003.0001
Comin, Hobijn (2010). An Exploration of Technology Diffusion. American Economic Review 100(5), 2031-2059. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2031
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton. (book)

Generative AI at work (Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond)

Generative AI at work: the largest gains go to the least experienced

We measure the gain from an AI assistant by worker experience and skill, not on average. In Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond's study of 5,172 support agents, the assistant raised issues resolved per hour by 15 percent on average, with less experienced and lower-skilled agents improving in speed and quality, the most experienced gaining little speed and losing a little quality, and evidence that the assistant helped agents learn. So the value of a deployment depends on the workforce it meets: how many novices, how fast people turn over, and how many tasks sit inside what the assistant does well. We weight measured gains by the client's own workforce and check the tasks against that frontier.

Born to answer
An assistant for 5,172 support agents: 15 percent more issues resolved per hour.
What it does now
Sizing an AI deployment by the workforce it meets.
The mathematics
G = sum over groups of w_k x g_k
The full entry
Where it began

Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond studied the staggered introduction of a generative AI assistant to 5,172 customer-support agents and found issues resolved per hour up 15 percent on average and about 30 percent for less skilled and less experienced agents, while the most skilled gained no significant speed and lost a little quality (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2025). Agents two months into the job with the assistant performed like agents with more than six months without it, and attrition among agents in their first six months fell by about 10 percentage points. Noy and Zhang (2023) found in an experiment with 453 professionals that ChatGPT cut writing time by 40 percent and raised quality by 18 percent while narrowing the gap between workers. Dell'Acqua and coauthors (2023) gave consultants GPT-4 and found gains on tasks inside the technology's frontier and losses outside it, and Otis and coauthors (2024) found the pattern reversed among Kenyan entrepreneurs, where those who started weaker did worse.

Why it works now

Measuring gains by worker needs output and quality person by person, before and after, which support and sales systems record but few companies extracted. Those logs can now be read, a staggered rollout analyzed and the gains weighted by the client's workforce outside the conversation. Where the assistant misled people, and whether the best workers' quality is holding, is still learned from team leads and frontline staff.

When it applies

A company is sizing the productivity gain from deploying an AI assistant to a large workforce doing similar, recorded tasks (customer support, sales chat, claims, coding, drafting), or an investor is judging a vendor's claimed gains, and the workforce differs in experience and skill. Not to be confused with task-exposure, which asks which tasks a technology can do across occupations, or organizational-complements, which asks whether returns depend on reorganization: this weights worker-level gains by the client's workforce and asks where the tasks sit relative to the technology's frontier.

What we would ask

What share of the workforce is in its first year, or below the median on quality, and how fast does it turn over?
Which tasks fall outside what the assistant does well, where users can do worse than without it?

What it needs

Worker-level output per hour and quality before and after, ideally from a staggered rollout; each worker's tenure and skill; turnover; the task mix, with the tasks the assistant handles poorly identified; and the deployment cost per worker.

How we would get it

The Desk computes gains by tenure and skill group from the rollout data and weights them by the client's workforce. Team leads and frontline workers in the pilot say where the assistant misled them, which is where averages hide losses.

Where it breaks

Gains from a pilot staffed by volunteers; output per hour rising while quality on hard cases falls; quality slipping among the best workers, whose practice the others learn from; tasks outside the frontier, where consultants using GPT-4 were 19 percentage points less likely to be correct (84.5 percent correct without AI, about 65 percent with it) (Dell'Acqua and others 2023); open-ended work where the pattern reverses, as among Kenyan entrepreneurs, where initially low performers did nearly 10 percent worse with AI advice (Otis and others 2024).

For example

A contact center with 2,000 agents, 40 percent in their first six months, weighs a support assistant. Its staggered pilot shows gains of 30 percent for agents under six months, 15 percent for those with six to twenty-four months and 3 percent for veterans; weighted by its mix of 40, 35 and 25 percent the expected gain is 0.40 x 30 + 0.35 x 15 + 0.25 x 3 = 18 percent. A center staffed 65 percent by veterans and 10 percent by newcomers would expect about 0.10 x 30 + 0.25 x 15 + 0.65 x 3 = 8.7 percent from the same pilot results, and gains less from any fall in early attrition. The research question is whether the veterans' quality holds up, since the study found small declines in quality among the most experienced agents.

The mathematics in fullExpected gain for a workforce G = sum over groups k of w_k x g_k, with w_k the share of workers in tenure or skill group k and g_k the gain measured for that group, ideally from a staggered rollout that compares each worker before and after; across tasks, G = sum over tasks j of m_j x G_j, with m_j the task's share of time and G_j negative for tasks outside the frontier. Where it is in the books

Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond (2025), Generative AI at Work, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Noy and Zhang (2023), Experimental evidence on the productivity effects of generative artificial intelligence, Science; Dell'Acqua and others (2023), Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier, working paper; Otis, Clarke, Delecourt, Holtz and Koning (2024), The Uneven Impact of Generative AI on Entrepreneurial Performance, working paper; Brynjolfsson (2022), The Turing Trap, Daedalus

Sources

Brynjolfsson, Li, Raymond (2025). Generative AI at Work. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 140(2), 889-942. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjae044
Noy, Zhang (2023). Experimental evidence on the productivity effects of generative artificial intelligence. Science 381(6654), 187-192. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adh2586
Dell'Acqua, McFowland III, Mollick and others (2023). Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier: Field Experimental Evidence of the Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Knowledge Worker Productivity and Quality. Working paper, SSRN 4573321. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4573321
Otis, Clarke, Delecourt, Holtz, Koning (2024). The Uneven Impact of Generative AI on Entrepreneurial Performance. Working paper, SSRN 4671369. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4671369
Brynjolfsson (2022). The Turing Trap: The Promise & Peril of Human-Like Artificial Intelligence. Daedalus 151(2), 272-287. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01915
McElheran, Li, Brynjolfsson, Kroff, Dinlersoz, Foster, Zolas (2024). AI adoption in America: Who, what, and where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 33(2), 375-415. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12576

Task-based exposure to automation (Autor; Brynjolfsson and Mitchell)

Task exposure: what share of the work a machine can do, and what that share is worth

We break a job, a cost base or an industry into tasks, score each task for whether the technology can do it or cut the time it takes by at least half, and weight the scores by the time or wages each task takes. The exposed share bounds the effect; the share of exposed tasks it pays to change and the cost saved on each turn the bound into a number, and Acemoglu's use of Hulten's theorem turns task savings into an economy-wide gain. Then we ask whether the exposed tasks will be automated, which displaces the people who did them, or augmented, which makes their work more valuable.

Born to answer
Routine tasks, 2003; what machine learning can do, 2017.
What it does now
What share of a cost base a machine could do, and what it saves.
The mathematics
E = sum of w_j x e_j; saving = E x f x c
The full entry
Where it began

Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) recast technology's effect on work as a matter of tasks rather than jobs: computers take routine tasks that follow explicit rules and complement problem solving and communication, which explained about 60 percent of the shift in demand toward college labor from 1970 to 1998. Frey and Osborne (2017) scored 702 occupations for their susceptibility to computerization, and Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2017) showed that scoring the tasks within occupations shrinks the share of US jobs at high risk from 38 to 9 percent. Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017) set out what machine learning can do in eight criteria, and with Rock (2018) scored 18,156 tasks, finding most occupations partly suitable and few fully automatable. Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rock (2024) estimated that about 1.8 percent of jobs could have over half their tasks affected by language models alone and just over 46 percent with complementary software, and Acemoglu (2025) turned task estimates into an economy-wide gain of no more than 0.66 percent of TFP over ten years.

Why it works now

Task inventories, wage shares and exposure scores used to take a team months to build for one company. Task lists from O*NET and a company's own time studies can now be matched to published rubrics, scored and weighted in hours, with the arithmetic done outside the conversation. Which exposed tasks can really be separated from the rest of a job is still a question for the people who do it.

When it applies

A decision depends on how much of a job, a function's cost base, an industry's labor or an economy's output a technology (machine learning, large language models, robots) could take over or speed up: a workforce plan, a services company's margin thesis, a vendor's addressable market, a forecast of displacement. Not to be confused with generative-ai-at-work, which measures realized gains inside one deployment, or pattern-skill-shift, which tracks a company's move toward new skills: this computes the exposed share of the work from its task content, and the saving that share implies.

What we would ask

Which tasks make up this job or cost line, and how much of the time or wage bill does each take?
For the exposed tasks, does the technology replace the person or let the person do more or better work, and what would it cost to change each task?

What it needs

A task inventory with time or wage shares (O*NET task lists, the client's own time studies); an exposure score for each task, from a published rubric such as Brynjolfsson and Mitchell's suitability for machine learning or Eloundou and coauthors' test of whether a language model could cut the time a task takes by at least half without lowering its quality; the share of exposed tasks it pays to change and the cost saving on each; and labor's share of costs.

How we would get it

The Desk scores tasks against a published rubric and computes the exposed share and the implied saving, by occupation and for the client's cost base. People who do the work, and their managers, say which exposed tasks can really be separated from the rest of the job, which no task list shows.

Where it breaks

Exposure read as displacement, when it is only technical feasibility; scores at the level of whole occupations that ignore the spread of tasks within them, which Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2017) show cuts the share of US jobs at high risk of automation from 38 to 9 percent; tasks the technology creates left out (displacement-and-reinstatement); the cost of changing a task, in redesign and error handling, ignored; rubric scores treated as fixed while the technology changes.

For example

A claims-processing company's thesis says AI will cut its labor cost in half. In its task inventory, data entry and document review take 35 percent of agents' time and score fully exposed; customer calls take 25 percent and score 0.5; adjudication and fraud judgment take 40 percent and score 0.1. Exposure is 0.35 x 1 + 0.25 x 0.5 + 0.40 x 0.1 = 0.515 of agent time. If 60 percent of the exposed time can be changed profitably and saves 40 percent of its cost, the saving is 0.515 x 0.6 x 0.4, about 12 percent of agent cost, a quarter of the thesis; with agents at 55 percent of operating cost, about 7 percent of operating cost.

The mathematics in fullExposure of a job or cost base E = sum over tasks j of w_j x e_j, with w_j the task's share of time or wages and e_j its exposure score between 0 and 1; the cost saving is E x f x c, with f the share of exposed tasks it pays to change and c the saving on each. Economy-wide, Acemoglu (2025) uses a version of Hulten's (1978) theorem: the gain in TFP is the share of tasks affected times the average cost saving on them, 0.20 x 0.23 x 0.144, about 0.66 percent over ten years, from 20 percent of US labor tasks exposed, 23 percent of those profitable to automate and a 27 percent labor cost saving times a 0.535 labor share; under 0.53 percent once hard-to-learn tasks are allowed for. Where it is in the books

Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017), What can machine learning do? Workforce implications, Science; Brynjolfsson, Mitchell and Rock (2018), What Can Machines Learn and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy?, AEA Papers and Proceedings; Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rock (2024), GPTs are GPTs, Science; Acemoglu (2025), The simple macroeconomics of AI, Economic Policy; Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2017), Revisiting the risk of automation, Economics Letters; Machine, Platform, Crowd (2017), Part 1, Mind and Machine (Chapters 2 to 5)

Sources

Brynjolfsson, Mitchell (2017). What can machine learning do? Workforce implications. Science 358(6370), 1530-1534. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap8062
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, Rock (2018). What Can Machines Learn and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 43-47. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181019
Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, Rock (2024). GPTs are GPTs: Labor market impact potential of LLMs. Science 384(6702), 1306-1308. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adj0998
Acemoglu (2025). The simple macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy 40(121), 13-58. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae042
Hulten (1978). Growth Accounting with Intermediate Inputs. The Review of Economic Studies 45(3), 511-518. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297252
Autor, Levy, Murnane (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1279-1333. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552801
Arntz, Gregory, Zierahn (2017). Revisiting the risk of automation. Economics Letters 159, 157-160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.001
Frey, Osborne (2017). The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Technological Forecasting and Social Change 114, 254-280. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.019
Webb (2019). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Labor Market. Working paper, SSRN 3482150. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3482150
Felten, Raj, Seamans (2021). Occupational, industry, and geographic exposure to artificial intelligence: A novel dataset and its potential uses. Strategic Management Journal 42(12), 2195-2217. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3286
Brynjolfsson (2022). The Turing Trap: The Promise & Peril of Human-Like Artificial Intelligence. Daedalus 151(2), 272-287. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01915
McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2017). Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future. W. W. Norton. (book)

Displacement and reinstatement (Acemoglu and Restrepo)

Displacement and reinstatement: whether the work automation removes is replaced by new work

We separate what a technology does to labor into the forces Acemoglu and Restrepo name: it displaces workers from the tasks it takes over, it raises productivity and so demand for work, it moves activity between industries, and it can create new tasks in which people have the advantage. Automation always lowers labor's share of the work it touches; whether employment and wages in a place, an occupation or a company fall depends on whether reinstatement and the productivity effect outrun displacement. We measure each from changes in labor shares over time and from comparisons of more and less exposed places, and we ask who bears the difference.

Born to answer
Fears of machine-made unemployment since the late eighteenth century; the task framework, 2018 to 2020.
What it does now
Whether new work replaces the work automation removes, and for whom.
The mathematics
Wage bill change = productivity + composition + substitution + task content
The full entry
Where it began

The fear that machines will take work is old: Mokyr, Vickers and Ziebarth (2015) trace it, with two companion anxieties, from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth, and John Maynard Keynes wrote of technological unemployment in 1930. Aghion and Howitt (1994) showed that faster growth through new technologies can raise unemployment by shortening jobs or lower it by making job creation more valuable. Acemoglu and Restrepo built the modern accounting: automation displaces labor from tasks and always lowers its share, new tasks reinstate it (2018, 2019), and their decomposition attributes slower US employment growth over three decades to faster displacement, weaker reinstatement and slower productivity growth. Across US commuting zones, one more industrial robot per thousand workers lowered the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42 percent (2020). Autor (2015) explains why automation has nonetheless left so many jobs: it complements labor and raises demand as well as substituting for it.

