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The reading list

Where the Library comes from.

Every paper below was resolved against the Crossref record before it was listed. Books are the assigned texts of the courses the Library draws on, with a few standard references marked as such. Nothing here is reproduced; the DOI links go to the publishers. Where a free copy exists in a repository or on an open-access journal site, the entry links to it as well: 151 of the 1401 papers, each link checked between 2026-09-16 and 2026-10-07.

Papers

Bayes (1763). An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London(53), 370-418. doi
Galton (1886). Regression Towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature. The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 15, 246. doi · Read a free copy
Jensen (1906). Sur les fonctions convexes et les inégalités entre les valeurs moyennes. Acta Mathematica 30(0), 175-193. doi · Read a free copy
Galton (1907). Vox Populi. Nature 75(1949), 450-451. doi · Read a free copy
Wald (1945). Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 16(2), 117-186. doi · Read a free copy
Black (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56(1), 23-34. doi
Metropolis, Ulam (1949). The Monte Carlo Method. Journal of the American Statistical Association 44(247), 335-341. doi
Arrow (1950). A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 328-346. doi
Brier (1950). Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability. Monthly Weather Review 78(1), 1-3. doi
Nash (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155. doi
Nash (1951). Non-Cooperative Games. The Annals of Mathematics 54(2), 286. doi
Markowitz (1952). Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance 7(1), 77-91. doi
Bellman (1954). The theory of dynamic programming. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60(6), 503-515. doi · Read a free copy
Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65(2), 135-150. doi
Kaplan, Meier (1958). Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations. Journal of the American Statistical Association 53(282), 457-481. doi
Coase (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44. doi
Kantorovich (1960). Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production. Management Science 6(4), 366-422. doi
Thistlethwaite, Campbell (1960). Regression-discontinuity analysis: An alternative to the ex post facto experiment. Journal of Educational Psychology 51(6), 309-317. doi
Ellsberg (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75(4), 643. doi
Vickrey (1961). Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. The Journal of Finance 16(1), 8-37. doi
Gale, Shapley (1962). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly 69(1), 9-15. doi
Mandelbrot (1963). The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices. The Journal of Business 36(4), 394. doi
Pratt (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica 32(1/2), 122. doi
Howard (1966). Information Value Theory. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 2(1), 22-26. doi
Bass (1969). A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. Management Science 15(5), 215-227. doi
Akerlof (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488. doi
Capen, Clapp, Campbell (1971). Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations. Journal of Petroleum Technology 23(06), 641-653. doi
Lorrain, White (1971). Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1(1), 49-80. doi
Cox (1972). Regression Models and Life-Tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 34(2), 187-202. doi
Gibbard (1973). Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica 41(4), 587. doi
Granovetter (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 78(6), 1360-1380. doi
Kahneman, Tversky (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review 80(4), 237-251. doi
Spence (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355. doi
Rubin (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66(5), 688-701. doi · Read a free copy
Tversky, Kahneman (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185(4157), 1124-1131. doi
Adams, Yellen (1976). Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(3), 475. doi
Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), 629. doi
Dempster, Laird, Rubin (1977). Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete Data Via the <i>EM</i> Algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 39(1), 1-22. doi
Freeman (1978). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social Networks 1(3), 215-239. doi
Green, Srinivasan (1978). Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues and Outlook. Journal of Consumer Research 5(2), 103-123. doi
Mussa, Rosen (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 301-317. doi
Romer, Rosenthal (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33(4), 27-43. doi
Heckman (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47(1), 153. doi
Holmstrom (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 74. doi · Read a free copy
Kahneman, Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263. doi
Dixit (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal 90(357), 95. doi · Read a free copy
Myerson (1981). Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58-73. doi · Read a free copy
Crawford, Sobel (1982). Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica 50(6), 1431. doi
Kreps, Wilson (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 253-279. doi
Milgrom, Roberts (1982). Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27(2), 280-312. doi
Milgrom, Weber (1982). A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica 50(5), 1089. doi
Rubinstein (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50(1), 97. doi
Myerson, Satterthwaite (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29(2), 265-281. doi
Green, Porter (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica 52(1), 87. doi
Arkes, Blumer (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1), 124-140. doi
Ashenfelter, Card (1985). Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics 67(4), 648. doi · Read a free copy
Bulow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer (1985). Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journal of Political Economy 93(3), 488-511. doi
Fudenberg, Maskin (1986). The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica 54(3), 533. doi
McDonald, Siegel (1986). The Value of Waiting to Invest. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4), 707. doi · Read a free copy
Wright (1936). Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes. Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences 3(4), 122-128. doi
Nagy, Farmer, Bui, Trancik (2013). Statistical Basis for Predicting Technological Progress. PLoS ONE 8(2), e52669. doi · Read a free copy
Ziegler, Trancik (2021). Re-examining rates of lithium-ion battery technology improvement and cost decline. Energy & Environmental Science 14(4), 1635-1651. doi
Jones (1995). R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy 103(4), 759-784. doi
Ramsey (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. The Economic Journal 38(152), 543-559. doi
Adrian, Crump, Moench (2013). Pricing the term structure with linear regressions. Journal of Financial Economics 110(1), 110-138. doi · Read a free copy
Agrawal, McHale, Oettl (2019). Finding Needles in Haystacks: Artificial Intelligence and Recombinant Growth. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, University of Chicago Press, 149-174. doi
Romney, Weller, Batchelder (1986). Culture as Consensus: A Theory of Culture and Informant Accuracy. American Anthropologist 88(2), 313-338. doi
Bonacich (1987). Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures. American Journal of Sociology 92(5), 1170-1182. doi · Read a free copy
Howard (1988). Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise. Management Science 34(6), 679-695. doi
Thaler (1988). Anomalies: The Winner's Curse. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(1), 191-202. doi · Read a free copy
Gilboa, Schmeidler (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18(2), 141-153. doi
Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1991). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 193-206. doi
Banerjee (1992). A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3), 797-817. doi
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 992-1026. doi · Read a free copy
Cohen (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin 112(1), 155-159. doi
Carlsson, van Damme (1993). Global Games and Equilibrium Selection. Econometrica 61(5), 989. doi
Kahneman, Lovallo (1993). Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking. Management Science 39(1), 17-31. doi
Fearon (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88(3), 577-592. doi
Fearon (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49(3), 379-414. doi
Angrist, Imbens, Rubin (1996). Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434), 444-455. doi
Austen-Smith, Banks (1996). Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review 90(1), 34-45. doi
Gabaix (1999). Zipf's Law for Cities: An Explanation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 739-767. doi
Roth, Peranson (1999). The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. American Economic Review 89(4), 748-780. doi · Read a free copy
Abreu, Gul (2000). Bargaining and Reputation. Econometrica 68(1), 85-117. doi
Anderson, van Wincoop (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle. American Economic Review 93(1), 170-192. doi
Baliga, Sjostrom (2004). Arms Races and Negotiations. Review of Economic Studies 71(2), 351-369. doi
Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004). How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 249-275. doi · Read a free copy
Klibanoff, Marinacci, Mukerji (2005). A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity. Econometrica 73(6), 1849-1892. doi
Flyvbjerg (2006). From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right. Project Management Journal 37(3), 5-15. doi · Read a free copy
Groves (2006). Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 70(5), 646-675. doi
Edelman, Ostrovsky, Schwarz (2007). Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American Economic Review 97(1), 242-259. doi
Al-Najjar, Baliga, Besanko (2008). Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing. The RAND Journal of Economics 39(1), 214-237. doi
Imbens, Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. Journal of Econometrics 142(2), 615-635. doi
Clauset, Shalizi, Newman (2009). Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data. SIAM Review 51(4), 661-703. doi · Read a free copy
Kohavi, Longbotham, Sommerfield (2009). Controlled experiments on the web: survey and practical guide. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 18(1), 140-181. doi · Read a free copy
Train (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press (book). doi
Athey, Imbens (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal effects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(27), 7353-7360. doi · Read a free copy
Kelly (1956). A New Interpretation of Information Rate. Bell System Technical Journal 35(4), 917-926. doi
Thorp (1969). Optimal Gambling Systems for Favorable Games. Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique / Review of the International Statistical Institute 37(3), 273. doi
Merton (1969). Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case. The Review of Economics and Statistics 51(3), 247. doi
Leontief (1936). Quantitative Input and Output Relations in the Economic Systems of the United States. The Review of Economics and Statistics 18(3), 105. doi
Little (1961). A Proof for the Queuing Formula: L = lambda W. Operations Research 9(3), 383-387. doi
Lorenz (1963). Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 20(2), 130-141. doi · Read a free copy
Kermack, McKendrick (1927). A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 115(772), 700-721. doi · Read a free copy
Ezekiel (1938). The Cobweb Theorem. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(2), 255. doi
Hotelling (1933). Analysis of a complex of statistical variables into principal components. Journal of Educational Psychology 24(6), 417-441. doi
Uhlenbeck, Ornstein (1930). On the Theory of the Brownian Motion. Physical Review 36(5), 823-841. doi
Black, Scholes (1973). The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 81(3), 637-654. doi
Taylor, Jonker (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40(1-2), 145-156. doi
Maynard Smith, Price (1973). The Logic of Animal Conflict. Nature 246(5427), 15-18. doi
Schelling (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1(2), 143-186. doi
Granovetter (1978). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. American Journal of Sociology 83(6), 1420-1443. doi · Read a free copy
Volterra (1926). Fluctuations in the Abundance of a Species considered Mathematically1. Nature 118(2972), 558-560. doi
Hardin (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859), 1243-1248. doi
Samuelson (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics 36(4), 387. doi
Sterman (1989). Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment. Management Science 35(3), 321-339. doi
Nickell (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica 49(6), 1417. doi
Granger, Newbold (1974). Spurious regressions in econometrics. Journal of Econometrics 2(2), 111-120. doi
Hotelling (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39(153), 41. doi
Arthur (1989). Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events. The Economic Journal 99(394), 116. doi
Fisher, Tippett (1928). Limiting forms of the frequency distribution of the largest or smallest member of a sample. Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 24(2), 180-190. doi
Hill (1995). A Statistical Derivation of the Significant-Digit Law. Statistical Science 10(4). doi · Read a free copy
Spetzler, Stael von Holstein (1975). Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis. Management Science 22(3), 340-358. doi
Breiman (2001). Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures. Statistical Science 16(3). doi
Tversky, Kahneman (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin 76(2), 105-110. doi
Embrechts, Klüppelberg, Mikosch (1997). Modelling Extremal Events. Springer (book). doi
Lee, Padmanabhan, Whang (1997). Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect. Management Science 43(4), 546-558. doi
Bak, Tang, Wiesenfeld (1987). Self-organized criticality: an explanation of the 1/f noise. Physical Review Letters 59(4), 381-384. doi
Diamond, Dybvig (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91(3), 401-419. doi · Read a free copy

Financial statement analysis

The research behind the Library's family Reading the financial statements, and behind the measurements the Desk works from filed statements: 359 papers, from the founding studies to current work on machine reading. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found. Many were published with a trading result attached. Most of those results have shrunk since, and none is offered here as a way to earn a return; they are listed for what they explain about a business.

The list was checked against the reading lists of 23 courses whose syllabi are public, at Berkeley Haas, Bocconi, Chicago Booth, Columbia, MIT Sloan, NYU Stern, Northwestern Kellogg, Ohio State Fisher, Texas McCombs, USC Marshall, UT Dallas Jindal, Washington Foster, Wharton and Yale SOM: master's courses in financial statement analysis and doctoral seminars in empirical accounting, some of them several years old. Of the 219 papers checked against those lists, 104 appear on at least one. An entry in the Library names a course only where one of its sources was on that course's list. This records what those courses assigned; it is not a claim of affiliation with any school.

Earnings and prices: the founding evidence

Ball, Brown (1968). An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6(2), 159. doi
Prices anticipate most of the year's earnings news before it is announced and keep drifting in its direction afterward. The paper that made earnings an object of market research.
Beaver (1968). The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 67. doi
Trading volume and price variability jump in the week earnings are announced: investors act on the number.
Beaver, Clarke, Wright (1979). The Association between Unsystematic Security Returns and the Magnitude of Earnings Forecast Errors. Journal of Accounting Research 17(2), 316. doi
The larger the earnings surprise, the larger the abnormal return: the size of the news matters, not only its direction.
Beaver, Lambert, Morse (1980). The information content of security prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2(1), 3-28. doi
Prices carry information about future earnings that past earnings do not: prices lead earnings.
Foster, Olsen, Shevlin (1984). Earnings Releases, Anomalies, and the Behavior of Security Returns. The Accounting Review 59(4), 574-603. doi
Drift after earnings announcements appears when the surprise is measured from the time series of quarterly earnings, varies with the size of the surprise and of the company, and persisted throughout 1974 to 1981.
Kormendi, Lipe (1987). Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns. The Journal of Business 60(3), 323. doi
The price response to an earnings surprise is larger the more persistent a company's earnings are.
Bernard, Thomas (1989). Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response or Risk Premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 1. doi
After a surprise, prices keep moving the same way for about sixty trading days. The evidence fits a slow market better than a risk premium.
Easton, Zmijewski (1989). Cross-sectional variation in the stock market response to accounting earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(2-3), 117-141. doi
The response to a dollar of surprise differs across companies with the persistence of their earnings and with their risk.
Lev (1989). On the Usefulness of Earnings and Earnings Research: Lessons and Directions from Two Decades of Empirical Research. Journal of Accounting Research 27, 153. doi
Earnings explain only a small share of the movement in returns around announcements, which points the research toward the quality of the number itself.
Bernard, Thomas (1990). Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13(4), 305-340. doi
Investors price a quarter's earnings as if the surprise would not echo in the next three quarters, although it predictably does.
Easton, Harris (1991). Earnings as an Explanatory Variable for Returns. Journal of Accounting Research 29(1), 19. doi
The level of earnings, and not only its change, explains returns.
Easton, Harris, Ohlson (1992). Aggregate accounting earnings can explain most of security returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(2-3), 119-142. doi
Over intervals of five to ten years, accounting earnings explain most of the variation in stock returns.
Freeman, Tse (1992). A Nonlinear Model of Security Price Responses to Unexpected Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 30(2), 185. doi
The price response per dollar of surprise shrinks as the surprise grows, because large surprises are mostly transitory.
Collins, Kothari, Shanken, Sloan (1994). Lack of timeliness and noise as explanations for the low contemporaneous return-earnings association. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18(3), 289-324. doi · Read a free copy
Earnings explain little of the same year's returns mainly because they are slow to reflect news prices already hold, not because they are noisy.
Dechow (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18(1), 3-42. doi
Over short intervals earnings track firm performance better than cash flow does, because accruals repair the timing and matching problems of cash.
Hayn (1995). The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20(2), 125-153. doi
Losses say less about value than profits do, because shareholders can liquidate rather than bear them for ever.
Ball, Bartov (1996). How naive is the stock market's use of earnings information? Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(3), 319-337. doi · Read a free copy
Investors know that quarterly surprises are correlated but underestimate the correlation by about half.
Basu (1997). The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 3-37. doi
Earnings report bad news sooner than good news. The asymmetry is measurable and it shapes how persistent a loss or a gain is.
Collins, Maydew, Weiss (1997). Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and book values over the past forty years. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 39-67. doi
The combined power of earnings and book value to explain prices did not fall over forty years; weight shifted from earnings toward book value as losses and one-time items grew.
Dechow, Kothari, Watts (1998). The relation between earnings and cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(2), 133-168. doi · Read a free copy
A model of how sales, working capital and accruals connect earnings to cash flow, and why current earnings forecast future cash flow better than current cash flow does.
Francis, Schipper (1999). Have Financial Statements Lost Their Relevance? Journal of Accounting Research 37(2), 319. doi
Tests the claim that statements have lost relevance and finds mixed evidence: the answer depends on how relevance is measured.
Lev, Zarowin (1999). The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them. Journal of Accounting Research 37(2), 353. doi
The usefulness of earnings, cash flows and book values to investors declined over twenty years, most where business change and intangible investment were greatest.
Kothari (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31(1-3), 105-231. doi
The standard survey of what three decades of research established about earnings, prices, valuation and market efficiency, and how each was tested.
Landsman, Maydew (2002). Has the Information Content of Quarterly Earnings Announcements Declined in the Past Three Decades? Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 797-808. doi
The market's reaction to quarterly earnings announcements grew over three decades; it did not decline.
Watts (2003). Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications. Accounting Horizons 17(3), 207-221. doi
Why accounting recognizes losses sooner than gains: contracts, litigation, taxes and regulation all demand it. Conservatism is a property to be read, not an error.
Ball, Shivakumar (2005). Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1), 83-128. doi
British private companies face substantially the same accounting standards, auditing and tax rules as public ones yet recognize losses less promptly, evidence that reporting quality follows market demand more than the rules.
Livnat, Mendenhall (2006). Comparing the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift for Surprises Calculated from Analyst and Time Series Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 44(1), 177-205. doi
Post-earnings-announcement drift is significantly larger when the surprise is measured against analysts' forecasts than against a time-series model of reported earnings.
Ball, Shivakumar (2008). How Much New Information Is There in Earnings? Journal of Accounting Research 46(5), 975-1016. doi
Each quarterly earnings announcement accounts for only about 1% to 2% of the information that reaches share prices in a year, so the main role of reported earnings is not timely news.
Dichev, Tang (2008). Matching and the Changing Properties of Accounting Earnings over the Last 40 Years. The Accounting Review 83(6), 1425-1460. doi
Among the 1,000 largest U.S. companies over 40 years, revenues and expenses have become less correlated and earnings more volatile and less persistent, consistent with matching getting worse.
Dechow, Sloan, Zha (2014). Stock Prices and Earnings: A History of Research. Annual Review of Financial Economics 6(1), 343-363. doi
A review of research on how earnings relate to stock prices: why earnings are useful, which accounting features make them so, and where investors misread them.
Beaver, McNichols, Wang (2020). Increased market response to earnings announcements in the 21st century: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 69(1), 101244. doi
The reaction to earnings announcements rose sharply after 2001, as guidance, forecasts and statement detail came to be released together with them.

Reading the statements for what comes next

Ou, Penman (1989). Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11(4), 295-329. doi
A single measure built from many statement ratios predicts the direction of next year's earnings, and a strategy based on it earned abnormal returns.
Fama, French (1992). The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 47(2), 427. doi
Size and book-to-market, two numbers from the statements and the price, describe the cross-section of average returns better than market beta.
Holthausen, Larcker (1992). The prediction of stock returns using financial statement information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(2-3), 373-411. doi
Statement ratios can be used to predict returns directly, without passing through an earnings forecast.
Penman (1992). Return to Fundamentals. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 7(4), 465-483. doi
A call to return research to fundamental analysis, the work of determining what a security is worth from accounting information, which modern finance had set aside in favor of relative pricing.
Lev, Thiagarajan (1993). Fundamental Information Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 31(2), 190. doi
Twelve signals analysts actually watch, such as inventory and receivables growing faster than sales, add to earnings in explaining returns.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny (1994). Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk. The Journal of Finance 49(5), 1541-1578. doi · Read a free copy
Investors extrapolate past growth too far; stocks priced for continued growth disappoint and out-of-favor stocks surprise.
Abarbanell, Bushee (1997). Fundamental Analysis, Future Earnings, and Stock Prices. Journal of Accounting Research 35(1), 1. doi
The same fundamental signals predict future earnings changes, and analysts' forecasts do not fully use them.
Abarbanell, Bushee (1998). Abnormal returns to a fundamental analysis strategy. The Accounting Review 73(1), 19-45. doi
A portfolio formed on the fundamental signals earned abnormal returns over the following year, much of them around later earnings announcements.
Frankel, Lee (1998). Accounting valuation, market expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(3), 283-319. doi · Read a free copy
A value estimate from book value and analysts' forecasts, set against price, predicts returns over the next three years.
Piotroski (2000). Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 1. doi
Nine yes-or-no signals of profitability, leverage and efficiency separate the cheap stocks that recover from those that do not.
Lee (2001). Market efficiency and accounting research: a discussion of 'capital market research in accounting' by S.P. Kothari. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31(1-3), 233-253. doi
Argues that prices adjust to information through a complex process, not instantly, and that accounting research should model markets with noise traders instead of assuming naive efficiency.
Mohanram (2005). Separating Winners from Losers among Low Book-to-Market Stocks using Financial Statement Analysis. Review of Accounting Studies 10(2-3), 133-170. doi · Read a free copy
A companion score for expensive growth stocks, built on the stability of earnings and on spending on research, capital and advertising.
Lewellen (2010). Accounting anomalies and fundamental analysis: An alternative view. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 455-466. doi
A skeptical companion to the review: which of the claimed regularities survive scrutiny of the tests.
Richardson, Tuna, Wysocki (2010). Accounting anomalies and fundamental analysis: A review of recent research advances. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 410-454. doi
A review of what statement-based signals predict, why, and how practitioners use them, with the forecasting framework that ties them together.
Wahlen, Wieland (2011). Can financial statement analysis beat consensus analysts' recommendations? Review of Accounting Studies 16(1), 89-115. doi
A score built from financial statement signals of a likely earnings increase picks stocks that outperform within each level of analysts' consensus recommendation.
Piotroski, So (2012). Identifying Expectation Errors in Value/Glamour Strategies: A Fundamental Analysis Approach. Review of Financial Studies 25(9), 2841-2875. doi
The value premium is concentrated where the price implies expectations that the fundamentals contradict.
Lee, So (2015). Alphanomics: The Informational Underpinnings of Market Efficiency. Foundations and Trends in Accounting 9(2-3), 59-258. doi
A monograph on why and where the analysis of fundamentals can add value in a market that is mostly, not fully, efficient.
Bartram, Grinblatt (2018). Agnostic fundamental analysis works. Journal of Financial Economics 128(1), 125-147. doi
A value estimate from a plain regression on current statement items, with no theory behind it, identifies mispricing that later corrects.
Monahan (2018). Financial Statement Analysis and Earnings Forecasting. Foundations and Trends in Accounting 12(2), 105-215. doi
A synthesis of research on forecasting earnings from the statements, which notes that the simple random-walk forecast is still as accurate as most alternatives and sets out the design choices behind any forecasting approach.
Sloan (2019). Fundamental Analysis Redux. The Accounting Review 94(2), 363-377. doi
Argues that mechanical factor investing has displaced the reading of the statements it was built on, and shows what the reading still catches.
Shao, Stoumbos, Zhang (2021). The power of firm fundamental information in explaining stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 26(4), 1249-1289. doi
Statement fundamentals explain a far larger share of return variation than earnings alone once their relations are allowed to be nonlinear.
Bartram, Grinblatt (2021). Global market inefficiencies. Journal of Financial Economics 139(1), 234-259. doi
Fair values estimated from point-in-time accounting data for stocks in 36 countries predict returns in most regions, more so in emerging markets and where trading costs are higher.

Where the return comes from, and how fast it fades

Fairfield, Sweeney, Yohn (1996). Accounting Classification and the Predictive Content of Earnings. The Accounting Review 71(3), 337-355. doi
Separating earnings into operating income, non-operating income, taxes and special items improves the forecast of next year's profitability.
Fama, French (2000). Forecasting Profitability and Earnings. The Journal of Business 73(2), 161-175. doi
Profitability reverts toward its mean at roughly 38 percent a year, faster when it is far from the mean and faster from below.
Fairfield, Yohn (2001). Using Asset Turnover and Profit Margin to Forecast Changes in Profitability. Review of Accounting Studies 6(4), 371-385. doi
The levels of margin and turnover do not forecast the change in return on assets, but a change in turnover does.
Nissim, Penman (2001). Ratio Analysis and Equity Valuation: From Research to Practice. Review of Accounting Studies 6(1), 109-154. doi
Organizes the ratios into a structure that separates operating from financing activities and documents how each ratio typically behaves over time.
Penman, Zhang (2002). Accounting Conservatism, the Quality of Earnings, and Stock Returns. The Accounting Review 77(2), 237-264. doi
Conservative accounting builds hidden reserves when investment grows and releases them into earnings when it slows, which makes current earnings a poor guide in either phase.
Chan, Karceski, Lakonishok (2003). The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates. The Journal of Finance 58(2), 643-684. doi
Sustained high growth in earnings is rare and is no more common than chance would produce; neither valuation ratios nor analysts' forecasts identify it in advance.
Fairfield, Whisenant, Yohn (2003). Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future Profitability and Market Mispricing. The Accounting Review 78(1), 353-371. doi
The accrual effect is part of a wider growth effect: growth in net operating assets of any kind is followed by lower profitability.
Anderson, Banker, Janakiraman (2003). Are Selling, General, and Administrative Costs "Sticky"? Journal of Accounting Research 41(1), 47-63. doi
Selling, general and administrative costs rise by more when sales increase than they fall when sales decrease by the same amount, so costs are sticky.
Nissim, Penman (2003). Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How It Informs About Profitability and Price-to-Book Ratios. Review of Accounting Studies 8(4), 531-560. doi
Separates leverage that arises from financing from leverage that arises in operations, and shows the two explain future profitability and price-to-book ratios differently.
Titman, Wei, Xie (2004). Capital Investments and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4), 677-700. doi
Companies that raise capital investment the most earn lower returns afterward, most where managers have the freest hand.
Fama, French (2006). Profitability, investment and average returns. Journal of Financial Economics 82(3), 491-518. doi
Given the price paid, more profitable companies earn higher returns and companies that invest more earn lower returns, as the valuation identity predicts.
Cooper, Gulen, Schill (2008). Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1609-1651. doi
Growth in total assets is one of the strongest single predictors of lower returns in the following year.
Soliman (2008). The Use of DuPont Analysis by Market Participants. The Accounting Review 83(3), 823-853. doi
The split of return into margin and turnover carries information about future profitability that neither analysts nor prices fully use.
Dichev, Tang (2009). Earnings volatility and earnings predictability. Journal of Accounting and Economics 47(1-2), 160-181. doi
Volatile earnings are much less persistent and much harder to forecast, and neither analysts nor investors allow for it fully.
Dickinson (2011). Cash Flow Patterns as a Proxy for Firm Life Cycle. The Accounting Review 86(6), 1969-1994. doi
Builds a life cycle indicator from cash flow patterns and shows that profitability persists and converges differently by stage, and that investors undervalue mature companies.
Novy-Marx (2011). Operating Leverage. Review of Finance 15(1), 103-134. doi
Operating leverage predicts returns across stocks and explains why the value premium is strong within industries but weak across them.
Novy-Marx (2013). The other side of value: The gross profitability premium. Journal of Financial Economics 108(1), 1-28. doi
Gross profit scaled by assets predicts returns as strongly as book-to-market does, and profitable companies are not the cheap ones.
Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Nikolaev (2015). Deflating profitability. Journal of Financial Economics 117(2), 225-248. doi
Why gross profit appeared to beat net income as a predictor: the deflator matters, and operating profitability does better than either.
Fama, French (2015). A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics 116(1), 1-22. doi
Adds profitability and investment to the market, size and value factors; with them in, the value factor becomes redundant in the US data.
Hou, Xue, Zhang (2015). Digesting Anomalies: An Investment Approach. Review of Financial Studies 28(3), 650-705. doi
Of nearly eighty documented anomalies, about half are insignificant once the smallest stocks are weighted properly, and a model with investment and profitability factors captures most of the rest.
Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Nikolaev (2016). Accruals, cash flows, and operating profitability in the cross section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 121(1), 28-45. doi
Profitability measured on a cash basis subsumes the accrual anomaly: what predicts returns is the cash a business earns.
Call, Hewitt, Shevlin, Yohn (2016). Firm-Specific Estimates of Differential Persistence and their Incremental Usefulness for Forecasting and Valuation. The Accounting Review 91(3), 811-833. doi
Estimating the persistence of accruals and cash flows separately for each company improves out-of-sample earnings forecasts over cross-sectional models, most of all for stable companies.
Asness, Frazzini, Pedersen (2019). Quality minus junk. Review of Accounting Studies 24(1), 34-112. doi · Read a free copy
Defines quality as profitable, growing and safe, and shows that high-quality stocks earn higher risk-adjusted returns although they command only modestly higher prices.
Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Nikolaev (2020). Earnings, retained earnings, and book-to-market in the cross section of expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 135(1), 231-254. doi
Book-to-market predicts returns through the retained earnings part of book value, which proxies for earnings yield; contributed capital has no predictive power.
Penman, Zhang (2021). Connecting book rate of return to risk and return: the information conveyed by conservative accounting. Review of Accounting Studies 26(1), 391-423. doi
Under conservative accounting, a depressed book return alongside heavy investment marks earnings that are at risk, and it predicts returns.

Earnings made of cash and earnings made of estimates

Sloan (1996). Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings? The Accounting Review 71(3), 289-315. doi
The accrual part of earnings is less persistent than the cash part, and prices behave as if investors do not see the difference.
Xie (2001). The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals. The Accounting Review 76(3), 357-373. doi
The mispricing is concentrated in the discretionary part of accruals, the part managers have the most room to set.
Barth, Cram, Nelson (2001). Accruals and the Prediction of Future Cash Flows. The Accounting Review 76(1), 27-58. doi
Breaking accruals into receivables, payables, inventory, depreciation and other components predicts future cash flow better than aggregate earnings does, because each component carries different information.
Dechow, Dichev (2002). The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review 77(s-1), 35-59. doi
Measures accrual quality by how well working capital accruals map into cash flows of the adjacent years; poor mapping means less persistent earnings.
Hribar, Collins (2002). Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical Research. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 105-134. doi
Accruals inferred from balance sheet changes are contaminated by mergers and divestitures; measure them from the cash flow statement.
Thomas, Zhang (2002). Inventory Changes and Future Returns. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 163-187. doi · Read a free copy
Among the components of accruals, the change in inventory carries most of the predictive power for returns.
McNichols (2002). Discussion of the Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review 77(s-1), 61-69. doi
A discussion that documents measurement error in the Dechow and Dichev measure and shows that Jones model discretionary accruals move with cash flows, so much of what they capture is not discretionary.
Hirshleifer, Kewei Hou, Teoh, Yinglei Zhang (2004). Do investors overvalue firms with bloated balance sheets? Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 297-331. doi
Net operating assets, the cumulative gap between accounting earnings and free cash flow, predict lower returns for years.
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, Schipper (2005). The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(2), 295-327. doi
Companies with poorer accrual quality pay a higher cost of debt and of equity.
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, Tuna (2005). Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(3), 437-485. doi
Ranks every accrual by how reliably it can be measured; the least reliable ones are the least persistent and the most mispriced.
Ball, Shivakumar (2006). The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 44(2), 207-242. doi
Accrual models that allow losses to be recognized sooner than gains explain accruals substantially better than the usual linear models, which matters for anyone estimating discretionary accruals or earnings quality.
Dechow, Ge (2006). The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies 11(2-3), 253-296. doi
Accruals make earnings more persistent than cash flows when accruals are high but less persistent when they are low, mainly because of special items, and low-accrual companies with special items earn higher later returns.
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, Tuna (2006). The Implications of Accounting Distortions and Growth for Accruals and Profitability. The Accounting Review 81(3), 713-743. doi
Accruals unrelated to sales growth are also less persistent, and extreme accruals go with alleged manipulation, so temporary accounting distortions, not growth alone, help explain why accruals persist less than cash flows.
Dechow, Richardson, Sloan (2008). The Persistence and Pricing of the Cash Component of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 46(3), 537-566. doi
Cash earnings are more persistent than accruals only through the part distributed to equity holders; the part retained as cash is about as persistent as accruals and is mispriced in a similar way.
Dechow, Ge, Schrand (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 344-401. doi
The standard survey of every measure used for earnings quality and what each one actually captures.
Green, Hand, Soliman (2011). Going, Going, Gone? The Apparent Demise of the Accruals Anomaly. Management Science 57(5), 797-816. doi
The return to the accrual strategy shrank toward zero in the US as hedge funds traded on it.
Hafzalla, Lundholm, Van Winkle (2011). Percent Accruals. The Accounting Review 86(1), 209-236. doi
Scaling accruals by earnings instead of total assets sorts companies very differently and gives a stronger return signal, mostly by picking better low-accrual stocks.
Allen, Larson, Sloan (2013). Accrual reversals, earnings and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(1), 113-129. doi
Accruals that contain estimation error reverse within a year, and those reversals account for the low persistence of accruals.
Dichev, Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal (2013). Earnings quality: Evidence from the field. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56(2-3), 1-33. doi
Chief financial officers describe high-quality earnings as sustainable and backed by cash, and estimate that about a fifth of companies manage earnings in any period.
Bushman, Lerman, Zhang (2016). The Changing Landscape of Accrual Accounting. Journal of Accounting Research 54(1), 41-78. doi
The negative correlation between accruals and cash flows, the mark of accruals smoothing cash, has largely disappeared since the 1960s.
Foerster, Tsagarelis, Wang (2017). Are Cash Flows Better Stock Return Predictors Than Profits? Financial Analysts Journal 73(1), 73-99. doi
Cash flow measures rebuilt from the cash flow statement on a direct-method basis predict stock returns more strongly than income statement measures, with cash taxes and capital expenditures adding to the signal.
Larson, Sloan, Zha Giedt (2018). Defining, measuring, and modeling accruals: a guide for researchers. Review of Accounting Studies 23(3), 827-871. doi
Offers a comprehensive definition and measure of accruals, decompositions into the main classes, and a single model of what drives each, with guidance on matching the measure to the question.
Lewellen, Resutek (2019). Why do accruals predict earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 67(2-3), 336-356. doi
Accruals predict lower earnings because they signal investment and rising costs, not only because they are measured with error.
Nallareddy, Sethuraman, Venkatachalam (2020). Changes in accrual properties and operating environment: Implications for cash flow predictability. Journal of Accounting and Economics 69(2-3), 101313. doi
Cash flows have become better predictors of future cash flows while earnings have not, as operating cycles shortened and intangible spending grew.
Ball, Nikolaev (2022). On earnings and cash flows as predictors of future cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 73(1), 101430. doi
Measured on a consistent basis, earnings predict future operating cash flow better than current cash flow does.
Green, Louis, Sani (2022). Intangible Investments, Scaling, and the Trend in the Accrual-Cash Flow Association. Journal of Accounting Research 60(4), 1551-1582. doi
The weakening link between accruals and cash flows is largely a product of intangible investment that is expensed; adjusting for it restores much of the relation.

Managed and misstated numbers

Healy (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3), 85-107. doi
Managers choose accruals to maximize the bonus the plan will pay, shifting income across periods when it falls outside the plan's bounds.
Jones (1991). Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29(2), 193. doi
The model of expected accruals that later work measures discretion against, built to show firms depressing earnings while seeking import protection.
Bartov (1993). The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation. The Accounting Review 68(4), 840-855. doi
Companies time the sale of assets to smooth earnings and to stay inside their debt covenants.
DeFond, Jiambalvo (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1-2), 145-176. doi
In the year before a covenant is breached, companies report abnormally high accruals.
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney (1995). Detecting Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 70(2), 193-225. doi
Compares the models used to detect earnings management; all have low power for manipulation of plausible size.
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney (1996). Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13(1), 1-36. doi
Companies sanctioned for manipulation were more often seeking outside financing and had weaker boards; their cost of capital rose when it was revealed.
Burgstahler, Dichev (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 99-126. doi
The distribution of reported earnings has too few small losses and too many small profits to be an accident.
Beneish (1999). The Detection of Earnings Manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal 55(5), 24-36. doi
A model of eight statement ratios that distinguishes companies later found to have manipulated earnings; the source of the M-score.
Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser (1999). Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds. The Journal of Business 72(1), 1-33. doi
Three thresholds drive the management of earnings: zero, last year's figure, and the analysts' forecast.
Healy, Wahlen (1999). A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. Accounting Horizons 13(4), 365-383. doi
What the evidence shows about why and how earnings are managed, and how little it shows about how much.
Dechow, Skinner (2000). Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators. Accounting Horizons 14(2), 235-250. doi
Why academics find little earnings management and regulators see a great deal: they are looking at different things.
Fields, Lys, Vincent (2001). Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31(1-3), 255-307. doi
A review of 1990s research on why managers choose the accounting methods they do and with what consequences, which concludes that the decade made limited progress.
Dichev, Skinner (2002). Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 40(4), 1091-1123. doi
Unusually few loan quarters fall just short of a covenant threshold and unusually many just clear it.
Skinner, Sloan (2002). Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don't Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies 7(2-3), 289-312. doi
Growth stocks fall far more on a small earnings miss than they rise on a beat of the same size.
Leuz, Nanda, Wysocki (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69(3), 505-527. doi
Earnings are managed less where outside investors are better protected, because insiders have less private benefit to conceal.
Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1-3), 3-73. doi
Most surveyed executives would give up real economic value to hit an earnings target or to smooth earnings.
Kothari, Leone, Wasley (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(1), 163-197. doi
Discretionary accrual tests are misspecified for unusually profitable or unprofitable firms; matching on performance repairs them.
Roychowdhury (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(3), 335-370. doi
Companies also manage earnings with real decisions: price discounts to pull sales forward, overproduction to lower unit cost, cuts to discretionary spending.
Tucker, Zarowin (2006). Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? The Accounting Review 81(1), 251-270. doi
The stock prices of companies that smooth income more contain more information about their future earnings, which suggests smoothing conveys information instead of garbling it.
Cohen, Dey, Lys (2008). Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods. The Accounting Review 83(3), 757-787. doi
Accrual-based earnings management rose until the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and fell afterward, while real earnings management rose, suggesting companies switched methods.
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2010). Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? The Journal of Finance 65(6), 2213-2253. doi
Frauds come to light through employees, the press and industry regulators far more often than through auditors or the securities regulator.
Stubben (2010). Discretionary Revenues as a Measure of Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 85(2), 695-717. doi
Models of discretionary revenue detect both simulated and actual manipulation better than the commonly used accrual models, which fail to detect it in a sample of SEC enforcement cases.
Dechow, Ge, Larson, Sloan (2011). Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 28(1), 17-82. doi
From the companies the regulator charged with misstatement, a score built on accrual quality, performance, off-balance-sheet activity and market incentives; the source of the F-score.
Lee (2012). Incentives to Inflate Reported Cash from Operations Using Classification and Timing. The Accounting Review 87(1), 1-33. doi
Companies inflate reported operating cash flow when distressed, near the investment-grade cutoff or followed by cash flow forecasts, by reclassifying items and by timing payments and collections.
Zang (2012). Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management. The Accounting Review 87(2), 675-703. doi
Managers treat real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes, choosing between them by relative cost and adjusting accruals after seeing how much real manipulation was achieved.
Beneish, Lee, Nichols (2013). Earnings Manipulation and Expected Returns. Financial Analysts Journal 69(2), 57-82. doi
Companies the manipulation model flags earn lower returns, even though few of them are ever charged with anything.
Amiram, Bozanic, Rouen (2015). Financial statement errors: evidence from the distributional properties of financial statement numbers. Review of Accounting Studies 20(4), 1540-1593. doi
The first digits of the numbers in a set of statements should follow a known distribution; the distance from it is larger in statements that were later restated and shrinks in the corrected version.
Amiram, Bozanic, Cox, Dupont, Karpoff, Sloan (2018). Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature. Review of Accounting Studies 23(2), 732-783. doi
A review of research on financial reporting fraud and misconduct across law, accounting and finance, setting out a common vocabulary, the main findings and the open questions.
Bird, Karolyi, Ruchti (2019). Understanding the "numbers game". Journal of Accounting and Economics 68(2-3), 101242. doi
A structural estimate of how often companies manipulate earnings to beat the forecast, and what it costs them.
Srivastava (2019). Improving the measures of real earnings management. Review of Accounting Studies 24(4), 1277-1316. doi · Read a free copy
The usual measures of real earnings management mistake a company's competitive strategy for manipulation, because both make its costs differ from its industry's.
Bao, Ke, Li, Yu, Zhang (2020). Detecting Accounting Fraud in Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach. Journal of Accounting Research 58(1), 199-235. doi
A learning model fed raw statement items, not ratios, outperforms the ratio-based fraud scores out of sample.
Bertomeu, Cheynel, Floyd, Pan (2021). Using machine learning to detect misstatements. Review of Accounting Studies 26(2), 468-519. doi · Read a free copy
Machine learning on accounting, market, governance and audit data detects material misstatements; accounting variables detect little alone but become important when interacted with audit and market variables.
Beneish, Vorst (2022). The Cost of Fraud Prediction Errors. The Accounting Review 97(6), 91-121. doi · Read a free copy
Even the best fraud models raise more than a hundred false alarms for each true case. Weighed by the cost of errors they are too costly for auditors, and worth using for investors only in the case of the M-score and of the F-score at demanding cutoffs.
Dyck, Morse, Zingales (2024). How pervasive is corporate fraud? Review of Accounting Studies 29(1), 736-769. doi · Read a free copy
Using the collapse of a large auditor as a natural experiment, estimates that only about a third of corporate frauds are detected in normal times.
Chakrabarty, Moulton, Pugachev, Wang (2025). Catch me if you can: In search of accuracy, scope, and ease of fraud prediction. Review of Accounting Studies 30(2), 1268-1308. doi
A score built on the distribution of first digits, alone or combined with the F-score, predicts misreporting about as well as the established models and can be computed for many more companies.
Yang, Zhu (2026). Misstatement Detection Lag and Prediction Evaluation. The Accounting Review 101(2), 395-417. doi
Misstatements come to light years late; fraud models built and tested without allowing for that delay look more accurate than they are.

From the statements to a value, and from a price back to its assumptions

Miller, Modigliani (1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares. The Journal of Business 34(4), 411. doi
Value is the discounted stream of what the business earns on its investments; the form of the payout does not change it.
Feltham, Ohlson (1995). Valuation and Clean Surplus Accounting for Operating and Financial Activities. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 689-731. doi
Extends the model to separate operating from financial assets and shows how conservative accounting changes the relation between value and book value.
Ohlson (1995). Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 661-687. doi
Value equals book value plus the present value of the earnings expected above a normal return on that book value.
Kaplan, Ruback (1995). The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance 50(4), 1059-1093. doi
In 51 highly leveraged transactions, discounting the forecast cash flows gave values within 10 percent, on average, of the transaction prices, at least as close as comparable-company methods.
Burgstahler, Dichev (1997). Earnings, adaptation and equity value. The Accounting Review 72(2), 187-215. doi
Value follows earnings when a business will continue as it is and book value when its resources may be redeployed; the relation is convex in both.
Penman, Sougiannis (1998). A Comparison of Dividend, Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15(3), 343-383. doi
Over finite horizons, valuations built on accrual earnings come closer to observed prices than those built on cash flows or dividends.
Dechow, Hutton, Sloan (1999). An empirical assessment of the residual income valuation model. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26(1-3), 1-34. doi
Tests the model's assumption about how abnormal earnings decay, and finds investors behave as if the decay were slower than it is.
Lee, Myers, Swaminathan (1999). What is the Intrinsic Value of the Dow? The Journal of Finance 54(5), 1693-1741. doi
An accounting-based value of the index, using analysts' forecasts and time-varying interest rates, predicted returns better than the simple ratios.
Francis, Olsson, Oswald (2000). Comparing the Accuracy and Explainability of Dividend, Free Cash Flow, and Abnormal Earnings Equity Value Estimates. Journal of Accounting Research 38(1), 45. doi
On forecasts investors actually had, abnormal earnings valuations were more accurate than free cash flow or dividend valuations.
Claus, Thomas (2001). Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence from Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock Markets. The Journal of Finance 56(5), 1629-1666. doi
The equity premium implied by prices and forecasts is about three percent, well below the historical average return.
Gebhardt, Lee, Swaminathan (2001). Toward an Implied Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research 39(1), 135-176. doi
Solves for the discount rate that equates price with the value implied by book value and forecasts: the return the price offers.
Lundholm, O'Keefe (2001). Reconciling Value Estimates from the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Residual Income Model. Contemporary Accounting Research 18(2), 311-335. doi
The two models give the same value when applied consistently; published differences come from inconsistent terminal assumptions.
Courteau, Kao, Richardson (2001). Equity Valuation Employing the Ideal versus Ad Hoc Terminal Value Expressions. Contemporary Accounting Research 18(4), 625-661. doi
With terminal values taken from forecast prices, the discounted cash flow and residual income models perform equally, so the apparent advantage of residual income does not hold on a level playing field.
Graham, Harvey (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60(2-3), 187-243. doi
A survey of 392 chief financial officers: large companies rely on net present value and the capital asset pricing model, and many apply a single company-wide discount rate even to projects in a new industry or country.
Bhojraj, Lee (2002). Who Is My Peer? A Valuation-Based Approach to the Selection of Comparable Firms. Journal of Accounting Research 40(2), 407-439. doi
Chooses comparable companies by the multiple their fundamentals warrant, which works better than choosing by industry and size.
Easton, Taylor, Shroff, Sougiannis (2002). Using Forecasts of Earnings to Simultaneously Estimate Growth and the Rate of Return on Equity Investment. Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 657-676. doi
Solves at once for the expected return and the growth that prices and forecasts imply, instead of assuming one to obtain the other.
Liu, Nissim, Thomas (2002). Equity Valuation Using Multiples. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 135-172. doi
Multiples of forward earnings explain prices best, historical earnings next, and cash flow and sales worst.
Easton (2004). PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital. The Accounting Review 79(1), 73-95. doi
Derives the price-earnings-to-growth ratio from a valuation model and uses it to back out the expected return the price implies.
Dechow, Sloan, Soliman (2004). Implied Equity Duration: A New Measure of Equity Risk. Review of Accounting Studies 9(2-3), 197-228. doi
Builds a duration measure for stocks using financial statement analysis and finds that longer-duration stocks are more volatile and have higher betas, with book-to-market acting as a crude proxy for duration.
Ohlson, Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Expected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinants of Value. Review of Accounting Studies 10(2-3), 349-365. doi
Value expressed through next year's earnings and their growth, the model that underlies the earnings multiple.
Easton, Monahan (2005). An Evaluation of Accounting-Based Measures of Expected Returns. The Accounting Review 80(2), 501-538. doi
Tests seven implied cost of capital measures built from prices and analysts' forecasts and finds none is positively related to realized returns across all companies, though some are reliable when forecasts are accurate.
Mauboussin (2006). Expectations Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns. CFA Institute Conference Proceedings Quarterly 23(3), 61-70. doi
Start from the price and solve for the cash flow expectations it embodies, then ask whether they are too high or too low.
Penman (2010). Financial Forecasting, Risk and Valuation: Accounting for the Future. Abacus 46(2), 211-228. doi
Argues that a valuation model is a model of accounting for the future: the accounting specifies the payoffs to forecast, shapes how they evolve, and bears on how risk is handled.
Hou, van Dijk, Zhang (2012). The implied cost of capital: A new approach. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53(3), 504-526. doi · Read a free copy
Earnings forecasts from a cross-sectional statistical model cover more companies and are less biased than analysts' forecasts, and the implied cost of capital built on them is a more reliable proxy for expected returns.
Penman, Reggiani (2013). Returns to buying earnings and book value: accounting for growth and risk. Review of Accounting Studies 18(4), 1021-1049. doi
Earnings yield and book-to-price together forecast returns, because book-to-price indicates growth that is at risk.
Penman, Reggiani (2018). Fundamentals of Value versus Growth Investing and an Explanation for the Value Trap. Financial Analysts Journal 74(4), 103-119. doi · Read a free copy
A cheap stock on earnings can be a trap when a high book-to-price signals earnings that are at risk; the accounting explains when.
Geertsema, Lu (2023). Relative Valuation with Machine Learning. Journal of Accounting Research 61(1), 329-376. doi
Machine learning models estimate valuation multiples substantially more accurately out of sample than traditional models, and stocks they mark as overvalued or undervalued move toward the estimate in the following month.

Distress and default

Beaver (1966). Financial Ratios As Predictors of Failure. Journal of Accounting Research 4, 71. doi
Single ratios, cash flow to debt above all, separate failing companies from healthy ones up to five years ahead.
Altman (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance 23(4), 589-609. doi
Combines five ratios into one score that classified bankrupt and healthy manufacturers; the source of the Z-score.
Merton (1974). On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates. The Journal of Finance 29(2), 449. doi
Equity is a call option on the firm's assets with the debt as the strike; the distance to default follows from it.
Ohlson (1980). Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 18(1), 109. doi
Replaces the discriminant score with a probability of failure estimated from nine statement measures; the source of the O-score.
Dichev (1998). Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk? The Journal of Finance 53(3), 1131-1147. doi
Companies with high bankruptcy risk earned lower, not higher, returns, which is hard to square with distress as a priced risk.
Shumway (2001). Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model. The Journal of Business 74(1), 101-124. doi
A hazard model that uses every year of a company's data and adds market variables forecasts failure better than the single-period scores.
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, Lundstedt (2004). Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy. Review of Accounting Studies 9(1), 5-34. doi
A bankruptcy probability derived from the option-pricing model and market prices carries significantly more information about failure than the Z-Score or the O-Score, even with updated coefficients.
Beaver, McNichols, Rhie (2005). Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy. Review of Accounting Studies 10(1), 93-122. doi
The ratios predict bankruptcy almost as well as they did forty years earlier; the slight decline is made up by market variables.
Bharath, Shumway (2008). Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance to Default Model. Review of Financial Studies 21(3), 1339-1369. doi · Read a free copy
The structural model's value lies in its functional form; a naive version forecasts default about as well as the solved one.
Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2008). In Search of Distress Risk. The Journal of Finance 63(6), 2899-2939. doi · Read a free copy
The best-performing failure model combines accounting and market measures, and the stocks it ranks most distressed have earned anomalously low returns.
Beaver, Correia, McNichols (2012). Do differences in financial reporting attributes impair the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy? Review of Accounting Studies 17(4), 969-1010. doi
Financial ratios predict bankruptcy less well where reporting discretion and intangible assets are more important, and their predictive ability has declined over time for reasons tied to those reporting attributes.
Correia, Richardson, Tuna (2012). Value investing in credit markets. Review of Accounting Studies 17(3), 572-609. doi
Credit spreads reflect forecasts of default, built from accounting and equity market information, only with a significant lag, which leaves room for value investing in corporate credit.
Baghai, Servaes, Tamayo (2014). Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing. The Journal of Finance 69(5), 1961-2005. doi
Credit rating agencies grew more conservative from 1985 to 2009: for the same company characteristics, ratings fell by three notches on average, and the market partly undid the effect in debt prices.
Kraft (2015). Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads. The Accounting Review 90(2), 641-674. doi
The adjustments rating analysts make for leases, pensions and other debt kept off the balance sheet are large, and yields follow the adjusted figures.
Lian, Ma (2020). Anatomy of Corporate Borrowing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(1), 229-291. doi
For U.S. nonfinancial companies, 80% of debt by value is lent against operating cash flows and only 20% against asset values, and a standard borrowing limit ties total debt to operating earnings.