Why it works now

Comparing exposed and unexposed places needs installations by industry and place, and employment and wages by place over many years, which came from separate public and industry sources. These can now be joined and the published estimates applied, or the comparison rebuilt, outside the conversation. Which jobs were cut, which appeared and who got them is still known to plant managers, recruiters and workforce boards.

When it applies

A decision depends on what a technology will do to employment, wages or the labor cost base in a specific place, occupation or company (a lender to a manufacturing region, a staffing or training business, a retailer whose customers work in exposed jobs, a workforce plan), and the question is the net effect rather than which tasks are exposed. Not to be confused with task-exposure, which computes the share of tasks a technology can do, or creative-destruction, which is about firms displacing firms: this weighs the work removed against the work created, and asks who bears the difference.

What we would ask

Where have similar machines already arrived, and what happened to employment and wages there compared with similar places that did not get them?
What new tasks have appeared around the technology (maintenance, programming, oversight, new services), and are the displaced workers the ones who can take them?

What it needs

Exposure of the place or occupation to the technology (installations per thousand workers, or a task-based exposure measure) and comparable places with less exposure; employment, wages and labor shares by industry over time; counts of new job titles or tasks; and the age, skills and mobility of the workers in the exposed tasks.

How we would get it

The Desk computes exposure and applies published estimates, or builds the comparison from public employment and wage data by place and industry. Plant managers, union representatives, workforce boards and recruiters say which jobs were cut, which new ones appeared and who got them.

Where it breaks

An estimate from one era and technology carried to another (industrial robots from 1990 to 2007 to AI now); effects averaged across places applied to one firm; exposure taken from plans that never happen; averages that hide losers when the displaced are not the ones hired into new tasks; history's long record of employment recovering, which Autor (2015) explains, treated as a guarantee for every place and decade.

For example

A regional bank lends heavily in a manufacturing county of 200,000 working-age people whose industries are adopting robots fast enough to raise its exposure, measured as Acemoglu and Restrepo measure it from industry robot adoption weighted by the county's mix of industries, by about 4 robots per thousand workers over five years. Applying their estimates across US commuting zones, that exposure lowers the employment-to-population ratio by about 4 x 0.2 = 0.8 percentage points, roughly 1,600 jobs, and wages by about 4 x 0.42 = 1.7 percent, relative to similar places. The research question is whether new maintenance and programming work is appearing in the county, and whether the workers displaced are the ones being hired for it.

The mathematics in fullAcemoglu and Restrepo (2019): change in the aggregate wage bill = productivity effect + composition effect + substitution effect + change in task content, where an industry's change in task content is the percent change in its labor share less its substitution effect, negative changes measuring displacement by automation and positive ones reinstatement by new tasks. Locally (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020), x more robots per thousand workers changes the employment-to-population ratio by about -0.2 x percentage points and wages by about -0.42 x percent. Where it is in the books

Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019), Automation and New Tasks, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), Robots and Jobs, Journal of Political Economy; Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), The Race between Man and Machine, American Economic Review; Aghion and Howitt (1994), Growth and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies; Mokyr, Vickers and Ziebarth (2015), The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Autor (2015), Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?, Journal of Economic Perspectives; The Second Machine Age (2014), Chapter 9, The Spread, and Chapter 12, Learning to Race with Machines; Race Against the Machine (2011), Chapter 3, Creative Destruction: The Economics of Accelerating Technology and Disappearing Jobs; The Power of Creative Destruction (2021), Chapter 3, Should We Fear Technological Revolutions?

Sources

Acemoglu, Restrepo (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(2), 3-30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.2.3
Acemoglu, Restrepo (2020). Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets. Journal of Political Economy 128(6), 2188-2244. https://doi.org/10.1086/705716
Acemoglu, Restrepo (2018). The Race between Man and Machine: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment. American Economic Review 108(6), 1488-1542. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160696
Aghion, Howitt (1994). Growth and Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 477-494. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297900
Mokyr, Vickers, Ziebarth (2015). The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different? Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(3), 31-50. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.3.31
Autor (2015). Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(3), 3-30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.29.3.3
Autor, Dorn (2013). The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market. American Economic Review 103(5), 1553-1597. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.1553
Goos, Manning, Salomons (2014). Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring. American Economic Review 104(8), 2509-2526. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.8.2509
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton. (book)
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011). Race Against the Machine: How the Digital Revolution Is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy. Digital Frontier Press. (book)
Aghion, Antonin and Bunel (2021). The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations, translated by Jodie Cohen-Tanugi from the French (Odile Jacob, 2020). Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (book)

Profiting from innovation (Teece)

Profiting from innovation: whether the innovator, its imitators or the owners of the assets it needs will capture the profit

We find out who will capture the profit an innovation creates before assuming the innovator will. Teece showed that innovators often lose to imitators and to the owners of the assets an innovation needs to reach customers, and that three things decide it: how hard the innovation is to copy, which turns on the law and on whether the know-how can be written down; whether a dominant design has emerged, after which competition turns to price and scale; and who owns the complementary assets (manufacturing, distribution, service, approvals) and whether they are generic, specialized or cospecialized. We estimate what each side could earn without the other, split the value on those fallbacks, and test the innovator's ways out: owning or contracting for the scarce assets before imitators arrive or, where a market for ideas exists, licensing or selling to an incumbent.

Born to answer
Research Policy, 1986: EMI's scanner, RC Cola's diet cola, Searle's NutraSweet.
What it does now
Who will capture the profit an innovation creates.
The mathematics
V_I = d_I + beta (Pi - d_I - d_A); integrate when K < V_A and T < L
The full entry
Where it began

David Teece's 1986 paper in Research Policy asked why innovators so often fail to profit from their innovations while customers, imitators and other firms gain. EMI brought its CAT scanner to the United States in 1973, lost market leadership within six years and left the business by the eighth; RC Cola was first with a diet cola and with cola in a can, and Coca-Cola and Pepsi followed almost at once; Searle, by contrast, made its aspartame patent and FDA approvals into an exceptionally tight appropriability regime, and NutraSweet sales passed 700 million dollars in 1985. Teece's answer rested on the appropriability regime, the dominant design paradigm and complementary assets, generic, specialized or cospecialized, and made the boundary of the firm a strategic choice. Later evidence fits: Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) found patents rated below lead time, learning curves and sales and service efforts in most of 130 lines of business; Tripsas (1997) found that specialized complementary assets buffered incumbent typesetter makers through a century of upheaval; Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) found that stronger patents raise licensing only among firms without such assets. The framework is verbal; the bargaining arithmetic is Vista's reading of it.

Why it works now

The appropriability regime, the stage of the design contest and the ownership of each needed asset are recorded in patents and litigation, product registries, licensing and partnership filings and the history of launches in a field, records that were rarely read together. They can now be assembled quickly, each asset classed, and the split of value computed at several fallbacks outside the conversation. How fast a rival could really design around the product, and whether the channel can be reached another way, is still known best to engineers, patent counsel and former executives of the incumbents.

When it applies

A thesis, valuation or deal assumes the company behind an innovation will keep most of its profit, while the innovation needs assets the company does not own to reach customers, or rivals could copy it: a biotech licensing a drug to a large pharmaceutical company, a device start-up facing incumbents that own the hospital channel, a chip designer dependent on a foundry, an AI developer selling through platforms it does not control. Not to be confused with creative-destruction, which prices how long an incumbent's rents last, profitability-fade, the base rate at which high returns revert, value-chain-position-profit, which finds the stage where an industry's profit already collects, or installed-base-profit and de-facto-standard-profit, which test a company already earning from a base or a standard: this asks how one innovation's profit will divide among the innovator, its imitators and the owners of the assets it needs.

What we would ask

If a well-funded rival set out to offer an equivalent, how long would it take, and what would stop it: a patent that has held up in court, know-how that cannot be written down, or nothing?
What does the innovation need to reach customers at scale that the company does not own, who owns it, and could the company get it elsewhere, or build it, before a rival copies the product?

What it needs

The patent and trade secret position (claims, remaining life, litigation and design-around record) and past imitation lags in the field; the number of competing designs and whether one has become dominant; each asset needed to reach customers at scale (production, channel, approvals and reimbursement, service, platform access, complementary products), classed as generic, specialized or cospecialized, with its owner, its supply and whether it is a bottleneck; the innovator's cash, and its cost and time to build or buy each asset; and past deal terms in the field (royalties, milestone and profit splits).

How we would get it

The Desk reads patents, litigation, licensing and partnership filings and past launches in the field, classes each needed asset, and computes the split at the fallbacks the records support and the integration test at the build cost and time they imply. Patent counsel, engineers who have designed around similar products and former executives of the incumbents say how fast imitation would come and whether the channel can be reached another way, which no filing states.

Where it breaks

A patent count read as protection, when Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) found lead time, learning curves and sales or service efforts rated above patents for protecting products in most of 130 lines of business; an asset called specialized when competitive suppliers exist (contract manufacturers, contract sales forces, rented computing); timing ignored, since before a dominant design emerges specialized assets matter little and early commitment can bind the innovator to the wrong design, as with de Havilland's Comet, and in network markets the design is settled by tipping-and-lock-in; integration assumed possible, when the innovator may lack the cash or the time, which is why Teece (1986) finds some innovators bound to fail; the one-market framework applied to an enabling, general purpose technology (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995), whose innovator cannot own all the complements (Teece 2018; Gambardella, Heaton, Novelli and Teece 2021).

For example

A device start-up's sensor would earn profits worth 1,000 million in present value once sold through hospital sales forces, reimbursement and service, a channel two incumbents own, and an incumbent could design around its patents in about two years. Alone the start-up could earn about 150 million (d_I = 150); an incumbent alone, by imitating, about 550 million (d_A = 550). With equal bargaining weight the start-up takes 150 + 0.5 x (1,000 - 150 - 550) = 300 million, 30 percent, and the incumbent 700 million. Building its own channel would cost 400 million, less than the 700 million it would move, but would take four years against a two-year design-around, so integration fails on time. If a court upheld a patent that blocks the design-around, cutting d_A to 100, the start-up's take would be 150 + 0.5 x (1,000 - 150 - 100) = 525 million, 52.5 percent. A valuation that credits the start-up with half the value is consistent only with that patent; whether it holds is the research question.

The mathematics in fullWith Pi the present value of the profit the innovation earns once combined with the complementary assets it needs, d_I what the innovator could earn without the asset owner (renting generic assets, building its own at cost K over T years, or another partner) and d_A what the owner could earn without the innovator (imitating after a lag L, or its existing products), a Nash (1950) split with the innovator's bargaining weight beta gives V_I = d_I + beta (Pi - d_I - d_A) and V_A = Pi - V_I, provided Pi > d_I + d_A; otherwise they compete and each earns its fallback. A tight appropriability regime lowers d_A, generic assets raise d_I, cospecialized assets lower both, and standards, disclosure and modularity can move them (Pisano and Teece 2007). Integration pays when K < V_A and T < L, and L is often short: Mansfield (1985) found that details of a new product generally reach rivals within about a year. Where it is in the books

Teece (1986), Profiting from technological innovation, Research Policy: section 3, the basic building blocks; section 4, implications for profitability; section 5, channel strategy issues, with the flow chart for the integration versus contract decision in fig. 10; Managing Intellectual Capital (2000), Chapter 5, Market Entry Strategies for Innovators: Avoiding Pyrrhic Victories, and Chapter 6, Imitation Strategies for Owners of Complementary Assets; Teece (2006), Reflections on 'Profiting from Innovation', Research Policy, section 2.2; Teece (2018), Profiting from innovation in the digital economy, Research Policy; Pisano and Teece (2007), How to Capture Value from Innovation, California Management Review; Gambardella, Heaton, Novelli and Teece (2021), Profiting from Enabling Technologies?, Strategy Science; Nash (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica: the split of the surplus is Vista's formalization of Teece's verbal framework

Sources

Teece (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15(6), 285-305. https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(86)90027-2
Teece (2006). Reflections on "Profiting from Innovation". Research Policy 35(8), 1131-1146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2006.09.009
Teece (2018). Profiting from innovation in the digital economy: Enabling technologies, standards, and licensing models in the wireless world. Research Policy 47(8), 1367-1387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.01.015
Pisano, Teece (2007). How to Capture Value from Innovation: Shaping Intellectual Property and Industry Architecture. California Management Review 50(1), 278-296. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166428
Gambardella, Heaton, Novelli, Teece (2021). Profiting from Enabling Technologies? Strategy Science 6(1), 75-90. https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2020.0119
Teece (2000). Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions. Oxford University Press. (book)
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter (1987). Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987(3), 783. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534454
Mansfield (1985). How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out? The Journal of Industrial Economics 34(2), 217. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098683
Tripsas (1997). Unraveling the Process of Creative Destruction: Complementary Assets and Incumbent Survival in the Typesetter Industry. Strategic Management Journal 18(S1), 119-142. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199707)18:1+<119::aid-smj921>3.0.co;2-0
Arora, Ceccagnoli (2006). Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing. Management Science 52(2), 293-308. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0437
Suárez, Utterback (1995). Dominant designs and the survival of firms. Strategic Management Journal 16(6), 415-430. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250160602
Gans, Stern (2003). The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy 32(2), 333-350. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0048-7333(02)00103-8
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
Bresnahan, Trajtenberg (1995). General purpose technologies 'Engines of growth'? Journal of Econometrics 65(1), 83-108. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01598-t

Learn the math
The question

In 1973 a British record company brought a new machine to American hospitals. EMI, better known for the Beatles' records, had built the first CAT scanner, the invention of its own engineer Godfrey Hounsfield, who would share the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for it. Nobody else had one. Doctors could see inside a living skull without opening it.

David Teece tells what happened next in the paper this model comes from. Within six years of its American introduction EMI had lost the lead, first to Technicare and then to General Electric, and by the eighth year it had dropped out of the business. In 1979 its troubles drove EMI into a rescue by Thorn Electrical Industries, and GE later bought what had been EMI's scanner business from Thorn for, in Teece's words, "a pittance." The firms that won were not better inventors. They had what a hospital buyer needs beside the machine: sales forces that already called on hospitals, service networks, and long experience selling imaging equipment. The scanner was EMI's. The road to the customer was theirs.

That is the question this model answers. An innovation creates value; who keeps it? The inventor, the imitators who copy it, or the firms that own what the invention needs to reach a buyer? Get the answer wrong and a valuation credits a company with profits that will end up in somebody else's accounts.

The idea in one paragraph

Picture a brilliant new car on one side of a river, and the only bridge into town owned by someone else. The car is worth a great deal once it crosses; on its own bank it is worth much less. The bridge owner will charge a toll, and how high the toll goes has nothing to do with how good the car is. It depends on two things: what the car's owner could do without the bridge (swim, build a ferry, sell the car to someone on the far side), and what the bridge owner could do without this car (build its own car, or keep collecting tolls from the cars it already carries). Teece's three questions are a way of reading those two fallbacks. How hard is the invention to copy? That decides how soon the bridge owner could build its own car. Has a standard design settled? Before it has, nobody knows which bridge matters. Are the needed assets generic, specialized to this invention, or tied to it both ways? That decides whether there are other bridges. The arithmetic below turns those answers into a split.

The math, step by step

Teece wrote his framework in prose and gave no split in numbers. The arithmetic in this section is Vista's formalization of it, borrowed from John Nash's bargaining solution; the Library entry says so, and so should anyone who uses it.

The symbols. All money is in $ millions, as present values (a present value counts money that arrives later at what it is worth today; Step 5 shows how). Pi is what the innovation earns once it is combined with the complementary assets it needs: production, a channel to customers, approvals, service. d_I is what the innovator could earn on its own, without the asset owner: by renting generic assets, by building its own, or with another partner. d_A is what the asset owner could earn without the innovator: usually by imitating once it can, or simply by carrying on with its existing products. The surplus of the deal is

S = Pi - d_I - d_A

the value that exists only if the two work together. V_I and V_A are what each finally takes, with V_I + V_A = Pi.

Step 1: when there is anything to share. If S is zero or negative, the two can do as well apart as together, and there is no deal: each takes its fallback. So the whole analysis assumes Pi > d_I + d_A. Keep that line in view; a strong enough imitator crosses it.

Step 2: Nash's rule. John Nash (1950) asked what split two reasonable bargainers would reach, and showed that four mild conditions leave only one candidate. The answer should not depend on the units value is measured in; it should leave no money on the table; two bargainers in identical positions should be treated identically; and it should not change if options neither side would choose are taken away. The one split that meets all four maximizes the product of the two gains over the fallbacks. Dropping the third condition allows unequal bargaining power, with the innovator's weight beta between 0 and 1, and the rule becomes: choose V_I, somewhere between d_I and Pi - d_A so that both gains are positive, to maximize

(V_I - d_I)^beta x (Pi - V_I - d_A)^(1 - beta)

Step 3: solving it. Maximizing a positive quantity is the same as maximizing its logarithm, because the logarithm rises whenever its argument rises, so the two peak at the same V_I. And the logarithm turns the product into a sum, since ln(a^p b^q) = (p ln a) + (q ln b):

f(V_I) = (beta ln(V_I - d_I)) + ((1 - beta) ln(Pi - V_I - d_A))

Differentiate with respect to V_I and set the result to zero. The derivative of ln u is u' / u, the derivative of the inside divided by the inside. In the first term the inside is V_I - d_I, whose derivative with respect to V_I is 1, so the term gives beta / (V_I - d_I). In the second the inside is Pi - V_I - d_A, whose derivative is -1 because V_I enters with a minus sign, so the term gives -(1 - beta) / (Pi - V_I - d_A). Setting the sum to zero and moving the second term across:

beta / (V_I - d_I) = (1 - beta) / (Pi - V_I - d_A)

Write g_I = V_I - d_I and g_A = Pi - V_I - d_A for the two gains. Cross-multiplying, the line says beta g_A = (1 - beta) g_I. The gains also add up to the surplus, g_I + g_A = S. Substitute g_A = S - g_I: (beta S) - (beta g_I) = g_I - (beta g_I), so g_I = beta S. Therefore

V_I = d_I + (beta (Pi - d_I - d_A))        V_A = Pi - V_I

In words: each side gets its fallback back, and then the surplus is cut in the proportions of bargaining power. With equal power, beta = 0.5, it is cut down the middle. (The second derivative of f is negative everywhere, so this is a maximum, not a minimum.)

Step 4: what moves the innovator's take. Multiply out the formula:

V_I = (beta Pi) + ((1 - beta) d_I) - (beta d_A)

Now read off the slopes: in a sum like this, the constant in front of each quantity is how much V_I moves when that quantity rises by a dollar and the others stay put. A dollar more of joint value adds beta to the innovator. A dollar more of its own fallback adds 1 - beta. A dollar less of the other side's fallback adds beta. The surprise is the first line: making the product better helps the innovator only in proportion to its bargaining weight, while the other side's share of the improvement goes, dollar for dollar, to whoever owns the bridge. Teece's three questions work on the other two terms. A tight appropriability regime (a patent that holds in court, know-how that cannot be written down) lowers d_A. Generic complementary assets, the ones anyone can rent, raise d_I. Cospecialized assets, each useless without the other, lower both.

Step 5: where time enters. Suppose the asset owner's own version of the product would be worth Y on the day it launches, and the owner needs L years to design around the innovation. At a discount rate r (a dollar due in a year is worth 1 / (1 + r) today, and a dollar due in L years is worth 1 / (1 + r)^L, because each year's wait divides by 1 + r once more), its fallback today is

d_A = Y / (1 + r)^L

Each extra year of lag divides d_A by 1 + r. This is how "hard to copy" becomes a number: protection is worth what it does to the other side's clock. (Holding Pi fixed while L changes is a simplification; it keeps the step clean.)

Step 6: the integration test. The innovator's way out is to own the asset itself. Building it costs K and takes T years. It pays only if two things are both true:

K < V_A        and        T < L

The first says building is cheaper than the toll: with its own channel the innovator keeps Pi - K instead of V_I, and Pi - K > V_I is the same inequality as K < Pi - V_I, which is K < V_A. The second says the building is finished before the imitator arrives. Many innovators pass the first and fail the second, and that is why Teece concluded some are simply bound to lose.

A worked example: the sensor and the hospital channel

This is the Library entry's own case, with round numbers stated as assumptions. A device start-up has a sensor whose profits are worth Pi = 1,000 once it is sold through hospital sales forces, reimbursement and service, a channel two incumbents own. Alone the start-up could earn about d_I = 150. An incumbent, which could design around the start-up's patents in about two years, could earn d_A = 550 by imitating. Bargaining power is equal.

The surplus is 1,000 - 150 - 550 = 300. The start-up takes 150 + (0.5 x 300) = 300, that is $300 million, 30% of the value its own sensor creates, and the incumbent takes $700 million. At a bargaining weight of 0.3 the start-up would take 240; at 0.7, 360. Bargaining skill moves the answer by tens of millions; the fallbacks move it by hundreds.

025050075010000150300450600750900What the incumbent could earn without the start-up, d_A, $ millionStart-up's take, V_I, $ millionits own fallback, 150no deal past 850design-around in 2 years: 300patent upheld: 525Equal bargaining weight, 0.5Weight 0.7Weight 0.3
Who owns the bridge sets the toll. The start-up's share does not depend on how good its sensor is alone; it depends on what each side could do without the other. A patent that a court upholds moves the dot from $300 million to $525 million without changing the sensor at all.

Can the start-up build its own channel? It would cost K = 400, well under the 700 it would stop paying, so the money test passes. But it would take T = 4 years against a two-year design-around: the time test fails. By the time the sales force is hired and trained, the incumbent's version is in the hospitals. That failed time test is also why d_I is only 150: a channel finished after the imitator arrives is not a way out, so it adds nothing to the start-up's fallback. Had the build taken one year, owning the channel would have been a real alternative, d_I would have risen toward 1,000 - 400 = 600, and at 600 the surplus 1,000 - 600 - 550 = -150 is negative: there is no deal to strike, the start-up simply builds, and the toll is gone.

Now suppose a court upholds a patent that blocks the design-around, and the incumbent's fallback falls to d_A = 100. The start-up's take becomes 150 + (0.5 x (1,000 - 150 - 100)) = 525, 52.5%. The rise, 225, is exactly beta times the 450 the incumbent lost. Nothing about the sensor changed; only a ruling about who could copy it.

Time does the same work more slowly. With a 10% discount rate, a two-year lag and d_A = 550 imply that the incumbent's own version is worth Y = 665.5 when it launches. A three-year lag makes d_A = 500 and the start-up's take 325; a four-year lag makes d_A = 454.5 and the take 347.7.

0175350525700024681012Years before the incumbent can launch its own version$ million2 years: 3004 years: 348Start-up's take, V_IIncumbent's fallback, d_A
Appropriability is a clock. A stronger patent or know-how that cannot be written down buys years before imitation, and years are worth money only through what they do to the other side's fallback. Even four years of protection lifts the start-up's take from 30% to under 35% here: to take half, the incumbent's version would have to be held off for more than fifteen years.

Each year of lag trims the incumbent's fallback by about 9%, and the start-up gains half of what it loses. For the start-up to take half the value, the incumbent would have to be held off for more than fifteen years: no patent and no secret in this field does that. This is the arithmetic behind the entry's last sentence. A valuation that credits the start-up with half the value is consistent only with the blocking patent, and whether it holds is the question to research.

One more reading helps when a deal is announced. If the start-up licensed the sensor instead and its 30% share were paid as a royalty on a product earning a 40% operating margin (an assumption), the royalty would be 30% of that 40%: profit is 0.40 of each dollar of sales, the start-up's share is 0.30 of that profit, so it collects 0.30 x 0.40 = 0.12 of sales, a 12% royalty. With the blocking patent the share is 52.5%, and 0.525 x 0.40 = 0.21, a 21% royalty. A royalty rate in a filing is a fallback story in disguise: it tells you what the two sides believed about who could do without whom.

The usual mistakes
  • Counting patents as protection. Symptom: "the company holds 200 patents, so it will keep the profit." Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) found managers in most of 130 lines of business rated lead time, learning curves and sales or service efforts above patents for protecting new products. Fix: ask how long a well-funded rival would need to offer an equivalent, and what would stop it. That is L, and it is what moves d_A.
  • Calling an asset specialized when it can be rented. Symptom: an innovator described as captive to a channel when contract manufacturers, contract sales forces or rented computing exist. Fix: look for competitive suppliers; if they exist, d_I is high and the toll is low.
  • Ignoring the timing of the design contest. Before a dominant design emerges, specialized assets matter little, and committing early can bind the innovator to the wrong design. Fix: ask whether the field has settled on a design before treating the channel as the bottleneck.
  • Assuming integration is possible. Symptom: "they can always build their own." Fix: run both halves of the test, K < V_A and T < L, and check the cash. Passing the first and failing the second is the common way to lose.
  • Crediting the product's quality to the innovator. From Step 4, a better product raises the innovator's take by only beta per dollar. Fix: when a thesis says "the product is better, so the company wins," ask who owns what the product needs.
Where the model breaks

The entry is plain about its limits. The framework is verbal; the bargaining arithmetic is Vista's reading of it, and the real split depends on fallbacks no filing states. A patent count says little about protection. An asset is only specialized if there is no competitive supplier. Before a dominant design emerges the whole picture can change, and in network markets the design is settled by tipping, a separate Library model. Integration may be beyond the innovator's cash or time. And the one-market picture does not fit an enabling, general purpose technology: an innovator whose invention feeds a hundred industries cannot own all their complements, and Teece's later work (2018, and with Gambardella, Heaton and Novelli in 2021) treats that case differently. The model also assumes the two sides know the fallbacks; in practice each has reasons to exaggerate its own, which is why the people who know the real lag (patent counsel, engineers who have designed around similar products, former executives of the incumbents) are the ones worth asking.

Check yourself

1. In the sensor example, the start-up improves the product so that Pi rises from 1,000 to 1,100, with both fallbacks unchanged. How much more does it take, and why not 100?

Answer: 50, for a take of 350. From Step 4, a dollar more of joint value adds beta = 0.5 to the innovator. The extra 100 exists only if the two work together, so it is surplus, and surplus is cut by bargaining weight. The incumbent can still walk away to its own version, so it still claims its half.

2. Cospecialized assets lower both fallbacks. If both d_I and d_A fall by 100 in the sensor example, what happens to the start-up's take at a bargaining weight of 0.5, and at 0.7?

Answer: at 0.5, nothing: the start-up loses 0.5 x 100 through its own fallback and gains 0.5 x 100 through the incumbent's. The stakes of the deal rise (the surplus goes from 300 to 500) but the split stays at 300. At 0.7 the start-up loses 0.3 x 100 through its own fallback and gains 0.7 x 100 through the incumbent's, a net 40: it takes 400 instead of 360. Being mutual hostages helps whichever side bargains better.

3. A software firm's tool creates value Pi = 600 when sold through a platform. Alone it could earn d_I = 100; the platform, copying it, d_A = 200; the firm's bargaining weight is 0.4. What does it take? Then compare two moves: hiring a contract sales force that raises d_I to 250, or winning a ruling that cuts d_A to 50. Which is worth more?

Answer: the surplus is 600 - 100 - 200 = 300, so the firm takes 100 + (0.4 x 300) = 220, about 36.7%, and the platform 380. The sales force raises its own fallback by 150, worth (1 - 0.4) x 150 = 90, for a take of 310. The ruling cuts the platform's fallback by 150, worth 0.4 x 150 = 60, for a take of 280. With a bargaining weight below one half, improving your own way out is worth more than closing the other side's.