What the balance sheet leaves out

Lev, Sougiannis (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(1), 107-138. doi
Estimates the research capital the income statement expenses; adjusting earnings and book value for it explains prices and later returns.
Chan, Lakonishok, Sougiannis (2001). The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures. The Journal of Finance 56(6), 2431-2456. doi
Research-intensive companies with poor past returns earn high subsequent returns, and research intensity raises return volatility.
Kothari, Laguerre, Leone (2002). Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays. Review of Accounting Studies 7(4), 355-382. doi
The future benefits of research and development spending are far more uncertain than those of spending on property, plant and equipment, measured by the variability of later earnings.
Eisfeldt, Papanikolaou (2013). Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. The Journal of Finance 68(4), 1365-1406. doi
Capital embodied in key people, measured from selling and administrative spending, earns a premium because those people can leave with it.
Srivastava (2014). Why have measures of earnings quality changed over time? Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(2-3), 196-217. doi · Read a free copy
The decline in measured earnings quality comes largely from newer cohorts of companies whose spending is on intangibles.
Peters, Taylor (2017). Intangible capital and the investment-q relation. Journal of Financial Economics 123(2), 251-272. doi
Adding capitalized research and a share of administrative spending to the capital stock makes investment theory fit the data much better.
Enache, Srivastava (2018). Should Intangible Investments Be Reported Separately or Commingled with Operating Expenses? New Evidence. Management Science 64(7), 3446-3468. doi
Splits administrative spending into the part that maintains current operations and the part that is investment; the investment part predicts future earnings.
Curtis, McVay, Toynbee (2020). The changing implications of research and development expenditures for future profitability. Review of Accounting Studies 25(2), 405-437. doi
The relation between research and development spending and later profitability has declined over time, with returns to such spending settling at lower levels than in earlier periods.
Eisfeldt, Kim, Papanikolaou (2022). Intangible Value. Critical Finance Review 11(2), 299-332. doi
A value factor built on book equity plus intangible capital prices assets better and earned more than the traditional one.
Lev, Srivastava (2022). Explaining the Recent Failure of Value Investing. Critical Finance Review 11(2), 333-360. doi
Book value misclassifies intangible-rich companies as expensive; correcting for it, and for slower mean reversion, explains the poor run of value.
Barth, Li, McClure (2023). Evolution in Value Relevance of Accounting Information. The Accounting Review 98(1), 1-28. doi
Across a broad set of accounting items, value relevance did not decline from 1962 to 2018; it moved from earnings toward items tied to intangibles, growth opportunities and alternative performance measures.
Babina, Fedyk, He, Hodson (2024). Artificial intelligence, firm growth, and product innovation. Journal of Financial Economics 151, 103745. doi · Read a free copy
Companies that invest in artificial intelligence, measured from the skills of the people they hire, grow faster in sales, employment and value, mainly through new products and mainly when they are already large.
Ewens, Peters, Wang (2024). Measuring Intangible Capital with Market Prices. Management Science. doi · Read a free copy
Capitalization rates inferred from the prices paid for companies imply about fifteen percent less intangible capital than the standard assumptions, with wide differences across industries.
Iqbal, Rajgopal, Srivastava, Zhao (2024). A Better Estimate of Internally Generated Intangible Capital. Management Science. doi
Replaces the rule-of-thumb rates for capitalizing research and administrative spending with rates estimated by industry; the resulting measures of capital serve financial statement analysis better.
Allen, Lewis-Western, Valentine (2026). Intangible-intensive firms and performance reporting. Review of Accounting Studies 31(3), 1877-1923. doi · Read a free copy
Companies that must expense their investment report adjusted measures more often when reported earnings lack relevance, and excluding investment-like spending improves the measure.
Iqbal, Srivastava (2026). How Do Amounts, Composition, and Quality of Accruals Differ for Physical versus Knowledge Firms? The Accounting Review 101(4), 295-319. doi
Knowledge-intensive companies report smaller accruals of lower quality, but the gap is concentrated in small, early-stage ones and closes as they scale.
Penman (2026). Empirical Research on Capitalizing Intangible Assets Is Logically Incoherent. Accounting Horizons 40(2), 17-22. doi
The dissent: the studies said to support capitalizing intangibles are inconsistent with how a rational investor infers the payoff to such spending, and leave out the information the investor uses.

Financing, issuance and payout

Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen (1995). Market underreaction to open market share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39(2-3), 181-208. doi
Companies that announce repurchases earn abnormal returns for four years, most of all when the stock is cheap.
Loughran, Ritter (1995). The New Issues Puzzle. The Journal of Finance 50(1), 23-51. doi
Companies that issue stock, in an initial or a later offering, earn poor returns for five years.
Fama, French (2001). Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60(1), 3-43. doi
The share of publicly traded companies paying dividends fell from two thirds to about a fifth in twenty years, partly because small unprofitable companies listed and partly because every kind of company became less likely to pay.
Brav, Graham, Harvey, Michaely (2005). Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77(3), 483-527. doi
Executives treat the dividend as nearly untouchable and the repurchase as the flexible residual after investment.
Bradshaw, Richardson, Sloan (2006). The relation between corporate financing activities, analysts' forecasts and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1-2), 53-85. doi
A single measure of net external financing predicts lower returns, and analysts are most optimistic about the companies raising the most.
Daniel, Titman (2006). Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information. The Journal of Finance 61(4), 1605-1643. doi
Returns unrelated to accounting performance tend to reverse, and share issuance is a strong negative predictor.
Hribar, Jenkins, Johnson (2006). Stock repurchases as an earnings management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41(1-2), 3-27. doi
A disproportionate number of companies make repurchases that lift earnings per share when they would otherwise have just missed the analysts' forecast.
Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, Roberts (2007). On the Importance of Measuring Payout Yield: Implications for Empirical Asset Pricing. The Journal of Finance 62(2), 877-915. doi
Payout yield that counts repurchases, and net payout yield that also subtracts issuance, predict returns over time and across stocks better than the dividend yield does.
Pontiff, Woodgate (2008). Share Issuance and Cross-sectional Returns. The Journal of Finance 63(2), 921-945. doi
The change in shares outstanding predicts returns more strongly than size, book-to-market or momentum.
Skinner (2008). The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 87(3), 582-609. doi
Repurchases have become the dominant form of payout and their overall level is determined by earnings, while companies that only pay dividends have nearly disappeared.
Almeida, Fos, Kronlund (2016). The real effects of share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 119(1), 168-185. doi
Companies that would just miss the earnings per share forecast are far more likely to repurchase shares to reach it, and such repurchases are followed by cuts in employment, investment and cash.

Analysts, adjusted earnings and expectations

La Porta (1996). Expectations and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 51(5), 1715-1742. doi
Stocks for which analysts forecast the highest earnings growth earn low returns and those with the lowest forecasts earn high returns, because expectations of growth are too extreme.
Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, Sloan (2001). Short-sellers, fundamental analysis, and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 61(1), 77-106. doi
Short sellers target companies priced high against their fundamentals and cover as the gap closes.
Bradshaw, Richardson, Sloan (2001). Do Analysts and Auditors Use Information in Accruals? Journal of Accounting Research 39(1), 45-74. doi
Analysts' forecasts do not build in the earnings declines that follow high accruals, and auditors do not signal them through opinions or auditor changes.
Bartov, Givoly, Hayn (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33(2), 173-204. doi
Meeting or beating the forecast earns a premium, even when it was achieved by guiding the forecast down.
Bradshaw, Sloan (2002). GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40(1), 41-66. doi · Read a free copy
The gap between reported and adjusted earnings widened sharply, and prices came to follow the adjusted figure.
Matsumoto (2002). Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises. The Accounting Review 77(3), 483-514. doi
Companies with more transient institutional holders and more growth to defend manage both earnings and forecasts to avoid a miss.
Doyle, Lundholm, Soliman (2003). The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings. Review of Accounting Studies 8(2-3), 145-174. doi
The expenses companies exclude from adjusted earnings predict lower future cash flow; they are not one-time, and investors do not fully allow for them.
Bradshaw (2004). How Do Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock Recommendations? The Accounting Review 79(1), 25-50. doi
Recommendations follow growth heuristics, not the present value of the analysts' own forecasts.
Richardson, Teoh, Wysocki (2004). The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives. Contemporary Accounting Research 21(4), 885-924. doi
Analysts' forecasts start optimistic and are walked down to a level the company can beat, most strongly when the company or its insiders sell stock after the announcement.
Bradshaw, Drake, Myers, Myers (2012). A re-examination of analysts' superiority over time-series forecasts of annual earnings. Review of Accounting Studies 17(4), 944-968. doi
Beyond the next few quarters, and for small or thinly followed companies, analysts forecast no better than a random walk.
Barth, Gow, Taylor (2012). Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R. Review of Accounting Studies 17(3), 526-562. doi
After stock compensation had to be expensed, managers who excluded it from pro forma earnings did so opportunistically, while analysts excluded it when that made earnings a better predictor of future performance.
So (2013). A new approach to predicting analyst forecast errors: Do investors overweight analyst forecasts? Journal of Financial Economics 108(3), 615-640. doi
The gap between a forecast from fundamentals and the analysts' forecast predicts the forecast error, and prices do not anticipate it.
Kothari, So, Verdi (2016). Analysts' Forecasts and Asset Pricing: A Survey. Annual Review of Financial Economics 8(1), 197-219. doi
A survey of research on sell-side analysts' forecasts: they move prices and help estimate expected returns, but they are predictably biased and the market does not fully correct for the bias.
Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, Whipple (2018). Non-GAAP reporting: Evidence from academia and current practice. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 45(3-4), 259-294. doi
Reviews what is known about adjusted earnings: who reports them, what is excluded, and when the exclusions inform or mislead.
Bentley, Christensen, Gee, Whipple (2018). Disentangling Managers' and Analysts' Non-GAAP Reporting. Journal of Accounting Research 56(4), 1039-1081. doi
Comparing managers' own non-GAAP earnings with the figures in I/B/E/S shows the database leaves out managers' lower-quality numbers, so using it understates how aggressive their reporting is.
Bordalo, Gennaioli, La Porta, Shleifer (2019). Diagnostic Expectations and Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 74(6), 2839-2874. doi
Stocks with the most optimistic long-term growth forecasts earn lower returns than those with the most pessimistic, which the authors explain by analysts overreacting to news about earnings growth.
Bouchaud, Krüger, Landier, Thesmar (2019). Sticky Expectations and the Profitability Anomaly. The Journal of Finance 74(2), 639-674. doi · Read a free copy
Explains the profitability anomaly by slow-moving expectations: analysts are too pessimistic about the future profits of highly profitable companies, and the anomaly is stronger where forecasts are stickier.
Engelberg, McLean, Pontiff (2020). Analysts and anomalies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 69(1), 101249. doi
Analysts' price targets and recommendations often run against what the published return predictors say.
Mohanram, White, Zhao (2020). Stock-based compensation, financial analysts, and equity overvaluation. Review of Accounting Studies 25(3), 1040-1077. doi · Read a free copy
Companies that pay more in stock trade at higher multiples and earn lower returns afterward; analysts who leave that cost out of their valuations set targets that are too high.
Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, Whipple (2021). Non-GAAP Earnings: A Consistency and Comparability Crisis? Contemporary Accounting Research 38(3), 1712-1747. doi
Companies seldom change how they define adjusted earnings, and when they do, or depart from the practice of their peers, the figure generally informs better about performance.
Rouen, So, Wang (2021). Core earnings: New data and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 142(3), 1068-1091. doi
A machine reading of the footnotes isolates items that will not recur; earnings without them persist longer, and analysts and prices are slow to see the difference.

Words and machines

Li (2008). Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(2-3), 221-247. doi
Companies with lower earnings file annual reports that are harder to read, and the earnings of companies with readable reports persist longer.
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, Macskassy (2008). More Than Words: Quantifying Language to Measure Firms' Fundamentals. The Journal of Finance 63(3), 1437-1467. doi
The share of negative words in news stories about a company forecasts lower earnings, and prices underreact briefly to that information, most of all for stories about fundamentals.
Brown, Tucker (2011). Large-Sample Evidence on Firms' Year-over-Year MD&A Modifications. Journal of Accounting Research 49(2), 309-346. doi
Companies with larger economic changes modify the management discussion more, but the discussion has grown more boilerplate and less informative over time.
Loughran, Mcdonald (2011). When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks. The Journal of Finance 66(1), 35-65. doi
General word lists misclassify financial language; a dictionary built for filings relates to returns, volume and later fraud.
Matsumoto, Pronk, Roelofsen (2011). What Makes Conference Calls Useful? The Information Content of Managers' Presentations and Analysts' Discussion Sessions. The Accounting Review 86(4), 1383-1414. doi
In more than 10,000 conference call transcripts, both the prepared presentation and the question period add information beyond the press release, and the question period adds more, especially when performance is poor.
Larcker, Zakolyukina (2012). Detecting Deceptive Discussions in Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research 50(2), 495-540. doi
Word-choice models of executives' conference call remarks identify calls tied to later restatements better than chance and at least as well as models built on accounting variables.
Mayew, Venkatachalam (2012). The Power of Voice: Managerial Affective States and Future Firm Performance. The Journal of Finance 67(1), 1-43. doi
Emotion detected in managers' voices during conference calls, when analysts press them, carries information about the company's future that analysts' near-term forecasts miss.
Huang, Teoh, Zhang (2014). Tone Management. The Accounting Review 89(3), 1083-1113. doi
Abnormally positive tone in an earnings release predicts lower future earnings and cash flow, and appears when managers have reason to mislead.
Loughran, Mcdonald (2016). Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance: A Survey. Journal of Accounting Research 54(4), 1187-1230. doi
What the methods for reading filings as data can and cannot support.
Dyer, Lang, Stice-Lawrence (2017). The evolution of 10-K textual disclosure: Evidence from Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 64(2-3), 221-245. doi
From 1996 to 2013 annual reports grew longer, more boilerplate and more redundant and less specific and readable, with fair value, internal control and risk factor disclosures accounting for virtually all the added length.
Froot, Kang, Ozik, Sadka (2017). What do measures of real-time corporate sales say about earnings surprises and post-announcement returns? Journal of Financial Economics 125(1), 143-162. doi
Real-time proxies for retailers' sales built from sources including mobile devices predict revenue and earnings surprises, and suggest managers do not fully disclose what they know at the announcement.
Cohen, Malloy, Nguyen (2020). Lazy Prices. The Journal of Finance 75(3), 1371-1415. doi
When a company changes the language of its annual or quarterly report, lower returns and worse news follow, and prices do not react at the time.
Gu, Kelly, Xiu (2020). Empirical Asset Pricing via Machine Learning. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2223-2273. doi
Tree and neural network models roughly double the performance of regression strategies; the gain comes from interactions among predictors.
Chen, Cho, Dou, Lev (2022). Predicting Future Earnings Changes Using Machine Learning and Detailed Financial Data. Journal of Accounting Research 60(2), 467-515. doi
Learning models fed the full detail of filed statements predict the direction of earnings changes better than analysts or regression models.
Cao, Jiang, Yang, Zhang (2023). How to Talk When a Machine Is Listening: Corporate Disclosure in the Age of AI. The Review of Financial Studies 36(9), 3603-3642. doi
As more filings are read by machines, companies write them to be easier for machines to process and tone down language that algorithms score as negative.
Huang, Wang, Yang (2023). FinBERT : A Large Language Model for Extracting Information from Financial Text. Contemporary Accounting Research 40(2), 806-841. doi
A language model adapted to financial text classifies the sentiment of sentences from analyst reports substantially better than the Loughran and McDonald dictionary and other machine learning methods.
Jones, Moser, Wieland (2023). Machine learning and the prediction of changes in profitability. Contemporary Accounting Research 40(4), 2643-2672. doi
Machine-learning methods predict next-period changes in profitability out of sample substantially better than regression, and show both margin and turnover changes to be informative.
van Binsbergen, Han, Lopez-Lira (2023). Man versus Machine Learning: The Term Structure of Earnings Expectations and Conditional Biases. The Review of Financial Studies 36(6), 2361-2396. doi
Measured against a machine-learning benchmark, analysts' earnings forecasts are biased upward, more so at longer horizons, and stocks with the most optimistic forecasts earn lower returns.
Cao, You (2024). Fundamental Analysis via Machine Learning. Financial Analysts Journal 80(2), 74-98. doi
Learning models forecast earnings more accurately out of sample than the standard statistical models and than the analysts' consensus, and what is new in their forecasts predicts returns.
Sarkar, Vafa (2024). Lookahead Bias in Pretrained Language Models. Working paper, SSRN 4754678. doi
Direct tests show that language models leak knowledge of the future into backtests, and that instructing them to ignore it is only a partial cure.
Shaffer, Wang (2024). Scaling Core Earnings Measurement with Large Language Models. Working paper, SSRN 4979501. doi
Asked to find a company's recurring earnings in its annual report, a language model drifts toward management's own adjustments unless the task is tightly structured; structured, it does as well as the existing measures.
Dessaint, Foucault, Fresard (2024). Does Alternative Data Improve Financial Forecasting? The Horizon Effect. The Journal of Finance 79(3), 2237-2287. doi
Alternative data makes short-term information cheaper, which shifts forecasters' attention to the short term: analysts' short-horizon forecasts have become more informative and their long-horizon forecasts less.
Binz, Schipper, Standridge (2025). Estimating profitability decomposition frameworks via machine learning: Implications for earnings forecasting and financial statement analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 80(2-3), 101805. doi · Read a free copy
Learning models that keep the structure of the profitability split forecast earnings better than either the classic ratios or an unstructured model.
Engelberg, Manela, Mullins, Vulicevic (2025). Entity Neutering. Working paper, SSRN 5182756. doi
Masking a text until a model cannot tell which company it is about preserves most of its predictive content, which puts a bound on how much of a result can be owed to memory.
Siano (2025). The News in Earnings Announcement Disclosures: Capturing Word Context Using LLM Methods. Management Science 71(11), 9831-9855. doi
A language model that reads words in context finds three times more of the announcement-day return in the text of earnings releases than word-count methods do.
Zhang, Zhu, Linnainmaa (2025). Man versus Machine Learning Revisited. The Review of Financial Studies 38(12), 3768-3790. doi
A much-cited result, that a learning model predicting analysts' errors earned a large trading profit, is traced to look-ahead bias; with the bias removed the profit disappears and a linear model does as well.
de Kok (2025). ChatGPT for Textual Analysis? How to Use Generative LLMs in Accounting Research. Management Science 71(9), 7888-7906. doi
A guide to using generative language models for textual analysis in accounting research, with a framework for model choice, prompts and validity and a case study detecting non-answers in conference calls.
Campbell, Ham, Lu, Wood (2026). Expectations Matter: When (Not) to Use Machine Learning Earnings Forecasts. Management Science. doi
Whether a machine forecast of earnings beats the analysts depends on how it is built: four in five specifications do not, and the ones that do win by correcting predictable analyst bias.
Levy (2026). Caution Ahead: Numerical Reasoning and Look-Ahead Bias in AI Models. Journal of Accounting Research 64(3), 1139-1188. doi
Language models reason poorly with numbers, and the commercial ones have often already read the period they are tested on; much of their apparent skill at accounting tasks is an artefact of both.
Lopez-Lira, Tang (2026). Can ChatGPT forecast stock price movements? Return predictability and large language models. Journal of Financial Economics 184, 104335. doi
Tested only on headlines dated after its training ended, a language model's reading of the news predicts the first price reaction and the drift after it, and the profit shrinks as such models spread.

Do the findings survive

Fama, French (2008). Dissecting Anomalies. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1653-1678. doi
The return patterns tied to net stock issues, accruals and momentum show up in all size groups, while the asset growth pattern is absent for big stocks and the profitability pattern is less robust.
Green, Hand, Zhang (2013). The supraview of return predictive signals. Review of Accounting Studies 18(3), 692-730. doi
Catalogues more than 330 published return-predicting signals from 1970 to 2010 and finds their returns are nearly uncorrelated with one another, which implies either pervasive mispricing or far more priced risks than assumed.
Penman, Zhu (2014). Accounting Anomalies, Risk, and Return. The Accounting Review 89(5), 1835-1866. doi
The accounting variables behind the anomalies forecast earnings growth in the same direction as they forecast returns, which is what the pricing of risky growth would produce.
Harvey, Liu, Zhu (2016). ... and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns. Review of Financial Studies 29(1), 5-68. doi
With hundreds of factors tested, the bar for significance should be much higher than the conventional one; most claimed findings are likely false.
Mclean, Pontiff (2016). Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability? The Journal of Finance 71(1), 5-32. doi
Returns to a published predictor are about a quarter lower out of sample and more than half lower after publication.
Green, Hand, Zhang (2017). The Characteristics that Provide Independent Information about Average U.S. Monthly Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 30(12), 4389-4436. doi
Of ninety-four characteristics, only a dozen carry independent information, and predictability fell sharply after 2003.
Yan, Zheng (2017). Fundamental Analysis and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns: A Data-Mining Approach. The Review of Financial Studies 30(4), 1382-1423. doi
From a universe of more than 18,000 signals built from the financial statements, many predict stock returns even after allowing for data mining, more so after high-sentiment periods and where arbitrage is limited.
Linnainmaa, Roberts (2018). The History of the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 31(7), 2606-2649. doi · Read a free copy
Most accounting-based anomalies are far weaker in the decades before the samples in which they were discovered.
Hou, Xue, Zhang (2020). Replicating Anomalies. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2019-2133. doi
Most of 452 published anomalies fail to replicate once the smallest stocks are given their proper weight.
Chen, Zimmermann (2022). Open Source Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing. Critical Finance Review 11(2), 207-264. doi
Provides open data and code that reproduce nearly all published cross-sectional return predictors; of the characteristics clearly significant in the original papers, almost all remain significant in the reproduction.
Martineau (2022). Rest in Peace Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. Critical Finance Review 11(3-4), 613-646. doi
In modern markets prices reflect earnings surprises on the announcement date: post-earnings-announcement drift has been absent for large stocks since 2006 and has more recently disappeared for microcaps.
Jensen, Kelly, Pedersen (2023). Is There a Replication Crisis in Finance? The Journal of Finance 78(5), 2465-2518. doi
The other side of the argument: tested together in one model, most published factors do replicate, fall into thirteen themes, and hold in ninety-three countries.
Bowles, Reed, Ringgenberg, Thornock (2024). Anomaly Time. The Journal of Finance 79(5), 3543-3579. doi
Returns to statement-based signals are concentrated in the first month after the information is released and decay soon after; forming portfolios on stale data understates them.
Hou, Mo, Xue, Zhang (2024). The Economics of Security Analysis. Management Science 70(1), 164-186. doi
The classic strategies of security analysis load on profitability, investment and expected growth, which gives them an explanation in equilibrium pricing.

Particular accounts

Bernard, Noel (1991). Do Inventory Disclosures Predict Sales and Earnings? Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 6(2), 145-181. doi
Inventory disclosures help predict sales and earnings, but the meaning depends on the type: for manufacturers, unexpected raw materials and work in process lead future sales, while unexpected finished goods signal lower future earnings.
Imhoff, Lipe, Wright (1991). Operating Leases: Impact of Constructive Capitalization. Accounting Horizons 5(1), 51-63. doi
Documents how much long-term operating lease commitments matter for commonly used measures of risk and performance once the leases are constructively capitalized.
Barth (1994). Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Investment Securities and the Market Valuation of Banks. The Accounting Review 69(1), 1-25. doi
Fair values of banks' investment securities explain their share prices better than historical cost does.
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, Shevlin (2002). Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect the Implications of Special Items for Future Earnings? Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 585-612. doi
Prices reflect more of the future earnings implications of special items than of other earnings components, but still not all of them.
Core, Guay, Kothari (2002). The Economic Dilution of Employee Stock Options: Diluted EPS for Valuation and Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review 77(3), 627-652. doi
The treasury-stock method systematically understates the dilution from employee stock options; economic dilution is on average double what reported diluted earnings per share reflects.
Rajgopal, Shevlin, Venkatachalam (2003). Does the Stock Market Fully Appreciate the Implications of Leading Indicators for Future Earnings? Evidence from Order Backlog. Review of Accounting Studies 8(4), 461-492. doi
Order backlog predicts future earnings, and investors overweight it.
Coronado, Sharpe (2003). Did Pension Plan Accounting Contribute to a Stock Market Bubble? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003(1), 323-371. doi · Read a free copy
In the 1990s stock prices capitalized the pension component of earnings like core earnings instead of reflecting the fair value of net pension assets in the footnotes, so pension earnings were often overvalued.
Aboody, Barth, Kasznik (2004). SFAS No. 123 Stock-Based Compensation Expense and Equity Market Values. The Accounting Review 79(2), 251-275. doi
Investors treat the cost of stock compensation as a real expense when valuing the company, whether or not it is recognized.
Lev, Nissim (2004). Taxable Income, Future Earnings, and Equity Values. The Accounting Review 79(4), 1039-1074. doi
The ratio of taxable income to book income predicts earnings growth; investors were slow to use it.
Hanlon (2005). The Persistence and Pricing of Earnings, Accruals, and Cash Flows When Firms Have Large Book-Tax Differences. The Accounting Review 80(1), 137-166. doi
A large gap between book and taxable income marks earnings that persist less, and investors read it as a warning.
Altamuro, Beatty, Weber (2005). The Effects of Accelerated Revenue Recognition on Earnings Management and Earnings Informativeness: Evidence from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101. The Accounting Review 80(2), 373-401. doi
Companies that recognized revenue early before SAB 101 were more likely to meet earnings benchmarks, yet their earnings were also more informative about future cash flows, and that informativeness declined after the rule.
Franzoni, Marín (2006). Pension Plan Funding and Stock Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance 61(2), 921-956. doi · Read a free copy
Companies with badly underfunded pension plans earn lower returns: the market is slow to price the claim on future earnings.
Jegadeesh, Livnat (2006). Revenue surprises and stock returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41(1-2), 147-171. doi
A revenue surprise adds to an earnings surprise in predicting the drift, because revenue-driven earnings growth is more persistent.
Beatty, Weber (2006). Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments. Journal of Accounting Research 44(2), 257-288. doi
When adopting the goodwill impairment standard, companies' choices to take charges at once below the line or defer them were shaped by equity market concerns and by debt covenant, bonus, turnover and delisting incentives.
Bergstresser, Desai, Rauh (2006). Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions, and Managerial Investment Decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(1), 157-195. doi
Managers assume higher long-term returns on pension assets when the assumption has more effect on reported earnings, and raise them before acquisitions and option exercises.
McVay (2006). Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items. The Accounting Review 81(3), 501-531. doi
Managers shift ordinary operating expenses into special items, which leaves bottom-line earnings unchanged but overstates core earnings, and they appear to do so to meet the analyst forecast.
Picconi (2006). The Perils of Pensions: Does Pension Accounting Lead Investors and Analysts Astray? The Accounting Review 81(4), 925-955. doi
Neither prices nor analysts' forecasts fully reflect the earnings effects of changes in pension information when the annual report appears; both adjust only gradually as later quarterly earnings arrive.
Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew (2008). Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 83(1), 61-82. doi
Introduces the long-run cash effective tax rate, cash taxes paid per dollar of pre-tax earnings over as long as ten years, and shows that one-year rates predict it poorly.
Fairfield, Kitching, Tang (2009). Are special items informative about future profit margins? Review of Accounting Studies 14(2-3), 204-236. doi
For highly profitable companies, negative special items are followed by lower profit margins, so they are not purely transitory; for low-profitability companies past special items say nothing about future margins.
Hanlon, Heitzman (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 127-178. doi
A review of tax research covering what reported tax expense tells investors, corporate tax avoidance, taxes in investment and financing decisions, and taxes in asset pricing.
Thomas, Zhang (2011). Tax Expense Momentum. Journal of Accounting Research 49(3), 791-821. doi
A surprise in quarterly tax expense predicts higher future returns and higher future earnings, consistent with tax expense carrying information about core profitability that prices reflect with a delay.
Ramanna, Watts (2012). Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required goodwill impairment. Review of Accounting Studies 17(4), 749-780. doi · Read a free copy
Among companies with market indications of impaired goodwill, the failure to write it down is associated with managers' incentives, not with private information.
Cornaggia, Franzen, Simin (2013). Bringing leased assets onto the balance sheet. Journal of Corporate Finance 22, 345-360. doi
Conventional leverage, Z-Score, return on capital and similar measures understate risk and overstate performance for companies that rely heavily on off-balance-sheet leases, and the distortion has grown over time.
Shalev, Zhang, Zhang (2013). CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation. Journal of Accounting Research 51(4), 819-854. doi
Acquirers whose chief executives are paid more through earnings-based bonuses allocate more of the purchase price to goodwill, which is not amortized and so lifts later earnings.
Gordon, Henry, Jorgensen, Linthicum (2017). Flexibility in cash-flow classification under IFRS: determinants and consequences. Review of Accounting Studies 22(2), 839-872. doi · Read a free copy
Under international standards companies choose where interest and dividends sit in the cash flow statement, and reported operating cash flow tends to exceed what the American rules would show.
Li, Sloan (2017). Has goodwill accounting gone bad? Review of Accounting Studies 22(2), 964-1003. doi
Since impairment testing replaced amortization, goodwill balances are inflated and write-downs come late; the delay is predictable from the statements.
Wangerin (2019). M&A Due Diligence, Post-Acquisition Performance, and Financial Reporting for Business Combinations. Contemporary Accounting Research 36(4), 2344-2378. doi
Acquirers that do less due diligence, measured by the time taken to negotiate and close, later show lower profitability, more goodwill impairments and lower-quality fair value estimates for what they bought.
Chuk, Lourie, Yoo (2021). The determinants and consequences of reverse factoring: Early evidence from the UK. Working paper, SSRN 3890547. doi
With supplier finance, buyers take far longer to pay their suppliers; the cash released lifts operating cash flow and goes to investment and dividends.
Ma, Thomas (2023). Economic consequences of operating lease recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics 75(2-3), 101566. doi
After the new lease standard was issued, lessees cut long-term operating leases and used more short-term leases and capital expenditures, with no evidence of the harm to performance, value or credit that managers had predicted.
Hinson, Pündrich, Zakota (2024). The Decision-Usefulness of ASC 606 Revenue Disaggregation. The Accounting Review 99(3), 225-258. doi
The revenue disaggregation required by ASC 606 more than doubled the median number of revenue items reported, and analysts' sales forecasts became more accurate and less dispersed for the companies affected.
Berger, Li, Liu (2025). The Effects of Mandatory Supplier Finance Program Disclosure on Credit Markets. Working paper, SSRN 5372816. doi
When disclosure of supplier finance programs became mandatory, bond investors charged more to the companies revealed to rely on them.
Heese, Shin, Wang (2025). Variable leases under ASC 842: first evidence on properties and consequences. Review of Accounting Studies 30(3), 2218-2263. doi · Read a free copy
Variable lease payments, which the current standard leaves off the balance sheet, are common, large and persistent; recognizing them would raise reported debt by about seven percent on average.
Beatty, Liao, Weber (2026). How Good Is Goodwill Accounting? Comparative Evidence on Post-FAS 141(R) Acquired Intangibles Accounting. The Accounting Review 101(3), 1-37. doi
A counterweight to the view that goodwill is widely overstated: from 2010 to 2020 there is no sign of runaway goodwill, and impairments followed performance.

The market's side: risk, options and reactions

Sharpe (1964). Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk. The Journal of Finance 19(3), 425-442. doi
In equilibrium an asset earns a premium only for the risk that moves with the market; the origin of beta and of the capital asset pricing model.
Blume (1975). Betas and Their Regression Tendencies. The Journal of Finance 30(3), 785-795. doi
Measured betas drift toward one from period to period, which is why an estimated beta is adjusted before it is used.
Breeden, Litzenberger (1978). Prices of State-Contingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices. The Journal of Business 51(4), 621. doi
The prices of options across strikes reveal the probabilities the market assigns to each future price, adjusted for risk.
Brown, Warner (1985). Using daily stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 14(1), 3-31. doi
The market-model event study on daily returns is well specified and powerful in realistic conditions; the standard method for measuring a reaction to news.
Fama, French (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33(1), 3-56. doi
Three factors, the market, size and book-to-market, describe the common variation in stock returns.
Jegadeesh, Titman (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance 48(1), 65-91. doi
Stocks that did well over the past three to twelve months keep doing well over the next three to twelve; the evidence for momentum.
Shleifer, Vishny (1997). The Limits of Arbitrage. The Journal of Finance 52(1), 35-55. doi
Because real arbitrage needs capital, is risky and is run with other people's money, it can fail just when prices are furthest from fundamental value, which is why some anomalies persist.
Asquith, Pathak, Ritter (2005). Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 78(2), 243-276. doi
High short interest predicts poor returns mainly where few shares are available to borrow.
Boehmer, Jones, Zhang (2008). Which Shorts Are Informed? The Journal of Finance 63(2), 491-527. doi
Heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted ones, and institutional short sellers are the best informed.

What companies choose to disclose: guidance and voluntary disclosure

Lang, Lundholm (1993). Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31(2), 246. doi
Examines why analysts rate some companies' disclosure practices more highly than others, and finds the ratings rise with company size, among other determinants.
Skinner (1994). Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting Research 32(1), 38. doi
In a sample of 93 NASDAQ companies during 1981 to 1990, voluntary earnings disclosures were infrequent; good news came as estimates of annual earnings per share, bad news as qualitative statements about the current quarter.
Botosan (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72(3), 323-349. doi
Among companies followed by few analysts, more voluntary disclosure in the annual report goes with a lower cost of equity capital; no such relation appears for heavily followed companies.
Healy, Palepu (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31(1-3), 405-440. doi
A review of research on corporate disclosure through regulated reports, voluntary communication such as forecasts and conference calls, and intermediaries such as analysts.
Verrecchia (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32(1-3), 97-180. doi · Read a free copy
Sorts the theory of disclosure into three strands: how disclosure affects prices and volume, when managers choose to disclose what they know, and which disclosure arrangements are efficient.
Hutton, Miller, Skinner (2003). The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 41(5), 867-890. doi
Bad-news earnings forecasts from management always move prices, but good-news forecasts do so only when accompanied by verifiable forward-looking statements.
Hirst, Koonce, Venkataraman (2008). Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework. Accounting Horizons 22(3), 315-338. doi
A framework for research on management earnings forecasts, organized by what prompts a forecast, the features managers choose for it, and its consequences; the chosen features are the least understood.
Kothari, Shu, Wysocki (2009). Do Managers Withhold Bad News? Journal of Accounting Research 47(1), 241-276. doi
Prices fall more on bad-news disclosures than they rise on good-news ones, consistent with managers holding back bad news while releasing good news promptly.
Beyer, Cohen, Lys, Walther (2010). The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50(2-3), 296-343. doi
A review of how managers' voluntary disclosures, mandated disclosures and analysts' reports together form a company's information environment, and of what research has learned about each.
Call, Hribar, Skinner, Volant (2024). Corporate managers' perspectives on forward-looking guidance: Survey evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 78(2-3), 101731. doi
Managers say they give guidance mainly to meet analyst and investor demand and to manage expectations, and that the guidance is usually conservative relative to their internal expectations.

Insiders, short sellers and auditors as signals

Seyhun (1986). Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics 16(2), 189-212. doi
Using about 60,000 insider trades from 1975 to 1981, examines whether insiders earn abnormal profits, whether outsiders who imitate them can, and what insider trading costs other investors.
Lakonishok, Lee (2001). Are Insider Trades Informative? Review of Financial Studies 14(1), 79-111. doi
Insiders trade as contrarians and their purchases predict returns, mainly in smaller companies, while their sales have no predictive ability.
Palmrose, Richardson, Scholz (2004). Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(1), 59-89. doi
Restatement announcements bring sharply negative abnormal returns on average, and the reaction is worse when fraud is indicated, when the amounts are more material, and when the restatement is attributed to the auditor.
Desai, Krishnamurthy, Venkataraman (2006). Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements. Review of Accounting Studies 11(1), 71-90. doi
Short sellers build positions in companies months before they restate earnings, more so where accruals are high, and unwind them after the price drops.
Doyle, Ge, McVay (2007). Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review 82(5), 1141-1170. doi
Companies disclosing material weaknesses in internal control have accruals that are poorly estimated and do not turn into cash, and the relation comes from company-level weaknesses, not account-specific ones.
Karpoff, Lou (2010). Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct. The Journal of Finance 65(5), 1879-1913. doi
Short interest builds steadily over the 19 months before a financial misrepresentation is revealed, more so when the misconduct is severe, and it is associated with faster discovery.
Cohen, Malloy, Pomorski (2012). Decoding Inside Information. The Journal of Finance 67(3), 1009-1043. doi · Read a free copy
Separates routine insider trades, which carry no information about the company's future, from opportunistic ones, which predict returns; a strategy following only opportunistic traders earns abnormal returns.
Engelberg, Reed, Ringgenberg (2012). How are shorts informed? Short sellers, news, and information processing. Journal of Financial Economics 105(2), 260-278. doi
Much of short sellers' advantage comes from analyzing public information: the negative relation between short sales and later returns is twice as large on news days and larger still on negative news days.
DeFond, Zhang (2014). A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58(2-3), 275-326. doi · Read a free copy
A review that defines audit quality as assurance of reporting quality and gives a framework for weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the many proxies used to measure it.
Brendel, Ryans (2021). Responding to Activist Short Sellers: Allegations, Firm Responses, and Outcomes. Journal of Accounting Research 59(2), 487-528. doi
Activist short seller reports have grown more frequent; target companies respond less than a third of the time, and those that open internal investigations later show more delistings and SEC enforcement actions.

Banks and insurers

Liu, Ryan (2006). Income Smoothing over the Business Cycle: Changes in Banks' Coordinated Management of Provisions for Loan Losses and Loan Charge-Offs from the Pre-1990 Bust to the 1990s Boom. The Accounting Review 81(2), 421-441. doi · Read a free copy
In the 1990s boom profitable banks pushed income down by speeding up loan loss provisions and charge-offs on homogeneous loans, then showed higher and more persistent income in the next three years, a form of smoothing.
Laux, Leuz (2010). Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis? Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(1), 93-118. doi
Finds it unlikely that fair-value accounting added much to the severity of the 2008 financial crisis; if anything the evidence points to bank assets being overvalued, not written down too far.
Huizinga, Laeven (2012). Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 106(3), 614-634. doi
During the U.S. mortgage crisis banks carried real estate assets above their market value, provisioned less for bad loans when heavily exposed, and used classification choices to prop up their books.
Nissim (2013). Relative valuation of U.S. insurance companies. Review of Accounting Studies 18(2), 324-359. doi
For U.S. insurers, book value multiples have valued companies more accurately than earnings multiples, and removing accumulated other comprehensive income from book value makes valuations worse.
Beatty, Liao (2014). Financial accounting in the banking industry: A review of the empirical literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58(2-3), 339-383. doi · Read a free copy
A survey of research on bank accounting: how bank reporting relates to valuation and risk, how reporting discretion is used for regulatory capital and earnings, and how accounting regimes change banks' decisions.
Calomiris, Nissim (2014). Crisis-related shifts in the market valuation of banking activities. Journal of Financial Intermediation 23(3), 400-435. doi
The fall in banks' market-to-book ratios in the financial crisis is explained less by unrecognized losses than by lower values for intangibles such as customer relationships and core deposits, and by unrecognized contingent obligations.
Jiang, Matvos, Piskorski, Seru (2024). Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs? Journal of Financial Economics 159, 103899. doi
Marking U.S. bank assets to market after the rate increases from early 2022 to early 2023 shows an average decline of 10 percent, and banks with large losses, low capital and high uninsured leverage were the most fragile.

Across countries and accounting standards

Ball, Kothari, Robin (2000). The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29(1), 1-51. doi
Accounting income in code law countries is less timely than in common law countries, particularly in recognizing economic losses, because it is tied more closely to payouts and less to public disclosure.
Barth, Landsman, Lang (2008). International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 46(3), 467-498. doi
Companies in 21 countries applying International Accounting Standards show less earnings management, more timely loss recognition and more value-relevant numbers than matched companies using domestic standards.
Daske, Hail, Leuz, Verdi (2008). Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences. Journal of Accounting Research 46(5), 1085-1142. doi · Read a free copy
Across 26 countries, market liquidity rose around mandatory IFRS adoption, but the capital market benefits appear only where companies have incentives to be transparent and legal enforcement is strong.
De George, Li, Shivakumar (2016). A review of the IFRS adoption literature. Review of Accounting Studies 21(3), 898-1004. doi · Read a free copy
A review of research on IFRS adoption: early studies found benefits such as greater transparency and lower cost of capital, but later work attributes some of them to other factors such as enforcement changes.

Earnings in aggregate: the economy, inflation and the market

Kothari, Lewellen, Warner (2006). Stock returns, aggregate earnings surprises, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics 79(3), 537-568. doi · Read a free copy
Unlike individual stocks, the market as a whole does not drift after aggregate earnings news, and aggregate returns are negatively related to concurrent earnings, which points to discount rates moving with earnings.
Konchitchki (2011). Inflation and Nominal Financial Reporting: Implications for Performance and Stock Prices. The Accounting Review 86(3), 1045-1085. doi
Inflation gains and losses that nominal statements leave unrecognized help predict future cash flows, and stock prices do not fully reflect them.
Konchitchki, Patatoukas (2014). Accounting earnings and gross domestic product. Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(1), 76-88. doi · Read a free copy
Growth in aggregate accounting earnings leads growth in nominal GDP, and professional macro forecasters do not fully use it, so their forecast errors are predictable.
Konchitchki, Patatoukas (2014). Taking the Pulse of the Real Economy Using Financial Statement Analysis: Implications for Macro Forecasting and Stock Valuation. The Accounting Review 89(2), 669-694. doi
Profitability drivers from the statements of the 100 largest companies, aggregated, predict later real GDP growth beyond what stock market returns predict.
Siegel (2016). The Shiller CAPE Ratio: A New Look. Financial Analysts Journal 72(3), 41-50. doi
Changes in how GAAP earnings are computed make recent return forecasts from the cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio too pessimistic; using national accounts profits instead improves the model's forecasts.

Segments, customers, suppliers and peers

Berger, Hann (2003). The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on Information and Monitoring. Journal of Accounting Research 41(2), 163-223. doi
The segment reporting standard SFAS 131 increased the number of segments companies report and revealed previously hidden information about diversification, which changed analysts' and the market's expectations.
Cohen, Frazzini (2008). Economic Links and Predictable Returns. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1977-2011. doi
Stock prices are slow to reflect news about a company's principal customers, so customer returns predict supplier returns.
Cohen, Lou (2012). Complicated firms. Journal of Financial Economics 104(2), 383-400. doi
The same information is priced first in easy-to-analyze companies and later in complicated ones, so the returns of the former predict the returns of their more complicated peers.
Patatoukas (2012). Customer-Base Concentration: Implications for Firm Performance and Capital Markets. The Accounting Review 87(2), 363-392. doi
Suppliers with more concentrated customer bases earn higher accounting returns through lower operating expenses and better asset use, and investors underreact to changes in concentration.
Custódio (2014). Mergers and Acquisitions Accounting and the Diversification Discount. The Journal of Finance 69(1), 219-240. doi
Because purchase accounting records acquired assets at transaction value, acquisitive conglomerates show a lower measured q; removing goodwill from assets eliminates a substantial part of the diversification discount.
Hoberg, Phillips (2016). Text-Based Network Industries and Endogenous Product Differentiation. Journal of Political Economy 124(5), 1423-1465. doi
Builds industries from the similarity of product descriptions in annual reports, giving each company its own changing set of competitors, which matches the rivals managers themselves name.

Options

What an option price says about the future, and what the buyers and sellers of options have earned: 130 papers, from the pricing models to current evidence on volatility, skew, earnings announcements and common strategies. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found. A result in a paper is evidence about how these markets have behaved; it is not offered here as a way to earn a return.

Pricing an option: the foundations

Stoll (1969). The Relationship Between Put and Call Option Prices. The Journal of Finance 24(5), 801-824. doi
Formulates put-call parity, under which arbitrage through conversion holds the gap between call and put prices to the interest cost of the position, and tests it empirically.
Merton (1973). Theory of Rational Option Pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4(1), 141. doi
Derives the restrictions any rational option price must satisfy from the assumption that investors prefer more to less, and extends the Black-Scholes theory to dividends, puts, warrants and the down-and-out option.
Black (1976). The pricing of commodity contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 3(1-2), 167-179. doi
Derives formulas for the values of forward contracts and commodity options in terms of the futures price, using assumptions like those behind the original option formula.
Merton (1976). Option pricing when underlying stock returns are discontinuous. Journal of Financial Economics 3(1-2), 125-144. doi
Derives an option pricing formula for a stock whose returns mix continuous movement with jumps, which like Black-Scholes does not depend on investor preferences or on the stock's expected return.
Roll (1977). An analytic valuation formula for unprotected American call options on stocks with known dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 5(2), 251-258. doi
Shows that an American call on a stock paying a known dividend, which can be worth exercising just before the payment, can be valued as a combination of three European options.
Margrabe (1978). The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another. The Journal of Finance 33(1), 177-186. doi
Derives an equation for the value of an option to exchange one risky asset for another, the form taken by performance fees, margin accounts, exchange offers and standby commitments.
Cox, Ross, Rubinstein (1979). Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics 7(3), 229-263. doi
A simple discrete-time model values options by arbitrage, contains Black-Scholes as a limiting case, and yields a numerical procedure for options where early exercise may be optimal.
Geske (1979). The valuation of compound options. Journal of Financial Economics 7(1), 63-81. doi
Prices an option on an option, treating a stock as an option on the firm's assets, so that leverage makes the stock's variance depend on its price.
Geske (1979). A note on an analytical valuation formula for unprotected American call options on stocks with known dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 7(4), 375-380. doi
Gives simple analytic formulas for the value of an American call on a stock with known dividends.
Klemkosky, Resnick (1979). Put-Call Parity and Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance 34(5), 1141-1155. doi
Extends the put-call parity models of Stoll and Merton to include a dividend term, and finds in tests after the fact that option prices were generally consistent with market efficiency.
Whaley (1981). On the valuation of American call options on stocks with known dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 9(2), 207-211. doi
Corrects the Roll and Geske formulas for an American call on a stock with known dividends and gives a numerical example.
Garman, Kohlhagen (1983). Foreign currency option values. Journal of International Money and Finance 2(3), 231-237. doi
Develops valuation formulas for foreign exchange options, where two interest rates enter in ways the Black-Scholes assumptions do not cover.
Barone-Adesi, Whaley (1987). Efficient Analytic Approximation of American Option Values. The Journal of Finance 42(2), 301-320. doi
Gives analytic approximations for American calls and puts on commodities and commodity futures that are accurate and far cheaper to compute than finite-difference, binomial or compound-option methods.
Hull, White (1987). The Pricing of Options on Assets with Stochastic Volatilities. The Journal of Finance 42(2), 281-300. doi
Prices a European call when volatility is itself random, and finds that the Black-Scholes price frequently overprices options, more so at longer maturities.
Heston (1993). A Closed-Form Solution for Options with Stochastic Volatility with Applications to Bond and Currency Options. Review of Financial Studies 6(2), 327-343. doi
Derives a closed-form price for a European call when volatility is stochastic and correlated with the asset's return, and shows that this correlation matters for return skewness and strike-price biases.
Bates (1996). Jumps and Stochastic Volatility: Exchange Rate Processes Implicit in Deutsche Mark Options. Review of Financial Studies 9(1), 69-107. doi
Prices American options under stochastic volatility with jumps and finds, in Deutsche mark options from 1984 to 1991, that stochastic volatility alone cannot explain the volatility smile under plausible parameters.
Bakshi, Cao, Chen (1997). Empirical Performance of Alternative Option Pricing Models. The Journal of Finance 52(5), 2003-2049. doi
Comparing option models on S&P 500 options, finds that stochastic volatility and jumps both matter for pricing, while for hedging stochastic volatility alone performs best.
Dumas, Fleming, Whaley (1998). Implied Volatility Functions: Empirical Tests. The Journal of Finance 53(6), 2059-2106. doi
On S&P 500 options from 1988 to 1993, a model in which volatility is a fixed function of price and time predicts and hedges no better than simply smoothing Black-Scholes implied volatilities.
Gatheral, Jaisson, Rosenbaum (2018). Volatility is rough. Quantitative Finance 18(6), 933-949. doi
High-frequency data show that log-volatility behaves like a fractional Brownian motion with a Hurst exponent of order 0.1, and a model built on that finding gives improved forecasts of realized volatility.

What option prices say about the future

Bates (1991). The Crash of ʼ87: Was It Expected? The Evidence from Options Markets. The Journal of Finance 46(3), 1009-1044. doi
S&P 500 futures options show that out-of-the-money puts became unusually expensive in the year before the October 1987 crash, though no strong crash fears appear in the two months just before it.
Canina, Figlewski (1993). The Informational Content of Implied Volatility. Review of Financial Studies 6(3), 659-681. doi
For S&P 100 index options, implied volatility has virtually no correlation with future volatility and does not incorporate the information in recent observed volatility.
Rubinstein (1994). Implied Binomial Trees. The Journal of Finance 49(3), 771-818. doi
Infers risk-neutral probabilities from the prices of European options observed together, and builds from them a binomial tree consistent with every observed option price.
Jackwerth, Rubinstein (1996). Recovering Probability Distributions from Option Prices. The Journal of Finance 51(5), 1611-1631. doi · Read a free copy
Recovers the risk-neutral probability distribution of the S&P 500 from option prices and finds that, since the stock market crash, large declines are priced as many times more likely than a lognormal distribution implies.
Aït-Sahalia, Lo (1998). Nonparametric Estimation of State-Price Densities Implicit in Financial Asset Prices. The Journal of Finance 53(2), 499-547. doi
Builds a nonparametric estimator of the state-price density implicit in option prices, which prices new or illiquid securities without arbitrage and captures skewness, excess kurtosis and volatility smiles.
Christensen, Prabhala (1998). The relation between implied and realized volatility. Journal of Financial Economics 50(2), 125-150. doi · Read a free copy
With longer series and nonoverlapping data, implied volatility on S&P 100 index options outperforms past volatility as a forecast of future volatility, contrary to earlier studies.
Demeterfi, Derman, Kamal, Zou (1999). A Guide to Volatility and Variance Swaps. The Journal of Derivatives 6(4), 9-32. doi
Explains how volatility swaps work and derives their pricing and hedging, showing that a variance swap can be replicated by a static portfolio of European calls and puts.
Bates (2000). Post-'87 crash fears in the S&P 500 futures option market. Journal of Econometrics 94(1-2), 181-238. doi
Over 1988 to 1993, distributions inferred from S&P 500 futures options were strongly negatively skewed; a model with jumps fits better than stochastic volatility alone, but implies large index moves that did not occur.
Britten-Jones, Neuberger (2000). Option Prices, Implied Price Processes, and Stochastic Volatility. The Journal of Finance 55(2), 839-866. doi
Characterizes every continuous price process consistent with current option prices, which yields a volatility forecast that needs no specific model, only the option prices themselves.
Jackwerth (2000). Recovering Risk Aversion from Option Prices and Realized Returns. Review of Financial Studies 13(2), 433-451. doi
Risk aversion implied jointly by S&P 500 option prices and realized returns looks standard before the 1987 crash and irreconcilable with theory after it, which points to mispriced options.
Whaley (2000). The Investor Fear Gauge. The Journal of Portfolio Management 26(3), 12-17. doi
Describes how the CBOE Market Volatility Index is constructed and examines its movements and its relation to stock market returns over fourteen years.
Carr, Madan (2001). Towards a Theory of Volatility Trading. Option Pricing, Interest Rates and Risk Management, 458-476. doi
Reviews three ways to trade realized volatility and shows that combining a static position in options with dynamic trading in futures produces payoffs tied to realized volatility that can carry no exposure to price.
Bakshi, Kapadia, Madan (2003). Stock Return Characteristics, Skew Laws, and the Differential Pricing of Individual Equity Options. Review of Financial Studies 16(1), 101-143. doi
Individual stocks' risk-neutral distributions are far less negatively skewed than the market index's; risk aversion introduces skewness into the risk-neutral density, and a stock's skewness splits into a systematic and an idiosyncratic part.
Jiang, Tian (2005). The Model-Free Implied Volatility and Its Information Content. Review of Financial Studies 18(4), 1305-1342. doi
Extends model-free implied volatility to prices with jumps and finds, for S&P 500 options, that it subsumes the information in Black-Scholes implied volatility and past realized volatility.
Carr, Wu (2006). A Tale of Two Indices. The Journal of Derivatives 13(3), 13-29. doi
Compares the original VIX, an average of Black-Scholes implied volatilities, with the model-free formula that replaced it, whose square is a good hedge for realized variance.
Bollerslev, Tauchen, Zhou (2009). Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia. Review of Financial Studies 22(11), 4463-4492. doi
The gap between implied and realized variance, the variance risk premium, predicts aggregate stock returns after 1990, most strongly at the quarterly horizon, with high premia preceding high returns.
Whaley (2009). Understanding the VIX. The Journal of Portfolio Management 35(3), 98-105. doi
Explains what the VIX measures, its history and its purpose, so that investors read the index correctly and avoid common misconceptions.
Bollerslev, Todorov (2011). Tails, Fears, and Risk Premia. The Journal of Finance 66(6), 2165-2211. doi
Compensation for rare events accounts for a large fraction of the average equity and variance risk premia, and a new index of investor fears shows large, time-varying compensation for the fear of disasters.
Ross (2015). The Recovery Theorem. The Journal of Finance 70(2), 615-648. doi · Read a free copy
The recovery theorem separates the state prices observed in option prices into the market's forecast of returns and its risk aversion, using state prices alone.
Borovička, Hansen, Scheinkman (2016). Misspecified Recovery. The Journal of Finance 71(6), 2493-2544. doi
Shows that the probability measure recovered from asset prices absorbs long-term risk adjustments, so treating it as investors' beliefs distorts inference about the trade-off between risk and return.
Martin (2017). What is the Expected Return on the Market? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(1), 367-433. doi
Derives a lower bound on the equity premium from index option prices, an index called SVIX; the bound is volatile, averages about 5%, and rose above 20% at the height of the 2008 crisis.
Griffin, Shams (2018). Manipulation in the VIX? The Review of Financial Studies 31(4), 1377-1417. doi
At VIX settlement, volume spikes in exactly the out-of-the-money S&P 500 options that set the index, a pattern the authors find inconsistent with hedging or liquidity trading and consistent with manipulation.
Martin, Wagner (2019). What Is the Expected Return on a Stock? The Journal of Finance 74(4), 1887-1929. doi
Derives a formula for a stock's expected return from the risk-neutral variance of the market and of the stock, both computed from option prices, with no free parameters.
Saha, Malkiel, Rinaudo (2019). Has the VIX index been manipulated? Journal of Asset Management 20(1), 1-14. doi · Read a free copy
Finds that daily movements in the VIX are explained by market fundamentals, and that its values and futures settlement prices on expiration days are consistent with normal market forces, not manipulation.
Chabi-Yo, Loudis (2020). The conditional expected market return. Journal of Financial Economics 137(3), 752-786. doi
Derives lower and upper bounds on the expected excess market return from option-implied volatility, skewness and kurtosis, computable in real time; the bounds are highly volatile and the implied expected return averages 5.2%.
Jackwerth, Menner (2020). Does the Ross recovery theorem work empirically? Journal of Financial Economics 137(3), 723-739. doi
Finds that the physical distributions recovered by Ross's method for the S&P 500 index are incompatible with future returns and fail to predict returns or realized variances.
Back, Crotty, Kazempour (2022). Validity, tightness, and forecasting power of risk premium bounds. Journal of Financial Economics 144(3), 732-760. doi
Tests the option-based lower bounds on risk premia and cannot reject that they are valid, but rejects that they are tight, so using the market bound as a forecast is often unreasonable.
Beason, Schreindorfer (2022). Dissecting the Equity Premium. Journal of Political Economy 130(8), 2203-2222. doi · Read a free copy
Using option prices and realized returns, attributes eight tenths of the average equity premium to months when the market falls more than 10%, while falls beyond 30% matter very little.

The volatility risk premium and what option positions earn

Coval, Shumway (2001). Expected Option Returns. The Journal of Finance 56(3), 983-1009. doi
At-the-money straddles on the S&P index with zero beta lose about three percent a week on average, which suggests that something beyond market risk, such as volatility risk, is priced in options.
Bakshi, Kapadia (2003). Delta-Hedged Gains and the Negative Market Volatility Risk Premium. Review of Financial Studies 16(2), 527-566. doi
Buying S&P 500 index options and hedging them with the stock loses money on average, more so when volatility is high, which is evidence of a negative volatility risk premium.
Bollen, Whaley (2004). Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape of Implied Volatility Functions? The Journal of Finance 59(2), 711-753. doi
Changes in implied volatility follow net buying pressure from public orders, driven by index puts for S&P 500 options and by calls for stock options.
Jones (2006). A Nonlinear Factor Analysis of S&P 500 Index Option Returns. The Journal of Finance 61(5), 2325-2363. doi
Priced volatility and jump risk factors contribute to the average returns on S&P 500 futures options from 1986 to 2000 but cannot explain their size, particularly for short-term out-of-the-money puts.
Broadie, Chernov, Johannes (2009). Understanding Index Option Returns. Review of Financial Studies 22(11), 4493-4529. doi
The large returns to writing out-of-the-money index puts are not statistically inconsistent with the Black-Scholes or Heston models, given the extreme sampling uncertainty of put returns; straddles and delta-hedged returns are a cleaner test.
Carr, Wu (2009). Variance Risk Premiums. Review of Financial Studies 22(3), 1311-1341. doi
Approximates the variance swap rate with a portfolio of options and measures the variance risk premium as the gap between realized variance and that rate, on five stock indexes and 35 stocks.
Driessen, Maenhout, Vilkov (2009). The Price of Correlation Risk: Evidence from Equity Options. The Journal of Finance 64(3), 1377-1406. doi
Finds that correlation risk is priced in S&P 100 index options relative to options on the index's components, though the premium cannot be captured once realistic trading frictions are counted.
Gârleanu, Pedersen, Poteshman (2009). Demand-Based Option Pricing. Review of Financial Studies 22(10), 4259-4299. doi
Models how end-user demand that dealers cannot fully hedge raises option prices, and shows that demand helps explain why index options are expensive and skewed.
Goyal, Saretto (2009). Cross-section of option returns and volatility☆. Journal of Financial Economics 94(2), 310-326. doi
Options on stocks whose historical volatility is well above their implied volatility earn more than options on stocks where it is well below, a difference usual risk factor models do not explain.
Santa-Clara, Saretto (2009). Option strategies: Good deals and margin calls. Journal of Financial Markets 12(3), 391-417. doi
Margin requirements limit how much capital can go into writing out-of-the-money puts and force positions to be closed at a loss, which cuts the strategy's profitability materially.
Cao, Han (2013). Cross section of option returns and idiosyncratic stock volatility. Journal of Financial Economics 108(1), 231-249. doi · Read a free copy
Delta-hedged equity option returns fall steadily as the underlying stock's idiosyncratic volatility rises, consistent with dealers charging more for options that are costlier to arbitrage.
Constantinides, Jackwerth, Savov (2013). The Puzzle of Index Option Returns. Review of Asset Pricing Studies 3(2), 229-257. doi
For portfolios of S&P 500 index options held at fixed maturity, moneyness and market beta, crisis-related factors for price jumps, volatility jumps and liquidity explain returns, and the alphas of short-maturity out-of-the-money puts become insignificant.
Bondarenko (2014). Why Are Put Options So Expensive? Quarterly Journal of Finance 04(03), 1450015. doi
Using a method that makes no parametric assumption about preferences, finds that no model in the class studied can explain the historically high prices of S&P 500 puts.
Boyer, Vorkink (2014). Stock Options as Lotteries. The Journal of Finance 69(4), 1485-1527. doi
Individual stock options with the most lottery-like, positively skewed payoffs earn much lower average returns, a premium that compensates intermediaries for unhedgeable risk in meeting investor demand.
Jurek, Stafford (2015). The Cost of Capital for Alternative Investments. The Journal of Finance 70(5), 2185-2226. doi
Hedge fund returns from 1996 to 2012 are not reliably distinguishable from mechanical S&P 500 put-writing, and the required return for bearing such downside risk can far exceed what traditional models suggest.
Byun, Kim (2016). Gambling preference and individual equity option returns. Journal of Financial Economics 122(1), 155-174. doi
Calls on the most lottery-like stocks underperform otherwise similar calls on the least lottery-like stocks by 10 to 20% a month, more so when investor sentiment is high.
Cheng (2019). The VIX Premium. The Review of Financial Studies 32(1), 180-227. doi · Read a free copy
The premium embedded in VIX futures falls or stays flat when measured risk rises, and a falling premium predicts higher market risk ahead, a pattern that falling hedging demand helps explain.
Muravyev, Ni (2020). Why do option returns change sign from day to night? Journal of Financial Economics 136(1), 219-238. doi
Delta-hedged S&P 500 index options lose 0.7% a day on average: they lose 1% overnight and gain 0.3% intraday, consistent with prices ignoring that volatility is higher during the trading day.
Frazzini, Pedersen (2022). Embedded Leverage. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 12(1), 1-52. doi
Options and leveraged exchange-traded funds relieve investors' leverage constraints, and the more leverage an instrument embeds, the lower its risk-adjusted return.
Bali, Beckmeyer, Mörke, Weigert (2023). Option Return Predictability with Machine Learning and Big Data. The Review of Financial Studies 36(9), 3548-3602. doi
With more than 12 million observations from 1996 to 2020, nonlinear machine learning models predict equity option returns out of sample and yield profits after transaction costs, which the authors attribute to informational frictions and mispricing.
Heston, Jones, Khorram, Li, Mo (2023). Option Momentum. The Journal of Finance 78(6), 3141-3192. doi
Straddles on stocks whose options earned high returns in the past keep outperforming over horizons of 6 to 36 months, and unlike stock momentum the effect is not followed by long-run reversal.
Duarte, Jones, Wang (2024). Very Noisy Option Prices and Inference Regarding the Volatility Risk Premium. The Journal of Finance 79(5), 3581-3621. doi
Contrary to the accepted view, volatility risk is priced in individual stock options, whose variance risk premium is negative; the analysis shows how much microstructure biases matter in empirical work with options.
Goyal, Saretto (2025). Can Equity Option Returns Be Explained by a Factor Model? IPCA Says Yes. The Review of Financial Studies 38(6), 1783-1821. doi
A factor model estimated by IPCA explains much of the profit of 46 delta-hedged equity option strategies: their average alpha is close to zero, against realized returns of over 80 basis points a month.

What option trading says about the stock

Easley, O'Hara, Srinivas (1998). Option Volume and Stock Prices: Evidence on Where Informed Traders Trade. The Journal of Finance 53(2), 431-465. doi
A model in which informed traders may choose options over stock, tested on intraday data, shows that option volume signed as positive or negative news carries information about future stock prices.
Ofek, Richardson, Whitelaw (2004). Limited arbitrage and short sales restrictions: evidence from the options markets. Journal of Financial Economics 74(2), 305-342. doi
Violations of put-call parity lean in the direction that short-sale constraints predict and grow with the cost of shorting; both the violations and that cost predict future stock returns.
Battalio, Schultz (2006). Options and the Bubble. The Journal of Finance 61(5), 2071-2102. doi
At the peak of the Internet bubble, synthetic stock prices built from options almost never diverged from actual prices, so there is no evidence that short-sale restrictions affected Internet stock prices.
Pan, Poteshman (2006). The Information in Option Volume for Future Stock Prices. Review of Financial Studies 19(3), 871-908. doi
Stocks with low put-call ratios in newly opened, buyer-initiated option positions outperform those with high ratios by more than 40 basis points the next day and more than 1% over the week.
Bali, Hovakimian (2009). Volatility Spreads and Expected Stock Returns. Management Science 55(11), 1797-1812. doi
Expected stock returns are negatively related to the spread between realized and implied volatility and positively related to the spread between call and put implied volatilities; the levels of volatility do not predict returns.
Cremers, Weinbaum (2010). Deviations from Put-Call Parity and Stock Return Predictability. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45(2), 335-367. doi
Stocks whose calls are expensive relative to their puts outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points a week, a predictability that weakens over the sample period.
Roll, Schwartz, Subrahmanyam (2010). O/S: The relative trading activity in options and stock. Journal of Financial Economics 96(1), 1-17. doi
The ratio of option to stock trading volume rises around earnings announcements, and a higher ratio beforehand goes with larger absolute returns afterward, which suggests some of that option trading is informed.
Xing, Zhang, Zhao (2010). What Does the Individual Option Volatility Smirk Tell Us About Future Equity Returns? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45(3), 641-662. doi
Stocks with the steepest volatility smirks in their options underperform those with the flattest by 10.9% a year after risk adjustment, and go on to report the worst earnings shocks.
Johnson, So (2012). The option to stock volume ratio and future returns. Journal of Financial Economics 106(2), 262-286. doi
Firms in the lowest decile of option-to-stock volume outperform the highest decile by 0.34% a week, and the ratio also predicts firm-specific earnings news, consistent with private information.
An, Ang, Bali, Cakici (2014). The Joint Cross Section of Stocks and Options. The Journal of Finance 69(5), 2279-2337. doi
Stocks with large increases in call implied volatility over the previous month tend to have high future returns, and stocks with large increases in put implied volatility tend to have low ones.
Ge, Lin, Pearson (2016). Why does the option to stock volume ratio predict stock returns? Journal of Financial Economics 120(3), 601-622. doi
With signed option volume, purchases of calls that open new positions are the strongest predictor of stock returns, which points to the leverage embedded in options as the main channel.
Augustin, Brenner, Subrahmanyam (2019). Informed Options Trading Prior to Takeover Announcements: Insider Trading? Management Science 65(12), 5697-5720. doi
Before 1,859 U.S. takeover announcements from 1996 to 2012, about 25% of targets show abnormal option volume, concentrated in short-dated out-of-the-money calls; the SEC litigates only about 8% of the deals in the sample.
Goncalves-Pinto, Grundy, Hameed, van der Heijden, Zhu (2020). Why Do Option Prices Predict Stock Returns? The Role of Price Pressure in the Stock Market. Management Science 66(9), 3903-3926. doi · Read a free copy
When option-implied and actual stock prices disagree, the stock's later return is predictable mainly because of price pressure in the stock, not because of informed trading in options.
Muravyev, Pearson, Pollet (2025). Why does options market information predict stock returns? Journal of Financial Economics 172, 104153. doi · Read a free copy
The power of implied volatility spread and skew to predict stock returns reflects stock borrow fees: it falls by at least two-thirds once stocks with high fees are excluded.

Options around earnings and other scheduled events

Patell, Wolfson (1979). Anticipated information releases reflected in call option prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1(2), 117-140. doi
Call option prices before annual earnings announcements show that investors anticipate the release: the variance implied by the Black-Scholes model changes systematically around the disclosure date.
Ederington, Lee (1996). The Creation and Resolution of Market Uncertainty: The Impact of Information Releases on Implied Volatility. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(4), 513. doi
Implied volatility in Treasury bond, Eurodollar and Deutschemark options builds in the expected effect of scheduled macroeconomic releases and falls once they are out, while major unscheduled news raises it.
Beber, Brandt (2006). The effect of macroeconomic news on beliefs and preferences: Evidence from the options market. Journal of Monetary Economics 53(8), 1997-2039. doi
Scheduled macroeconomic announcements reduce the uncertainty implied by Treasury options whatever the news, while changes in the higher moments of the implied distribution depend on whether the news is good or bad.
Rogers, Skinner, Van Buskirk (2009). Earnings guidance and market uncertainty. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48(1), 90-109. doi
Implied volatilities show that management earnings forecasts raise short-term uncertainty, mainly when the news is bad and forecasts are sporadic, while uncertainty declines after earnings are announced.
Billings, Jennings (2011). The option market's anticipation of information content in earnings announcements. Review of Accounting Studies 16(3), 587-619. doi
Builds from option prices a measure of how strongly the market expects a stock to react to an earnings report, and shows it tracks the reaction that follows.
Barth, So (2014). Non-Diversifiable Volatility Risk and Risk Premiums at Earnings Announcements. The Accounting Review 89(5), 1579-1607. doi
Some earnings announcements carry volatility risk that cannot be diversified, and investors pay a premium in option prices to hedge it, concentrated in bellwether firms and visible in straddle returns.
Kelly, Pástor, Veronesi (2016). The Price of Political Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence from the Option Market. The Journal of Finance 71(5), 2417-2480. doi
Options whose lives span national elections and global summits are more expensive, which shows that political uncertainty is priced; the protection is worth more when the economy is weak.
Andersen, Fusari, Todorov (2017). Short-Term Market Risks Implied by Weekly Options. The Journal of Finance 72(3), 1335-1386. doi
Weekly S&P 500 index options isolate volatility and jump risk, and reveal variation in the risk of a sharp fall that market volatility does not capture and that helps predict equity returns.
Gao, Xing, Zhang (2018). Anticipating Uncertainty: Straddles around Earnings Announcements. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53(6), 2587-2617. doi
Straddles on individual stocks usually lose money, but at-the-money straddles held from three days before an earnings announcement to the announcement earn 3.34% on average, most for small, volatile and costly-to-trade firms.
Dubinsky, Johannes, Kaeck, Seeger (2019). Option Pricing of Earnings Announcement Risks. The Review of Financial Studies 32(2), 646-687. doi · Read a free copy
Separates the price uncertainty that option prices attach to earnings announcement dates from ordinary daily volatility, and finds it large, varying over time and informative about future return volatility.
Smith, So (2022). Measuring Risk Information. Journal of Accounting Research 60(2), 375-426. doi
Derives from an option pricing model a measure of how an announcement changes investors' expectations of risk, and warns against reading simple changes in implied volatility as that information.
Alexiou, Goyal, Kostakis, Rompolis (2025). Pricing event risk: evidence from concave implied volatility curves. Review of Finance 29(4), 963-1007. doi
Before earnings announcements the implied volatility curves of short-term equity options often turn concave, a sign of a bimodal risk-neutral distribution; those firms move more on the day, and straddles on them earn lower returns.

The evidence on common option strategies

Whaley (2002). Return and Risk of CBOE Buy Write Monthly Index. The Journal of Derivatives 10(2), 35-42. doi
From 1988 to 2001 the CBOE index of buying the S&P 500 and writing one-month at-the-money calls earned almost as much as the S&P 500 with substantially lower risk.
Ni, Pearson, Poteshman (2005). Stock price clustering on option expiration dates. Journal of Financial Economics 78(1), 49-87. doi
On expiration dates the closing prices of stocks with listed options cluster at strike prices, an effect to which hedging by option market makers and manipulation by proprietary traders both contribute.
Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, Poteshman (2007). Option Market Activity. Review of Financial Studies 20(3), 813-857. doi
Detailed data on who buys and writes options show that straddles and strangles are a small fraction of volume, and that a large share of call writing is part of covered call positions.
Bhansali (2008). Tail Risk Management. The Journal of Portfolio Management 34(4), 68-75. doi
Sets out principles for hedging tail risk: treat it as a systemic shock in which liquidity falls and markets become correlated, measure it with macro scenarios, and choose hedges by cost and performance under stress.
Bauer, Cosemans, Eichholtz (2009). Option trading and individual investor performance. Journal of Banking & Finance 33(4), 731-746. doi
Most individual investors lose substantially on their option trades, far more than on stocks, because of poor market timing and high trading costs; gambling and entertainment, not hedging, are the main motives.
Ungar, Moran (2009). The Cash-secured PutWrite Strategy and Performance of Related Benchmark Indexes. The Journal of Alternative Investments 11(4), 43-56. doi
Over the period studied the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index beat the S&P 500 with significantly lower volatility, mainly because index options were richly priced relative to the volatility later realized.
Bhansali, Davis (2010). Offensive Risk Management II: The Case for Active Tail Hedging. The Journal of Portfolio Management 37(1), 78-91. doi
Argues that tail hedges bought at the right price let an investor hold more risky assets with less risk of large loss, and that active rules for monetizing the hedges can be justified.
Golez, Jackwerth (2012). Pinning in the S&P 500 futures. Journal of Financial Economics 106(3), 566-585. doi · Read a free copy
S&P 500 futures are pulled toward the at-the-money strike on days when options on the futures expire, driven by market makers rebalancing their delta hedges.
Ilmanen (2012). Do Financial Markets Reward Buying or Selling Insurance and Lottery Tickets? Financial Analysts Journal 68(5), 26-36. doi
Across many markets, selling insurance and selling lottery tickets have earned positive long-run rewards, while buying catastrophe insurance and holding lottery-like investments have earned poor ones.
Israelov, Nielsen (2014). Covered Call Strategies: One Fact and Eight Myths. Financial Analysts Journal 70(6), 23-31. doi
An index covered call earns two premiums, the equity and the volatility risk premium, and the article refutes eight common beliefs about it, among them that it generates income or protects on the downside.
Israelov, Nielsen (2015). Covered Calls Uncovered. Financial Analysts Journal 71(6), 44-57. doi
Splits a covered call's return into equity exposure, short volatility and an uncompensated equity reversal exposure that carried about 25% of the risk for little return, and proposes a version that removes it.
Israelov, Klein (2016). Risk and Return of Equity Index Collar Strategies. The Journal of Alternative Investments 19(1), 41-54. doi
An equity index collar is expected to return less than its index, mainly because it earns less equity risk premium, and it has done worse than other ways of cutting downside risk.
Israelov (2018). Pathetic Protection: The Elusive Benefits of Protective Puts. The Journal of Alternative Investments 21(3), 6-33. doi
In the typical case put options reduce drawdowns less well than simply holding less of the underlying asset, unless purchases and maturities are timed just right.
Harvey, Hoyle, Rattray, Sargaison, Taylor, Van Hemert (2019). The Best of Strategies for the Worst of Times: Can Portfolios Be Crisis Proofed? The Journal of Portfolio Management 45(5), 7-28. doi
Among defenses against equity sell-offs, continuously holding short-dated S&P 500 puts is the most reliable and the most costly, while futures momentum and quality strategies performed well in past drawdowns.
Barbon, Buraschi (2020). Gamma Fragility. Working paper, SSRN 3725454. doi
Links large imbalances in dealers' gamma to intraday momentum and reversal in stock returns: negative gamma with illiquidity goes with momentum, positive gamma with reversal, most in the least liquid stocks.
Augustin, Cheng, Van den Bergen (2021). Volmageddon and the Failure of Short Volatility Products. Financial Analysts Journal 77(3), 35-51. doi · Read a free copy
Describes the collapse of short volatility exchange-traded products on 5 February 2018 and shows the risks of hedge and leverage rebalancing when a market is concentrated and volatile.
Baltussen, Da, Lammers, Martens (2021). Hedging demand and market intraday momentum. Journal of Financial Economics 142(1), 377-403. doi · Read a free copy
In over 60 futures markets from 1974 to 2020, the return in the last 30 minutes of trading follows the return earlier in the day, a pattern linked to gamma hedging by market makers in options and leveraged ETFs.
Ilmanen, Thapar, Tummala, Villalon (2021). Tail Risk Hedging: Contrasting Put and Trend Strategies. Journal of Systematic Investing 1(1), 111-124. doi
Compares regular index put buying with multi-asset trend following as tail hedges on long-run cost and reliability in equity sell-offs, and concludes that the cost advantage favors trend following.
Ni, Pearson, Poteshman, White (2021). Does Option Trading Have a Pervasive Impact on Underlying Stock Prices? The Review of Financial Studies 34(4), 1952-1986. doi
Hedge rebalancing by option market makers affects the volatility of the underlying stock and the probability of large price moves, through a channel that carries no information.
de Silva, Smith, So (2022). Losing is Optional: Retail Option Trading and Earnings Announcement Volatility. Working paper, SSRN 4050165. doi
Retail investors buy options heavily before earnings announcements, overpay relative to realized volatility and pay very wide spreads, losing 5 to 9% on average around announcements, to the benefit of market makers.
Bryzgalova, Pavlova, Sikorskaya (2023). Retail Trading in Options and the Rise of the Big Three Wholesalers. The Journal of Finance 78(6), 3465-3514. doi
Retail trading in U.S. options grew rapidly, helped by payment for order flow, nearly 90% of which comes from three wholesalers; retail investors prefer cheap weekly options and lose money on average.
Bogousslavsky, Muravyev (2024). An Anatomy of Retail Option Trading. Working paper, SSRN 4682388. doi
In trader-level data on $15 billion of retail stock and option trades, option trades are mostly short-term purchases with almost no covered calls or protective puts, and lose modestly relative to wide bid-ask spreads.
Israelov, Ndong (2024). A "Devil's Bargain": When Generating Income Undermines Investment Returns. The Journal of Alternative Investments 26(4), 9-26. doi
For covered calls, more option income means lower expected total return: a negative, mechanical relation, confirmed on S&P 500 covered-call strategies over nearly 25 years.
Eaton, Green, Roseman, Wu (2026). Retail option traders and the implied volatility surface. Journal of Financial Economics 177, 104238. doi
Retail traders buy short-dated options and often sell long-dated ones; during brokerage outages implied volatility falls where they usually buy and rises for long-dated options, evidence that retail demand moves option prices.

Trading costs, hedging and market structure

Leland (1985). Option Pricing and Replication with Transactions Costs. The Journal of Finance 40(5), 1283-1301. doi
Because transaction costs defeat continuous hedging, develops a modified replicating strategy that depends on the size of the costs and how often the hedge is revised, and gives bounds on option prices.
Figlewski (1989). Options Arbitrage in Imperfect Markets. The Journal of Finance 44(5), 1289-1311. doi
Simulations with uncertain volatility, transaction costs and discrete rebalancing show the standard option arbitrage is so risky and costly that it sets only very wide bounds on option prices.
Battalio, Shkilko, Van Ness (2016). To Pay or Be Paid? The Impact of Taker Fees and Order Flow Inducements on Trading Costs in U.S. Options Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51(5), 1637-1662. doi
Effective spreads are higher on option venues that pay for order flow than on maker-taker venues, but once taker fees are counted the paying venues are cheaper for most options, though not for high-priced ones.
Jensen, Pedersen (2016). Early option exercise: Never say never. Journal of Financial Economics 121(2), 278-299. doi · Read a free copy
The rule never to exercise a call early fails when investors face frictions: early exercise can be optimal when it cuts short-sale, transaction or funding costs, and billions of dollars of it are documented.
Hull, White (2017). Optimal delta hedging for options. Journal of Banking & Finance 82, 180-190. doi · Read a free copy
The usual delta does not minimize the variance of a hedged position because volatility moves with price; a minimum variance delta estimated on S&P 500 options improves on stochastic volatility models.
Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs, Karoui (2018). Illiquidity Premia in the Equity Options Market. The Review of Financial Studies 31(3), 811-851. doi
Illiquid equity options earn more than liquid ones after risk adjustment, 3.4% a day for at-the-money calls and 2.5% for puts, compensating market makers for holding large, risky net long positions.
Battalio, Figlewski, Neal (2020). Option Investor Rationality Revisited: The Role of Exercise Boundary Violations. Financial Analysts Journal 76(1), 82-99. doi · Read a free copy
The best bid for an in-the-money call is often below its intrinsic value, so exercising early can be the right choice and actual exercise behavior is less irrational than earlier studies concluded.
Muravyev, Pearson (2020). Options Trading Costs Are Lower than You Think. The Review of Financial Studies 33(11), 4973-5014. doi
Option price changes are predictable at high frequency and many traders time their executions, so effective spreads for those traders are less than 40% of conventional measures.
Ernst, Spatt (2026). Payment for Order Flow and Option Internalization. The Review of Financial Studies. doi
Designated market makers receive the first five contracts of any order they bring to their exchange, a rule that creates a barrier to entry in option wholesaling and protects wholesaler profits and high payment for order flow.
Hendershott, Khan, Riordan (2026). Option Auctions. The Review of Financial Studies 39(3), 783-834. doi
Wholesalers that pay for retail option orders compete through price improvement in exchange auctions, but most auctions lack multiple bidders offering meaningful improvement, and wholesalers earn their revenue in trades outside auctions.

Investment strategy

What has earned a return, how a portfolio is built and sized, why prices can stay wrong, and whether managers and published strategies deliver: 183 papers. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found. Many of these results have weakened since they were published, and the papers that test them are listed beside them.

Portfolio theory and asset pricing: the foundations

Tobin (1958). Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk. The Review of Economic Studies 25(2), 65. doi
Explains the demand for cash as a response to risk, and shows that the mix of risky assets an investor holds does not depend on how much of the portfolio is kept in cash.
Lintner (1965). The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets. The Review of Economics and Statistics 47(1), 13. doi
Proves the separation theorem under more general conditions, shows how the best mix of risky assets is found, and derives the equilibrium prices of risk assets under idealized conditions.
Samuelson (1969). Lifetime Portfolio Selection By Dynamic Stochastic Programming. The Review of Economics and Statistics 51(3), 239. doi
In a lifetime model of consumption and investment, having many periods ahead does not by itself justify more risk early in life: with isoelastic utility, relative risk tolerance is the same in the prime of life as near its end.
Merton (1971). Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model. Journal of Economic Theory 3(4), 373-413. doi
Extends the continuous-time consumption and portfolio problem to more general preferences and price behavior, and proves a mutual fund separation theorem that does not need quadratic utility or normally distributed prices.
Black (1972). Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing. The Journal of Business 45(3), 444. doi
When borrowing at the riskless rate is restricted, expected return is still a linear function of beta, but the line is flatter than the standard model predicts, which matches the evidence.
Fama, MacBeth (1973). Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests. Journal of Political Economy 81(3), 607-636. doi
Tests whether average returns on New York Stock Exchange stocks line up with risk as the two-parameter model says, and cannot reject either the model or an efficient market.
Merton (1973). An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. Econometrica 41(5), 867. doi
When investors trade continuously over a lifetime, their demand for assets also reflects possible changes in future investment opportunities, so an asset's expected return can differ from the riskless rate even when it has no market risk.
Ross (1976). The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic Theory 13(3), 341-360. doi
Develops the arbitrage model as an alternative to the mean-variance model: when returns share common factors, a well-diversified portfolio that uses no wealth and bears no factor risk must earn nothing, which ties expected returns to factor exposures.
Roll (1977). A critique of the asset pricing theory's tests Part I: On past and potential testability of the theory. Journal of Financial Economics 4(2), 129-176. doi
A valid test of the asset pricing model requires knowing the composition of the true market portfolio of all assets, so the model is close to untestable in practice and published tests are ambiguous.
Lucas (1978). Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy. Econometrica 46(6), 1429. doi
Derives equilibrium asset prices in a pure exchange economy with identical consumers, as a setting for asking when a failure of prices to follow a martingale is evidence against competitive or rational behavior.
Breeden (1979). An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic consumption and investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Economics 7(3), 265-296. doi
Derives an asset pricing model in which an asset's risk is its beta with respect to aggregate real consumption, not its beta with respect to the market portfolio.
Mehra, Prescott (1985). The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 15(2), 145-161. doi
From 1889 to 1978 the average return on US equity over Treasury bills was far larger than a class of general equilibrium models can produce: the equity premium puzzle.
Campbell, Cochrane (1999). By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107(2), 205-251. doi · Read a free copy
A consumption model with slow-moving habit explains the equity premium, long-horizon return predictability and countercyclical volatility: investors fear stocks because they do poorly in recessions.
Fama, French (2004). The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(3), 25-46. doi
Reviews the logic of the capital asset pricing model and the evidence on it, and concludes that its empirical record is poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in applications.
Cochrane (2011). Presidential Address: Discount Rates. The Journal of Finance 66(4), 1047-1108. doi
Surveys the evidence that variation in price-dividend ratios corresponds to variation in discount rates, not in expected cash flows, and that the cross-section of expected returns now involves a zoo of factors.
Koijen, Yogo (2019). A Demand System Approach to Asset Pricing. Journal of Political Economy 127(4), 1475-1515. doi
Builds an asset pricing model from the holdings of institutions and households, with demand that depends on asset characteristics, and uses it to study the role of institutions in price movements, volatility and predictability.

Market efficiency and why prices can stay wrong

Fama (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. The Journal of Finance 25(2), 383. doi
Reviews the evidence on market efficiency in three groups of tests: whether past returns predict future returns, how quickly prices reflect public announcements, and whether any investors hold information that prices do not reflect.
Miller (1977). Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion. The Journal of Finance 32(4), 1151-1168. doi
When investors disagree and short selling is restricted, demand for a stock comes from its most optimistic holders, so stocks with the widest disagreement, often the riskiest, can be bid up and earn lower returns.
Shleifer (1986). Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down? The Journal of Finance 41(3), 579-590. doi
Stocks added to the S&P 500 earn a positive abnormal return at the announcement that lasts at least ten days and is related to buying by index funds: demand curves for stocks slope down.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldmann (1990). Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets. Journal of Political Economy 98(4), 703-738. doi · Read a free copy
Unpredictable swings in the beliefs of noise traders create a risk that deters rational investors from betting against them, so prices can stay far from fundamental value even without fundamental risk.
Fama (1991). Efficient Capital Markets: II. The Journal of Finance 46(5), 1575-1617. doi · Read a free copy
The sequel regroups the evidence as return predictability, event studies and tests for private information, and grants that with information and trading costs the extreme version of the efficiency hypothesis is false.
Fama (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics 49(3), 283-306. doi
Argues that long-term return anomalies do not overturn market efficiency: apparent overreaction is about as common as underreaction, and most of the anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in method.
Gromb, Vayanos (2002). Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs. Journal of Financial Economics 66(2-3), 361-407. doi · Read a free copy
In a model of arbitrageurs who must post collateral in each market, their trading supplies liquidity and benefits all investors, but because positions are limited by wealth they may take too much or too little risk.
Mitchell, Pulvino, Stafford (2002). Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets. The Journal of Finance 57(2), 551-584. doi
In 82 cases where a company was worth less than its subsidiary, the link was severed before the gap closed in 30 percent of them, and the uneven path to convergence cut the arbitrageur's return.
Lamont, Thaler (2003). Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-outs. Journal of Political Economy 111(2), 227-268. doi
In technology carve-outs of 1998 to 2000, a parent traded for less than the subsidiary shares its holders were due to receive; shorting costs kept arbitrage from correcting the mispricing.
Brunnermeier, Nagel (2004). Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble. The Journal of Finance 59(5), 2013-2040. doi
Hedge funds did not lean against the technology bubble: they were heavily invested in technology stocks, captured the upturn, and cut positions in stocks that were about to decline.
Coval, Stafford (2007). Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets. Journal of Financial Economics 86(2), 479-512. doi · Read a free copy
Mutual funds hit by large outflows sell the positions they hold in common and press prices down; investors who trade against them earn significant returns, and the forced trades are predictable.
Brunnermeier, Pedersen (2009). Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 22(6), 2201-2238. doi
Traders' funding and the liquidity of the assets they trade reinforce each other, so margins can be destabilizing and market liquidity can dry up suddenly across many securities at once.
Gromb, Vayanos (2010). Limits of Arbitrage. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2(1), 251-275. doi
Surveys the theory of why arbitrageurs fail to remove mispricing: fundamental and non-fundamental risk, short-selling costs, leverage and margin constraints, and limits on equity capital.
Khandani, Lo (2011). What happened to the quants in August 2007? Evidence from factors and transactions data. Journal of Financial Markets 14(1), 1-46. doi · Read a free copy
Simulated long-short equity and market-making strategies trace the quant losses of August 2007 to market-wide deleveraging and a sudden withdrawal of market-making capital.
Stambaugh, Yu, Yuan (2012). The short of it: Investor sentiment and anomalies. Journal of Financial Economics 104(2), 288-302. doi · Read a free copy
Each of a broad set of anomalies is stronger after high investor sentiment, and the extra profit comes from the short leg, consistent with overpricing that short-sale impediments leave uncorrected.
Gârleanu, Pedersen (2018). Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management. The Journal of Finance 73(4), 1663-1712. doi
In a model where prices are only as efficient as the market for asset managers, informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed ones underperform, and large investors gain from searching for informed managers.
Greenwood, Shleifer, You (2019). Bubbles for Fama. Journal of Financial Economics 131(1), 20-43. doi
A sharp run-up in an industry's price does not on average predict unusually low returns, but it does predict a much higher probability of a crash, and features of the run-up help forecast the crash.
Haddad, Huebner, Loualiche (2025). How Competitive Is the Stock Market? Theory, Evidence from Portfolios, and Implications for the Rise of Passive Investing. American Economic Review 115(3), 975-1018. doi
When some investors trade less aggressively, others respond but offset only two-thirds of the change, and the rise of passive investing over 20 years has made demand for individual stocks 11 percent more inelastic.

Factors and styles: value, size, momentum, low risk, quality, carry

Basu (1977). Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The Journal of Finance 32(3), 663-682. doi
Over the 14 years studied, portfolios of low price-earnings stocks earned higher returns than portfolios of high price-earnings stocks, and the higher returns did not come with higher systematic risk.
Banz (1981). The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. Journal of Financial Economics 9(1), 3-18. doi
Smaller NYSE firms earned higher risk-adjusted returns than larger firms for at least forty years; the effect is concentrated in very small firms, and whether size itself is responsible is left open.
De Bondt, Thaler (1985). Does the Stock Market Overreact? The Journal of Finance 40(3), 793-805. doi
Finds evidence consistent with investors overreacting to unexpected and dramatic news: substantial weak-form inefficiencies, with portfolios of prior losers earning exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after formation.
Rosenberg, Reid, Lanstein (1985). Persuasive evidence of market inefficiency. The Journal of Portfolio Management 11(3), 9-16. doi
Two strategies, one buying stocks with high book value relative to price and one betting on reversal of the prior month's stock-specific return, each produced highly significant results.
Fama, French (1996). Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies. The Journal of Finance 51(1), 55-84. doi
Return patterns tied to size, earnings and cash flow to price, book-to-market, past sales growth and long-term past return largely disappear in a three-factor model; the continuation of short-term returns does not.
Jegadeesh, Titman (2001). Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations. The Journal of Finance 56(2), 699-720. doi
Momentum profits continued in the 1990s, after the original study, which argues against data snooping, and the evidence gives cautious support to behavioral models of delayed overreaction.
Arnott, Hsu, Moore (2005). Fundamental Indexation. Financial Analysts Journal 61(2), 83-99. doi
Indexes that weight companies by measures of size other than market capitalization delivered consistent, significant benefits relative to standard capitalization-weighted indexes.
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang (2006). The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected Returns. The Journal of Finance 61(1), 259-299. doi
Stocks with high sensitivity to changes in aggregate volatility have low average returns, and stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have very low average returns that size, book-to-market, momentum and liquidity do not explain.
Blitz, van Vliet (2007). The Volatility Effect. The Journal of Portfolio Management 34(1), 102-113. doi
Stocks with low historical volatility earned high risk-adjusted returns in US, European and Japanese markets, an effect similar in size to value, size and momentum and not explained by them.
Baker, Bradley, Wurgler (2011). Benchmarks as Limits to Arbitrage: Understanding the Low-Volatility Anomaly. Financial Analysts Journal 67(1), 40-54. doi
High-beta and high-volatility stocks have long underperformed low-beta and low-volatility stocks, and mandates to beat a fixed benchmark discourage institutions from arbitraging the gap.
Loughran, Wellman (2011). New Evidence on the Relation between the Enterprise Multiple and Average Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46(6), 1629-1650. doi
The enterprise multiple, enterprise value over EBITDA, is a strong determinant of stock returns: firms with low multiples earn higher subsequent returns than firms with high multiples.
Fama, French (2012). Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 105(3), 457-472. doi
Value premiums appear in North America, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific and, outside Japan, shrink as firm size grows; momentum appears everywhere except Japan; pricing does not look integrated across regions.
Moskowitz, Ooi, Pedersen (2012). Time series momentum. Journal of Financial Economics 104(2), 228-250. doi · Read a free copy
Finds time series momentum in each of 58 liquid futures contracts across equity indexes, currencies, commodities and bonds: returns persist for one to twelve months and partially reverse over longer horizons.
Asness, Frazzini (2013). The Devil in HML's Details. The Journal of Portfolio Management 39(4), 49-68. doi
Measuring book-to-price with current prices instead of lagged prices gives a better proxy for the true ratio, and value portfolios built that way earned significantly more than the standard construction.
Asness, Moskowitz, Pedersen (2013). Value and Momentum Everywhere. The Journal of Finance 68(3), 929-985. doi
Value and momentum premia appear in eight markets and asset classes, move together across them, and are negatively correlated with each other, which points to common global risks such as funding liquidity.
Frazzini, Pedersen (2014). Betting against beta. Journal of Financial Economics 111(1), 1-25. doi · Read a free copy
Investors who face leverage and margin constraints bid up high-beta assets, so high beta goes with low alpha, and a factor long leveraged low-beta assets and short high-beta assets earns significant risk-adjusted returns.
Asness, Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz (2015). Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing. The Journal of Portfolio Management 42(1), 34-52. doi
Takes the common claims about value investing one at a time and tests each against the academic literature and simple checks on public data.
Barroso, Santa-Clara (2015). Momentum has its moments. Journal of Financial Economics 116(1), 111-120. doi
The risk of momentum varies over time and is predictable, and managing that risk virtually eliminates the crashes and nearly doubles the strategy's Sharpe ratio.
Daniel, Moskowitz (2016). Momentum crashes. Journal of Financial Economics 122(2), 221-247. doi · Read a free copy
Momentum strategies suffer infrequent, persistent strings of losses that come in panic states, after market declines and when volatility is high, as the market rebounds; the crashes are partly forecastable.
Hurst, Ooi, Pedersen (2017). A Century of Evidence on Trend-Following Investing. The Journal of Portfolio Management 44(1), 15-29. doi
Trend following delivered positive average returns in every decade since 1880, with low correlation to traditional asset classes, and performed well in 8 of the 10 largest drawdowns of a 60/40 portfolio.
Asness, Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz, Pedersen (2018). Size matters, if you control your junk. Journal of Financial Economics 129(3), 479-509. doi · Read a free copy
The objections to the size premium disappear once the quality of the firm is controlled for: a significant premium emerges that is stable through time and not concentrated in microcaps.
Frazzini, Kabiller, Pedersen (2018). Buffett's Alpha. Financial Analysts Journal 74(4), 35-55. doi
Berkshire Hathaway's alpha becomes insignificant after controlling for low-beta and quality factors; with leverage of about 1.7 to 1, the record reflects leveraging cheap, safe, high-quality stocks.
Koijen, Moskowitz, Pedersen, Vrugt (2018). Carry. Journal of Financial Economics 127(2), 197-225. doi · Read a free copy
Extends carry from currencies to any asset, splitting expected return into carry and expected price appreciation, and finds that carry predicts returns in equities, bonds, commodities, Treasuries, credit and options.
Haddad, Kozak, Santosh (2020). Factor Timing. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 1980-2018. doi
Returns on market-neutral equity factors are strongly predictable, and timing the factors on that predictability improves substantially on holding them in fixed proportions.
Huang, Li, Wang, Zhou (2020). Time series momentum: Is it there? Journal of Financial Economics 135(3), 774-794. doi
Asset-by-asset regressions show little evidence that the past twelve months' return predicts the next month's, and the trend strategy performs about the same as one based only on the historical mean.
Arnott, Harvey, Kalesnik, Linnainmaa (2021). Reports of Value's Death May Be Greatly Exaggerated. Financial Analysts Journal 77(1), 44-67. doi
Attributes the underperformance of value since 2007 to book value missing intangible assets and to value stocks becoming cheaper relative to growth stocks, neither of which implies the premium is gone.
Baltussen, Swinkels, van Vliet (2021). Global factor premiums. Journal of Financial Economics 142(3), 1128-1154. doi · Read a free copy
For 24 factor premiums across equity, bond, commodity and currency markets from 1800 to 2016, replication is ambiguous once p-hacking is allowed for, but out-of-sample tests find the large majority present with limited decay.
Ehsani, Linnainmaa (2022). Factor Momentum and the Momentum Factor. The Journal of Finance 77(3), 1877-1919. doi
Most factors are positively autocorrelated, and momentum in factor returns accounts for most forms of momentum in individual stocks: momentum is not a separate risk factor but a way of timing other factors.
Novy-Marx, Velikov (2022). Betting against betting against beta. Journal of Financial Economics 143(1), 80-106. doi · Read a free copy
The performance of the betting against beta factor comes from construction choices that in effect equal-weight stocks; it earns positive returns after costs, but by tilting toward profitability and investment.

Investor behavior that bears on strategy

Shefrin, Statman (1985). The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Finance 40(3), 777-790. doi
Sets out why investors tend to sell winners too early and hold losers too long, through mental accounting, regret aversion, self-control and taxes, and argues that tax considerations alone cannot explain the pattern.
Benartzi, Thaler (1995). Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1), 73-92. doi · Read a free copy
Explains the equity premium with investors who are more sensitive to losses than to gains and who evaluate their portfolios frequently; the premium fits prospect theory if portfolios are evaluated annually.
Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics 49(3), 307-343. doi
A model of how investors form beliefs, based on psychological evidence, that produces both underreaction of prices to news such as earnings announcements and overreaction to a series of good or bad news.
Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam (1998). Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions. The Journal of Finance 53(6), 1839-1885. doi · Read a free copy
Explains underreaction and overreaction with two biases: overconfidence about private information, which produces long-run reversal and excess volatility, and biased self-attribution, which adds short-run momentum and earnings drift.
Odean (1998). Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? The Journal of Finance 53(5), 1775-1798. doi
In the trading records of 10,000 brokerage accounts, investors strongly prefer to realize winners over losers, which rebalancing and trading costs do not explain and which lowers after-tax returns in taxable accounts.
Hong, Stein (1999). A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets. The Journal of Finance 54(6), 2143-2184. doi
When private information spreads gradually and traders do not extract it from prices, prices underreact in the short run; momentum traders profit by chasing the trend and so push prices to overreact at long horizons.
Odean (1999). Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review 89(5), 1279-1298. doi
Tests whether overconfidence leads investors to trade too much, and demonstrates that the trading volume of investors with discount brokerage accounts is excessive.
Barber, Odean (2000). Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors. The Journal of Finance 55(2), 773-806. doi
Among 66,465 households at a discount broker from 1991 to 1996, those that traded most earned 11.4 percent a year while the market returned 17.9 percent: active trading carried a large performance penalty.
Barberis, Thaler (2003). A survey of behavioral finance. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1053-1128. doi
Surveys behavioral finance through its two building blocks, limits to arbitrage and psychology, and applies them to the aggregate market, the cross-section of returns, individual trading and corporate finance.
Hirshleifer, Teoh (2003). Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36(1-3), 337-386. doi
Models how the way firms present information affects market prices when investors have limited attention, with implications for pro forma earnings, the accounting for option compensation and aggregation in reporting.
Baker, Wurgler (2006). Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 61(4), 1645-1680. doi
When sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small, young, volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend-paying, extreme growth and distressed stocks; when sentiment is high, those stocks earn relatively low returns.
Barber, Odean (2008). All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors. Review of Financial Studies 21(2), 785-818. doi
Individual investors are net buyers of stocks that catch their attention, such as stocks in the news, with unusual volume or with extreme one-day returns, because they cannot search the thousands of stocks they could buy.
Frazzini, Lamont (2008). Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 88(2), 299-322. doi
Using mutual fund flows to measure retail sentiment toward individual stocks, high sentiment predicts low future returns: by reallocating across funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run.
DellaVigna, Pollet (2009). Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements. The Journal of Finance 64(2), 709-749. doi
Earnings announced on Fridays draw a 15% lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response than those on other weekdays, which supports limited attention as a cause of post-announcement drift.
Greenwood, Shleifer (2014). Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns. Review of Financial Studies 27(3), 714-746. doi
Survey measures of investors' expected stock returns rise with past returns and the level of the market, and are strongly negatively correlated with the expected returns that models compute.
Giglio, Maggiori, Stroebel, Utkus (2021). Five Facts about Beliefs and Portfolios. American Economic Review 111(5), 1481-1522. doi · Read a free copy
A survey of wealthy retail investors matched to their accounts shows that beliefs are reflected in portfolios but with small sensitivity on average, and that beliefs differ persistently across individuals.
Barber, Huang, Odean, Schwarz (2022). Attention-Induced Trading and Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users. The Journal of Finance 77(6), 3141-3190. doi
Robinhood users trade more on attention than other retail investors, and intense buying by them forecasts negative returns: the top stocks bought each day average 20-day abnormal returns of minus 4.7 percent.
Akepanidtaworn, Di Mascio, Imas, Schmidt (2023). Selling Fast and Buying Slow: Heuristics and Trading Performance of Institutional Investors. The Journal of Finance 78(6), 3055-3098. doi
Institutional investors with portfolios averaging $573 million show skill in buying, but their selling decisions underperform substantially, even against selling at random.