Teach me more
  • Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy, David J. Teece, Research Policy, 1986 (21 pages; the publisher's page, which may ask for a subscription). The source: the EMI, RC Cola, IBM PC and NutraSweet cases, the three kinds of complementary assets, and the flow chart for when to integrate. It is written in prose for scholars and gives no split in numbers, which is what this lesson adds.
  • Appropriability Strategies to Capture Value from Innovation, Marco Ceccagnoli and Frank Rothaermel, a chapter in Technological Innovation: Generating Economic Results (Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth, volume 26, Emerald, 2016, pages 3 to 31), a free copy hosted at Ceccagnoli's Georgia Tech page. The clearest modern restatement of the two drivers, the strength of protection and who owns the specialized assets, with how they interact, the evidence since 1986, and the TiVo story.
  • How to Capture Value from Innovation: Shaping Intellectual Property and Industry Architecture, Gary Pisano and David Teece, California Management Review, 2007 (the abstract is free; the article is sold). The next step: an innovator need not take the fallbacks as given, and can move them through patents, standards and the way an industry is put together.

The papers behind the Library entry are Teece (1986), above; Nash, "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, 1950, whose split this lesson borrows; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987, the survey behind the first of the usual mistakes; and Teece, "Reflections on 'Profiting from Innovation'", Research Policy, 2006, the author's own look back twenty years later.

Dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen)

Dynamic capabilities: whether management can rebuild the advantage when its market shifts

We separate what a company does well today from its capacity to change what it does. Teece calls the first ordinary capabilities and the second dynamic capabilities: sensing a shift early, seizing it with capital and a changed business model, and transforming the organization to match. Ordinary capability shows in today's margins against peers; dynamic capability shows only in the record of earlier shifts, so we read it there: how much capital the company moved toward the new opportunity, how fast, and whether its return recovered faster than its peers' after the same shock. Then we ask whether that record sits in repeatable processes or in one or two executives, because the second leaves with them.

Born to answer
Strategic Management Journal, 1997; sensing, seizing and reconfiguring, 2007.
What it does now
Whether management can rebuild an advantage when its market shifts.
The mathematics
R = (1/2) x sum of |a_j(t) - a_j(t - k)|; gap halves every ln 2 / -ln(1 - b) years
The full entry
Where it began

Teece, Pisano and Shuen set out dynamic capabilities in a working paper around 1990; Teece and Pisano published the idea in 1994, and the three in the Strategic Management Journal in 1997: where technology changes fast, advantage rests on processes shaped by a firm's assets and history, and finding new opportunities and organizing to embrace them matter more than moves against rivals. Teece's 2007 paper split the capability into sensing, seizing and reconfiguring and named its microfoundations, and his 2014 paper set out the distinction between ordinary and dynamic capabilities, which Winter (2003) had also drawn, adding that change can come from ad hoc problem solving. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argued that the capabilities are identifiable processes, such as product development and alliancing, with best practices common across firms. The evidence cited here comes from single industries: Helfat (1997) found that oil companies with more complementary know-how and assets did more coal conversion research as oil prices rose, and Adner and Helfat (2003) found significant time-varying corporate effects within one industry; Arend and Bromiley (2009) argued that the view still lacked a coherent foundation and strong empirical support.

Why it works now

A company's earlier shifts are recorded in segment notes, acquisition and divestiture filings, capital spending by segment and executive histories, spread across decades of filings that were rarely assembled. They can now be read and joined, and redeployment and recovery computed for the company and its peers outside the conversation. Whether the moves came from a process or a person is still known only to the executives and directors who were there.

When it applies

A thesis rests on a company adapting to a shift it did not cause (a new technology, a regulation, a new kind of rival, a change in what customers buy), and the question is whether management will rebuild the advantage or defend the old one: an incumbent facing a technology transition, a conglomerate redeploying capital, a company whose founder or long-serving chief executive is leaving, a turnaround. Not to be confused with profitability-fade, the base rate at which high returns revert, creative-destruction, which prices the hazard that a replacement arrives, or organizational-complements, which asks whether a technology pays only with the reorganization around it: this asks whether this management has shown, in earlier shifts, the capacity to reconfigure, and whether that capacity will outlast the people who exercised it.

What we would ask

When the company's market or technology last shifted, how long did it take to move capital and people toward the new opportunity, and what did it stop doing?
Who made those decisions, and would the company make them the same way if those people left?

What it needs

Segment revenue, operating income and assets for at least ten years, with the dates of the shifts the company faced, and the same for peers that faced them; capital expenditure, research, acquisitions and divestitures by segment; the share of revenue from businesses entered or rebuilt in the last five years; executive tenure and turnover, and who led each major reallocation.

How we would get it

The Desk computes, from filings, the redeployment of assets across segments after each shift, the recovery of the company's return against its peers, and the share of revenue from new businesses. Former executives and directors say how each shift was noticed and decided, whether a process or a person drove it, and what the company declined to do, which no filing records.

Where it breaks

Success called a capability after the fact, which makes the idea circular; Arend and Bromiley (2009) found the view short of a coherent foundation and of empirical support, so the capability must be read from the record before the next shift and tested against it; activity counted as capability, when acquisitions and reorganizations can destroy value, so redeployment counts only where the return recovers; a capability vested in one executive taken for an organizational one, a risk Teece (2012) illustrates with Apple's record with and without Steve Jobs; cost forgotten, since change can also come from ad hoc problem solving (Winter 2003) and constant transformation is costly (Teece, Peteraf and Leih 2016); a lack of written process read as weakness in fast markets, where the processes that work are simple and experiential (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).

For example

Two coatings makers faced the same shift from 2016, when their largest customers moved from solvent-based to waterborne products, and each company's return on capital fell from 4 points above the peer median to 2 below. Over four years A moved a quarter of its operating assets between segments, from shares of 50, 30 and 20 percent to 25, 30 and 45 (R = 0.5 x (0.25 + 0 + 0.25) = 0.25); B moved 4 percent. A closed the 6-point gap at 0.40 a year, a half-life of ln 2 / -ln 0.60 = 1.36 years; B at 0.12, 5.42 years; the peer median at 0.20, 3.11 years. After four years A was 0.78 points short of its old margin (6 x 0.6^4) and B 3.60 points short (6 x 0.88^4). A thesis that B will adapt as A did rests on a capability its record does not show; whether A's moves came from a process or from a chief executive since retired is the research question.

The mathematics in fullRedeployment over k years is R = (1/2) x sum over segments j of |a_j(t) - a_j(t - k)|, with a_j segment j's share of operating assets: 0 when nothing moved, 1 when everything did. After a shift at t0 the gap between the company's return on capital and its old margin over the peer median closes as x(t + 1) - x(t) = b (x_0 - x(t)), so the gap left after h years is (x_0 - x(t0)) (1 - b)^h and halves every ln 2 / -ln(1 - b) years, about ln 2 / b for small b, to be set beside the peers' b and the base rate of profitability-fade. The renewal share is N = revenue from businesses entered or rebuilt in the last five years / total revenue. Adner and Helfat (2003) find time-varying corporate effects significant within one industry, which is why the comparison is with peers facing the same shift. Where it is in the books

Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, Strategic Management Journal; Teece (2007), Explicating dynamic capabilities, Strategic Management Journal: sensing, seizing and reconfiguring; Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management (2009), Chapter 1, The Nature and Microfoundations of (Sustainable) Enterprise Performance, and Chapter 3, The Foundations of Dynamic Capabilities (with Mie Augier); Teece (2014), The Foundations of Enterprise Performance, Academy of Management Perspectives: ordinary and dynamic capabilities; Teece (2012), Dynamic Capabilities: Routines versus Entrepreneurial Action, Journal of Management Studies; Teece, Peteraf and Leih (2016), Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Agility, California Management Review; Arend and Bromiley (2009), Assessing the dynamic capabilities view: spare change, everyone?, Strategic Organization: the critique

Sources

Teece, Pisano, Shuen (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 18(7), 509-533. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199708)18:7<509::aid-smj882>3.0.co;2-z
Teece (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal 28(13), 1319-1350. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.640
Teece (2009). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: Organizing for Innovation and Growth. Oxford University Press. (book)
Teece (2014). The Foundations of Enterprise Performance: Dynamic and Ordinary Capabilities in an (Economic) Theory of Firms. Academy of Management Perspectives 28(4), 328-352. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2013.0116
Teece (2012). Dynamic Capabilities: Routines versus Entrepreneurial Action. Journal of Management Studies 49(8), 1395-1401. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01080.x
Teece, Peteraf, Leih (2016). Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Agility: Risk, Uncertainty, and Strategy in the Innovation Economy. California Management Review 58(4), 13-35. https://doi.org/10.1525/cmr.2016.58.4.13
Teece (2018). Business models and dynamic capabilities. Long Range Planning 51(1), 40-49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2017.06.007
Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter (2007). Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organizations. Blackwell. (book)
Winter (2003). Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 24(10), 991-995. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.318
Eisenhardt, Martin (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic Management Journal 21(10-11), 1105-1121. https://doi.org/10.1002/1097-0266(200010/11)21:10/11<1105::aid-smj133>3.0.co;2-e
Helfat (1997). Know-how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability accumulation: the case of R&D. Strategic Management Journal 18(5), 339-360. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199705)18:5<339::aid-smj883>3.0.co;2-7
Adner, Helfat (2003). Corporate effects and dynamic managerial capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 24(10), 1011-1025. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.331
Arend, Bromiley (2009). Assessing the dynamic capabilities view: spare change, everyone? Strategic Organization 7(1), 75-90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127008100132
Fama, French (2000). Forecasting Profitability and Earnings. The Journal of Business 73(2), 161-175. https://doi.org/10.1086/209638

R&D races (Loury; Reinganum; Harris and Vickers), with the catch-up arch

The R&D race: who chases a lead, how hard, and how much of it survives

We value a technological lead by what catching up is worth to the best-funded rival and what it would cost, not by how long the lead has lasted or how large it is. In the race models a rival chooses how hard to chase and the prize sets the pace; in the catch-up arch, the reduced form Vista uses, a rival facing a lead of size q wins g q a by closing it with probability a and pays c a^2 / 2 to try, so it chases at a = min(1, k q) with k = g / c, and the lead that survives, q (1 - k q), rises with the lead at first and then falls, to nothing at q = 1 / k. We measure the lead in the unit the market prices, estimate the prize and the cost of the chase from the rivals' budgets and from past chases in the line, and compute the share of the lead the figures say will survive and the value the leader earns on the way. Then we ask the one question that decides the shape: does copying get more expensive as the lead grows? Where it does, the best lead keeps the most; where it does not, the best lead is chased hardest. And we read a long record of stable share and margins for what it measures, the prize times the lead, which a small prize can produce as easily as a strong lead.

Born to answer
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979; Review of Economic Studies, 1985 and 1987; the arch in Vista Inquiry No. 12, 2026.
What it does now
How much of a technological lead survives the chase its value provokes.
The mathematics
a* = min(1, k q), k = g / c; R(q) = q (1 - k q), peaking at q = 1 / (2k)
The full entry
Where it began

The race models grew from the question Glenn Loury opened his 1979 paper with, whether Adam Smith's competition or Schumpeter's momentary monopoly does more for invention: in his model of identical firms racing for a prize under uncertainty, more rivals make each firm spend less yet each still invests more than is socially optimal, and free entry dissipates the prize as in a common pool; Tom Lee and Louis Wilde (1980) showed that with R&D as a variable cost rather than a fixed commitment more rivalry raises each firm's spending, so the sign turns on the cost structure; and Jennifer Reinganum (1982) put the race in continuous time, where perfect patent protection speeds development and rewarded imitation can reverse the effect of rivalry. Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983) found that an arbitrarily small head start can preempt a race unless a laggard can leapfrog, Christopher Harris and John Vickers (1985, 1987) that a race's winner often behaves as if alone and that under uncertainty the leader works harder than the follower and both work harder as the gap closes, and Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro (1987) the same in a two-stage race; Reinganum's 1989 Handbook chapter surveys the field, with the warning that the results turn on whether discovery is certain. The catch-up arch, the reduced form used here, was set out by Russ W. Rosenzweig in Vista Inquiry No. 12 (October 2026) as a way to ask the question the race models answer in general: how much of a lead survives the chase it provokes.

Why it works now

The prize to a chaser and the cost of the chase are recorded in the rivals' budgets, hiring, capital spending and licensing, in the imitation lags of past episodes in the line and in the leader's own pace of improvement, records that were rarely read together. They can now be assembled quickly, the lead measured in the unit the market prices, and the arch computed at the implied prize and at the prize a larger market would imply, outside the conversation. What the chase really costs, and whether the next step is harder than the last, is still known best to the engineers who have tried to copy the product and to the executives who paid for the attempt.

When it applies

A thesis values a technological lead by how long it has lasted or how large it is, without asking what catching up is worth to the best-funded rival and what it would cost: an AI model or chip said to be a generation ahead, a drug after its exclusivity ends, a published investment strategy, any argument from a moat. Not to be confused with competition-and-innovation, the inverted U between competition and innovation across industries, which this entry's arch rhymes with on different axes; creative-destruction, which prices how long an incumbent's rents last against the research aimed at its line; profitability-fade, the base rate at which high returns revert; or profiting-from-innovation, which asks who captures the profit once the race is run: this asks how much of a given lead survives the chase its own value provokes.

What we would ask

If the best-funded rival set out to close this lead, what would it win in customers and profit, what would it cost in money and time, and has anyone inside that rival priced the attempt?
Does each further step of the lead cost a copier more than the last (complementary assets, know-how that cannot be written down, a system that must be rebuilt whole), or about the same?

What it needs

The lead measured in a unit the market prices (performance per dollar, efficacy, cost per unit, time to market) and scaled against the largest lead the market could reward; the prize to a rival per unit of lead closed (the leader's revenue and margin in the contested segment, and the share past chasers took when they caught up); the chaser's cost of closing it (its spending aimed at the line, its hiring and capital commitments, the imitation lags of past episodes); whether that cost rises with the size of the lead (the share of the lead that sits in complementary assets, tacit know-how or integrated systems); the leader's own pace of improvement; and the record of past chases in the line, who chased, at what cost, and whether they gave up, caught up or leapfrogged.