Return predictability and the equity premium

Merton (1980). On estimating the expected return on the market: An exploratory investigation. Journal of Financial Economics 8(4), 323-361. doi
Estimating the expected market return from historical averages ignores changes in the level of market risk; estimates should require the expected excess return to be positive and should be adjusted for changing variance.
Campbell, Shiller (1988). The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount Factors. Review of Financial Studies 1(3), 195-228. doi · Read a free copy
Derives a linear relation tying the log dividend-price ratio to expected future dividend growth and expected future discount rates, which gives a way to judge how much each contributes to the ratio.
Fama, French (1988). Dividend yields and expected stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 22(1), 3-25. doi
The power of dividend yields to forecast stock returns increases with the return horizon, and time-varying expected returns generate temporary components in prices.
Campbell, Shiller (1998). Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock Market Outlook. The Journal of Portfolio Management 24(2), 11-26. doi
Price-earnings and dividend-price ratios do poorly at forecasting dividend or earnings growth, and are useful mainly for forecasting future stock price changes.
Lettau, Ludvigson (2001). Consumption, Aggregate Wealth, and Expected Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 56(3), 815-849. doi
Fluctuations in the ratio of consumption to aggregate wealth strongly predict US stock returns, and forecast them better at short and intermediate horizons than the dividend yield and other popular variables.
Fama, French (2002). The Equity Premium. The Journal of Finance 57(2), 637-659. doi
Estimated from dividend and earnings growth, the equity premium for 1951 to 2000 was 2.55 and 4.32 percent, far below the 7.43 percent average return, which suggests the realized return was a lot higher than expected.
Asness (2003). Fight the Fed Model. The Journal of Portfolio Management 30(1), 11-24. doi
Comparing the stock market's earnings yield with the nominal bond yield sets a real number against a nominal one, and the comparison fails to forecast long-term returns, which traditional valuation measures do.
Boudoukh, Richardson, Whitelaw (2008). The Myth of Long-Horizon Predictability. Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 1577-1605. doi · Read a free copy
With persistent predictors and overlapping returns, estimates at different horizons are almost perfectly correlated even when there is no predictability, so the stronger-looking long-horizon evidence adds little.
Campbell, Thompson (2008). Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat the Historical Average? Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 1509-1531. doi · Read a free copy
Many predictive regressions do beat the historical average return out of sample once weak restrictions are imposed on the signs of coefficients and forecasts; the gain is small but economically meaningful.
Cochrane (2008). The Dog That Did Not Bark: A Defense of Return Predictability. Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 1533-1575. doi
If returns were not predictable, dividend growth would have to be, to account for the variation in dividend yields; the absence of dividend growth predictability is stronger evidence than the return forecasts themselves.
Welch, Goyal (2008). A Comprehensive Look at The Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction. Review of Financial Studies 21(4), 1455-1508. doi
Variables proposed as predictors of the equity premium have by and large predicted poorly in and out of sample for 30 years, are unstable, and would not have helped an investor time the market.
Rapach, Strauss, Zhou (2010). Out-of-Sample Equity Premium Prediction: Combination Forecasts and Links to the Real Economy. Review of Financial Studies 23(2), 821-862. doi
Combining the forecasts of many individual predictive regressions delivers significant out-of-sample gains over the historical average, consistently over time, where individual predictors fail.
Bessembinder (2018). Do stocks outperform Treasury bills? Journal of Financial Economics 129(3), 440-457. doi
Most US common stocks since 1926 have lifetime returns below one-month Treasury bills; the best-performing 4% of companies explain the net gain of the whole market, which shows how skewed individual stock returns are.
Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, Taylor (2019). The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870-2015. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(3), 1225-1298. doi
Assembles annual total returns on equity, housing, bonds and bills for 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, to measure the real rate of return on all major asset classes.
Anarkulova, Cederburg, O'Doherty (2022). Stocks for the long run? Evidence from a broad sample of developed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 143(1), 409-433. doi
Across 39 developed countries from 1841 to 2019, long-horizon stock outcomes are highly uncertain: a diversified investor with a 30-year horizon has an estimated 12% chance of losing relative to inflation.
Goyal, Welch, Zafirov (2024). A Comprehensive 2022 Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction. The Review of Financial Studies 37(11), 3490-3557. doi
Of 29 predictors of the equity premium published after 2008, more than one-third no longer have significance even in sample, half of the rest perform poorly out of sample, and a small number still perform reasonably well.
McQuarrie (2024). Stocks for the Long Run? Sometimes Yes, Sometimes No. Financial Analysts Journal 80(1), 12-28. doi
A record of US stock and bond returns from 1792 shows that over multi-decade periods stocks sometimes beat bonds, bonds sometimes beat stocks, and sometimes they performed about the same.

Building, sizing and risk-managing a portfolio

Sharpe (1966). Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of Business 39(S1), 119. doi
Introduces a measure of mutual fund performance, the reward-to-variability ratio, later named the Sharpe ratio after its author.
Samuelson (1971). The "Fallacy" of Maximizing the Geometric Mean in Long Sequences of Investing or Gambling. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 68(10), 2493-2496. doi · Read a free copy
Maximizing the geometric mean at each step makes a higher final wealth virtually certain in a long sequence, but that does not make the strategy optimal for an investor's utility over any finite number of periods.
Treynor, Black (1973). How to Use Security Analysis to Improve Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Business 46(1), 66. doi
Sets out how an investor with special insight should turn the analyst's judgments into a portfolio, linking judgmental security analysis to statistical portfolio selection; without such insight the market portfolio is the right holding.
Brinson, Hood, Beebower (1986). Determinants of Portfolio Performance. Financial Analysts Journal 42(4), 39-44. doi
In 91 large US pension plans over 1974 to 1983, investment policy explained on average 93.6 percent of the variation in total plan return, and active management cost the average plan 1.10 percent a year.
Jorion (1986). Bayes-Stein Estimation for Portfolio Analysis. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21(3), 279. doi
Uncertainty about expected returns leads to suboptimal portfolios, and the sample mean is an inadmissible estimator; a simple empirical Bayes estimator gives significant gains in portfolio selection in simulations.
Statman (1987). How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio? The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22(3), 353. doi
A well-diversified portfolio of randomly chosen stocks needs at least 30 stocks for a borrowing investor and 40 for a lending investor, not the roughly 10 commonly assumed.
Perold, Sharpe (1988). Dynamic Strategies for Asset Allocation. Financial Analysts Journal 44(1), 16-27. doi
Sets out explicit rules for rebalancing between stocks and bills: buy-and-hold does nothing, while rules that sell stocks as the market falls and buy as it rises amount to buying portfolio insurance.
Michaud (1989). The Markowitz Optimization Enigma: Is 'Optimized' Optimal? Financial Analysts Journal 45(1), 31-42. doi
Mean-variance optimization tends to maximize the effect of errors in its inputs, and unconstrained it can do worse than equal weighting; adjusted inputs and sensible constraints improve its practical value.
Black, Litterman (1992). Global Portfolio Optimization. Financial Analysts Journal 48(5), 28-43. doi
Uses the equilibrium returns of the global capital asset pricing model as a neutral starting point for portfolio optimization, to be tilted in accordance with the investor's views.
Rotando, Thorp (1992). The Kelly Criterion and the Stock Market. The American Mathematical Monthly 99(10), 922-931. doi
Describes the Kelly criterion, a rule for apportioning capital in favorable games, and applies it to the US stock market.
Sharpe (1992). Asset allocation: Management style and performance measurement. The Journal of Portfolio Management 18(2), 7-19. doi
Uses a factor model with twelve asset classes to measure a fund's effective exposure to each class from its returns, and so to judge how much value its manager added through active management.
Sharpe (1994). The Sharpe Ratio. The Journal of Portfolio Management 21(1), 49-58. doi
Restates and generalizes the reward-to-variability ratio, by then known as the Sharpe ratio, and sets out the range of applications for which it is suited.
Ibbotson, Kaplan (2000). Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100 Percent of Performance? Financial Analysts Journal 56(1), 26-33. doi
Asset allocation policy explains about 90 percent of the variability of a typical fund's returns over time, about 40 percent of the variation among funds, and about 100 percent of the level of return.
Clarke, de Silva, Thorley (2002). Portfolio Constraints and the Fundamental Law of Active Management. Financial Analysts Journal 58(5), 48-66. doi
Generalizes the fundamental law of active management to portfolios run under constraints, such as limits on short positions and turnover, that keep managers from fully using their ability to forecast returns.
Lo (2002). The Statistics of Sharpe Ratios. Financial Analysts Journal 58(4), 36-52. doi
Derives the statistical distribution of the Sharpe ratio and shows that serial correlation in monthly returns can overstate a hedge fund's annual Sharpe ratio by as much as 65 percent.
Ledoit, Wolf (2004). Honey, I Shrunk the Sample Covariance Matrix. The Journal of Portfolio Management 30(4), 110-119. doi · Read a free copy
The sample covariance matrix should not be used for portfolio optimization; shrinking it pulls the most extreme coefficients toward central values, which reduces tracking error and raises the realized information ratio.
Thorp (2006). The Kelly Criterion in Blackjack Sports Betting, and the Stock Market. Handbook of Asset and Liability Management, 385-428. doi
Explains the Kelly criterion, maximizing the expected logarithm of wealth, as the answer to how much to bet, with formulas and applications to blackjack, sports betting and the securities markets.
DeMiguel, Garlappi, Uppal (2009). Optimal Versus Naive Diversification: How Inefficient is the 1/ N Portfolio Strategy? Review of Financial Studies 22(5), 1915-1953. doi
Of 14 optimization models tested on seven datasets, none consistently beats equal weighting out of sample on Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return or turnover: estimation error more than offsets the gain from optimal diversification.
Kritzman, Page, Turkington (2010). In Defense of Optimization: The Fallacy of 1/ N. Financial Analysts Journal 66(2), 31-39. doi
With longer samples or plausible assumptions for expected returns, optimized portfolios outperform equally weighted ones out of sample; the apparent superiority of equal weighting comes from relying on short rolling samples.
MacLean, Thorp, Ziemba (2010). Long-term capital growth: the good and bad properties of the Kelly and fractional Kelly capital growth criteria. Quantitative Finance 10(7), 681-687. doi
The Kelly criterion maximizes the long-run growth rate of wealth, but its wagers can be very large and it is risky in the short term, so most of one's wealth can be lost in bad scenarios.
Maillard, Roncalli, Teïletche (2010). The Properties of Equally Weighted Risk Contribution Portfolios. The Journal of Portfolio Management 36(4), 60-70. doi
A portfolio in which each component contributes equally to risk has volatility between that of the minimum-variance and the equally weighted portfolios, and is offered as a trade-off between the two.
Anderson, Bianchi, Goldberg (2012). Will My Risk Parity Strategy Outperform? Financial Analysts Journal 68(6), 75-93. doi
Comparing value-weighted, 60/40 and risk parity strategies, results depend on the start and end dates even over decades, transaction costs can reverse the ranking when leverage is used, and a significant premium does not guarantee outperformance.
Asness, Frazzini, Pedersen (2012). Leverage Aversion and Risk Parity. Financial Analysts Journal 68(1), 47-59. doi
If investors are averse to leverage, safer assets must offer higher risk-adjusted returns than riskier ones, and risk parity portfolios exploit this by equalizing risk across asset classes, which overweights the safer assets.
Haghani, Dewey (2017). Rational Decision Making under Uncertainty: Observed Betting Patterns on a Biased Coin. The Journal of Portfolio Management 43(3), 2-8. doi
Given $25 to bet on a coin biased 60% to heads, most of 61 quantitatively trained players bet poorly, and about 30% lost the whole stake.
Moreira, Muir (2017). Volatility-Managed Portfolios. The Journal of Finance 72(4), 1611-1644. doi
Portfolios that take less risk when volatility is high produce large alphas and higher Sharpe ratios for the market and several factors, because changes in volatility are not offset by proportional changes in expected returns.
Harvey, Hoyle, Korgaonkar, Rattray, Sargaison, Van Hemert (2018). The Impact of Volatility Targeting. The Journal of Portfolio Management 45(1), 14-33. doi
Scaling exposure to a volatility target raises the Sharpe ratio only for risk assets such as equity and credit, but across all asset classes it reduces the likelihood of extreme returns.
Cederburg, O'Doherty, Wang, Yan (2020). On the performance of volatility-managed portfolios. Journal of Financial Economics 138(1), 95-117. doi
Across 103 equity strategies, volatility-managed portfolios do not systematically beat their unmanaged versions in direct comparisons, and implementable out-of-sample versions generally do worse.
Van Hemert, Ganz, Harvey, Rattray, Sanchez Martin, Yawitch (2020). Drawdowns. The Journal of Portfolio Management 46(8), 34-50. doi
Quantifies the probability of reaching a given drawdown under different return properties, and shows that drawdown-based rules help detect managers who have lost their ability to outperform.

Liquidity, trading costs and capacity

Kyle (1985). Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica 53(6), 1315. doi
A model of an informed insider, noise traders and market makers in which the insider's trading is concealed by noise trading, market depth is constant, and all private information reaches the price by the end of trading.
Amihud, Mendelson (1986). Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics 17(2), 223-249. doi · Read a free copy
In a model where investors with different holding periods trade assets with different spreads, expected return is an increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread, and the evidence is consistent with it.
Almgren, Chriss (2001). Optimal execution of portfolio transactions. The Journal of Risk 3(2), 5-39. doi
Frames the execution of a portfolio trade as a choice between transaction costs from market impact and volatility risk, and constructs the efficient frontier of liquidation strategies under a linear cost model.
Amihud (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of Financial Markets 5(1), 31-56. doi · Read a free copy
Expected market illiquidity raises expected stock excess returns over time, so part of the excess return is an illiquidity premium; illiquidity is measured as the daily ratio of absolute return to dollar volume.
Pástor, Stambaugh (2003). Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns. Journal of Political Economy 111(3), 642-685. doi
Stocks whose returns are more sensitive to swings in aggregate liquidity earned higher average returns, by 7.5 percent a year from 1966 through 1999 after adjusting for market, size, value and momentum.
Korajczyk, Sadka (2004). Are Momentum Profits Robust to Trading Costs? The Journal of Finance 59(3), 1039-1082. doi
With price impact, abnormal returns to momentum strategies decline as the portfolio grows; equal-weighted strategies do best before costs and worst after, and liquidity-weighted versions could absorb $5 billion or more before profits vanish.
Lesmond, Schill, Zhou (2004). The illusory nature of momentum profits. Journal of Financial Economics 71(2), 349-380. doi
Momentum strategies require frequent trading in disproportionately high-cost stocks, and the stocks that generate large momentum returns are those with high trading costs, so the apparent profits are an illusion.
Acharya, Pedersen (2005). Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial Economics 77(2), 375-410. doi
In a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security's required return depends on its expected liquidity and on how its return and liquidity move with the market's return and liquidity.
Gârleanu, Pedersen (2013). Dynamic Trading with Predictable Returns and Transaction Costs. The Journal of Finance 68(6), 2309-2340. doi
When trading is costly and signals decay at different speeds, the best policy is to aim in front of the target and trade only partly toward it, giving more weight to signals that decay slowly.
Novy-Marx, Velikov (2016). A Taxonomy of Anomalies and Their Trading Costs. Review of Financial Studies 29(1), 104-147. doi
After trading costs, most anomalies with turnover below 50% a month still earn significant net spreads when designed to limit costs, few with higher turnover do, and size, value and profitability strategies have the most capacity.
Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz (2018). Trading Costs. Working paper, SSRN 3229719. doi
Using 1.7 trillion dollars of live trades by a large institutional manager across 21 developed equity markets, finds actual trading costs to be an order of magnitude smaller than previous studies suggest.
Patton, Weller (2020). What you see is not what you get: The costs of trading market anomalies. Journal of Financial Economics 137(2), 515-549. doi
Comparing the returns to factor exposures on paper with those mutual funds actually achieve, typical funds earn low returns to value and none to momentum after implementation costs.
Chen, Velikov (2023). Zeroing In on the Expected Returns of Anomalies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 58(3), 968-1004. doi · Read a free copy
After bid-ask spreads, post-publication effects and the trading technology of the era since the early 2000s, the average of 204 anomalies has an expected return of 4 basis points a month.
Jensen, Kelly, Malamud, Pedersen (2026). Machine Learning and the Implementable Efficient Frontier. The Review of Financial Studies 39(10), 3035-3078. doi
Proposes judging strategies by net-of-cost return at each level of risk; machine learning portfolios that ignore trading costs rely on fleeting small-scale characteristics and earn poor net returns, which cost-aware optimization corrects.

Do managers and funds deliver

Jensen (1968). The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964. The Journal of Finance 23(2), 389-416. doi
Derives a risk-adjusted measure of portfolio performance and finds that 115 mutual funds over 1945 to 1964 on average did not predict prices well enough to beat buying and holding the market, even gross of management expenses.
Sharpe (1991). The Arithmetic of Active Management. Financial Analysts Journal 47(1), 7-9. doi
Before costs the average actively managed dollar must earn the same return as the average passively managed dollar, and after costs it must earn less; this follows from arithmetic alone.
Carhart (1997). On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance 52(1), 57-82. doi
Common factors in stock returns and differences in expenses explain almost all persistence in equity mutual fund returns; the only persistence left is strong underperformance by the worst funds.
Agarwal, Naik (2004). Risks and Portfolio Decisions Involving Hedge Funds. Review of Financial Studies 17(1), 63-98. doi
Many equity-oriented hedge fund strategies have payoffs resembling a short put option on the market index, and so bear significant left-tail risk that the mean-variance framework underestimates.
Berk, Green (2004). Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets. Journal of Political Economy 112(6), 1269-1295. doi
In a rational model with competitive capital flows and decreasing returns to scale, active funds do not outperform passive benchmarks even though managers differ in skill, so past performance does not predict future returns.
Chen, Hong, Huang, Kubik (2004). Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization. American Economic Review 94(5), 1276-1302. doi
Mutual fund returns decline with fund size, before and after fees, most of all among funds that have to invest in small and illiquid stocks, which ties the effect to liquidity.
Fung, Hsieh (2004). Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk-Based Approach. Financial Analysts Journal 60(5), 65-80. doi
Proposes seven asset-based style factors, observable in market prices, as a benchmark for hedge funds; they explain up to 80 percent of the monthly return variation of diversified hedge fund portfolios.
Kacperczyk, Sialm, Zheng (2005). On the Industry Concentration of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1983-2011. doi
Among actively managed US mutual funds from 1984 to 1999, funds more concentrated in a few industries performed better on average after controlling for risk and style.
Kaplan, Schoar (2005). Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1791-1823. doi
Average private equity fund returns net of fees roughly equal the S&P 500, with wide differences across funds, and returns persist strongly across successive funds of the same partnership.
Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, White (2006). Can Mutual Fund "Stars" Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis. The Journal of Finance 61(6), 2551-2595. doi
A bootstrap of US equity mutual fund returns over 1975 to 2002 finds that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs, and that their superior alphas persist.
French (2008). Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1537-1573. doi
Averaging over 1980 to 2006, investors spent 0.67% of the value of the US stock market each year searching for superior returns, which is what the typical investor would have gained by switching to a passive market portfolio.
Goyal, Wahal (2008). The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors. The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1805-1847. doi · Read a free copy
Among 3,400 plan sponsors from 1994 to 2003, managers were hired after large positive excess returns that did not continue, and fired managers would have done no worse than their replacements.
Cremers, Petajisto (2009). How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance. Review of Financial Studies 22(9), 3329-3365. doi
Introduces Active Share, the share of a fund's holdings that differs from its benchmark, and finds that funds with the highest Active Share outperform their benchmarks before and after expenses while the lowest underperform.
Phalippou, Gottschalg (2009). The Performance of Private Equity Funds. Review of Financial Studies 22(4), 1747-1776. doi
Reported private equity performance is overstated by inflated valuations of ongoing investments and a bias toward better funds in the data; net of fees, funds averaged 3% a year below the S&P 500.
Fama, French (2010). Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns. The Journal of Finance 65(5), 1915-1947. doi
Actively managed US equity funds in aggregate hold something close to the market portfolio, and their costs show up as lower returns to investors; simulations suggest few funds have enough skill to cover their costs.
Dichev, Yu (2011). Higher risk, lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn☆. Journal of Financial Economics 100(2), 248-263. doi
Because of the timing of their capital flows, hedge fund investors earned dollar-weighted returns 3% to 7% a year below the funds' buy-and-hold returns, and their real alpha is close to zero.
Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan (2014). Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know? The Journal of Finance 69(5), 1851-1882. doi
In data on nearly 1,400 US funds, buyout funds consistently outperformed public markets, by more than 3% a year against the S&P 500; venture capital funds outperformed in the 1990s and underperformed in the 2000s.
Pástor, Stambaugh, Taylor (2015). Scale and skill in active management. Journal of Financial Economics 116(1), 23-45. doi
Finds strong evidence that as the active mutual fund industry grows, a fund's ability to beat passive benchmarks declines; managers have become more skilled over time, but industry growth has kept that from raising performance.
Frazzini, Friedman, Pomorski (2016). Deactivating Active Share. Financial Analysts Journal 72(2), 14-21. doi
On the same sample, Active Share correlates with benchmark returns but does not predict fund returns; within a benchmark it is as likely to relate negatively to performance as positively.
Pedersen (2018). Sharpening the Arithmetic of Active Management. Financial Analysts Journal 74(1), 21-36. doi
Sharpe's equality assumes the market portfolio never changes; because shares are issued and repurchased and indexes reconstituted, passive investors must trade too, so active managers can in aggregate be worth positive fees.
Cremers, Fulkerson, Riley (2019). Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively Managed Mutual Funds. Financial Analysts Journal 75(4), 8-35. doi
Reviews the research on active mutual funds since 1997 and concludes that the conventional view, that active management creates no value for investors, is too negative.
Ennis (2020). Institutional Investment Strategy and Manager Choice: A Critique. The Journal of Portfolio Management 46(5), 104-117. doi
Returns of public pension funds and endowments are explained by a few stock and bond indexes; alternatives stopped diversifying in the 2000s, and the funds trailed passive investment by 1.0% and 1.6% a year over a recent decade.
Stafford (2021). Replicating Private Equity with Value Investing, Homemade Leverage, and Hold-to-Maturity Accounting. The Review of Financial Studies 35(1), 299-342. doi
Buyout funds select small firms with value characteristics and add leverage; a portfolio of similar public stocks financed with brokerage loans earned higher mean returns than direct investments in private equity funds.
Ben-David, Franzoni, Kim, Moussawi (2023). Competition for Attention in the ETF Space. The Review of Financial Studies 36(3), 987-1042. doi
Early ETFs tracked broad indexes at low cost; newer specialized ETFs charge high fees and lose about 30% risk-adjusted over their first five years, because the stocks they track are overvalued at launch.

Data mining, replication and machine learning

Lo, MacKinlay (1990). Data-Snooping Biases in Tests of Financial Asset Pricing Models. Review of Financial Studies 3(3), 431-467. doi
Tests of asset pricing models can mislead when portfolios are formed by sorting on a characteristic chosen from the data, such as market value; the resulting bias can be substantial.
Sullivan, Timmermann, White (1999). Data-Snooping, Technical Trading Rule Performance, and the Bootstrap. The Journal of Finance 54(5), 1647-1691. doi
Applies a bootstrap reality check to technical trading rules across the full universe of rules from which they were drawn, using 100 years of daily Dow Jones data, to adjust their performance for data snooping.
Schwert (2003). Anomalies and market efficiency. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 939-974. doi
Many well-known anomalies do not hold up in different sample periods; the size and value effects seem to have disappeared after the papers that highlighted them were published.
Bailey, López de Prado (2014). The Deflated Sharpe Ratio: Correcting for Selection Bias, Backtest Overfitting, and Non-Normality. The Journal of Portfolio Management 40(5), 94-107. doi
Reporting only the best of many backtests inflates expected performance; the deflated Sharpe ratio corrects a Sharpe ratio for the number of trials and for non-normal returns.
Novy-Marx (2014). Predicting anomaly performance with politics, the weather, global warming, sunspots, and the stars. Journal of Financial Economics 112(2), 137-146. doi
Predictive regressions find that the party of the US president, the weather in Manhattan, sunspots and the planets all significantly predict the performance of popular anomalies, which bears on how such regressions are interpreted.
Harvey, Liu (2015). Backtesting. The Journal of Portfolio Management 42(1), 13-28. doi
Gives a statistical framework for discounting the Sharpe ratio of a backtested strategy to account for the many strategies tried, and a profit hurdle a strategy must clear to be deemed significant.
Harvey (2017). Presidential Address: The Scientific Outlook in Financial Economics. The Journal of Finance 72(4), 1399-1440. doi
Unreported tests, no adjustment for multiple testing and p-hacking mean many published results will fail to hold up; raising significance thresholds may not be enough, and a minimum Bayes factor is offered as an alternative.
Suhonen, Lennkh, Perez (2017). Quantifying Backtest Overfitting in Alternative Beta Strategies. The Journal of Portfolio Management 43(2), 90-104. doi
For 215 alternative beta strategies promoted by investment banks, Sharpe ratios fell by a median 73% between the backtest and the live period, and by more for the most complex strategies.
Arnott, Harvey, Markowitz (2019). A Backtesting Protocol in the Era of Machine Learning. The Journal of Financial Data Science 1(1), 64-74. doi
Machine learning needs far more data than finance usually offers, and markets respond to past research; the authors set out a research protocol for machine learning and for quantitative finance in general.
Chen, Zimmermann (2020). Publication Bias and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 10(2), 249-289. doi
Estimates that publication bias shrinks the returns of 156 published long-short portfolios by only 12.3%, much less than their decay after publication, which points to mispricing more than data mining.
Chordia, Goyal, Saretto (2020). Anomalies and False Rejections. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2134-2179. doi · Read a free copy
Using over 2 million randomly generated trading strategies, sets t-statistic thresholds of 3.8 and 3.4 for anomaly tests and estimates that about 45% of rejections would be false without a correction for multiple testing.
Feng, Giglio, Xiu (2020). Taming the Factor Zoo: A Test of New Factors. The Journal of Finance 75(3), 1327-1370. doi
A method for testing whether a new factor adds anything beyond a large set of existing ones finds most recently proposed factors redundant, with a few that keep significant explanatory power.
Freyberger, Neuhierl, Weber (2020). Dissecting Characteristics Nonparametrically. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2326-2377. doi
A nonparametric selection method finds that many previously identified return predictors add no incremental information about expected returns, and that nonlinearities are important.
Harvey, Liu (2020). False (and Missed) Discoveries in Financial Economics. The Journal of Finance 75(5), 2503-2553. doi
Proposes a way to calibrate both false discoveries and misses in tests of funds and factors, sets t-statistic hurdles tied to a chosen false discovery rate, and finds current methods lack power to detect outperforming managers.
Jacobs, Müller (2020). Anomalies across the globe: Once public, no longer existent? Journal of Financial Economics 135(1), 213-230. doi · Read a free copy
Across 241 anomalies in 39 stock markets, the United States is the only country with a reliable decline in returns after publication, which suggests that barriers to arbitrage segment markets and that anomalies reflect mispricing.
Avramov, Cheng, Metzker (2023). Machine Learning vs. Economic Restrictions: Evidence from Stock Return Predictability. Management Science 69(5), 2587-2619. doi
Deep learning signals earn their profits in hard-to-arbitrage stocks and stressed markets; excluding microcaps, distressed stocks or high-volatility episodes weakens them considerably, and reasonable trading costs weaken them further.
Kelly, Xiu (2023). Financial Machine Learning. Foundations and Trends in Finance 13(3-4), 205-363. doi
Surveys machine learning in the study of financial markets, written for financial economists who want the tools and for statisticians who want the applications.
Kelly, Malamud, Zhou (2024). The Virtue of Complexity in Return Prediction. The Journal of Finance 79(1), 459-503. doi
Proves that simple models with few parameters severely understate return predictability compared with models that have more parameters than observations, and documents the gain in predicting US equity market returns.
Menkveld, Dreber, Holzmeister and others (2024). Nonstandard Errors. The Journal of Finance 79(3), 2339-2390. doi
When 164 teams tested the same hypotheses on the same data, the variation in results from their different research choices was sizable, smaller for more reproducible work, and underestimated by the participants.

Fat tails, fragility and ruin

The research behind the Library's family Fat tails, fragility and ruin: 27 papers, most of them by Nassim Nicholas Taleb and his coauthors, on fat tails, fragility, ruin, forecasting and how options are actually traded, with one critique listed beside the reply it drew. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Fat tails and the limits of statistics

Taleb (2007). Black Swans and the Domains of Statistics. The American Statistician 61(3), 198-200. doi
A reply to statisticians' reviews of The Black Swan: its critique applies only where randomness is wild and the decision turns on expectations or higher moments, not on a probability alone; where randomness is mild, or errors are cheap, statistics works well.
Taleb (2009). Finiteness of variance is irrelevant in the practice of quantitative finance. Complexity 14(3), 66-76. doi
Argues that outside the models the line between finite and infinite variance makes no practical difference: power laws with tail exponents above two are no safer for Gaussian tools than those below, which undermines dynamic hedging arguments and mean-variance portfolio construction.
Taleb (2009). Errors, robustness, and the fourth quadrant. International Journal of Forecasting 25(4), 744-759. doi
Presents evidence that econometric methods built on variance do not replicate, sorts decisions by payoff (binary or open-ended) and randomness (thin or fat tailed), and places the fourth quadrant, open-ended payoffs under fat tails, where rare-event estimates fail, proposing ways to limit the damage there.
Mandelbrot, Taleb (2010). Mild vs. Wild Randomness: Focusing on Those Risks That Matter. The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Risk Management, 47-58. doi
Contrasts mild randomness, where no single observation moves the total much, with wild randomness, where one observation can dominate it, and argues that risk measures derived from the bell curve, such as the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio, mislead where randomness is wild.
Taleb (2019). How much data do you need? An operational, pre-asymptotic metric for fat-tailedness. International Journal of Forecasting 35(2), 677-686. doi · Read a free copy
Proposes kappa, a measure from zero (Gaussian) to one (maximally fat tailed) based on how fast averages of a variable settle, and uses it to say how many observations a fat-tailed variable needs to match the reliability of a Gaussian sample.
Taleb (2019). Probability, Risk, and Extremes. Extremes, 46-66. doi
A lecture setting out thin and fat tails and their consequences: under fat tails sample averages mislead and the tail decides the properties, and when ruin is possible the odds for one person exposed over time differ from the average across many people.

Fragility, antifragility and convex responses

Taleb (2004). Bleed or Blowup? Why Do We Prefer Asymmetric Payoffs? Journal of Behavioral Finance 5(1), 2-7. doi
Surveys behavioral research for why people prefer a steady small gain with an occasional large loss to the reverse, tracing the preference to biased inference about rare events, to prospect theory and to research on well-being.
Taleb, Canetti, Kinda, Loukoianova, Schmieder (2012). A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing. IMF Working Papers 2012(216), 1. doi
Proposes a second-order stress test, rerunning a scenario with the shock a little larger and a little smaller to see whether losses accelerate; applied to large US banks and to public debt, it ranks fragility to tail shocks even when the model's levels are wrong.
Taleb, Douady (2013). Mathematical definition, mapping, and detection of (anti)fragility. Quantitative Finance 13(11), 1677-1689. doi · Read a free copy
Defines fragility as losing, and antifragility as gaining, from wider dispersion of shocks, ties both to the curvature of the exposure, and gives a model-free test, comparing outcomes under small changes in a parameter, that also detects model error.
Geman, Geman, Taleb (2015). Tail Risk Constraints and Maximum Entropy. Entropy 17(6), 3724-3737. doi
Builds portfolios that are constrained only in the left tail and otherwise as uncertain as possible, and finds that the tail constraint outweighs the usual considerations and that a barbell, very safe holdings on one side and maximally uncertain ones on the other, emerges by itself.
Taleb (2018). (Anti)Fragility and Convex Responses in Medicine. Springer Proceedings in Complexity, 299-325. doi · Read a free copy
Applies convex and concave responses to medicine: links the shape of a dose-response curve to the spread of outcomes, defines antifragility as a locally convex response, and treats harm from treatment as the tail risk of an intervention, weighed against a benefit that grows with severity.
Taleb, West (2023). Working with Convex Responses: Antifragility from Finance to Oncology. Entropy 25(2), 343. doi
Carries the analysis of nonlinear responses from finance into oncology, relating the convexity of a dose-response function to the statistics of outcomes and proposing tractable relations among dose, severity of disease and harm from treatment.

Ruin, survival, skin in the game and precaution

Taleb, Tapiero (2010). Risk externalities and too big to fail. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 389(17), 3503-3507. doi
With a firm's own losses capped at its capital and the losses it imposes on others unbounded, derives when a firm should not be allowed to be too big to fail: when expected external losses rise at an increasing rate with its capital at risk.
Taleb, Sandis (2014). The Skin In The Game Heuristic for Protection Against Tail Events. Review of Behavioral Economics 1(1-2), 115-135. doi
Argues that agency theory misses how opacity compounds moral hazard where tails are fat, and proposes that anyone whose action can harm others, even with small probability, must bear some of the damage, so that exposure removes reckless risk takers from the system.
Siegenfeld, Taleb, Bar-Yam (2020). What models can and cannot tell us about COVID-19. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117(28), 16092-16095. doi
Argues that models cannot predict an epidemic's precise course, because infections depend exponentially on an uncertain growth rate, but can identify interventions that make active infections decline exponentially, which matters more than the forecast.
Taleb, Bar-Yam, Cirillo (2022). On single point forecasts for fat-tailed variables. International Journal of Forecasting 38(2), 413-422. doi · Read a free copy
Using COVID-19 as the case, argues that single point forecasts of fat-tailed, multiplicative variables are invalid, that waiting for better data is itself a decision with costs, and that systemic risks call for evidence of no harm rather than evidence of harm.
Taleb (2026). Lindy as Distance From an Absorbing Barrier. Wilmott 2026(144). doi
Models the Lindy effect, a remaining life expectancy that grows with age, as the time a random process takes to reach an absorbing barrier, and shows that it holds when the process has no drift while any drift toward the barrier removes it.

Forecasts, bets and real payoffs

Makridakis, Taleb (2009). Decision making and planning under low levels of predictability. International Journal of Forecasting 25(4), 716-733. doi
Introduces a special section of the journal by summarizing evidence that forecasts in the economy, business, floods and medicine are often inaccurate and that their uncertainty cannot be assessed reliably, distinguishing forecasts built on patterns, on relationships and on judgment.
Taleb (2018). Election predictions as martingales: an arbitrage approach. Quantitative Finance 18(1), 1-5. doi · Read a free copy
Treats a continuously updated election forecast as the price of a binary option and shows that the more uncertain the outcome, the closer a consistent probability stays to one half, so a sound forecast should not swing widely with each new poll.
Taleb (2020). On the statistical differences between binary forecasts and real-world payoffs. International Journal of Forecasting 36(4), 1228-1240. doi · Read a free copy
Shows that being right often on yes-or-no questions differs from doing well on continuous payoffs, especially under fat tails, so a good binary forecasting record can go with poor results, and that many findings that people overestimate rare events conflate the two.
Taleb, Richman, Carreira, Sharpe (2023). The probability conflation: A reply to Tetlock et al. International Journal of Forecasting 39(2), 1026-1029. doi
Replying to Tetlock and coauthors, argues that expert judgment and forecasting tournaments do not capture tail risk and are not compatible with extreme value methods, and reports a result widening the gap between tail expectations and the probabilities that go with them.
Tetlock, Lu, Mellers (2023). False dichotomy alert: Improving subjective-probability estimates vs. raising awareness of systemic risk. International Journal of Forecasting 39(2), 1021-1025. doi
Replies to Taleb and coauthors that forecasting tournaments and tail-risk work are complementary rather than opposed: tournaments train accurate probability judgments on questions that resolve quickly, while the tail-risk program accepts many false alarms in order to catch systemic risks.
Taleb, Cirillo (2025). The Regress of Uncertainty and the Forecasting Paradox. Risks 13(12), 247. doi
Shows that uncertainty about one's own error rates, compounded layer upon layer, thickens the tails of any forecast, so predictive distributions must have heavier tails than the past data they were fitted to.

Tail risk in the historical record: wars, pandemics, operational losses

Cirillo, Taleb (2016). On the statistical properties and tail risk of violent conflicts. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 452, 29-45. doi · Read a free copy
Studies violent conflicts over two thousand years with a dual distribution suited to fat-tailed but bounded war sizes, finds the true mean of casualties well above the sample mean, and finds no trend in the timing of large wars to support claims of a long peace.
Cirillo, Taleb (2016). Expected shortfall estimation for apparently infinite-mean models of operational risk. Quantitative Finance 16(10), 1485-1494. doi
Shows how to estimate expected shortfall for operational losses that look infinite-mean in the data but cannot exceed a firm's value, using a smooth dual distribution so that capital can be set aside against the tail.
Cirillo, Taleb (2020). Tail risk of contagious diseases. Nature Physics 16(6), 606-613. doi · Read a free copy
Applies extreme value methods to deaths in 72 pandemics of the past 2,500 years, each with over a thousand victims, finds them extremely fat tailed with an apparently infinite mean, and concludes that tail risk, not the averages of epidemic models, should guide risk management.

Option pricing as traders practice it

Haug, Taleb (2011). Option traders use (very) sophisticated heuristics, never the Black-Scholes-Merton formula. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 77(2), 97-106. doi
Argues from historical trading sources that option traders priced options with heuristics and put-call parity long before 1973 and did not adopt the Black-Scholes-Merton formula afterwards, fitting fat tails and skew by adjusting a single volatility parameter.

How people really decide

The research behind the Library's family How people really decide: 77 papers by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Richard Thaler and the economists and psychologists who tested, extended or disputed their findings, on frames, reference points, mental accounts, defaults, plans, noise and the limits to arbitrage. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and disputed results are listed beside the papers that dispute them.

Prospect theory, loss aversion and reference points

Kahneman, Knetsch, Thaler (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98(6), 1325-1348. doi
In repeated markets for coffee mugs and other goods given at random to half the subjects, owners demand far more to sell than buyers will pay and far fewer goods trade than predicted, while markets for cash-value tokens trade as predicted.
Tversky, Kahneman (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), 1039-1061. doi
Presents a reference-dependent theory of consumer choice in which losses and disadvantages weigh more than gains and advantages, explaining why a change of reference point often reverses preferences.
Tversky, Kahneman (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. doi
Introduces cumulative prospect theory, with separate decision weights for gains and for losses, and confirms a fourfold pattern: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses when probabilities are high, and the reverse when they are low.
Heath, Huddart, Lang (1999). Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 601-627. doi
In the stock option exercises of over 50,000 employees at seven companies, exercise follows recent price trends and roughly doubles when the stock price passes its maximum of the previous year, a reference point.
Genesove, Mayer (2001). Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4), 1233-1260. doi
In downtown Boston condominiums in the 1990s, owners facing nominal losses set asking prices higher by 25 to 35 percent of the gap between expected price and purchase price, sold for 3 to 18 percent of it more, and sold more slowly.
Kahneman (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist 58(9), 697-720. doi
Reviews the early work with Tversky through two ideas, how easily thoughts come to mind and the contrast between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning, and uses them to explain prospect theory, framing effects and attribute substitution in judgment.
Baker, Pan, Wurgler (2012). The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 106(1), 49-71. doi · Read a free copy
Finds that merger offer prices are pulled toward the target's recent peak price, that acceptance jumps when an offer exceeds that peak, that bidders' shareholders react worse the more the offer is pushed toward it, and that merger waves come when prices are near peaks.
Thaler (2016). Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, and Future. American Economic Review 106(7), 1577-1600. doi
Traces behavioral economics back to Smith, Fisher and Keynes, argues that the case for keeping the idealized rational agent has been refuted, including in financial markets, and calls for descriptive theories built from data alongside models of optimal behavior.
Gal, Rucker (2018). The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? Journal of Consumer Psychology 28(3), 497-516. doi
Reviews the evidence for loss aversion and concludes that it does not show losses to be, on balance, more impactful than gains, then asks why the principle remains so widely accepted among social scientists.
Brown, Imai, Vieider, Camerer (2024). Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion. Journal of Economic Literature 62(2), 485-516. doi · Read a free copy
A meta-analysis of 607 estimates of the loss aversion coefficient from 150 articles published from 1992 to 2017 finds a mean of 1.955, with a 95 percent probability that the true value lies between 1.820 and 2.102.

Framing and mental accounting

Thaler (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1(1), 39-60. doi
Argues that in well-defined situations many consumers act inconsistently with economic theory, proposes prospect theory as the basis for a descriptive alternative, and discusses the underweighting of opportunity costs, the failure to ignore sunk costs, search, regret and self-control.
Thaler, Shefrin (1981). An Economic Theory of Self-Control. Journal of Political Economy 89(2), 392-406. doi
Models self-control by treating the individual as an organization with a farsighted planner and a myopic doer, a conflict like that between owners and managers, and applies it to pensions, the timing of income and saving, and individual discount rates.
Tversky, Kahneman (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211(4481), 453-458. doi
Shows that the same decision problem framed in different ways produces predictable reversals of preference, in choices about money, hypothetical and real, and about human lives, a dependence on formulation that troubles the theory of rational choice.
McNeil, Pauker, Sox, Tversky (1982). On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies. New England Journal of Medicine 306(21), 1259-1262. doi
Among 238 patients, 491 graduate students and 424 physicians choosing between surgery and radiation for lung cancer, surgery was more attractive in all three groups when outcomes were framed as the probability of living rather than of dying.
Kahneman, Tversky (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist 39(4), 341-350. doi
Explains risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses and the overweighting of sure and improbable outcomes, shows that framing violates the invariance rational choice requires, and uses mental accounting to explain why a cost can feel unlike an uncompensated loss.
Thaler (1985). Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science 4(3), 199-214. doi
Develops a model of consumer behavior that codes combinations of gains and losses with the prospect theory value function, evaluates purchases through a new concept of transaction utility together with household budgeting, and draws implications for pricing.
Shefrin, Thaler (1988). The Behavioral Life-cycle Hypothesis. Economic Inquiry 26(4), 609-643. doi
Proposes the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis, in which households divide wealth into current income, current assets and future income, accounts with different temptations to spend, and presents econometric evidence that these components are not treated as interchangeable.
Thaler (1990). Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4(1), 193-205. doi
Reviews evidence on household saving and argues that relaxing the life-cycle model's assumption that money is fungible, and allowing for self-control, explains many of the saving anomalies observed.
Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, Kunreuther (1993). Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7(1), 35-51. doi
A series of studies finds framing manipulations leading consumers to hypothetical insurance choices that violate basic laws of probability and value, with distorted perceptions of risk and framing effects in judging premiums and benefits, and similar effects in actual purchases.
Heath, Soll (1996). Mental Budgeting and Consumer Decisions. Journal of Consumer Research 23(1), 40. doi
Three studies find that consumers set budgets for categories of spending and track purchases against them, so that budgeting can lead to underconsumption, with the largest effects for purchases typical of their category.
Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, Thaler (1997). Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 407-441. doi
In three samples of New York City cabdrivers, whose wages are correlated within days but not between them, hours worked fall when wages are high, consistent with deciding one day at a time and quitting once a loose daily income target is reached.
Thaler (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12(3), 183-206. doi
Summarizes how households organize, evaluate and track financial activities: how outcomes are experienced and judged, how spending is assigned to labeled and budgeted accounts, and how often accounts are evaluated, each of which violates the fungibility of money.
Hastings, Shapiro (2013). Fungibility and Consumer Choice: Evidence from Commodity Price Shocks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1449-1498. doi · Read a free copy
Using panel data on gasoline purchases, finds that when gasoline prices rise consumers switch to lower octane grades far more than income effects can explain, rejecting the fungibility of gas money, with a simple model of category budgeting fitting the data well.
Klein, Ratliff, Vianello and others (2014). Investigating Variation in Replicability. Social Psychology 45(3), 142-152. doi
Across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants, 10 of 13 classic and contemporary effects replicated consistently while two priming effects did not, and replicability depended more on the effect than on the sample or setting.

Plans, forecasts and the outside view

Kahneman, Tversky (1982). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. Judgment under Uncertainty, 414-421. doi
Separates singular information about the case at hand from distributional information about outcomes in similar cases, traces nonregressive predictions and overconfidence to neglect of the latter, and proposes procedures to elicit it and combine it with intuition.
Buehler, Griffin, Ross (1994). Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people underestimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67(3), 366-381. doi
Five studies find people predicting their own task completion times too optimistically while overestimating others', focusing on plans for the task rather than relevant past experience, and losing the bias when told to connect past experience to the prediction.
Flyvbjerg, Holm, Buhl (2002). Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie? Journal of the American Planning Association 68(3), 279-295. doi
In 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth 90 billion dollars across project types, regions and periods, the cost estimates used to decide whether to build are highly and systematically misleading, a pattern the authors attribute to strategic misrepresentation rather than error.
Flyvbjerg (2008). Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice. European Planning Studies 16(1), 3-21. doi
Details reference class forecasting, which bases projections on the actual performance of comparable past projects to bypass optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, and describes its first use in planning practice, for transport investments in the United Kingdom including the Edinburgh Tram and Crossrail.
Lovallo, Clarke, Camerer (2012). Robust analogizing and the outside view: two empirical tests of case-based decision making. Strategic Management Journal 33(5), 496-512. doi
In private equity investment decisions, forming a reference class of analogies outperforms relying on a few familiar ones, and in film revenue forecasts a similarity-based method combining reference class forecasting with case-based reasoning beats regression models.
Flyvbjerg (2021). Top Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview. Project Management Journal 52(6), 531-546. doi
Identifies the ten behavioral biases most important for project management, from strategic misrepresentation and optimism to the planning fallacy, base rate neglect and escalation of commitment, and presents base rates of project performance from 2,062 projects.
Flyvbjerg, Budzier, Lee, Keil, Lunn, Bester (2022). The Empirical Reality of IT Project Cost Overruns: Discovering A Power-Law Distribution. Journal of Management Information Systems 39(3), 607-639. doi
In 5,392 information technology projects, cost overruns follow a power law with a fat tail of extreme overruns, far riskier than the near-normal distribution managers often assume, possibly generated by chain reactions among interdependent technical components.

How investors trade: gains and losses, evaluation periods, prior outcomes

Thaler, Johnson (1990). Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice. Management Science 36(6), 643-660. doi
Proposes an editing rule for how prior gains and losses combine with the payoffs of a current choice, and reports real money experiments showing more risk seeking after a prior gain and a strong pull toward outcomes that offer a chance to break even after a loss.
Brown, Harlow, Starks (1996). Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry. The Journal of Finance 51(1), 85-110. doi
Among 334 growth mutual funds from 1976 to 1991, managers trailing at mid-year raised fund volatility in the rest of the annual assessment period more than mid-year leaders did, an effect that grew as investor attention to performance increased.
Chevalier, Ellison (1997). Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 105(6), 1167-1200. doi
Estimates the shape of the relation between mutual fund flows and performance, which gives fund companies reasons to raise or lower risk depending on year-to-date return, and finds funds altering portfolio riskiness at year end in line with those incentives.
Gneezy, Potters (1997). An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 631-645. doi
An experiment finds that the more frequently returns are evaluated, the more risk averse investors become, in line with myopic loss aversion, with implications for the equity premium and for how fund managers present results.
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, Schwartz (1997). The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 647-661. doi
Experiments show investors accepting more risk when they evaluate their investments less often, and when payoffs are raised enough to remove losses; those given the most frequent feedback took the least risk and earned the least.
Weber, Camerer (1998). The disposition effect in securities trading: an experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 33(2), 167-184. doi
In experiments in which subjects trade shares in six risky assets, they sell winners and keep losers as prospect theory predicts, and the pattern is greatly reduced when shares are sold automatically at the end of each period.
Benartzi, Thaler (1999). Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments. Management Science 45(3), 364-381. doi
Finds people facing many plays of a mixed gamble reacting to the possible loss on a single play yet accepting when shown the distribution of the total, and employees putting more retirement savings in stocks when shown long-term rather than one-year returns.
Barberis, Huang, Santos (2001). Prospect Theory and Asset Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 1-53. doi
Models investors who are loss averse over fluctuations in financial wealth, with loss aversion that depends on prior investment performance, and shows that this helps explain the high mean, excess volatility and predictability of stock returns.
Coval, Shumway (2005). Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? The Journal of Finance 60(1), 1-34. doi · Read a free copy
Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders appear highly loss averse, regularly taking above-average afternoon risk to recover morning losses, which moves afternoon prices briefly, though prices set by these traders reverse more quickly than prices set by others.
Grinblatt, Han (2005). Prospect theory, mental accounting, and momentum. Journal of Financial Economics 78(2), 311-339. doi · Read a free copy
Models investors who hold losers out of prospect theory and mental accounting, which opens a spread between price and value that looks like momentum, and finds that a proxy for aggregate unrealized capital gains, not past returns, predicts the cross-section of returns.
Haigh, List (2005). Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis. The Journal of Finance 60(1), 523-534. doi
Comparing traders recruited from the Chicago Board of Trade with students, finds the professionals behaving consistently with myopic loss aversion to a greater extent than the students, rather than less.
Frazzini (2006). The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News. The Journal of Finance 61(4), 2017-2046. doi
Using mutual fund holdings to estimate the prices at which holders bought each stock, finds that drift after news is strongest when holders' capital gains and the news share a sign, consistent with the disposition effect slowing the response of prices.
Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, Thaler (2008). Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show. American Economic Review 98(1), 38-71. doi · Read a free copy
In the large-stakes television game show Deal or No Deal and related classroom experiments, risky choices depend on earlier outcomes in the game, with risk aversion falling after both unfavorable and favorable surprises, consistent with reference-dependent theories.
Barberis, Xiong (2009). What Drives the Disposition Effect? An Analysis of a Long-Standing Preference-Based Explanation. The Journal of Finance 64(2), 751-784. doi
Shows that prospect theory preferences defined over annual gains and losses often fail to predict a disposition effect, while preferences defined over realized gains and losses predict it more reliably.
Ben-David, Hirshleifer (2012). Are Investors Really Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? Trading Responses to Past Returns and the Disposition Effect. Review of Financial Studies 25(8), 2485-2532. doi
Finds the probability of selling V-shaped in a position's profit, with big losers sold more readily than small ones at short holding periods and little sign of a jump at zero profit, pointing to belief revision rather than a preference for realizing gains.

Noise and the reliability of professional judgment

Goldberg (1970). Man versus model of man: A rationale, plus some evidence, for a method of improving on clinical inferences. Psychological Bulletin 73(6), 422-432. doi
Reanalyzing 29 clinical psychologists' diagnoses from patients' test profiles, finds that linear models of each judge's own judgments are generally more valid than the judges themselves, even when built on a small set of cases and tested on new ones.
Dawes (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making. American Psychologist 34(7), 571-582. doi
Shows that improper linear models, with weights set by intuition, by simulating a judge or equally, still beat clinical intuition in predicting a numerical outcome from numerical predictors, that equal weights are quite robust, and answers common objections to using them.
Dawes, Faust, Meehl (1989). Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment. Science 243(4899), 1668-1674. doi
Reviews research comparing clinical and actuarial methods of diagnosis and prediction, finds the actuarial method superior, and discusses why it is more accurate and why it meets resistance.
Ashton (2000). A review and analysis of research on the test-retest reliability of professional judgment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13(3), 277-294. doi
Reviews studies of how consistently professional judges give the same judgment to identical cases on two occasions, finding reliability that varies by field and by design and concluding that knowledge of this basic property of judgment is meager.
Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, Nelson (2000). Clinical versus mechanical prediction: A meta-analysis. Psychological Assessment 12(1), 19-30. doi
A meta-analysis of studies of human health and behavior finds mechanical prediction about 10 percent more accurate than clinical prediction on average, substantially better in 33 to 47 percent of studies and substantially worse in only 6 to 16 percent.
Kahneman, Klein (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist 64(6), 515-526. doi
Maps the conditions under which professional intuition can be trusted, concluding that judging an intuition requires assessing how predictable its environment is and whether the judge has had the chance to learn its regularities, since confidence is not a reliable guide.
Kleinberg, Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig, Mullainathan (2018). Human Decisions and Machine Predictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133(1), 237-293. doi · Read a free copy
Using bail decisions and econometric strategies for outcomes that judges' choices hide, finds that an algorithm could cut crime by up to 24.7 percent with no change in jailing, or jailing by up to 41.9 percent with no rise in crime, while reducing racial disparities.

Defaults and choice architecture

Samuelson, Zeckhauser (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1(1), 7-59. doi
Decision experiments and faculty choices of health plans and retirement programs show individuals sticking disproportionately with the status quo, a bias with possible explanations from economics, psychology and decision theory.
Benartzi, Thaler (2001). Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans. American Economic Review 91(1), 79-98. doi
Finds that some investors in defined contribution plans divide contributions evenly across the funds offered, so that the share invested in stocks depends strongly on the share of stock funds in the plan.
Madrian, Shea (2001). The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4), 1149-1187. doi
At a company that introduced automatic enrollment in its 401(k) plan, participation became significantly higher and many participants kept the default contribution rate and fund, which few earlier hires had chosen, a result of inertia and of reading the default as advice.
Johnson, Goldstein (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives? Science 302(5649), 1338-1339. doi
Using natural and experimental data on the decision to become an organ donor, finds that default options produce large differences in stated preferences, with defaults that make donation the norm significantly raising donation rates.
Thaler, Benartzi (2004). Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving. Journal of Political Economy 112(S1), S164-S187. doi
In the first implementation of Save More Tomorrow, in which employees commit in advance to save part of future raises, 78 percent of those offered joined, 80 percent stayed through four raises, and their average saving rate rose from 3.5 to 13.6 percent in 40 months.
Benartzi, Thaler (2007). Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), 81-104. doi
Surveys the rules of thumb employees use in deciding whether to join a retirement plan, how much to contribute and how to invest, finds them passive and prone to naive diversification, and argues that sensible defaults and automatic increases are effective and cheap remedies.
Jachimowicz, Duncan, Weber, Johnson (2019). When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects. Behavioural Public Policy 3(02), 159-186. doi · Read a free copy
A meta-analysis of 58 default studies with 73,675 participants finds a considerable average effect of defaults (d = 0.68) with substantial variation, larger in consumer domains, smaller in environmental ones, and larger when the default signals endorsement or the status quo.
DellaVigna, Linos (2022). RCTs to Scale: Comprehensive Evidence From Two Nudge Units. Econometrica 90(1), 81-116. doi · Read a free copy
Comparing 126 trials covering 23 million people run by two large US nudge units with published academic trials, finds an average take-up effect of 1.4 percentage points at scale against 8.7 in journals, about 70 percent of the gap explained by selective publication.
Maier, Bartoš, Stanley, Shanks, Harris, Wagenmakers (2022). No evidence for nudging after adjusting for publication bias. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(31). doi
Reanalyzing the Mertens meta-analysis with a robust Bayesian correction for publication bias, finds no evidence for an overall nudging effect, evidence against information and assistance nudges, undecided evidence for structural ones, and heterogeneity suggesting some nudges work.
Mertens, Herberz, Hahnel, Brosch (2022). The effectiveness of nudging: A meta-analysis of choice architecture interventions across behavioral domains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(1). doi
A meta-analysis of over 200 studies finds choice architecture interventions changing behavior with a small to medium average effect, d = 0.43 after the authors' 2022 correction, largest when the structure of the choice is changed, with moderate publication bias.

Limits to arbitrage and the law of one price

Lee, Shleifer, Thaler (1991). Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle. The Journal of Finance 46(1), 75-109. doi
Finds that discounts on closed-end funds move together, that new funds start when seasoned funds trade at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts narrow when small stocks do well, consistent with swings in individual investor sentiment.
Lamont, Thaler (2003). Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4), 191-202. doi
Documents violations of the law of one price in closed-end country funds, twin shares, dual class shares and corporate spinoffs, and traces them all to limits on how far rational arbitrageurs can intervene.
Cherkes, Jones, Spatt (2026). A solution to the Palm-3Com spinoff puzzles. Critical Finance Review 15(3), 249-270. doi
Revisits the relative prices of Palm and 3Com in 2000 and argues that lending fees and uncertainty about the spinoff date, priced through Palm's forward prices from options, give a rational account of the levels and co-movement that had looked like mispricing.

Sunk costs and escalation of commitment

Staw (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: a study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16(1), 27-44. doi
In a business investment simulation with 240 business school students, people committed the most additional resources to a previously chosen course of action when they were personally responsible for its negative consequences.
Staw, Hoang (1995). Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly 40(3), 474. doi
In the National Basketball Association, players drafted earlier received more playing time and stayed longer with their teams after controlling for performance, injuries, trade status and position, evidence that what teams spent shaped personnel decisions.
Camerer, Weber (1999). The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: a re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39(1), 59-82. doi
Reexamining Staw and Hoang's NBA data with tests of rational explanations, finds that evidence of escalation of commitment persists but is weaker in duration and magnitude than first reported.
Ho, Png, Reza (2018). Sunk Cost Fallacy in Driving the World's Costliest Cars. Management Science 64(4), 1761-1778. doi · Read a free copy
Using Singapore policy that varied the sunk cost of buying a new car, estimates that driving rises with that cost, an elasticity of 0.048, so that policy from 2009 to 2013 went with 86 kilometers a month, or 5.6 percent, more driving.

Overreaction and its critics

De Bondt, Thaler (1987). Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality. The Journal of Finance 42(3), 557-581. doi
Reports further evidence for overreaction, past losers outperforming past winners in a way that firm size and CAPM betas do not explain, and relates excess January returns to short-term and long-term past performance and to the previous year's market return.
Conrad, Kaul (1993). Long-Term Market Overreaction or Biases in Computed Returns? The Journal of Finance 48(1), 39-63. doi
Shows that the returns to long-term contrarian strategies in earlier studies are biased upward by cumulating monthly returns that carry measurement error, and that the remaining returns to losers and winners are unrelated to overreaction.
Ball, Kothari, Shanken (1995). Problems in measuring portfolio performance An application to contrarian investment strategies. Journal of Financial Economics 38(1), 79-107. doi · Read a free copy
Finds five-year contrarian returns hard to measure: loser stocks are low priced with skewed returns, a one-eighth dollar price increase cuts their mean return by a quarter, and portfolios formed at the end of June earn negative abnormal returns.

Winning bids, acquisitions and overconfidence

Bazerman, Samuelson (1983). I Won the Auction But Don't Want the Prize. Journal of Conflict Resolution 27(4), 618-634. doi
An auction experiment demonstrates the winner's curse, paying too much for an item of uncertain value, and finds it grows with the uncertainty about the item's value and with the number of competing bidders.
Roll (1986). The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business 59(2), 197. doi
Proposes that hubris, bidders acting on valuations above the market price that are really errors, can explain corporate takeovers, and argues that the evidence on mergers and tender offers supports this as much as taxes, synergy or inefficient target management.
Malmendier, Tate (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89(1), 20-43. doi
Using CEOs' personal overinvestment in their company and their press portrayal as measures of overconfidence, finds overconfident CEOs 65 percent more likely to make acquisitions, especially diversifying ones funded internally, with announcement returns of minus 90 basis points against minus 12.
Massey, Thaler (2013). The Loser's Curse: Decision Making and Market Efficiency in the National Football League Draft. Management Science 59(7), 1479-1495. doi · Read a free copy
Comparing the market value of National Football League draft picks with the surplus value the drafted players deliver, finds top picks significantly overvalued, contrary to rational expectations and consistent with psychological research, despite high stakes and ample chances to learn.

Innovation, productivity and displacement

The research behind the Library's family Innovation, productivity and displacement: 91 papers by Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, Erik Brynjolfsson and the economists whose work they built on or answered, on where progress comes from, how it shows in productivity, and whom it displaces. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Where progress comes from: useful knowledge, ideas and the cost of research

Solow (1957). Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. The Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3), 312. doi
Separates movements along the aggregate production function from shifts of it and finds that of the doubling of US private nonfarm output per hour of work from 1909 to 1949, about seven-eighths came from technical change and one-eighth from more capital per hour.
Arrow (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, 609-626. doi
Treats invention as the production of knowledge and argues that indivisibility, inappropriability and uncertainty lead free markets to invest too little in it, above all in basic research, and that a monopolist, which would displace its own profits, has less incentive to invent than a competitive firm.
Romer (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98(5, Part 2), S71-S102. doi
Models growth as driven by deliberate investment in technology, a nonrival and partly excludable good, so equilibrium has monopolistic competition; the stock of human capital sets the growth rate, too little human capital goes to research, and integration into world markets raises growth.
Mokyr (1992). Technological Inertia in Economic History. The Journal of Economic History 52(2), 325-338. doi
Argues that new techniques succeed only in a receptive social setting and that resistance, mostly through nonmarket channels, from vested interests whose assets the techniques threaten and from intellectuals opposed to technology on principle, governs their fate, with Britain and France in the Industrial Revolution as cases.
Mokyr (1994). Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress. Research Policy 23(5), 561-574. doi
Models the struggle between innovators and groups that expect to lose from innovation as an urn process: a single economy drifts toward an absorbing state of technological stagnation, which Mokyr calls Cardwell's Law, while a world of competing economies escapes it even when each alone would not.
Mokyr (2005). Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1113-1180. doi
Surveys how the Industrial Revolution turned into modern economic growth, tying it to the growth of useful knowledge and to the links among science, technology and human capital, and argues that the Enlightenment redirected research toward practical problems and joined theory more closely to practice.
Mokyr (2005). The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth. The Journal of Economic History 65(2), 285-351. doi
Traces the Industrial Revolution to the seventeenth-century program of expanding useful knowledge and applying it to practical problems, carried out by Enlightenment institutions that enlarged that knowledge and made it more accessible, without which the breakthrough would not have become sustained growth.
Jones (2009). The Burden of Knowledge and the "Death of the Renaissance Man": Is Innovation Getting Harder? Review of Economic Studies 76(1), 283-317. doi
Shows that as knowledge accumulates innovators train longer, specialize more and work in larger teams, with age at first invention, specialization and teamwork rising among US inventors, a burden of knowledge that helps explain why productivity growth did not accelerate despite far more research.
Dittmar (2011). Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the Printing Press. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(3), 1133-1172. doi
Finds that European cities where printing presses were established in the 1400s grew 60 percent faster from 1500 to 1600 than similar cities, using distance from Mainz as an instrument for adoption, a city-level effect of the printing press where aggregate data had shown none.
Squicciarini, Voigtländer (2015). Human Capital and Industrialization: Evidence from the Age of Enlightenment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4), 1825-1883. doi · Read a free copy
Uses city subscriptions to the Encyclopédie in eighteenth-century France as a measure of knowledge elites and finds they predict city growth after French industrialization began, while average literacy does not; upper-tail knowledge raised productivity in innovative industrial technology.
Ahmadpoor, Jones (2017). The dual frontier: Patented inventions and prior scientific advance. Science 357(6351), 583-587. doi
Links 4.8 million US patents and 32 million research articles through chains of citations: 61 percent of patents link back to prior research and 80 percent of cited articles forward to a future patent, typically two to four steps apart, with university patents closest to science.
Mokyr (2018). The past and the future of innovation: Some lessons from economic history. Explorations in Economic History 69, 13-26. doi
Asks what released the brakes on growth that held for most of recorded history and whether sustained growth can last, and concludes that no technological reason exists for growth in economic welfare to slow, although institutions may become a serious constraint in some areas.
Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, Webb (2020). Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? American Economic Review 110(4), 1104-1144. doi · Read a free copy
Splits growth into research effort times research productivity and finds, across industries, products and firms, effort rising substantially while research productivity falls sharply; the researchers needed to double computer chip density are more than 18 times those needed in the early 1970s.

Creative destruction: competition, entry and the turnover of firms

Tushman, Anderson (1986). Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 31(3), 439. doi
Using minicomputers, cement and airlines from their births through 1980, finds technology advancing by incremental change punctuated by breakthroughs that destroy or enhance existing firms' competence; new firms initiate the competence-destroying ones, existing firms the competence-enhancing ones, and initiators grow faster.
Henderson, Clark (1990). Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1), 9. doi · Read a free copy
Defines architectural innovation, which changes how a product's components are linked while leaving the components alone, and shows in photolithographic alignment equipment that it destroys the value of established firms' architectural knowledge, embedded in their structure and routines, in ways hard to see and correct.
Aghion, Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Econometrica 60(2), 323. doi
Builds growth on creative destruction, each innovation making the last obsolete: the prospect of more research tomorrow shortens the life of rents and can deter research today, business stealing can make laissez-faire growth excessive, and log output follows a random walk with drift.
Aghion, Howitt (1994). Growth and Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 477-494. doi
Models unemployment when growth comes from new technologies that require workers to move: faster growth raises the payoff to creating jobs, a capitalization effect, but shortens job matches and raises separations, a creative destruction effect, so growth can raise or lower long-run unemployment.
Christensen, Bower (1996). Customer Power, Strategic Investment, and the Failure of Leading Firms. Strategic Management Journal 17(3), 197-218. doi
From the disk drive industry, shows that established firms led in every technology their existing customers wanted, even radical ones, but failed with simpler technologies first useful only in emerging markets, because resources follow powerful customers; as performance outran demand, those technologies invaded the mainstream.
Bartelsman, Doms (2000). Understanding Productivity: Lessons from Longitudinal Microdata. Journal of Economic Literature 38(3), 569-594. doi · Read a free copy
Reviews research on longitudinal microdata: wide and persistent productivity dispersion across firms and plants, the consequences of entry, exit and reallocation for aggregate growth, and correlates such as managerial ability, technology use, human capital and regulation, with causality still unsettled.
Aghion, Harris, Howitt, Vickers (2001). Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation. Review of Economic Studies 68(3), 467-492. doi · Read a free copy
In a growth model where laggards must catch up step by step before contending for the lead, more product market competition usually raises growth because firms running neck and neck innovate to escape it; a little imitation helps growth, too much harms it.
Foster, Haltiwanger, Krizan (2001). Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence. New Developments in Productivity Analysis, 303-372. doi
Compares studies of how much reallocation across plants and firms, including entry and exit, contributes to aggregate productivity growth, finds the estimates vary with country, sector, period, frequency and method, and reexamines the question with US manufacturing and service establishment data.
Klette, Kortum (2004). Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation. Journal of Political Economy 112(5), 986-1018. doi
Models heterogeneous firms that win product lines through innovation and lose them to rivals, with entry and exit, and accounts for persistent R&D, its concentration among incumbents, the link from R&D to patents, and why R&D intensity tracks productivity but not firm size or growth.
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2005). Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), 701-728. doi
Finds an inverted U between product market competition and innovation in panel data and explains it: competition discourages laggards but spurs firms running neck and neck to innovate; as predicted, the leader-follower gap widens with competition and the curve is steeper where industries are neck and neck.
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, Prantl (2009). The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity. Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1), 20-32. doi
Using UK microdata and European and UK policy reforms, finds that the threat of technologically advanced entry raises incumbents' innovation and productivity growth in industries near the technology frontier, where innovating lets them survive, and discourages it in laggard industries.
Syverson (2011). What Determines Productivity? Journal of Economic Literature 49(2), 326-365. doi
Surveys why businesses differ so much and so persistently in measured productivity, a 90th-percentile US manufacturing plant producing about 1.92 times the 10th-percentile plant from the same inputs, and finds causes both within producers' control and in their operating environment, such as competition and regulation.
Aghion, Akcigit, Howitt (2014). What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian Growth Theory? Handbook of Economic Growth, 515-563. doi
Surveys Schumpeterian growth theory on four questions: competition and market structure, firm dynamics, growth institutions suited to a country's stage of development, and long technological waves, showing where its predictions differ from other growth models and can be tested on micro data.
Bloom, Draca, Van Reenen (2016). Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity. The Review of Economic Studies 83(1), 87-117. doi
Finds that Chinese import competition raised patenting, IT and TFP within the most exposed European firms from 1996 to 2007 and shifted employment toward more technologically advanced firms, together about 14 percent of European technology upgrading over 2000 to 2007, while reducing employment and the unskilled share.
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, Stoffman (2017). Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), 665-712. doi
Measures each patent's private value from the stock market's response to news of its grant, for US firms from 1926 to 2010; the values track future citations, are associated with growth, reallocation and creative destruction, and in aggregate account for sizable medium-run swings in growth and TFP.
Akcigit, Kerr (2018). Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations. Journal of Political Economy 126(4), 1374-1443. doi · Read a free copy
Models multiproduct incumbents improving their own products while entrants and incumbents acquire new product lines, quantifies the model with Census Bureau and patent data on US firms, and finds internal innovation scales moderately faster with firm size than external innovation.
Garcia-Macia, Hsieh, Klenow (2019). How Destructive Is Innovation? Econometrica 87(5), 1507-1541. doi
Using all US nonfarm private businesses from 1983 to 2013, infers that most productivity growth comes from incumbents improving their own products, with creative destruction around a quarter of growth, because job creation and destruction have thinner tails than a dominant role for creative destruction implies.
Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, Shu (2020). Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from US Patents. American Economic Review: Insights 2(3), 357-374. doi · Read a free copy
Using three decades of US patents matched to their corporate owners, finds that rising import competition from China reduced sales, profitability and R&D and lowered patenting in exposed US manufacturing, most among initially less profitable and less capital-intensive firms.
Akcigit, Ates (2021). Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(1), 257-298. doi
Reviews ten facts on declining US business dynamism and proposes a model of endogenous markups, innovation and competition in which a decline in knowledge diffusion from frontier firms to laggards can account for the trends together.
Cunningham, Ederer, Ma (2021). Killer Acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy 129(3), 649-702. doi
Shows that incumbents may buy innovative targets to discontinue projects that overlap their own products: in pharmaceuticals such projects are less likely to be developed after acquisition, about 5.3 to 7.4 percent of acquisitions fit the pattern, and they cluster just below antitrust thresholds.

General purpose technologies and the long wait for their payoff

Devine (1983). From Shafts to Wires: Historical Perspective on Electrification. The Journal of Economic History 43(2), 347-372. doi
Recounts how US manufacturing moved between 1880 and 1930 from water and steam power distributed by shafts and belts to electric motors driving individual machines, and argues that the larger gain was not the energy saved but more output per unit of capital and labor.
Bresnahan, Trajtenberg (1995). General purpose technologies 'Engines of growth'? Journal of Econometrics 65(1), 83-108. doi · Read a free copy
Defines general purpose technologies, such as the steam engine, the electric motor and semiconductors, by pervasiveness, potential for improvement and innovational complementarities with their users, and shows that arm's-length dealings between a GPT and its users deliver less innovation, and later, than the economy could get.
Trajtenberg, Henderson, Jaffe (1997). University Versus Corporate Patents: A Window On The Basicness Of Invention. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 5(1), 19-50. doi
Proposes patent citation measures of how basic and how appropriable inventions are: forward measures of importance and generality, the spread of later citing patents across fields, run higher for university patents, while citations from the same inventor, a sign of appropriability, run higher for corporate ones.
Jovanovic, Rousseau (2005). General Purpose Technologies. Handbook of Economic Growth, 1181-1224. doi
Compares electricity, from 1894 to 1930, and information technology, from 1971, as general purpose technologies in the US: productivity growth was slow at the start of both, both spread widely and improved, IT's price fell much faster while electricity spread faster, and both brought entry, exit and mergers.
David, Wright (2006). General Purpose Technologies and Surges in Productivity: Historical Reflections on the Future of the ICT Revolution. The Economic Future in Historical Perspective. doi
Relates the diffusion of general purpose technologies to surges in productivity through US industrial electrification, compared with Britain and Japan, and draws analogies and contrasts between the electric dynamo and information and communications technology.
Atkeson, Kehoe (2007). Modeling the Transition to a New Economy: Lessons from Two Technological Revolutions. American Economic Review 97(1), 64-88. doi
Builds a quantitative model of diffusion and growth after a technological revolution, with plant learning calibrated to the life cycle of US manufacturing plants, that matches the transition after electrification, and finds such slow transitions recur only when much knowledge about the old technology exists beforehand.
Comin, Hobijn (2010). An Exploration of Technology Diffusion. American Economic Review 100(5), 2031-2059. doi
Estimates adoption lags for 15 technologies in 166 countries over two centuries: countries adopted technologies on average 45 years after their invention, newer technologies faster than old ones, and differences in adoption account for at least a quarter of cross-country differences in income per person.

Complements and measurement: organization, intangible capital and the productivity statistics

Brynjolfsson (1993). The productivity paradox of information technology. Communications of the ACM 36(12), 66-77. doi
Reviews why computing power that grew more than a hundredfold after 1970 left little mark on measured productivity, and sorts the explanations into four: mismeasurement of outputs and inputs, lags from learning and adjustment, redistribution and dissipation of profits, and mismanagement of information and technology.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (1995). Information Technology As A Factor Of Production: The Role Of Differences Among Firms. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 3(3-4), 183-200. doi
Extends firm-level production functions for information technology with firm effects and a translog form and finds that firm differences may account for up to half the productivity benefits imputed to IT, while its elasticity stays positive and significant.
Milgrom, Roberts (1995). Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19(2-3), 179-208. doi · Read a free copy
Summarizes the theory of supermodular optimization and games as a framework for systems of complementary practices, and applies it to the shift to modern manufacturing and to the strategy and structure of the Lincoln Electric Company.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (1996). Paradox Lost? Firm-Level Evidence on the Returns to Information Systems Spending. Management Science 42(4), 541-558. doi · Read a free copy
Using data on 367 large firms from 1987 to 1991, finds that information systems spending made a substantial contribution to output: the gross marginal product of computer capital averaged 81 percent, at least that of other capital, and the paradox had disappeared by 1991 in this sample.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2000). Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4), 23-48. doi
Draws on case studies and firm-level evidence to argue that organizational investments largely determine the value of IT investments, that IT's benefits are often intangible and hard to measure, and that the late-1990s productivity revival partly reflects intangible capital accumulated earlier.
Oliner, Sichel (2000). The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story? Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4), 3-22. doi
Finds that greater use of information technology capital and faster efficiency gains in making computers account for about two-thirds of the speedup in US labor productivity growth between the first and second halves of the 1990s.
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2002). Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 339-376. doi · Read a free copy
Finds firm-level complementarities among information technology, workplace reorganization and new products and services, in both productivity and factor demand: adopting firms use more skilled labor, and IT's effect on labor demand is larger when it comes with specific organizational changes.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, Yang (2002). Intangible Assets: Computers and Organizational Capital. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2002(1), 137-198. doi
Using 1,216 large firms over 1987 to 1997, finds each dollar invested in computers associated with over ten dollars of market value, against just over one for other tangible assets, and ties the excess to a cluster of organizational practices that raise both market value and later output.
Stiroh (2002). Information Technology and the U.S. Productivity Revival: What Do the Industry Data Say? American Economic Review 92(5), 1559-1576. doi
Using US industry data, finds the late-1990s productivity revival broad-based, with the most IT-intensive industries showing significantly larger gains and nearly all of the aggregate acceleration coming from industries that produce or heavily use information technology.
Basu, Fernald, Oulton, Srinivasan (2003). The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth, or Does Information Technology Explain Why Productivity Accelerated in the United States but Not in the United Kingdom? NBER Macroeconomics Annual 18, 9-63. doi
Argues that if information technology needs unmeasured complementary investment, measured TFP should rise with past IT capital and may fall while the investment is made; US industry data fit this, with the post-1995 acceleration concentrated in IT-using industries, and UK data show a related pattern.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt (2003). Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4), 793-808. doi
For 527 large US firms from 1987 to 1994, finds computerization's contribution to productivity and output growth normal over one year but up to five times greater over five to seven years, consistent with large, slow complementary investments such as organizational capital that conventional measures omit.
Brynjolfsson, Hu, Smith (2003). Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers. Management Science 49(11), 1580-1596. doi
Estimates that the greater variety offered by online bookstores, with Amazon listing more than 23 times the titles of a typical Barnes and Noble superstore, raised consumer welfare by 731 million to 1.03 billion dollars in 2000, seven to ten times the gain from lower prices.
Bartel, Ichniowski, Shaw (2007). How Does Information Technology Affect Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and Worker Skills. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4), 1721-1758. doi
In valve manufacturing plants, finds that new IT-enhanced equipment cut setup, run and inspection times, moved plants toward customized products, and came with higher technical and problem-solving skill requirements and new human resource practices.
Corrado, Hulten, Sichel (2009). Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth. Review of Income and Wealth 55(3), 661-685. doi
Estimates that US published data left out as much as 800 billion dollars of intangible investment in 2003 and more than 3 trillion dollars of business intangible capital; counting it speeds measured growth in output per worker and makes capital deepening, not multifactor productivity, the dominant source.
Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen (2012). Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle. American Economic Review 102(1), 167-201. doi
Finds that US multinationals operating in Europe obtained more productivity from IT than other multinationals, as did establishments they took over, and traces the advantage mainly to tougher people management practices, in the sectors behind the US productivity acceleration after 1995.
Brynjolfsson, Milgrom (2013). Complementarity in Organizations. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, 11-55. doi
Defines complementarity, a formal cousin of synergy, and uses it to explain why organizational practices come in clusters, how they fit a business strategy and why organizations differ, with frequent technology change, flexibly trained workers and worker discretion as a cluster that travels together.
Brynjolfsson, McElheran (2016). The Rapid Adoption of Data-Driven Decision-Making. American Economic Review 106(5), 133-139. doi · Read a free copy
Using Census Bureau data on a large sample of US manufacturing plants, finds that data-driven decision making nearly tripled, from 11 to 30 percent, between 2005 and 2010, with adoption more likely in larger plants and those with complements such as information technology and educated workers.
Byrne, Fernald, Reinsdorf (2016). Does the United States Have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement Problem? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2016(1), 109-182. doi
Finds little evidence that the US productivity slowdown after 2004 comes from growing mismeasurement of information technology: correcting hardware prices makes the slowdown in labor productivity worse, and the gains from free digital services are largely nonmarket and too small to offset it.
Syverson (2017). Challenges to Mismeasurement Explanations for the US Productivity Slowdown. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(2), 165-186. doi
Challenges the view that the US productivity slowdown since 2004 is largely mismeasurement: it occurred in dozens of countries regardless of their use of information technology, and estimated surplus from digital goods falls far short of the 3 trillion dollars or more of missing output.
Brynjolfsson, Collis, Eggers (2019). Using massive online choice experiments to measure changes in well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116(15), 7250-7255. doi
Proposes measuring the consumer welfare from digital goods with massive online choice experiments and finds large gains missing from GDP because many such goods have a zero price: the median Facebook user needed about 48 dollars to give it up for a month.
Brynjolfsson, Rock, Syverson (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox: A Clash of Expectations and Statistics. The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, 23-60. doi
Weighs four explanations for the clash between AI's promise and slowing measured productivity, namely false hopes, mismeasurement, redistribution and implementation lags, and argues lags matter most: like other general purpose technologies, AI pays only after complementary investments that behave as intangible capital.
Brynjolfsson, Rock, Syverson (2021). The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(1), 333-372. doi · Read a free copy
Shows how poorly measured intangible investment complementing a general purpose technology makes measured productivity growth too low in its early years and too high later, a productivity J-curve; adjusting US data for intangibles tied to computer hardware and software puts TFP 15.9 percent above official measures by 2017.

Artificial intelligence at work: tasks, exposure and who gains

Hulten (1978). Growth Accounting with Intermediate Inputs. The Review of Economic Studies 45(3), 511-518. doi
Shows that aggregate productivity growth equals each sector's productivity growth weighted by its gross output over aggregate final demand, essentially Domar's rule, with weights that sum to more than one when sectors supply one another; the result behind task-based estimates of AI's economy-wide effect.
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell (2017). What can machine learning do? Workforce implications. Science 358(6370), 1530-1534. doi
Sets out eight criteria that make a task suitable for machine learning, among them well-defined inputs and outputs, large digital data sets, clear feedback and tolerance for error, and argues that since most jobs mix suitable and unsuitable tasks, the effects are more complex than replacement.
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, Rock (2018). What Can Machines Learn and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 43-47. doi · Read a free copy
Applies a rubric of suitability for machine learning to 18,156 O*NET tasks and finds that machine learning affects different occupations than earlier automation, that most occupations include some suitable tasks, that few are fully automatable, and that realizing its potential usually requires redesigning jobs.
Webb (2019). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Labor Market. Working paper, SSRN 3482150. doi
Measures tasks' exposure to a technology by the overlap between task descriptions and patent texts, validates it on software and robots, whose exposed occupations lost employment and wages, and predicts that AI, aimed at high-skilled tasks, will reduce 90:10 wage inequality without affecting the top 1 percent.
Felten, Raj, Seamans (2021). Occupational, industry, and geographic exposure to artificial intelligence: A novel dataset and its potential uses. Strategic Management Journal 42(12), 2195-2217. doi
Creates and validates a measure of each occupation's exposure to artificial intelligence, the AI Occupational Exposure, builds industry and county measures from it, and describes how to construct firm-level measures.
Brynjolfsson (2022). The Turing Trap: The Promise & Peril of Human-Like Artificial Intelligence. Daedalus 151(2), 272-287. doi
Argues that a focus on human-like AI risks a trap: as machines become better substitutes for workers, workers lose bargaining power, whereas AI that augments people creates new capabilities, products and more value, and current incentives favor automation over augmentation.
Dell'Acqua, McFowland III, Mollick and others (2023). Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier: Field Experimental Evidence of the Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Knowledge Worker Productivity and Quality. Working paper, SSRN 4573321. doi
In a preregistered experiment with 758 consultants, those given GPT-4 completed 12.2 percent more tasks inside the frontier of AI capabilities, 25.1 percent faster and at higher quality, but on a task chosen to lie outside it were 19 percentage points less likely to be correct (84.5 percent correct without AI, about 65 percent with it).
Noy, Zhang (2023). Experimental evidence on the productivity effects of generative artificial intelligence. Science 381(6654), 187-192. doi
In a preregistered experiment with 453 college-educated professionals doing occupation-specific writing tasks, access to ChatGPT cut the time taken by 40 percent, raised output quality by 18 percent and reduced inequality between workers.
Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin, Rock (2024). GPTs are GPTs: Labor market impact potential of LLMs. Science 384(6702), 1306-1308. doi
Rates the relevance of large language models to the tasks in US occupations, with human raters and with GPT-4, and estimates that about 1.8 percent of jobs could have over half their tasks affected by the models alone, rising to just over 46 percent with complementary software.
McElheran, Li, Brynjolfsson, Kroff, Dinlersoz, Foster, Zolas (2024). AI adoption in America: Who, what, and where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 33(2), 375-415. doi
From the 2018 Annual Business Survey of 850,000 US firms, finds that fewer than 6 percent used any of five AI-related technologies, just over 18 percent weighted by employment, with use concentrated in very large firms, young high-growth startups and a handful of superstar cities.
Otis, Clarke, Delecourt, Holtz, Koning (2024). The Uneven Impact of Generative AI on Entrepreneurial Performance. Working paper, SSRN 4671369. doi
In a field experiment giving Kenyan entrepreneurs a GPT-4 business assistant, finds no detectable average effect on revenues or profits, but initially high performers may have gained over 15 percent while low performers did nearly 10 percent worse, depending on which advice they chose to act on.
Acemoglu (2025). The simple macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy 40(121), 13-58. doi
Applies a version of Hulten's theorem to a task-based model, so aggregate gains equal the share of tasks affected times average task-level cost savings, and finds no more than a 0.66 percent rise in TFP over ten years, under 0.53 percent once hard-to-learn tasks are allowed for.
Brynjolfsson, Li, Raymond (2025). Generative AI at Work. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 140(2), 889-942. doi
Studies the staggered rollout of a generative AI assistant to 5,172 customer-support agents: issues resolved per hour rose 15 percent on average, less experienced and lower-skilled agents improved in both speed and quality, and the most experienced gained a little speed and lost a little quality.

Automation and displacement: jobs, wages and new work

Autor, Levy, Murnane (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1279-1333. doi
Argues that computers substitute for workers in routine cognitive and manual tasks that follow explicit rules and complement nonroutine problem solving and complex communication, and finds that computerization explains about 60 percent of the shift in demand toward college labor from 1970 to 1998.
Autor, Dorn (2013). The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market. American Economic Review 103(5), 1553-1597. doi · Read a free copy
Explains the growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization of US employment and wages from 1980 to 2005 by the falling cost of automating routine tasks: local labor markets specialized in routine work adopted IT, moved low-skill labor into services and saw earnings grow at both tails.
Goos, Manning, Salomons (2014). Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring. American Economic Review 104(8), 2509-2526. doi · Read a free copy
Documents job polarization in 16 Western European countries from 1993 to 2010 and explains much of it, both within and between industries, with routine-biased technological change and offshoring.
Autor (2015). Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(3), 3-30. doi
Explains why automation has not eliminated most jobs: it substitutes for labor but also complements it, raises output and so demand for labor, and interacts with labor supply; computers take routine, codifiable tasks while amplifying workers' problem solving, adaptability and creativity.
Mokyr, Vickers, Ziebarth (2015). The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different? Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(3), 31-50. doi
Reviews three anxieties about technology from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, that machines will replace workers and widen inequality, that work or its loss will dehumanize, and that the great inventions are behind us, and compares them with their present forms.
Arntz, Gregory, Zierahn (2017). Revisiting the risk of automation. Economics Letters 159, 157-160. doi
Shows that estimates putting up to half of jobs at risk of automation overstate it by ignoring the variety of tasks within occupations and the adaptability of jobs; with task-level data the share of US jobs at high risk falls from 38 to 9 percent.
Frey, Osborne (2017). The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Technological Forecasting and Social Change 114, 254-280. doi
Estimates the probability of computerization for 702 detailed US occupations with a Gaussian process classifier and examines how many jobs are at risk and how an occupation's risk relates to its wages and educational attainment.
Acemoglu, Restrepo (2018). The Race between Man and Machine: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment. American Economic Review 108(6), 1488-1542. doi
Models automation of existing tasks alongside the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage: automation lowers employment and the labor share while new tasks raise them, and because automation makes labor cheaper it encourages new tasks, which can keep growth balanced.
Acemoglu, Restrepo (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(2), 3-30. doi
Shows that automation displaces labor from tasks and always lowers the labor share while new tasks reinstate it, infers both from industry data, and attributes slower US employment growth over three decades to faster displacement, weaker reinstatement and slower productivity growth.
Acemoglu, Restrepo (2020). Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets. Journal of Political Economy 128(6), 2188-2244. doi
Estimates across US commuting zones that one more industrial robot per thousand workers reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42 percent, with no differential trends before 1990 in the most exposed areas.

The digital economy: firm size, networks, information goods and search costs

Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani, Kambil (1994). Does Information Technology Lead to Smaller Firms? Management Science 40(12), 1628-1644. doi
Using US industry data on IT capital and four measures of firm size, finds that investment in information technology is associated with later decreases in average firm size, most pronounced two to three years after the investment.
Brynjolfsson, Kemerer (1996). Network Externalities in Microcomputer Software: An Econometric Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market. Management Science 42(12), 1627-1647. doi · Read a free copy
Estimates hedonic prices for spreadsheet software from 1987 to 1992: a 1 percent larger installed base went with a 0.75 percent higher price, products following the dominant Lotus standard sold for 46 percent more, and quality-adjusted prices fell 16 percent a year.
Bakos, Brynjolfsson (1999). Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency. Management Science 45(12), 1613-1630. doi
Shows that bundling large numbers of unrelated information goods for one price can be surprisingly profitable, because the law of large numbers makes valuations of a bundle easier to predict than of single goods; the result does not carry to most physical goods, whose marginal costs negate it.
Brynjolfsson, Smith (2000). Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers. Management Science 46(4), 563-585. doi
Comparing book and CD prices at 41 Internet and conventional outlets over 15 months, finds Internet prices 9 to 16 percent lower and adjusted in far smaller steps, but substantial price dispersion among Internet retailers, so branding, awareness and trust still matter online.
Brynjolfsson, Hu, Simester (2011). Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello Long Tail: The Effect of Search Costs on the Concentration of Product Sales. Management Science 57(8), 1373-1386. doi · Read a free copy
Using a multichannel retailer's data, finds sales less concentrated in its Internet channel than in its traditional channel even with identical products and prices, and links the longer tail to customers' use of search and recommendation tools, that is, to lower search costs.
Aral, Brynjolfsson, Van Alstyne (2012). Information, Technology, and Information Worker Productivity. Information Systems Research 23(3-part-2), 849-867. doi
Studies recruiters at an executive search firm through 125,000 emails and 1,300 projects and finds that multitasking raises output with diminishing returns, and that contacts with diverse knowledge make recruiters more productive when they juggle varied projects.

Profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities

The research behind two entries in the Library's family Innovation, productivity and displacement, on who keeps the profit an innovation creates and on whether a company can rebuild its advantage when its market shifts: 30 papers by David Teece and his coauthors, with the studies that tested those ideas and the debate over dynamic capabilities. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Profiting from innovation: appropriability, dominant designs and complementary assets

Teece (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15(6), 285-305. doi
Explains why innovators often fail to profit while customers, imitators and others gain: when imitation is easy, the profits can go to owners of complementary assets such as manufacturing and distribution, so an innovator may need a prior position in them, and some innovators are bound to fail.
Teece (1998). Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The New Economy, Markets for Know-How, and Intangible Assets. California Management Review 40(3), 55-79. doi
Argues that liberalized markets and new markets for intermediate products are stripping competitive advantage back to its core, intangible assets that are hard to create and hard to imitate, and draws out what that means for managing intellectual capital inside firms.
Teece (2006). Reflections on "Profiting from Innovation". Research Policy 35(8), 1131-1146. doi
Looks back two decades at the profiting from innovation framework, reviews its foundations and the work that extended it, links it to the strategy literature on resources and dynamic capabilities, and outlines a Schumpeterian theory of the firm and a framework for planning technology commercialization.
Pisano, Teece (2007). How to Capture Value from Innovation: Shaping Intellectual Property and Industry Architecture. California Management Review 50(1), 278-296. doi
Argues that managers need not take the appropriability regime and their industry's architecture as given, and shows how even small firms can shape both, by putting information in the public domain, helping set standards and promoting modularity, to keep others from tapping the profit stream.
Teece (2018). Profiting from innovation in the digital economy: Enabling technologies, standards, and licensing models in the wireless world. Research Policy 47(8), 1367-1387. doi
Extends the framework to platforms and enabling technologies: an innovator whose technology serves many downstream industries cannot own all the complements, some complements are needed for the technology to work at all, and coordination problems leave private returns below social returns, so research is underfunded.
Gambardella, Heaton, Novelli, Teece (2021). Profiting from Enabling Technologies? Strategy Science 6(1), 75-90. doi
Revises the profiting from innovation framework for enabling technologies, those applicable across many domains, presents evidence that profiting from them differs from profiting from narrower discrete technologies, and argues that the share of the benefits the innovator can capture is likely to be smaller still.

Evidence on who captures the returns from innovation

Mansfield (1985). How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out? The Journal of Industrial Economics 34(2), 217. doi
Using data from 100 American firms, finds that a firm's development decisions are generally known to rivals within about 12 to 18 months, and that the detailed nature and operation of a new product or process generally leaks out within about a year.
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter (1987). Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987(3), 783. doi · Read a free copy
Surveying 650 R&D executives in 130 lines of business, finds lead time, learning curves and sales or service efforts rated more effective than patents for protecting new products, secrecy rated above patents for processes, and product patents rated highly effective in few industries, drugs among them.
Suárez, Utterback (1995). Dominant designs and the survival of firms. Strategic Management Journal 16(6), 415-430. doi
Applies survival analysis to six industries to test whether the evolution of the technology an industry rests on, including the emergence of a dominant design, shapes which firms survive, and finds that treating technology as a dynamic and strategic variable improves the account of firms' survival.
Tripsas (1997). Unraveling the Process of Creative Destruction: Complementary Assets and Incumbent Survival in the Typesetter Industry. Strategic Management Journal 18(S1), 119-142. doi
From the typesetter industry's history between 1886 and 1990, finds that whether incumbents or entrants prevail through radical technical change turns on investment, technical capability and specialized complementary assets together, and that those assets buffered incumbents when their technical competence was destroyed.
Gans, Stern (2003). The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy 32(2), 333-350. doi
Offers a framework for the commercialization strategy of technology start-ups, in which whether they compete with established firms or cooperate with them, reinforcing existing market power, depends on whether a market for ideas exists, and examines what such markets require and how they work.
Arora, Ceccagnoli (2006). Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing. Management Science 52(2), 293-308. doi
Using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of US industrial R&D, finds that more effective patent protection raises licensing only for firms that lack the specialized complementary assets needed to commercialize a technology; for firms that have them, it raises patenting and lowers licensing.

Know-how, scope and the boundaries of the firm

Teece (1977). Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of Transferring Technological Know-How. The Economic Journal 87(346), 242. doi
Measures the resources it takes to transfer a manufacturing technology from plants in one country to plants in another and examines what drives that cost; across 26 projects in chemicals, petroleum refining and machinery, transfer averaged 19 percent of total project costs.
Teece (1980). Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1(3), 223-247. doi
Extends Williamson's transaction cost account of vertical integration to diversification, arguing that economies of scope alone do not call for a multiproduct firm, which becomes the efficient form when the shared input is proprietary know-how or a specialized, indivisible asset, with the US petroleum industry as the case.
Monteverde, Teece (1982). Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry. The Bell Journal of Economics 13(1), 206. doi
Tests a transaction cost theory of vertical integration on data from the US automobile industry, refined to include the cost of transferring industrial know-how, and finds that the development and deepening of specialized skills help set where efficient boundaries between making and buying lie.
Teece (1982). Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3(1), 39-63. doi
Outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm in which firms diversify to avoid the high transaction costs of trading the services of specialized assets, notably organizational knowledge that is fungible and tacit, through markets, and finds neoclassical explanations of diversification seriously deficient.
Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, Winter (1994). Understanding corporate coherence: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 23(1), 1-30. doi
Shows that as US manufacturing firms grow more diverse they keep a constant level of coherence between neighboring activities, contrary to the idea that firms with many activities are incoherent, and explains coherent diversification by enterprise learning, path dependence and the selection environment.
Teece (2003). Expert talent and the design of (professional services) firms. Industrial and Corporate Change 12(4), 895-916. doi
Discusses the expert services firm, a professional firm whose main product is the delivery of expert services, and argues that the growing importance of expert talent changes the employment relation inside such firms and makes the professional services firm a distinct organizational form.

Dynamic capabilities and business models

Teece, Pisano, Shuen (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 18(7), 509-533. doi
Proposes the dynamic capabilities framework: where technology changes fast, advantage rests on distinctive processes shaped by a firm's asset positions and history, lasts while demand holds and imitation stays hard, and depends more on finding new opportunities and organizing to embrace them than on moves against rivals.
Teece (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal 28(13), 1319-1350. doi
Specifies the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities, the skills, processes, structures, decision rules and disciplines behind an enterprise's capacity to sense opportunities, seize them and reconfigure its assets, and argues that firms strong in them both adapt to their business ecosystems and shape them.
Teece (2010). Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation. Long Range Planning 43(2-3), 172-194. doi
Defines a business model as the design by which a firm delivers value to customers, entices them to pay and turns those payments into profit, a hypothesis about what customers want and how to meet it profitably, and relates business models to strategy, innovation management and economic theory.
Teece (2012). Dynamic Capabilities: Routines versus Entrepreneurial Action. Journal of Management Studies 49(8), 1395-1401. doi
Argues that some dynamic capabilities rest on the skills and knowledge of one or a few executives rather than on organizational routines, that entrepreneurial management is needed to sustain superior performance, and uses Apple's record with and without Steve Jobs as an illustration.
Teece (2014). The Foundations of Enterprise Performance: Dynamic and Ordinary Capabilities in an (Economic) Theory of Firms. Academy of Management Perspectives 28(4), 328-352. doi
Restates the dynamic capabilities framework and adds what the literature had left out or poorly integrated, the entrepreneurial manager, resources, strategy and the distinction between ordinary and dynamic capabilities, offering it as a multidisciplinary account of long-run enterprise performance.
Teece, Peteraf, Leih (2016). Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Agility: Risk, Uncertainty, and Strategy in the Innovation Economy. California Management Review 58(4), 13-35. doi
Argues that organizational agility is costly and not always necessary, separates deep uncertainty, common in the innovation economy, from risk that traditional tools can manage, and explains how strong dynamic capabilities let managers calibrate how much agility they need and deliver it at reasonable cost.
Teece (2018). Business models and dynamic capabilities. Long Range Planning 51(1), 40-49. doi · Read a free copy
Argues that business models, dynamic capabilities and strategy are interdependent: strong dynamic capabilities improve business model design, while a business model, through organization design, shapes a firm's capabilities and bounds the strategies open to it, and calls for empirical work on business model change.

The debate over dynamic capabilities

Helfat (1997). Know-how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability accumulation: the case of R&D. Strategic Management Journal 18(5), 339-360. doi
Studying the US petroleum industry in the 1970s and early 1980s, finds that as oil prices rose, firms with more complementary technological knowledge and physical assets undertook more research on coal conversion, a synthetic fuels process.
Eisenhardt, Martin (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic Management Journal 21(10-11), 1105-1121. doi
Argues that dynamic capabilities are specific, identifiable processes such as product development, strategic decision making and alliancing, with features common across firms, detailed and stable in moderately dynamic markets but simple, experiential and fragile in high-velocity ones, where resource-based reasoning reaches a boundary.
Adner, Helfat (2003). Corporate effects and dynamic managerial capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 24(10), 1011-1025. doi
Finds that within a single industry, where managers face the same external environment, time-varying corporate effects tied to corporate-level managerial decisions are statistically significant, and introduces dynamic managerial capabilities to explain why decisions and performance diverge as conditions change.
Winter (2003). Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 24(10), 991-995. doi · Read a free copy
Defines ordinary capabilities as those that let a firm make a living now and dynamic capabilities as those that extend, modify or create them, and argues that change can also come through ad hoc problem solving, so whether dynamic capabilities are built depends on their costs and benefits.
Arend, Bromiley (2009). Assessing the dynamic capabilities view: spare change, everyone? Strategic Organization 7(1), 75-90. doi
Assesses the dynamic capabilities view for logical consistency, conceptual clarity and empirical rigor and finds four major problems: unclear value added over existing concepts, the lack of a coherent theoretical foundation, weak empirical support and unclear practical implications.