How we would get it

The Desk measures the lead in the market's unit, estimates the prize and the cost of the chase from the rivals' disclosed budgets, hiring and capital spending and from past episodes in the line, and computes the arch at the implied prize-to-cost ratio and at the ratio a larger market would imply: the rival's effort, the share of the lead that survives, the value earned on the way, and whether the record's persistence is consistent with a small prize as well as a strong lead. Engineers who have tried to copy the product, former executives of the chasers and customers who have run both say what the chase really costs and whether the next step is harder than the last, which no filing records.

Where it breaks

The prize measured as the leader's whole market rather than the rival's gain from closing the lead, which overstates k when a chaser would win only part of it; copying cost assumed constant when it rises with complexity or with complementary assets, as in the few industries where Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) found product patents highly effective, drugs among them, where the arch flattens and the best lead keeps the most; the leader assumed to stand still, when it also runs, so the lead is the difference of two speeds and the record is a Red Queen's race; a long record of high returns read as a strong lead when persistence measures k q and may mean a small prize; and the model's one-shot simplification, where the literature has a race in continuous time with uncertainty in which the leader works harder than the follower and both work harder as the gap closes (Harris and Vickers 1987; Grossman and Shapiro 1987), a small head start can preempt the race outright, and a laggard can leapfrog when the race has stages (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole 1983).

For example

Novo Nordisk's semaglutide was the best technology of its kind when Wegovy was approved in June 2021, and the prize for catching it was the largest in pharmaceuticals. Eli Lilly's tirzepatide sold about a seventh as much in the first quarter of 2023, pulled even in the second quarter of 2025 and passed it in the third, about four years and four months after Wegovy's approval. In the arch at k = 1 with b = d = 1, a lead of 0.8 provokes a chase of a = 0.8, keeps 0.8 x (1 - 0.8) = 0.16 and earns 0.8 + 0.16 = 0.96 on the way, while a lead of 0.4 provokes a = 0.4, keeps 0.4 x 0.6 = 0.24 and earns 0.64: the bigger lead earns 50 percent more and keeps two thirds as much, and the reversal holds whenever 1 < k (qH + qL) < 1 + b / d, here 1.2. At k = 2 the peak moves to q = 0.25 and every lead above 0.5 is caught entirely. In AI chips, Broadcom's AI semiconductor revenue, between 11 and 14 percent of NVIDIA's data center revenue in matched quarters from 2024 through the first quarter of 2026, reached 18.8 percent in the second quarter of 2026, from about one eighth to almost one fifth. A thesis that reads NVIDIA's years of high margins as a strong lead is reading k q; the research question is k, what the lead is worth to the chasers' customers and what closing it costs them.

The mathematics in fullA leader holds a lead q, measured in the unit the market prices and scaled so that 1 is the largest lead the market could reward. A rival that closes it with probability a wins g q a and pays c a^2 / 2, so it chooses a* = min(1, k q) with k = g / c, the prize for catching up divided by its cost. The lead that survives is R(q) = q (1 - k q), which rises to a peak of 1 / (4k) at q = 1 / (2k) and falls to zero at q = 1 / k, where the chase becomes a certainty; the value earned on the way is V(q) = b q + d R(q), with b weighing the years before the rival arrives and d the years after. For two leads below saturation, R(qH) - R(qL) = (qH - qL) (1 - k (qH + qL)), so the bigger lead earns more and keeps less exactly when 1 < k (qH + qL) < 1 + b / d. When the cost of copying rises with the lead as q^gamma, a* = min(1, k0 q^(1 - gamma)); for gamma below 1 the peak moves out to q = (1 / ((2 - gamma) k0))^(1 / (1 - gamma)), and for gamma of 1 or more the surviving lead never falls. The share of a lead that survives is 1 - k q, so a record of persistence measures k q, the prize times the lead, and cannot by itself tell a lead too hard to copy from one not worth copying. The arch is a one-period reduced form of the race models: Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) on how the number of rivals moves each firm's effort, with the sign turning on whether R&D is a fixed or a variable cost; Reinganum (1982) on investment rules with perfect patent protection and with rewarded imitation; Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987) on the leader's advantage and on racing under uncertainty; Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983) on when a small head start preempts and when a laggard can leapfrog. Where it is in the books

Loury (1979), Market Structure and Innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics: section II, the model; section III, competitive entry and long-run equilibrium; section IV, welfare analysis of industry equilibria; Lee and Wilde (1980), Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics: section IV, fixed against variable costs in the R&D technology; Reinganum (1982), A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior, Econometrica; Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983), Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races, European Economic Review; Harris and Vickers (1985), Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race, and (1987), Racing with Uncertainty, Review of Economic Studies; Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Dynamic R&D Competition, Economic Journal; Reinganum (1989), The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 1, Chapter 14: section 2, symmetric models; section 3, asymmetric models; Vista Inquiry No. 12, The Sincerest Flattery (Russ W. Rosenzweig, October 2026): the catch-up arch, the reduced form used here

Sources

Loury (1979). Market Structure and Innovation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(3), 395. https://doi.org/10.2307/1883165
Lee, Wilde (1980). Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94(2), 429. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884551
Reinganum (1982). A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior. Econometrica 50(3), 671. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912607
Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, Tirole (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races. European Economic Review 22(1), 3-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(83)90087-9
Harris, Vickers (1985). Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race. The Review of Economic Studies 52(2), 193. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297616
Harris, Vickers (1987). Racing with Uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies 54(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297442
Grossman, Shapiro (1987). Dynamic R&D Competition. The Economic Journal 97(386), 372. https://doi.org/10.2307/2232884
Reinganum (1989). The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 849-908. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01017-4
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2005). Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), 701-728. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.2.701
Mansfield (1985). How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out? The Journal of Industrial Economics 34(2), 217. https://doi.org/10.2307/2098683
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter (1987). Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987(3), 783. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534454
Fama, French (2000). Forecasting Profitability and Earnings. The Journal of Business 73(2), 161-175. https://doi.org/10.1086/209638

Endogenous growth and nonrival ideas (Romer)

Ideas are nonrival: why knowledge businesses scale

We separate a business built on an idea from one built on things. Romer's point is that an idea, a design, a model, a formula, a dataset, can be used by any number of people at once without being used up, where a machine or an hour of labor cannot; so a business whose product is an idea pays its cost once and sells it again and again at almost no further cost, its average cost falls without limit, and it earns a profit only if it can keep others from using the idea (patents, secrecy, data, a standard) and price above marginal cost. We measure the fixed cost of the idea against the cost of one more use, the share of revenue that is margin at scale, how excludable the idea is and for how long, and whether the stock of ideas the business draws on is growing or getting harder to add to.

Born to answer
Journal of Political Economy, 1990.
What it does now
Why an idea business scales, and what keeps others off the idea.
The mathematics
Average cost F / Q + c falls toward c; dA/dt = delta L_A A^phi
The full entry
Where it began

Kenneth Arrow set out in 1962 why information is an unusual good: once produced it costs nothing to share and is hard to keep others from using, so markets produce too little of it. Paul Romer, in his 1983 dissertation and his 1986 paper, built a model of growth in which knowledge has increasing returns, and in 1990 the model that carries his name: ideas are nonrival, so an economy's output has increasing returns in ideas and the things that use them, and because ideas must be paid for, the economy runs on monopolistic competition rather than perfect competition. Charles Jones (1995) showed that the model's prediction that more researchers mean faster growth had failed in the data, and rewrote it so that growth depends on the growth of research effort; Martin Weitzman (1998) made new ideas combinations of old ones. Romer shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics with William Nordhaus. David Warsh's Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations (2006) tells the story of the paper, and Haskel and Westlake (2017) carried the properties of ideas into the accounts of companies.

Why it works now

Development and training costs, per-use costs, volumes and prices are disclosed or can be estimated for most knowledge businesses, and the average cost curve, the recovery volume and the margin at scale can be computed outside the conversation. How fast a rival could reproduce the idea, and at what cost, is still known best to the engineers who have built the equivalent.

When it applies

Software, AI models, drugs after discovery, media, designs and data businesses; a thesis about margins at scale; a question whether a low price is predatory or simply marginal cost; a question how long an idea can be kept exclusive; a growth forecast for an economy or a sector that rests on the pace of discovery. Not to be confused with experience-curve-profit, where the unit cost of a physical product falls with cumulative output; digital-profit or de-facto-standard-profit, which test a company already earning from a digital design or a standard; useful-knowledge, which asks whether a technology can keep improving; or general-purpose-technology, which asks where the value of a pervasive technology lands: this asks what follows from a product that is nonrival, and how excludable it is.

What we would ask

What did the idea cost to create, what does one more use cost, and at the current volume what is the average cost per use?
What stops a rival from using the same idea, how long will that last, and what does it cost to keep up with the ideas the business itself depends on?

What it needs

The fixed cost of creating the product (development, training, discovery), the marginal cost of one more unit or use (serving, computing, distribution), volumes and prices, the means of exclusion and their term (patents and their expiry, secrecy, access to data, contracts), the record of imitation in the field, and the research effort behind the field's own progress.

How we would get it

The Desk computes average and marginal cost at present and projected volumes, the volume at which the fixed cost is recovered at a given price, and the margin at scale, and reads patents, licenses and the imitation record for how long exclusion holds. What the record cannot show is how fast a rival could reproduce the idea and what it would cost; engineers who have built the equivalent and former licensing executives know that.

Where it breaks

A rival good (a device, a server hour, a person's time) read as an idea because software is involved; marginal cost taken as zero when serving, computing and support costs are real and scale with use; exclusion assumed permanent when patents expire and secrets leak; the increasing returns of the idea confused with a monopoly earned by something else; and growth from ideas extrapolated when Jones (1995) showed that with more researchers each idea gets harder to find, so the long-run rate depends on the growth of research effort, and Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb (2020) measured the decline.

For example

A company spends $1 billion to build an AI model and $0.002 of computing to answer each query. At 10 billion queries a year the average cost of a query is $0.102; at 100 billion it is $0.012; at 1 trillion it is $0.003, and it keeps falling toward the $0.002 of marginal cost, which it never reaches. A price at marginal cost never recovers the $1 billion; at a price of $0.01 the company needs 125 billion queries to recover it, and every query after that earns $0.008 of margin. The thesis therefore rests on two things the cost curve does not show: how long rivals can be kept from an equivalent model, and whether the next model costs $1 billion or $10 billion to build. Doubling both the stock of ideas and the people using them quadruples output in Romer's model; whether the stock keeps doubling depends on research productivity, which has been falling.

The mathematics in fullA good is nonrival when one person's use leaves it fully available to others, and excludable when others can be kept from using it (Romer 1990). With a fixed cost F to create an idea and a marginal cost c per use, average cost is F / Q + c, falling toward c without limit, so price must exceed c and the idea recovers F only under some exclusion; the volume that recovers F at price p is F / (p - c). Output Y = A x F(K, L), with A the nonrival stock of ideas, has increasing returns in (A, K, L) together: doubling all three more than doubles Y. Romer (1990): the stock of ideas grows as dA/dt = delta L_A A, so its growth rate is delta L_A; Jones (1995): dA/dt = delta L_A A^phi with phi < 1, so the long-run growth rate is n / (1 - phi), with n the growth of research effort, and a constant research force gives falling growth. Where it comes from

Romer (1986), Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, and (1990), Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy; Romer (1994), The Origins of Endogenous Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives; Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention: the properties of information as a good; Jones (1995), R and D-Based Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Political Economy; Jones and Romer (2010), The New Kaldor Facts, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics; Weitzman (1998), Recombinant Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb (2020), Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?, American Economic Review; Warsh, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations (2006), the history of the 1990 paper; Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules (1999), chapters 1 to 3 on the cost structure of information goods; Haskel and Westlake, Capitalism without Capital (2017), the four properties of intangibles

Sources

Romer (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political Economy 94(5), 1002-1037. https://doi.org/10.1086/261420
Romer (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98(5, Part 2), S71-S102. https://doi.org/10.1086/261725
Romer (1994). The Origins of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(1), 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.1.3
Jones (1995). R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy 103(4), 759-784. https://doi.org/10.1086/262002
Jones, Romer (2010). The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Population, and Human Capital. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(1), 224-245. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.2.1.224
Weitzman (1998). Recombinant Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2), 331-360. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555595
Arrow (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, 609-626. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400879762-024
Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, Webb (2020). Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? American Economic Review 110(4), 1104-1144. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180338
Warsh (2006). Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery. W. W. Norton. (book)
Shapiro and Varian (1999). Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Harvard Business School Press. (book)
Haskel and Westlake (2017). Capitalism without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy. Princeton University Press. (book)

Contests, wars and the bargain behind them

Why rivals fight when a settlement would serve both, what the fighting reveals, who quits first, where to concentrate, how far strength reaches, and whether the other side has a way out.

Drawn from Sun Tzu's The Art of War (Lionel Giles's translation, 1910; Samuel Griffith's, 1963) and Carl von Clausewitz's On War (Michael Howard and Peter Paret's edition, 1976), and from the formal theory that grew from them: Lanchester, Richardson, Borel, von Neumann, Boulding, Schelling, Maynard Smith, and the bargaining theory of war from Fearon on. The readings for investment research, the tests and the worked examples are Vista's.

The bargaining theory of war (Fearon; Powell)

If fighting destroys value, why are they fighting?

Sun Tzu put the highest skill in breaking the other side's resistance without a battle, and Clausewitz called war policy carried on by other means; James Fearon turned both into a theorem. Because a fight burns value that a settlement would have kept, there is always a split both sides prefer to fighting, and a contest that goes on anyway needs a reason. There are only three. One side knows something about its own strength or resolve that it cannot credibly reveal, so a bluff and a real threat look alike. The side growing stronger cannot promise not to use its future strength, so the side losing ground fights while it still can. Or the prize cannot be divided. When two companies, a company and its workers, an activist and a board, or a bidder and a target are fighting, or are about to, we work out the range of settlements, how wide it is, which of the three reasons keeps it closed, and what would open it: a credible disclosure, a binding long-term term, or a way to divide what looked indivisible.