R&D races and catching up

The research behind one entry in the Library's family Innovation, productivity and displacement, on how much of a technological lead survives the chase its value provokes: 8 papers, the patent-race models from Loury (1979) to Harris and Vickers (1987) and the survey that gathers them, which Vista Inquiry No. 12 reduced to the catch-up arch. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Market structure and the pace of R&D

Loury (1979). Market Structure and Innovation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(3), 395. doi
Identical firms invest under uncertainty for a prize won by the first to innovate: more rivals lower each firm's investment, yet each invests more than is socially optimal and entry runs past the optimal number, a common-pool failure that licensing fees and finite patent life can correct.
Lee, Wilde (1980). Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94(2), 429. doi
Recasts Loury's race with R&D as a variable cost rather than a fixed commitment, and finds the effect of rivalry on a firm's investment reversed: when variable costs matter more than fixed ones, more rivals raise each firm's equilibrium R&D; the welfare conclusions match Loury's.
Reinganum (1982). A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior. Econometrica 50(3), 671. doi
Builds a differential game of R&D among n identical firms facing uncertain discovery, a long development period, the risk a rival innovates first and the risk of imitation: perfect patent protection speeds development, and with it more rivals mean more R&D effort, while rewarded imitation can reverse that.

Races: head starts, preemption, leapfrogging and the leader's effort

Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, Tirole (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races. European Economic Review 22(1), 3-31. doi
Asks when a patent race stays competitive and when it degenerates into monopoly: a firm with an arbitrarily small head start can preempt its rivals unless a firm behind in expected time to discovery can leapfrog, which a multi-stage R&D process or imperfect monitoring of rivals' investment allows.
Harris, Vickers (1985). Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race. The Review of Economic Studies 52(2), 193. doi
In a two-player race for an indivisible prize the winner often behaves as if alone, affected by competition at most in the first stage; relative valuations, discount rates, efficiency and starting distances decide who wins, so the potential competition an incumbent monopolist faces may matter little.
Grossman, Shapiro (1987). Dynamic R&D Competition. The Economic Journal 97(386), 372. doi
In a two-stage stochastic patent race between two firms, the leader does R&D more intensively than the follower and both intensify their efforts if the follower catches up; also weighs licensing by the leader, patents on intermediate research results and research joint ventures that coordinate initial efforts.
Harris, Vickers (1987). Racing with Uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies 54(1), 1. doi
Combines technological uncertainty with strategic interaction as a race unfolds, which earlier models had separated, and finds in a one-dimensional race that the leader makes greater efforts than the follower and that efforts rise as the gap narrows, results that hold under conditions in a two-dimensional race.

The timing of innovation, surveyed

Reinganum (1989). The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 849-908. doi
Surveys the timing of innovation: in symmetric races aggregate R&D is typically too high, too many firms investing too much, an over-grazing of the commons; in asymmetric races, all else equal, a small head start wins a deterministic race and a lucky laggard can win an uncertain one.

Mechanism design and institutions (Roger Myerson)

Roger Myerson's work beyond the auction and bilateral-trade papers already in the core list, with three studies of honest reporting in practice: 11 papers on the revelation principle, on why a ruler needs checks before anyone will trust him, on how voting rules shape what candidates promise, on dividing value among people who can only cooperate along a network, and on forecast bonuses and the ratchet. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Mechanism design and the revelation principle

Myerson (1979). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47(1), 61. doi
Shows that, for group decisions where each person holds private information, the outcomes reachable by mechanisms in which truthful reporting is optimal include the equilibrium outcomes of every other mechanism, and defines a bargaining solution on that set; an early statement of the revelation principle.
Baron, Myerson (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica 50(4), 911. doi
Derives the best regulation of a monopolist whose costs the regulator cannot see: prices and subsidies are set from the firm's own cost report, so that the firm never makes a loss and never gains by misreporting; the buying side of a screening menu.
Myerson (1982). Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 67-81. doi
Formulates the general principal-agent problem, in which those who work for a principal both know things the principal cannot observe and take actions the principal cannot control, and shows by the revelation principle that the best coordination mechanism can be found by linear programming.

Commitment, trust and the foundations of the state

Myerson (2008). The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. American Political Science Review 102(1), 125-139. doi
Treats a leader's temptation to deny debts to past supporters as the central moral-hazard problem in politics and shows that a leader free of checks can recruit only limited support, and does better with a court of supporters able to bring him down; such trust underlies every constitution.
Myerson (2009). Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict. Journal of Economic Literature 47(4), 1109-1125. doi
Reviews Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict and argues that its emphasis on information and commitment, and its analysis of games with many equilibria, stimulated non-cooperative game theory and redefined the place of economics in the social sciences.

Voting rules and electoral systems

Myerson (1993). Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review 87(4), 856-869. doi
Compares electoral systems by the incentive they give candidates to promise favors to small groups instead of appealing equally to all voters, and finds that rules guaranteeing representation for minorities in multiseat elections produce the most unequal campaign promises.
Myerson, Weber (1993). A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political Science Review 87(1), 102-114. doi
Defines a voting equilibrium, in which voters' beliefs about which candidates are serious contenders produce a result that justifies those beliefs, and shows the rule matters: plurality barely restricts the winner's position in three-candidate races, while approval voting puts the winner at the median voter.

Cooperation on networks

Myerson (1977). Graphs and Cooperation in Games. Mathematics of Operations Research 2(3), 225-229. doi
Uses graphs to describe who can cooperate with whom and proves that fair rules for dividing a game's value over such a structure are unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.

Honest reports in practice: forecast bonuses and the ratchet

Weitzman (1976). The New Soviet Incentive Model. The Bell Journal of Economics 7(1), 251. doi
Models a Soviet reform that made an enterprise manager's bonus depend on the plan target the manager proposed as well as on how far it was met, so that talking a target down no longer paid, and analyzes the scheme's basic properties.
Freixas, Guesnerie, Tirole (1985). Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect. The Review of Economic Studies 52(2), 173. doi
Shows that when a planner revises an incentive scheme using what a firm's past output revealed, and cannot commit to how, firms underproduce to avoid tougher targets, the ratchet effect, and the planner may accept a statically worse scheme to induce revelation.
Chen (2005). Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning. Management Science 51(1), 60-75. doi
Compares Gonik's forecast-linked bonus from IBM Brazil, under which an honest forecast pays best, with a menu of linear contracts when a firm plans production from its salespeople's forecasts, and finds the menu earns the firm more, because Gonik's plan cannot ask for more effort in good markets.

Estimating what cannot be seen

The research behind the Library entry How big is what we cannot see?, in the family Weighing evidence: 3 papers on estimating a hidden total from the part that leaks into view, from capture-recapture with unequal catchability to the January 2020 estimates of the Wuhan outbreak from cases found in travelers abroad. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Estimating a hidden total from what leaks into view

Chao (1987). Estimating the Population Size for Capture-Recapture Data with Unequal Catchability. Biometrics 43(4), 783. doi
Proposes a point estimate and confidence interval for the size of a closed population when individuals differ in how likely they are to be caught, and shows it works best when most of those caught were caught only once or twice, where the jackknife does poorly.
Nishiura, Jung, Linton and others (2020). The Extent of Transmission of Novel Coronavirus in Wuhan, China, 2020. Journal of Clinical Medicine 9(2), 330. doi
From thirteen exported cases reported by 24 January 2020, estimates about 5,502 cumulative cases in China when hundreds had been reported, so infections numbered in the thousands and exposures went well beyond the market first linked to the outbreak.
Wu, Leung, Leung (2020). Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study. The Lancet 395(10225), 689-697. doi
Infers the size of the Wuhan epidemic from cases exported abroad: about 75,815 infections by 25 January 2020, doubling every 6.4 days, with other large Chinese cities one to two weeks behind.

Contests, wars and the bargain behind them

The research behind the Library's family Contests, wars and the bargain behind them, which reads Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Clausewitz's On War through the formal theory that grew from them: 44 papers, on why costly contests happen when a settlement would serve both sides, what the fighting reveals, wars of attrition and exit, the division of forces across fronts (Colonel Blotto), arms races and contests, the reach of strength and the strength of the defense, leaving the other side a way out, and the value of being unpredictable. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

The classics read as models

Beyerchen (1992). Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War. International Security 17(3), 59. doi
Argues that On War treats every war as a nonlinear phenomenon whose course cannot be analytically predicted, tracing that unpredictability to interaction between the opponents, to friction and to chance, and reads Clausewitz's refusal of a predictive theory as insight rather than confusion.
Niou, Ordeshook (1994). A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Journal of Peace Research 31(2), 161-174. doi
Reads The Art of War against modern game theory and finds that Sun Tzu anticipated dominant, minmax and mixed strategies but not the full implications of equilibrium, so his advice on outguessing an opponent stays open to a more complete strategic analysis.

War as bargaining and as information

Wagner (2000). Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44(3), 469. doi
Since nearly all wars end because the parties agree to stop, argues that fighting belongs inside the bargaining that leads to a settlement rather than being an alternative to it, and shows with a model in which settlement stays possible after war starts that the usual framing misleads.
Filson, Werner (2002). A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. American Journal of Political Science 46(4), 819. doi
Lets the parties keep negotiating after war begins, with the defender's private strength revealed on the battlefield and at the table: attackers usually win the wars they start, but the longer a war lasts the likelier the attacker loses, since the weakest defenders settle early.
Kydd, Walter (2002). Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence. International Organization 56(2), 263-296. doi
Models extremist violence as a strategic play on mistrust between moderates negotiating peace, and finds that spoilers most often derail a peace process when the targeted side believes the opposing moderates are strong enough to restrain their own extremists, and more often fail when those moderates look weak.
Reiter (2003). Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1(1), 27-43. doi
Surveys the bargaining model, which treats the initiation, prosecution, termination and consequences of war as one bargaining process, applies it to each phase of war, reviews the empirical evidence, and relates it to psychological, organizational, domestic and constructivist theories.
Slantchev (2003). The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations. American Political Science Review 97(4), 621-632. doi
Models fighting and bargaining at once under private information about relative power: offers and rejections reveal more than battlefield outcomes, states use both to learn and settle before military victory, and war stops being useful once it loses its informational content.
Powell (2004). Bargaining and Learning While Fighting. American Journal of Political Science 48(2), 344-361. doi
Treats war as a costly process with a risk of military collapse rather than a single lottery, compares bargaining and learning when states are unsure of the cost of fighting or of the distribution of power, and suggests how to tell the two kinds of war apart empirically.
Smith, Stam (2004). Bargaining and the Nature of War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6), 783-813. doi
Embeds bargaining in a random-walk model of warfare that combines lottery and war-of-attrition features, and finds that disputes after long wars are less likely to turn violent and that, if one does, the costlier and longer the previous war, the shorter the next.
Powell (2006). War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization 60(1), 169-203. doi
Argues that bargaining indivisibilities are really commitment problems and that one mechanism links preventive war, preemptive attack and fights over issues that shape future bargaining power: large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war.

Attrition and exit

Maynard Smith (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology 47(1), 209-221. doi
Defines the evolutionarily stable strategy and analyzes displays, contests won by whoever persists longer: persistence should vary widely, following a negative exponential distribution, display intensity should not reveal how long a contestant will continue, and an irrelevant asymmetry can settle a contest.
Bishop, Cannings (1978). A generalized war of attrition. Journal of Theoretical Biology 70(1), 85-124. doi
Generalizes the war of attrition, in which the longer displayer wins and both pay for time, to general rewards and costs and to contests ending in injury or retreat, finding either no evolutionarily stable strategy or a unique one, sometimes a two-way split of behavior.
Ghemawat, Nalebuff (1985). Exit. The RAND Journal of Economics 16(2), 184. doi
In a declining industry where firms differ in size but share unit costs, the unique perfect equilibrium has the largest firm exit first, so survivability falls with size; strong scale economies can reverse the order, but the cost advantage required looks surprisingly large.
Fudenberg, Tirole (1986). A Theory of Exit in Duopoly. Econometrica 54(4), 943. doi
A duopoly war of attrition in which each firm knows only its own cost and grows more pessimistic about its rival's over time; since staying forever may be dominant for a low-cost firm, exit timing has a unique equilibrium, unlike the classic war of attrition.
Hendricks, Weiss, Wilson (1988). The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information. International Economic Review 29(4), 663. doi
Characterizes all Nash equilibria of the continuous-time war of attrition with complete information, asymmetric payoffs and any horizon: asymmetric pure strategy equilibria always exist, and a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria arises most readily when the horizon is infinite or the game symmetric.
Bulow, Klemperer (1999). The Generalized War of Attrition. American Economic Review 89(1), 175-189. doi
A war of attrition among N plus K firms for N prizes: in a natural oligopoly the lowest-value firms drop out at once even though values are private, while in a standard-setting contest each firm's exit time is independent of the number of rivals and of their actions.
Busse (2002). Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(2), 298. doi
Using data on 14 major airlines from 1985 to 1992, finds that carriers in worse financial condition, especially highly leveraged ones, are more likely to start price wars, and that a carrier is more likely to join one the more of its traffic is on the leader's routes.

Concentration across fronts: Colonel Blotto

Borel (1953). The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels. Econometrica 21(1), 97. doi
Defines a method of play as a complete code, finds that with three methods a random mix lets a player meet any opponent evenly but doubts this holds with more, and introduces the game of splitting a total among three numbers, won by beating the rival on two.
Roberson (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory 29(1), 1-24. doi
Two players spread forces across n battlefields, each won by the larger allocation, and the payoff is the share of battlefields won; characterizes the unique equilibrium payoffs for every symmetric and asymmetric pair of total forces and constructs new equilibrium joint distributions.
Hart (2008). Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. International Journal of Game Theory 36(3-4), 441-460. doi
Introduces and solves General Lotto games, a class of integer-valued allocation games, and uses them to analyze the discrete Colonel Blotto game, obtaining optimal strategies for every symmetric Blotto game.
Golman, Page (2009). General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch. Public Choice 138(3-4), 279-299. doi
Extends Colonel Blotto, a game of mismatching an opponent's allocation, to General Blotto games with more general payoffs and spillovers between fronts; most still lack pure strategy equilibria, but under replicator learning the added structure can make play more predictable than in the original game.
Kovenock, Roberson (2021). Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory 71(3), 997-1032. doi
Generalizes General Lotto and Colonel Blotto to battlefields valued differently across fronts and by each player, with unequal budgets, and finds that each player does better by attacking harder where its own relative valuation is lower: the best defense is a good offense.

Arms races and contests

Intriligator, Brito (1984). Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War? Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(1), 63-84. doi
In a dynamic model of missile war between two nuclear powers, shows that depending on starting and ending weapon levels an arms race can lead to peace as well as war, a disarming race to war as well as peace, and a qualitative race can promote crisis instability.
Fudenberg, Tirole (1985). Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology. The Review of Economic Studies 52(3), 383. doi
In a game of timing over adopting a new technology, the threat of preemption equalizes the rents of two rivals, though not in general oligopoly, and when the gain from preempting is small the optimal symmetric outcome of late adoption can be an equilibrium.
Hirshleifer (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63(2), 101-112. doi
Compares contest success functions in which the chance of winning depends on the ratio of the parties' resources with ones in which it depends on their difference; the logistic difference form allows one-sided submission and two-sided peace as equilibria, which the ratio form never does.
Hirshleifer (1991). The Paradox of Power. Economics & Politics 3(3), 177-200. doi
Explains why poorer or smaller contenders often gain on richer ones in a power struggle: the weaker side is rationally motivated to invest relatively more in fighting, and only when conflict is decisive enough does the richer side gain.
Baye, Kovenock, de Vries (1996). The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory 8(2), 291-305. doi
Characterizes equilibrium in the all-pay auction, where every bidder forfeits its bid and the highest bid wins, a model of rent seeking, R&D races and political contests: the set of equilibria is far larger than recognized, including asymmetric equilibria in symmetric contests of three or more players.
Skaperdas (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7(2), 283-290. doi
Axiomatizes the additive contest success function, which gives each player's probability of winning a prize from all players' efforts, with independence from irrelevant alternatives as the key axiom, along with the two common forms in which the odds depend on the ratio or the difference of efforts.
Garfinkel, Skaperdas (2007). Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview. Handbook of Defense Economics, 649-709. doi
Surveys the economics of conflict, in which resources go to production or to appropriation and defense, combined through technologies of conflict, covering how power is distributed, when parties settle in the shadow of conflict or fight, alliances, and how conflict distorts investment and innovation.

Reach, force ratios and the strength of the defense

Engel (1954). A Verification of Lanchester's Law. Journal of the Operations Research Society of America 2(2), 163-171. doi
Tests Lanchester's attrition equations against the American capture of Iwo Jima, using the daily landings and casualties, and finds them applicable, adding that such tests gain value when repeated often enough to support general conclusions.
Jervis (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30(2), 167-214. doi
Explains when the security dilemma, in which one state's gains in security reduce others', weakens enough for cooperation: when exploitation pays little and mutual cooperation much, and when defense has the advantage over offense and defensive postures can be told apart from offensive ones.
Epstein (1989). The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies. International Security 13(4), 90. doi
Replies that the 3:1 rule as Mearsheimer states it is too ill-defined to test, since it never says in what units combat power is counted, insists that balance assessment treat warfare as a dynamic process, and defends his adaptive dynamic model against Mearsheimer's critique.
Mearsheimer (1989). Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics. International Security 13(4), 54. doi
Defends the rule that an attacker needs at least a 3:1 local advantage in combat power to break through a defender's front, a rule about breakthrough battles only, and argues that against proper historical evidence it appears quite reliable while Epstein's critique and model are flawed.
Chintagunta, Vilcassim (1992). An Empirical Investigation of Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly. Management Science 38(9), 1230-1244. doi
Uses the Lanchester model of combat as the dynamics of market share in a differential game of advertising between two rivals, estimates it on Coke and Pepsi from 1968 to 1981, and compares closed-loop, open-loop and optimal-control spending policies.

Leaving a way out, and burning the bridges

Lambert, Larcker (1985). Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1-3), 179-203. doi
Finds that adopting golden parachutes, payments to executives on a change in control, meets a positive stock market reaction, and that the cross-section of that reaction fits the view that parachutes improve how executives respond to takeover bids.
Fearon (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1), 68-90. doi
Compares two costly signals of resolve, tying hands through audience costs paid only on backing down and sinking costs such as mobilization paid up front: leaders never bluff with either and do better on average by tying hands, though it raises the risk of war.
Bebchuk, Cohen, Wang (2014). Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders. Journal of Corporate Finance 25, 140-154. doi
Golden parachutes go with higher expected acquisition premiums, partly through executives' incentives, yet adopting firms earn negative abnormal returns during and after adoption, raising the possibility of an overall cost to shareholders through weaker discipline from the market for control or acceptance of value-reducing deals.

Deception and unpredictability

v. Neumann (1928). Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen 100(1), 295-320. doi
Defines a game of strategy exactly and proves that in two-person zero-sum games, once each player may draw his choice by a lottery of his own design, max min equals min max: the randomizing player can no longer be seen through, since no one can predict his move.
Fudenberg, Tirole (1986). A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation. The RAND Journal of Economics 17(3), 366. doi
A predator whose characteristics are common knowledge preys to jam an entrant's inference about its own future profitability, since the entrant judges from current profits whether to stay, in contrast to reputation models in which the predator preys to signal something about itself.
Gartzke (1999). War Is in the Error Term. International Organization 53(3), 567-587. doi
Shows that the most general rationalist explanation of war makes its onset theoretically indeterminate, because war turns on variables unobservable beforehand to researchers and participants alike, so analysis can narrow the set of states that might fight but cannot predict which will.
Walker, Wooders (2001). Minimax Play at Wimbledon. American Economic Review 91(5), 1521-1538. doi
Tests minimax play on first serves in ten top professional tennis matches: winning rates are consistent with equal chances whichever way the server serves, rejected in only one of 40 point games, but players switch direction too often to be truly random.
Avenhaus, von Stengel, Zamir (2002). Chapter 51 Inspection games. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1947-1987. doi
Surveys inspection games, from arms control to auditing and environmental monitoring, in which an inspectee may manipulate the data to conceal illegal acts, covering material accountancy, data verification, sequential inspection with limited resources, and inspector leadership, committing to a strategy in advance.
Chiappori, Levitt, Groseclose (2002). Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer. American Economic Review 92(4), 1138-1151. doi
Models penalty kicks as a zero-sum game of left, middle and right, derives predictions that survive aggregation across heterogeneous kickers and goalies, and finds in 459 kicks from the French and Italian top leagues that play is consistent with mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Brunnermeier, Pedersen (2005). Predatory Trading. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1825-1863. doi
Models predatory trading, which induces or exploits other investors' need to cut positions: when one trader is forced to liquidate, others trade the same way first and reverse later, prices overshoot, the distressed trader's liquidation value falls, and a trader can profit from triggering a rival's crisis.

Nobel models

The research behind eleven entries added to existing families of the Library from the work of Nobel laureates in economics and physics: 110 papers on make or buy and incomplete contracts (Williamson; Grossman, Hart and Moore), two-sided platforms (Rochet and Tirole), bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig), the financial accelerator (Bernanke and Gertler; Kiyotaki and Moore), excess volatility and narratives (Shiller), volatility clustering (Engle; Bollerslev), nonrival ideas (Romer), the O-ring (Kremer), fingerprinting a cause in noisy data (Hasselmann), search and matching (Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides) and rugged landscapes (Parisi; Kauffman and Levinthal), with Ronald Ross's mathematics of malaria behind the contagion entry and the foundational papers of the 2024 physics and chemistry laureates on neural networks and protein structure. Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Make or buy: transaction costs and incomplete contracts (Williamson; Grossman, Hart and Moore)

Coase (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4(16), 386-405. doi
Asks why firms exist if the price mechanism coordinates production, and answers that using the market has costs, discovering prices and negotiating each contract, so a firm grows until the cost of organizing one more transaction inside it equals the cost of buying it outside.
Williamson (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology 87(3), 548-577. doi
Takes the transaction as the unit of analysis and assigns transactions to governance structures, market or firm, in a discriminating way, so that economizing on transaction costs decides the efficient boundaries of the firm and the organization of its internal dealings, employment relations included.
Grossman, Hart (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 691-719. doi
Defines ownership as the purchase of the residual rights of control that a contract cannot list in advance; since rights one party gains the other loses, integration pays only when the acquirer's gain in productive control outweighs the loss of incentive on the side that gives it up.
Hart, Moore (1990). Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 98(6), 1119-1158. doi
Identifies a firm with the assets its owners control and shows that owning an asset matters because it sets each party's bargaining position when contracts are incomplete, so assets should go to the parties whose investments matter most, and complementary assets should be owned together.
Holmström, Roberts (1998). The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 73-94. doi
Reviews the transaction cost and property rights theories, which explain firm boundaries by ex post bargaining and holdup, and shows with cases that many observed boundaries are set by other factors, and that firms use mechanisms other than asset ownership to protect investments.
Baker, Gibbons, Murphy (2002). Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 39-84. doi
Models relational contracts, informal agreements sustained by the value of the future relationship, inside and between firms, and shows that integration changes each party's temptation to renege and hence the best relational contract the parties can sustain, so the integration decision serves the relationship.
Whinston (2003). On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19(1), 1-23. doi
Draws out what the property rights theory of Grossman, Hart and Moore predicts about vertical integration and finds that the large body of evidence supporting transaction cost economics, in which higher quasi-rents raise the likelihood of integration, says little about those predictions.
Lafontaine, Slade (2007). Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 45(3), 629-685. doi
Surveys the evidence on which transactions are brought inside the firm and on what vertical integration does to prices, quantities, investment and profits, highlighting where the transaction cost and property rights theories have been tested and where work remains.
Hart, Moore (2008). Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(1), 1-48. doi
Treats a contract as a reference point for what each party feels entitled to: a party who gets less than the contract allowed shades its performance, so a flexible contract costs inefficient shading while a rigid one costs lost adjustment, which explains long-term contracts without specific investments.

Two-sided platforms (Rochet and Tirole)

Rochet, Tirole (2002). Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 549. doi
Analyzes a payment card association as a two-sided platform: the interchange fee paid by merchants' banks to cardholders' banks balances the two sides, and merchant resistance, bank market power and consumers' choice of card together decide whether the fee set cooperatively is too high or too low.
Caillaud, Jullien (2003). Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers. The RAND Journal of Economics 34(2), 309. doi
Models imperfect price competition between intermediaries with indirect network externalities, where users can register with several of them and prices can depend on identity and usage; efficient and some inefficient market structures arise, and intermediaries prefer non-exclusive services, which soften competition.
Rochet, Tirole (2003). Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4), 990-1029. doi
Builds a model of competing platforms that must get both sides on board, in software, media and payment systems, and derives how the total price is split between the two sides under for-profit platforms, not-for-profit associations, an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.
Parker, Van Alstyne (2005). Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design. Management Science 51(10), 1494-1504. doi
Asks how a firm can profitably give a product away and answers with a model of two-sided network externalities built from network effects, price discrimination and product differentiation: even without competition a firm may give one side a free good to raise what the other side pays.
Armstrong (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 668-691. doi
Presents three models in which one group's benefit from a platform depends on how many of the other group join: a monopoly platform, competing platforms joined singly, and competitive bottlenecks; prices depend on the cross-group externalities, on lump-sum against per-transaction fees, and on multi-homing.
Rochet, Tirole (2006). Two-sided markets: a progress report. The RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 645-667. doi
Defines a market as two-sided when the structure of prices, not only their level, affects volume, so the Coase theorem fails, and unifies membership externalities and usage externalities in one model with results on the mix of membership and usage charges.
Rysman (2009). The Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(3), 125-143. doi
Defines a two-sided market as one in which two sets of agents interact through a platform and each set's decisions affect the other's outcomes, as with game consoles and payment cards, and surveys the pricing, competition and policy questions that follow.
Weyl (2010). A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms. American Economic Review 100(4), 1642-1672. doi
Develops a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks in which platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, shows that profit maximization internalizes network externalities only to marginal users, and proposes a tractable model in which users differ in income or scale.
Tirole (2015). Market Failures and Public Policy. American Economic Review 105(6), 1665-1682. doi
Tirole's Nobel lecture: industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power through models that capture the essence of a situation and are then tested, with the aim of advising public decision makers on intervention and companies on the design of their business models.

Bank runs and liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig)

Diamond (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. The Review of Economic Studies 51(3), 393. doi
Develops a theory of intermediation from the cost of monitoring borrowers: a bank is a delegated monitor whose diversification lowers the cost of giving it the incentive to monitor, and in the setting studied debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are optimal.
Jacklin, Bhattacharya (1988). Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications. Journal of Political Economy 96(3), 568-592. doi
Contrasts panics with information-based runs in a model where the bank cannot see depositors' liquidity needs and depositors are unequally informed about asset quality, and shows that whether deposits or traded equity give better risk sharing depends on the information about returns.
Allen, Gale (1998). Optimal Financial Crises. The Journal of Finance 53(4), 1245-1284. doi
Argues that panics are tied to the business cycle rather than to sunspots: runs occur when depositors expect low returns on bank assets, can be first-best efficient as risk sharing between early and late withdrawers, and call for central bank intervention when runs are costly.
Diamond, Rajan (2001). Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking. Journal of Political Economy 109(2), 287-327. doi
Loans are illiquid when collecting them needs the lender's relationship skills; a bank with a fragile, run-prone capital structure commits itself to create liquidity, letting depositors withdraw when needed while shielding borrowers, so capital requirements and narrow banking may reduce liquidity creation.
Goldstein, Pauzner (2005). Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs. The Journal of Finance 60(3), 1293-1327. doi
Modifies Diamond and Dybvig so that fundamentals select which equilibrium occurs, which yields the ex ante probability of a panic-based run and ties it to the deposit contract; derives conditions under which banks raise welfare and a contract that trades liquidity against the cost of runs.
Schmidt, Timmermann, Wermers (2016). Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds. American Economic Review 106(9), 2625-2657. doi
Uses daily share-class flows of money market funds in September 2008 and finds that the cross-section of outflows in the week of the Lehman failure fits a model of coordination with incomplete information and strategic complementarities, with investors of differing sophistication behaving differently within the same fund.

The financial accelerator and credit cycles (Bernanke and Gertler; Kiyotaki and Moore)

Fisher (1933). The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Econometrica 1(4), 337. doi
States the debt-deflation theory: over-indebtedness followed by distress selling lowers prices, which raises the real burden of the remaining debt, so the collective effort to pay down debt can leave debtors owing more, the mechanism Fisher offers for great depressions.
Shleifer, Vishny (1992). Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach. The Journal of Finance 47(4), 1343-1366. doi
Explains liquidation values by who can buy: when a distressed firm sells assets its industry peers are usually in trouble too, so assets sell below their value in best use, which makes leverage costly ex ante and explains debt capacity across industries and over the cycle.
Bernanke, Gertler (1995). Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4), 27-48. doi
Sets out the credit channel of monetary policy: informational frictions in credit markets worsen when money is tight, raising the external finance premium and amplifying policy's effect through the balance sheet and bank lending channels; forecasting with credit aggregates is not a valid test of it.
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1996). The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 1. doi
Interprets the financial accelerator as changes in the agency costs of lending over the cycle: at the onset of a recession, borrowers with high agency costs get a smaller share of credit, the flight to quality, and account for more of the decline, as a manufacturing panel shows.
Kiyotaki, Moore (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 211-248. doi
In an economy where lenders cannot force repayment unless debt is secured, durable assets serve as both inputs and collateral; the interaction of credit limits and asset prices makes small, temporary shocks produce large, persistent swings in output and asset prices that spill across sectors.
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1999). The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1341-1393. doi
Builds a dynamic general equilibrium model in which credit market frictions amplify and propagate shocks, the financial accelerator, adding money, price stickiness, heterogeneous firms and investment delays to study how those frictions shape the transmission of monetary policy.
Bernanke (2000). Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression. Essays on the Great Depression, 41-69. doi
First published in the American Economic Review in 1983: argues that the financial disruptions of 1930 to 1933 reduced the efficiency of credit allocation, so that costlier and scarcer credit depressed aggregate demand, a non-monetary channel beside the monetary one Friedman and Schwartz stressed.
Geanakoplos (2010). The Leverage Cycle. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 24(1), 1-66. doi
Argues that in a crisis collateral rates, margins or leverage, matter more than interest rates: leverage rises in good times and collapses in bad, the leverage cycle, in which the same assets pass between optimists who can borrow against them and lenders who will not.
Mian, Sufi (2011). House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the US Household Leverage Crisis. American Economic Review 101(5), 2132-2156. doi
Finds that homeowners borrowed 25 cents for every dollar of home equity gained from 2002 to 2006, more so the younger and the lower the credit score, adding $1.25 trillion of household debt and at least 39 percent of new defaults from 2006 to 2008.
Bernanke (2023). Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations. American Economic Review 113(5), 1143-1169. doi
Bernanke's Nobel lecture: imperfect and asymmetric information in credit markets can combine with other forces to produce credit-market stress, in which intermediation is costly and borrowing hard, and evidence from the 1930s and from 2007 to 2009 shows such stress deepening and prolonging recessions.

Excess volatility, valuation ratios and narratives (Shiller)

Shiller (1979). The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure. Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1190-1219. doi
Expectations models make long rates long averages of expected short rates, which the averaging should smooth; actual long rates are more volatile than those limits allow, which implies forecastability, and long rates tend to fall when high relative to short rates rather than rise.
Shiller (1984). Stock Prices and Social Dynamics. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1984(2), 457. doi
Argues that the evidence usually read as supporting efficient markets does not rule out that changing fashions among investors move prices, proposes a model of their effect, and explores it against the twentieth-century United States stock market.
Kleidon (1986). Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models. Journal of Political Economy 94(5), 953-1001. doi
Argues that plotting prices against perfect-foresight prices is invalid evidence of excess volatility, since the latter is built to be smoother; prices appear nonstationary, which accounts for the reported violations, and variance bounds valid under nonstationarity are not violated for Standard and Poor's data.
Campbell, Shiller (1987). Cointegration and Tests of Present Value Models. Journal of Political Economy 95(5), 1062-1088. doi
When a price is the present value of a stream the two are cointegrated and their spread should forecast the stream's changes; vector autoregressions find the spread behaving much like an optimal forecast for long and short interest rates, less so for stock prices against dividends.
Barsky, De Long (1993). Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 291-311. doi
Shows that the major long-run swings of the United States stock market over a century are broadly consistent with investors who must estimate a slowly varying long-run dividend growth rate, so that prices respond more than proportionately to long-run movements in dividends.
Shiller (2003). From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1), 83-104. doi
Traces the erosion of faith in efficient markets through the anomalies and excess volatility found in the 1980s and the rise of behavioral finance from the 1990s: feedback theories, models of smart money interacting with ordinary investors, and evidence on the obstacles smart money faces.
Shiller (2017). Narrative Economics. American Economic Review 107(4), 967-1004. doi
Treats popular narratives as contagions with an epidemiology: stories that go viral motivate spending and investing, and the depression of 1920 to 1921, the Great Depression, the recession of 2007 to 2009 and the present are read as products of the narratives of their times.

Volatility clustering: ARCH and GARCH (Engle)

Engle (1982). Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation. Econometrica 50(4), 987. doi
Introduces autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic processes, serially uncorrelated with a constant unconditional variance but a conditional variance that changes with the past, so the recent past informs the one-period forecast variance; gives maximum likelihood estimation and finds the variance of United Kingdom inflation changing over time.
Engle, Lilien, Robins (1987). Estimating Time Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure: The Arch-M Model. Econometrica 55(2), 391. doi
Extends ARCH so that the conditional variance enters the mean, ARCH-M, letting the expected excess holding yield on a long bond depend on its conditional variance; on three interest rate data sets the ARCH process and the time-varying risk premium are highly significant.
Nelson (1991). Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach. Econometrica 59(2), 347. doi
Introduces exponential ARCH, which lets returns and volatility innovations be correlated, removes the inequality constraints on parameters and gives a direct reading of how persistent volatility shocks are; applied to the CRSP value-weighted index from 1962 to 1987.
Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993). On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks. The Journal of Finance 48(5), 1779-1801. doi
Finds a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance with a GARCH-M model that allows seasonal volatility, different impacts for positive and negative surprises and interest rates as predictors; negative surprises raise volatility and positive ones lower it.
Engle (2001). GARCH 101: The Use of ARCH/GARCH Models in Applied Econometrics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4), 157-168. doi
Explains the simplest GARCH model and its motivation for readers who want to analyze and forecast volatility, illustrates it on portfolio risk and sketches the extensions.
Engle, Patton (2001). What good is a volatility model? Quantitative Finance 1(2), 237-245. doi
Lists what a volatility model must capture, persistence and mean reversion, the asymmetry by which the sign of a shock affects volatility, and the influence of outside variables, and shows on the Dow Jones index how GARCH-type models capture them.
Engle (2002). Dynamic Conditional Correlation. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 20(3), 339-350. doi
Proposes dynamic conditional correlation models, which pair univariate GARCH models for each series with a parsimonious model of the time-varying correlations, estimated simply in two steps, and shows that they perform well in a variety of settings.
Poon, Granger (2003). Forecasting Volatility in Financial Markets: A Review. Journal of Economic Literature 41(2), 478-539. doi
Compares the volatility forecasting results of 93 papers from two decades, historical models against volatility implied from options, across asset classes, with definitions of volatility and the problems of evaluating forecasts and of measuring actual volatility.
Engle (2004). Risk and Volatility: Econometric Models and Financial Practice. American Economic Review 94(3), 405-420. doi
Engle's Nobel lecture: risks must be taken to earn rewards, not all risks are equally rewarded, and both lie in the future, so the task is to measure expected loss as it changes over time, which the ARCH family of models was built to do.
Hansen, Lunde (2005). A forecast comparison of volatility models: does anything beat a GARCH(1,1)? Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(7), 873-889. doi
Compares 330 ARCH-type models out of sample on exchange rate and IBM return data and finds no evidence that anything beats a GARCH(1,1) for the exchange rate, while for IBM the GARCH(1,1) is clearly beaten by models that allow a leverage effect.

Nonrival ideas and endogenous growth (Romer)

Romer (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political Economy 94(5), 1002-1037. doi
Presents a model of long-run growth in which knowledge is an input with increasing marginal productivity, so growth rates can rise over time, small disturbances can be amplified by private agents and large countries may always grow faster, with long-run evidence offered in support.
Romer (1994). The Origins of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(1), 3-22. doi
Describes the two strands that converged as endogenous growth, the empirical question whether poor countries catch up and the theoretical one of how to build aggregate growth theory around discovery, innovation and technological change, and argues that the second will matter more.
Weitzman (1998). Recombinant Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2), 331-360. doi
Gives the knowledge production function microfoundations in which new ideas come from recombining old ones, as a research station crosses plant varieties, so knowledge builds on itself combinatorially and the limit to growth becomes the capacity to process ideas into usable form.
Jones, Romer (2010). The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Population, and Human Capital. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(1), 224-245. doi
Redoes Kaldor's stylized facts of growth and finds that the modern facts turn on four variables rather than physical capital alone, ideas, institutions, population and human capital, whose interactions explain why growth has accelerated and why there are gains from trade.

The O-ring production function (Kremer)

Becker (1973). A Theory of Marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81(4), 813-846. doi
Sets out a theory of marriage as a market in equilibrium in which each person does as well as possible, deriving that the gain from marrying rises with income and human capital and that people tend to pair with others like themselves on most traits.
Kremer (1993). The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 551-575. doi
Proposes a production function in which a mistake in any one of several tasks spoils the output, so high-skill workers who make few mistakes are matched together, wages and output rise steeply in skill, and small firms predominate where skill is scarce; imperfect observability yields multiple equilibria.
Garicano (2000). Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production. Journal of Political Economy 108(5), 874-904. doi
Shows that a knowledge-based hierarchy is a natural way to organize the acquisition of knowledge when matching problems with those who can solve them is costly: production workers learn the common problems and specialized problem solvers handle the exceptional ones.
Grossman, Maggi (2000). Diversity and Trade. American Economic Review 90(5), 1255-1275. doi
Models trade between countries with similar aggregate endowments but different distributions of talent: the country with a homogeneous workforce exports the good whose technology has complementarities between tasks, while the one with a diverse workforce exports the good where individual success matters most.
Jones (2011). Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of Economic Development. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3(2), 1-28. doi
Returns to linkages and complementarity: intermediate goods give a multiplier like capital's, and because a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, problems along a production chain sharply reduce output under complementarity, amplifying distortions and helping explain income differences across countries.

Fingerprinting a cause in noisy data (Hasselmann)

Hasselmann (1976). Stochastic climate models: Part I. Theory. Tellus A: Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography 28(6), 473. doi
Explains slow climate variability as the integrated response of the slow components, the ocean, the ice and the land, to continuous random forcing by short-period weather, which the model keeps as random forcing terms, so a system that merely integrates noise shows long swings without any slow cause.
Frankignoul, Hasselmann (1977). Stochastic climate models, Part II Application to sea-surface temperature anomalies and thermocline variability. Tellus 29(4), 289-305. doi
Applies the stochastic climate model to the upper ocean: large, long-lived sea-surface temperature anomalies arise as the response of the surface layers to short-time atmospheric forcing, white noise producing a red spectrum, stationary only with negative feedback, and the simple model matches mid-latitude observations.
Bell (1986). Theory of Optimal Weighting of Data to Detect Climatic Change. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 43(16), 1694-1710. doi
Shows that a search for model-predicted climate change can fail because of climatic noise, and derives the weighted average of the data that maximizes the probability of detecting the predicted change, with the sampling error of the needed covariance estimate taken into account.
Hasselmann (1993). Optimal Fingerprints for the Detection of Time-dependent Climate Change. Journal of Climate 6(10), 1957-1971. doi
Derives the optimal linear filter, the fingerprint, for detecting a given time-dependent climate change signal in natural variability: the product of the assumed signal pattern and the inverse of the variability's covariance matrix, which maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio of the detection variable.
Hegerl, von Storch, Hasselmann, Santer, Cubasch, Jones (1996). Detecting Greenhouse-Gas-Induced Climate Change with an Optimal Fingerprint Method. Journal of Climate 9(10), 2281-2306. doi
Applies optimal fingerprints to near-surface temperature trends: a guess pattern of the expected change is projected onto the observations after weighting toward low-noise directions, yielding a scalar detection variable that is compared with natural variability estimated from models and observations.
Hasselmann (1998). Conventional and Bayesian approach to climate-change detection and attribution. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 124(552), 2541-2565. doi
Reviews the multi-fingerprint theory of detection and attribution and generalizes it to a Bayesian approach, which quantifies how detection tests should change prior assessments of an externally forced change and lets indicators unsuited to signal-to-noise analysis be combined.
Hannart, Pearl, Otto, Naveau, Ghil (2016). Causal Counterfactual Theory for the Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related Events. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 97(1), 99-110. doi
Brings the causal theory built on counterfactuals, standard in epidemiology and economics, into the detection and attribution of weather and climate events, which had largely done without its definitions and methods despite their consensual nature and proven use.

Search and matching (Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides)

Diamond (1982). Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 90(5), 881-894. doi
Analyzes a barter economy in which trade is coordinated by a random matching process and finds multiple steady-state rational expectations equilibria, all inefficient away from the corners, so an economy with this trading friction has no unique natural rate of unemployment.
Diamond (1982). Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium. The Review of Economic Studies 49(2), 217. doi
Derives the equilibrium negotiated wage from a simple search technology and the Nash bargaining solution as a function of unemployment and vacancy rates, and finds that a new worker's expected earnings and social marginal product generally differ, so the incentives for mobility are inefficient.
Hosios (1990). On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 279. doi
Gives general conditions for constrained efficiency in economies with trading frictions and unemployment, integrating the Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides matching and bargaining models, and reformulates several labor market models as matching-bargaining problems to apply them.
Mortensen, Pissarides (1994). Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 397-415. doi
Adds job-specific shocks to the matching model so that job creation and destruction are both endogenous: an aggregate shock makes them move oppositely while a dispersion shock makes them move together, and destruction is the more volatile, as United States data show.
Burdett, Mortensen (1998). Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment. International Economic Review 39(2), 257. doi
Characterizes the unique equilibrium of a game in which employers post permanent wages and workers sample offers sequentially: wage dispersion among identical workers is a robust outcome provided workers search while employed as well as when unemployed.
Petrongolo, Pissarides (2001). Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function. Journal of Economic Literature 39(2), 390-431. doi
Surveys the aggregate matching function and finds a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas function of vacancies and unemployment estimated successfully for several countries, with no consensus yet on microfoundations and refinements from disaggregated data, spatial aggregation and on-the-job search.
Hall (2005). Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness. American Economic Review 95(1), 50-65. doi
Shows that matching frictions explain the labor market's qualitative response to adverse shocks but need implausibly large shocks for the magnitudes, and that wage stickiness arising in equilibrium, with no worker-employer pair leaving a gain unexploited, greatly raises the model's sensitivity.
Rogerson, Shimer, Wright (2005). Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 43(4), 959-988. doi
Surveys search models of the labor market: why workers sometimes stay unemployed, what sets the length of spells, how unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies coexist, why homogeneous workers earn different wages, and how wages and turnover interact.
Shimer (2005). The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies. American Economic Review 95(1), 25-49. doi
Argues that the textbook search and matching model cannot produce the observed cyclical swings in unemployment and vacancies from plausible shocks: the vacancy-unemployment ratio is almost 20 times as volatile as labor productivity, while the model predicts nearly equal volatility.
Hagedorn, Manovskii (2008). The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited. American Economic Review 98(4), 1692-1706. doi
Answers the finding that the standard search model understates cyclical swings with a calibration that uses the cost of creating vacancies and the cyclicality of wages to set the value of nonmarket activity and the bargaining weights, under which the model fits the data.
Elsby, Michaels, Ratner (2015). The Beveridge Curve: A Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 53(3), 571-630. doi
Surveys the Beveridge curve from its measurement to its place in labor market models, and names the puzzles that remain: the role of vacancies in recruiting, the amplitude and persistence of cyclical unemployment-vacancy dynamics, and the sources of lateral shifts in the curve.

Rugged landscapes (Parisi; Kauffman; Levinthal)

Sherrington, Kirkpatrick (1975). Solvable Model of a Spin-Glass. Physical Review Letters 35(26), 1792-1796. doi
Introduces a solvable model of a spin glass: an Ising model whose spins are coupled by infinite-ranged random interactions drawn from a Gaussian distribution, in which both a spin-glass phase and a ferromagnetic phase occur and the competition between them can be studied.
Parisi (1979). Infinite Number of Order Parameters for Spin-Glasses. Physical Review Letters 43(23), 1754-1756. doi
Shows that in the mean-field approximation a spin glass must be described by an infinite number of order parameters within replica theory, the step that opened the way to the full solution of the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model and its many-valley structure.
Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, Vecchi (1983). Optimization by Simulated Annealing. Science 220(4598), 671-680. doi
Draws the connection between statistical mechanics and combinatorial optimization: annealing in solids, cooling slowly enough to avoid freezing into a poor configuration, becomes simulated annealing, a method for finding good minima of functions of very many variables.
Parisi (1983). Order Parameter for Spin-Glasses. Physical Review Letters 50(24), 1946-1948. doi
Defines a physical order parameter for spin glasses, a function on the interval from 0 to 1 tied to the probability distribution of the overlap between the system's many states, and shows that it coincides with the order parameter of the broken replica-symmetry approach.
Kauffman, Levin (1987). Towards a general theory of adaptive walks on rugged landscapes. Journal of Theoretical Biology 128(1), 11-45. doi
Begins a general theory of adaptive walks via fitter variants: for uncorrelated landscapes it gives the number of local optima, the lengths of walks and the optima reachable from a start, and finds similar statistics in model genetic networks and the traveling salesman problem.
Kauffman, Weinberger (1989). The NK model of rugged fitness landscapes and its application to maturation of the immune response. Journal of Theoretical Biology 141(2), 211-245. doi
Models adaptive evolution as uphill walks on rugged fitness landscapes and introduces the NK model, in which each of N sites depends on K others so that K tunes the landscape's ruggedness, and applies it to the affinity landscape of antibodies maturing in the immune response.
March (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. Organization Science 2(1), 71-87. doi
Analyzes the trade-off between exploring new possibilities and exploiting old certainties, with models of mutual learning between members and an organizational code and of competition for primacy, and argues that adaptive processes refine exploitation faster than exploration, effective in the short run and self-destructive in the long.
Levinthal, March (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal 14(S2), 95-112. doi
Examines how organizations balance exploring new knowledge against exploiting current competence, and how their simplification and specialization produce three myopias of learning: overlooking distant times, distant places and failures.
Levinthal (1997). Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes. Management Science 43(7), 934-950. doi
Models an organization whose attributes interact in their effect on fitness, making the landscape rugged with many peaks: the form at founding then has a lasting effect, since local adaptation climbs to the peak nearest the start, and selection acts on the diversity that results.
Gavetti, Levinthal (2000). Looking Forward and Looking Backward: Cognitive and Experiential Search. Administrative Science Quarterly 45(1), 113-137. doi
Uses simulation to relate forward-looking search based on a cognitive map of actions and outcomes to backward-looking search based on experience: even a crude, low-dimensional representation of the landscape guides initial search powerfully, and changing the representation is itself a mode of adaptation.
Rivkin (2000). Imitation of Complex Strategies. Management Science 46(6), 824-844. doi
Shows that the complexity of a successful strategy, the number of its elements and the interactions among them, can by itself deter imitation: with many interacting elements the search for the best strategy is intractable, and would-be imitators get stuck on inferior configurations.
Rivkin, Siggelkow (2003). Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies Among Elements of Organizational Design. Management Science 49(3), 290-311. doi
Simulates how elements of organizational design depend on one another, hierarchy, incentives, departmental decomposition and the interactions among decisions, and finds them tied by one tension: an organization must search broadly for good configurations yet stay stable enough to exploit them.
Parisi (2023). Nobel Lecture: Multiple equilibria. Reviews of Modern Physics 95(3). doi
Parisi's Nobel lecture recalls the genesis of multiple equilibria in the natural sciences, his contribution to the idea within statistical mechanics, the many states of a spin glass, and the applications of these ideas in physics and in other disciplines.

The threshold of an epidemic (Ronald Ross)

Ross (1916). An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori pathometry. Part I. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 92(638), 204-230. doi
Opens Ross's a priori pathometry: since the principal problems of epidemiology, the rate of infection, the frequency of outbreaks and the loss of immunity, can scarcely be resolved except by analysis, he writes differential equations for the affected and unaffected and follows their course over time.
Ross, Hudson (1917). An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori pathometry. Part II. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 93(650), 212-225. doi
Continues the analysis with the mathematician Hilda Hudson, extending the equations of a priori pathometry, how an infection runs through a population under stated assumptions, to further cases of the happening element and preparing the treatment of variable infectivity in Part III.
Ross, Hudson (1917). An application of the theory of probabilities to the study of a priori pathometry. Part III. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 93(650), 225-240. doi
Examines variable happening, the case in which the infectivity element does not stay constant over time, which the authors argue nature will seldom allow, and works out how changes in infectivity alter the course of an epidemic in their equations.
Heesterbeek (2002). A Brief History of R0 and a Recipe for its Calculation. Acta Biotheoretica 50(3), 189-204. doi
Traces the genesis of the basic reproduction number R0 in demography, ecology and epidemiology, asks why the concept matured in epidemiology fifty years after it had in demography, and gives an algorithm for computing it in heterogeneous populations.
Smith, Battle, Hay, Barker, Scott, McKenzie (2012). Ross, Macdonald, and a Theory for the Dynamics and Control of Mosquito-Transmitted Pathogens. PLoS Pathogens 8(4), e1002588. doi
Reviews the history of the Ross-Macdonald model of mosquito-borne transmission and finds that several scientists contributed over seventy years: Ross built two different models and Macdonald a third, so the model is best defined by a consensus set of assumptions within a wider theory of transmission and control.

Neural networks and protein structure (the 2024 laureates)

Hopfield (1982). Neural networks and physical systems with emergent collective computational abilities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 79(8), 2554-2558. doi
Shows that computational properties can emerge as collective properties of a large number of simple neuron-like units: a model network stores memories as stable states of a phase-space flow and retrieves an entire memory from any sufficiently large part of it, a content-addressable memory.
Ackley, Hinton, Sejnowski (1985). A Learning Algorithm for Boltzmann Machines. Cognitive Science 9(1), 147-169. doi
Presents a learning algorithm for Boltzmann machines, networks of simple parallel units whose power lies in their connections: a search procedure suited to parallel networks and a way of choosing internal representations that lets a network learn constraint satisfaction tasks.
Amit, Gutfreund, Sompolinsky (1985). Storing Infinite Numbers of Patterns in a Spin-Glass Model of Neural Networks. Physical Review Letters 55(14), 1530-1533. doi
Studies the Hopfield network when the number of stored patterns grows in proportion to its size and finds that, despite its spin-glass features, it works as an associative memory up to a storage ratio of about 0.14, where dynamically stable states nearly coincide with the patterns.
Hopfield, Tank (1985). "Neural" computation of decisions in optimization problems. Biological Cybernetics 52(3), 141-152. doi
Shows that highly interconnected networks of nonlinear analog neurons can compute a collective solution to an optimization problem posed as desired optima under constraints, with simulations of a network built for the traveling salesman problem.
Rumelhart, Hinton, Williams (1986). Learning representations by back-propagating errors. Nature 323(6088), 533-536. doi
Describes back-propagation, which repeatedly adjusts the weights of a network's connections to minimize the difference between its actual and desired outputs, so that hidden units come to represent important features of the task, which earlier methods such as the perceptron procedure could not create.
Kuhlman, Dantas, Ireton, Varani, Stoddard, Baker (2003). Design of a Novel Globular Protein Fold with Atomic-Level Accuracy. Science 302(5649), 1364-1368. doi
Designs Top7, a 93-residue protein with a fold and sequence not seen in nature, by iterating between sequence design and structure prediction; it folded, was extremely stable, and its crystal structure matched the design to 1.2 angstroms, opening regions of protein space nature has not explored.
Hinton, Salakhutdinov (2006). Reducing the Dimensionality of Data with Neural Networks. Science 313(5786), 504-507. doi
Trains a multilayer network with a small central layer to reconstruct high-dimensional inputs, and shows that with a good initialization of the weights such deep autoencoders learn low-dimensional codes that work much better than principal components for reducing dimensionality.
LeCun, Bengio, Hinton (2015). Deep learning. Nature 521(7553), 436-444. doi
Reviews deep learning, in which models of multiple processing layers learn representations with several levels of abstraction and have transformed speech and visual recognition, object detection, drug discovery and genomics, with back-propagation indicating how each layer's parameters should change.
Huang, Boyken, Baker (2016). The coming of age of de novo protein design. Nature 537(7620), 320-327. doi
Reviews de novo protein design, which explores the full space of sequences guided by the physics of folding rather than modifying natural proteins, and argues that the methods now allow a wide range of structures to be designed from scratch with atomic-level accuracy.
Krizhevsky, Sutskever, Hinton (2017). ImageNet classification with deep convolutional neural networks. Communications of the ACM 60(6), 84-90. doi
Trains a deep convolutional network of 60 million parameters on the 1.2 million images of the ImageNet contest and cuts the top-5 error rate to 17.0 percent, well below the previous best, using graphics processors and a regularization method called dropout.
Jumper, Evans, Pritzel and others (2021). Highly accurate protein structure prediction with AlphaFold. Nature 596(7873), 583-589. doi
Presents AlphaFold, which predicts a protein's three-dimensional structure from its amino acid sequence to near experimental accuracy, addressing the gap between the roughly 100,000 unique protein structures determined by experiment and the billions of known sequences.
Dauparas, Anishchenko, Bennett and others (2022). Robust deep learning-based protein sequence design using ProteinMPNN. Science 378(6615), 49-56. doi
Describes ProteinMPNN, a deep learning method for protein sequence design that recovers native sequences at 52.4 percent against 32.9 percent for the physically based Rosetta, couples positions across single or multiple chains, and is confirmed in silico and by experiment.
Watson, Juergens, Bennett and others (2023). De novo design of protein structure and function with RFdiffusion. Nature 620(7976), 1089-1100. doi
Fine-tunes the RoseTTAFold structure prediction network into RFdiffusion, a diffusion model for protein design that solves a wide range of design challenges, de novo binders and higher-order symmetric architectures among them, with designs confirmed by experiment.
Abramson, Adler, Dunger and others (2024). Accurate structure prediction of biomolecular interactions with AlphaFold 3. Nature 630(8016), 493-500. doi
Describes AlphaFold 3, a diffusion-based architecture that predicts the joint structure of complexes of proteins, nucleic acids, small molecules, ions and modified residues, with far greater accuracy for protein-ligand interactions than docking tools and much higher accuracy for protein-nucleic acid interactions.

Expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen

The research behind four entries added to the Library's family How people really decide on 11 October 2026: 62 papers on rising expectations and the J-curve (Tocqueville, Davies, Gurr) with the tests that found it wanting, expectations as the reference point, hedonic adaptation and the evidence on what people do and do not adapt to (Helson; Brickman and Campbell), income and happiness, remembered utility and the peak-end rule (Kahneman and coauthors), and identified and statistical lives (Bastiat; Schelling). Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and results that were later challenged are listed beside the papers that challenged them.

Rising expectations and the J-curve, and the tests that followed (Tocqueville, Davies, Gurr)

Davies (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review 27(1), 5. doi
Proposes that revolutions are most likely when a long period of economic and social development is followed by a short, sharp reversal, so people fear losing ground gained with great effort; the evidence is Dorr's Rebellion and the Russian and Egyptian revolutions.
Gurr (1968). A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. American Political Science Review 62(4), 1104-1124. doi
Tests a causal model of the general conditions of civil strife across 114 polities with new indices built to fit the theoretical variables; five measured variables jointly account for about two thirds of the variation in the magnitude of strife among nations.
Snyder, Tilly (1972). Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960. American Sociological Review 37(5), 520. doi
Tests the claim that collective violence follows hardship after a period of relative well-being on year-to-year French data from 1830 to 1960, finds no significant effect of short-term hardship while measures of government repression fit, and proposes struggles for power as the better explanation.
Grofman, Muller (1973). The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis. American Political Science Review 67(2), 514-539. doi
Finds measured gaps between hoped-for and actual achievement only weakly associated with potential for political violence, and that people who perceive change in either direction, worse or better, show more of it than people who perceive none: a V-curve, not a J.
Hirschman, Rothschild (1973). The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(4), 544. doi
Introduces the tunnel effect, the gratification people take in others' advances while they expect their own to follow, and traces how it can turn to indignation as development proceeds, with consequences for political integration and revolution.
Miller, Bolce, Halligan (1977). The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory. American Political Science Review 71(3), 964-982. doi
Uses individual survey data over time to test the J-curve account of the 1960s urban riots, that progress followed by a sharp decline caused them, and rejects it, tracing the frustration instead to ambiguity in how Black Americans perceived their economic position.
Sigelman, Simpson (1977). A Cross-National Test of the Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 21(1), 105-128. doi
Finds a moderate straight-line relation between income inequality and political violence across countries and no support for the curved versions of the relation; adding affluence, social mobility and the rate of social change does not strengthen it.
Crosby (1979). Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bolce, and Halligan. American Political Science Review 73(1), 103-112. doi
Replies to Miller, Bolce and Halligan that they misread relative deprivation theory and measured its variables poorly, reviews four versions of the theory, and asks for more careful measurement before the theory is rejected.
Brush (1996). Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(4), 523-545. doi
Traces how social scientists received Gurr's relative deprivation theory of collective violence: after mostly negative empirical tests, Gurr and other advocates abandoned it in its original form, yet many writers, psychologists especially, kept citing it favorably.
Graham, Pettinato (2002). Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers and Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies. Journal of Development Studies 38(4), 100-140. doi
In Peru and Russia the respondents with the largest income gains judged their progress most harshly, which the authors attribute to shifting reference norms and economic volatility: a large gap separates the upwardly mobile's objective gains from their own assessment of them.
Campante, Chor (2012). Why was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(2), 167-188. doi
Argues that the Arab Spring followed decades in which schooling expanded while labor markets stayed weak, a pattern most pronounced where upheaval was greatest: an increasingly educated population without matching economic opportunity.
Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, Bialosiewicz (2012). Relative Deprivation. Personality and Social Psychology Review 16(3), 203-232. doi
A meta-analysis of 210 studies finds the effects of relative deprivation weak and inconsistent overall, but stronger when the measure includes angry resentment about injustice, matches the level of the outcome, personal or group, and is well constructed.

Expectations as the reference point: disappointment and reference-dependent preferences

Bell (1985). Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Operations Research 33(1), 1-27. doi
Adds disappointment, the comparison of an outcome with what was expected beforehand, to utility theory, so that the same prize is worth less when it was the worst a gamble could have paid, and decision makers may pay a premium to avoid being disappointed.
Loomes, Sugden (1986). Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty. The Review of Economic Studies 53(2), 271. doi
Models choice when an outcome below the prior expectation produces disappointment and one above it elation, and shows that several observed violations of expected utility theory follow from it and can be defended as consistent behavior.
Koszegi, Rabin (2006). A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4), 1133-1165. doi
Makes the reference point a person's recent rational expectations about outcomes, so gains and losses are measured against what was expected; among the results, a worker is less likely to keep working when income so far is unexpectedly high.
Mas (2006). Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(3), 783-821. doi
After New Jersey police unions lost final-offer arbitration and received less than they asked, arrest rates and sentence lengths fell and crime reports rose relative to when they won, and more so the further the award fell below the demand.
Abeler, Falk, Goette, Huffman (2011). Reference Points and Effort Provision. American Economic Review 101(2), 470-492. doi
In a real-effort experiment that manipulated what subjects expected to earn, subjects worked longer and earned more when expectations were high, as models that take expectations as the reference point predict.
Card, Dahl (2011). Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 103-143. doi
Upset losses by a home professional football team, defeats when it was favored by four points or more, raised police reports of at-home violence by men against partners by 10 percent; losses in games expected to be close, and upset wins, had little effect.

Hedonic adaptation: the adaptation level, the treadmill and its revisions (Helson; Brickman and Campbell)

Brickman, Coates, Janoff-Bulman (1978). Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36(8), 917-927. doi
Twenty-two major lottery winners were no happier than 22 controls and took less pleasure in ordinary events, and 29 paralyzed accident victims idealized their past; the authors read both through adaptation level theory, as contrast with a peak and habituation to a new level.
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, Wheatley (1998). Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(3), 617-638. doi
In six studies people overestimated how long they would feel bad after a breakup, a denial of tenure, an electoral defeat and other setbacks, because they neglected the defenses that soften negative events: a durability bias in forecasting feelings.
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, Rabin (2003). Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1209-1248. doi
People exaggerate how much their future tastes will resemble their present ones; with habit formation this projection bias leads them to consume too much early, save less than they planned, and misjudge purchases of durable goods.
Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, Diener (2003). Reexamining adaptation and the set point model of happiness: Reactions to changes in marital status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84(3), 527-539. doi
In fifteen years of German panel data on more than 24,000 people, satisfaction reacted to marriage and widowhood and on average drifted back toward its baseline, but people differed widely, and those who reacted strongly were still far from baseline years later.
Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, Diener (2004). Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction. Psychological Science 15(1), 8-13. doi
In the same German panel, unemployment lowered life satisfaction, which recovered only in part even after reemployment, and people unemployed before reacted no less to a new spell: some losses move the set point itself.
Diener, Lucas, Scollon (2006). Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation theory of well-being. American Psychologist 61(4), 305-314. doi
Proposes five revisions to the hedonic treadmill: set points are not neutral, they differ across people, a person has several for different parts of well-being, set points can change, and people differ in how far they adapt.
Kahneman, Thaler (2006). Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1), 221-234. doi
Reviews evidence that people often fail to predict how they will feel about outcomes, among other reasons because a decision focuses attention on features that will not stand out once the outcome is lived, so choices do not maximize experienced utility.
Gardner, Oswald (2007). Money and mental wellbeing: A longitudinal study of medium-sized lottery wins. Journal of Health Economics 26(1), 49-60. doi
British lottery winners of £1,000 to £120,000 went on to show better mental health than people with no win or a small one, an improvement of about 1.4 points on the General Health Questionnaire two years after the win.
Lucas (2007). Long-term disability is associated with lasting changes in subjective well-being: Evidence from two nationally representative longitudinal studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92(4), 717-730. doi
In two national panels, the onset of a long-term disability was followed by moderate to large drops in happiness, 0.40 to 1.27 standard deviations, and by little adaptation over the following years.
Clark, Diener, Georgellis, Lucas (2008). Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis. The Economic Journal 118(529), F222-F243. doi
Twenty waves of German panel data show adaptation to marriage, divorce, widowhood, the birth of a child and layoff that cannot be told from complete, but little adaptation to unemployment for men, with effects that begin before many events.
Nelson, Meyvis (2008). Interrupted Consumption: Disrupting Adaptation to Hedonic Experiences. Journal of Marketing Research 45(6), 654-664. doi
Six studies show that interrupting an experience disrupts adaptation, making pleasant experiences more enjoyable and unpleasant ones more irritating, even though people avoid breaks in pleasant experiences and seek them in unpleasant ones.
Oswald, Powdthavee (2008). Does happiness adapt? A longitudinal study of disability with implications for economists and judges. Journal of Public Economics 92(5-6), 1061-1077. doi
British panel data show people who become disabled recovering a good part of their mental well-being, with hedonic adaptation of roughly 30 to 50 percent depending on the severity of the disability: partial, not complete.
Di Tella, Haisken-De New, MacCulloch (2010). Happiness adaptation to income and to status in an individual panel. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 76(3), 834-852. doi
In German panel data from 1984 to 2000, about 65 percent of the first year's effect of an income gain on happiness was lost over the next four years, while the effect of a gain in status held or grew.
Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid, Lucas (2012). Subjective well-being and adaptation to life events: A meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102(3), 592-615. doi
A meta-analysis of 188 publications finds that life events move life evaluations more consistently than daily feelings, that the pace of adaptation differs from event to event, and that the effects do not follow how desirable an event is supposed to be.
Lindqvist, Östling, Cesarini (2020). Long-Run Effects of Lottery Wealth on Psychological Well-Being. The Review of Economic Studies 87(6), 2703-2726. doi
Swedish lottery players surveyed 5 to 22 years after a large prize reported sustained increases in life satisfaction against matched controls, with no sign of fading, though smaller effects on happiness and mental health; satisfaction with finances carried much of it.

Income and happiness: the Easterlin paradox and its challengers

Stevenson, Wolfers (2008). Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2008(1), 1-87. doi
Across many data sets, countries and decades, finds a clear positive link between average life satisfaction and income per head with no satiation point, and rising happiness with growth within countries, leaving relative income a smaller role than the Easterlin paradox implies.
Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa, Zweig (2010). The happiness-income paradox revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(52), 22463-22468. doi
Finds that over ten years or more happiness does not rise with a country's income in developing, transition and developed countries, though the two move together in the short run, and argues that critiques confuse the short-run relation with the long-run one.
Kahneman, Deaton (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(38), 16489-16493. doi
In more than 450,000 Gallup responses, life evaluation rose steadily with the logarithm of income, while daily emotional well-being rose with it only up to about $75,000 a year.
Killingsworth (2021). Experienced well-being rises with income, even above $75,000 per year. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118(4). doi
More than a million real-time reports from a large US sample show experienced well-being rising with the logarithm of income, with as steep a slope above $80,000 a year as below it.
Killingsworth, Kahneman, Mellers (2023). Income and emotional well-being: A conflict resolved. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120(10). doi
An adversarial collaboration reconciles the two earlier findings: happiness levels off with income only among the least happy people, and rises steadily with the logarithm of income among the rest, even accelerating in the happiest group.

Reference points that move: prices, pay and habit

Constantinides (1990). Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle. Journal of Political Economy 98(3), 519-543. doi
Shows that habit persistence, in which the satisfaction from consumption depends on past consumption, drives a wedge between risk aversion and the willingness to substitute consumption over time, which can resolve the equity premium puzzle.
Kalyanaram, Winer (1995). Empirical Generalizations from Reference Price Research. Marketing Science 14(3_supplement), G161-G169. doi
Three generalizations from reference price research: consumers use reference prices in choosing brands, those reference prices are formed partly from past prices, and consumers react more to prices above the reference than to prices below it.
Mazumdar, Raj, Sinha (2005). Reference Price Research: Review and Propositions. Journal of Marketing 69(4), 84-102. doi
Reviews the behavioral and modeling research on reference prices: how they form from past purchases and context, how they are recalled and used, and how they shape purchase decisions, ending with testable propositions.
Kube, Maréchal, Puppe (2013). Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association 11(4), 853-870. doi
In a field experiment a wage cut reduced workers' output by more than 20 percent and the damage persisted, while an equal raise produced no gain in output, consistent with reciprocity.

Remembered utility: the peak-end rule, duration neglect and the rosy view

Fredrickson, Kahneman (1993). Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(1), 45-55. doi
In two experiments with pleasant and aversive film clips, the length of a clip had little effect on how it was judged afterward; retrospective evaluations behaved like a weighted average of moments, as if duration did not matter.
Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, Redelmeier (1993). When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End. Psychological Science 4(6), 401-405. doi
Subjects who held one hand in water at 14 degrees Celsius for 60 seconds, and the other for those 60 seconds plus 30 more as the water warmed to 15 degrees, chose by a significant majority to repeat the longer trial: more pain, a better end.
Redelmeier, Kahneman (1996). Patients' memories of painful medical treatments: real-time and retrospective evaluations of two minimally invasive procedures. Pain 66(1), 3-8. doi
Patients' memories of the total pain of colonoscopy and lithotripsy tracked the most intense moment and the last three minutes of the procedure, while long procedures were not remembered as particularly bad.
Kahneman, Wakker, Sarin (1997). Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 375-406. doi
Separates decision utility, the weight of an outcome in a choice, from experienced utility, its hedonic quality, reported in the moment or remembered afterward, and shows how errors in remembered utility can lead people to prefer dominated options.
Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, Cronk (1997). Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The "Rosy View". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33(4), 421-448. doi
Across a trip to Europe, a Thanksgiving vacation and a three-week bicycle trip, people expected more than they enjoyed during the event and remembered it, within days, as better than they had experienced it: the rosy view.
Redelmeier, Katz, Kahneman (2003). Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial. Pain 104(1), 187-194. doi
In a randomized trial of 682 colonoscopy patients, adding a short, milder interval at the end made the final moments less painful, the whole procedure remembered as less unpleasant, and a later repeat colonoscopy slightly more likely.
Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, Diener (2003). What to Do on Spring Break? Psychological Science 14(5), 520-524. doi
Students' remembered spring-break experience, not what they felt during it or what they had predicted, directly predicted whether they wanted to repeat the trip, so memory rather than experience guided the next choice.
Rode, Rozin, Durlach (2007). Experienced and remembered pleasure for meals: Duration neglect but minimal peak, end (recency) or primacy effects. Appetite 49(1), 18-29. doi
In memories of meals, duration was neglected, but there was no sign of peak, first-course or last-course effects, so a small portion of a favorite dish is remembered about as well as a large one.
Kemp, Burt, Furneaux (2008). A test of the peak-end rule with extended autobiographical events. Memory & Cognition 36(1), 132-138. doi
Forty-nine students texted their daily happiness on vacation; afterward the vacation's length had no effect on their overall rating, they could not recall the daily detail, and the peak-end rule was not an outstandingly good predictor of what they remembered.
Miron-Shatz (2009). Evaluating multiepisode events: Boundary conditions for the peak-end rule. Emotion 9(2), 206-213. doi
In large samples from the United States, France and Denmark rating the previous day episode by episode, the time-weighted average of feelings predicted the day's overall evaluation better than its peak and end, with lows also weighing in.
Alaybek, Dalal, Fyffe, Aitken, Zhou, Qu, Roman, Baines (2022). All's well that ends (and peaks) well? A meta-analysis of the peak-end rule and duration neglect. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 170, 104149. doi
A meta-analysis of 174 effect sizes finds a large peak-end effect on retrospective evaluations, r of 0.58, robust across conditions and comparable to the effect of the overall average, with the duration of the experience having essentially no effect.

Identified and statistical lives: the seen and the unseen

Jenni, Loewenstein (1997). Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 14(3), 235-257. doi
Sets out four possible causes of the identifiable victim effect and finds in two studies that the strongest is the share of those at risk who can be saved, which is high for an identified victim and low for a statistical one.
Repenning, Sterman (2001). Nobody Ever Gets Credit for Fixing Problems That Never Happened: Creating and Sustaining Process Improvement. California Management Review 43(4), 64-88. doi
Explains why most improvement programs fail to deliver even though the tools work: the failure lies in how the effort interacts with the organization's physical, economic, social and psychological structures, and the article shows how successful firms overcame it.
Small, Loewenstein (2003). Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(1), 5-16. doi
Even the weakest identification raised caring: people gave more to compensate losers, and to a charity family, already chosen from a list than to ones about to be chosen from the same list, with no personal information given.
Viscusi, Aldy (2003). The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1), 5-76. doi
Reviews more than 60 studies from ten countries of the wage premiums workers receive for fatal risk, the basis of the value of a statistical life, and finds its income elasticity about 0.5 to 0.6, with a discussion of how the estimates are used in policy.
Kogut, Ritov (2005). The "identified victim" effect: an identified group, or just a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 18(3), 157-167. doi
The extra giving to an identified victim held for a single person but not for a group of eight identified people, and distress was highest for the single identified victim, so the effect is largely an emotional reaction to one.
Slovic (2007). "If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and Decision Making 2(2), 79-95. doi
Argues from psychological research that people who will make great efforts to rescue one person grow numbly indifferent to the many, because feeling fades as numbers grow, and offers this psychic numbing as part of the explanation for the neglect of mass killing.
Small, Loewenstein, Slovic (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102(2), 143-153. doi
In field experiments, teaching or priming people to notice that they give more to identified than to statistical victims reduced giving to the identified victim without raising giving to statistical ones, so total giving fell.
Lee, Feeley (2016). The identifiable victim effect: a meta-analytic review. Social Influence 11(3), 199-215. doi
A meta-analysis of 41 studies finds the identifiable victim effect significant but modest, a correlation of 0.05, and reliable mainly with a single victim, a photographed child in poverty, little responsibility for the need, and a request for money.
Maier, Wong, Feldman (2024). Revisiting and Rethinking the Identifiable Victim Effect: Replication and Extension of Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007). Collabra: Psychology 9(1). doi
A preregistered replication of Small, Loewenstein and Slovic with hypothetical donations found no identifiable victim effect and no debiasing, and a reanalysis suggested publication bias in the literature; the authors suggest insensitivity to the number of victims as the better description.

Watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor

The research behind seven entries added to existing families of the Library on 12 October 2026, from a reading of the Gospel of Luke (the Pharisees watching, and the places of honor at the feast): 64 papers on regulatory capture and the revolving door (Stigler, Peltzman, Laffont and Tirole), raising rivals' costs through rules, licenses and franchise laws (Salop and Scheffman; Krattenmaker and Salop), enforcement and what scrutiny finds (Becker), scapegoats in markets, boardrooms and politics (Bacchetta and van Wincoop), double binds and the questions managers do not answer (Bateson and coauthors), countersignaling (Feltovich, Harbaugh and To) and hubris in acquisitions (Roll; Malmendier and Tate). Each carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and findings that cut against a model are listed beside it.

Regulatory capture: the economic theory of regulation and the revolving door

Stigler (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 3. doi
Argues that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry it governs and is designed and operated mainly for its benefit, because the state's power to coerce, to tax, to license entry and to fix prices, is a resource an organized industry can win.
Posner (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2), 335. doi
Sets the public interest theory of regulation against the theory that regulation is supplied to interest groups competing to raise their members' incomes, judges the economists' version of the second the more promising, and lists the weaknesses of both and of the evidence offered for them.
Peltzman (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics 19(2), 211-240. doi
Extends and generalizes Stigler's theory of regulation and reaches a conclusion Stigler shared: a regulatory agency will not serve a single economic interest exclusively.
Becker (1983). A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371. doi
Political outcomes are an equilibrium of competing pressure groups; deadweight costs discourage pressure by subsidized groups and encourage pressure by taxpayers, so government that corrects market failures and government that favors the powerful come from the same competition.
Laffont, Tirole (1991). The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), 1089-1127. doi
An agency model of interest-group politics: the response to the risk of capture is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation, which means low-powered incentives for regulated firms, and a group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient regulation.
Dal Bó (2006). Regulatory Capture: A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225. doi
Reviews the theory and evidence on regulatory capture, from the Stigler and Peltzman approach to models of hidden information, common agency, revolving doors and informational lobbying, with the evidence on the revolving door and on how the way regulators are chosen affects outcomes.
Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, Trebbi (2014). Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking . The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(2), 889-938. doi
Federal and state bank supervisors, rotated by law through the same banks, apply identical rules differently: federal supervisors downgrade almost twice as often, state leniency goes with higher failure rates, and the evidence gives no support to the revolving door as the reason.
Correia (2014). Political connections and SEC enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics 57(2-3), 241-262. doi
Firms with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying are less likely to face SEC enforcement actions and pay lower penalties when they do, especially when the contributions go to politicians able to press the SEC or to lobbyists who once worked there.
Lucca, Seru, Trebbi (2014). The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. Journal of Monetary Economics 65, 17-32. doi
Career histories of federal and state bank regulators show flows out of regulation into the private sector rising in booms and in periods of intense enforcement, a pattern the authors find inconsistent with a quid pro quo and consistent with regulators acquiring skills the industry pays for.
Heese, Khan, Ramanna (2017). Is the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviews. Journal of Accounting and Economics 64(1), 98-122. doi
Politically connected firms receive more SEC comment-letter reviews, with more issues raised and more senior staff involved, evidence the authors read as inconsistent with capture and as a more nuanced relation than the enforcement studies suggested.
Kempf (2020). The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 135(1), 41-67. doi
Investment banks hire the more accurate rating analysts, and as an analyst's chance of being hired by a bank rises, the accuracy of the analyst's ratings of securitized products improves: the revolving door can sharpen incentives as well as threaten capture.

Raising rivals' costs: rules, licenses and franchise laws as competitive weapons

Leland (1979). Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards. Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1328-1346. doi
Minimum quality standards can raise welfare in markets where buyers cannot judge quality, though they are not a first-best remedy, and standards set by the profession or the industry itself are likely to be set too high.
Krattenmaker, Salop (1986). Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price. The Yale Law Journal 96(2), 209. doi
Proposes a two-step test for exclusion: does the conduct unavoidably and significantly raise competitors' costs, and does that let the excluding firm raise its own price above the competitive level; harm to competitors alone is not harm to competition.
Shapiro (1986). Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing. The Review of Economic Studies 53(5), 843. doi
Licensing as a required minimum investment in training eases moral hazard over quality; licensing and certification help buyers who value quality highly at the expense of those who do not, and licensing lowers welfare when training is observable.
Bartel, Thomas (1987). Predation through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Journal of Law and Economics 30(2), 239-264. doi
Uneven compliance costs and uneven enforcement of workplace safety and environmental rules gave large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt competitive gains at the expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt, offsetting much of the rules' direct cost to them.
Salop, Scheffman (1987). Cost-Raising Strategies. The Journal of Industrial Economics 36(1), 19. doi
Strategies that raise rivals' costs have advantages over predatory pricing: they are credible, need not drive the rival out, and need not require classical market power; a general model is applied to overbuying inputs and to vertical integration.
Granitz, Klein (1996). Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case. The Journal of Law and Economics 39(1), 1-47. doi
Standard Oil dominated refining in the 1870s through a transportation cartel: railroads charged rival refiners disadvantageously high rates and Standard policed the cartel by shifting its shipments, and whenever the cartel broke down, Standard's pricing power vanished.
Kleiner (2000). Occupational Licensing. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4), 189-202. doi
Weighs the case for occupational licensing, better quality for those served, against its costs, a restricted supply of labor that raises the price of the work and of the services, and identifies the policies that could replace it.
Lafontaine, Scott Morton (2010). Markets: State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(3), 233-250. doi
State franchise laws, won by dealers' associations whose businesses yield about a fifth of state sales taxes, all but guarantee dealer profitability and survival at manufacturers' expense, and the evidence suggests they raise distribution costs and retail car prices.
Kleiner, Krueger (2013). Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market. Journal of Labor Economics 31(S1), S173-S202. doi
A national survey designed for the purpose finds 29 percent of employees licensed by government and 35 percent licensed or certified; licensing is associated with wages about 18 percent higher, government certification with much less.

Enforcement and detection: what scrutiny finds and what it misses

Becker (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76(2), 169-217. doi
Treats offenses as choices and asks how many resources and how much punishment should go to enforcing each law, that is, how many offenses should be permitted; the answer turns on the cost of catching and convicting offenders, the form of punishment and offenders' responses.
Polinsky, Shavell (2000). The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. Journal of Economic Literature 38(1), 45-76. doi
Surveys the theory of public enforcement: how the probability and size of sanctions and the rule of liability should be set, with extensions to errors, marginal deterrence, self-reporting, repeat offenders and imperfect knowledge of the chance of being caught.
Karpoff, Lee, Martin (2008). The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43(3), 581-611. doi
Across 585 firms subject to SEC actions for financial misrepresentation, legal penalties averaged $23.5 million while the market's reputational penalty exceeded 7.5 times all legal penalties; each dollar of inflated value was lost on revelation, plus $3.08 more.
Li (2010). Corporate Financial Fraud: An Application of Detection Controlled Estimation. Working paper, SSRN 1698038. doi
Models corporate fraud and its detection together, allowing for fraud that is never detected, and finds that ignoring incomplete detection biases downward the estimated effects of the factors that drive fraud.
Wang, Winton, Yu (2010). Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs. The Journal of Finance 65(6), 2255-2292. doi
Fraud at going public rises with investor optimism about an industry's prospects but falls when beliefs are extremely high, through investors' monitoring and short-term executive pay, both of which move with those beliefs: how closely investors watch varies with the cycle.
Kedia, Rajgopal (2011). Do the SEC's enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct? Journal of Accounting and Economics 51(3), 259-278. doi
Firms closer to an SEC office, and in areas with more past SEC enforcement, are less likely to restate their financial statements, and the resource-constrained SEC is more likely to investigate firms near its offices: where the regulator looks shapes both conduct and what is found.

Scapegoats: blame that settles on one cause

Staw, McKechnie, Puffer (1983). The Justification of Organizational Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 28(4), 582. doi
Letters to shareholders show strong self-serving attributions, enhancing and defensive; they were followed by stock price gains, and enhancement by officers' selling, which suggests impression management rather than genuine optimism.
Weaver (1986). The Politics of Blame Avoidance. Journal of Public Policy 6(4), 371-398. doi
Politicians are moved more by avoiding blame for unpopular actions than by claiming credit for popular ones, because voters weigh losses more than gains; the strategies that follow include limiting the agenda, scapegoating, passing the buck and jumping on the bandwagon.
Boeker (1992). Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top. Administrative Science Quarterly 37(3), 400. doi
In 67 organizations over 22 years, powerful chief executives were less likely to be dismissed after performance declines; they displaced the blame onto subordinate top managers, who were replaced while the chief executive stayed.
Khanna, Poulsen (1995). Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains or Scapegoats? The Journal of Finance 50(3), 919-940. doi
Managers of firms that filed for Chapter 11 made decisions very like those of managers of healthier firms, and the market did not react positively when they were replaced: when managers are blamed for financial distress, they serve as scapegoats.
Bertrand, Mullainathan (2001). Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3), 901-932. doi
CEO pay responds as much to a lucky dollar, from observable shocks beyond the CEO's control, as to a general dollar of performance, consistent with CEOs who have captured their own pay setting; better governed firms pay their CEOs less for luck.
Bacchetta, van Wincoop (2004). A Scapegoat Model of Exchange-Rate Fluctuations. American Economic Review 94(2), 114-118. doi
In a monetary model with noisy rational expectations, investors unsure of a structural parameter rationally blame exchange rate moves driven by unobserved factors on an observed fundamental with a large imbalance, so the scapegoat, and its apparent effect, change over time.
Bacchetta, van Wincoop (2013). On the unstable relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals. Journal of International Economics 91(1), 18-26. doi
When structural parameters are unknown and change slowly, expectations of them can swing widely through rational scapegoat effects, which explains the unstable relation between exchange rates and fundamentals while leaving volatility and forecasting power little changed.
Fratzscher, Rime, Sarno, Zinna (2015). The scapegoat theory of exchange rates: the first tests. Journal of Monetary Economics 70, 1-21. doi
Survey data recording which fundamentals traders blamed for the moves of 12 exchange rates support the scapegoat theory: the resulting models explain much of the variation and direction of exchange rates in sample, though their forecasts out of sample are mixed.
Jenter, Kanaan (2015). CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation. The Journal of Finance 70(5), 2155-2184. doi
In 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, CEOs were more likely to be fired after bad industry and, less so, bad market performance, factors beyond their control; a fall in industry performance from the 90th to the 10th percentile doubled the chance of a forced turnover.

Double binds, loaded questions and non-answers

Bateson, Jackson, Haley, Weakland (1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia. Behavioral Science 1(4), 251-264. doi
Describes the double bind, a situation in which whatever a person does, he cannot win, from communications analysis and the theory of logical types, and hypothesizes that a person caught in it repeatedly within a family may develop schizophrenic symptoms.
Ringuette, Kennedy (1966). An experimental study of the double bind hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 71(2), 136-141. doi
Judges expert in the double bind concept could not reliably agree on whether letters contained double bind communication, which undercut its use as a test of the hypothesis about schizophrenia and called for a more critical appraisal of the concept.
Hennestad (1990). The Symbolic Impact of Double Bind Leadership: Double Bind and the Dynamics of Organizational Culture. Journal of Management Studies 27(3), 265-280. doi
Members of an organization caught in conflicting management signals, and unable to comment on the contradiction, cannot learn about their situation; in extreme cases the organization narrows its own horizon, and attempts to change direction are experienced as one more double bind.
Bull (1994). On Identifying Questions, Replies, and Non-Replies in Political Interviews. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 13(2), 115-131. doi
From 33 televised British political interviews, sets out guidelines for identifying questions, replies and non-replies, and argues that responses lie on a continuum, with many intermediate responses between a full reply and a complete failure to answer.
Clayman (2001). Answers and evasions. Language in Society 30(3), 403-442. doi
In broadcast news interviews, interviewees who resist a question's agenda do so overtly, with damage control, or covertly, by making the resistance less conspicuous; both lower the cost of resisting, and the norm of answering stays strong.
Hollander, Pronk, Roelofsen (2010). Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research 48(3), 531-563. doi
Managers regularly leave participants in conference calls in the dark by not answering their questions, and investors interpret the silence negatively: no news is read as bad news.
Rogers, Norton (2011). The artful dodger: Answering the wrong question the right way. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 17(2), 139-147. doi
Listeners often fail to notice when a speaker answers a similar but different question, and so do not judge the dodger worse; detection rises when the question stays in view, and a fluent answer to the wrong question was rated above a halting answer to the right one.
Smith, Lewis (2011). Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing. Academy of Management Review 36(2), 381-403. doi
Reviews the study of paradox in organizations and proposes a dynamic equilibrium model in which cyclical responses to contradictory demands sustain peak performance in the present and success in the future.
Gow, Larcker, Zakolyukina (2021). Non-Answers During Conference Calls. Journal of Accounting Research 59(4), 1349-1384. doi
A linguistic measure finds that about 11 percent of analysts' questions on conference calls draw non-answers, a stable rate; negative, uncertain, complex or detailed questions, and questions on performance or proprietary information, are the likeliest to go unanswered.

Countersignaling: the low seat, the quiet brand and the beatable forecast

Feltovich, Harbaugh, To (2002). Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 630. doi
When other noisy information about quality exists, medium types signal to separate from low types while high types skip the signal or countersignal, saving its cost and showing a confidence that separates them from medium types; experiments confirm that subjects learn to countersignal.
Cotter, Tuna, Wysocki (2006). Expectations Management and Beatable Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance? Contemporary Accounting Research 23(3), 593-624. doi
Managers give public guidance more often when analysts' forecasts are optimistic; analysts react quickly, and guidance makes it more likely that the final consensus is a target the company can meet or beat.
Araujo, Gottlieb, Moreira (2007). A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics 38(4), 1020-1043. doi
In a job market model where one signal conveys two kinds of information, countersignaling is more likely in jobs that need a different mix of skills from the one schooling uses; the GED signals high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and does not raise wages.
Berger, Ward (2010). Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption. Journal of Consumer Research 37(4), 555-569. doi
Across product categories the most expensive goods are less likely to carry visible logos; subtle markers let insiders recognize each other and stand apart from mainstream buyers, who prefer explicit, widely recognized symbols of prestige.
Han, Nunes, Drèze (2010). Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence. Journal of Marketing 74(4), 15-30. doi
Wealthy buyers low in need for status pay a premium for quiet luxury goods only their own kind recognize, the wealthy high in need for status buy loud ones to set themselves apart from the less affluent, and those who cannot afford them buy loud counterfeits.
Bellezza, Gino, Keinan (2014). The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity. Journal of Consumer Research 41(1), 35-54. doi
Nonconforming behavior, such as gym clothes in a luxury boutique or red sneakers at work, can lead observers to confer higher status and competence; the effect disappears when observers do not know the setting's norms or the nonconformity looks unintentional.
Sezer, Gino, Norton (2018). Humblebragging: A distinct, and ineffective, self-presentation strategy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 114(1), 52-74. doi
Across nine studies, bragging masked by a complaint or by humility is common but less effective than plain bragging: it lowers liking, perceived competence, compliance and generosity, because it is seen as insincere.

Hubris in acquisitions: overconfident bidders and the market's verdict

Hayward, Hambrick (1997). Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(1), 103. doi
In 106 large acquisitions, premiums rose with signs of CEO hubris (recent company performance, media praise, self-importance), more so with an inside board or a CEO who also chaired it; acquirers' shareholders lost, and lost more the greater the hubris and the premium.
Andrade, Mitchell, Stafford (2001). New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2), 103-120. doi
Merger activity clusters by industry, with deregulation behind nearly half of it since the late 1980s; from 1973 to 1998 the combined announcement return of the merging firms is positive and operating performance improves relative to industry peers.
Hietala, Kaplan, Robinson (2003). What Is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies. Financial Management 32(3), 5. doi
Shows when stock prices around a takeover contest reveal a bidder's overpayment and the synergies, and estimates from the 1994 contest for Paramount that Viacom overpaid by more than $2 billion, although Viacom's CEO owned about three quarters of it.
Shleifer, Vishny (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70(3), 295-311. doi
A model of mergers driven by stock market misvaluation of the merging firms and by the market's perception of synergies explains who acquires whom, the choice of cash or stock, the valuation consequences and merger waves.
Luo (2005). Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 60(4), 1951-1982. doi
The market's reaction to a merger announcement predicts whether the deal is later completed, beyond what the market anticipated, suggesting that merging companies learn from the reaction, more so when canceling is easier.
Malmendier, Tate (2005). CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. The Journal of Finance 60(6), 2661-2700. doi
CEOs classified as overconfident, because they keep too much personal exposure to their company's risk, overestimate the returns to their projects: their firms' investment is more sensitive to cash flow, especially where the firm depends on equity.
Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz (2005). Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. The Journal of Finance 60(2), 757-782. doi
Acquirers' shareholders lost 12 cents per dollar spent around announcements from 1998 to 2001, $240 billion in all, against 1.6 cents in the 1980s; most of the loss came from a few deals with negative synergies by very highly valued firms, which did poorly afterward.
Masulis, Wang, Xie (2007). Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns. The Journal of Finance 62(4), 1851-1889. doi
Acquirers with more antitakeover provisions earn significantly lower announcement returns, consistent with managers shielded from the market for corporate control indulging in empire building, while acquirers in competitive industries or with a separate chair earn more.
Billett, Qian (2008). Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers. Management Science 54(6), 1037-1051. doi
CEOs' first acquisitions show no announcement effect and later ones negative effects; past success raises the chance of another deal without curbing its losses, and CEOs buy more of their own stock before later deals, consistent with self-attribution bias feeding overconfidence.
Kau, Linck, Rubin (2008). Do managers listen to the market? Journal of Corporate Finance 14(4), 347-362. doi
Managers are more likely to cancel major investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the announcement, and listen more when large blockholders hold more shares and CEO pay is more sensitive to performance, against Roll's view that hubris makes them ignore the market.
Malmendier, Tate (2009). Superstar CEOs . Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4), 1593-1638. doi
CEOs who win prestigious business awards then underperform their own past and matched non-winners, while taking more pay, more outside activities such as board seats and book writing, and more earnings management, most where governance is weak.
Ben-David, Graham, Harvey (2013). Managerial Miscalibration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1547-1584. doi
In more than 13,300 forecasts, executives' 80 percent confidence intervals for the stock market's return contained the outcome only 36 percent of the time; those miscalibrated about the market are miscalibrated about their own firms, which invest and borrow more.
Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, Roll (2016). CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51(1), 113-137. doi
Narcissistic acquiring CEOs negotiate faster and are marginally more likely to initiate deals; narcissism in either CEO lowers the chance a deal is completed, and acquirers' shareholders react less favorably when the target's CEO is more narcissistic.

Falsification and severe tests

The research behind one entry added to the Library's family Weighing evidence on 13 October 2026, falsification-before-conviction: 9 papers on severe tests and the Duhem-Quine problem (Quine; Mayo and Spanos; Gelman and Shalizi), on how people test ideas and how forecasts are scored (Wason; Klayman and Ha; Nickerson; Mellers and others) and on why published tests fail to hold (Ioannidis; the Open Science Collaboration). Popper, Duhem, Lakatos, Kuhn, Tetlock and Mayo are books. Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and findings that cut against a model are listed beside it.

Falsification, severe tests and the Duhem-Quine problem

Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review 60(1), 20. doi
Argues that statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not one at a time but only as a corporate body, so that a failed prediction can be met by revising any part of the web of belief.
Mayo, Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(2), 323-357. doi
Argues that a hypothesis may be inferred from data only if it has passed a severe test, one the hypothesis would probably have failed if it were false, and uses that criterion to avoid fallacies from tests that are too sensitive or not sensitive enough.
Gelman, Shalizi (2013). Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 66(1), 8-38. doi
Argues that the most successful Bayesian statistics accords better with hypothetico-deductivism than with Bayesian confirmation: priors do their work in models that are checked against data and revised when they fail.

How people test ideas, and how forecasts are scored

Wason (1960). On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12(3), 129-140. doi
In a task built so that confirming evidence alone would almost certainly mislead, only six of 29 subjects reached the correct rule without first reaching an incorrect one; 13 reached one incorrect conclusion and nine two or more.
Klayman, Ha (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review 94(2), 211-228. doi
Shows that much of what is called confirmation bias is better described as a positive test strategy, testing cases expected to have the property of interest, which is informative in many settings and misleads in others.
Nickerson (1998). Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises. Review of General Psychology 2(2), 175-220. doi
Reviews evidence that people seek and interpret evidence in ways partial to the beliefs and hypotheses they already hold, with examples from several practical settings, possible explanations, and a discussion of whether the habit is useful.
Mellers, Ungar, Baron and others (2014). Psychological Strategies for Winning a Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament. Psychological Science 25(5), 1106-1115. doi
In a two-year tournament in which every forecast was scored against what happened, training in probability, teaming and tracking the best performers each improved accuracy.

When published tests fail to hold

Ioannidis (2005). Why Most Published Research Findings Are False. PLoS Medicine 2(8), e124. doi
Shows that the chance a claimed finding is true depends on study power, bias, the number of teams chasing significance and the ratio of true to false relationships in the field, and can fall below one half.
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 349(6251). doi
Replicating 100 experiments published in three psychology journals in 2008 reproduced the original result in about one-third to one-half of them, depending on the criterion.

The raven paradox: which evidence counts

The research behind one entry added to the Library's family Weighing evidence on 14 October 2026, which-evidence-counts: 5 papers on the raven paradox and the Bayesian answer to it (Hosiasson-Lindenbaum; Maher; Vranas; Fitelson and Hawthorne) and on learning from the survivors (Denrell). Hempel's essays, Goodman's Fact, Fiction, and Forecast and Quine's Ontological Relativity are books; Hempel's 1945 paper and Good's notes of 1960 and 1967 are named in the entry. Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and findings that cut against a model are listed beside it.

The raven paradox and Bayesian confirmation

Hosiasson-Lindenbaum (1940). On confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 5(4), 133-148. doi
Takes a few plain axioms for a degree of confirmation between sentences, a number between 0 and 1, and derives from them theorems that settle several problems about confirmation in a strict way.
Maher (1999). Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox. Philosophy of Science 66(1), 50-70. doi
Traces the ravens paradox to three plausible principles of confirmation that cannot all hold, uses Carnap's inductive logic to say which one is false and why, and names a true principle close enough to it to explain why the false one seems right.
Vranas (2004). Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55(3), 545-560. doi
Sets out the standard Bayesian answer, that a nonblack nonraven does confirm that all ravens are black but only to a minute degree, and argues that it rests on a rarely defended assumption: that learning an object is nonblack should not change the probability of the hypothesis.
Fitelson, Hawthorne (2010). The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24(1), 207-241. doi
Retraces the history of the paradox of confirmation from Hempel and Goodman and applies recent Bayesian treatments of it to the Wason selection task, which cognitive scientists had modeled on the older philosophy.

Learning from the survivors

Denrell (2003). Vicarious Learning, Undersampling of Failure, and the Myths of Management. Organization Science 14(3), 227-243. doi
Shows that firms visible at any time are the survivors of a process that removed many others, and that the press favors successes, so learning from them undersamples failure and can make a risky practice that is unrelated to performance look like a cause of success.

The narrative fallacy and hindsight

The research behind one entry added to the Library's family Weighing evidence on 15 October 2026, the-story-that-fits-too-well: 3 papers on hindsight bias, how strong it is across studies and what it costs investors (Guilbault and others; Biais and Weber; Roese and Vohs). Taleb's The Black Swan, which names the narrative fallacy, and Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow are already listed as books, and Fischhoff's 1975 paper is named in the entry. Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Hindsight and the stories told after the outcome

Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, Posavac (2004). A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 26(2-3), 103-117. doi
Pools 95 studies of hindsight bias and finds a moderate effect overall, larger for objective probability estimates and for almanac questions than for real-world events and case histories.
Biais, Weber (2009). Hindsight Bias, Risk Perception, and Investment Performance. Management Science 55(6), 1018-1029. doi
Models hindsight bias as forgetting how little one knew before the news, which makes people learning about volatility underestimate it; in experiments, more biased students gave lower volatility estimates and more biased investment bankers performed worse.
Roese, Vohs (2012). Hindsight Bias. Perspectives on Psychological Science 7(5), 411-426. doi
Reviews the evidence that people judge an event more predictable once it is known, traces the bias to selective recall, the ease of understanding a known outcome and the wish for an orderly world, and finds it narrows attention to one explanation and feeds overconfidence.

Pandora's box: searching among costly options

The research behind one entry added to the Library's family Deciding under uncertainty on 27 October 2026, pandoras-box: Weitzman's 1979 paper, which names Pandora's problem and proves her rule, Gittins on the index idea it shares, and 5 later papers on choosing a set at once, payoffs beyond the best prize, auctions when bidders pay to look, and taking an option without checking it (Chade and Smith; Olszewski and Weber; Kleinberg, Waggoner and Weyl; Doval; Beyhaghi and Kleinberg). Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found.

Searching among costly options: Pandora's rule and what came after

Gittins (1979). Bandit Processes and Dynamic Allocation Indices. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology 41(2), 148-164. doi
Gives a unified account of dynamic allocation indices, which reduce problems of choosing among competing projects to computing one index per project, with applications to scheduling, sequential clinical trials and a class of search problems.
Weitzman (1979). Optimal Search for the Best Alternative. Econometrica 47(3), 641. doi
Shows that when costly checks reveal independent prizes and only the best is kept, each option gets a reservation value from its own features; checking in descending order and stopping once a prize beats every unchecked value is optimal, so a long shot may rightly come first.
Chade, Smith (2006). Simultaneous Search. Econometrica 74(5), 1293-1307. doi
Solves the case where costly options must be chosen all at once, as when a student applies to several colleges, and finds a greedy rule picks the optimal set, which is less aggressive than the sequential choice and more aggressive than the best single option.
Olszewski, Weber (2015). A more general Pandora rule? Journal of Economic Theory 160, 429-437. doi
Asks whether Pandora's rule extends to payoffs that depend on every prize found rather than only the best, and shows in what sense it cannot: a generalized rule is optimal only when the problem can be recast in Weitzman's best-prize form.
Kleinberg, Waggoner, Weyl (2016). Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 23-24. doi
Shows that when bidders must pay to learn what a good is worth, a descending price auction keeps its usual properties because it guarantees a price at the moment of investigation, while ascending and simultaneous auctions waste checks on goods already well placed and discourage needed ones.
Doval (2018). Whether or not to open Pandora's box. Journal of Economic Theory 175, 127-158. doi
Lets the searcher take an option without checking it first, which saves the check but risks a disappointment, and finds conditions under which the optimal policy can be characterized; both the order of checks and the stopping rule may then differ from Weitzman's.
Beyhaghi, Kleinberg (2019). Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection. Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 131-132. doi
Finds that once options may be taken unchecked no simple ranking policy is optimal, and gives simple committing policies that always reach at least 1 - 1/e, about 63 percent, of the optimal value, and 4/5 with two options.

The 2026 economics prize: rate rules, news and spending, guidance, debt and taxes

The research behind five entries added to existing families of the Library on 13 October 2026 from the work of Robert E. Hall and Michael Woodford, the 2026 economics laureates: 36 papers on interest-rate rules, the neutral rate and the output gap (Rotemberg and Woodford; Clarida, Gali and Gertler; Laubach and Williams; Orphanides), on consumption that moves only on news and on who spends a windfall (Hall; Hall and Mishkin; Campbell and Mankiw; Johnson, Parker and Souleles; Boehm, Fize and Jaravel), on forward guidance and its puzzle (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson; McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson; Gabaix; Angeletos and Lian), on the fiscal theory of the price level with its critics (Woodford; Cochrane; Buiter; Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba) and on taxes and the cost of capital (House and Shapiro; Zwick and Mahon). Woodford's Interest and Prices, Wicksell, Friedman, Cochrane and Hall and Jorgenson are listed as books. Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, on what it found, and findings that cut against a model are listed beside it.