Born to answer
International Organization, 1995 and 2006; Sun Tzu and Clausewitz before them.
What it does now
Why a costly contest is happening at all, and what would end it.
The mathematics
Fight only if no split x with p - c_A <= x <= p + c_B can be agreed
The full entry
Where it began

The Art of War, attributed to Sun Tzu and compiled in China in the fifth or fourth century BC, ranks the ways to win and puts victory without battle first, the destruction of armies lower and the siege of cities last. Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian officer who fought Napoleon, left On War unfinished at his death in 1831; his widow published it, and its first chapter makes war an instrument of policy rather than an end. James Fearon (1995) asked the question both books imply: if fighting is costly and both sides can foresee its outcome, why do they not agree on that outcome and save the cost? His answer, that only private information, commitment problems or indivisible stakes can explain it, became the foundation of the bargaining theory of war, and Robert Powell (2006) showed how large, rapid shifts in power produce fights that no offer can prevent. Economists found the same commitment problem in markets: Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer and Song Ma (2021) showed that some acquisitions of drug projects end them, an incumbent paying to stop a future rival before it can compete.

Why it works now

Each side's prospects and costs sit in filings, vote tallies, strike-fund statements and price data, and the range between them can be computed in code for every contest a portfolio is exposed to. What the record cannot say is what each side privately believes, and whether a long contract would bind; people who sat across the table in earlier rounds know that.

When it applies

A strike or a lockout, a proxy contest or an activist campaign, a hostile bid, a price war, a standoff with a regulator, or an incumbent buying a fast-growing entrant's project before it can compete; any contest a thesis assumes will end one way or the other. Not to be confused with why-deals-fail, which asks why a sale both sides would gain from does not close when each side's value is private; price-war-or-truce, which asks when a standing truce breaks; or credible-commitment, which tests a single promise or threat: this entry asks why a costly fight is happening at all, and which of three causes keeps the settlement out of reach.

What we would ask

What does each side expect to get by fighting it out, and what will the fight cost each of them?
Is either side about to grow stronger in a way it cannot promise not to use, and could a long-term contract lock today's split in place?

What it needs

Each side's prospects if the contest runs to the end (vote counts and holder lists in a proxy contest, strike funds and inventory in a labor fight, cash and unit costs in a price war), each side's cost of fighting per period, what each side has disclosed about its own strength and what it could disclose credibly, and whether the balance of power is about to move: a technology, a patent expiry, capacity coming on line, a financing that runs out.

How we would get it

The Desk works out each side's expected payoff from fighting and the settlement range between them from filings, vote tallies, strike-fund and inventory figures and the cost of each quarter of fighting, and says which of the three causes the record points to. What the documents do not show is what each side privately believes about its own strength, and whether a long-term term would bind; former negotiators on both sides, proxy solicitors, labor economists and the people who ran earlier rounds know that.

Where it breaks

The payoffs from fighting cannot be estimated, so the range is a guess; one side values the fight itself, as a reputation for toughness to be used in later contests (Kreps and Wilson), which raises its payoff from fighting; the decision is made by an agent whose own payoff differs from the organization's (a union leader facing election, a chief executive protecting a job), so the range for the agent is not the range for the firm; and the theory explains why a fight happens, not which side wins it.

For example

A company and its union bargain over $100 million a year of profit. If they strike, the union expects to come away with 40% of it, but the strike costs the union $10 million and the company $30 million. Any contract giving the union between $30 million and $70 million a year beats a strike for both sides: a range $40 million wide, exactly the two sides' costs added together. Now let automation be coming: a strike next year would win the union only 10%. Measure everything in years of profit, with profit and costs recurring every year and a discount factor of 0.9. A strike now that locks in today's split, 40% less the strike's cost of 10%, is worth 0.3 / (1 - 0.9) = 3 years of profit to the union; peace is worth at most 1, because the company can promise everything this year but, once the machines arrive, will offer only what a strike would then win, which is nothing after its cost. The union strikes, though a settlement range exists today. A six-year contract that fixes the split and limits automation removes the commitment problem, and with it the reason to strike.

The mathematics in fullNormalize the prize to 1. If they fight, side A expects a share p and the fight costs the sides c_A and c_B, as shares of the prize. Any split x for A with p - c_A <= x <= p + c_B leaves both better off than fighting, a range of width c_A + c_B > 0 (Fearon 1995). Three things can keep a fight going anyway: private information with a reason to misrepresent it, so an offer one type would accept is refused by another; a commitment problem; and an indivisible prize. In a simple version of the commitment problem (Powell 2006), the prize is 1 per period, future periods are discounted by d, and A's share from fighting falls from p0 today to p1 from tomorrow on. The most A can be promised in peace is the whole of today's prize and then only its future fighting value, 1 + d (p1 - c_A) / (1 - d), against (p0 - c_A) / (1 - d) from fighting now; so A fights now when d (p0 - p1) > (1 - d)(1 + c_A - p0), which large shifts and patient players satisfy. Where it comes from

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chapter 3 (Lionel Giles's translation, 1910): the highest skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting.; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret's edition, 1976): war as the continuation of policy by other means.; Fearon (1995), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49(3): the bargaining range and its three causes of war.; Powell (2006), War as a Commitment Problem, International Organization 60(1): shifts in power that the rising side cannot promise not to use.

Sources

Fearon (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49(3), 379-414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324
Powell (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization 60(1), 169-203. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061
Reiter (2003). Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1(1), 27-43. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592703000033
Kreps, Wilson (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8
Cunningham, Ederer, Ma (2021). Killer Acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy 129(3), 649-702. https://doi.org/10.1086/712506
Sun Tzu (1910). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes by Lionel Giles. Luzac and Co. (book)
Clausewitz (1976). On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (revised 1984). Princeton University Press. (book)

Fighting as information and the principle of convergence (Wagner; Slantchev; Smith and Stam)

What will the fighting itself reveal, and when will they settle?

Clausewitz saw that real war seldom runs to the extreme of theory, because each side learns as it goes and policy keeps a hand on the fighting; the bargaining theory of war makes the learning exact. Contests start because the two sides disagree about how a fight would go, and each round of fighting is evidence that both of them read. When the evidence has moved their beliefs close enough together that a settlement both prefer appears, they settle. So the length of a strike, a price war or a proxy fight is not random: it depends on how far apart the two sides began, how much each round reveals and how much each round costs. We write down each side's starting view of the contest, read each round's result as evidence for both, and estimate when the gap will close, and which result would close it at once.

Born to answer
American Journal of Political Science, 2000; American Political Science Review, 2003.
What it does now
How long a contest lasts, and which result would end it.
The mathematics
Settle once (w_s - w_w)(b_C - b_I) < combined cost of a round
The full entry
Where it began

Clausewitz distinguished war as theory would push it, to the extreme, from real war, which unfolds over time, pauses and stays under policy's control. Harrison Wagner (2000) argued that fighting is part of the bargaining rather than its failure, and a group of formal models followed: William Filson and Suzanne Werner (2002) and Branislav Slantchev (2003), who called it the principle of convergence, showed that battles reveal each side's strength until expectations meet, and Alastair Smith and Allan Stam (2004) showed that wars end when the two sides' beliefs converge. Robert Powell (2004) worked out how a side should bargain while it learns from the fighting.

Why it works now

A contest's rounds now arrive as data, weekly share figures, vote counts, quarterly results, and each side's statements can be read as a stated belief and updated in code. What the data cannot show is what each side privately makes of each result.

When it applies

A contest is under way and the question is how long it lasts and how it ends: a strike in its second week, a price war in its second quarter, an activist campaign after a first vote, a standards contest after the first large customer chose. Also before a contest, to judge whether the two sides' public statements are far enough apart to make one likely. Not to be confused with the-bargain-behind-the-fight, which asks why a costly fight happens at all, or war-of-attrition-and-exit, which asks who quits first when the fighting reveals nothing new: here the fighting is informative, and settlement follows the evidence.

What we would ask

How far apart are the two sides' views of how this contest ends, and what has each said that shows it?
What would the next round's result tell both sides, and which result would end it?

What it needs

Each side's stated or implied expectation of the outcome (guidance, letters to holders, strike-fund statements, management's commentary on share), the result of each round as it arrives (weekly share data, a vote count, a customer's choice, a quarter's results), and the cost of each round to each side.

How we would get it

The Desk turns each side's statements into a starting view, reads each round's result as evidence for both, updates both views and estimates how many more rounds would bring them within the settlement range. What the record cannot show is what each side privately believes and how it reads each result; people who sat on either side of earlier rounds, and the analysts who track the contest weekly, know that.

Where it breaks

The rounds reveal little (results are noise, or each side can explain any result away), so the beliefs need not converge; the disagreement is about the other side's resolve rather than its strength, which the fighting may never reveal; the stated views are bargaining positions, not beliefs; and a contest can end for reasons outside the model, a change of leadership or a buyer for one side.

For example

A challenger cuts prices to take share from an incumbent. If the challenger is strong, it wins any given quarter's contest for share with probability 0.7; if weak, with 0.3. The challenger believes it is strong with probability 0.6; the incumbent puts it at 0.2. Their expectations of a quarter's result therefore differ by (0.7 - 0.3) x (0.6 - 0.2) = 0.16; suppose a settlement both prefer appears once that difference is below 0.08, the cost of a quarter of fighting to the two together as a share of what is at stake. The challenger is in fact weak. After one losing quarter both update by Bayes's rule: the challenger's belief falls to 0.391 and the incumbent's to 0.097, and the difference in expected results to 0.118. After a second losing quarter they stand at 0.216 and 0.044, a difference of 0.069, inside the range, and the price war ends two quarters after it began. A winning quarter for the challenger would have kept it going: decisive early results end contests, and evenly matched ones last.

The mathematics in fullEach side i holds a belief b_i that the challenger is the strong type, which wins a round with probability w_s against w_w for the weak type, so side i expects the challenger to win with probability w_w + (w_s - w_w) b_i. After a round the challenger loses, each belief updates by Bayes's rule: b' = b (1 - w_s) / (b (1 - w_s) + (1 - b)(1 - w_w)). A settlement both prefer exists once (w_s - w_w)(b_C - b_I) falls below the combined cost of a round as a share of the stake, so contests are shorter when rounds are more revealing (w_s - w_w larger) and costlier (Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Slantchev 2003; Smith and Stam 2004; Powell 2004). Where it comes from

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, book 1 (Howard and Paret, 1976): real war differs from war in theory because it unfolds over time and under policy's control.; Wagner (2000), Bargaining and War, American Journal of Political Science 44(3): fighting as part of the bargaining, not its breakdown.; Slantchev (2003), The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations, American Political Science Review 97(4): fighting reveals information until expectations converge and the war ends.; Smith and Stam (2004), Bargaining and the Nature of War, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6): wars end when the two sides' beliefs converge.

Sources

Wagner (2000). Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44(3), 469. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669259
Filson, Werner (2002). A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. American Journal of Political Science 46(4), 819. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088436
Slantchev (2003). The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations. American Political Science Review 97(4), 621-632. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055403000911
Smith, Stam (2004). Bargaining and the Nature of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6), 783-813. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704268026
Powell (2004). Bargaining and Learning While Fighting. American Journal of Political Science 48(2), 344-361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00074.x
Beyerchen (1992). Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War. International Security 17(3), 59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539130
Clausewitz (1976). On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (revised 1984). Princeton University Press. (book)

The war of attrition and exit from declining industries (Maynard Smith; Ghemawat and Nalebuff)

Who quits first, and what does the waiting cost?

Some contests are won by outlasting, not by any one blow: two rivals each lose money every quarter they both stay, and the prize goes to whoever is left. John Maynard Smith gave this war of attrition its exact form, and its lesson is unsettling. When the rivals are alike, each quits at a random moment, and the money burned while they wait is, on average, the whole prize. Where they differ, the contest is often decided before it starts: in a shrinking industry, the firm that could stay profitable longest on its own is believed when it says it will stay, and its rival, knowing that, leaves first. Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff showed that this is usually the larger firm, because a shrinking market can support the smaller firm's capacity alone for longer. We work out each side's cost of staying, the prize and who can credibly outlast whom.

Born to answer
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1974; RAND Journal of Economics, 1985.
What it does now
Who quits first, and how much the waiting burns.
The mathematics
Quit hazard c / V; expected total cost = V
The full entry
Where it began

John Maynard Smith (1974) set out to explain why animals so often settle contests by display rather than combat, and modeled the display as a war of attrition, in which each contestant chooses how long to persist and the one who persists longer wins, at a cost to both. D. T. Bishop and Chris Cannings (1978) generalized it, and economists took it to industry: Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff (1985) showed that in a declining industry the larger firm leaves first, because the market can support its smaller rival alone for longer, and Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1986) solved exit when each firm is unsure of the other's costs. Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer (1999) generalized the contest to many players and fewer prizes.

Why it works now

Cash burn, runway and financing terms are in the filings, and the year each firm's capacity stops paying in a shrinking market can be computed from demand and cost data in code. What filings cannot show is each side's private resolve and the patience of its backers.

When it applies

Rivals each burning cash for share with a single survivor in view (ride-hailing, delivery, streaming, subsidized launches), a declining industry with too much capacity, a standards contest in which buyers wait for one side to give up, or a holdout in a restructuring. Not to be confused with share-wars-and-attrition, which models strength grinding against strength in Lanchester's terms, or capacity-cycles, which explains why capacity arrives as demand leaves: this entry asks who exits, when, and at what total cost.

What we would ask

What does each side lose for every quarter it stays, and what does the survivor win?
Which side could still make money alone as the market shrinks, and does the other side know it?

What it needs

Each side's cash burn or operating loss in the contested business per period and its funding runway; the value of the prize to a survivor, the margin a lone survivor could earn; and in a declining market the path of demand and each firm's capacity and costs, so that the date at which each firm stops being profitable even alone can be computed.

How we would get it

The Desk computes each side's burn and runway from filings and financing terms, the survivor's prize from the margins market leaders earn, and in a declining industry the year each firm's capacity stops paying even without its rival. What the record cannot show is each side's private resolve and whether its backers will keep paying for the burn; former executives of both and the lenders and investors who fund it know that.

Where it breaks

The contest need not have a single survivor (both can settle into a truce, which is price-war-or-truce); the prize is not fixed but grows or shrinks with the contest; one side is funded by owners who value the contest for other reasons (a strategic parent, a state fund); exit is not all or nothing, so the larger firm shrinks rather than leaves (Ghemawat and Nalebuff's later work); and in the symmetric case the timing is random, so the model gives odds, not a date.

For example

Two delivery companies each burn $250 million a year to hold share in a market that will pay the survivor $1 billion in present value. In the symmetric war of attrition each quits at a constant hazard equal to its burn divided by the prize, 25% a year; the first exit comes after 2 years on average, and the expected total burn of the two together is $1 billion, the whole prize. Now a declining industry: two firms together stop being profitable in year 5; the larger would stay profitable on its own until year 8, the smaller on its own until year 10. Because only the smaller firm could keep going alone after year 8, it can promise to stay, and the larger firm, which cannot outlast it, leaves as soon as the pair turns unprofitable, in year 5.

The mathematics in fullTwo players contest a prize V and each pays c per unit of time while both stay. In the symmetric equilibrium each quits at the constant hazard c / V, so the first exit comes at rate 2c / V, the expected length is V / (2c) and the expected total cost is 2c x V / (2c) = V: the prize is spent in full (Maynard Smith 1974; Bishop and Cannings 1978; Bulow and Klemperer 1999). With unequal staying power the game is solved backward from the last date at which each firm is profitable alone, and the firm that would have to leave first as a monopolist leaves first in the duopoly (Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986). Where it comes from

Maynard Smith (1974), The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, Journal of Theoretical Biology 47(1): the war of attrition.; Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985), Exit, RAND Journal of Economics 16(2): in a declining industry the larger firm leaves first.; Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), A Theory of Exit in Duopoly, Econometrica 54(4): exit timing when each firm is unsure of the other's costs.; Bulow and Klemperer (1999), The Generalized War of Attrition, American Economic Review 89(1): contests with more contestants than prizes.

Sources

Maynard Smith (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology 47(1), 209-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6
Bishop, Cannings (1978). A generalized war of attrition. Journal of Theoretical Biology 70(1), 85-124. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(78)90304-1
Ghemawat, Nalebuff (1985). Exit. The RAND Journal of Economics 16(2), 184. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555409
Fudenberg, Tirole (1986). A Theory of Exit in Duopoly. Econometrica 54(4), 943. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912845
Bulow, Klemperer (1999). The Generalized War of Attrition. American Economic Review 89(1), 175-189. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.175
Busse (2002). Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(2), 298. https://doi.org/10.2307/3087435
Maynard Smith, Price (1973). The Logic of Animal Conflict. Nature 246(5427), 15-18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0

Richardson's arms race model

Is this spending a race that no one can stop alone?

Clausewitz described how each side's effort raises the other's, a reciprocal action that drives war toward its extreme unless something restrains it. Lewis Fry Richardson wrote that dynamic as two equations: each side's spending rises with its rival's, falls with the burden of its own, and carries a fixed grievance that would drive it even if the rival stopped. Whether the race settles at a level or runs away turns on one comparison, the product of the two sides' reactions against the product of their restraints. When rivals spend on capacity, advertising, talent or AI computing because the other is spending, we estimate each side's reaction to the other, test whether the race has a resting point and say what level it implies; spending that answers a rival rather than demand earns its return only for as long as the race lasts.

Born to answer
Arms and Insecurity, 1960; Clausewitz's reciprocal actions before it.
What it does now
Whether rivals' spending has a resting point, and where.
The mathematics
x* = (a h + n g) / (m n - a b), stable when m n > a b
The full entry
Where it began

Clausewitz described three reciprocal actions that push each side in war to escalate in answer to the other. Lewis Fry Richardson, a British meteorologist and Quaker who had driven ambulances on the Western Front, and who had earlier tried to forecast the weather by hand with differential equations, wrote the arms race as two such equations between the world wars; Arms and Insecurity, his full treatment, was published in 1960, after his death. Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito (1984) asked whether such races cause wars, and Jack Hirshleifer (1989) and Stergios Skaperdas (1996) turned spending on a contest into the odds of winning it, the contest success functions that economists now use for races of every kind.

Why it works now

Rivals' capital spending and guidance are reported every quarter, and each side's reaction to the other can be estimated in code from the series. What the series cannot show is how each management reads the other's plans; the suppliers who take the orders see that first.

When it applies

Capital spending that rises together across rivals faster than demand (data centers and AI chips, chip plants, aircraft fleets, store openings), advertising or promotion that escalates in step, bidding for scarce talent; a thesis that assumes a rival's spending will level off. Not to be confused with capacity-cycles, where capacity answers demand with a delay, or sunk-cost-and-escalation, where one party keeps spending because it has already spent: here each side spends because the other does.

What we would ask

When the rival raised its spending last year, how much did this company raise its own, and the other way round?
If both stopped answering each other, what would each spend on demand alone?

What it needs

Each rival's spending by period, from filings and guidance, over enough periods to estimate how each responds to the other's last move; the part of the spending that demand alone would justify, the grievance term; and any limit (financing, power, supply) that would stop a race with no resting point.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles the rivals' spending series from filings and guidance, fits each side's reaction to the other's past spending and its own restraint, and checks whether the product of the reactions exceeds the product of the restraints. What the filings cannot show is how management reads the rival's plans; people who planned that spending inside the rivals, and their largest suppliers, know that.

Where it breaks

Spending responds to the same demand rather than to each other, so the fitted reactions are spurious (spurious-trends); the race is in quality or features rather than dollars; a third rival or a supplier's capacity sets the pace; the reactions drift as the contest changes; and a race with no resting point is stopped by financing or the market, not by the equations.

For example

Two cloud companies would each spend $40 billion a year on demand alone. Each adds 60 cents for every dollar the other spends, and the burden of its own spending takes back a dollar for every dollar each year. The race settles, because 1 x 1 is more than 0.6 x 0.6, and each settles at (0.6 x 40 + 40) / (1 - 0.36) = $100 billion a year, two and a half times what demand alone would justify. Raise each reaction to 0.8 and each settles at (0.8 x 40 + 40) / (1 - 0.64) = $200 billion; raise it past 1 and there is no resting point: spending grows until money, power or the market stops it.

The mathematics in fullRichardson (1960): dx/dt = a y - m x + g and dy/dt = b x - n y + h, with reactions a and b, restraints m and n and grievances g and h. The resting point is x* = (a h + n g) / (m n - a b) and y* = (b g + m h) / (m n - a b); it is stable when m n > a b, and when a b > m n spending grows without limit until something outside the model stops it. Read as a game, each side prefers to spend whatever the other does while both would prefer mutual restraint, a prisoner's dilemma escaped only by repeated play or an agreement from outside. Where it comes from

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, book 1, chapter 1 (Howard and Paret, 1976): the reciprocal actions that drive each side to escalate.; Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (1960): the arms race as two differential equations, published after his death.; Intriligator and Brito (1984), Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?, Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(1).; Hirshleifer (1989), Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions, Public Choice 63(2): how spending on a contest turns into the odds of winning it.

Sources

Richardson (1960). Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, Edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. Boxwood Press (Pittsburgh) and Quadrangle Books (Chicago). (book)
Intriligator, Brito (1984). Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War? Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(1), 63-84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002784028001004
Hirshleifer (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63(2), 101-112. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00153394
Skaperdas (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7(2), 283-290. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213906
Fudenberg, Tirole (1985). Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology. The Review of Economic Studies 52(3), 383. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297660
Clausewitz (1976). On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (revised 1984). Princeton University Press. (book)

The Colonel Blotto game (Borel; Gross and Wagner; Roberson)

Where should the weaker side concentrate?

Sun Tzu warned that a commander who prepares everywhere is weak everywhere, and Clausewitz made concentration of force his first rule. Emile Borel's Colonel Blotto game makes the point exact: two sides divide fixed budgets across several fronts, and each front goes to whoever commits more there. A stronger side that spreads its budget evenly and predictably can be beaten, front by front, by a weaker side that concentrates where it is not expected; in equilibrium the weaker side randomizes where it concentrates and still takes a predictable share of the fronts, half the ratio of the two budgets when there are enough fronts. When a challenger with less money attacks a leader across many markets, regions or customer segments, we count the fronts, compare the budgets, and ask whether the leader's spread is predictable and where the challenger is concentrating.

Born to answer
Comptes Rendus, 1921; RAND, 1950; Economic Theory, 2006.
What it does now
Where a weaker side should concentrate against a stronger one across many fronts.
The mathematics
Weaker side's expected share X_B / (2 X_A) when 2/n <= X_B / X_A
The full entry
Where it began

Sun Tzu wrote that the side that prepares to defend everywhere is weak everywhere, and Clausewitz made the concentration of force at the decisive point his first principle. The French mathematician Emile Borel posed the game of dividing forces across several fronts in 1921; Oliver Gross and Robert Wagner of the RAND Corporation solved cases of it in 1950 under the name it still carries, Colonel Blotto. Brian Roberson (2006) found the equilibrium for any budgets and any number of fronts, Sergiu Hart (2008) solved the discrete version, and the game has since been applied to elections, advertising, security and research portfolios.

Why it works now

Store and branch counts, advertising by market, hiring by region and segment results make each side's allocation across fronts visible from public data, and the game can be solved for the actual budgets in code. Where each side will concentrate next is known to the regional managers and the agencies that place the spending.

When it applies

A challenger with a smaller budget competing with a leader in many separate markets at once (regional banks, retail and restaurant chains, local media across cities, a drug company across indications, a sales force across territories), or a leader deciding whether to defend everywhere. Not to be confused with share-wars-and-attrition, which models two strengths grinding in one theater, or capacity-and-allocation, which allocates a budget with no rival: here each front goes to whoever commits more there, and the rival is choosing too.

What we would ask

How many separate fronts is this contest fought on, and does each go to whoever commits more there?
Does the leader spread its budget evenly and predictably, and where is the challenger concentrating?

What it needs

The list of fronts and what each is worth (market, region, segment), each side's budget for the contest (marketing, sales force, store openings, discounts), and how each side has allocated it across fronts in the past, from filings, store and branch counts, advertising data and hiring.

How we would get it

The Desk counts the fronts and their value, estimates each side's budget and its past allocation across them from filings and public data, and checks whether the leader's allocation is even and predictable and whether the challenger's is concentrated. What it cannot see is where each side plans to concentrate next; former regional managers and the agencies that buy media for both sides know that.

Where it breaks

Fronts are not won outright but shared in proportion to spending (a contest success function, not Blotto); the fronts are linked, so winning one helps win the next, as with network effects; budgets are not fixed and can be raised; and the equilibrium describes randomized allocations, so it gives odds across fronts, not the front the challenger will choose.

For example

A leader and a challenger contest three equally valuable markets; the leader has 6 units of marketing and the challenger 4. If the leader spreads 2, 2, 2, as leaders often do, the challenger can put just over 2 into one market and win it, though it cannot win two, which would take more than 4; spread evenly itself, at 1.33 a market, it would win none. In equilibrium, with budgets exactly 2 to 3 (the edge of the case Brian Roberson solved), the challenger's expected share of the markets is 4 / (2 x 6), one third, from a budget two thirds of the leader's.

The mathematics in fullColonel Blotto (Borel 1921; Gross and Wagner 1950): two players with budgets X_A >= X_B divide them across n fronts of equal value, and each front goes to whoever commits more. No allocation chosen with certainty is an equilibrium. In the continuous game with n >= 3 and 2/n <= X_B / X_A <= 1, the weaker player's equilibrium expected share of the fronts is X_B / (2 X_A) (Roberson 2006). Against a known even split of X_A / n per front, the weaker player wins the largest number of fronts k with k X_A / n < X_B. Where it comes from

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chapter 6 (Giles, 1910): a side that strengthens itself everywhere is weak everywhere.; Borel (1921; English translation in Econometrica, 1953): the game of dividing forces across fronts.; Roberson (2006), The Colonel Blotto Game, Economic Theory 29(1): the equilibrium for any budgets and any number of fronts.; Kovenock and Roberson (2021), Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games, Economic Theory 71(3).

Sources

Borel (1953). The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels. Econometrica 21(1), 97. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906946
Roberson (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory 29(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0071-5
Hart (2008). Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. International Journal of Game Theory 36(3-4), 441-460. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0099-9
Golman, Page (2009). General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch. Public Choice 138(3-4), 279-299. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9359-x
Kovenock, Roberson (2021). Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory 71(3), 997-1032. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01272-2
Sun Tzu (1910). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes by Lionel Giles. Luzac and Co. (book)

The loss-of-strength gradient and the culminating point (Boulding; Clausewitz)

How far from home does strength reach?

Clausewitz observed that an attack weakens as it advances, its lines longer and its strength left behind in garrisons, until it reaches a culminating point beyond which the defender is the stronger; Kenneth Boulding drew the same thing as two lines, each side's strength falling with distance from its home base at a loss-of-strength gradient. Where the lines cross is the edge of each side's reach. A company expanding into a rival's home region meets the same arithmetic: distribution, brand, management attention and local relationships all thin with distance. We estimate each side's strength at home and how fast it fades, find where the lines cross, and ask whether a new technology or an acquisition has flattened one side's fade enough to move the line.