Interest-rate rules, the neutral rate and the output gap

Rotemberg, Woodford (1997). An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 12, 297-346. doi
Builds a small estimated model of output, interest rates and inflation derived from optimizing buyers and price-setting sellers, and uses it to compare rules by which the Fed might set interest rates.
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999). The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature 37(4), 1661-1707. doi
Reviews monetary policy rules in a simple New Keynesian framework and shows that optimal policy implicitly incorporates inflation targeting, with gains from a credible commitment to fight inflation.
Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000). Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 147-180. doi
Estimates a forward-looking Fed reaction function and finds that policy responded much more strongly to expected inflation after 1979 than before, which matters for economic stability.
Orphanides (2001). Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data. American Economic Review 91(4), 964-985. doi
Shows that policy recommendations from Taylor's rule computed with data available at the time differ considerably from those computed with later revised data.
Orphanides, Norden (2002). The Unreliability of Output-Gap Estimates in Real Time. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(4), 569-583. doi
Finds that later revisions of the estimated output gap are as large as the gap itself, mostly because end-of-sample estimates are unreliable.
Eggertsson, Woodford (2003). Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003(1), 139-233. doi
Analyzes how a central bank should conduct policy when the policy rate cannot go below zero, using the same expectations-based model of the economy.
Laubach, Williams (2003). Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4), 1063-1070. doi
Estimates the natural rate of interest and trend growth jointly with a Kalman filter and finds a close link between the two, with wide uncertainty around each estimate.
Blanchard, Gali (2007). Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39(s1), 35-65. doi
Shows that with real wage rigidity the basic New Keynesian model gains a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap, which the standard version lacks.

News, consumption smoothing and hand-to-mouth households

Hall (1978). Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy 86(6), 971-987. doi
Shows that optimizing consumers make consumption follow a random walk with trend, so that nothing but current consumption should help predict its future change, and finds income has no predictive power while stock prices do.
Flavin (1981). The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income. Journal of Political Economy 89(5), 974-1009. doi
Finds that consumption reacts more to current income than the permanent income hypothesis allows, rejecting the joint rational expectations and permanent income view.
Hall, Mishkin (1982). The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income: Estimates from Panel Data on Households. Econometrica 50(2), 461. doi
Finds in a panel of about 2,000 households that consumption responds much more to permanent than to transitory income, and that the data fit 80 percent of families behaving as the theory says and 20 percent consuming current income.
Hall (1988). Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption. Journal of Political Economy 96(2), 339-357. doi
Finds no strong evidence in twentieth-century U.S. data that consumption growth responds to expected real interest rates, so the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is likely small.
Campbell, Deaton (1989). Why is Consumption So Smooth? The Review of Economic Studies 56(3), 357. doi
Argues that U.S. consumption is smooth because it responds with a lag to income changes, not because permanent income is smoother than measured income.
Campbell, Mankiw (1989). Consumption, Income, and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 4, 185-216. doi
Proposes that aggregate data are best read as two groups of consumers, half following permanent income and half consuming current income.
Zeldes (1989). Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy 97(2), 305-346. doi
Tests the permanent income hypothesis against borrowing constraints using family panel data.
Carroll (1997). Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 1-55. doi
Argues that households facing income uncertainty who are sufficiently impatient save as buffer-stock savers, whose consumption growth tracks income growth rather than tastes alone.
Parker (1999). The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes. American Economic Review 89(4), 959-973. doi
Tests whether predictable changes in income move consumption growth, using the payroll tax cap, a test of the central prediction of the life-cycle model.
Souleles (1999). The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds. American Economic Review 89(4), 947-958. doi
Uses the predictable timing of income tax refunds to test whether consumption responds to expected income changes, as the permanent income theory says it should not.
Johnson, Parker, Souleles (2006). Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001. American Economic Review 96(5), 1589-1610. doi
Uses the random timing of the 2001 rebates and reports that households spent 20 to 40 percent of them on nondurables in the quarter received and about two thirds over two quarters.
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, McClelland (2013). Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008. American Economic Review 103(6), 2530-2553. doi
Uses the randomized timing of the 2008 stimulus payments and finds households spent 12 to 30 percent on nondurables in the quarter received and 50 to 90 percent counting durables.
Boehm, Fize, Jaravel (2025). Five Facts about MPCs: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. American Economic Review 115(1), 1-42. doi
Reports from a randomized experiment a one-month marginal propensity to consume of 23 percent on a cash-like transfer, higher on an expiring card, and high even for liquid wealthy households.

Communication, commitment and forward guidance

Kydland, Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85(3), 473-491. doi
Shows that discretionary policy fails to maximize the social objective because policy is a game against rational agents who anticipate it, which is the case for rules.
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, Jansen (2008). Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 46(4), 910-945. doi
Surveys the literature on central bank communication and finds it can move financial markets and make policy more predictable.
Campbell, Evans, Fisher, Justiniano (2012). Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2012(1), 1-80. doi
Separates commitment to a future action from a forecast of policy and examines how Fed statements can substitute for rate cuts at the zero bound.
Coibion, Gorodnichenko (2015). Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. American Economic Review 105(8), 2644-2678. doi
Finds pervasive evidence in professional forecasts and other agents that expectations adjust with information rigidities, a test of full-information rational expectations.
McKay, Nakamura, Steinsson (2016). The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited. American Economic Review 106(10), 3133-3158. doi
Shows that when households face uninsurable income risk and borrowing limits, precautionary saving weakens the effect of far-future promises about interest rates.
Angeletos, Lian (2018). Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge. American Economic Review 108(9), 2477-2512. doi
Shows that dropping the assumption of common knowledge weakens the effect of news about future policy and helps resolve the forward guidance puzzle.
Gabaix (2020). A Behavioral New Keynesian Model. American Economic Review 110(8), 2271-2327. doi
Adds cognitive discounting, partial myopia toward distant events, to the New Keynesian model, which removes the forward guidance puzzle and changes the Taylor principle.
Del Negro, Giannoni, Patterson (2023). The Forward Guidance Puzzle. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics 1(1), 43-79. doi
Shows that standard models grossly overstate the effect of forward guidance, whose measured effects on expectations were 28 and 8 times smaller than predicted, and offers a perpetual youth fix.

The fiscal theory of the price level

Sargent (1981). Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Quarterly Review 5(3). doi
Shows how, when fiscal policy dominates, the central bank's control over inflation can be limited by the need to finance government deficits.
Woodford (1995). Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 43(1), 1-46. doi
Argues that the price level can be determinate even when the central bank pegs interest rates, because it must equate the real value of government nominal liabilities with the present value of expected surpluses.
Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba (2001). Is the Price Level Determined by the Needs of Fiscal Solvency? American Economic Review 91(5), 1221-1238. doi
Argues that regimes in which surpluses respond to debt are as plausible as those in which the price level jumps to assure solvency, and fit postwar U.S. data better.
Cochrane (2001). Long-Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Econometrica 69(1), 69-116. doi
Shows that the maturity of the debt determines whether news of future deficits means inflation now or later, and that debt operations can trade current for future inflation.
Buiter (2002). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: A Critique. The Economic Journal 112(481), 459-480. doi
Argues that the fiscal theory confuses a budget constraint that must always hold with an equilibrium condition, producing contradictions and anomalies.

Taxes and the cost of capital

House, Shapiro (2008). Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation. American Economic Review 98(3), 737-768. doi
Uses the bonus depreciation episode to show that investment in qualifying capital rose sharply and estimates a high supply elasticity of investment.
Zwick, Mahon (2017). Tax Policy and Heterogeneous Investment Behavior. American Economic Review 107(1), 217-248. doi
Finds from over 120,000 firms that bonus depreciation raised eligible investment by 10.4 and 16.9 percent in two episodes, with small firms responding more than large ones.

AI, judgment and the choosing of ideas

What AI does to the making and the choosing of ideas: 13 papers, from field experiments in which people generated ideas with and without AI (Doshi and Hauser; Dell'Acqua and others; Terwiesch and others; Otis and others), through older work about picking the best idea and what dependent judges are worth (Clemen and Winkler; Smith and Winkler; Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrich; Mollick and Nanda), to tests of language models as judges (Panickssery, Bowman and Feng; Doshi and others; Wen and others; Sandström and Thelwall). Two of the field experiments appear here in their journal versions; their working papers are listed under Innovation, productivity and displacement, and the note of each journal version names its working paper. Each paper carries one sentence, in our words, saying what it found, and findings that cut against each other are listed side by side.

Generating ideas with AI: quality, sameness and who gains

Doshi, Hauser (2024). Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content. Science Advances 10(28). doi
In an online experiment where some writers got story ideas from a language model, their stories were judged more creative, better written and more enjoyable, especially among less creative writers, but more alike: writers are individually better off while together producing a narrower scope of novel content.
Dell'Acqua, Ayoubi, Lifshitz and others (2026). The Cybernetic Teammate: A Field Experiment on Generative AI and Teamwork. Organization Science 37(4), 1217-1242. doi
In a preregistered field experiment with 791 Procter & Gamble professionals, individuals using AI matched two-person teams without it and gave more balanced solutions whatever their background; AI chiefly raised the quality of the ideas generated, while human judgment kept its value in selecting among them.
Dell'Acqua, McFowland, Mollick and others (2026). Navigating the Jagged Technological Frontier: Field Experimental Evidence of the Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Knowledge Worker Productivity and Quality. Organization Science 37(2), 403-423. doi
Journal version of working paper SSRN 4573321: among 758 consultants, those given GPT-4 completed 12.2 percent more tasks inside the frontier of AI capabilities, 25.1 percent faster and at higher quality, but on a task chosen to lie outside it were 19 percentage points less likely to be correct (84.5 percent correct without AI, about 65 percent with it).
Otis, Clarke, Delecourt, Holtz, Koning (2026). The Uneven Impact of Generative Artificial Intelligence on Entrepreneurial Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya. Management Science. doi
Journal version of working paper SSRN 4671369: Kenyan entrepreneurs given a GPT-4 business assistant showed no measurable average change in revenues or profits, but initial low performers did nearly 10 percent worse and high performers may have gained over 15 percent, through the advice each chose to implement.
Terwiesch, Meincke, Girotra, Mollick, Nave, Ulrich (2026). Artificial intelligence and its impact on creativity and diversity: An empirical study of large language model-generated product ideas. Production and Operations Management. doi
Asked for products priced under $50 for college students, large language models gave ideas with higher purchase intent than humans', 7 times more likely to rank in the top 10 percent, but less novel and less diverse, a gap that pooling vendors, prompting and scale nearly close.

Choosing the best idea, and what dependent judges are worth

Clemen, Winkler (1985). Limits for the Precision and Value of Information from Dependent Sources. Operations Research 33(2), 427-442. doi
Shows that positive dependence among information sources can seriously reduce the precision and value of what they provide: the value of each added source can fall very rapidly, and the limit as sources are added can be considerably less than the expected value of perfect information.
Smith, Winkler (2006). The Optimizer's Curse: Skepticism and Postdecision Surprise in Decision Analysis. Management Science 52(3), 311-322. doi
Shows that choosing the alternative with the highest estimated value means its actual value should be expected to fall short of its estimate even when every estimate is unbiased, names this the optimizer's curse, and proposes Bayesian adjustment of the estimates as disciplined skepticism.
Girotra, Terwiesch, Ulrich (2010). Idea Generation and the Quality of the Best Idea. Management Science 56(4), 591-605. doi
Measuring a group by the quality of its best ideas, finds that a hybrid structure, individuals working alone and then together, generates more and better ideas and judges their quality better than a team working together throughout, and that building on others' ideas is counterproductive.
Mollick, Nanda (2016). Wisdom or Madness? Comparing Crowds with Expert Evaluation in Funding the Arts. Management Science 62(6), 1533-1553. doi
Comparing national experts with the crowd on the largest crowdfunding site in funding theater projects, finds significant agreement; where they disagree the crowd is far more likely to fund what experts would not, and outcomes of crowd-only projects did not differ from those both chose.

AI as a judge of ideas

Panickssery, Bowman, Feng (2024). LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generations. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37, 68772-68802. doi
Finds that language models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 can tell their own outputs from those of other models and of people with non-trivial accuracy, and that the stronger this self-recognition, the stronger their bias toward scoring their own outputs above texts people judge equally good.
Doshi, Bell, Mirzayev, Vanneste (2025). Generative artificial intelligence and evaluating strategic decisions. Strategic Management Journal 46(3), 583-610. doi
In two studies, each ranking 60 business models, finds that a large language model's single evaluations are often inconsistent and biased, but that evaluations aggregated across models, prompts and roles tend to resemble the rankings of human experts.
Wen, Si, Chen, He, Feng (2025). Predicting Empirical AI Research Outcomes with Language Models. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38, 2988-3005. doi
A fine-tuned GPT-4.1 with a paper retrieval agent picked the better-performing of two AI research ideas 64.4 percent of the time in natural language processing, against 48.9 percent for human experts, and 77 percent across 1,585 test pairs, while off-the-shelf frontier models did no better than chance.
Sandström, Thelwall (2026). Can Large Language Models Evaluate Grant Proposal Quality? Revisiting the Wennerås and Wold Peer Review Data. Journal of Data and Information Science. doi
Comparing scores from medium-sized open-weight language models with peer review of 142 Swedish Medical Council postdoctoral fellowship applications from 1994, finds the models agreed more with each other (mean Spearman 0.34) than with the experts (0.22), the best reaching about half the correlation between reviewers.

Books

Frank, Robert H. Microeconomics and Behavior. McGraw-Hill.
MMSS 211-1 Assigned text, Turbo Micro, Fall 2026.
Lay, Lay and McDonald. Linear Algebra and Its Applications, 6th ed. Pearson.
MATH 285 Assigned text, Accelerated Mathematics for MMSS.
Rice, John A. Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis, 3rd ed. Cengage.
MATH 385 Assigned text, Probability and Statistics for MMSS.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Cengage.
MATH 386-1 Assigned text, Econometrics for MMSS.
Gibbons, Robert (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press.
MMSS 211-2 Assigned text, Introduction to Game Theory.
Tadelis, Steven (2013). Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press.
MMSS 311-1 Assigned text, Advanced Game Theory.
Kreps, David M. (1988). Notes on the Theory of Choice. Westview Press.
MECS 550-1 The doctoral decision theory text at Kellogg MEDS.
Savage, Leonard J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley; Dover reprint 1972.
MECS 550-1 Subjective probability and expected utility from axioms.
Gilboa, Itzhak (2009). Theory of Decision under Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press.
MECS 550-1 Modern treatment including ambiguity.
Myerson, Roger B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
MECS 540-2 Written at MEDS; assigned in Political Economy II.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
MECS 540-2 Commitment, focal points, credible threats.
Muthoo, Abhinay (1999). Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge University Press.
MECS 540-2 Assigned background reading.
Salanie, Bernard (2005). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd ed. MIT Press.
MECS 465 Lectured from in Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
Bertsimas, Dimitris and Freund, Robert M. (2004). Data, Models, and Decisions: The Fundamentals of Management Science. Dynamic Ideas.
DECS-433 Decision trees, value of information, simulation cases.
Klibanoff, Sandroni, Moselle and Saraniti. Managerial Statistics: A Case-Based Approach. Cengage.
DECS-430/431 The Kellogg MBA statistics text, written in MEDS.
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer. Economics of Strategy, 7th ed. Wiley.
MECN-441 The Kellogg competitive strategy text.
Besanko, David and Braeutigam, Ronald. Microeconomics, 5th ed. Wiley.
MECN-430 Optional text, Microeconomic Analysis.
Dixit, Avinash K. and Pindyck, Robert S. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press.
DECS-433 Real options and the value of waiting.
Raiffa, Howard (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty. Addison-Wesley.
MECN-451 The decision tree and value of information tradition.
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
MECNX-435 Biases the executive dilemmas course teaches to anticipate.
Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
MMSS (1995 network curriculum) Centrality, structural equivalence, cohesive groups.
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
ECON 410 / MECS core The doctoral microeconomics reference.
Lanchester, F. W. (1916). Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. Constable.
MMSS 1995 (difference equations) The square law of concentrated force, later applied to market share battles.
Lotka, Alfred J. (1925). Elements of Physical Biology. Williams and Wilkins.
MMSS 1995 (difference equations) Predator and prey as coupled equations.
Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press.
MMSS 300 Why groups with a shared interest fail to act on it.
Forrester, Jay W. (1958). Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers. Harvard Business Review, 36(4), 37-66.
MECN-451 The founding article of system dynamics; feedback and delay in industrial supply chains.
Howard, Ronald A. and Abbas, Ali E. (2016). Foundations of Decision Analysis. Pearson.
MS&E 252 (Stanford) The Stanford decision analysis text: framing, alternatives, clairvoyance, probability encoding.
Sterman, John D. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. McGraw-Hill.
MECN-451 The standard text on feedback, stocks, flows, and delay in business systems.
Penman, Stephen H. Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation, 5th ed. McGraw-Hill.
Assigned in Columbia B8110; NYU Stern ACCT-GB.2303; NYU Stern Advanced Financial Statement Analysis; Ohio State Fisher AMIS 7220; and 3 more The graduate text for valuing a company from its statements, built on residual earnings.
Wahlen, James M., Baginski, Stephen P. and Bradshaw, Mark T. Financial Reporting, Financial Statement Analysis, and Valuation: A Strategic Perspective. Cengage.
Assigned in Chicago Booth 30130; Texas McCombs ACC 327; Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7; Wharton ACCT 742 Strategy, accounting quality, profitability and risk analysis, forecasting and valuation, in that order.
Easton, Peter D., McAnally, Mary Lea and Sommers, Gregory A. Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation. Cambridge Business Publishers.
Assigned in NYU Stern ACCT-GB.2303; NYU Stern ACCT-UB 3; Texas McCombs ACC 327; Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7; and 1 more The operating and financing split of the statements, carried through to forecasting and valuation.
Palepu, Krishna G. and Healy, Paul M. Business Analysis and Valuation: Using Financial Statements. Cengage.
Assigned in Berkeley Haas MBA 222; Columbia B8110; Texas McCombs ACC 327; Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7 Strategy analysis, accounting analysis, financial analysis and prospective analysis, in that order.
Lundholm, Russell and Sloan, Richard. Equity Valuation and Analysis. McGraw-Hill.
Assigned in Texas McCombs ACC 327; Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7; USC Marshall ACCT 581; Washington Foster ACCTG 510 Forecasting the statements and turning the forecast into a value.
White, Gerald I., Sondhi, Ashwinpaul C. and Fried, Dov. The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements, 3rd ed. Wiley.
Assigned in Columbia B8110; NYU Stern ACCT-GB.2303 The analyst's reference on how each accounting choice changes the reported numbers.
Revsine, Lawrence, Collins, Daniel W., Johnson, W. Bruce and Mittelstaedt, H. Fred. Financial Reporting and Analysis. McGraw-Hill.
Assigned in Northwestern Kellogg ACCT-451; NYU Stern ACCT-GB.2303 Financial reporting taught from the point of view of the person who has to use the statements.
Subramanyam, K. R. Financial Statement Analysis. McGraw-Hill.
Assigned in USC Marshall ACCT 581 Accounting analysis first, then profitability, cash flow and credit analysis.
Damodaran, Aswath. Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset. Wiley.
Assigned in MIT Sloan 15.535 The practitioner reference on discounted cash flow, relative valuation and their inputs.
Koller, Tim, Goedhart, Marc and Wessels, David. Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies. Wiley.
Assigned in Columbia B8110 The practitioner reference on return on invested capital, growth and value. An earlier edition, by Copeland, Koller and Murrin, is the one on the syllabus.
Penman, Stephen (2011). Accounting for Value. Columbia Business School Publishing.
Assigned in Texas McCombs ACC 380K.7; and 1 more Anchoring a valuation on book value and near-term earnings, and paying little for growth.
Rappaport, Alfred and Mauboussin, Michael J. (2021). Expectations Investing: Reading Stock Prices for Better Returns, revised ed. Columbia Business School Publishing.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey Reading the expectations in a price instead of forecasting a value.
Lev, Baruch and Gu, Feng (2016). The End of Accounting and the Path Forward for Investors and Managers. Wiley.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey The case that reported earnings and book value have lost relevance as investment moved into intangibles.
Graham, Benjamin and Dodd, David L. (1934). Security Analysis. McGraw-Hill.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey Where the discipline began: the margin of safety, and the reading of statements for what a business has actually earned.
Schilit, Howard M., Perler, Jeremy and Engelhart, Yoni. Financial Shenanigans, 4th ed. McGraw-Hill.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey A catalogue of the ways earnings and cash flow are flattered, with the filings that showed it.
Mulford, Charles W. and Comiskey, Eugene E. (2002). The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting Practices. Wiley.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey How aggressive accounting shows up in the statements, account by account.
Penman, Stephen and Pope, Peter F. (2025). Financial Statement Analysis for Value Investing. Columbia Business School Publishing.
Reference work, not found on a syllabus in the survey The most recent book-length treatment: value investing as the work of understanding a business through its accounting and challenging the price with it.
Mauboussin, Michael J. and Callahan, Dan (2022). ROIC and Intangible Assets: A Look at How Adjustments for Intangibles Affect ROIC. Counterpoint Global Insights, Morgan Stanley Investment Management.
Practitioner report, not found on a syllabus in the survey What treating intangible spending as investment does to measured returns on capital, worked on real companies.
Mauboussin, Michael J. and Callahan, Dan (2023). Stock-Based Compensation: Unpacking the Issues. Counterpoint Global Insights, Morgan Stanley Investment Management.
Practitioner report, not found on a syllabus in the survey Why paying people in stock is a real cost, and how to carry it through cash flow and valuation.
Aldasoro, Inaki, Doerr, Sebastian and Rees, Daniel (2026). Financing the AI boom: from cash flows to debt. BIS Bulletin No. 120, Bank for International Settlements.
Central bank bulletin, not found on a syllabus in the survey How the build-out of computing capacity moved from being paid for out of operating cash flow to being financed with debt.
Fridson and Alvarez (2022). Financial Statement Analysis: A Practitioner's Guide, 5th ed. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis A working analyst's guide to reading the statements skeptically, covering how reported numbers are shaped and how to use them in credit and equity work
O'Glove (1987). Quality of Earnings. Free Press.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis A practitioner's account of how to judge how much of a company's reported earnings is real, from close reading of the annual report
Dechow and Schrand (2004). Earnings Quality. Research Foundation of CFA Institute.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis A monograph for analysts on what makes earnings a good guide to a company, and on the research into persistence, accruals and earnings management
Mulford and Comiskey (2005). Creative Cash Flow Reporting: Uncovering Sustainable Financial Performance. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis How reported operating cash flow is flattered by classification and timing, and how to adjust it to a sustainable figure
Altman, Hotchkiss and Wang (2019). Corporate Financial Distress, Restructuring, and Bankruptcy, 4th ed. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis The reference on predicting corporate distress and on what happens in restructuring and bankruptcy, including the Z-score models
Ryan (2007). Financial Instruments and Institutions: Accounting and Disclosure Rules, 2nd ed. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis The accounting and disclosure rules for financial instruments and for banks, insurers and other financial institutions, written for those who analyze them
Greenwald, Kahn, Bellissimo, Cooper and Santos (2020). Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond, 2nd ed. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis The Graham and Dodd approach set out as a valuation method that starts from asset value, then earnings power, then growth
Ganguin and Bilardello (2005). Fundamentals of Corporate Credit Analysis. McGraw-Hill.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis A rating agency view of corporate credit analysis: business risk, financial risk, cash flow and the structure of the debt
Staley (1997). The Art of Short Selling. Wiley.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis Case studies of how short sellers read financial statements for signs of trouble
Lev (2001). Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting. Brookings Institution Press.
Standard reference, financial statement analysis The case that accounting measures intangible investment poorly, with proposals for how to report it
Hull (2021). Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 11th. Pearson.
Standard reference, options The standard university text on how derivatives are priced, hedged and used
Natenberg (2014). Option Volatility and Pricing: Advanced Trading Strategies and Techniques, 2nd. McGraw-Hill Education.
Standard reference, options The trader's text on volatility, the sensitivities of an option position and the behavior of spreads
McMillan (2012). Options as a Strategic Investment, 5th. Prentice Hall Press.
Standard reference, options A reference on each option strategy: how it is built, what can go wrong and what to do next
Cox and Rubinstein (1985). Options Markets. Prentice-Hall.
Standard reference, options The early graduate text on how options are valued, built on the binomial model, and on how the markets work
Gatheral (2006). The Volatility Surface: A Practitioner's Guide. Wiley.
Standard reference, options How stochastic volatility, local volatility and jumps shape the implied volatility surface
Taleb (1997). Dynamic Hedging: Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options. Wiley.
Standard reference, options A trader's account of hedging option books in practice, where the textbook assumptions fail
Sinclair (2013). Volatility Trading, 2nd. Wiley.
Standard reference, options Measuring and forecasting volatility, and sizing and managing trades on the gap between implied and realized volatility
Sinclair (2010). Option Trading: Pricing and Volatility Strategies and Techniques. Wiley.
Standard reference, options Pricing, hedging and risk from the standpoint of someone who trades options for a living
Bennett (2014). Trading Volatility: Trading Volatility, Correlation, Term Structure and Skew. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Standard reference, options A practitioner's guide to volatility, correlation, term structure and skew trades, including variance swaps
Rebonato (2004). Volatility and Correlation: The Perfect Hedger and the Fox, 2nd. Wiley.
Standard reference, options What a model's volatility and correlation inputs mean for someone who has to hedge with it
Wilmott (2006). Paul Wilmott on Quantitative Finance, 2nd, three volumes. Wiley.
Standard reference, options A broad reference on the mathematics of pricing and hedging derivatives
Passarelli (2012). Trading Options Greeks: How Time, Volatility, and Other Pricing Factors Drive Profits, 2nd. Bloomberg Press (Wiley).
Standard reference, options How delta, gamma, theta and vega drive the profit and loss of common option positions
Derman and Miller (2016). The Volatility Smile. Wiley.
Standard reference, options Why the smile exists and how local volatility, stochastic volatility and jump models try to explain it
Bergomi (2016). Stochastic Volatility Modeling. Chapman and Hall/CRC.
Standard reference, options How stochastic volatility models are chosen and used to price and hedge equity derivatives
Graham (2003). The Intelligent Investor: A Book of Practical Counsel, Revised edition, updated with new commentary by Jason Zweig (first published 1949). HarperBusiness Essentials.
Standard reference, investment strategy The statement of value investing for the general reader: the margin of safety, the line between investment and speculation, and the investor's own behavior as the main risk
Grinold and Kahn (2000). Active Portfolio Management: A Quantitative Approach for Producing Superior Returns and Controlling Risk, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill.
Standard reference, investment strategy The standard text on quantitative active management: the information ratio, the fundamental law of active management, forecasting, portfolio construction and transaction costs
Ilmanen (2011). Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards. Wiley.
Standard reference, investment strategy A reference on what drives expected returns across asset classes, strategy styles and risk factors, from historical returns, theory and forward-looking indicators
Ilmanen (2022). Investing Amid Low Expected Returns: Making the Most When Markets Offer the Least. Wiley.
Standard reference, investment strategy What an investor can do when starting yields and valuations imply low returns: which premia to harvest, how to diversify, and how to manage risk and cost
Ang (2014). Asset Management: A Systematic Approach to Factor Investing. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy Treats asset classes as bundles of underlying factors, and builds portfolio choice, delegated management and the evaluation of funds on that view
Pedersen (2015). Efficiently Inefficient: How Smart Money Invests and Market Prices Are Determined. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy How hedge fund strategies work, from equity and macro to arbitrage, on the view that markets are inefficient enough to pay those who make them efficient
Swensen (2009). Pioneering Portfolio Management: An Unconventional Approach to Institutional Investment, Fully revised and updated (2nd ed.; first published 2000). Free Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy The endowment model as its architect described it: an equity orientation, diversification into illiquid and alternative assets, and the conditions under which active management can pay
Marks (2011). The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor. Columbia University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy A practitioner on risk, market cycles, the price paid as the source of risk, and thinking that differs from the consensus
Malkiel (2023). A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Best Investment Guide That Money Can Buy, 13th ed. (first published 1973). W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, investment strategy The case for efficient markets and index funds, written for the general investor
Bernstein (1992). Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street. Free Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy A history of how portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing model, efficient markets and option pricing moved from universities into practice
Thorp (2017). A Man for All Markets: From Las Vegas to Wall Street, How I Beat the Dealer and the Market. Random House.
Standard reference, investment strategy A memoir by the mathematician who applied the Kelly criterion to blackjack and then to a hedge fund: edge, sizing and risk from the practitioner's side
MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (editors) (2011). The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Criterion: Theory and Practice. World Scientific.
Standard reference, investment strategy The collected papers on growth-optimal investing, including Latane, Samuelson and Thorp, for anyone who needs the sources behind the Kelly criterion and the objections to it
Mauboussin (2012). The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports, and Investing. Harvard Business Review Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy How to tell skill from luck in an activity, and what the mix implies for judging a track record
Campbell and Viceira (2002). Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term Investors. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy Portfolio choice for investors with long horizons, where changing expected returns, inflation and labor income alter what is safe and what is risky
Cochrane (2005). Asset Pricing, Revised edition (first edition 2001). Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy The graduate text that organizes asset pricing around the stochastic discount factor, from the theory to the empirical methods used to test it
López de Prado (2018). Advances in Financial Machine Learning. Wiley.
Standard reference, investment strategy Methods for applying machine learning to financial data: labeling, cross-validation that avoids leakage, backtest overfitting and bet sizing
Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002). Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy Long-run returns on stocks, bonds and bills across many countries, the base for estimates of the equity premium that are not drawn from the United States alone
Siegel (2022). Stocks for the Long Run: The Definitive Guide to Financial Market Returns & Long-Term Investment Strategies, 6th ed. (first published 1994). McGraw Hill.
Standard reference, investment strategy The long record of US asset returns and the argument that stocks are the best long-term holding; to be read with the later papers that question how far the record generalizes
Shiller (2015). Irrational Exuberance, Revised and expanded 3rd ed. (first published 2000). Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy The case that stock, bond and housing prices are moved by psychology and narrative beyond what fundamentals justify, with the long-run valuation data
Shleifer (2000). Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, investment strategy A short theoretical account of why arbitrage is limited and how investor sentiment moves prices
Greenblatt (2010). The Little Book That Still Beats the Market, Updated edition of The Little Book That Beats the Market. Wiley.
Standard reference, investment strategy The practitioner formula of buying good businesses at cheap prices, ranked on return on capital and earnings yield; the journal evidence on its parts is in the papers
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J. and Andelman, Bob (1997). The Profit Zone: How Strategic Business Design Will Lead You to Tomorrow's Profits. Times Business.
Standard reference, business design The profit models: the ways a business design captures value, from installed bases and de facto standards to brands, product pyramids and local leadership.
Slywotzky, Adrian J., Morrison, David J., Moser, Ted, Mundt, Kevin A. and Quella, James A. (1999). Profit Patterns: 30 Ways to Anticipate and Profit from Strategic Forces Reshaping Your Business. Times Business.
Standard reference, business design The recurring patterns by which profit moves between businesses, in seven groups: mega, value chain, customer, channel, product, knowledge and organizational.
Slywotzky, Adrian J. (2002). The Art of Profitability. Warner Business Books.
Standard reference, business design The profit models retold as lessons from a mentor to a young analyst, with digital profit added; several of its companies are invented for teaching.
Taleb (2004). Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets, 2nd ed. (first published 2001; reissued by Random House, 2005). Thomson/Texere.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin The first volume of the Incerto: luck mistaken for skill in markets and in life, survivorship, and the gap between how often a call is right and how much it makes or loses
Taleb (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., with the postscript essay On Robustness and Fragility (first published by Random House, 2007). Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin Rare events of extreme impact that are explained only after the fact; Mediocristan and Extremistan; the limits of prediction; the barbell; and, in the postscript essay, fragility, the fourth quadrant and ten principles for a society robust to such events
Taleb (2010). The Bed of Procrustes: Philosophical and Practical Aphorisms. Random House.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin Aphorisms on how people cut the world to fit their ideas: robustness and fragility, prediction, ethics and the sucker problem, in compressed form
Taleb (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Random House.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin Things that gain from volatility and stress: fragility detected as harm that accelerates with the size of a shock, optionality and the barbell, harm from intervention and via negativa, the Lindy effect, and skin in the game as an ethical rule
Taleb (2018). Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Random House.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin The fifth volume of the Incerto: why those who decide should bear the downside, how an intransigent minority can set the rules, time as the judge of experts (the Lindy effect), and the logic of ruin, where one path through time is not the average of many
Taleb (2020). Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails: Real World Preasymptotics, Epistemology, and Applications, The Technical Incerto, vol. 1 (free electronic version, arXiv 2001.10488). STEM Academic Press.
Standard reference, fat tails, fragility and ruin The technical companion: how standard statistics fail under fat tails, the law of medium numbers, the kappa metric of how much data is enough, calibration under fat tails, and the papers on wars, inequality estimation and option pricing
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (editors) (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, how people really decide The collected research on judgment heuristics and their biases, from representativeness, availability and anchoring to overconfidence, intuitive prediction and the corrective procedures for it
Kahneman and Tversky (editors) (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Russell Sage Foundation and Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, how people really decide The collected papers on prospect theory, framing and mental accounting, with applications to finance, labor supply, insurance and law, including several of the papers in this section
Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press.
Standard reference, how people really decide Choice architecture: how defaults, the order and description of options and feedback shape decisions about saving, investing, health and the environment, and the case for designs that steer without removing choice
Thaler (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, how people really decide Thaler's history of behavioral economics through his own work: the list of anomalies, the endowment effect, mental accounting and sunk costs, self-control, fairness, overreaction, closed-end funds, negative stock prices, game shows and Save More Tomorrow
Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein (2021). Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment. Little, Brown Spark.
Standard reference, how people really decide Unwanted variability in professional judgments of the same case: how to measure it with a noise audit, how it divides into level, pattern and occasion noise, and how rules, averaging and structured judgment reduce it
Thaler and Imas (2025). The Winner's Curse: Behavioral Economics Anomalies, Then and Now, Updated ed. (first published as The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life, by Thaler alone, Free Press, 1992). Simon & Schuster.
Standard reference, how people really decide Each chapter reprints one of Thaler's Anomalies columns and then asks how the finding has held up since, from the winner's curse and loss aversion to retirement saving, credit card debt and financial markets
Schumpeter (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper and Brothers.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement The argument, in its seventh chapter, The Process of Creative Destruction, that capitalism advances as new products, methods and forms of organization displace old ones from within, with the forecast that its success would undermine it
Cardwell (1972). Turning Points in Western Technology: A Study of Technology, Science and History. Science History Publications.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement A history of Western technology and its ties to science from the seventeenth century to the twentieth, in which Cardwell observed that no nation stays technologically creative for more than a short span of history, the remark Mokyr named Cardwell's Law
Rosenberg (1982). Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement Essays opening the economics of technology: how technologies depend on one another, technological expectations, learning by using, how far science drives invention, and the market forces that direct innovation
Mokyr (1990). The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement A history of technological creativity from classical antiquity to the industrial age and an analysis of why some societies keep inventing while others stall, where Mokyr names Cardwell's Law and sets Europe's political fragmentation against China
Aghion and Howitt (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. MIT Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement The graduate treatise on growth through innovation: the Schumpeterian approach, growth and unemployment, market structure, cycles, education, open economies, tests of the theory, and how research is organized and supported
Mokyr (2002). The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement How useful knowledge grew and spread from the eighteenth century: knowledge of what and knowledge of how, the base of understanding on which a technique rests, the cost of access to knowledge, the Industrial Enlightenment, and the resistance new techniques meet
Aghion and Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. MIT Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement A graduate textbook of growth theory built around the Schumpeterian model of creative destruction, with chapters on general purpose technologies, technology transfer, and competition and entry, including the inverted U
Mokyr (2009). The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850. Yale University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement An economic history of Britain from 1700 to 1850 that gives the ideas and institutions of the Enlightenment a central place in explaining why the Industrial Revolution began there
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011). Race Against the Machine: How the Digital Revolution Is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy. Digital Frontier Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement A short book on how digital technology affects employment and the economy: technology on the second half of the chessboard, creative destruction and disappearing jobs, and prescriptions for keeping up
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement How digital technologies, improving exponentially and recombining, raise the bounty of production while widening the spread of its rewards, why productivity gains lag a general purpose technology, and how people and policy might race with machines
Gordon (2016). The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement The case that the great inventions of roughly 1870 to 1970 raised American living standards as later innovation has not, so that growth has slowed, a counterpoint to the technological optimists
Mokyr (2016). A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement Why sustained growth began in Europe: cultural entrepreneurs such as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, a competitive market for ideas across a politically fragmented continent, and the Republic of Letters, with China as the comparison
McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2017). Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future. W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement Three rebalancings brought by digital technology, between minds and machines, products and platforms, and a company's core and the crowd outside it, and how organizations adjust to each
Aghion, Antonin and Bunel (2021). The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations, translated by Jodie Cohen-Tanugi from the French (Odile Jacob, 2020). Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Standard reference, innovation, productivity and displacement Growth through creative destruction for general readers: technological revolutions and jobs, competition and innovation, inequality and taxation, secular stagnation, financing innovation, globalization, and the investor state and insurer state
Teece (1976). The Multinational Corporation and the Resource Cost of International Technology Transfer. Ballinger.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities A study of how US multinational corporations transfer technology abroad, by licensing to independent firms and governments and through joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries, and of the level and determinants of the resource cost of transfer, with data on twenty-nine projects
Teece (editor) (1987). The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal. Ballinger.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities The Transamerica lectures in corporate strategy at the University of California, Berkeley, with chapters by Michael Porter, Kim Clark, Steven Wheelwright, Paul Lawrence, Jeffrey Pfeffer, Richard Rumelt, Sidney Winter and Karl Weick, and Teece's chapter on profiting from technological innovation
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (editors) (1994). Fundamental Issues in Strategy: A Research Agenda. Harvard Business School Press.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities A volume of essays, edited by Richard Rumelt, Dan Schendel and David Teece, setting out a research agenda for strategic management
Teece (2000). Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities Teece's Clarendon lectures on managing knowledge assets: the knowledge economy, governance modes and innovation, market entry strategies for innovators (Chapter 5, the profiting from innovation framework), imitation strategies for owners of complementary assets, outsourcing, licensing and antitrust, with cases on semiconductors and Pilkington's float glass process
Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter (2007). Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organizations. Blackwell.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities A short book defining a dynamic capability as an organization's capacity to create, extend or modify its resource base, with examples from alliances, acquisitions and management, the idea of dynamic managerial capabilities, and empirical measures for testing the concept
Teece (2009). Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: Organizing for Innovation and Growth. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, profiting from innovation and dynamic capabilities Teece's book on dynamic capabilities: their nature and microfoundations (Chapter 1, as in the 2007 article), the entrepreneurial function of the manager, their foundations and Penrose effects (with Mie Augier), the multinational enterprise, management and enterprise in economic development, and competition in regimes of rapid technological change
Sun Tzu (1910). Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World, Translated from the Chinese with introduction and critical notes by Lionel Giles. Luzac and Co.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them The thirteen chapters, from laying plans and waging war to the nine situations, attack by fire and the use of spies, with an introduction on Sun Wu and his book, the Chinese commentators, critical notes and a Chinese concordance
Sun Tzu (1963). The Art of War, Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart; UNESCO Collection of Representative Works. Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press).
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them A translation with an explanatory introduction and selected commentaries, treating the planning and conduct of military operations along with their economic, political and psychological factors
Clausewitz (1976). On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (revised 1984). Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them Clausewitz's attempt to understand war in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy, in the standard English edition, with essays by Paret, Howard and Bernard Brodie and Brodie's guide to reading the book
Boulding (1962). Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. Harper and Brothers.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them A general theory of conflict across social life: static and dynamic models, game theory, viability, ecological and epidemiological models, economic, industrial, international and ideological conflict, its control and resolution, and the breakdown of national defense under nuclear weapons
Richardson (1960). Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, Edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. Boxwood Press (Pittsburgh) and Quadrangle Books (Chicago).
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them Richardson's differential equations of the arms race, in which each nation arms in response to its rival, is checked by the burden of its own arms and is driven by grievances, fitted to the armament races before both world wars
Handel (2001). Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd revised and expanded ed. Frank Cass.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them A close textual comparison of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Mao, and to a lesser extent Jomini and Machiavelli, on ends and means, the center of gravity, victory without bloodshed, numerical superiority, deception and intelligence, and war termination
Biddle (2004). Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them Argues that force employment, the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is used, has been central to victory and defeat since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weapons, and tests the account with several methods against views centered on numbers and technology
Dupuy (1987). Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat. Paragon House.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them An attempt at a general, quantified theory of combat drawn from military history, built around Dupuy's quantified judgment model, the timeless verities of combat, and commentary on Clausewitz, Jomini and Fuller and on suppressive fire
Epstein (1985). The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory. Brookings Institution.
Standard reference, contests, wars and the bargain behind them Argues that the Lanchester equations fail to capture the basic dynamics of warfare and give an implausible picture of combat, and offers alternative equations for assessing conventional balances dynamically
Williamson (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. Free Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models Transaction cost economics in full: asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism, the governance of contractual relations, vertical integration and its limits, the employment relation, corporate governance and antitrust
Hart (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press).
Standard reference, Nobel models The property rights approach to the firm: incomplete contracts, residual control rights and asset ownership, then their application to debt, equity and the financial structure of companies
Evans and Schmalensee (2016). Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms. Harvard Business Review Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models How platforms that serve two or more groups of customers start, price and grow, from payment cards and operating systems to ride hailing, with the ignition problem and the pricing of each side
Tirole (2017). Economics for the Common Good, Translated by Steven Rendall. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models Tirole's account for general readers of market failures and regulation, with chapters on the digital economy and two-sided platforms, competition policy and the economist's role in public decisions
Bagehot (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Henry S. King and Co.
Standard reference, Nobel models The Victorian money market described from inside: the Bank of England's reserve, how a panic spreads from bank to bank, and the rule that in a panic the central bank should lend freely at a high rate on good security
Shiller (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models The epidemiology of economic stories, with nine perennial narratives from the gold standard to bitcoin, and the case that contagious narratives help explain booms, depressions and bubbles
Haskel and Westlake (2017). Capitalism without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models Intangible investment and its four properties, scalability, sunkenness, spillovers and synergies, and what they do to inequality, the measurement of productivity, finance and management
Shapiro and Varian (1999). Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Harvard Business School Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models The economics of information goods, high fixed cost and near-zero marginal cost, with versioning, lock-in, network effects, standards wars and the pricing that follows
Warsh (2006). Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery. W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, Nobel models The history of growth theory from Adam Smith's pin factory to Romer's 1990 paper, told around the puzzle of increasing returns and the nonrivalry of knowledge
Perrow (1984). Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books.
Standard reference, Nobel models Why systems that are both complex and tightly coupled, nuclear plants, chemical works, aircraft and shipping, produce accidents from small failures that interact in unexpected ways, with the Three Mile Island case
von Storch and Zwiers (1999). Statistical Analysis in Climate Research. Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models The statistical methods of climate science, including the detection of climate change signals in natural variability by optimal fingerprinting, time series analysis and the testing of hypotheses with correlated data
Pissarides (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd ed. MIT Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models The matching model of unemployment in one treatment: the matching function, job creation and destruction, wage bargaining, the Beveridge curve and labor market policy
Mezard, Parisi and Virasoro (1987). Spin Glass Theory and Beyond. World Scientific.
Standard reference, Nobel models The replica method and Parisi's solution of the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model, the many-valley structure of the spin-glass phase, and applications to optimization and neural networks, with reprints of the original papers
Kauffman (1993). The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University Press.
Standard reference, Nobel models Adaptation on rugged fitness landscapes, the NK model and the complexity catastrophe, Boolean networks and the order that arises in them, and self-organization as a partner of selection in evolution
Ross (1911). The Prevention of Malaria, 2nd ed. John Murray.
Standard reference, Nobel models Ross's treatise on malaria and its prevention, with the addendum setting out his mathematical theory of happenings, from which the first threshold for an epidemic to die out was derived
Tocqueville (1856). The Old Regime and the Revolution. Michel Levy Freres, Paris; English translation by John Bonner, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1856.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Book III, chapter 4 (chapter 16 in the English translations of 1856): France grew more prosperous under Louis XVI, the districts that progressed most became the chief theater of the Revolution, and the most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually when it begins to reform
Gurr (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Relative deprivation, the gap between what people believe they are entitled to and what they think they can get, as the root of political violence, with the decremental, aspirational and progressive patterns of deprivation
Tilly (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen The alternative to the grievance account of rebellion: interests, organization, mobilization of resources and opportunity, with repression and the struggle for power at the center
Runciman (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Relative deprivation measured against a chosen reference group, with a survey of how British workers compared themselves with others
Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949). The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Volume 1. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen The wartime surveys in which the phrase relative deprivation was coined: soldiers in branches with faster promotion were less satisfied with their chances of promotion
Helson (1964). Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach to Behavior. Harper and Row.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen The adaptation level, a pooled average of past and present stimulation against which each new stimulus is judged, and the experiments that support it
Appley, editor (1971). Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium. Academic Press.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Holds Brickman and Campbell, Hedonic relativism and planning the good society, pages 287 to 302, which coined the hedonic treadmill: gains raise the adaptation level, so satisfaction returns toward neutral
Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, editors (1999). Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. Russell Sage Foundation.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Holds Frederick and Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, pages 302 to 329, the review of what people adapt to, how fast and how far, and of the mechanisms that produce adaptation
Bastiat (1850). That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen. Guillaumin, Paris; English translation in Selected Essays on Political Economy, Foundation for Economic Education, 1964.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen The broken window and its lesson: an act produces effects that are seen and effects that are not, and the good economist weighs both, including the use the money would otherwise have found
Chase, editor (1968). Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis. Brookings Institution.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Holds Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, which distinguished an identified life from a statistical one and proposed valuing a small reduction in the risk of death by what people would pay for it
David and Reder, editors (1974). Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz. Academic Press.
Standard reference, expectations, adaptation, memory and the unseen Holds Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?, the origin of the Easterlin paradox: within a country richer people are happier, yet average happiness did not rise as the country grew richer
Girard (1972). Violence and the Sacred. Grasset, Paris; English translation by Patrick Gregory, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor Rivalry spreads by imitation until a community resolves its crisis by turning, all together, on one victim; the unanimity of the blame, not the victim's guilt, restores the peace
Girard (1982). The Scapegoat. Grasset, Paris; English translation by Yvonne Freccero, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor How accounts of persecution can be read from the persecutors' side: the crisis, the accusation, the signs that mark a victim, and the violence presented as justice
Silverglate (2009). Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent. Encounter Books.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor Argues that federal criminal law has grown so broad and vague that an ordinary professional may break it several times a day without knowing it, which leaves the choice of whom to pursue with the prosecutor
Carpenter and Moss, editors (2014). Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It. Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor Essays that test the theory of capture against the record, distinguish strong capture from weak, and set out how capture can be detected, measured and limited
Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967). Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. W. W. Norton.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor Communication as behavior with rules: every message carries content and a claim about the relationship, and paradoxical injunctions, the double bind among them, can be escaped only by stepping outside the frame
Hood (2011). The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, watchers, rule-makers, scapegoats and the seat of honor The strategies officials and organizations use to avoid blame, presentational, agency and policy, and what they cost in accountability and in the quality of public services
Popper (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London (first published in German as Logik der Forschung, 1934).
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests A theory is scientific if it forbids something and so can be refuted by a test; corroboration measures how severely a theory has been tested and survived, never how probable it is
Duhem (1906). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton University Press, 1954 (translated by Philip Wiener from La theorie physique, 1906).
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests An experiment tests a group of hypotheses together with the instruments and assumptions behind it, so a failed prediction does not say which part to give up
Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press (contains Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, pp. 91-196).
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests Lakatos treats a research programme as a hard core protected by auxiliary assumptions and asks whether its changes predict new facts or merely patch old failures
Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests Normal science works inside a paradigm and treats a failed prediction as a puzzle to solve; only an accumulation of anomalies that no revision absorbs opens a crisis
Tetlock (2005). Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests Experts' forecasts, once made specific enough to score, were hard to tell from chance at long horizons, and the experts rarely changed their minds when wrong
Mayo (2018). Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars. Cambridge University Press.
Standard reference, falsification and severe tests Argues that evidence supports a claim only to the extent that the claim has survived a probe that would probably have exposed its error
Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Free Press, New York (reprints Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, Mind, 1945, with a postscript).
Standard reference, the raven paradox Hempel's essays on confirmation and explanation, including the paper that set out the paradox of the ravens: if every black raven confirms that all ravens are black, then every non-black non-raven seems to confirm it too
Goodman (1955). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Standard reference, the raven paradox Poses the new riddle of induction: every emerald seen so far is green and also grue (green if seen before a set date, blue otherwise), so the evidence alone cannot say which predicate to project
Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Standard reference, the raven paradox Contains Natural Kinds, which argues that induction projects only natural kinds and that the complement of a kind, such as non-black or non-raven, is not one, which is one reason a white shoe seems irrelevant to ravens
Woodford (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize The book behind the prize: a model of households and price-setting firms whose spending and prices depend on the expected path of the policy rate, with an interest rate rule as the third equation
Gali (2015). Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework and Its Applications. Princeton University Press, second edition.
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize A textbook derivation of the three-equation New Keynesian model, its rate rules and its policy exercises
Wicksell (1898). Interest and Prices: A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money. Macmillan, London, 1936 (translated by R. F. Kahn from Geldzins und Gueterpreise, 1898).
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize Prices rise when the bank rate sits below the natural rate that equates saving and investment, and fall when it sits above
Friedman (1957). A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton University Press for the NBER.
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize Households spend out of permanent income, so a transitory change in income moves spending far less than a lasting one
Cochrane (2023). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Princeton University Press.
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize A full account of the view that the price level equates the real value of government debt with the present value of surpluses, with its history and its objections
Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Tax Policy and Investment Behavior. American Economic Review 57(3), 391-414 (not indexed at Crossref).
Standard reference, the 2026 economics prize Derives the yearly rental cost of owning capital from the price of the machine, the interest rate, depreciation and the tax treatment, and shows how depreciation rules and credits change it