Born to answer
Conflict and Defense, 1962; On War, 1832.
What it does now
How far an expansion can reach before the defender is stronger.
The mathematics
d* = (S_A - S_B + s_B D) / (s_A + s_B)
The full entry
Where it began

Clausewitz wrote that most attacks weaken as they advance, until they reach a culminating point beyond which the defense is stronger, and that defense is the stronger form of war. The economist Kenneth Boulding, in Conflict and Defense (1962), drew each side's strength as falling with distance from its home base at a loss-of-strength gradient, and found the boundary where two such lines cross; he used it to explain why some states are safe and others are not. The argument over how much stronger the defense is ran through the 1980s as the attacker's 3 to 1 rule, between John Mearsheimer and Joshua Epstein, whose adaptive dynamic model treated the attacker's culminating point explicitly.

Why it works now

Unit economics by region, openings and closings, and the locations of distribution centers are in filings and public data, and each side's fade with distance can be fitted in code. Why the fade happens, logistics, brand or management, is known to the people who ran the regions.

When it applies

A retailer, bank, restaurant chain, hospital system or distributor expanding into a region where a rival is strongest, or defending its own region against one; a thesis that assumes a successful format will travel. Not to be confused with local-leadership-profit, which explains why being the biggest name in each town pays, or interaction-gravity, which predicts who trades with whom: here the question is where an expansion stops paying, and why.

What we would ask

How quickly does this company's advantage fade with distance from its home base, and how quickly does the rival's?
Has anything (a distribution center, an acquisition, an online channel) flattened that fade?

What it needs

Each side's performance by distance from its home base: unit economics by region (sales per store or branch, margins, share) from segment disclosures, regional data and the record of openings and closings; the locations of distribution centers and headquarters; and any change that alters the fade, such as new logistics, acquisitions or online ordering.

How we would get it

The Desk assembles unit economics by region and distance, fits how each side's strength falls with distance, and locates the boundary and how it moves when either fade changes. What the figures cannot show is why the fade happens (logistics, brand, management or local ties); former regional managers and real estate and logistics heads know that.

Where it breaks

Strength does not fade with distance but jumps (a format that travels online); the defender's strength is spread evenly rather than concentrated at home; the contest is not geographic; the rival can be bought rather than met; and a fitted fade reflects the sites chosen, which were the best ones first.

For example

Two grocery chains are headquartered 300 miles apart. Measured on a common scale, the first is worth 100 at home and the second 80, and each loses 0.3 for every mile from home. The first chain is the stronger out to (100 - 80 + 0.3 x 300) / (0.3 + 0.3) = about 183 miles from its home, the culminating point of its advance; the last 117 miles belong to the rival. If a new distribution center halves the first chain's fade to 0.15 a mile, its reach moves to (20 + 90) / (0.15 + 0.3) = about 244 miles.

The mathematics in fullBoulding (1962): side A's strength at distance d from its home is S_A - s_A d, and side B's at the same point, D - d from its home, is S_B - s_B (D - d). They are equal at d* = (S_A - S_B + s_B D) / (s_A + s_B). Each side dominates its own side of d*; a lower gradient s_A moves the boundary toward the rival, and d* is the culminating point of A's advance, beyond which the defender is stronger. The defender's advantage at home (Clausewitz's stronger form of war, debated as the attacker's 3 to 1 rule by Mearsheimer and Epstein in 1989) enters as a higher S at home. Where it comes from

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, book 7 (Howard and Paret, 1976): the culminating point of the attack.; Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (1962): the loss-of-strength gradient and the boundary of viability.; Mearsheimer (1989), Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics, International Security 13(4); Epstein (1989), in the same journal, on the adaptive dynamic model.

Sources

Boulding (1962). Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. Harper and Brothers. (book)
Mearsheimer (1989). Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics. International Security 13(4), 54. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538780
Epstein (1989). The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies. International Security 13(4), 90. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538781
Epstein (1985). The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory. Brookings Institution. (book)
Biddle (2004). Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton University Press. (book)
Clausewitz (1976). On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (revised 1984). Princeton University Press. (book)

Leaving the opponent a way out: golden parachutes and commitment (Sun Tzu; Schelling; Lambert and Larcker)

Has the other side been left a way out?

Sun Tzu advised leaving a surrounded army an outlet and not pressing a desperate enemy too hard, and put his own soldiers on ground with no escape when he wanted them to fight to the death. Both halves are the same arithmetic: a side fights hardest when giving way is worth nothing to it. When a contest turns on whether the other side resists (a board facing a bid, managers facing a reorganization, holders facing an exchange offer, an activist who needs to show a win), we compare what the other side's decision maker gets from resisting with what that person gets from giving way, and ask whether a way out worth more than resisting, and costing less than the fight, has been offered.

Born to answer
The Art of War; The Strategy of Conflict, 1960; Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985.
What it does now
Whether a way out costs less than the fight it avoids.
The mathematics
Offer e just above q B - k when that is less than K
The full entry
Where it began

Sun Tzu advised leaving a surrounded army an outlet and not pressing a desperate enemy too hard, and placing one's own soldiers where they cannot escape when they must fight to the death; Thomas Schelling (1960) made the second half a theory of commitment, burning one's own bridges to make a threat believable. Corporate finance met the first half in the golden parachute, a payment to executives on a change of control. Richard Lambert and David Larcker (1985) found that share prices rose when companies adopted such plans, consistent with lowering managers' resistance to bids, and Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles Wang (2014) found that they go with a higher expected acquisition premium, yet the shares of adopting firms earn negative abnormal returns during and after adoption, which may mean weaker discipline from the market for control.

Why it works now

Change-in-control and severance terms are filed in every proxy statement, so the arithmetic of resisting and giving way can be done for each executive in code. How each person values keeping the position is known to directors and advisers who have watched such contests.

When it applies

A hostile or unsolicited bid where the target's managers can delay or resist; a debt exchange or restructuring that needs holders to agree; a reorganization or automation program that needs the cooperation of the people it affects; an activist campaign in which a settlement must let both sides claim something. Not to be confused with negotiation-and-outside-options, which researches each side's fallback to predict the split, or credible-commitment, which tests whether a threat or promise binds: this entry asks whether the other side's way out is good enough to make resisting not worth its while, and whether that way out costs less than the fight.

What we would ask

What does the other side's decision maker personally get from resisting, and from giving way?
Is there a way out (a severance, a role, a better exchange, a public win) worth more to that person than resisting and cheaper than the fight?

What it needs

The decision maker's own payoffs: severance and change-in-control terms from the proxy statement and employment agreements, equity and its vesting, the private value of control or position; the odds that resistance succeeds; and what resistance costs the side that wants the outcome (delay, fees, a higher premium, value lost).

How we would get it

The Desk reads the change-in-control and severance terms in the proxy statement and agreements, estimates the decision maker's payoff from resisting and from giving way, and sets the cost of a fight beside the cost of the way out. What filings cannot show is how the decision maker values keeping the position; former directors, deal advisers and people who have sat through such contests know that.

Where it breaks

The decision maker's payoff is not personal (a founder who values independence above any payment, or a board whose duty to holders makes resisting right); a generous way out rewards resisting next time and becomes the price of every deal; a way out offered too visibly signals weakness; and the evidence on change-in-control payments cuts both ways: they go with a higher expected acquisition premium, yet the shares of firms that adopt them earn negative abnormal returns during and after adoption (Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang 2014).

For example

A bidder wants a company whose chief executive values keeping the job at $30 million and could resist with a 50% chance of keeping the company independent. Resisting is worth 0.5 x $30 million = $15 million to the executive; giving way with no severance is worth nothing, so the executive resists, and the fight costs the bidder $200 million in delay, fees and a higher premium. A change-in-control payment of $25 million makes giving way worth more than resisting and costs the bidder an eighth of the fight. Run the other way, the same arithmetic says an executive with nothing to gain from a sale fights hardest.

The mathematics in fullThe other side resists when q B - k > e, where B is what its decision maker keeps if resistance succeeds, q the chance it does, k the decision maker's own cost of resisting and e what giving way is worth. The side that wants the outcome offers e just above q B - k whenever that is less than K, the cost of the fight to it. Raising e raises the loser's outside option, which removes the fight and moves the settlement range (the-bargain-behind-the-fight); setting e to zero is Sun Tzu's ground with no escape, which makes resistance certain. Where it comes from

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chapters 7 and 11 (Giles, 1910): leave a surrounded army an outlet; soldiers with no escape fight to the death.; Lambert and Larcker (1985), Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1).; Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2014), Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance 25.; Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960): commitment by removing one's own way out.

Sources

Lambert, Larcker (1985). Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3), 179-203. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90036-9
Bebchuk, Cohen, Wang (2014). Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders. Journal of Corporate Finance 25, 140-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.008
Fearon (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1), 68-90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041001004
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. (book)
Fearon (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49(3), 379-414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324
Sun Tzu (1910). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes by Lionel Giles. Luzac and Co. (book)

Mixed strategies and the minimax theorem (von Neumann); inspection games

Is being predictable the weakness?

Sun Tzu held that all warfare rests on deception: appear weak where strong, absent where present. John von Neumann proved the mathematics behind the advice: where one side gains what the other loses and any pattern can be exploited, the best play is to randomize, in proportions that leave the opponent nothing to exploit, and professional tennis players and penalty takers have been found to mix much as the theory says. In markets the same weakness appears wherever a large participant follows a schedule others can read: index changes, known rebalancing dates, calendar promotions, inspections on a fixed rota, a buyback that buys at the same time every day. We ask whether a participant's behavior is predictable, who can act against it, and what randomizing would cost and save.

Born to answer
Mathematische Annalen, 1928.
What it does now
Whether a schedule others can read is itself the weakness.
The mathematics
Random audits deter when (k / n) F >= g
The full entry
Where it began

Sun Tzu's first chapter rests warfare on deception: look unable when able, near when far. John von Neumann proved the minimax theorem in 1928, showing that in contests where one side gains what the other loses there is a best way to mix one's moves, and it became a pillar of game theory. The theory was tested where stakes are high and play is observed: Mark Walker and John Wooders (2001) found that serves at Wimbledon mix much as the theory predicts, and Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Steven Levitt and Timothy Groseclose (2002) found the same for penalty kicks. Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Pedersen (2005) showed how a trader forced to sell is exploited by others who know it.

Why it works now

Index methodologies, rebalancing rules and buyback disclosures are public, and the price moves around predictable dates can be measured in code for any holding. Who is positioned against a pattern is known to the traders and specialists on the other side.

When it applies

A fund, index or company whose trades or actions are scheduled and public; a forced seller others know must sell; an audit or inspection regime whose pattern can be learned; a promotion calendar that customers or competitors can game. Not to be confused with cheap-talk-or-costly-signal, which asks what a statement reveals, or limits-to-arbitrage, which asks why a mispricing persists: here the question is whether a pattern is itself the weakness.

What we would ask

Can others see in advance what this participant will do, and when?
Who gains by acting first against that pattern, and how much would varying the timing or the targets take from them?

What it needs

The schedule and size of the participant's actions (index methodology and reconstitution dates, fund flows and rebalancing rules, buyback execution disclosures, audit frequencies), prices or outcomes around those dates, and who trades or acts ahead of them.

How we would get it

The Desk reads the published rules and schedules, measures the moves in prices or outcomes around the predictable dates, and estimates the cost of the pattern and how much randomizing within the rules would recover. What the record cannot show is who is positioned against the pattern; traders, index specialists and former operators of such programs know that.

Where it breaks

The contest is not zero-sum, so randomizing may give up a gain both sides share; the pattern is required by rule and cannot be changed; predictability has a value of its own (customers and regulators prefer schedules); and against a few opponents an apparent pattern may be noise.

For example

An inspector can audit one of four sites each period. A violation gains a site's manager $1 million and a caught violation costs $5 million. On a fixed, known rota, three of the four sites are unwatched each period and nothing deters a violation there. Audited at random, each site faces a one-in-four chance of inspection and an expected penalty of $1.25 million, more than the gain, so all four are deterred by the same single inspector. The smallest penalty that deters under random audit is $4 million; with one audit for ten sites it would be $10 million.

The mathematics in fullIn a zero-sum game with payoff matrix M, von Neumann's (1928) minimax theorem guarantees mixed strategies x and y with max_x min_y x M y = min_y max_x x M y; at the solution each player's mix leaves the opponent indifferent among the actions it uses, so no pattern can be exploited. In an inspection game with k audits among n sites, a gain g and a penalty F, random audits deter when (k / n) F >= g, while a known schedule leaves n - k sites with no deterrent at all. A large trade that others can predict invites trading ahead of it (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005). Where it comes from

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chapter 1 (Giles, 1910): all warfare is based on deception.; Von Neumann (1928), Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100: the minimax theorem.; Walker and Wooders (2001), Minimax Play at Wimbledon, American Economic Review 91(5); Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002), on penalty kicks, American Economic Review 92(4).; Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Predatory Trading, Journal of Finance 60(4).

Sources

v. Neumann (1928). Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen 100(1), 295-320. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01448847
Walker, Wooders (2001). Minimax Play at Wimbledon. American Economic Review 91(5), 1521-1538. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1521
Chiappori, Levitt, Groseclose (2002). Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer. American Economic Review 92(4), 1138-1151. https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344678
Brunnermeier, Pedersen (2005). Predatory Trading. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1825-1863. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00781.x
Avenhaus, von Stengel, Zamir (2002). Chapter 51 Inspection games. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1947-1987. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0005(02)03014-x
Niou, Ordeshook (1994). A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Journal of Peace Research 31(2), 161-174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343394031002004
Sun Tzu (1910). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes by Lionel Giles. Luzac and Co. (book)

The Library, written down.

We keep our method in the open. The Decision Library lists every structure, each with where it began, why it works now, when it applies, what we would ask, what evidence would settle it, how we would get it, where the method breaks, a worked example, the mathematics underneath in symbols, and the papers it rests on. No equation is evaluated there and no answer is given. The mathematics underneath is set out at How the models work (50 structures), and every source is listed on the reading list (1401 papers, 184 books).

Bring us the decision